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Crime Decline in Context Richard Rosenfeld Contexts 2002 1: 25 DOI: 10.1525/Ctx.2002.1.1.25

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Crime Decline in Context Richard Rosenfeld Contexts 2002 1: 25 DOI: 10.1525/Ctx.2002.1.1.25 Contexts http://ctx.sagepub.com/ Crime Decline in Context Richard Rosenfeld Contexts 2002 1: 25 DOI: 10.1525/ctx.2002.1.1.25 The online version of this article can be found at: http://ctx.sagepub.com/content/1/1/25 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: American Sociological Association Additional services and information for Contexts can be found at: Email Alerts: http://ctx.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://ctx.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Citations: http://ctx.sagepub.com/content/1/1/25.refs.html >> Version of Record - Feb 1, 2002 What is This? Downloaded from ctx.sagepub.com at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on January 3, 2013 feature article richard rosenfeld crime decline in context Skyrocketing violent crime rates obsessed Americans for decades. Crime rates have now been dropping for 10 years. What has happened, and how can we learn from it? After rising to a peak in the early 1990s, crime rates in the The crime decline is real, not an artifact of changes in the United States have been falling for almost a decade. The turn- rate at which crimes are reported to or recorded by the police. around was sudden, unexpected, and years later remains It is significant, long, and deep enough to qualify as a trend something of a puzzle. Some observers attribute most of the and not just a short-run statistical anomaly. It is pervasive, cut- drop to tougher sentences and rising rates of imprisonment. ting across major offense categories and population groups. Others believe more vigilant policing of loitering, public drunk- Finally, it is time-limited. Crime rates cannot be negative, so enness, and other so-called quality-of-life offenses is respon- the rate of decline curve should slow in the coming years. And sible. Still others point to shrinking drug markets or the it is possible, of course, that crime rates will increase, as they booming economy of the 1990s. No strong consensus exists did in the 1980s. Predicting the future is always hazardous, but regarding the sources of the crime drop. the best guesses about the next decade will be based on an informed assessment of the recent past. a n i l documenting the decline o r a C h A “crime rate” is the number of offenses of a specified t r o N type divided by the population of some jurisdiction. By taking e s h n t population size into account, crime rates can be compared o f i t o c e y across places and times with different populations. The nation r s r e o t r C has two “official” crime rates. One consists of offenses known u f o o c t to the police. These are compiled in the FBI’s Uniform Crime h n p e a r m t g r o a t p o e h P D So the declines in crime are real, but are they Marion Correctional Institution, Marion, North Carolina. meaningful? The simple answer is yes. By the Even if we cannot say with certainty what is responsible for year 2000, homicide and burglary rates were the crime decline of the 1990s, it is possible to rule out some lower than at any time since the mid-1960s. of the usual causes and identify some of the real factors in the Victimization rates have fallen for youth, crime drop. But the first step in unraveling the mystery of the crime decline is to determine whether it happened at all. adults, blacks, whites, males, and females, in large cities and rural areas, in every region of real crime decline? the country. But the timing and magnitude of Several years after the rate of crime began declining, most these changes differ across population groups, Americans continued to rank crime among the nation’s most and those differences offer important clues serious public problems and to believe that crime rates were still going up. A relatively small percentage of Americans have regarding the causes of the crime decline. direct experience with serious crime. The primary source of public information about crime is the mass media. Given the constant media drumbeat of murder and mayhem, it is not Reports (UCR). The other is based on reports by victims to the surprising that people would be unaware or skeptical of claims Justice Department’s annual National Crime Victimization that crime rates were dropping. But they were and still are. Survey (NCVS). Both of the crime indicators include informa- Downloaded from ctx.sagepub.com at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on January 3, 2013 spring 2002 contexts 25 d l o G e v e t S y b o t o h P Unemployed youth, Manhattan. tion on serious violent and property offenses, such as assault, So the declines in crime are real, but are they meaningful? rape, robbery, burglary and auto theft. The UCR also records The simple answer is yes. By the year 2000, homicide and bur- homicides which, of course, are not counted in victim surveys. glary rates were lower than at any time since the mid-1960s. Both the FBI report and the Justice Department survey are lim- Victimization rates have fallen for youth, adults, blacks, whites, ited to so-called street crimes and omit serious white-collar, males, and females, in large cities and rural areas, in every corporate, and governmental offenses (e.g., price-fixing, vio- region of the country. But the timing and magnitude of these lations of workplace safety rules, pollution, corruption, changes differ across population groups, and those differences antitrust violations and false advertising). National indicators offer important clues regarding the causes of the crime decline. for such “suite” crimes do not exist, so no one knows whether Consider the difference in the timing of the decrease in they have been rising or falling. youth and adult homicide victims. The victimization rates for The FBI statistics indicate that street crime has substantial- people over the age of 24 have fallen more or less continu- ly decreased over the past decade. In 1991 the FBI counted ously since 1980. On the other hand, youth homicide followed 24,700 criminal homicides in the United States, or 9.8 homi- a more cyclical pattern, falling during the early 1980s, rising cides for every 100,000 Americans. By the end of 1999, the from the mid-1980s to a peak in 1993 and then falling again number of homicides had dropped to 15,500, and the rate fell since then. The increase in youth homicide during the 1980s to 5.7 per 100,000, a 42 percent decline. The nation’s robbery and early 1990s was so dramatic that it gave rise to concerns rate also fell by about 40 percent and the burglary rate about a national youth violence “epidemic.” The victimization dropped by one-third during the 1990s. The decreases were rate for 14- to 17-year-olds nearly tripled, and that for 18- to less steep, but still appreciable, for rape and aggravated 24-year-olds almost doubled between 1984 and 1993. The fall assault (assaults involving serious injury or the use of a from the 1993 peak in youth homicide has been equally pro- weapon), both of which declined by about 20 percent. There nounced (figure 1). The trends in the rates at which teenagers is some reason to believe that the declines in nonlethal vio- and young adults committed homicide were almost identical lence are even sharper than those reported in the FBI report to the victimization trends. because victims became bolder about reporting such incidents I focus on criminal homicide in this discussion because more to the police and the police recorded more of them. However, accurate and detailed information about the characteristics of the drop registered in the FBI report and police statistics is mir- victims and offenders exists for homicide than for other crimes rored in Justice Department survey results that are unaffected and because it is the most serious. However, the same basic by patterns in reporting and recording. patterns also characterize serious nonlethal criminal violence. Downloaded from ctx.sagepub.com at UNIV WASHINGTON LIBRARIES on January 3, 2013 26 contexts spring 2002 figure 1 Homicide Rates by Age of Victim, 1980-1998 25 Age 18-24 n o i t a l 20 u p o Age 25-34 p 0 0 0 , 15 0 0 1 r e p Age 35-49 s 10 m i t c i V Age 14-17 5 Age 50 and over Age 14 and under 0 1980 1985 1990 1995 A credible explanation of the homicide decline, then, must constitute only 2 to 3 percent of the nation’s homicide victims.) explain why the time trends were different for adult and youth A sufficient explanation of the recent homicide trends should homicides, the first dropping steadily since 1980, the second accommodate these race, sex, and city-size differences as well. fluctuating. Another notable pattern in the homicide drop An explanation of the crime drop should account for why involves the differing time trends for offenses committed with the trends differ for youth and adults and why they are most and without firearms. Roughly two-thirds of homicides in the evident in firearm homicides, in the large cities and among United States are committed with a gun. Both the increase in young black men. Serious explanations should account for youth homicide during the 1980s and early 1990s and the both the rise and the decline in crime rates since the 1980s.
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