THE BATTLE of the PEACE-BUILDING NORM AFTER the IRAQ WAR by DAISAKU HIGASHI a THESIS SUBMITTED in PARTIAL FULFILLMENT of THE
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THE BATTLE OF THE PEACE-BUILDING NORM AFTER THE IRAQ WAR by DAISAKU HIGASHI A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Political Science) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA July 2006 © Daisaku Higashi 2006 ABSTRACT This thesis argues that there is a norm on peace building created by a series of practices of the United Nations after the end of the Cold War. The norm can be characterized by three key components: (l) the UN's leading role authorized by the UN Security Council)' (2) indigenous legitimacy conferred by local political process (peace agreements, popular consultations, etc.); and (3) national elections legitimatized by IOs (UN). After its invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration attempted to change this norm and to rebuild Iraq in a virtually unilateral way without the UN's political role. However, the United States failed in this attempt and needed to ask for the help of the United Nations to design the alternative political transition, create interim governments, and conduct elections by exercising the UN's unique legitimacy. The case shows that international norms, created by IOs, are able to resist the challenge by a hegemon that attempted to change the norm, and that the IOs could push the hegemon to follow the original expectations of the norm. The case is a serious challenge to the realist tenet because the norm can substantially regulate the behavior of the hegemon even in a hard case involving the vital interests of a hegemonic state, such as the US involvement in Iraq. The case is also significant in demonstrating how the norm can be changed; contrary to the realist conviction, even a hegemonic state cannot change the norm with free hands when the United Nations Secretariat and other UN member states seriously oppose the amendment of the norm. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ii TABLE OF CONTENTS iii LIST OF FIGURES v CHAPTER I The Peace-Building Norm and Its Components 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 What Is Peace Building? 4 1.3 Why Norms Matter and How They Change: Theoretical Debates..... 5 1.3.1 Realism... : 6 1.3.2 Neo-Liberalism 8 1.3.3 Constructivism... 11 1.3.4 Why Is Examining the Nona on Peace Building Significant? The Impact on Lives 13 1.3.5 Not in the Margins: Theoretical Implications 14 1.4 What Is the Peace Building Norm? 17 1.4.1 Three Key Components 18 1.4.2 Empirical Support --23 1.5 Explaining the Peace-Building Norm: Why Is It Robust? 35 1.5.1 Functional Explanation: Success Rate ..35 1.5.2 The UN Advantage in Legitimacy 38 1.5.3 Legitimacy for Whom? The Audience..... 39 1.5.4 International Legitimacy 40 1.5.5 Indigenous Legitimacy and Elections 44 1.5.6 Did Hegemony Create the Peare-Bunding Norm? 45 1.6 Method -48 CHAPTER II The Bush Adnumstration Challenge to the Peace-Building Norm 50 2.1 Unilateralism vs. UN Legitimacy: The Neoconservative Agenda 50 2.2 The U.S. Plan to Rebuild Iraq Single-Handedly 52 2.2.1 Absolute Power of Authority by Resolution 1483 52 2.2.2 The U.S.' First Attempt to Change the Peace-Building Norm 53 2.2.3 The Authority of Bremer 54 2.2.4 The First Bremer Plan 55 2.2.5 The U.S.' Second Attempt to Change the Peace-Building Norm 56 2.2.6 Crucial Policies by Bremer Without UN Consultation 58 2.3 Why Did the U.S. Try to Conduct Nation Building by Itself? 60 2.3.1 The Other Neoconservative Agenda: Increase Security for Israel. 60 2.3.2 Oil As National Interest 63 Chapter III Resistance to the Hegemon .65 3.1 Why Did the UN Get Involved in Iraq in the Aftermath of the Invasion? 65 3.1.1 The Marginal Role of the United Nations Until August 19, 2003 65 3.1.2 The Realist Account? 67 3.2 The Challenge to U.S. Policy Following the Attack on the UN 68 3.3 Proposals by Kofi Annan on Rebuilding Iraq 71 3.3.1 The Reasons for Annan's Proposal 74 3.3.2 Assistance for Annan from Other Member States 75 iii 3.4 The U.S. Continued to Ignore the UN and Adopted Resolution 1511.... 77 CHAPTER IV U.S. Changed Policy on Nation Building in Iraq 80 4.1 Gradual Change in U.S. Policy on Iraq 80 4.1.1 Bremer Caucus Plan 80 4.1.2 Second Change of U.S. Policy on January 19, 2004 84 4.1.3 UN Designed the Procedure of Nation Building and Elections in Iraq 85 4.1.4 UN Election Design and Assistance 88 4.2 Reason for U.S. Change 89 4.2.1 U.S.