Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, ,Mter Mitwirkung Von Theodor \\'1
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alter SELECTED WRITINGS VOLUME 1 1913-1926 Edited by Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings THE BELKNAP PRESS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England , . I Contents Copyright © 1996 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights rese rved Printed in the United States of America y l Second printing, 1997 METAPHYSICS OF "Experience" 3 This work is a transla tion of selec tions from Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, ,mter Mitwirkung von Theodor \\'1. Adorno und Gershom Sch olem, heraltSgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann lind Hermann The Metaphysics of You Schweppenhiiuser, copyright © 1972, 1974, 1977, 1982, 1985, 1989 by Suh rkamp Verlag. "The Task of rhe Tra nslator" originally appeared in English in Wal ter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed ited by Hannah Two Poems by Friedrich Are nd t, English translation copyright © 1968 by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. "On Language as Such The Life of Students 3' and the Language of Man," "Fate and Cha racter," "Critique of Violen,?;" " Nap les," and "One-Way Street" originally appeared in English in Walter Benjamin, Reflections, English translation copyright Aphorisms on Imaginati © 1978 by Harcoun Brace Jovanovich, Inc . Published by arrangement with Harc ourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. "One-Way Street" also appeared i.n Walter Benjamin, "One-Way Street " and Other Writings (Lon A Child's View of ColOl don: NLBNerso, 1979, 1985). "Socrates" and "On the Program of the Coming Philosophy" originally appeared in English in The Philosophical Forum 15, nos. 1-2 (1983-1984). Socrates 52 Publication of this book has been aided by a grant from Inter Nationes, Bonn. Trauerspiel and Traged) Frontispiece: Walter Benjamin, Paris, 1927. PholO by Germaine Krull. Collection Gary Smith, Berlin. The Role of Language i Library of Congress Catalogjng-jn-Pub/jcatjon Data On Language as Such a Benjami n, Walter, 1892-1940. [Selections. English. 1996] Theses on the Problem Selected writings / Walter Benjamin; edited by Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jenni ngs. osroevsky's The Idiot p. cm. "This work is a translation of selections from Walter Benjamin, Gesammelre Schriften ... Painting and the Graph copyright 1972 ... by Suhrkamp Verlag"-T.p. verso. Includes index. Painting, or Signs and ! Contents: v. 1. 191 3-1926. The Ground of Intentio ISBN 0-674-94585-9 (v. 1: alk. paper) I. Bullock, Marcus Paul, 1944- . II. Jennings, Michael William. III. Title. The Object: Triangle PT2603.E455A26 1996 838'.91209-dc20 96-23027 Perception Is Reading Designed by Gwen Frankfeldt On Perception 93 cation of contents of the J by its whole innermost I guage. On the other hal necessary to ask of whic On Language as Such and to say: the German langl of everything that we co on the La nguage of Man direct expression of that mental entity. It is then~ communicates itself in la distinguished from it. TIi. precisely in its language into which all linguistic t precisely over this abyss i and the linguistic entity J study of linguistic theory, it is, rather, the frequent being that constitutes a d of which is found in the Every expression of human mental life can be understood as a kind of paradox has a place, as language, and this understanding, in the manner of a true method, every remains a paradox, and i where raises new questions. It is possible to talk about a language of music What does language ~ and of sculpture, about a language of justice that has nothing directly to do corresponding to it. It is I with those in which German or English legal judgments are couched, about itself in language and no a language of technology that is not the specialized language of technicians. speaker, if this means son Language in such contexts means the tendency inherent in the subjects Mental being communica concerned-technology, art, justice, or religion-toward the communication tha t it is not outwardly of the contents of the mind. To sum up: all communication of the contents identical with linguistic b l of the mind is language, communication in words being only a particular What is communicable i case of human language and of the justice, poetry, or whatever underlying therefore communicates it or founded on it. The existence of language, however, is coextensive not mental being only insofar only with all the areas of human mental expression in which language is insofar as it is capable oj always in one sense or another inherent, but with absolutely everything. Language communicat There is no event or thing in either animate or inanimate nature that does festation of this being, h( not in some way partake of language, for it is in the nature of each one to tion" 1 ( J (' langua§ communicate its mental contents. This