Iraq As a Failed State Report #4

Pauline H. Baker LESSONS FROM THE JANUARY ELECTIONS Iraq as a Failed State Report #4

Pauline H. Baker The Fund for Peace 1701 K Street, NW Eleventh Floor Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 223-7940 (phone) (202) 223-7947 (fax) www.fundforpeace.org LESSONS FROM THE JANUARY ELECTIONS

Contents

PREFACE 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 INDICATOR TRENDLINE GRAPHS Graph 1: Iraq Indicator Totals 13 Graph 2: Key Events in Iraq 14 Graph 3: Indicator Trendline Graphs 15 Table 1: Iraq: Summary Indicator Ratings 18 DATA INTERPRETATION Appendix I: October Indicator Summary 19 Appendix II: November Indicator Summary 25 Appendix III: December Indicator Summary 31 Appendix IV: January Indicator Summary 37 Appendix V: February Indicator Summary 42 Appendix VI: March Indicator Summary 49 Appendix VII: April Indicator Summary 55 METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 61 LESSONS FROM THE JANUARY ELECTIONS

Preface

Although there have been many reports on Iraq, the Fund for Peace (FfP) is contributing to post-conflict Iraq analysis by providing a systematic evaluation of Iraqi progress, using specific metrics for measuring social, economic and political stabilization since the invasion in April 2003. Applying the analytical framework developed by the FfP to assess societies at risk of internal conflict and state collapse, this series of reports evaluates Iraq’s progress toward sustainable security – the stage at which the country is largely peaceful and capable of governing itself without external military or administrative oversight.1

The methodology employed is detailed in the Methodological Note at the end of this report. Briefly, it is based on independent ratings of twelve top conflict indicators enumerated in the attached charts, five core political institutions, and “stings” or unanticipated events and factors. The purpose of the ratings is to discover patterns and trends over time; a particular rating in one indicator at one point in time is less significant than changes over time. Ratings are reviewed carefully, based on information gleaned from open-source English and Arabic language sources, government reports, studies by diverse organizations and groups that had conducted site visits in Iraq, and various scholars and journalists. Detailed narratives describing the indicator trends are contained in the Appendices of this report.

Although research assistants and other staff at the FfP have contributed to the report, the conclusions are entirely the responsibility of the author, who has conducted years of research into failing states and internal war. She has been ably assisted by outstanding students who have brought creative skills, thoughtful insights, and critical minds to a topic that is highly complex and controversial.

For this report, special thanks go to Matthew Manes from Appalachian State University, Liana Wyler from Duke University and Gamze Demirtola from George Washington University. All added to the quality of the final product. Thanks also to Anne Bader, Jason Ladnier, Krista Hendry, Patricia Taft and Isaac Borocz, who helped prepare the series and offered constructive criticisms.

Pauline H. Baker August 15, 2005

1 For another application of the methodology, see the “Failed States Index” in Foreign Policy, July/August 2005, 56-65. Additional details can be obtained on the Fund for Peace website: www.fundforpeace.org.

Overview

This is the fourth report in the Fund for Peace Iraq series. In previous reports, we evaluated trends since March 2003, before the THIS IS THE FOURTH REPORT IN invasion, in a month-by-month, indicator-by-indicator assessment THE FUND FOR PEACE IRAQ at roughly six-month intervals.

SERIES. IN PREVIOUS REPORTS, The first report concluded that Iraqi institutions had decayed WE EVALUATED EVENTS SINCE considerably before the invasion and that the country was a failing MARCH 2003, BEFORE THE state at the time of the military intervention. Military action dealt INVASION, IN A MONTH-BY- the final blow that precipitated the total collapse of the state. MONTH, INDICATOR-BY- INDICATOR ASSESSMENT AT The second report found that Iraq had slipped into a “failed state syndrome,” a condition in which trends were reinforcing each ROUGHLY SIX-MONTH other to produce a spiraling conflict that was driving Iraq toward INTERVALS. Lebanonization, or sectarian civil war.

In the third report, the situation in Iraq deteriorated further. For the first time, all the twelve indicators were in alert, the most dangerous rating, reinforcing the trend toward Lebanonization. Despite vigorous efforts to quell the insurgency and generate broader political support for the interim government, the social, economic and political/military indicators got worse. Nonetheless, the political process continued to move forward, focusing mostly on holding an election in January 2005.

In this fourth report, which covers the period from October 2004 through April 20052, we continue the analysis with two other IN ADDITION TO TRACKING THE features. In addition to tracking the indicators on a monthly basis, INDICATORS ON A MONTHLY we also provide an overview of trends for the first two years of the occupation, from April 2003 to April 2005, through an enlarged BASIS, WE ALSO PROVIDE AN aggregate trendline, showing key events. This yielded interesting OVERVIEW OF TRENDS FOR THE findings, discussed below. FIRST TWO YEARS OF OCCUPATION…. WE ALSO LOOK We also look closely at the impact of the January 2005 elections, CLOSELY AT THE IMPACT OF THE widely described as a political milestone. In particular, we JANUARY 2005 ELECTIONS, examine whether three major political expectations were fulfilled. WIDELY DESCRIBED AS A In the recommendations, we review the lessons that can be drawn from this experience for the upcoming elections – on October 15 POLITICAL MILESTONE. to ratify the constitution and on December 15 to elect a full-term government. Finally, we provide a strategic recommendation that is essential if the insurgency is to be subdued and the trend toward civil conflict is to be averted.

2 In this report, an additional month was added to the usual six-month interval to incorporate data on the establishment of the new government and the National Assembly.

Findings

· Since April 2004, all twelve indicators have remained in alert, the most dangerous zone. This has been the pattern for a full year. Although there was a slight SINCE APRIL 2004, ALL TWELVE improvement in economic conditions following the INDICATORS HAVE REMAINED IN January elections, overall progress was not sustained. ALERT, THE MOST DANGEROUS ZONE. THIS HAS BEEN THE · Most disturbingly, a review of trends since the PATTERN FOR A FULL YEAR. beginning of the occupation reveals an apparent linkage between progress in democratization and a worsening of the ratings. At important times – when the Interim Governing Council was established (June 13, 2003), when Saddam Hussein was captured (March 2, 2004), when the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1546 that transferred sovereignty to the interim government (June 8, 2004) and when official results of the January elections were announced (February 13, 2005) – the indicator ratings shot up THE RISK OF CONFLICT sharply. (See Key Events in Iraq (Pre -war through INCREASED, RATHER THAN April 2005) p. 14) In other words, the risk of civil DECREASED, AT CRITICAL conflict increased, rather than decreased, at critical STAGES OF THE POLITICAL stages of the political process when things were PROCESS, WHEN THINGS WERE expected to improve.

EXPECTED TO IMPROVE. · There are two possible interpretations of this seeming paradox. One is that democratization itself is driving conflict because jihadists and disgruntled Baathists oppose democratic change. This may be true of fundamentalists who want a theocratic state, but it is not a universal view of the Sunni population, where the heart of the insurgency lies. Many Sunni civilians want the insurgency to end. A second, more likely, explanation is that the failure to effectively incorporate THE FAILURE TO EFFECTIVELY a broad range of Sunni leaders into the political INCORPORATE A BROAD RANGE process is driving conflict because, in the eyes of Iraq’s traditional ruling group, the process is heading toward OF SUNNI LEADERS INTO THE Shiite domination with Kurdish collaboration and/or POLITICAL PROCESS IS DRIVING autonomy, an outcome that will result in permanent CONFLICT. Sunni exclusion from power.

· Pre -electoral political expectations of the impact of polls were only partially achieved. The hope that political legitimacy would be enhanced was fulfilled insofar as a new transitional government was elected by Shiites and Kurds, but Sunnis regarded the process as illegitimate and largely stayed away from the polls.

· The election failed to fulfill two other major goals: quelling the insurgency and reducing sectarian polarization. In fact, elections may have intensified both. The insurgency expanded to target more civilians , mainly Shiites, and violence intensified against the police and security forces. Since party organization and voting was along ethnic/religious THE ELECTION FAILED TO lines, sectarian divisions in the society were reflected in the political parties that gained seats in the National FULFULL TWO OTHER MAJOR Assembly and in the composition of the transition GOALS: QUELLING THE government. Rather than mitigating the ethnically INSURGENCY AND REDUCING charged political atmosphere, the election exposed the SECTARIAN POLARIZATION…. depth of the fault lines. RATHER THAN MITIGATING THE ETHNICALLY CHARGED Lessons from the January Elections

POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE, THE Conditions in Iraq were far from favorable for elections in January ELECTION EXPOSED THE DEPTH 30, 2005. All twelve indicators were in alert, the insurgency was OF THE FAULT LINES. continuing unabated, and many candidates and parties had to forego campaigning for security reasons. That made the turnout on election day all the more remarkable. Voters bravely went to the polls in large numbers in most of the country and they were rightly applauded for their courage. Nonetheless, elections did not enhance sustainable security. Without measurable improvements in the underlying conflict indicators, the premature elections heightened expectations beyond the capacity of the government to fulfill them.

In order to extract lessons for future elections is it important to ALTHOUGH LETIGIMACY WAS understand the expectations that surrounded the polls by the U.S. RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONALLY government and Iraqi officials. Basically, there were three: AND AMONG THE WINNERS – PRINCIPALLY THE SHIITES AND · Elections Would Increase Political Legitimacy KURDS – THE NEWLY ELECTED There was a conviction that elections, if carried off successfully, GOVERNMENT WAS NOT SEEN AS would boost the political legitimacy of the Iraqi government and LEGITIMATE OR that the sooner this happened, the better. This expectation did not REPRESENTATIVE AMONG THE fully come to pass. Although legitimacy was recognized SUNNIS. internationally and among the winners – principally the Shiites and the Kurds – the newly elected government was not seen as legitimate or representative among the Sunnis. Before the election, leaders of the Sunni population had pleaded for a delay. Adnan Pachachi, perhaps Iraq’s most recognized Sunni politician, called for a postponement, maintaining that a few months more would have given the country time to encourage Sunnis to take part while improving security. These calls were rejected.

· Elections Would Undermine the Insurgency

Although there were expectations that violence might get worse as elections approached, many U.S. and Iraqi leaders believed that in the long-run, voting would help weaken the insurgency by showing Iraqis that they had a chance to pursue their political goals without violence and create a government with broad ATTACKS INCREASED AFTER THE popular support. But attacks increased after the elections, with ELECTIONS, WITH GREATER greater lethality and with civilians being targeted more frequently, LETHALITY AND WITH CIVILIANS in addition to foreign forces and Iraqi police and military. Instead BEING TARGETED MORE of undermining the insurgency, elections intensified the violence. FREQUENTLY, IN ADDITION TO FOREIGN FORCES AND IRAQI · Elections Would Reduce Political Polarization Among Ethnic Groups POLICE AND MILITARY. INSTEAD OF UNDERMINING THE Many thought that elections would diminish polarization among INSURGENCY, ELECTIONS the sectarian groups by providing an opportunity for everyone to INTENSIFIED THE VIOLENCE. participate in shaping their government. But the election did little to improve relations among factionalized groups – especially the Sunnis, who largely abstained from voting. After much coaxing, some Sunni leaders agreed to join the 55-member constitutional drafting committee, but as a group the Sunni population remained alienated from the process. Moreover, those moderate leaders who agreed to participate did not represent more militant factions behind the insurgency, which targeted them for attack as collaborators.

Thankfully, significant levels of violence did not, in fact, materialize on election day as expected and there was a high voter turn-out. Notwithstanding concerns about voting procedures (e.g., candidates’ identities not being disclosed due to security concerns and the entire country treated as a single electoral district), on THE LEGITIMACY OF THE balance the election was deemed a logistical success. The Shiite GOVERNMENT WAS parties won, but not by a large margin, and the Kurdish parties COMPROMISED BY THE LACK OF were over-represented. SUNNI PARTICIPATION AND THE INABILITY OF THE SECURITY The trend lines tell a more complex story. Following elections, FORCES TO CONTAIN THE there was a slight change for the better in economic conditions, as VIOLENCE. retail and construction trades boomed, financial reserves and foreign investment grew and oil exports increased in the following months. Unemployment and inflation, however, were still high and gas lines were long. Initially, there was a sense of optimism about the future and opinion polls showed that nearly 90 percent of the population felt that the country was moving in the right direction. Experts warned, however, that the legitimacy of the government was compromised by the lack of Sunni participation and the inability of the security forces to contain the violence. Political parties bickered over ministerial posts, the insurgency

intensified, the economy fell short, and within months optimism began to wane. Ethnic groups staked out rigid demands on unresolved constitutional issues, straining the political process and disillusioning the populace. Major unresolved constitutional questions over religion, women, federalism and revenue distribution hung in the balance, as the process moved at a snail’s pace. Finally, in April, three months after the elections, a government was formed. But by then, it was clear that the January OF ALL THE PROBLEMS elections had not put the country on a more secure footing; none of CONFRONTING THE COUNTRY, the indicators had significantly improved and the country’s risk of THE MOST CRITICAL IS THE civil conflict was as high as before the elections. The elections did, EXCLUSION OF SUNNIS FROM however, foreshadow more serious problems to come. THE POLITICAL PROCESS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE A HOST Conclusions OF OTHER UNRESOLVED ISSUES, Of all the problems confronting the country, the most critical is the MARGINALIZATION OF THE exclusion of Sunnis from the political process. Although there are SUNNI POPULATION IS THE a host of other unresolved issues, marginalization of the Sunni BIGGEST SINGLE FACTOR population is the biggest single factor driving the insurgency, DRIVING THE INSURGENCY. providing it with a rationale, receptivity and recruits. Experts estimate that approximately 10 percent of the insurgents are foreign; the rest are Iraqi, mostly from Sunni provinces. Many ordinary Sunnis do not support violent extremism, but they are frustrated by the absence of a meaningful channel for them to express their interests. Fragmented among tribal and clan lines with political parties based on personalities, the Sunnis are a politically dispirited population. The anti-Baathist bias that pervades the interim government and most of the Shiite population is creating profound distrust, underminin g chances of reconciliation and confidence-building needed to reach a political settlement and end the violence.

To be sure, efforts have been made to include Sunnis in government, but they have been far too little. It is not sufficient to WHAT IS NEEDED IS A SOCIAL invite 15 Sunnis (two of whom have been assassinated) to take CONTRACT BETWEEN THE part in a 55 member constitutional panel. Nor is it enough to offer SHIITES, KURDS, SUNNIS AND them a nominal share of governmental positions. Those minimal OTHER MINORITIES IN A steps for inclusion are matched by similar trends of under- representation in the police, the armed forces, the justice system COMPREHENSIVE POWER- and the civil service. SHARING FORMULA THAT ENSURES THAT EACH GROUP What is needed is a social contract between the Shiites, Kurds, HAS A STAKE IN A UNIFIED IRAQ. Sunnis and other minorities in a comprehensive power-sharing formula that ensures that each group has a stake in a unif ied Iraq. Negotiating such a formula may require altering the democratization schedule. The formula should be codified either in the constitution or in a political understanding among the major parties that they will form a government of national unity after the next round of elections.

Without such a formula, the fissures in Iraqi society will not be healed. A constitution that glosses over the hard issues may be ratified and an election for a full-term government may be held; but the lessons of the January contest suggest that if further elections take place without including the Sunnis as integral THE LESSONS OF THE JANUARY players, and without resolving key issues, such as religion, federalism, revenue sharing and women, they would likely CONTEST SUGGEST THAT IF accelerate the pace of deterioration into open civil war and FURTHER ELECTIONS TAKE national disintegration. PLACE WITHOUT INCLUDING THE SUNNIS AS INTEGRAL PLAYERS, Iraq may confront that dilemma sooner rather than later. The next AND WITHOUT RESOLVING KEY important hurdle is ratification of a constitution in October. The ISSUES… THEY WOULD LIKELY transitional administrative law states that the constitution will not be le gal if two-thirds of the voters in three of the 18 provinces vote ACCELERATE THE PACE OF against it. That gives the Sunnis a virtual veto, which they are DETERIORATION INTO OPEN likely to exercise if they turn out to vote in the upcoming elections, CIVIL WAR AND NATIONAL as they are being urged to do. If they remain angered and DISINTEGRATION. alienated, they could reject the constitution when other groups support it.

Another scenario is that the Kurds, who want to preserve their autonomy, might join the Sunnis in casting a protest vote, splintering the coalition that formed the interim government and shifting the balance of power away from the Shiites. This could happen if aggrieved voters support tribal, ethnic or religious leaders. It was a pattern evident in the January elections and is typical of electoral contests in conflicted societies generally.

Two other developments have the potential to add fuel to the conflict. First, the announced intention to withdraw U.S. and other multinational troops from certain provinces might reduce local resentment over the occupation and score political points at home, but it could also invite guerrillas to fill the vacuum. Currently, CURRENTLY, IRAQI TROOPS ARE Iraqi troops are not sufficiently prepared to take on the insurgency NOT SUFFICIENTLY PREPARED on their own; if they falter, multinational forces may have to TO TAKE ON THE INSURGENCY reoccupy areas they handed over to Iraqi forces, rekindling popular ON THEIR OWN; IF THEY FALTER, anger. MULTINATIONAL FORCES MAY HAVE TO REOCCUPY AREAS THEY The looming trial of Saddam Hussein is another imponderable that could enflame Sunni anger. Planned to begin while the HANDED OVER TO IRAQI FORCES, constitutional process is under way, it could give frustrated Sunnis REKINDLING POPULAR ANGER. a martyr figure in Saddam Hussein, a man who inspires little respect but who reminds them of their loss of power. There is a danger that Sunnis would see this as a vengeance trial designed to undermine the spirit of resistance. From a political viewpoint, it would have been preferable to try him before this year’s round of elections or to wait until next year when elections are over.

Finally, the decision of the interim government to allow the militias to operate with impunity is undermining security. It may be impractical to demilitarize the militias at the current time, but the eventual goal should be adhered to, with a plan to incorporate THE INDICATORS SUGGEST private armies into integrated units in the regular armed forces. THAT THE U.S. STRATEGY IN Independent militias allow separatist groups to shape things on the IRAQ IS HAVING A BOOMERANG ground, create “no-go” zones that challenge the authority of the EFFECT: DEMOCRATIZATION IS government, and ultimately “opt out” of the state if things do not UNWITTINGLY FUELING THE go their way. Several reports allege that militias are infiltrating the Iraqi security forces, collaborating with criminal gangs, and CONFLCIT, THE PRESENCE OF enforcing their own laws in local areas imposing stricter adherence FOREIGN FORCES IS ENFLAMING to Sharia law. Iraq will not be governable unless these ethnic and THE INSURGENCY, AND STATE- religious militias are disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated, BUILDING WITHOUT POLITICAL preferably while coalition forces are still around to oversee the INCLUSIVENESS IS DEEPENING process. SECTARIAN DIVISIONS WITHIN THE SOCIETY. Recommendations

Policy options facing the United States at this point are not simple and they contain many contradictions. The U.S. strategy is to press for parliamentary democracy, train local forces, and try to establish a governance infrastructure so American and coalition forces can go home. The indicators suggest, however, that this strategy is having a boomerang effect: democratization is unwittingly fueling the conflict, the presence of foreign forces is enflaming the GIVEN THE EXTREMELY HIGH insurgency, and state-building without political inclusiveness is LEVEL OF TENSION IN THE deepening sectarian divisions within the society. COUNTRY, DECISION MAKERS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON These contradictions are manifested in sustained high ratings of CORRECTING THE STRATEGIC the indicators, which have not substantially improved over the last IMBALANCES OF THE POLITICAL year. What is driving the conflict most is the marginalization of Sunnis, an ethnic group that analysts estimate represent 20 percent PROCESS. THE MOST DRAMATIC of the population. MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD BE FOR THE ELECTED Given the extremely high level of tension in the country, decision INTERIM GOVERNMENT TO TAKE makers should concentrate on correcting the strategic imbalances THE BOLD STEP OF NEGOTIATING of the political process. The most dramatic move in this direction A NATIONAL UNITY would be for the elected interim government to take the bold step of negotiating a national unity government with all parties GOVERNMENT WITH ALL pledging to support that coalition, no matter which one wins. This PARTIES PLEDGING TO SUPPORT does not mean that the winning party will be giving up power; it THE COALITION, NO MATTER merely means that it will be politically inclusive. Without such a WHICH ONE WINS. step, or a similar political dispensation that would guarantee a political future to the Sunnis, Iraq will continue to be a fertile environment for the insurgency.

