Cultural Reflections on the Popularity of Chinese Learning

CHAPTER 3 Cultural Reflections on the Popularity of Chinese Learning

Zhao Lin

The Historically Inevitable Emergence of the “Chinese Learning” Craze

Recently, a cultural resurgence has occurred in China that has compelled widespread attention: the emergence of the popularity of Chinese learning.1 Many universities have established sinological academies, sinological research institutes, and a prodigious number of sinological forums with varying inter- pretations of traditional Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. In every city square, all kinds of old customs and new things are borrowing from prestige of “Chinese learning.” Many major events, such as Confucian rituals at the Temple of Confucius and paying homage to the Tomb of the Yellow Emperor, have made a lot of noise with their massive displays; even the practices of geo- mancy ( fengshui), divination, and astrology are plying their arts. This inher- ently complex “Chinese learning craze” has a very strong appeal and tempers the intensity of China’s rapid economic growth and ideals of its revival as an international power. The Chinese learning craze gives the face of the Chinese cultural spirit an image in stark contrast to the “wholesale Westernization” of the early reform period in China. In relation to the global culture that emerged at the end of the cold war, this “Chinese learning craze” seems to pos- sess culturally conservative values, demanding cultural “modernization, not Westernization.” This is manifested as a conscientious national cultural identity while also having imperfections that create unavoidable complications. Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order put forward a thought-provoking concept of “the paradox of Western values.” As he argued:

1 “Chinese learning” (guoxue) (or, more literally, “national learning”) is a blanket term that refers to all philosophy, religion, customs, literature, and cultural practices and beliefs that emerged from pre-twentieth-century China, particularly Confucianism, but also folk beliefs and customs, Buddhism, and Daoism.—Trans.

Initially, Westernization and modernization are closely linked. . . . In the early phases of change, Westernization thus promotes modernization. In the later phases, modernization promotes de-Westernization and the resurgence of indigenous culture in two ways. At the societal level, modernization enhances the economic, military, and political power of the society as a whole and encourages the people of that society to have con- fidence in their culture and to become culturally assertive. At the indi- vidual level, modernization generates feelings of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations are broken and leads to crises of identity to which religion provides an answer.2

This “paradox of Western values” has played a role in that what people have seen in the twenty-first century is not the triumphal march of Western culture across the globe but the revival of traditional religions and cultures in the non-Western world. This is particularly the case in Asia, which is home to three-fifths the world’s population and, it is indisputable that national pride in Muslim and Hindu countries as well as China is strong. According to the latest statistics, as of mid-2008, Christians (regardless of denomination) around the world numbered 2.2 billion, which is about 33 percent of the world’s population (about 6.7 billion). Among them, 556 million Christians live in Europe (about 76 percent of the population) and 220 million in North America (about 64 percent of the population). Another 530 million Christians live in Latin America (about 91 of the population), 423 million in Africa (about 42 percent of the population), and 355 million in Asia (about 8% of the population). It is clear from these statistics that those practicing modern Christianity are not centered in the traditional heartland of Christianity in Europe and North America (and in the twentieth century there was a marked decline in the proportion of the population that is Christian in these traditional centers of Christianity) but, instead, in Latin America and Africa (in particular, sub-Saharan Africa). Extrapolating from the current rate of expansion, by 2025 the population of Latin America and Africa will reach 634 million and 628 million, respectively, replacing Europe (with 537 million Christians by 2025) as the principal areas for Christians and making Latin America and Africa the two areas with the largest Christian population. In Asia, although the total population of Christians will reach 300 million, as a proportion of the continent’s total population of 4 billion, Asian Christians will be incomparable with Christians in Latin America, Africa, North America, and Europe. Furthermore, as of mid-2008, there were 1.4 billion

2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 75–76.