use of the word "language" is in no municates itself." The la way metaphorical. For to think that we cannot imagine anything that does not the lamp (for the me l not communicate its mental nature in its expression is entirely meaningful; ble, is by no means the consciousness is apparently (or really) bound to such communication to communication, the lamr varying degrees, but this cannot alter the fact that we cannot imagine a total the linguistic being of a absence of language in anything. An existence entirely without relationship linguistic theory depends to language is an idea; but this idea can bear no fruit even within that realm even the appearance of t of Ideas whose circumference defines the idea of God. means, "That which in ; All that is asserted here is that all expression, insofar as it is a communi On this "is" (equivalent t On Language as Such 63 cation of contents of the mind, is to be classed as language. And expression, by its whole innermost nature, is certainly to be understood only as lan guage. On the other hand, to understand a linguistic entity, it is always necessary to ask of which mental entity it is the direct expression. That is to say: the German language, for example, is by no means the expression of everything that we could-theoretically-express through it, but is the direct expression of that which communicates itself in it. This "itself" is a mental entity. It is therefore obvious at once that the mental entity that communicates itself in language is not language itself but something to be distinguished from it. The view that the mental essence of a thing consists precisely in its language-this view, taken as a hypothesis, is the great abyss into which all linguistic theory threatens to fall,l and to survive suspended precisely over this abyss is its task. The distinction between a mental entity and the linguistic entity in which it communicates is the first stage of any study of linguistic theory; and this distinction seems so unquestionable that it is, rather, the frequently asserted identity between mental and linguistic being that constitutes a deep and incomprehensible paradox, the expression of which is found in the ambiguity of the word "logos." Nevertheless, this paradox has a place, as a solution, at the center of linguistic theory, but remains a paradox, and insoluble, if placed at the beginning. What does language communicate? It communicates the mental being corresponding to it. It is fundamental that this mental being communicates itself in language and not through language. Languages, therefore, have no speaker, if this means someone who communicates through these languages. Mental being communicates itself in, not through, a language, which means that it is not outwardly identical with linguistic being. Mental being is identical with linguistic being only insofar as it is capable of communication. What is communicable in a mental entity is its linguistic entity. Language therefore communicates the particular linguistic being of things, but their mental being only insofar as this is directly included in their linguistic being, insofar as it is capable of being communicated. Language communicates the linguistic being of things. The clearest mani festation of this being, however, is language itself. The answer to the ques tion "What does language communicate?" is therefore "All language com municates itself." The language of this lamp, for example, communicates not the lamp (for the mental being of the lamp, insofar as it is communica ble, is by no means the lamp itself) but the language-lamp, the lamp in communication, the lamp in expression. For in language the situation is this: the linguistic being of all things is their language. The understanding of linguistic theory depends on giving this proposition a clarity that annihilates even the appearance of tautology. This proposition is untautological, for it means, "That which in a mental entity is communicable is its language." On this "is" (equivalent to "is immediately") everything depends.-Not that 64 On Language as Such of things-that is, thrOl which appears most clearly in its language is communicable in a mental equally, the advocate of entity, as was just said by way of transition, but this capacit~ for commu nicating factual subject I nication is language itself. Or: the language of a mental entity IS directly the word by which he de that which is communicable in it. Whatever is communicable of a mental of language, the invalidil entity, in this it communicates itself. Which signifies that all language com clear in what follows. It I municates itself. Or, more precisely, that all language commUnicates Itself its object factual, and it in itself; it is in the purest sense the "medium" of the communication. of language, in contrast, Mediation which is the immediacy of all mental communication, is the communication. It mean fundamen:al problem of linguistic theory, and if one chooses to call this cates itself to God.