Sunnis have been sidelined, partially by their own hand when they decided to boycott the January elections. Nonetheless, the original mistake was the comprehensive de-Baathification policy, which provoked a reaction among the Sunnis. Moreover, the boycott was not the only factor that caused Sunni disempowerment. Sunnis are ALL THE MAJOR ETHNIC AND disproportionally represented in state institutions. They are being weeded out of the judicial system in preparation for the tria l of RELIGIOUS GROUPS MUST HAVE Saddam Hussein. Rhetorically, both the U.S. government and the A CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN Iraqi transitional government have encouraged Sunnis to THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, EVEN IF participate more fully, but they have not yet been successfully IT MEANS MODIFYING THE brought in as an integral part of the political process. ELECTION SCHEDULE. THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IF A All the major ethnic and religious groups must have a chance to GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL participate in the political system, even if it means modifying the election schedule. This could be accomplished if a government of UNITY WAS ANNOUNCED IN national unity was announced in advance of legislative elections ADVANCE OF LEGISLATIVE and implemented immediately afterward. Although it would not be ELECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTED easy for Iraq, such a strategy proved to be very successful in South IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARD. Africa during the transition to majority rule in the 1990s. Drawing up a timetable for withdrawing foreign troops would also be a step in the right direction, even if that, too, had to be modified later if events required.

A government of national unity has the potential to reverse current trends. It would build political legitimacy, as all parties would automatically be participating in the government. It would pull the rug out from the insurgency; insurgents would no longer be able to FORMING A GOVERNMENT OF point to Sunni exclusion as a rationale for violence. This would leave only the very extreme elements clinging to armed resistance. NATIONAL UNITY WOULD And it would relieve sectarian tensions by including all major REQUIRE A MAJOR ACT OF identity groups in decision-making positions. STATESMANSHIP, POLITICAL WILL AND RISK-TAKING BY ALL Forming a government of national unity would require a major act PARTIES. BUT THE INDICATORS of statesmanship, political will and risk-taking by all parties. But WOULD LIKELY GO DOWN TO A the indicators would likely go down to a safer level, the country’s vulnerability to civil conflict would be reduced, and a foundation SAFER LEVEL, THE COUNTRY’S for a united Iraq would be created. VULNERABILITY TO CIVIL CONFLICT WOULD BE REDUCED, There is no guarantee that a unity government would succeed or AND A FOUNDATION FOR A last for long. To do so, there would have to be sufficient political UNITED IRAQ WOULD BE cohesion to begin delivering public goods and remaking state CREATED. institutions. Even a short-lived unity government, however, might be all that Iraq needs to get through a sensitive transition period, filled with constitutional and electoral competition. Difficult as it may be, a unity government is preferable to current trends, which are heading toward civil war.

Iraq Indicator Totals (Pre-war through April 2005)

120

110

100

Indicator Totals 50

May July May July June April June April August March August March Pre-war April-03 October February October February September November December January-04 September November December January-05 Month

91-120 Alert

Legend 61-90 Warning 31-60 Monitoring 1-30 Sustainable

Key Events in Iraq (Pre-war through April 2005)* 120

August 18, 2004 Iraqi Nat’l Conf. Selects a 115 100-seat national January 30, 2005 April 28, 2005 assembly that will act as Elections for seats Iraq’s National Assembly parliament until Jan. 2005 in the 275- approves cabinet members elections member national for all but five ministries assembly March 2, 2004 Approx. 180 die during multiple attack in December 16, 2004 Baghdad and Karbala February 28, 2005 110 Iraqi election campaign officially begins in preparation Car bomb kills for the Jan. 30 elections 122 in Hilla April 20, 2004 Iraqi leaders set up a March 19, 2003 tribunal to try Hussein Operation Iraqi and other members of Freedom begins Baath regime December 13, 2003 April 9, 2003 105 Saddam Hussein is Baghdad falls to captured by Coalition forces American troops

April 21, 2003 July 7, 2004 Coalition Provisional December 21, 2004 Indicator Totals Authority established Prime Minister Iyad Allawi signs into law broad powers Suicide bomber kills 24 that allow him to impose a people, including 22 inside a U.S. military 100 state of emergency May 1, 2003 mess hall tent February 13, 2005 President Bush Official results of announces the the elections are January 28, 2005 end of major announced June 28, 2004 Iraqi borders are combat U.S.-led coalition sealed in transfers sovereignty over preparation for March 8, 2004 to interim Iraqi gov’t the elections IGC signs an interim constitution called the 95 April 23, 2004 June 8, 2004 Transitional August 19, 2003 CPA announces the easing U.N. security council Administrative Law U.N. Headquarters of the purge of members of unanimously approves destroyed, killing 24 the Baath Party from resolution 1546, which injuring approx. 100 military and gov’t positions transfers sovereignty to an interim Iraq gov’t June 13, 2003 Interim Iraqi Governing Council is established Source: www.cfr.org 90

-03 June July -04 July -05 April May April May June April war August March August March - May July October February May July October February June September November December January April June September November December January April Pre August March August March Pre-war April-03 October October January-04 February January-05 February September November*ThisDecember graph is an enlargement of Iraq Indicator Totals (Pre-war through April 2005)September NovemberDecember The Fund For Peace, Copyright 2005 14 INDICATOR TRENDLINE GRAPHS

1.. Mountiing Demographiic Pressures 2.. Massiive Movement off Reffugees or Internalllly Diispllaced Persons

10 10

9 9

8 8

7 7

6 6

5 5 Indicator Rating Indicator Rating 4 4

3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0

May June July May June July May June July May June July March April March April March April March April Pre-war April-03 August August Pre-war April-03 August August October February October February October February October February September NovemberDecemberJanuary-04 September NovemberDecemberJanuary-05 September NovemberDecemberJanuary-04 September NovemberDecemberJanuary-05 Month Month 3.. Legacy off Vengeance-Seekiing Group 4.. Chroniic and Sustaiined Human Flliight Griievance or Group Paranoiia

10 10

9 9

8 8

7 7

6 6

5 5 Indicator Rating Indicator Rating 4 4

3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0

7-10 Alert Legend 4-6 Warning 1-3 Sustainable

5.. Uneven Economiic Devellopment Allong 6.. Sharp and/or Severe Economiic Group Liines Declliine

10 10

9 9

8 8

7 7

6 6

5 5 Indicator Rating Indicator Rating 4 4

3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0

May June July May June July May June July May June July March April March April March April March April Pre-war April-03 August August Pre-war April-03 August August October February October February October February October February September NovemberDecemberJanuary-04 September NovemberDecemberJanuary-05 September NovemberDecemberJanuary-04 September NovemberDecemberJanuary-05 Month Month 7.. Criimiinalliizatiion and/or 8.. Progressiive Deteriioratiion off Dellegiitiimiizatiion off the State Publliic Serviices

10 10

9 9

8 8

7 7

6 6

5 5 Indicator Rating Indicator Rating 4 4

3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0

May July May July May June July May June July June April June April March April March April August March August March Pre-war April-03 August August Pre-war April-03 October October October February October February January-04 February January-05 February September NovemberDecemberJanuary-04 September NovemberDecemberJanuary-05 September NovemberDecember September November December Month Month

7-10 Alert Legend 4-6 Warning 1-3 Sustainable

9.. Suspensiion or Arbiitrary Applliicatiion off 10.. Securiity Apparatus Operates as a Human Riights “State Wiithiin a State”

10 10

9 9

8 8

7 7

6 6

5 5 Indicator Rating Indicator Rating 4 4

3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0

May June July May June July May June July May June July March April March April March April March April Pre-war April-03 August August Pre-war April-03 August August October February October February October February October February September NovemberDecemberJanuary-04 September NovemberDecemberJanuary-05 September NovemberDecemberJanuary-04 September NovemberDecemberJanuary-05 Month Month 11.. Riise off Factiionalliized Elliites 12.. Interventiion off Other States or Externall Polliitiicall Actors

10 10

9 9

8 8

7 7

6 6

5 5 Indicator Rating Indicator Rating 4 4

3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0

7-10 Alert Legend 4-6 Warning 1-3 Sustainable

APPENDIX I: OCTOBER INDICATOR SUMMARY

Analysis of Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures Rating: 9

Disease in Iraq could kill more people than the military conflict, according to the Iraqi Ministry of Health. Disruption of water supplies has meant that approximately 20 percent of urban households and 50 percent of rural households do not have access to safe drinking water. Furthermore, nearly 5,000 more cases of mumps and measles than in all of 2003 were reported in the first half of the year. UNICEF estimates that approximately 6,880 children under the age of five die each year in Iraq, for a rate of 125 per 1,000 live births.3 According to a report issued by researchers at Johns Hopkins University, the risk of death from violence is 58 times higher than before the war.4 Additionally, Iraq may face a housing crisis of “catastrophic proportions” unless international aid is expedited; Iraqi officials say the country urgently needs 1.5 million new homes but lacks the proper funding to build them.5

2. Massive Movement of Refugees and IDPs Rating: 9

Iraqi Kurds continue to flee cities within the Sunni Triangle for destinations in the Kurdish-controlled north. Kurdish unemployment levels are high, however, prompting many men to go back to the Sunni areas to return to their jobs, leaving their families behind. 6 Elsewhere, 80 percent of Fallujah’s 300,000 residents have fled their city, awaiting the end of the U.S.-led onslaught on the insurgent-controlled region. 7 UNHCR resumes its voluntary repatriation program for Iraqi refugees in Iran seeking to return; officials, however, are not encouraging repatriation at this time due to the security and economic situation.8

3. Legacy of Vengeance Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia Rating: 9

The Christian community continues to be targeted by Muslim extremists in Iraq.9 In addition to bombings, Christian stores and restaurants where alcohol is sold are being banned by local governments.10 Separately, Kurds hold rallies with up to 100,000 participants in and around Kirkuk, sparking more concern about the fate of the region and potential violent ethnic conflict in northern Iraq. Arabs and Turkmen fear a Kurdish uprising in the region. 11

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight Rating: 8

So many physicians and scientists have fled the country due to threats, assassinations and kidnappings that the Iraqi Health Ministry reports that their exodus threatens to “abort scientific progress in Iraq.”12

3 “Little progress on child mortality.” IRIN. 10/11/2004. 4 “Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: Cluster sample survey.” The Lancet. 10/29/2004. 5 “UN says Iraq may face housing crisis.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 10/1/2004. 6 “Kurds continue to flee cities of Sunni Triangle.” IRIN. 10/5/2004. 7 “Fallujans Flee From US, Zarqawi fight.” The Christian Science Monitor. 10/19/2004. 8 “More Iraqis return to the south.” IRIN. 10/13/2004. 9 ”Churches bombed in Baghdad.” The Washington Post. 10/16/04. 10 Ibid. 11 “Maaoud Barzani: Kurds ready to fight for Kirkuk.” Kurdistan Observer. 10/12/2004. 12 “Insurgents widen campaign of intimidation against Iraqis.” Knight Ridder Newspapers. 10/4/2004.

Following the church bombings in Baghdad, leaders in the Christian community express concern that more Christians will flee the country. Christians make up approximately 3 percent of Iraq’s population and have no political influence, but the community accounts for 20 percent of the country’s doctors and an even greater percentage of its engineers and professors.13

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines Rating: 8

In general, Sunnis have been on the downhill path economically as well as politically, while Shiites have had better job opportunities and access to services such as health care and electricity.

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Rating: 9

Iraq’s economic recovery is facing significant obstacles in addition to the ongoing violence. Despite having the world’s second largest oil reserves, Iraq has become a net importer of fuel because of war damage and sabotage attacks on oil pipelines. The oil and fuel shortage in Iraq is so dramatic that some people use ration cards to ensure their families receive enough fuel.14

Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund predicts a postwar boom for Iraq’s economy. It predicts that gross domestic product will grow 52 percent in 2004, 17 percent in 2005 and continue to grow approximately 10 percent per year from 2006 until 2009. The Fund also predicts that oil revenue will increase significantly from $16.2 billion this year to $22 billion in 2009. 15 At the same time, the IMF makes clear that these numbers depend on the security situation in the country being brought under control and Iraq’s debt burden being solved. 16

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State Rating: 9

The Iraqi government is playing a stronger role in military decisions. Rather than being perceived as a step toward exercising full sovereignty, this is being seen by some as evidence of collaboration with the occupation, which is exerting pressure against the insurgents, especially among Sunnis. The situation in Fallujah is getting increasingly explosive as American and Iraqi forces continue their nighttime air attacks on the city, killing a large number of civilians.17 Meanwhile, Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr tells the city of Fallujah that he supports its struggle against the occupation forces and is threatening to withhold endorsement of the upcoming January elections. There is fear that a boycott or stay-at-home response by important Sunni groups and al-Sadr’s Shiite followers would raise serious questions about the legitimacy of the elections, since both groups are regarded as crucial political players in Iraq.18

According to the head of the Commission for Public Integrity, Judge Radi al-Radi, corruption in the interim Iraqi government is rampant. Hundreds of instances of administrative corruption and bribery have been revealed.19 Promotions and demotions in the ministries are handled on a personal basis and not on

13 “Iraqi Christians struggle to stay.” The Christian Science Monitor. 10/18/2004. 14 “Fuel shortages worsen as winter approaches.” Azzaman. 10/18/2004. 15 “Iraq’s set for 50% Growth in 2004.” BBC News. 10/19/2004. 16 “IMF predicts post -war boom in Iraq.” Tradearabia, 10/19/2004. 17 “They want Zarqawi. They can’t kill him so they are killing us.” The Independent. 10/17/2004. 18 “U.N. envoy warns against U.S. attack on Fallouja.” Los Angeles Times. 10/25/2004. 19 “Funds to rebuild Iraq are drifting away from target.” The Washington Post. 10/06/2 004.

qualifications. In early October, the Environment Ministry Undersecretary Ali Hanush resigns, claiming that his complaints of corruption and cronyism in the government have not been addressed.20

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services Rating: 9

Health officials report a surge in water-born diseases, particularly among Iraqi children. It appears that deteriorating sewage and drinking water networks are to blame, with untreated water inundating streets and seeping through rusty and porous water pipes. Because health officials are busy treating victims of car bombings, street fighting and violent crimes, the World Health Organization is working in conjunction with the Iraq Ministry of Environment to establish water quality control laboratories and training programs for environmental personnel. 21

A survey released by the Iraq Ministry of Education confirms that hundreds of school facilities are lacking the basic necessities to educate children. Up to 70 percent of school buildings have non- functioning water systems; other schools have been damaged by bombings, fire, or looting; and there are not enough desks, chairs, classrooms and books to accommodate the recent surge in school enrollment.22 All of Iraq’s hospitals are in urgent need of repair; suffering from 12 years of sanctions, looting following the fall of Baghdad, and a lack of investment during Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraqi officials say 100 percent of Iraq’s hospitals require rehabilitation. 23 On the positive side, some progress is being made in power generation. Total power generation in Iraq is now at 5,300 megawatts, far surpassing the 4,400 megawatts level that existed under Saddam Hussein.24

9. Suspension of Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights Rating: 9

Continuing violence without apprehension or trial of the perpetrators, including criminal gangs that are largely responsible for kidnappings, is a sign of the continuing widespread lack of law and order in Iraq. Human rights violations in prisons are alleged to be conducted by the coalition and Iraqi forces.25 The reinstated death penalty might come to be used for terrorists operating in Iraq against government forces, occupation forces or civilians. Foreign terrorists might face capital punishment, and the Iraqi Ministry of Justice is also considering trying the U.S. soldiers involved in the prison scandal in Abu Ghraib. 26

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State” Rating: 10

More than 30 guerrilla factions exist in Iraq, according to U.S. officials, with limited interaction or agreement among the groups; there is no single commander, no political wing and no predominant

20 “Analysis: Reports of rampant corruption in new Iraqi institutions.” Radio Free Europe. 10/15/2004. 21 “Water-born diseases threaten thousands in Iraq.” Azzaman. 10/6/2004. “Iraq water, sewerage set to miss out as U.S. cash shifts to security.” Agence France-Presse. 10/7/2004. “Water quality control project implemented.” IRIN. 10/5/2004. 22 “Iraq’s schools suffering from neglect and war.” UNICEF. 10/15/2004. “Lack of books affecting children’s education.” UNAMI. 10/14/2004. 23 “Iraq public health ‘key concern.’” BBC News. 10/13/2004. 24 “Capital’s electricity supply gets major boost.” IRIN. 10/27/2004. 25 “About 6.000 prisoners held in two Iraqi jails without charge.” Relief Web, 10/06/2004. “U.S.: Detained al-Qaeda suspects ‘disappeared.’” Rights Watch. 10/12/2004. “Four US Soldiers have been charged with murder in the asphyxiation death of an Iraqi general during questioning in Iraq last year.” Al-Jazeera. 10/05/2004. 26 “Iraqi Mujahedin may face death penalty.” Al-Jazeera. 10/25/2004.

group. 27 Insurgents from all the diverse groups are widening their intimidation campaign to include virtually anyone who is employed by coalition forces, Western companies, or the interim government. Intimidation tactics deepen the sense that no one in Iraq is safe, undermine reconstruction efforts, and make it more difficult to establish the legitimacy of a new Iraqi government.28 Officials believe that the militant groups are receiving expansive funding from several sources, including an underground network operated by former Baath party members, relatives of Saddam Hussein, wealthy Saudi doctors and Islamic charities that send funds through Syria.29 Furthermore, evidence of widespread infiltration of the Iraqi military forces by insurgents is mounting; an adviser to interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi says up to 5 percent of Iraqi troops are actually insurgents who have infiltrated the system.30

Recent evidence suggests that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s militant group is expanding its network after having pledged its allegiance to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. The organization’s banner has recently been seen flying in Samarra, Ramadi and Baghdad, cities outside its original Fallujah headquarters.31 Meanwhile, followers of Muqtada al-Sadr are handing in some of their weapons, which include grenade launchers, mortar shells and machine guns, in exchange for cash. The deal, which also includes $500 million in aid to Sadr City and the release of some imprisoned al-Sadr loyalists, is meant to end all hostilities in the area, including the cessation of Mahdi Army attacks on U.S. forces and nightly air strikes by American pla nes.32 Observers, however, question whether all arms are being handed in and doubt that this suggests that the Mahdi Army is being disbanded, as Muqtada al-Sadr has shifted political positions frequently in the past, often reversing himself when circumstances change.