-Led Nation Building Suffered from a Lack of Legitimacy in Iraq 89 4.2.2 How Did U.S. Legitimacy Deteriorate Among Iraqis 95 4.2.3 Lack of Legitimacy Among the Public in the United States 98 CHAPTER V Failure of Peace Building in Iraq and Its Impact on Other Peace Building 101 5.1 Why Is Nation Building in Iraq Not Successful? 101 5.1.1 Lack of UN Authorization for the Invasion of Iraq Damaged the Possibility of Success 103 5.1.2 Mistakes in the First Year of Occupation Were Too Massive to Recover From 106 5.1.3 Ongoing Suffering After Sovereignty Was Returned in July, 2004 113 5.2 Impact of Lesson in Iraq on Other Peace Building in the Future 114 5.2.1 It Is Unlikely That the U.S. Will Attempt to Change the Peace-Building Norm Again ••• 114 5.2.2 New Challenge of the United Nations Peace Building 116 5.3 Conclusion 118 Bibliography 122 iv LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1 Peace-Building Process in Cambodia 24 Figure 1.2 Peace-Building Process in Bosnia ..26 Figure 1.3 Peac«-Building Process in Croatia ...27 Figure 1.4 Peace-Building Process in East Timor 29 Figure 1.5 Peace-Bunding Process in Afghanistan 31 Figure 1.6 Peace-Building Process in DRC 34 Figure 2.1 The First Bremer Plan 56 Figure 3.1 The First Bremer Plan 73 Figure 3.2 The Annan Proposal 73 Figure 4.1 Second Bremer Plan (Caucus Plan) 80 Figure 4.2 Brahimi Proposal 86 Figure 4.3 Attack Against U.S. Forces ...95 Figure 4.4 National Poll in Iraq May 14-23, 2004 96 Figure 4.5 About U.S.-British Military Action (USA Today/CNN/Gallup) 98 Figure 5.1 Coalition Forces in Iraq in 2005 104 Figure 5.2 Gallup Poll of Iraq 2004 110 Figure 5.3 Gallup Poll of Baghdad 2003-2004 Ill Figure 5.4 Gallup Poll of Baghdad 2003-2004 112 v CHAPTER I The Peace-Building Norm and Its Components 1.1 Introduction Peace building has become one of the dominant issues in current international politics. Observing difficulties and challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, and East Timor, there is no doubt that peace building—whatever you call it, such as post-conflict reconstruction or nation building—has been a crucial issue in world politics. Both policy makers and academic researchers interested in "war and peace" are motivated to examine this phenomenon, which has been prominent since the end of the Cold War. In this thesis, I argue that there is a norm on peace building created by the practices of International Organizations (IOs), especially the United Nations, which established the grounds of post-conflict reconstruction after the end of the Cold War.11 argue that the norm can be characterized as consisting of the following requirements: (l) the UN in a leading role authorized by the UN Security Council; (2) indigenous legitimacy conferred by a local political process (peace agreements, popular consultations ,etc,); 1 Sens also argues that "a peace-building norm has emerged within the UN system" (Sens, 2004, p. 141). In this thesis, I will develop his argument and articulate the key components of the peace-building norm, as well as examine how the United States tried to change that norm in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq. 1 and (3) national elections legitimatized by IOs (UN). After its invasion of Iraq, the United States tried to change this norm and to rebuild Iraq in a virtually unilateral way without giving the UN a leading role in the political transitional process in Iraq. In doing so, I argue, the United States did not simply ignore existing norms of peace building, but also attempted to change the peace-building norm. In spite of the ambitious plan of the Bush administration, however, the United States failed in this attempt and needed to accept the requests by the UN Secretariat and other member states that pushed the United States to follow the original peace- building norm. Consequently, the United States decided to ask the United Nations to design and assist in the key political procedures of post-conflict reconstruction, such as establishing the interim government and designing and conducting the two national elections in Iraq. I argue that even the United States, one of the most powerful states in human history and the hegemonic power of the early 21st century, has realized that it is impossible to conduct peace building single-handedly, and that it needs to ask the United Nations to be politically involved to obtain the legitimacy of peace building.