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Obstacles and Possibilities for Peace Between Israel and Palestine

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Obstacles and Possibilities for Peace Between Israel and Palestine COMMENTARY OBSTACLES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINE Obstacles and Possibilities for Peace between Israel and Palestine GALIA GOLAN Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel ORCID No: 0000-0003-0430-7395 ABSTRACT There have been various obstacles to resolution of the Israe- li-Palestinian conflict since the United Nations resolved to partition Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state. Some of these ob- stacles have been psychological, with both sides contesting the iden- tity and narrative of the other. More concrete barriers have been the many settlements built by Israel in the occupied West Bank, includ- ing East Jerusalem, since 1967, totaling today over 500,000 Israeli settlers. The commentary addresses these and other obstacles, but it also notes the important changes that have occurred, making resolu- tion of the conflict possible. These include the pragmatic 1988 PLO decision to create a state next to the state of Israel in the West Bank and Gaza, with a capital in East Jerusalem; the exchange of letters of mutual recognition between Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin that preceded the 1993 Oslo Principles, and the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002. Keywords: Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace, Conflict Resolution, Oslo Process, Arab Peace Ini- tiative, PLO Insight Turkey 2020 Vol. 22 / No. 1 / pp. 33-46 Recieved Date: 01/02/2020 • Accepted Date: 02/15/2020 • DOI: 10.25253/99.2020221.03 2020 Wınter 33 COMMENTARY GALIA GOLAN Identity Issues Arabs living in this area developed a national identity only in response he Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the arrival of Zionists and Zionist can be characterized in many claims to the land in the late nine- Tways. Clearly it has historic as- teenth and early twentieth century. pects, territorial, and for many, ideo- Similarly, however, most Palestinians logical aspects, as well as religious do not believe that there is such a sources. For some, the conflict com- thing as a Jewish nation, viewing Is- bines all of these, contributing in one raelis as Jewish religionists and, thus, form or another over the years to psy- having no claim to statehood. This is chological aspects. Many factors have a simplification, but for many it is the kept the conflict alive and prevented essence of the conflict –neither side solution. Yet there are also factors recognizes the basic identity of the that could bring about resolution other and therefore the right of the relatively satisfactory for both sides.1 other to statehood. Some would sim- Such a solution, which is indeed pos- plify this further with the claim that sible, is genuine sovereignty for each each side, Palestinians or Jews, was people, in a two-state solution. This the first to abide here centuries ago commentary will outline the obsta- and therefore has a prior claim to this cles to such a solution, as they have land as its “homeland.” appeared over the past decades, but it will also highlight some of the efforts and proposals that have brought the Psychological Factors two sides close to success. Beyond this very basic obstacle, there For some, this is a conflict between is also a strong psychological factor two nations and their national move- often misunderstood or underesti- ments over self-determination in mated by each side. For the Palestin- the same piece of land. Both have a ians, this factor is the Naqba, that is, history in the land and conflicting the expulsion of local Palestinians in claims to ownership, possibly exclu- the course of the wars that followed sive ownership. But even with such the United Nations (UN) decision claims there is a basic contradiction of 1947 to partition the British man- in the eyes of most on each side: nei- date of Palestine into a Jewish state ther side views the other as a people, and an Arab state. For Palestinians, a nation, and therefore having a legit- the Palestinian refugees from the imate claim to self-determination in 1940s, regardless if they fled from the form of statehood. This is a basic the fighting or were forced out, must clash over the issue of identities. Most be allowed to return, including their Israelis do not consider the Palestin- descendants. Their original villages ians a nation but rather merely a part and homes, their rights, must some- of the Arab world, with many Arab how be restored or, at the very least, states in which they might choose to acknowledged and accounted for. For live. The common legend is that the decades many refugees were urged to 34 Insight Turkey OBSTACLES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINE remain in refugee camps, and their plight was politically exploited by The failure of attempts to some to