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites Rating: 9

A new poll conducted by the International Republican Institute concludes that the leaders of Iraq’s religious parties would have won the elections if they had been held in October 2004. The poll also suggests that the U.S.-backed government under Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi is losing political ground; only 41 percent of the Iraqi population believes that their country is heading in the right direction, and only 43 percent believe 5he current government is effective in working for the benefit of Iraq.33 Muqtada al-Sadr, who supports an Iranian-style theocratic state and a winner-takes-all model for the election, is considering entering politics to compete in the elections in January. There are concerns that a single Shiite-based government may create a one party state and leave the Kurds and Sunnis out of the picture.34 Al Sadr’s Shiite rival, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has issued a strong statement in favor of the elections.35

12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors Rating: 10

External actors are playing a large role on both sides of the political divide in Iraq, including the insurgency. Yet, many Iraqi insurgents in Fallujah are turning against foreign fighters—particularly Abu

27 “U.S. Faces complex insurgency in Iraq.” The Associated Press. 10/4/2004. 28 “Insurgents widen campaign of intimidation against Iraqis.” Knight Ridder Newspapers. 10/4/2004. 29 “Estimates by U.S. see more rebels with more funds.” The New York Times. 10/22/2004. 30 “Inquiry into ambush opens; Iraqi forces feared infiltrated.” The New York Times. 10/26/2004. 31 “Zarqawi Movement Vows al-Qaeda Allegiance.” The Associated Press. 10/18/2004. 32 “Sadr fighters disarm, again.” The Christian Science Monitor. 10/12/2004. “Iraqi officials plan to extend buying of arms.” The New York Times. 10/18/2004. 33 “Religious leaders ahead in Iraq poll.” The Washington Post. 10/22/04. 34 “Al-Sadr wants winner-take-all.” Newsday. 10/13/2004. 35 “Upcoming ballot is seen as an opportunity to secure power and influence for majority faction.” Kurdish Media. 10/28/2004.

Musab al-Zarqawi, who wants to continue fighting despite local unwillingness to sustain more damage to their cities. Disputes over this matter, and other tactics, such as beheading hostages, have led Iraqis to kill at least five foreign Arabs in recent weeks.36 The U.S. plans to keep its forces “out of immediate sight” in many regions of Iraq during the January elections; in doing so, officials hope to encourage broad participation without having the military completely withdraw from cities and towns.37 Separately, Saudi and Iraqi officials reveal that President George W. Bush turned down a plan last month for a Muslim peacekeeping force intended to assist the United Nations in organizing elections because the group refused to work under U.S. command.38

The coalition forces and the Iraqi government are also trying to obtain more military support from other external actors. NATO has agreed to send hundreds of military advisers to Iraq to train local security forces.39 Increased participation by the U.N. in monitoring the upcoming January election would be useful, both for technical support and political legitimacy. The United States is counting on the U.N. to play a large role in the voting process, but the U.N. concluded that the ongoing insurgency makes it too dangerous for foreign election workers and is working through Iraqi workers.40 Separately, Poland’s prime minister has announced that his country will remove its troops from Iraq early next year. If Poland withdraws, it would be the second major European nation to remove its troops from Iraq, after Spain.41 Thailand, Singapore and Hungary have also left the coalition while New Zealand, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic will withdraw their troops next March.42

Core 5

1. Police

In its current state, the Iraqi police force is not capable to secure the country for the January elections. U.S. officials estimate that the additional 10,000 troops needed in the city will not be trained and ready until spring or summer 2005. 43 Separately, the Iraq Ministry of Interior is creating special “police commando battalions” that will add immediate “strike-force capacity” to Iraq’s police forces. The battalions will be made up of highly vetted Iraqi officers and servicemen, the battalions have already performed with distinction in insurgent hotbeds.44

2. Leadership

Support for the interim Iraqi government is steadily decreasing, according to a survey conducted by the International Republican Institute.45 Coalitions between political parties, mainly along ethnic lines, are forming across the country as groups begin to prepare for the January elections. 46 The splitting of political parties along ethnic lines is being viewed by prominent analysts as a warning that the legitimacy of the upcoming election could be in question if all ethnic groups do not participate.47

36 “Insurgent alliance is fraying in Fallujah.” The Washington Post. 10/13/2004. 37 “US forces likely to maintain low profile during Iraq elections.” Financial Times. 10/26/2004. 38 “Muslim peacekeepers for Iraq nixed.” Newsday. 10/18/2004. 39 “NATO consensus on training.” IRIN. 10/18/2004. “NATO obstacles delay training of Iraqi force.” The New York Times. 10/7/2004. 40 “U.N. aide sSays Iraqi elections are on target.” The New York Times. 10/22/2004. 41 “Poland to cut Iraq troops in early ’05.” United Press International. 10/15/2004. 42 “No ill will – The coalition of the willing is thinning.” The Indian Times, 11/17/2004. 43 “Baghdad’s Persistent Police Shortage to Continue Until Summer, U.S. General Says.” Associated Press. 10/19/2004. 44 “Iraqis Train as Police Commandos.” Trade Arabia . 10/21/2004. 45 “U.S.-Backed Iraqi Governemnt Losing Support: Survey.” Reuters. 10/24/2004. “Spinning Iraqi Opinion at Taxpayer Expense.” 10/25/2004. 46 “Political Maneuvering in Kirkuk.” Institute for War and Peace Reporting. 10/28/2004. 47 “Iraq: Can Local Governance Save Central Government?” International Crisis Group. 10/27/2004.

3. Civil Service

Corruption in the civil service, especially in lower administrational levels, continues, and public services are lagging.

4. Judiciary

Judges and prosecutors involved in the Iraqi Special Tribunal to try Saddam Hussein and other former Baathist leaders are not prepared to administer full-fledged trials. Iraqi and Western advisors say they lack familiarity with international law with regard to mass killing and genocide, Iraqi and Western advisors say. United Nations officials are also criticizing the tribunal’s inclusion of the death penalty and its alleged failure to meet the minimum “standards of justice.”48

5. Military

The Iraqi military is not at its optimal strength, suffering from insufficient manpower and equipment to deal with the hostile insurgency. Pentagon officials hope that the Iraqi military will reach its full strength of 250,000 trained and equipped soldiers by mid-2005, although independent analysts are less optimistic.49 Although some experts claim that the military has been turning out better-trained, combat- ready soldiers since last June, others point out many issues that continue to plague the fledgling security forces, including insufficient equipment and that insurgents have infiltrated the Iraqi forces.50

STINGS

¨ The top aide to rebel Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr announces that al-Sadr’s militiamen will hand over their weapons as part of a peace initiative in Baghdad's Sadr City and other areas.

48 “U.N. Refuses to Assist Iraqis With War Crimes Trials.” The Washington Post. 10/23/2004. 49 “Training Iraqi Forces.” Council on Foreign Relations. 10/7/2004. “Iraqi Forces May Need Five Years, Report Says.” The Guardian. 10/19/2004. 50 “Training Iraqi Forces.” Council on Foreign Relations. 10/7/2004.

Analysis of Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures Rating: 9

The quality of life remains low in Iraq after nearly 17 months of U.S. occupation. A recent study finds that 11 percent of Iraqi families live in abject poverty and 5.8 million continue to rely almost exclusively on government rations. Returning refugees in particular, find it difficult to reestablish their old lives; houses have been destroyed, job opportunities are sparse and threats of deportation are common.51 Several reports also cite growing concerns about the spread of disease, death and psychological trauma among children. 52 Another recently released report details the number of Iraqi casualties of war over the previous six months. According to the report, 3,438 Iraqis were killed and 15,517 injured as a result of terrorist attacks and military operations. Ninety percent of those killed and injured are men; most of the casualties are in the Anbar, Najaf and Baquba governorates.53

2. Massive Movement of Refugees and IDPs Rating: 9

More than 240,000 Iraqi refugees have returned to southern Iraq this year. Many who have returned are living in substandard conditions where old homes were demolished and jobs are scarce. Officials acknowledge the housing shortage and are planning to build 300,000 new units across the country.54 In retaliation, approximately 30 to 35 percent of Iranian Kurdish refugees at the Al Tash camp in Iraq have fled due to fighting around the region. 55 An estimated 70 percent of the residents of Fallujah, a city of 300,000 people , remain displaced after the U.S. -led operation in their city. While many find temporary shelter with friends and family members, others reside in crowded camps where conditions are far below satisfactory standards of living.56

3. Legacy of Vengeance Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia Rating: 9

Threats against Christians in Iraq increase during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan as Christians fear they will be driven out of the country. Armed groups are allegedly forcing Christians to adhere to Isla mic rules and forcing real estate offices from serving Christians.57 The Kurdish population is also being targeted, with militants threatening Kurdish restaurant owners who want to remain open during the Ramadan fasting. Other prominent Kurds in the city have been victims of kidnappings and assassinations.58 As a recent assassination spree of Kurdish Iraqi soldiers further deepens ethnic tensions, Kurdish leaders are devising strategies on how to create an autonomous Kurdish region.59

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight

51 “Focus on returnees from Iran in the south.” IRIN. 11/11/2004. 52 “5.8 million Iraqis still lack enough food.” Azzaman. 11/2/2004. “War ‘wreaking havoc on Iraq young’.” The Associated Press. 11/23/2004. 53 “3,438 Iraqis killed in past six months.” Xinhua. 11/9/2004. 54 “Focus on returnees from Iran in the south.” IRIN. 11/11/2004. 55 “Up to a third of al Tash camp refugees reported to have fled after fighting around Ramadi.” UNHCR. 11/23/2004. 56 “Grim picture of Fallujah refugees painted by Iraqi government.” Agence France-Presse. 11/10/2004. “Thousands of residents have fled Fallujah.” IRIN. 11/8/2004. 57 “Iraqi Christians keep low profile” The Associated Press. 11/13/2004. 58 “Is Mosul the next al-Fallujah?” Radio Free Europe. 11/5/2004. 59 “Fear of ethnic conflict charges Mosul unrest.” The Boston Globe. 11/30/2004. “Iraqi election creates unusual alliances.” The Associated Press. 11/29/2004.

Rating: 8

Due to insecurity and a lack of faith in the rebuilding process, thousands of Iraqis continue to leave their country. Many of these refugees are the wealthiest and brightest of the population, taking with them capital and expertise that are vital to the reconstruction of Iraq.60

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines Rating: 8

Safer, often predominately Shiite cities are being awarded more employment contracts; more than 32,000 jobs have been created in the mostly Shiite city of Nasiriya. Jobs in the security forces are also overwhelmingly taken by Shiites.61

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Rating: 9

Insurgents continue to launch attacks on oil pipelines, fueling stations and oil tanker drivers across the country, as well as on imported refined products; thus, oil that is normally exported, has to be used for domestic purposes.62 It is estimated that attacks on oil facilities have cost Iraq’s treasury billions of dollars since the beginning of the war.63 Despite the ongoing attacks, international oil companies such as Chevron Texaco, BP, Shell and Lukoil are launching programs to assist Iraqis in managing their oil fields. It is speculated that the anticipation of future provisions to allow foreign investment in the oil industry, which had been previously nationalized under Saddam Hussein, is driving these goodwill gestures from oil companies interested in future Iraqi oil contracts.64

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State Rating: 9

Polarizing events, including the U.S.-led operation in Fallujah, are threatening to reduce the legitimacy of the Interim Government and the future elections. Iraq’s official Iraqi Islamic Party has threatened to leave the U.S.-backed interim government if the Iraqi forces do not quit the assaults on Fallujah. 65 Leading Sunni clerics are accusing interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi of being responsible for the deaths and the destruction in Fallujah, and are calling for a boycott of the January election.66 Disagreement continues, regarding the interim government’s decision to hold elections by the end of January. Although Sunni Arabs and Sunni Kurds say they many not participate in the election, Shiites have made it clear several times that they are not willing to postpone the date.67 Some Shiites are suggesting that there might be movement within their ranks to demand regional autonomy, modeled after the Kurdish area, in case the election is postponed.

So far, 47 organizations, including Sunni, Shiite, Turkmen and Christian groups, have declared that they will not participate in any election taking place in the beginning of 2005. A main reason for the boycott call is the U.S.-led operation in Fallujah. Meanwhile, voter registration begins and will last until

60 “The best, brightest, wealthiest flee Iraq.” IraqNet. 11/22/2004. 61 “Thousands of jobs created as stability returns to southern city.” Azzaman. 11/19/2004. 62 “Attacks cut Iraq’s northern exports.” Gulfnews. 11/22/2004. 63 “Massive attacks halt Iraqi oil flow.” Al Jazeera . 11/02/2004. “Turkish trucks stop ferrying fuel to Iraq.” Azzaman. 11/06/2004. 64 “Turkish trucks stop ferrying fuel to Iraq.” Azzaman. 11/06/2004. 65 “Sunni party threatens to quit Iraq government if Faluja assault continues.” Agence France-Presse. 11/9/2004. 66 “Mosques bombed as fighting rages in Falluja.” Al-Jazeera. 11/10/2004 67 “Iraqi election creates unusual alliances.” The Kurdistan Observer. 11/29/04. “Iraqis call for boycott of fake elections.” Al-Jazeera. 11/18/2004.

December 15. The interim government says it has thus far received registration from 63 parties and movements.68

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services Rating: 8

A combination of ongoing military operations and constant insecurity is hindering public service and reconstruction projects in Iraq. As fighting rages in Fallujah, medics report insufficient supplies and a shortage of staff in the city’s hospitals and clinics.69 Despite improvements in immunizing children and reconstructing hospitals across the country, an Iraqi report claims that the health system in Iraq is in a state of crisis.70 The report says there is poor sanitation in hospitals, shortages of drugs and staff, and a dearth of services for mothers and children. Excess deaths, injuries and high levels of illness are caused directly and indirectly by ongoing conflict.71 Health officials express concern about a rise in the number of Iraqi drug addicts, accusing countries such as Iran and Afghanistan of exploiting Iraq’s porous borders.72 Conditions in Baghdad have noticeably improved, but the national power grid continues to suffer from damages in the 1990s and again during the 2003 U.S.-led invasion; blackouts could extend beyond 2009 if Iraq does not receive additional money for repairs and constructio n and if sabotage continues.73

While many of the country’s public services are in various states of deterioration, there are a few events that bring hope for improvement to Iraq’s people. Following the surrender of some arms by the Mahdi Army last month, the interim Iraqi government has earmarked reconstruction funds for improving the water system, leaking pipes, unpaved streets and sanitation issues in the poorer sections of the capitol.74 The United States and Iraqi governments are generously funding education projects, and renovating and building hundreds of schools in order to improve the quality of the education system.75 Despite the constant threat of violence and kidnappings that are causing parents to question the safety of sending their children to school, attendance across the country is around 80 percent.76

9. Suspension of Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights Rating: 9

Kidnappings and killings—primarily of foreigners and supporters of the occupying forces—continue to occur. There is a widespread belief that no foreigner in Iraq is safe anymore when strong opponents and outspoken sympathizers of a new, democratic Iraq are also kidnapped and murdered.77 The attacks on Fallujah are raising accusations of human rights violations carried out by the U.S.-led forces. One seemingly execution-style killing is captured on tape by NBC, and eyewitnesses interviewed by al-Jazeera say there are several other incidents of this kind in the city. Thousands of Iraqi people demonstrate in the streets of Baghdad, Basra and Hit against the attack on Fallujah. Some of them are arrested and beaten by

68 “Forty-seven bodies boycott Iraq elections,” World Crisis Web. 11/18/2004. 69 “Doctors, medical supplies scarce in Fallujah as major assault begins.” Agence France-Presse. 11/8/2004. 70 “Iraqi health authorities fret rise in drug-abuse, blame Iran.” Agence France-Presse. 11/10/2004. 71 “Iraq health care ‘in deep crisis.’” BBC News. 11/30/2004. 72 “Iraqi health authorities fret rise in drug-abuse, blame Iran.” Agence France-Presse. 11/10/2004. 73 “Blackouts predicted for Baghdad through 2009.” Reuters. 11/3/2004. 74 “Campaign to redevelop Sadr City.” Azzaman. 11/4/2004. 75 “Iraq allocates $25 million monthly for education process.” Middle East North Africa Financial Network. 11/9/2004. “3,000 school buildings were damaged due to war, looting.” Azzaman. 11/28/2004. 76 “Blackouts predicted for Baghdad through 2009.” Reuters. 11/3/2004. 77 “Iraqi’s killing by marine dominates Arab media.” The Associated Press. 11/17/2004.

the Iraqi security forces. During the operation in Fallujah, the interim government of Iraq imposes a curfew on several cities in the country. 78

The Interim Government under Prime Minister Iyad Allawi issues a directive, warning the media in Iraq to reflect the government’s position in fighting with the U.S. coalition forces; the warning prevents journalists from attacking “patriotic descriptions to groups of killers and criminals” and urges the media to reserve a portion of their coverage to the events in Iraq that highlight the stance of the Iraq government and its position. Many international media organizations fear that this could be an attempt at censorship. 79

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State” Rating: 9

In early November, U.S. and Iraqi forces began “Operation Dawn,” an assault on Fallujah, which has been under insurgent control since April, when U.S. forces failed to take control of the city. The goal of the new mission is to regain control of the city and kill or arrest as many insurgents as possible. By the end of the month, the U.S. reported that some pockets of insurgents still exist in parts of the city, despite efforts to prevent the rebels from regrouping. In total, approximately 2,000 Iraqis were killed during the fighting and more than 1,600 have been captured.80 The remaining rebels are believed to be moving to other parts of Iraq, including Mosul, the third-largest city in the country. Once cited as an example of a success story in the post-Saddam Hussein era, Mosul now suffers from rampant insecurity and failing public services.81

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites Rating: 9

The Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr is calling on his followers to withhold participation in the January election. His office in Baghdad has issued a Fatwa forbidding followers to take part in the polling, saying that the January election is illegal. 82 Al-Sadr’s Shiite rival, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, is continuing to urge his followers to participate the election in January. He has assigned top aides to take charge of efforts designed to ensure that the Shiite majority of Iraq will win the electoral majority in January and thereby achieve their long denied power.83 Al-Sistani stays steadfast in his opinion that, no matter the status of the security situation, the election should take place because it is a major benchmark for the Iraqi people and preparations have gone too far to stop them now.

