Iraq As a Failed State Report #4
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Pauline H. Baker LESSONS FROM THE JANUARY ELECTIONS Iraq as a Failed State Report #4 Pauline H. Baker The Fund for Peace 1701 K Street, NW Eleventh Floor Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 223-7940 (phone) (202) 223-7947 (fax) www.fundforpeace.org LESSONS FROM THE JANUARY ELECTIONS Contents PREFACE 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 INDICATOR TRENDLINE GRAPHS Graph 1: Iraq Indicator Totals 13 Graph 2: Key Events in Iraq 14 Graph 3: Indicator Trendline Graphs 15 Table 1: Iraq: Summary Indicator Ratings 18 DATA INTERPRETATION Appendix I: October Indicator Summary 19 Appendix II: November Indicator Summary 25 Appendix III: December Indicator Summary 31 Appendix IV: January Indicator Summary 37 Appendix V: February Indicator Summary 42 Appendix VI: March Indicator Summary 49 Appendix VII: April Indicator Summary 55 METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 61 LESSONS FROM THE JANUARY ELECTIONS Preface Although there have been many reports on Iraq, the Fund for Peace (FfP) is contributing to post-conflict Iraq analysis by providing a systematic evaluation of Iraqi progress, using specific metrics for measuring social, economic and political stabilization since the invasion in April 2003. Applying the analytical framework developed by the FfP to assess societies at risk of internal conflict and state collapse, this series of reports evaluates Iraq’s progress toward sustainable security – the stage at which the country is largely peaceful and capable of governing itself without external military or administrative oversight.1 The methodology employed is detailed in the Methodological Note at the end of this report. Briefly, it is based on independent ratings of twelve top conflict indicators enumerated in the attached charts, five core political institutions, and “stings” or unanticipated events and factors. The purpose of the ratings is to discover patterns and trends over time; a particular rating in one indicator at one point in time is less significant than changes over time. Ratings are reviewed carefully, based on information gleaned from open-source English and Arabic language sources, government reports, studies by diverse organizations and groups that had conducted site visits in Iraq, and various scholars and journalists. Detailed narratives describing the indicator trends are contained in the Appendices of this report. Although research assistants and other staff at the FfP have contributed to the report, the conclusions are entirely the responsibility of the author, who has conducted years of research into failing states and internal war. She has been ably assisted by outstanding students who have brought creative skills, thoughtful insights, and critical minds to a topic that is highly complex and controversial. For this report, special thanks go to Matthew Manes from Appalachian State University, Liana Wyler from Duke University and Gamze Demirtola from George Washington University. All added to the quality of the final product. Thanks also to Anne Bader, Jason Ladnier, Krista Hendry, Patricia Taft and Isaac Borocz, who helped prepare the series and offered constructive criticisms. Pauline H. Baker August 15, 2005 1 For another application of the methodology, see the “Failed States Index” in Foreign Policy, July/August 2005, 56-65. Additional details can be obtained on the Fund for Peace website: www.fundforpeace.org. The Fund For Peace, Copyright 2005 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & RECOMMENDATIONS Overview This is the fourth report in the Fund for Peace Iraq series. In previous reports, we evaluated trends since March 2003, before the THIS IS THE FOURTH REPORT IN invasion, in a month-by-month, indicator-by-indicator assessment THE FUND FOR PEACE IRAQ at roughly six-month intervals. SERIES. IN PREVIOUS REPORTS, The first report concluded that Iraqi institutions had decayed WE EVALUATED EVENTS SINCE considerably before the invasion and that the country was a failing MARCH 2003, BEFORE THE state at the time of the military intervention. Military action dealt INVASION, IN A MONTH-BY- the final blow that precipitated the total collapse of the state. MONTH, INDICATOR-BY- INDICATOR ASSESSMENT AT The second report found that Iraq had slipped into a “failed state syndrome,” a condition in which trends were reinforcing each ROUGHLY SIX-MONTH other to produce a spiraling conflict that was driving Iraq toward INTERVALS. Lebanonization, or sectarian civil war. In the third report, the situation in Iraq deteriorated further. For the first time, all the twelve indicators were in alert, the most dangerous rating, reinforcing the trend toward Lebanonization. Despite vigorous efforts to quell the insurgency and generate broader political support for the interim government, the social, economic