justify enmity toward and the struggle against Israel. resolve the conflict through negotiations, such as For Israelis, the Holocaust occupies Chairman Arafat and Prime a central role that often blinds one to any other event or factor. Centuries Minister Rabin’s initiatives of discrimination, exclusion and op- of mutual recognition pression, culminating in the system- atic destruction of six million Jews and interim steps in the in the Holocaust, has a place in the Oslo Accords, has led psyche of most if not all Jews, every- to disillusionment and where. And for Israeli Jews, this not only renders them victims but also le- extremism, in both societies gitimizes, indeed evokes, the need for their own sovereign existence in what was their homeland in ancient times. created more victims, more recrim- Just as the plight of the Palestinian inations, and more obstacles. What refugee has been exploited by some political psychologists have called for political purposes, so too the Ho- an ethos of conflict has been created, locaust and past oppression is often perhaps even nurtured, within both manipulated by Israeli governments Israeli and Palestinian publics, giv- to justify or motivate opposition to ing rise to mutual hatred as well as Palestinian demands. Moreover, the suspicion.4 Arab rejection of the creation of the state of Israel and the challenges to its existence in the 1940s and 1950s Additional Barriers strengthened the Israeli fear that its legitimacy as a state in the region Beyond these psychological barri- would never be accepted.2 ers, there are very real physical and political barriers. Refugees still live Yet the mutual sense of victimhood in camps in many Arab countries, is real; so is an obsession with and denied citizenship in all but Jordan; concern over personal safety and na- since 1967 families have been di- tional security. Together they serve as vided by the Israeli occupation, lands serious barriers to understanding or have been expropriated by Israel in even hearing the voice of the other the West Bank, where some 500,000 side.3 settlers now live, including East Jeru- salem. Indeed, a second and even a Still more barriers have been created third generation of Israelis has been since the Naqba and the Holocaust, born and raised in settlements on of course. Decades of wars, terror at- land that is supposed to serve as a tacks, and military occupation have part of a Palestinian state in the West 2020 Wınter 35 COMMENTARY GALIA GOLAN Israelis join a rally for the 24th anniversary of the assassination Bank. In addition, the failure of at- This is a decline born of frustration of former Israeli tempts to resolve the conflict through and of the belief that there is no part- Pime Minister negotiations, such as Chairman ner for peace on the other side. Yitzhak Rabin at Yasser Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin Square, Yitzhak Rabin’s initiatives of mutual on November 2, 2019. recognition and interim steps in the International Environment JACK GUEZ / AFP Oslo Accords, has led to disillusion- via Getty Images ment and extremism, in both soci- Political realities outside the region eties. The political situation today in have also changed, but not necessar- Israel has both leading political par- ily for the better. Once it was the Cold ties agreed on the need for continued War that added to the sustainability Israeli control over the occupied ter- of the conflict. By providing polit- ritories. On the Palestinian side, the ical and material backing, the two challenge of Hamas to Fatah weak- super-powers acted as enablers, even ens the Palestinian leadership and if they did not intervene directly in handicaps Palestine Liberation Or- the conflict at every step of the way ganization (PLO) decisions. In both or actually welcomed the risks of war societies, alienation from moderate between their regional allies. What- leaders and potential peace makers ever their motivations, the super has become widespread, with more powers’ competition in the Middle demagogic, violent elements gaining East accorded the conflict a central ground. Polls on both sides indicate role in the international community, a decline in what was once majority and Arab support for the PLO helped support for the two-state solution. maintain this focus on the conflict. 36 Insight Turkey OBSTACLES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND PALESTINE Yet the end of the Cold War, and of the Soviet Union, has not eliminated U.S. backing for Israel’s right the barriers from outside. The United States, under the leadership of Presi- wing political camp not only dent Donald Trump, has not used its strengthens that trend in status to leverage agreement. Rather, Israel, but it also contributes by presenting a “peace plan” in 2020 that unabashedly reflects the most to the frustration and growing right-wing of Israeli positions, the extremism at the edges United States has become a barrier to the compromises needed for peace.
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