12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors Rating: 10

The United States plans to raise the number of American troops by at least 10,000 in an effort to provide additional security. The increase will elevate the total number of U.S. troops in Iraq to around 150,000.84 Following the leads of Spain, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Honduras, the Philippines and Norway, Hungary is planning on pulling its troops out of Iraq in the near future. New Zealand and Thailand are also expressing a desire to bring their contingencies home, and Singapore, Moldova and

78 “What drives the fighters in flip-flops.” The Guardian. 11/17/2004. “Iraqi’s killing by marine dominates Arab media.” The Associated Press. 11/17/2004. “Setback to U.S. image in war.” The Christian Science Monitor, 11/17/2004. 79 “Press watchdog deeply disturbed by Iraqi regime’s media threat.” One World. 11/15/2004. 80 “Fallujah rebels claim to have resumed Iraq attacks.” Agence France-Presse. 11/26/2004. 81 “Fear of chaos grips Mosul.” Azzaman. 11/27/2004. 82 “Moqtada Sadr says he will boycott elections.” Azzaman. 11/22/2004. 83 “Iraq’s al-Sistani spearheading effort to ensure Shiite electoral victory.” Associated Press. 11/17/2004. 84 “U.S. to boost Iraq troop strength.” NBC News. 11/29/2004.

Bulgaria are beginning to reduce their presence in Iraq. Poland, the fourth-largest contributor of troops in the coalition, will withdraw by the end of next year.85 Fiji, on the other hand, is sending highly trained former United Nations peacekeeping soldiers to Iraq to act as bodyguards for senior U.N. officials. Georgia, too, will increase its troop numbers in order to help protect U.N. workers, upping its total numbers to about 850. Fiji and Georgia are the only two countries that have agreed to supply protection forces to the U.N. in Iraq.86 Additionally, the European Union has agreed to provide some financial and logistical support to Iraq in preparation for the planned election in January.87

Iraqi Kurdish and Western officials purport that Islamic extremists are moving supplies and new recruits from Iran into Iraq. Although direct involvement by the Iranian government has not been established, U.S. and Iraqi officials are blaming the porous border for the ease of migration between the two countries, stating that some militants repeatedly cross back and forth, returning to Iraq with superior weapons, explosives and training. 88

Core 5

1. Police

Police remain incapable of maintaining peace in areas such as Mosul, where the intensity of insurgent attacks are making thousands of police officers to flee their police stations.89 The safety of Iraqi security officers continues to be tenuous, as policemen are being targeted by the insurgency. The inability of police to do their job is seen as an indication that insurgents are destabilizing Iraq by weakening its security forces.90

2. Leadership

Despite the continued insurgent attacks and kidnappings, the Iraqi Independent Electoral Commission announces that the parliamentary election will take place in the last week of January. Participation by all the Iraqi ethnic groups in the steps leading up to the Jan. 30 election, however, is mixed. More than 60, mostly new parties have signed up to participate in the January elections, while another 60, mostly Sunni groups have either aligned together in boycotting the election or calling for a delay.91 Shiites, in particular, are insisting that the election must be held on schedule, although many worry that a Sunni boycott would effectively diminish the legitimacy of the election and of the constitution that will be crafted by the elected assembly. 92

3. Civil Service

International assistance is being provided to create a civil service training program, which will train senior Iraqi civil servants in key areas such as economic reform, poverty, social development and public sector management. The project is designed to help Iraqis address the immediate needs for managing

85 “Hungary joins others in pulling troops from Iraq.” International Herald Tribune. 11/4/2004. 86 “Fiji to send soldiers to protect UN in Iraq.” Xinhua. 11/8/2004. 87 “EU agrees support package for Iraq.” Agence France-Presse. 11/3/2004 88 “Extremists moving across Iran-Iraq border.” Associated Press. 11/8/2004. 89 “Iraqi police use kidnapper’s videos to fight crime.” The New York Times. 2/5/2005. 90 “21 Iraqi Police Executed.” The Australian. 11/8/2004. 91 “Forty-Seven Bodies Boycott Iraq Elections.” Islam Online. 11/18/2004. “Leading Iraq Politicians Call for Election Delay.” Reuters. 11/26/2004. 92 “Shiites Reject Delay of Election.” The Washington Post. 11/28/2004.

reconstruction, as well as enable them to develop their own solutions and strategies and implement policies central to the success of their development priorities.93

4. Judiciary

The capacity of the Iraqi judicial system to function properly is in question as the chief investigator for Iraq’s Central Criminal Court is dismissed because he was targeting numerous top political figures over the past few months.94

5. Military

According to reports from U.S. military officials, the Iraqi National Guard and the Iraqi police forces are ineffective entities. In the provinces beset with the most violence, Iraqi forces are so intimidated by insurgents that many are reluctant to show up for work.95 One senior Iraqi Interior Ministry official asserts that, based on the inadequate performance of Iraqi forces thus far, any major withdrawal of American troops in the next ten years would provoke chaos.96

Stings

¨ Hungary announces it will withdraw its 300 non-combat troops from Iraq by March 31. ¨ Iraq's most prominent Sunni party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, says it is withdrawing from the interim Iraqi government and the Muslim Scholars Association, a group of respected Sunni clerics, calls for a boycott of coming elections.

93 “World Bank Signs Grant Agreement to Support Second Phase of Training for Iraq’s Senior Civil Service.” World Bank Media Release. 11/9/2004. 94 “Demoted Iraqi Judge Fears for His Country’s Future.” The Christian Science Monitor. 11/1/2004. 95 “U.S. Officials Say Iraq’s Forces Founder Under Rebel Assaults.” The New York Times. 11/30/2004. 96 Ibid.

Analysis of Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures Rating: 9

Access to food and medical attention is improving as cash, food and supplies such as medicine antiseptics, sutures and blood pressure readers are being delivered to devastated areas such as Fallujah.97 The city itself is experiencing demographic pressure as reconstruction efforts remain sluggish and Fallujah residents are falling pressure to return to their homes in preparation for the upcoming election, leaving little time to secure the city from future insurgent infiltration, and prepare for much needed reconstruction projects. 98 Overall, progress is being made to improve electricity output, rehabilitate and expand water treatment plants; to date, more than 2,000 schools have been rehabilitated, 8.7 million grade school math and science text books have been printed and distributed, and nearly 33,000 secondary school teachers and administrators have be trained nationwide.99

2. Massive Movement of Refugees and IDPs Rating: 9

Refugees from Fallujah are causing the most difficulty. Originally, approximately 250,000 residents were displaced from surrounding areas, with more than 200,000 residents still living in hotels, with relatives, or outside the Iraqi borders.100 As the winter approaches, many refugees are unprepared to face the decreasing temperatures of December, and there has been a reported shortage of food and materials.101

3. Legacy of Vengeance Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia Rating: 8

Insurgents continue to exacerbate sectarian conflict by carrying out attacks against Christians, Kurds, and Shiites. Churches and mosques were attacked, in attempts to target Christian and Shiite groups.102 In the beginning of December a suicide attack was carried out against a bus transporting Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq. Furthering Kurdish-Arab tensions, the police force in Mosul disintegrated, causing the U.S. military to utilize more Kurdish soldiers in a Sunni Arab dominated city. 103 Although Sunni-led insurgent attacks continue, the intensity of the sectarian conflict is less than in recent months; this is mainly due to a nationwide anticipation of the January election, creating a temporary freeze on ethnic -based violence as some Sunnis weigh their interests in participation in the political process or not.104 The number of fatalities in hostile incidents for December has dropped from 125 in November to 57; and the number of daily attacks by insurgents has dropped from 77 in November to 57 in December.105

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight

97 “Slain soldiers; mothers reaching out to Iraqis, delegation bringing cash, relief supplies to Fallujah refugees.” The San Francisco Chronicle. 12/27/2004. 98 “In Falluja's ruins, big plans and a risk of chaos.” The New York Times. 12/1/2004. 99 “Iraq humanitarian and reconstruction assistance updates: Weekly report #4.” USAID. 12/22/2004. 100 “The world; for displaced Falloujans, a new battle underway; Last month's fighting has forced thousands to take refuge in tent cities and other camps. It's unclear when they'll be allowed to return home.” The Los Angeles Times. 12/8/2004. 101 “Iraq Humanitarian Assistance Report.” Pacific Disaster Management Information Network. 12/13/2004. “In Falluja's ruins, big plans and a risk of chaos.” The New York Times. 12/1/2004. 102 “Insurgents bomb 2 churches in northern Iraq city.” The New York Times. 12/8/2004. 103 “Iraq insurgents kill 17 as sectarian strife rises.” The Guardian. 104 “Iraq election interest on rise; candidates lists in hundreds as Shiites mobilize.” The Houston Chronicle. 12/10/2004. 105“Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Securit y in Post-Saddam Iraq.” The Brookings Institution. 4. 1/19/2005. Ibid. 19.

Rating: 8

Iraq is encountering problems from its brain drain throughout the month of December. In the first instance, many officials have been absent in Fallujah where the need for reconstruction is urgent. After a successful military operation there, U.S. and Iraqi public officials are ready to begin reconstruction; certain individuals, however, continue to voice concerns regarding the absence of Iraqi officials and public works technicians.106 Secondly, the brain drain is making it difficult to replace officials targeted by the insurgency. The police chief, Maj. Gen. Talib Shamil Samrriee, resigned after his home was attacked and his son was nearly kidnapped.107 Qassem Mihawi, the director of Iraq’s telecommunications system was killed in Baghdad. 108 Lastly, it was reported that 700 electoral commissioners resigned because of increased threats from militant groups.109 There are gaps in the leadership cadres of many Iraqi institutions due to intimidation and the flight of professionals.

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines Rating: 8

Progress in economic development is related to the amount violence in a given area. In November, the military operation in Fallujah—a predominantly Sunni population—led to the destruction of much of the city’s infrastructure. As future military operations are conducted in Sunni dominated areas, more will be affected. According to a report conducted by The Independent, the national unemployment rate is currently at 60 percent, while the Sunni unemployment is 80 percent.110

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Rating: 8

Frustration over the lack of sufficient oil supply continues as the rise in black markets is increasingly creating problems. In the past year there has been a hike in oil demand with the arrival of approximately 750,000 new cars, accompanied by the growing need for gas-powered generators because of continued power outages.111 While the subsidized price of gasoline has remained at nine cents per a gallon, the black market price has skyrocketed to $2.25 per gallon. So severe is the shortage that police officers have been abusing their powers by cutting long gas lines and taking more than the allotted amount to individuals in an attempt to sell gas on the black market. Many privately owned gas companies are selling entire truckloads of gas to the black market.112

On a positive note, the United States forgave Iraq of a $4.1 billion debt and there has been discussion of bilateral talks with Arab nations about debt relief. 113 Also, Kuwait agreed to import up to 200 million cubic feet of Iraqi natural gas on a daily basis in an attempt to help boost Iraqi revenue and aid in the

106 “Generals see gains from Iraq offensives: Insurgents expected to adopt new tactics.” Washington Post. 12/6/2004 107 “The conflict in Iraq: Flare of violence kills 4 in Samarra: The police chief of the previously pacified city says he’s resigning after the attacks on his home and car and an attempt to kidnap his son at school.” Los Angeles Times. 12/9/2004. 108 “Iraq's state-run telecommunications chief shot dead as Bush warns Iran, Syria.” Al-Bawaba. 12/16/2004. 109 “Militants groups warn Iraqis not to participate in Jan. 30 vote; Mosul election workers reportedly resign after threat.” The Associated Press. 12/30/2004. 110 “Why are we inflicting this discredited market fundamentalism on Iraq?” The Independent. 12/22/2004. 111 “The conflict in Iraq; Baghdad gas crisis blamed on insurgent sabotage; officials say attacks on pipelines and depots around the capital have increased, disrupting supply. Lines stretch for miles at fuel stations.” Los Angeles Times. 12/9/2004. 112 Ibid. 113 “U.S. forgives $4.1 billion in Iraq debt.” The Associated Press. 12/17/2004. “Iraq seeks further deal on debt relief.” Financial Times. 12/2/2004.

reconstruction process.114 Despite of the pressing issue of black markets, there has been an overall increase in oil revenue this month as compared to November.115

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State Rating: 9

The most pressing issue facing Iraq is the pending election set for January 30. The U.S. government and the Iraqi Interim Government firmly support the election in hopes of boosting the legitimacy of the Iraqi government, undermining the insurgency and reducing sectarian conflict. Iraq’s president, Ghazi al- Yawar a Sunni Muslim stated, “I personally think there is a legal and moral obligation to hold elections on the set date.”116 Initially, the two major Kurdish parties supported a delay in the election, but they are now in full support. Adnan Pachachi, a Sunni politician, organized Sunni leaders and clerics to establish consensus in favor of delaying elections for six months.117 In an attempt to quell opposition within the Sunni population, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi, met with various Sunni leaders.118 By the end of December, a major Sunni party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, withdrew from the election. A report conducted by the U.N. stated that registration is below expectations.119 Furthermore, in an attempt to preserve balance within the newly elected government, there is discussion about reserving seats in the 275-member legislature for Sunnis, even if they lose in the election. 120

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services Rating: 8

As noted above, Fallujah is currently suffering from the military operation that took place in November. The water and sewer plants will take months to repair, the power lines need to be rebuilt from scratch and the main health centers are no longer operational. 121 Northern oil fields were re-instated with the potential to pump 500,000 barrels of oil a day, while oil pipe-lines southwest of Kirkuk were sabotaged a few days later.122 Contrack, an engineering and construction company responsible for building roads and bridges, is the first major U.S. firm to pull out of Iraq since the projects are no longer profitable ventures.123

9. Suspension of Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights Rating: 9

The Committee to Protect Journalists reported that 54 journalists were killed in Iraq this year, marking the most deaths in the past decade.124 Also, insurgents continue to attack innocent civilians, target Iraqis that “collaborate” with Western forces and intimidate potential Sunni voters.

114 “Kuwait, Iraq agree on mega energy deal.” Al-Bawaba. 12/15/2004 115 “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post -Saddam Iraq.” The Brookings Institution. 23. 1/19/2005. 116 “Iraq's Sunni president backs Jan. 30 date for elections; Allawi meets Sunni leaders in Jordan.” The Associated Press. 12/1/2004. 117 “The fourth election.” The New York Times. 12/1/2004. 118 “Allawi to meet Sunni leaders on election.” The New York Times. 12/1/2004. 119 “Top Shiite politician escapes assassination as main Sunni party drops out of national election.” The Associated Press. 12/27/2004. “Problems mount for Iraqi vote.” Christian Science Monitor. 12/28/2004. 120 “U.S. is suggesting guaranteed role for Iraqi’s Sunnis.” The New York Times. 12/26/2004. 121 “In Falluja's ruins, big plans and a risk of chaos.” The New York Times. 12/1/2004. “UN fears for refugees who fled attack on Falluja.” The Guardian. 12/3/2004. 122 “Iraqi official blames rebel attacks for worsening fuel shortages.” The Associated Press. 12/15/2004. “UN fears for refugees who fled attack on Falluja.” The Guardian. 12/3/2004. 123 “Arlington company quits work in Iraq; contractor cites dangerous, costly work environment.” The Washington Post. 12/23/2004. 124 “Group says 54 journalists killed this year, the most in a decade.” The Associated Press. 12/10/2004.

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State” Rating: 9

Fallujah is under the direct control of U.S. military and Iraqi forces; major military operations ended with more than 200 insurgents captured.125 Explosives attached to car doors and large amounts of weapons were found in Fallujah, suggesting the city was a major center of operation.126 Elsewhere, 22 individuals were killed in the deadliest attack on a U.S. military base near the northern city of Mosul, demonstrating the insurgent’s intelligence capabilities. Former Special Forces counterinsurgency expert Kalev Sepp noted that the attack “was carried out in daylight against the largest facility on the base, at exactly the time when the largest number of soldie rs would be present.”127 Although insurgent attacks continue, there is an overall decrease in the total number attacks from the month of November.128

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites Rating: 9

In preparation for the election, party slates are formed, closely resembling the prevailing factions between Shiites, Kurds, and Sunnis. The Shiites and Kurds are showing strong signs of political solidarity. Under the leadership of Grand Ayatolla al-Sistani an alliance between secularists, religious zealots, and moderates are formed under the United Iraqi Alliance, two-thirds of whom are Shiites.129 The two major Kurdish parties also announced that they would offer a single list of candidates in an attempt to increase the political influence of the Kurds.130 Meanwhile, the political presence of the Sunnis in the election process and the development of the constitution remains ambivalent.

12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors Rating: 10

The United States is planning to increase the number of troops before the election from 138,000 to 150,000, which marks the largest troop presence since the start of the war.131 As accusations against Syrian and Iranian intervention are made, both governments deny any involvement.132 Nonetheless, the estimated number of foreign insurgents is on the rise.133

Core 5

1. Police

Insurgents increasingly target policemen through various intimidation tactics of death threats, kidnappings and beheadings.134 Police stations are often attacked leaving police equipment and records accessible to

125 “US death toll in Iraq reaches 1,250.” The Independent. 12/2/2004. “Iraqi president backs January elections; influential Sunni wants 'dialogue' to avert boycott.” The Washington Post. 12/2/2004. 126 “US death toll in Iraq reaches 1,250.” The Independent. 12/2/2004. 127 “Mess tent blast kills 15 GIs; 60 hurt in Mosul; attack is deadliest on a U.S. base.” The Washington Post. 12/22/2004. “Fragmented leadership of the Iraqi insurgency.” The Christian Science Monitor. 12/21/2004. 128 “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post -Saddam Iraq.” The Brookings Institution. 18. 1/19/2005. 129 “Candidate slate shows Shiites closing ranks; Sistani backs list for parliamentary vote.” The Washington Post. 12/7/2004. 130 “Iraqi president backs January elections; influential Sunni wants 'dialogue' to avert boycott.” The Washington Post. 12/2/2004. 131 “Iraq's Sunni president backs Jan. 30 elections; another attack on airport road.” The Associated Press. 12/1/2004. 132 “Iraq's defense minister accuses Iran, Syria of supporting al-Zarqawi's terror group.” The Associated Press. 12/15/2004. 133 “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post -Saddam Iraq.” The Brookings Institution. 15. 1/19/2005. 134 “Insurgent attacks kill Iraqi police general; marine killed in western province; election preparations on track.” The Associated Press. 12/11/2004.

insurgents, which furthers the concern of insurgent infiltration. 135 Also, in an attempt to disintegrate leadership within the police force, many high-ranking officers are forced to resign after family members are endangered from attempted kidnappings and repeated attacks.136 Police forces still remain ill equipped and ill prepared to operate in high-conflict areas. Overall, the trained number of forces is well below the required amount.137

2. Leadership

Although leadership is increasingly forming along group lines, there are some major rifts within the predominantly Shiite bloc, the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). The Shiite Council decided to break away from UIA because of power disputes within. 138 Otherwise, leadership and party orientation remains along sectarian lines. As Shiite leaders continue to push for elections on January 30, major Sunni groups and leaders are calling for postonement.