and political/military indicators got worse. Nonetheless, the political process continued to move forward, focusing mostly on holding an election in January 2005. In this fourth report, which covers the period from October 2004 through April 20052, we continue the analysis with two other IN ADDITION TO TRACKING THE features. In addition to tracking the indicators on a monthly basis, INDICATORS ON A MONTHLY we also provide an overview of trends for the first two years of the occupation, from April 2003 to April 2005, through an enlarged BASIS, WE ALSO PROVIDE AN aggregate trendline, showing key events. This yielded interesting OVERVIEW OF TRENDS FOR THE findings, discussed below. FIRST TWO YEARS OF OCCUPATION…. WE ALSO LOOK We also look closely at the impact of the January 2005 elections, CLOSELY AT THE IMPACT OF THE widely described as a political milestone. In particular, we JANUARY 2005 ELECTIONS, examine whether three major political expectations were fulfilled. WIDELY DESCRIBED AS A In the recommendations, we review the lessons that can be drawn from this experience for the upcoming elections – on October 15 POLITICAL MILESTONE. to ratify the constitution and on December 15 to elect a full-term government. Finally, we provide a strategic recommendation that is essential if the insurgency is to be subdued and the trend toward civil conflict is to be averted. 2 In this report, an additional month was added to the usual six-month interval to incorporate data on the establishment of the new government and the National Assembly. The Fund For Peace, Copyright 2005 5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & RECOMMENDATIONS Findings · Since April 2004, all twelve indicators have remained in alert, the most dangerous zone. This has been the pattern for a full year. Although there was a slight SINCE APRIL 2004, ALL TWELVE improvement in economic conditions following the INDICATORS HAVE REMAINED IN January elections, overall progress was not sustained. ALERT, THE MOST DANGEROUS ZONE. THIS HAS BEEN THE · Most disturbingly, a review of trends since the PATTERN FOR A FULL YEAR. beginning of the occupation reveals an apparent linkage between progress in democratization and a worsening of the ratings. At important times – when the Interim Governing Council was established (June 13, 2003), when Saddam Hussein was captured (March 2, 2004), when the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1546 that transferred sovereignty to the interim government (June 8, 2004) and when official results of the January elections were announced (February 13, 2005) – the indicator ratings shot up THE RISK OF CONFLICT sharply. (See Key Events in Iraq (Pre -war through INCREASED, RATHER THAN April 2005) p. 14) In other words, the risk of civil DECREASED, AT CRITICAL conflict increased, rather than decreased, at critical STAGES OF THE POLITICAL stages of the political process when things were PROCESS, WHEN THINGS WERE expected to improve. EXPECTED TO IMPROVE. · There are two possible interpretations of this seeming paradox. One is that democratization itself is driving conflict because jihadists and disgruntled Baathists oppose democratic change. This may be true of fundamentalists who want a theocratic state, but it is not a universal view of the Sunni population, where the heart of the insurgency lies. Many Sunni civilians want the insurgency to end. A second, more likely, explanation is that the failure to effectively incorporate THE FAILURE TO EFFECTIVELY a broad range of Sunni leaders into the political INCORPORATE A BROAD RANGE process is driving conflict because, in the eyes of Iraq’s traditional ruling group, the process is heading toward OF SUNNI LEADERS INTO THE Shiite domination with Kurdish collaboration and/or POLITICAL PROCESS IS DRIVING autonomy, an outcome that will result in permanent CONFLICT. Sunni exclusion from power. · Pre -electoral political expectations of the impact of polls were only partially achieved. The hope that political legitimacy would be enhanced was fulfilled insofar as a new transitional government was elected by Shiites and Kurds, but Sunnis regarded the process as illegitimate and largely stayed away from the polls. The Fund For Peace, Copyright 2005 6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & RECOMMENDATIONS · The election failed to fulfill two other major goals: quelling the insurgency and reducing sectarian polarization. In fact, elections may have intensified both. The insurgency expanded to target more civilians , mainly Shiites, and violence intensified against the police and security forces. Since party organization and voting was along ethnic/religious THE ELECTION FAILED TO lines, sectarian divisions in the society were reflected in the political parties that gained seats in the National FULFULL TWO OTHER MAJOR Assembly and in the composition of the transition GOALS: QUELLING THE government.