Structure” of Physics: a Case Study∗ (Journal of Philosophy 106 (2009): 57–88)
The “Structure” of Physics: A Case Study∗ (Journal of Philosophy 106 (2009): 57–88) Jill North We are used to talking about the “structure” posited by a given theory of physics. We say that relativity is a theory about spacetime structure. Special relativity posits one spacetime structure; different models of general relativity posit different spacetime structures. We also talk of the “existence” of these structures. Special relativity says that the world’s spacetime structure is Minkowskian: it posits that this spacetime structure exists. Understanding structure in this sense seems important for understand- ing what physics is telling us about the world. But it is not immediately obvious just what this structure is, or what we mean by the existence of one structure, rather than another. The idea of mathematical structure is relatively straightforward. There is geometric structure, topological structure, algebraic structure, and so forth. Mathematical structure tells us how abstract mathematical objects t together to form different types of mathematical spaces. Insofar as we understand mathematical objects, we can understand mathematical structure. Of course, what to say about the nature of mathematical objects is not easy. But there seems to be no further problem for understanding mathematical structure. ∗For comments and discussion, I am extremely grateful to David Albert, Frank Arntzenius, Gordon Belot, Josh Brown, Adam Elga, Branden Fitelson, Peter Forrest, Hans Halvorson, Oliver Davis Johns, James Ladyman, David Malament, Oliver Pooley, Brad Skow, TedSider, Rich Thomason, Jason Turner, Dmitri Tymoczko, the philosophy faculty at Yale, audience members at The University of Michigan in fall 2006, and in 2007 at the Paci c APA, the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association, and the Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference.
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