3. Civil Service

There is some concern regarding the actions and capabilities of the Iraqi Interim Government. The International Advisory and Monitoring Board conducted a report citing smuggling, mismanagement [and] inadequate spending records.”139 Furthermore, there are questions about the government’s ability to conduct reconstruction projects and provide assistance in food and fuel distribution. 140

4. Judiciary

Iraqi judges began interrogating Ali Hassan al-Majid (notoriously known as Chemical Ali) and Sultan Hashim Ahmad about human rights violations and the use of chemical gases against thousands of Kurds.141

5. Military

The Iraqi military is also facing increased attacks and similar threats of intimidation to that of the police force. Notable deficiencies are found in the quality of soldiers and leadership, with concerns about participation of Sunnis in military forces. After a year of recruiting Iraqis, coalition forces have focused on numbers rather than quality of troops. There is now an attempt to focus on “mission capability, leadership, and the creation of effective unit elements with matching emphasis on unit integrity.”142 After visiting Iraq, Senator Jon Warner expressed concern over the inadequacies of the Iraqi security forces saying, “In my judgment [the training of Iraqi security forces] is falling behind in its capability and commitment to pick up the job and carry it forward.”143

135 “Militants kill 30 in Baghdad strikes; two police stations, Shiite mosque are hit, violence rocks Mosul.” The Washington Post. 12/4/2004. 136 “The conflict in Iraq; flare of violence kills 4 in Samarra; the police chief of the previously pacified city says he’s resigning after attacks on his home and car and an attempt to kidnap his son at school.” Los Angeles Times. 12/9/2004. 137 Cordesman, Anthony H. “Strengthening Iraqi Military Security Forces.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. 55. 2/17/2005. Information taken from a report conducted by the United States for the Multinational Force. The data revealed that the amount of trained and on hand policemen was 50,798 while 135,000 policemen are required (as of 12/6/2004). 138 “Rift among Shiite factions may hurt them in election.” The New York Times. 12/7/2004. 139 “Board monitoring Iraq's oil revenue criticizes former U.S. administrators and current government for mismanagement.” The Associated Press. 12/15/2004. 140 “Generals see gains from Iraq offensives; insurgents expected to adopt new tactics.” The Washington Post. 12/6/2004. 141 “Iraqi judges start questioning Saddam's defense minister and Chemical Ali.” The Asso ciated Press. 12/18/2004. 142 Ibid. 60. 143 “At least 64 dead as rebels strike in 3 Iraqi cities.” The New York Times. 12/20/2004.

Stings

¨ The Kurdish Referendum Movement gave the United Nations a petition with 1.7 million signatures requesting for a referendum on Kurdish independence.

Analysis of Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures Rating: 9

A report conducted by the Defense Science Board stated that a force of 500,000 is needed in Iraq for stability and distribution of necessary goods. Currently, there are approximately 150,000 soldiers present, which helps to account for the difficulty troops are facing as they fight insurgents and distribute food and water.144 With the winter in full swing Iraqis are feeling the brunt of the cold weather. The distribution of subsidized fuel is at a minimum and practically nonexistent in some areas.145 Separately, the interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi announced the extension of the state of emergency for another 30 days while continuing martial law across the country. Additionally, operations in Fallujah remain slow with much of the infrastructure destroyed and only a handful of food stalls in use. Many refugees are forced to wait in line for hours until they receive their daily food and water rations.146

2. Massive Movement of Refugees and IDPs Rating: 9

There is no evidence to suggest change in this indicator for the month of January.

3. Legacy of Vengeance Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia Rating: 9

Throughout the month, insurgents increased their attacks on all levels, and Christians remain victims to both Sunni and Shiite discrimination. Churches are being attacked and a Catholic archbishop is abducted.147 In attempts to arouse Shiites, many mosques, religious leaders and politicians are attacked. Mahmoud Madaeni, a top Shiite Muslim cleric is killed. 148 Car bombs are used by insurgents during a major Muslim holiday; and an ambulance filled with explosives is detonated during a Shiite wedding, killing 18 and injuring dozens of police and hospital officials.149

Violence aside, the political process also appears to be having the unintended affect of provoking sectarian divisions. In an attempt to alleviate logistical confusion, the elections were based on all of Iraq being a single constituency; arranging elections in this manner favors well-known national organizations over local officials, affecting local Sunni candidates negatively. 150 And with the prominent Sunni party, the Iraqi Islamic Party withdrawing from the elections in December, the nationally recognized parties were dominantly Shiite blocks. Furthermore, votes went to political parties, not individual candidates, whose identities were hidden for security reasons. With the risk of campaigning extremely high, citizens had little knowledge of platforms and were forced to vote along factional lines.151 After the elections, many pre-election concerns about Sunni exclusion were reaffirmed. For the most part, in Sunni dominated areas, polls were nearly deserted; and in some Sunni towns, such as Azamiyah, the polls remained closed.

144 “Study urges bigger role for State Dept. military seen as unprepared for nation-building.” The Boston Globe. 1/5/2005. 145 “In Iraq, a winter of discontent.” Christian Science Monitor. 1/10/2005. 146 “The world; after leveling city, U.S. tries to build trust; in Fallouja, marines are on a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign to woo residents and help keep rebels from returning.” Los Angeles Times. 1/7/2005 147 “Gunmen kidnap the Catholic Archbishop of Mosul as pre-election violence flares in Iraq.” The New York Times. 1/18/2005. 148 “Aide to top Shiite Ayatollah slain near Baghdad; as pressure builds among Sunnis to delay elections; British official suggests government will be balanced.” The Washington Post. 1/14/2005. 149 “Vehicle-bomb attacks against Shiite mosque, wedding kill 18 during Muslim holiday.” The Associated Press. 1/21/2005. 150 “U.S. officials are haunted by initial plan for nationwide candidate lists for Iraqi election.” The New York Times. 1/9/2005. 151 “Baghdad governor assassinated.” Financial Times. 1/5/2005.

Ultimately, nearly 60 percent of the population voted, although Sunni participation was scant.152 The Bush administration views the high voter turnout as a success, while many analysts view low Sunni participation as a potential cause of civil war.

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight Rating: 8

As insurgents increase their efforts to deligitimize the Interim Government, public officials continue to resign and are often killed. A report conducted by the State Department finds that a large number of police, highway patrol and border enforcement personnel, “have quit or abandoned their stations.”153 Many electoral commission officers resigned prior to the January 30 election, including a 13-member election commission located in the Anbar province.154 Similarly, the entire election committee and city council of Biaji resigned because of repeated death threats from insurgents.155 Meanwhile, as insurgents continue to create problems for public officials, 85,000 refugees from Fallujah returned to their homes, but only 8,500 elected to stay.156

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines Rating: 8

Although many Iraqis are experiencing economic hardship, Sunni Muslims continue to take the brunt of the situation. The four predominantly Sunni provinces—Baghdad, Anbar, Nineveh and Slahadin—could not be secured for elections because of the complexity of security operations.157 For similar reasons, Sunnis face more severe economic hardships. In Sunni areas many are left unemployed.158 In Shiite areas such as Sadr city, projects are more prevalent, jobs are created and distribution of food is much easier.159

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Rating: 8

The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security reports that the oil infrastructure underwent 146 attacks last year with oil revenue falling 15 percent short of the target set by the Interim Government.160 Unemployment remains stagnant as storeowners are often forced to close their shops early due to increased combat.161 As a result, there is a noticeable decrease in sales while prices for commodities, rent and fuel continue to soar.162 According to the State Department, early January exports dropped below one million barrels a day, although by the end of the month oil revenue from exports rose. 163

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State Rating: 9

152 “Rice says Iraqi election exceeds expectations.” The Associated Press. 1/30/2005. 153 “Report paints bleak picture of Iraqi forces US officials see urgent need for better training.” The Boston Globe. 1/8/2005. 154 “Allawi says violence may impede voters; 19 killed in rebel attacks across Iraq.” The Washington Post. 1/12/2005. 155 “Kerry visits Iraq for ‘firsthand’ view; car bombs kill 15.” The Washington Post. 1/6/2005. 156 “Residents of Falluja still fearful of returning Iraq insurgency.” Financial Times. 1/15/2005. 157 “Some Iraq areas unsafe for vote, U.S. general says.” The New York Times. 1/7/2005. 158 “In Iraq, a winter of discontent.” The Christian Science Monitor. 1/10/2005. 159 “G.I. mission in Sadr city: From sewage to showcase.” The New York Times. 1/11/2005. 160 “Oil revenues 15% short of target as sabotage takes toll.” Financial Times. 1/15/2005. 161 “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post -Saddam Iraq.” The Brookings Institute. 25. 6/16/2005. “Surging violence casts doubt on election; Iraqi government begins to waver—but delay unlikely.” The San Francisco Chronicle. 1/5/2005. 162 “In Iraq, a winter of discontent.” Christian Science Monitor. 1/10/2005. 163 “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post -Saddam Iraq.” The Brookings Institute. 24. 6/16/2005.

Violence continues as insurgents increase their attacks on Iraqi security forces, public officials and civilians.164 Christian storeowners are often subject to Islamic laws and forced to pay Dawa party officials out of fear of future assaults.165 With elections imminent, expectations are high among U.S. officials; many critics, however, are pessimistic regarding the political process and the future role of Sunnis in the new government. Very few candidates campaigned, forcing Iraqis to select candidates with very little information. 166 In the beginning of January, voter registration rose significantly except among Sunnis. In a survey conducted by the International Republican Institute, more than 40 percent of Sunnis say they do not intend to vote.167 Furthermore, many Sunnis believe the election is fixed. 168 Although the overall voter turnout is high, the legitimacy of the election remains in question, particularly among Sunnis.

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services Rating: 8

Restoring electricity remains a difficult task with insurgent attempts targeting the electricity infrastructure. After an attack on a power grid between Baiji and Tikrit the entire national system is forced to shut down. In response to the devastating attack a senior U.S. diplomat says, “What they are doing is focus ing efforts on intelligent attacks on infrastructure, especially oil and electricity. The number of attacks is down, but the effectiveness of attacks is up significantly.”169 A report conducted by the State Department found that Baghdad has an average of 8.2 to 11 hours of electricity a day, with outages staggered across the city in two and four-hour blocks. Adding to the report a commander of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Gulf Region told reporters that electricity production remains at 80 percent of what it was under Saddam Hussein. 170 Contributing to the negative outlook, there are 127,000 Iraqis trained to take part in security operations, which is well short of the projected goal of 270,000 Iraqis trained.171 Nonetheless, on election day, more than 300,000 Iraqi and U.S. forces were on the streets protecting voters as they went to the polls, marking a relatively successful election.172

9. Suspension of Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights Rating: 9

Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi announced the implementation of heightened security measures for election day, marking an unprecedented security lock down. 173 Discussions aim at getting higher representation for underrepresented groups. Women will makeup 25 percent of the government, while observers search for ways of guaranteeing Sunnis seats regardless of the election outcome.174 But the atmosphere of violence and fear, and the election lock-down affirm that the human rights situation has not improved.

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State”

164 Ibid. 18. 165 “Iraqi officials cite rise of interest in elections; in final week, many act to ensure registration.” The Washington Post. 1/2/2005. 166 “Ally of militant cleric is on the stump in Sadr city.” The New York Times. 1/5/2005. 167 “Iraqi officials cite rise of interest in elections; in final week, many act to ensure registration.” The Washington Post. 1/2/2005. 168 “If Sunnis won’t vote, then what?” The Christian Science Monitor. 1/5/2005. 169 “The critical battle for Iraq’s energy; attacks by saboteurs cripple infrastructure.” The Washington Post. 1/15/2005. 170 “2 Iraqi guardsmen, mayor’s aide killed.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. 1/13/2005. 171 “Iraq guardsmen are facing their big test as vote nears and attacks are increased.” The New York Times. 1/8/2005. 172 “Voting begins in Iraq’s first free election in a half-century, attacks on polling station kills 14.” The Associated Press. 1/30/2005. 173 “Violence provokes government to extend emergency powers in Iraq.” The Independent. 1/7/2005. 174 “Iraq to restrict use of cars, place security cordons around polling places for upcoming election.” The Associated Press. 1/15/2005. “Suicide blast kills 29 in Iraq; Shiites in Balad blame town’s Sunni police force.” The Washington Post. 1/3/2005.

Rating: 10

The intensity and frequency of attacks increase as a U.S. Embassy official describes the insurgency as “the war’s worse, and the insurgency’s worse,” with more than 70 attacks per a day, which kill 90 during the first week of January.175 Also, there were attacks on oil infrastructure and electrical switchboards. The attack on the oil infrastructure halted 700,000 million barrels of oil production including export and domestic routes.176 In response to coalition forces putting supplementary armor on U.S. Humvees, insurgents add more explosive power, killing multiple troops in an attack.177 On Election Day, there are a string of attacks at polling stations with estimated 44 killed.178 Overall attacks against Iraqi security forces and total attacks increased.179

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites Rating: 9

With the elections asserting the sectarian divide between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds tension between factionalized variable remains high. Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani’s image is used to represent the United Iraqi Alliance party bloc, while Sunni leaders continue to call for a boycott of the elections.180 In an attempt to reduce fears within the Sunni population, Shiite political leaders repeatedly state there is no plan to seek a theocratic Shiite state.181

12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors Rating: 10

The U.S. military presence peaks, with 150,000 troops stationed in Iraq. Britain sent 650 troops to southern Iraq to help bolster security for elections. An alleged insurgent leader claimed to receive money from Iran to conduct attacks in Iraq. 182 Furthermore, it is found that many Saddam Hussein supporters reside in Syria and utilize the Syrian banking system to fund insurgent attacks and aid in flows of money, weapons and combatants.183

Core 5

1. Police

A report conducted by the State Department cited that many “police, highway patrol, and border enforcement personnel are quitting or abandoning their stations.” Also, many policemen la ck the equipment necessary to engage insurgents during battle.184 With the number of trained Iraqi policemen at 55,059, they still remain well below the total amount required of 135,000. 185

175 “Baghdad governor slain by insurgents; 5 Americans, 13 Iraqis killed in other attacks.” The Washington Post. 1/5/2005. “Ever bloodier; Iraq.” The Economist. 1/8/2005. “Some Iraq areas unsafe for Iraq vote, U.S. general says.” The New York Times. 1/7/2005. 176 “Sabotage in Iraq pushes crude oil price higher commodities.” Financial Times. 1/11/2005. 177 “Suicide bomb rips police HQ in Tikrit.” Daily News. 1/11/2005. 178 “Rice says Iraqi election exceeds expectations.” The Associated Press. 1/30/2005. 179 “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post -Saddam Iraq.” The Brookings Institute. 25. 6/1 6/2005. 180 “The conflict in Iraq; slate uses cleric’s image, but its own suffers; rival candidates protest United Iraqi Alliance’s prominent display of its ties to Sistani, citing electoral rules that bar religious symbols.” Los Angeles Times. 1/16/2005. 181 “Iraqi Shiite coalition tries to depel fears of Iran-style rule.” The Washington Post. 1/16/2005. 182 “Iraqi die in errant bombing by U.S.; toll is disputed; rebels kill Sunni.” The Washington Post. 1/9/2005. 183 “U.S. said to weigh sanctions on Syria over Iraqi network.” The New York Times. 1/5/2005. 184 “Report paints bleak picture of Iraqi forces US officials see urgent need for better training.” The Boston Globe. 1/8/2005. 185 Cordesman, Anthony H. “Strengthening Iraqi Security Forces.” Center for Strategic International Studies. 78. 2/22/2005.

2. Leadership

The leadership among Iraqis has remained relatively the same since the month of December as Sistani continues to have the most domineering presence within the Shiite population and the United Iraqi Alliance. Many Iraqi Interim Government officials have been outspoken about delaying the election, especially the Sunni Interim President Ghazi Al Yawar.186 Ultimately, the leadership of different parties still resembles the sectarian differences within the country.

3. Civil Service

Many local government and election officials have resigned leading up to the January 30 election. 187 In attempt to include women in the political process, lists of candidates must include one woman for every three slots.188 Also, in fear that Sunnis will be underrepresented in the legislative assembly, there is discussion about including Sunnis regardless of the amount of seats they gain in the election. 189

4. Judiciary

Although Iraqi judges began interrogating Ali Hassan al-Majid and Hussein’s Defense Minister Sultan Hashim Ahmad in December, there is little discussion about a trial in the near future.

5. Military

President Bush announces that efforts to train Iraq’s security forces are falling short of the desired goal, and that four out of the 18 provinces are not secured for elections.190 In an attempt to improve the security situation, the budget for Iraqi security forces is nearly doubled from $1 billion to $1.9 billion. 191 Also, the Iraqi security forces were assigned the task of securing 5,500 polling stations during the January 30 election; overall, the mission was relatively successful despite of the nearly 200 attacks and 44 deaths.192

Stings

¨ More than 58 percent of the eligible voting population cast their ballots in the January 30 election. ¨ Abu Ahmed, a high-ranking member of Zarqawi’s militant group was captured.

186 Ibid. 187 “Kerry visits Iraq for 'firsthand' view; car bombs kill 15.” The Washington Post. 1/6/2005. 188 “Women seek (some) power; female candidates in Iraq push mostly for modest changes, and even that is dangerous.” The Atlanta Journal- Constitution. 1/16/2005. 189 “Pressure mounts for Iraqi election delay: Interim president stirs debate over postponement as another day of violence claims lives of senior administrator, civilians and US troops.” The Guardian. 1/5/2005. 190 “Iraq guardsmen are facing their big test as vote nears and attacks are increased.” The New York Times. 1/8/2005. 191 “Report paints bleak picture of Iraqi forces US officials see urgent need for better training.” The Boston Globe. 1/8/2005. 192 Cordesman, Anthony H. “Strengthening Iraqi Security Forces.” Center for Strategic International Studies. 70. 2/22/2005.

Analysis of Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures Rating: 9

Iraq continues to struggle under demographic pressures that have troubled the country since the war began in 2003. Ethnic and religious divisions fuel violent outbreaks; reconstruction projects to improve basic supplies of food, water and electricity are not complete; lines for fuel remain longer than one mile every day.193 Lack of adequate security is an especially significant source of demographic pressure for the country. Results from a country-wide survey by the International Republican Institute indicate that more than 75 percent of Iraqis fear for the safety of themselves and their family. 194 Separately, a group of environmental scientists reports that environmental damage sustained during the past several years is not permanent.195

2. Massive Movement of Refugees and IDPs Rating: 9

The number of Iraqis seeking refuge in neighboring countries may be growing. United Nations officials have noticed that in the past four months, the flow of refugees away from Iraq has spiked in a manner they had expected to occur in 2003. 196 Syria, more than any other country in the region, is bearing the brunt of this exodus; officials say Syria has received more than 700,000 Iraqis since the beginning of the U.S.-led invasion.197 In addition, as many as 15,000 Iraqi Christians are believed to have left since August 2004; more than 700 Iraqi Christians still are seeking refugee status.198 Former residents of Fallujah are continuing to return to the city, after having been evacuated prior to the massive military operations there in November.199 Officials estimate that approximately 60,000 of the 250,000 residents have returned.200

3. Legacy of Vengeance Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia Rating: 8

Sunnis, upset by their overwhelming defeat in the Jan. 30 elections, are seeking revenge by targeting Shiite-populated areas for attack.201 As expected by several experts who feared that low Sunni election turnout will exacerbate the already fractious groups, bombings are resuming after a short, post-election lull. 202 Insurgents bomb Shiite mosques and neighborhoods, as well as bakeries and barber shops

193 “Roadside blast and rising tensions in Basra end Shias’ election euphoria.” The Independent. 2/6/2005. “Iraqi Kurds detail demands for a degree of autonomy.” The New York Times. 2/18/2005. “Insurgents target oil pipeline, kill police officers in Baghdad, U.S. soldier and Iraqi troops killed in north.” The Associated Press. 2/14/2005. “In Fallujah, peace meets impatience.” The Boston Globe. 2/21/2005. “Violence trumps rebuilding in Iraq; U.S. officials say soaring security costs have consumed $1 billion earmarked for badly needed water, power and sanitation projects.” Los Angeles Times. 2/21/2005. “Iraq grows more dangerous, but…” The New York Times. 2/13/2005. 194 “Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion,” International Republican Institute, (www.iri.org/03-15-05-IraqPoll.asp[March 25, 2005]). Interviews with 1,967 Iraqis in 15 of 18 governorates, excluding Anbar (Ramadi, Ninewah (Mosul), and Dohuk for security reasons. Margin of error is +/- 3 %. 195 “Iraq marshes can be partially restored.” Financial Times. 2/21/2005. 196 “Iraqi refugees overwhelm Syria; migrants who fled violence put stress on housing market, schools.” The Washington Post. 2/3/2005. 197 Ibid. 198 “Killing Christians: An ancient minority flees insurgent atrocities.” The Associated Press. 2/6/2005. 199 “Fallujans welcome security, await electricity.” Christian Science Monitor. 2/8/2005. 200 “A return to Fallujah to see what remains; residents pass military checkpoints before reentering devastated Iraqi city.” The Washington Post. 2/14/2005. 201 “Roadside bast and rising tensions in Basra end Shias’ election euphoria.” The Independent. 2/6/2005. “Car bomb at mosque kills 13 in Iraq; gunmen kill 11 bakery workers, Rumsfeld makes surprise visit.” The Associated Press. 2/11/2005. 202 “Low voting rate risks isolation for Sunni Iraqis.” The New York Times. 2/3/2005.

frequented by Shiites.203 The number of ethnic -based attacks rose higher still, as Shiites gathered to celebrate Ashoura, their holiest day of the year; notably, however, the attacks were less deadly than last year.204 Retaliating in kind, Shiite extremists assassinate Taha al-Amiri, a prominent chief judge of the highest criminal court in Basra who was also a former member of the Baathist Party.205

Despite continued violence along Shiite-Sunni lines, political statements from both sides suggest that the groups are becoming interested in cooperating together. Police officers and Iraqi National Guardsmen are noticing that the public is offering more tips about the insurgency.206 Shiites try to show “political finesse” rather than “triumphalism, revenge, or displays of smug ascendancy” after their election success.207 In an effort to reach out to Sunnis and secular groups, leaders of the heavily Shiite United Iraqi Alliance publicly say they will not create a theocracy with their newfound political power.208 Sunnis, too, are interested in political cooperation; leaders of the Sunni Association of Muslim Scholars hint at their desire to join the political process and help write the new constitution. 209

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight Rating: 8

A wave of middle - and upper-class religious minority groups fleeing Iraq is occurring as insurgents continue to attack Iraqi Shiites and Christians on a daily basis. This is particularly troublesome as many of these refugees are doctors, professors, business owners and recent college graduates, who officials had hoped would constitute an intellectual core of the new Iraq.210 Politicians, too, are taking up flight as more continue to be assassinated. Neighborhood councils, which were created in an effort to build local governance, are disappearing as its members are going into hiding in order to evade the insurgents.211

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines Rating: 8

Although efforts by the government are being made to ensure that access to public services is as evenly available as possible across the country, some cities are faring better than others. Differences in economic development are mainly associa ted with differences in the level of insurgent violence in the region, a factor that is related to ethnic group affiliations.

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Rating: 7

203 “Prominent Iraqi judge assassinated in Basra.” The Associated Press. 2/12/2005. “Car bomb kills 17 outside hospital south of Iraqi capital; U.S. forces battle insurgents around Mosul mosque.” The Associated Press. 2/12/2005. “In Iraq, to be a hairstylist is to risk death.” Los Angeles Times. 2/22/2005. 204 “More than a dozen killed in three Baghdad explosio ns aimed at worshippers during Shiite religious festival.” The Associated Press. 2/18/2005. “Shiites mark holy day amid hope, violence; attackers kill 54 in Iraq, but there are fewer casualties than feared: Pilgrims flock to shrines as religious rites add to post -election optimism.” Los Angeles Times. 2/20/2005. 205 “Prominent Iraqi judge assassinated in Basra.” The Associated Press. 2/12/2005. 206 “Iraqis cite shift in attitudes since vote; mood seen moving against insurgency.” The Washington Press. 2/7/2005. 207 “Iraq’s Shiites plan a humble rise to power; sensing election victory, leadership urges decorum, inclusiveness.” The Washington Post. 2/2/2005 208 “Shiites pledge Iraqi unity.” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. 2/14/2005. 209 “After boycott, Sunnis knock on back door; in a belated bid to join Iraq’s political process, leaders are working to ensure a role in the new government and a hand in the constitution.” Los Angeles Times. 2/5/2005. 210 “Iraqi refugees overwhelm Syria; migrants who fled violence put stress on housing market, schools.” The Washington Post. 2/3/2005. 211 “Iraq’s neighborhood councils are vanishing.” Christian Science Monitor. 2/25/2005.

The retail and construction trades are booming, and financial reserves and foreign investments are growing. 212 Iraq’s economy is improving, despite high unemployment and inflation rates, as well as long gas lines.213 Following repairs to oil lines in southern Iraq, oil exports appear to be increasing. 214 Notable research groups have found that Iraqi unemployment statistics may be misleading; the numbers give an impression that the economic situation is worsening, despite actual improvements.215

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State Rating: 9

Concerns regarding the legitimacy of the Iraqi government are widespread. Experts warn that the Sunni’s lack of participation in the Jan. 30 election will cast doubt on the newly elected government’s credibility. 216 The continued threat of insurgent attacks, which many Sunnis say was their reason for shying away from the polls, is also undermining the government’s ability to control violent outbreaks across the country.217 Officials are having difficulty estimating the number of insurgents at large, and they have confirmed that insurgents are infiltrating Iraqi security forces and stealing uniforms and equipment.218 Records also indicate that the level of insurgency attacks per day has increased since last year, although the intensity has decreased 20 percent to 50 percent since last fall. 219 Despite the continued insurgent attacks, the election rekindled a sense of optimism for the future among Iraqis. Additional polls suggest that the majority of Iraqis believe that the country is moving in the right direction and almost 90 percent of the population believes that conditions will improve.220

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services Rating: 8

Barely-adequate provisions of public services such as electricity, security and health care exist, although much is left to be desired.221 Most of the Iraqi security forces still are not prepared, with respect to training and equipment, for combat.222 Further complicating the situation, Iraqis are frustrated by delays to improve public services such as sewage, electricity and water, which are occurring because funds for reconstruction are being re-channeled toward boosting security.223 Nonetheless, the security maintenance at all the polling locations for the election marks the Iraqi National Guard and police’s first successful

212 “Iraq grows more dangerous, but…” The New York Times. 2/13/2005. 213 “Iraq grows more dangerous, but…” The New York Times. 2/13/2005. 214 “Exports of oil from southern Iraq on the rise.” Al-Bawaba. 2/9/2005. 215 “Iraq Index: Tracking variables of reconstruction and security in Post -Saddam Iraq.” The Brookings Institution. 5/30/2005. P. 26. The report says there is an inherent difficulty in measuring the Iraqi rate of unemployment over time. Recent estimates are likely to be more accurate than older ones, but also higher; this means that despite an improvement in the economic situation nationwide, the numbers give the impression that it is getting worse. 216 “Mideast governments and newspapers concerned by low Sunni turnout in Iraqi elections.” The Associated Press. 2/1/2005. 217 “Sunnis Arabs meet as Shiites prepare for power after holy days’ carnage.” The Associated Press. 2/20/2005. 218 “Defense secretary refuses to estimate size of insurgency in Iraq.” The Associated Press. 2/17/2005. “25 killed as insurgents in Iraq carry out a wave of attacks.” The New York Times. 2/25/2005. 219 “The state of Iraq: an update.” The New York Times. 2/21/2005. 220 “Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion,” International Republican Institute, (www.iri.org/pdfs/IRIJune04PollPresentation.ppt [May 10, 2005]). Interviews with 2,200 Iraqis conducted May 27- June 11, 2004. Margin of error is +/-2.4%. “Survey of Iraqi Public Opinion,” International Republican Institute, (www.iri.org/03-15-05-IraqPoll.asp[March 25, 2005]). Interviews with 1,967 Iraqis in 15 of 18 governorates, excluding Anbar (Ramadi, Ninewah (Mosul), and Dohuk for security reasons. Margin of error is +/- 3 %. 221 “Power plays preoccupy Iraqi leaders.” Christian Science Monitor.2/22/2005. “The state of Iraq: an update.” The New York Times. 2/21/2005. 222 “Delays for Iraqi Security Force.” The New York Times. 2/4/2005. 223 “Violence trumps rebuilding in Iraq; U.S. officials say soaring security costs have consumed $1 billion earmarked for badly needed water, power and sanitation projects.” Los Angeles Times. 2/21/2005.

large-scale operation, an indication that Iraqi security efforts are improving.224 Furthermore, electricity generator hardware is becoming more available and electricity service is trending up as well.225

9. Suspension of Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights Rating: 9

The extent of women’s rights in Iraq is of high concern, although opinions on the matter are diverse. A report by Amnesty International suggests that the rights of women are increasingly being violated over the course of the post-Saddam period in Iraq.226 Although acknowledging that the “extent of the problem is difficult to establish,” the report cites evidence of women being kidnapped and raped, and notes that lack of security has forced many women out of public life.227 Other experts, however, believe that gains by women, made by the election results, suggest that women will be able to have a larger political role in the new Iraq.228

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State” Rating: 9

Most critically, the presence of a deadly insurgency in Iraq continues to threaten national security. A surge in violence and kidnappings after the elections make officials concerned about security inadequacies.229 The use of suicide bombers for attacks increase; in one of the most deadly attacks since April 2003, a suicide bomber kills more than 100 people and injures more than 130. 230 Additional armed extremist groups are operating across the country and regional militias such as the 80,000-strong Kurdish Peshmerga continue to exist. Still, the number of fatalities as a result of insurgent acts is down since January.231

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites Rating: 9

The post-election political scene includes the ascendancy of Shiites and Kurds to power. But with their newly established power, factionalizing elements begin to surface. The Kurds have become emboldened by the election results to press for an ambitious political agenda of near-autonomous control of the Kurdistan region. 232 As indicated by an overwhelmingly successful informa l referendum on whether Kurdistan should be independent from Iraq, the Kurds are gaining support for a potentially factionalizing issue.233 Such ambitions are alarming Iraqis, especially Shiites, as well as neighboring countries that are trying to suppress Kurdish separatist movements within their own borders.234 Cracks within the Shiite coalition emerge almost immediately following the election results; Shiites begin to realize that even

224 “Iraq grows more dangerous, but…” The New York Times. 2/13/2005. 225 Ibid. 226 “Iraq rights: Amnesty says it’s getting worse for women.” Inter Press Service. 2/22/2005. 227 “Postelection optimism ebbing in Iraq; with no official results and a surge in violence, some wonder whether even a new government can make a difference; others hold on to hope.” Los Angeles Times. 2/13/2005. 228 “The unheralded revolution: Can the gains made by Iraq’s women be echoed elsewhere?” The Washington Post. 2/24/2005. 229 “Four Egyptians kidnapped in Baghdad, raising fears about a new wave of abductions.” The Associated Press. 2/6/2005. 230 “Suicide bomber kills more than 100, wounds 133 in attack south of Baghdad.” The Associated Press. 2/28/2005. “27 die as new wave of attacks hits Iraq: Suicide bombers bring worst day of violence since poll.” The Guardian. 2/8/2005. 231 “Iraq Index: Tracking variables of reconstruction and security in Post-Saddam Iraq.” The Brookings Institution. 5/30/2005. 232 “Kurds press role as deal makers.” The New York Times. 2/9/2005. 233 “As Iraqis celebrate, the Kurds hesitate.” The New York Times. 2/1/2005. 234 “Iraqi Kurds detail demands for a degree of autonomy.” The New York Times. 2/18/2005.

among themselves, they hold significant differences of opinion about how to govern. 235 Although several prominent Shiite leaders publicly announce that they will refrain from using their new power to install clerics into the government, some Shiites believe that the election results have given them a mandate to create a religious constitution that would alienate other groups in Iraq. 236 Wrangling relating to the post of prime minister exacerbate political tensions, especially after interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi announces that he will form a separate coalition to fight for the position.237

12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors Rating: 10

Despite the election success, many Iraqis continue to be critical of U.S. presence.238 Rumors that the United States is planning to create permanent military bases in Iraq remain rampant, and Sunnis in particular are associating their bitterness about the results of the election with their resentment of U.S. “occupation.”239 Many experts to believe that continued U.S. presence in Iraq is antagonizing the new government from developing; and empirical evidence seems to support such a theory. 240 Iraqis that boycotted the elections have agreed to participate in drafting the constitution, on the condition that the United States set a timetable for withdrawal; suicide bombers are targeting U.S. forces and U.S. - supported Iraqi officials; and insurgents are attacking civilians with U.S.-friendly attitudes, such as barbers who cut American-style haircuts.241 Acknowledging these concerns, the United States is now aiming to lower its profile in Iraq and focus on empowering Iraqis with the training and resources to run their own country.242 With time, the United States hopes to encourage a culture in which Iraqis will increasingly expect results from their leaders, rather than direct the blame for their troubles on Americans.243

Core 5

1. Police

Although police security forces are becoming more capable, there remains room for significant improvement.244 In terms of the force’s progress, February marked its first large-scale successful operation: security at the polling places for the election.245 Problems with regard to adequate training and equipment, however, remain a significant challenge for Iraq’s fledgling police force. Of the approximately 80,000 Iraqi police, Pentagon officials have conceded that less than half of them are capable of dealing with any threat in Iraq.246

235 “Within Shiite bloc, diverse views emerge.” Christian Science Monitor. 2/2/2005. 236 “Shiite alliance claims victory; the slate would have to reach out to Sunnis and Kurds to govern; its leaders reject installing clerics and turning Iraq into a theocracy.” Los Angeles Times. 2/2/2005. ”Top Iraq Shiites pushing religion in constitution.” The New York Times. 2/6/2005. 237 Allawi announces new coalition to challenge al-Jaafari for Iraqi prime minister post.” The Associated Press. 2/23/2005. “Allawi forms secular coalition in move to stay in office.” The New York Times. 2/24/2005. 238 “With elections past, many are critical of U.S. presence; others welcome anti-insurgency efforts as assembly prepares to assume power.” The Washington Post. 2/17/2005. 239 “Arabs look up at Iraq’s star.” Christian Science Monitor. 2/3/2005. “After vote, Sunni bitterness stirs.” Christian Science Monitor. 2/2/2005. 240 “The expanding circle of extremism.” Mideast Mirror. 2/2/2005. 241 “Developments in Iraq.” The Associated Press. 2/15/2005. “Iraqi parties jostle for positions.” The Independent. 2/16/2005. “Suicide bomber kills more than 100, wounds 133 in attack south of Baghdad.” The Associated Press. 2/28/2005. “In Iraq, to be a hairstylist is to risk death.” Los Angeles Times. 2/22/2005. 242 “US troops lower profile in fighting Iraqi insurgents.” Financial Times. 2/24/2005. “Iraq grows more dangerous, but…” The New York Times. 2/13/2005. 243 “Power plays preoccupy Iraqi leaders.” Christian Science Monitor. 2/22/2005. 244 “Many Iraqi troops not fully trained U.S. officials say.” The New York Times. 2/4/2005. 245 F41 246 “Rumsfeld concedes Iraq insurgency likely to persist after elections.” Financial Times. 2/4/2005. “Many Iraqi troops not fully trained U.S. officials say.” The New York Times. 2/4/2005.

2. Leadership

After the Jan. 30 elections, Iraq faces in February the difficult challenge of agreeing upon a viable set of political leaders for its new national government. Complex negotiations among the top political parties continue throughout the month, leaving in question the ability of the new government to successfully lead the country. A hotly contested struggle for the prime minister position, hard bargaining by the Kurds, and continued uncertainty regarding Sunni political participation threatens to leave the new government stuck in a political impasse. 247

3. Civil Service

Some analysts fear that the depth of Iraq’s sectarian divisions will likely produce a weak government with a corrupt bureaucracy.248 Prolonged political haggling about political appointments in the new government is preventing the interim ministries from functioning effectively. None of the new ministry candidates have been named and many current ministers are expected to be replaced; no new reconstruction projects can be approved until the new ministers are appointed.249

4. Judiciary

There remains no exact schedule for the Tribunal, although U.S. officials believe they could begin in a matter of weeks, because the training and evidence-gathering period for the Iraqi judges, prosecutors and investigators has been so extensive.250

5. Military

New information regarding the status of Iraq’s new Army and National Guard suggests that most units are poorly armed and have limited mobility. Pentagon documents show that 89 of 90 battalions of the Iraqi Army and National Guard are insufficiently trained and equipped to be able to confront any security threat in Iraq.251 Absentee rates of up to 40 percent and ongoing insurgent attacks that target new recruits further reduce the number of capable soldiers on hand. 252 Another serious problem that remains to be solved is whether political parties, especially those of the Kurds and Shiites, can keep their private armies. The presence of ethnic or sect-based militias, however, can easily lead to warlord-style fiefs across Iraq, which prominent analysts believe will facilitate the descent of the country into a “Lebanon-style civil war.”253

Stings

247 “Vote over, Iraq faces task of forming a government.” The New York Times. 2/1/2005. “The world; Allawi will make longshot bid to keep his job.” Los Angeles Times. 2/24/2005. “The world; Allawi will make longshot bid to keep his job.” Los Angeles Times. 2/24/2005. “The world; Allawi will make longshot bid to keep his job.” Los Angeles Times. 2/24/2005. “Sunnis in Iraq rethink strategy; willingness to participate will likely depend on attitude of new government.” The Washington Post. 2/6/2005. 248 “Iraqi elections: Shia victory means more legitimacy, but the divisions are still deep: analysis.” The Independent. 2/14/2005. 249 “Iraq ministers run the show.” UPI. 2/23/2005. 250 “Trials of some of Hussein’s aides to start within weeks; his is expected in 2006.” The New York Times. 2/10/2005. “War-crimes trials gear up in Iraq.” Christian Science Monitor. 2/23/2005. 251 “Readiness of Iraqi soldiers questioned; troops ‘lightly equipped’, have ‘limited mobility,’ Pentagon records show.” The Baltimore Sun. 2/18/2005. 252 “Many Iraqi troops not fully trained, US officials say.” The New York Times. 2/4/2005. “War-crimes trials gear up in Iraq.” Christian Science Monitor. 2/23/2005. 253 “Kurds vow to retain militia as guardians of autonomy.” The New York Times. 2/27/2005.

¨ As highlighted by a suicide bombing this month that killed more than 100 people and injured more than 130, insurgents are increasingly relying on suicide bombers for their attacks. ¨ Intense political wrangling along ethnic lines and within factionalized groups emerges immediately after the election, preventing a smooth transition of leadership from occurring.

Analysis of Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures Rating: 9

There have been limited improvements made on demographic pressures that have plagued Iraq since the U.S.-le d invasion in 2003. Doctors are raising the concern that continued exposure to violence in Iraq is leading to an increase in depression and psychiatric illnesses.254 The World Health Organization reported a decrease in the overall number of communicable diseases contracted in Iraq over the past year; WHO is also engaged in projects to improve infection control, health education for professionals and students, and supplies of drugs on shortage.255

2. Massive Movement of Refugees and IDPs Rating: 8

Iraqi refugees are returning to the country. Nearly 100,000 Iraqis have returned since Saddam Hussein fell from power, and another 400,000 await entrance in camps supervised by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.256 The increasing number of spontaneously returning Iraqis from neighboring countries further reflects the view that Iraqis believe that the current situation is improving.257

3. Legacy of Vengeance Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia Rating: 9

Despite mutual efforts to cooperate in the political arena, Shiite-Sunni group interactions remain violent and deadly. The Iraqi government admitted that its police tortured and killed three Shiite militiamen from the Badr Organization, prompting the men’s families to claim that these Shiite militiamen were deliberately targeted by police opposed to the rise of Shiite power; Iraqi government officials are insisting that the incident was an isolated case.258 Judges such as Barwez Mohammed Mahmoud, who are involved with the special tribunal that will try Saddam Hussein, are targeted by pro-Baathist insurgents.259 Shiite clerics are being assassinated, and Shiite mosques bombed.260 Amid the violence, religious Shiite leader Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is calling for political groups to unite and form a new government.261 Internal fractures among Iraqi Sunnis are balking their efforts to become involved in the political process. Widespread disorganization and internal divisions makes it impossible for the Sunnis to create a coherent, representative political group.262

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight Rating: 8

254 “G2: ‘We are living in a state of constant fear’: As the violence in Iraq continues, the number of people traumatized by the conflict grows; yet little or no psychiatric treatment is available to them – and what there is can be terrifyingly crude.” The Guardian. 2/2/2005. 255 World Health Organization in Iraq Weekly Bulletin. 28 Feb-6 March 2005, 7-13 March 2005, 21-27 March 2005, 28 March-4 Apr 2005. 256 “Over US$1 million raised for Iraqi refugees.” Al-Bawaba. 3/10/2005. 257 Iraq Operation 2005 Supplementary Appeal. February 2005. UNHCR. 258 “Deaths spur calls to overhaul Iraqi police.” The Boston Globe. 3/31/2005. 259 “Iraqi special tribunal judge reportedly killed outside Baghdad home.” The Associated Press. 3/1/2005. 260 “Shiite cleric and relief official slain by gunmen in Baghdad.” The New York Times. 3/6/2005. “Suicide bomber blows himself up at mosque in Mosul, killing 47; progress made toward forming Iraqi government.” The Associated Press. 3/10/2005. 261 “Shiite spiritual leaders call for unity, formation of government.” The Associated Press. 3/5/2005. 262 “Iraq’s Sunni Arabs seek their voice; the divided minority is trying to stake a claim in a system now dominated by Shiites and Kurds.” Los Angeles Times. 3/28/2005.

Continued violence deters members of the middle and educated classes from remaining in Iraq. Those that stay in the hopes of participating in the post-Saddam economic and political reconstruction are often considered easy targets for the insurgents.

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines Rating: 8

Consequences of the 2003 debaathification laws continue to affect political and security-related occupations. Disproportionate numbers of Sunnis remain left out of government and military jobs.263 Efforts to reverse debaathification and the movement of skilled, jobless Sunnis toward supporting the insurgency, however, are under way.264 Although still underrepresented, some ex-Baathists now participate in every branch of the military, security and police forces, and the ministries of defense and intelligence are actively recruiting experienced Sunnis.265

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Rating: 7

Economic improvements continue in Iraq. Foreign investors, from both governmental and private sectors, are increasingly interested in funding Iraqi efforts and reconstruction projects.266 Iraq’s gross domestic product is expected to soar 17 percent in 2005, continuing a rapid growth trend that began in 2004. 267 Per capita income in Iraq is also on the rise, up to a projected $928 from last year’s $832 – all higher number than when Saddam Hussein was in power.268 Police, pensioners and teachers have seen their income grow tenfold since 2003.269 Electronic appliances and cell phones are also being bought faster than stores can stock them, which is an indication of the financial improvements occurring in Iraq. 270 Experts warn, however, that continued process of economic revitalization hinges on improving the security situation.271 Despite having implemented innovative methods of transporting oil this month, sabotage attacks on oil pipelines, for example, continue siphoning away potential revenue.272

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State Rating: 10

Crime is rampant across the country as international and regional organized crime groups that deal in arms trade, drugs, stolen cars and blackmailing people begin settling into Iraq. 273 Lawless zones spot the country and Baghdad remains one of the world’s most dangerous cities.274 A recent public health study

263 Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, United States House of Representatives. A Statement by Anthony Cordesman. Published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. March 14, 2005, P. 4. 264 Ibid, P. 10. 265 Ibid, P. 10. 266 “Iraq investments expected to hit over US$44 billion.” Al-Bawaba. 3/9/2005. “Investment fund for Iraq launched.” Financial Times. 3/15/2005. 267 “Two years after war, recovery of tattered Iraqi economy hinges on ending the violence.” The Associated Press.3/15/2005. 268 “Key economic indicators for Iraq.” The Associated Press. 3/15/2005. 269 “Patchwork of progress and perils in Iraq.” Christian Science Monitor. 3/18/2005 270 Ibid. 271 “Two years after war, recovery of tattered Iraqi economy hinges on ending violence.” The Associated Press. 3/15/2005. 272 “Derelict plants are crippling Iraq’s oil industry.” The New York Times. 3/3/2005. “Fuel trucks help cut petrol queues.” Financial Times. 3/4/2005. “The haggling continues; why Iraq has no government yet.” The Economist. 3/12/2005. 273 “Crime as lethal as warfare in Iraq; as morgues fill, police blame sectarian rivalries suppressed by Hussein; kidnapping and the trade in arms and drugs are also on the rise.” Los Angeles Times. 3/20/2005. “Drugs threaten Afghanistan’s stability and put Iraq at risk, narcotics control board says in new report.” The Associated Press. 3/1/2005. 274 “Roads out of Baghdad become no-go zones.” Christian Science Monitor. 3/17/2005.

found that violence has become the primary cause of death since the invasion of Iraq, and 60 percent of deaths registered by the Baghdad central morgue are the result of gunshot wounds.275 Notably, violence is most likely to occur at the hands of criminals unrelated to the insurgency, such as kidnappers, carjackers and angry neighbors.276 In fact, officials believe that there are more criminals in Iraq than before and that purely criminal acts are often mistaken for insurgent acts.277 Corruption is thriving amid the millions of dollars that are channeled to Iraq for reconstruction aid. A report by Transparency International claims that Iraq has the potential to become “the biggest corruption scandal in history,” especially because of the entrenched legacy of graft that predates the U.S. occupation. 278 Furthermore, the legitimacy of the state is being undermined by the existence of power feuds in regional provinces, which suggest that the central government has little power to control the country.279

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services Rating: 8

The ability of the government to provide public services to Iraqis is mixed. On the one hand, reconstruction plans are in progress, educational training programs to teach Iraqis new skills are being held, and access to the Internet and telephones is increasing. 280 On the other hand, there is also evidence to suggest that there remains significant room for improvement of provisions of public services. Lame- duck ministrie s are having difficulty providing adequate services as the composition of the post-election government remained to be determined. 281 Attacks on Iraqi government officials are slowing the pace of reconstruction efforts.282 National security remains limited, and reports suggest that many weapons, physical and biological, from Saddam Hussein’s regime are missing or have surfaced in black markets around the world.283 Furthermore, a surge in the occupancy of jails in Iraq is posing security challenges for the military; these challenges were realized as security forces discovered several escape attempts by prisoners.284

9. Suspension of Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights Rating: 9

Revelations about the persistent human rights abuses by Iraqis are published by the State Department; abuses include torture, rape and illegal detentions by police officers last June.285 Various human rights groups are frustrated by the U.S. government’s refusal to collect data on the number of civ ilian casualties

275 “Dead Iraqis: why an estimate was ignored.” Columbia Journalism Review. 3/2005. “Crime as lethal as warfare in Iraq; as morgues fill, police blame sectarian rivalries suppressed by Hussein; kidnapping and the trade in arms and drugs are also on the rise.” Los Angeles Times. 3/20/2005. 276 “Crime as lethal as warfare in Iraq; as morgues fill, police blame sectarian rivalries suppressed by Hussein; kidnapping and the trade in arms and drugs are also on the rise.” Los Angeles Times. 3/20/2005. 277 “Joint Chiefs chairman says rise in insurgent violence likely in months ahead.” The Associated Press. 3/15/2005. 278 “Why graft thrives in postconflict zones.” Christian Science Monitor. 3/17/2005. “New government warned to act on bribes and fraud.” The Independent. 3/17/2005. 279 “Tussle over Najaf leadership threatens to ignite fighting.” Financial Times. 3/4/2005. 280 “Baghdad: Plan to implement number of service projects.” Al-Bawaba. 3/8/2005. “IT training for Iraqis.” Al-Bawaba. 3/8/2005. “Iraqis to be trained on how to deal industrial waste.” Al-Bawaba. 3/8/2005. 281 “Interior minister says Iraqi police, army should secure country in 18 months.” The Associated Press. 3/28/2005. 282 “Major arrests show a shift in Iraq.” Christian Science Monitor. 3/1/2005. “Suicide bomber kills 106 civilians.” The Advertiser. 3/1/2005. 283 “Missiles, microbes, sacked weapon sites: Loose ends proliferate in Iraq. The Associated Press. 3/23/2005. 284 “American jails in Iraq bursting with detainees.” The New York Times. 3/4/2005. “US foils Iraqi bid for great escape through 600ft tunnel.” The Independent. 3/27/2005. 285 “U.S.-installed government in Iraq is cited by U.S. for rights abuses.” The New York Times. 3/1/2005.

that have occurred in Iraq since 2003. 286 Evidence also suggests that Arab media and press are being suppressed through U.S. and Middle East efforts.287

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State” Rating: 9

Independent militias and insurgent groups continue to operate across Iraq, although the number of fatalities as a result of insurgent attacks continues its downward trend since January.288 Most drastically this month, 41 corpses are found in two separate locations; additionally, several unmarked, shallow graves are found, underscoring the existence of rampant violence and crime.289 Assassinations of politicians and judges also continue, as they remain major targets of insurgent attacks.290 Another source of insurgent targets is U.S.-supported contract workers; officials note that site and contract employees in Iraq are attacked, on average, more than 22 times per week.291

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites Rating: 9

In addition to being the top three ethnic groups in Iraq, the Shiites, Kurds and Sunnis are the top three political factions. Throughout Iraq’s recent history, these groups have been pitted against one another, and today, polarization continues both within and between the groups. A public rupture in the Shiite alliance, rooted in disagreements regarding the “Islamization” of Iraq, may potentially further polarize the political scene.292 Sunnis are attempting to seek a political voice in creating a new constitution, but internal disagreements are limiting their efforts.293 The Kurds are frustrating the Sunnis and Shiites with their alleged intransigence and “maximalist demands for power.”294 Political agreements are struck between the various groups, only to be overturned again.295

12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors Rating: 10

Intervention in Iraq by the United States continues to be a sore spot for Iraqis. Sunnis continue to claim that they will consider the insurgency legitimate until U.S. troops withdraw.296 Additionally, anti- American groups are blaming the United States for democratically instigating a new Iranian-style power in Iraq.297

286 “U.S. addresses Iraqis’ losses with payments; the monetary handouts for deaths, injuries or damage are goodwill gestures and do not signify culpability, military officials say.” Los Angeles Times. 3/10/2005. 287 “In the deadly cauldron of Iraq, even the Arab media are being pushed off the story.” Columbia Journalism Review. 3/2005. 288 “Iraq Index: Tracking variables of reconstruction and security in Post-Saddam Iraq.” The Brookings Institution. 5/30/2005. 289 “Security forces find 41 corpses in Iraq; truck bomber kills 3 in Baghdad.” The Associated Press. 3/9/2005. “Graves found at depot pose puzzle in Iraq.” The Oregonian. 3/3/2005. 290 “Iraqi planning minister escapes assassination attempt.” The Associated Press. 3/9/2005. “Iraqi special tribunal judge reportedly killed outside Baghdad home.” The Associated Press. 3/1/2005. 291 “Baghdad suicide bombing highlights danger to U.S. contractors working in Iraq.” The Associated Press. 3/9/2005. 292 “Theocracy now: What will the Shia parties want once they have power in Iraq? Exactly what America doesn’t want.” The American Prospect. 3/2005. “Shia bloc battles to maintain Iraq unity.” Financial Times. 3/7/2005. 293 “Sunnis now want to join Iraq politics.” Christian Science Monitor. 3/24/2005. 294 “Crisis looms in Kirkuk over power-sharing.” Financial Times. 3/10/2005. “U.S. avoids role of mediator as Iraqis remain deadlocked.” The New York Times. 3/20/2005. “Revenge of the Kurds: Buoyed by election success, an Iraqi minority aims to expand its influence. Could it fracture the country? Time Magazine. 3/7/2005. 295 “Shiite-dominated alliance strike deal with Kurds to form new Iraqi government.” 3/10/2005. 296 “Sunni leader vows support for insurgents.” The New York Times. 3/29/2005. 297 “Unintended Consequences in Iraq.” Los Angeles Times. 3/1/2005.

Core 5

1. Police

In a series of unprecedented steps in Iraq, the government has admitted that its police tortured and killed three Shiite militiamen while they were in custody. 298 Although government officials say the incident was isolated case, Shiite leaders are claiming that this incident proves that the police force is a haven for Baathists who mistreated Shiites under Saddam Hussein.299 U.S. officials say Iraqi police are improving. 300 Critics, however, remain wary of positive developments about Iraqi capability, pointing to past reports that have proven overly optimistic.301

2. Leadership

In the aftermath of the Jan. 30 elections, Iraq’s new leaders still have several crucial steps to take in forming a democratic government, including naming top officials and cabinet members, writing a constitution, and holding another election. After Shiite and Kurdish parliamentary blocs quickly agree on who will be prime minister and president, protracted delays soon ensue.302 The delays, which throw a wrench in the political process, stem from a lack of trust in political rivals’ intentions, a hard-line Kurdish demands regarding Kirkuk and other sensitive issues, and a last-minute withdrawal from consideration of the Shiite-Kurd coalition’s favorite choice for assembly speaker, Ghazi Yawar, President of the interim government and a Sunni. 303 Iraqi political leaders try to seek assistance from the United States in solving their polit ical impasse, but U.S. officials say they are heeding a strict no-interference policy ordered by the President.304

3. Civil Service Delays associated with forming the new Iraqi government are having reverberating effects among ministries and government workers. After the Jan. 30 elections, interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi ordered the country’s ministries not to start any long-term projects or make any major policy decisions before the new government was installed. In late March, almost two months into the political wrangling among assembly members, Allawi’s office rescinded its order; many ministry officials, however, remain hesitant about beginning long-term projects and are distracted by the political negotiations and insecurity of their own jobs.305

4. Judiciary

In an effort to increase transparency of Iraqi Special Tribunal, which has been working under secrecy and anonymity in order to protect the judges from insurgents, Raid Juhi, the chief investigating judge at the three-tiered tribunal, publicly announced his role in the tribunal. 306 This announcement comes despite this

298 “Deaths spur calls to overhaul Iraqi police.” The Boston Globe. 3/31/2005. 299 “Deaths spur calls to overhaul Iraqi police.” The Boston Globe. 3/31/2005. 300 “Iraqi troop training: Signs of progress.” Christian Science Monitor. 3/29/2005. As proof of the Iraqi security force’s growing capability, U.S. officials point to the fact that an Iraqi brigade is assuming responsibility for a large portion of Baghdad and in one of the most significant operations yet by its nascent security forces, an Iraqi police commando force successfully raided a guerilla camp north of Baghdad. 301 “Iraqi troop training: Signs of progress.” Christian Science Monitor. 3/29/2005. 302 “Shia-Kurd pact clears way to form government.” Financial Times. 3/12/2005. 303 “Iraqi assembly sets new date to choose leaders – Again; Shiites, Kurds strike tentative deal.” The Washington Post. 3/27/2005. “Leading Sunni Drops Bid for Key Iraqi Post.” The Washington Post. 3/29/2005. 304 “U.S. avoids political fight among Iraqis; Americans resist entreaties to assist deadlocked assembly.” The Washington Post. 3/31/2005. 305 “Delay and uncertainty hamper day-to-day efforts of Iraqi ministries.” The New York Times. 3/26/2005. 306 “First of Saddam’s judges goes public.” UPI. 3/22/2005. “Hussein judge steps out of the shadows; secret of successful government ‘is the success of law,’ Iraqi says.” The Washington Post. 3/22/2005.

month’s assassination of Barwez Mohammed Mahmoud, another investigative judge on the tribunal and his son, as well as an assassination attempt on investigative judge Wayed al-Jadr, who was seriously wounded by the incident.307

5. Military

U.S. commanders are seeing progress in the development of the Iraqi army and U.S. forces are beginning to place Iraqis at the forefront of anti-insurgency operations.308 Obstacles remain, however, as U.S. military trainers say Iraqi soldiers have “little concept” of officer accountability or noncommissioned officer corps with effective authority and leadership. More equipment is needed, as the army’s primary combat transport is an unarmored two-wheel-drive Nissan pickup truck, and many units have been infiltrated by insurgents, despite rigorous screening. 309 U.S. and Iraqi commanders are also very concerned about the ethnic breakdown of the Iraqi army, which has more Shiites and Kurds than Sunnis; they fear this imbalance will fuel the insurgency and cause Sunnis to feel they are being targeted unfairly. 310

Stings

¨ In an unprecedented announcement, the Iraqi government admits that its police tortured and killed three Shiite militiamen while in custody. ¨ As crime rates increase in Iraq, officials report that violence is most likely to occur at the hands of criminals unrelated to the insurgency. ¨ As the Kurds continue their hard-line demands for nearly autonomous control of the Kurdish region in exchange for agreeing on Shiite coalition choices for various government positions, they are perceived as the major political group that is stalling the new government. ¨ Despite having been tapped for the speakership in early March, Sunni Ghazi Yawar withdraws himself from consideration for assembly speaker at the end of March, just before he was to be officially named to the position.

307 “Car bombs kill 10 as judge shot dead.” The Advertiser. 3/3/2005. 308 “Iraqi troops making progress, if slowly; the soldiers seen as their country’s future lack equipment, training and unity. But the U.S. says they have helped curb insurgent strikes.” Los Angeles Times. 2/28/2005. Despite shortcomings, they say the new Iraqi army is coming to excel at capturing insurgents – they are more capable than U.S. forces at identifying guerillas among the general population and are adept at securing residents’ cooperation in raids. 309 “U.S. joins old foes to build new Iraqi army.” Los Angeles Times. 3/21/2005. 310 Ibid.

Analysis of Indicators

1. Mounting Demographic Pressures Rating: 9

Reconstruction frustrations are taking a toll on Iraqis. Fallujah residents are returning to their homes as officials begin to offer remuneration for property damaged during the assault, but they are upset by the slow place of reconstruction aid, continued insecurity and unemployment.311 Health problems, as well as a shortage of drugs and supplies, are exacerbating demographic pressures. Following an increase in cases reported by the Infectious Diseases Control Centre, doctors are expecting an outbreak of hepatitis. According to officials, the increase is due to poor sewage control, particularly in suburbs of the city. Increases in typhoid, tuberculosis and water-borne diseases are expected as well.

2. Massive Movement of Refugees and IDPs Rating: 9

Iranian Kurdish refugees in Iraq continue to flee elsewhere, allegedly because of the continued insecurity that has followed the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime; approximately 3,500 of the 12,000 refugees who had been at the Al Tash camp prior 2003 have returned to Iran or fled to northern Iraq and Jordan. Humanitarian agencie s often find it difficult to send supplies to refugee camps in Iraq. One camp near the Jordanian border cannot be accessed from within Iraq, and food items and personal hygiene products are delivered via the Jordanian side.312

3. Legacy of Vengeance Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia Rating: 9

After months of political wrangling surrounding the formation of newly-elected Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s government cabinet, almost all the ministry positions have been filled. Officials believe, however, that continued sectarian and ethnic tensions threaten to halt or slow the political progress.313 Iraq’s Shiites and Kurds are united on some issues such as their intense distrust of Sunni Arabs, and their hostility against members of the former Baath Party.314 According to a top official, the Shiite Muslim bloc leading the new Iraqi government will demand the removal of all top officials left over from Saddam Hussein. On other issues, such as whether to enshrine Koranic law in the new constitution and allow the Kurds to retain broad autonomous powers of the Kurdistan region, the Shiites and Kurds clash.315

Sunnis remain frustrated by the political arrangements. Shiite and Kurdish leaders have agreed to grant six ministries to Sunni Arabs, in an effort to create a national unity government, but Sunnis boycotted the cabinet swearing ceremony in protest of feeling marginalized. 316 Officials believe that the rise in the frequency of kidnappings of Shiite Arabs by Sunni insurgents is a sign of growing sectarian tensions as a

311 “Falluja residents return to city.” BBC News. 4/7/2005. “In Fallujah, U.S. envoy greeted by complaints.” The New York Times. 4/14/2005. “US journalist in Iraq.” US Berkeley News. 4/21/2005. “Preaching the rule of law in a tribal land.” The Washington Post. 4/16/2005. 312 “Child’s death highlights refugees’ plight on Iraq-Jordan border.” UNHCR. 4/15/2005. 313 “A crucial window for Iraq: 15 weeks to pull together.” The New York Times. 4/29/2005. 314 “Military raid in Baghdad snares 65, officials say.” The New York Times. 4/12/2005. 315 “A Kurd is named Iraq’s president as tensions boil.” The New York Times. 4/7/2005. “Honing the art of mediation in divided Kirkuk.” The Washington Post. 5/2/2005. 316 “Iraqi cabinet may be all set today, leaders of parties say.” The New York Times. 4/27/2005. “String of explosions kills 50 in Iraq.” The Washington Post. 4/30/2005. “Cabinet sworn in but 6 Iraq posts remain unfilled.” The New York Times. 5/4/2005.

result of Sunni under-representation in the new government.317 Sunni kidnappers’ threats to kill the hostages unless all Shiites evacuate a town south of Baghdad are latest in a series of retaliatory abductions by armed Sunni and Shiite groups.318

4. Chronic and Sustained Human Flight Rating: 8

There is no evidence to suggest a change in this indicator for the month of April.

5. Uneven Economic Development Along Group Lines Rating: 8

Although electricity availability is often limited, U.S. occupation authorities are ensuring that the burden is equally shared across the country. Whereas Saddam Hussein removed power from other parts of the country to serve Baghdad, routine of blackouts today occur everywhere.319 The pace of reconstruction often varies depending on how safe the region is from insurgent attacks. Due to the outbreak of insurgency violence in central and southern Iraq, the United States is shifting funds that had been devoted to reconstruction projects in the Kurdish region. While American officials believe that the shift of billions of dollars from reconstruction to security is essential for maintaining stability in Iraq, the tradeoff carries a special resonance to Kurds as more than 90 projects are cancelled.320

6. Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Rating: 7

A growing car industry and an influx of home appliances is increasing the demand for oil in Iraq; oil revenue is more than $1.5 billion in April, up from $0.2 billion in June 2003. 321 Maximum oil production remains far from being accomplished, however, as oil fields and pipelines continue to be constrained by poorly maintained facilities and insurgent attacks.322 The pace of reconstruction could accelerate if security improves and foreign spending increases.323

7. Criminalization and/or Delegitimization of the State Rating: 10

Looting and corruption is rampant. In Iraq’s major cites and at border crossings, equipment looted from abandoned weapons manufacturing plants is being sold in open street markets.324 Officials note that corruption and bribery in the oil industry, inherited from the Saddam Hussein regime, has increased in the past two years because of the weakness of the state.325 Criminals not necessarily associated with the insurgency are on the loose, kidnapping foreigners in particular, for monetary and political reasons; in the

317 “Iraqis in accord on top positions, ending deadlock.” The New York Times. 4/6/2005. “On Falluja streets, new government seen as threat.” Reuters Alertnet. 4/29/2005. 318 “ At least 20 are killed in wave of violence in Iraq.” The New York Times. 4/17/2005. 319 “Power grid in Iraq far from fixed.” The Washington Post. 5/1/2005. 320 “Security vs. rebuilding: Kurdish town loses out.” The New York Times. 4/16/2005. 321 “Iraq Index: Tracking variables of reconstruction and security in Post-Saddam Iraq.” The Brookings Institution. 5/30/2005, P. 24. 322 “Why a black market for gasoline vexes Iraq.” The Christian Science Monitor. 4/20/2005. “Rebel attacks kill 12 in Iraq.” Arab News. 4/20/2005. 323 “Iraq: Security problems slow reconstruction.” Radio Free Europe. 4/26/2005. “The power grid in Iraq far from fixed.” The Washington Post. 5/1/2005. “A promise unfulfilled: Iraq’s oil is lagging.” The New York Times. 5/2/2005. 324 “Arms equipment plundered in ’03 surfaces in Iraq.” The New York Times. 4/17/2005. 325 “Arms equipment plundered in ’03 surfaces in Iraq.” The New York Times. 4/17/2005.

past year, more than 200 foreigners have been abducted and 30 killed. 326 Additionally, U.S. officials and Shiite clergy are concerned that continued delays in forming a new Iraqi government will increase popular frustration and endanger the government’s legitimacy.327 Officials fear that further delays associated with drafting a constitution and holding national elections will breed corruption and civil turbulence and create questions and uncertainties about the progress of the political process.328

8. Progressive Deterioration of Public Services Rating: 8

American officials say the political vacuum caused by the prolonged stalemate over the formation of a new Iraqi government has led to apathetic law enforcement and public administration. Some regional government leaders are appointing police and security officials without consulting with the Interior Ministry, as required by law.329 As the political impasse persists over the formation of an Iraqi government, the provincial governments are adrift.330 In addition, the delays caused by the transition to new Iraqi government halt the construction projects, major new contracts and government reorganization.331

9. Suspension of Arbitrary Application of the Rule of Law and Widespread Violation of Human Rights Rating: 9

The future of women’s rights in Iraq is unclear. Among the 87 women who won seats to the Iraqi national assembly, there is a deep divide between those advocating Western-style rights and those who support Islamic laws that are often viewed as infringements on women’s rights.332 Arbitrary civilian and journalist deaths are growing, according to several reports.333 Figures compiled from records kept by the health, human rights, interior and other ministrie s suggest that more than 6,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed over the past two years.334

As American forces shift control to Iraqi units, there is growing concern among U.S. officers that the lack of civilian oversight of Iraqi security forces will allow for abuse. U.S. officers acknowledge that Iraqi forces have beaten, tortured, and broken people’s bones.335 An Iraqi television show called “Terrorism in the Grip of Justice” features detainees confessing to various crimes in situations that violate the Geneva Conventions on human rights.336

10. Security Apparatus Operates as a “State Within a State” Rating: 10

Pentagon records reveal that the average number of bombings, shootings, and rocket and mortar attacks is at 50 or 60 attacks per day, up from approximately 40 per day since the Jan. 30 elections.337 The

326 “3 arrested in abduction of British aid worker.” The Washington Post, 5/2/2005. 327 “Political impasse alarms Shiite clergy.” The Washington Post. 4/3/2005. 328 “Rumsfeld, in Iraq, warns of pitfalls for leaders.” The New York Times. 4/12/2005. 329 “Rice and Cheney are said to push Iraq on impasse.” The New York Times. 4/25/2005. 330 “Iraq’s assembly accepts cabinet despite tension.” The New York Times. 4/29/2005. 331 Ibid. 332 “ In jeans or veils, Iraqi women are split on new political power.” The New York Times. 4/13/2005. 333 “US arrests 8 suspects in helicopter crash.” CNN.com. 4/23/2005. 334 “Insurgency has killed 6,000 civilians, Iraq says.” Reuters. 4/5/2005. 335 “Iraqi forces brings calm to a rebel stronghold.” The Washington Post. 4/28/2005. 336 “The way of the commandos.” The New York Times Magazine. 5/1/2005. 337 “Pentagon plays down new rise in Iraq violence.” The Washington Post. 4/27/2005.

resurgence of violence coincides with deepening uncertainty over the formation of the next government, and U.S. and Iraqi officials are concerned that further delays in forming the government will mean further losses in fighting the insurgency. 338

Officials believe that the insurgency is getting stronger and more sophisticated in its attacks.339 The violence shows that the insurgents still have the resources and organizational structure to carry out discip lined and demoralizing strikes.340 The insurgents demonstrate the capability to maneuver from one area of operation to another with ease, making use of superior techniques and means of communication and transportation to strike at a chosen target in an organized manner.341 Senior American commanders say the insurgents match ruthlessness wit a growing tactical sophistication.342 The most recent attack on the Abu Ghraib prison exemplified the insurgency’s ability to use their strength for larger, more concentrated attacks.343

11. Rise of Factionalized Elites Rating: 9

The militant Shiite leader Muqtada al Sadr has recently taken part in democratic politics. Instead of a return to shootings and bombings, his group says they will be protesting and lobbying the new Shiite-led government as part of a non-violent campaign to secure the withdrawal of American and British troops.344 Twenty-three members of the national assembly and three members of the cabinet – the health minister, the transportation minister and the civil society minister – belong to al Sadr’s political movement.345 Recent al Sadr-backed political demonstrations illustrates the ability of al Sadr to mobilize his followers peacefully and capitalize on Iraqi resentment caused by the presence of 150,000 foreign troops.346

To compensate the lack of Sunni representation and encourage moderate Sunnis to support the government, Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani urges Shiites to give Sunnis 10 cabinet posts. The Sunni nominated four candidates are vetoed by deputies belonging to the United Iraqi Alliance on the ground that they have links with the expelled Baath Party.347 Calls by Shiite Muslim clerics for action against any Sunni hardliners still in the government and military reflect growing tensions over how the new, Shiite-dominated government will handle the country’s sectarian divide.348

12. Intervention of Other States or External Political Actors Rating: 10

While senior commanders say the insurgency is still mostly driven by Iraqis, small numbers of foreign fighters who carry out most of the suicide bombings are still coming mainly from Syria.349 The U.S. -led coalition in Iraq is growing smaller as Poland announces plans to withdraw its last 1,700 troops, Bulgaria aims to pull out its 500 troops, and Japan reports that its 550 troops will be withdrawn by year’s end. 350

338 “Analysis: Iraq’s insurgency exploits delay in forming govt.” Reuters. 4/20/2005. 339 “String of explosions kills 50 in Iraq.” The Washington Post. 4/30/2005. 340 “Wave of attacks in Iraq kill 60 and wound 100.” The New York Times. 4/30/2005. 341 “Bombs, clashes shake Iraq.” Aljazeera.net. 4/21/2005. 342 “Video appears to show insurgents kill a downed pilot.” The New York Times. 4/23/2005. 343 “Zarqawi said to be behind Iraq raid.” The Washington Post. 4/5/2005. 344 “Democracy seems to be creeping forward in Iraq, if not in the wider Arab world.” The Guardian. 4/13/2005. 345 “Iraq’s assembly accepts cabinet despite tension.” The New York Times. 4/29/2005. 346 “Tens of thousands of Iraqis demand U.S. withdrawal.” The Washington Post. 4/10/2005. 347 “Communal system taking hold in Iraq.” Foreign Panorama. 5/8/2005. 348 “Iraqi cleric hails amnesty idea.” The Washington Post. 4/16/2005. 349 “US commanders see possible cut in troops in Iraq.” The New York Times. 4/17/2005. 350 “ Rumsfeld warns Iraq on corruption.” News.co.au. 4/13/2005.

Other American allies such as the Ukraine, the Netherlands and Spain are pulling their soldier from Iraq.351

Core 5

1. Police

American officers say the biggest challenges are recruiting new Iraqi leaders at all levels of command, and training the new Iraqi police.352 Many police allegedly lack the skills, confidence, and gear to suppress a fierce insurgency and protect a fledgling democracy. Though improvements in the ability of Iraqis to police their own country still remains, U.S. soldiers are now increasingly moving to an advisory role.

2. Leadership

A new president, two vice presidents and a prime minister are elected, and a partial cabinet is approved by the Member’s of Iraq’s National Assembly. The 30 approved ministers include 16 Shiites, nine Kurds, four Sunni Arabs and one Christian. One-fifth of the new cabinet’s 37 positions are left empty: two deputy prime minister spots and the ministries of defense, oil, industry, electricity and human rights.353 Meanwhile, interim Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari will act as defense minister; Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi will serve as oil minister; and Deputy Prime Minister Rosh Nouri Shaways will be electricity minister until the position is filled.354

3. Civil Service

Iraq's political factions are increasingly at odds over the distribution of ministries in the yet-to-be-formed government. The ministers in the new Iraqi government have been chosen on the basis of ethnic background rather than expertise, which raises concern among analysts who believe that further factionalization along ethnic lines, will prevent a democratic government from emerging in Iraq.

4. Judiciary

The Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance demands for trials of every former official, soldier or worker suspected of wrongdoing during Saddam Hussein’s era. Hussain Shahristani, who helped form the Shiite alliance, says plans for how to handle members of Hussein’s Baath Party in the armed forces and intelligence services are being outlined. 355

5. Military U.S. commanders say their objective is to have an entire Iraqi division of 10,000 troops which would be in charge of most of Baghdad by this fall. Some U.S. military leaders expect the gradual handover to allow a reduction of U.S. troops in Iraq beginning next year. U.S. advisers and Iraqi soldiers, however, acknowledge that the Iraqi forces are still poorly equipped; they lack medics, adequate communications equipment, computers and other battlefield necessities.356 Threats by the new government to reinstate

351 “Bomber kills scores at Iraq police center.” ABC News. 5/5/2005. 352 “US Commanders See Possible Cut in Troops in Iraq.” The New York Times. 4/11/2005. 353 “Iraqi Assembly Approves Partial Cabinet.” The Washington Post. 4/29/2004. 354 “String of Explosions Kill 50 in Iraq.” The Washington Post. 4/30/2004. 355 “Iraqi Alliance Seeks to Oust Top Officials of Hussein Era.” The Washington Post. 4/18/2005. 356 “Handoff to Iraqi Forces Being Tested in Mosul.” The Washington Post. 4/7/2005.

debaathification practices within Iraq’s military and civil service is causing U.S. officials to be concerned; such a purge could rid the armed forces, which are being assembled, trained and armed by the United States at a cost of billions of dollars, of their most seasoned combatants against the insurgency.”357

Stings ¨ Insurgent attacks are on the rise again, after a brief lull that followed the Jan. 30 elections. Officials say these attacks are increasingly more sophisticated.

357 “Rumsfeld Urges Iraqi Leaders Not To Purge Security Forces.” The Washington Post. 4/13/2005.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

As previously stated, this report marks the fourth of a series of six-month progress reports. These reports are based on an analytical methodology that has been developed and tested over the past eight years. The objectives of this particular project are to: ¨ Assess the extent to which Iraq is moving toward a situation in which it can solve its own problems peacefully without an outside military or administrative presence. This will provide the basis for an exit strategy. ¨ Analyze trend lines in Iraq along 12 top social, economic and political/military indicators of internal instability. ¨ Evaluate five core institutions, (political leadership, civil service, system of justice, police and military) which are necessary for the state to function. ¨ Review “stings” – the surprises, triggers, idiosyncrasies, national temperament, and other frequently overlooked factors. ¨ Present a “before” and “after” portrait, with trend lines, showing progress and regression in specific indicators as well as the aggregate at several intervals over time. ¨ Make concrete policy recommendations and conclusions.

This study is an objective, nonpartisan assessment, tracking the post-war reconstruction effort in systematic fashion, with updates at six-month intervals until sustainable security is achieved. It is important that both the U.S. presence in, and exit from, Iraq be neither premature nor longer than necessary. Only a comprehensive tracking and assessment study can make reasonably reliable judgments of this kind.

This report offers a balanced combination of quantitative data grounded in rigorous qualitative research. This even blend of statistical and descriptive analysis accurately portrays the internal situation in Iraq according to trends across 12 distinct variables, or indicators. With each month, ratings are assigned to each indicator of instability according to a comprehensive assessment of daily news coverage of Iraq. The research team referenced over 150 domestic and international news sources, including Arabic language sources, for this report. The data collected is information available to the public through accessible media sources. At the end of each month, a rating, (between 1-10), is assigned based on the developments of that particular month by indicator. Each month’s rating is assigned relative to the previous month’s ratings. The respective ratings are then justified qualitatively by indicator in descriptive summaries in the appendices of this report. (It is important to note that these summaries are highlights of the particular month’s developments and provide a condensed representation of the most significant developments on the ground, as reported by the media, expert, and independent organizations which were on site. Any specific developments omitted are done so because they are judged by the research team to be redundant, outliers, or relatively unimportant with respect to the highlighted events.) From this methodology, the internal stability of Iraq is assessed by following monthly trends, both by indicator and aggregate ratings. For more comprehensive information on the methodology, please refer to An Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse: Manual for Practitioners, authored by Pauline H. Baker and Angeli E. Weller (1998, Fund for Peace) or visit the website at www.fundforpeace.org.

As stated previously, each particular indicator is assigned a monthly value from 1, being the most stable, to 10, the most unstable or intense. Along with each rating, there is a corresponding, descriptive summary in the respective appendix to justify the rating. Therefore, any change in the indicator ratings can be easily referenced by accessing the appendix for that particular month (paginated in the Table of Contents). The graphs illustrate the trends, first as total aggregate representation and then separately by each indicator. The aggregate representation is accompanied by a legend that describes the overall state stability. These graphs accurately represent the change in Iraq’s internal stability or lack thereof.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

This research team, led by Dr. Pauline H. Baker, president of the FfP and the original author of the methodology, accepts that the rating system of 1-10 is somewhat subjective. However, in light of the logistical barriers to conducting field research in any conflict environment, and/or collapsing state, the potential for bias is accounted for by internal checks, such as consistency in research methods, extensive citation, and comprehensive discussion regarding the meanings of any statistics and developments. Moreover, the research team maintained consistency in research patterns and sources, accompanied by cross-referencing of any observed inconsistencies. Furthermore, over time, as these reports continue, the numerical ratings define themselves in specific tangible conditions, relative to previous ratings, so that clear trends emerge.