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The Chicago Council on Global Affairs The Chicago Council on Global Affairs “In Jeopardy? Europe and the Transatlantic Alliance” Welcome: Marshall Bouton, President, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs Moderator: Niamh King, Vice President, Programs, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs Speaker: The Honorable R. Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics, Harvard Kennedy School Location: Chicago, Illinois Date: Wednesday, March 28, 2012 Transcript by Federal News Service Washington, D.C. NIAMH KING: Good evening. Thank you very much for coming. My name is Niamh King. I’m the vice president for programs here at The Chicago Council. If you wouldn’t mind please turning off your phones or your blackberrys or anything that might make a noise and disrupt our program you could do that now. We’re delighted tonight to have Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns here. He’s here as part of our ―In Jeopardy‖ series. This is our second ―In Jeopardy‖ program. Many of you might have remember our first one that we had on March 1st with Ambassador Ivo Daalder, who is also here tonight as part of our conference that Marshall will talk about. This is the opening address of a conference that we’ve organized in conjunction with eight think tanks from around the world, and we’re thrilled that they’re here. And I’d like to welcome all of the conference attendees who are here tonight. So as I mentioned, this is part of a series, and we have three more upcoming programs in this series. On April 17th we’ll welcome Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who is the former secretary general of NATO. On April 23rd, we’ll welcome Martin Wolf from the Financial Times. And on May 2nd we’ll welcome Madeleine Albright. So please see our website or any of my colleagues if you’d like information about that. It’s also on our website. We have a wonderful new website that covers all of the issues for NATO and G8, I’d welcome you to check that out. And just to give some thanks for a the gracious support that we have for this program series, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Robert R. McCormick Foundation, The Cooper Family Foundation. Abbot is one of our corporate sponsors, and WBEZ and WTTW are our media sponsors. We’d also like to thank the Atlantic Council because they’re our co-sponsors for tonight’s program and the conference. We’re now up to 56 partners in our ―In Jeopardy‖ consortium. If anyone has another organization they’d like to reach out to us and be a part of it, we’d be delighted to have you. Please feel free to contact us. And I’ll be back up for Q&A, but now I’d like to welcome Marshall Bouton, our president, to the podium. (Applause.) MARSHALL BOUTON: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. I’m delighted to be here tonight and to be able to welcome Ambassador Burns, for the privilege of knowing him for some time and a great admirer of his work. So I know you all are in for a treat. Ambassador Burns, we’re delighted to have you here to give this second lecture in the ―In Jeopardy‖ series. And his appearance here tonight also marks the opening of a two and a half day conference that The Chicago Council is hosting along with eight partners from North America and Europe. The subject of the conference is ―Smart Defense and the Future of NATO: Can the Alliance Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century?‖ This conference is of course about the issues that will be discussed at the NATO summit here in the middle of May. We have been told by senior officials in both the U.S. government and other governments that the conference we are organizing with others here in Chicago is the single most important nongovernmental preparatory event that’s occurring in the run-up to the summits. And it’s a great privilege for us therefore also to welcome here tonight a number of the conference attendees who’ve flown in today to start their conversations with us tomorrow. As I’m sure many of you know, in June 2011 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in a major public statement in Europe, stated that NATO, the linchpin of the—of European security and transatlantic relations, faced, I quote, ―the possibility of a dim if not dismal future.‖ However, during the same speech, Secretary Gates also noted that such a future is possible, but not inevitable. It’s been apparent for some time that NATO and the transatlantic alliance at large must address a number of fundamental questions about its future. And the conference we have organized is designed to deal with those questions. So tonight we are particularly fortunate to have Nick Burns with us to share his insights on these most pressing issues as we look to the next decade in U.S.-European relations. What needs to be done to resolve the dilemmas that face NATO in a post-cold world and eventually post-Afghanistan world and ultimately, what is the future of what has been the strongest alliance in the modern period? Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns is uniquely qualified to help us gain some insight into these issues. Most immediately, he is at present the chair of a major study commissioned by the Atlantic Council, an organization we are partnering with tonight, as also in the conference. And that study, which is tentatively entitled ―NATO 2020,‖ will offer a far-sighted and broad strategic vision of how the alliance will operate in the world in 2020. And I know that Ambassador Burns is planning tonight to share with you some advance notice of the major conclusions of that study. But to grasp why we’re so fortunate to have Nick Burns with us tonight, I need to step back from that immediate involvement of his and say a few words about his broader experience. Ambassador Burns is unarguably one of the most skilled and accomplished diplomats of his generation. Before retiring after 27 years in the foreign service, he held the position of undersecretary of state for political affairs. That is the highest post in the State Department that a career officer can aspire to. And he served in that post with great distinction and in dealing with a wide range of issues. And in fact, throughout his career he has worked in a variety of senior positions in our government across a wide spectrum of geographies and topics, as ambassador to Greece and ambassador to NATO, as a senior director in the National Security Council for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, as the spokesman for the United States State Department and in many other important capacities. He has played leadership roles in dealing with some of the most complex and difficult policy dilemmas that have faced our nation over the last two decades, including the Iranian nuclear program—didn’t stay around long enough to solve that, Nick, for us. I’m sure that our government is consulting him; the negotiation of the U.S. Civilian Nuclear Agreement, a transformative international development; our military relationships in the Middle East and most particularly with Israel; and during his time in the White House, the crisis in the Balkans. Ambassador Burns is perhaps best known to many for his prodigious skills as a negotiator. And I’ve had the opportunity in recent years to see Nick in operation, and I now understand why he has that reputation. He is extraordinarily effective for many reasons: his broad knowledge; his great articulateness, as you will hear tonight; his personal charm, which is genuine indeed; and his quiet but very steely persistence in the face of determined adversaries sitting across the negotiating table from him. And in his new life in the private sector, Nick Burns continues his active involvement in the study and practice of diplomacy as a professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School, as director of the Aspen Strategy Group, as senior counsel at the Cohen Group and as adviser to a number of foundations and think tanks, including the Atlantic Council. Now, as a final note, though, I must confess to harboring one real doubt about Ambassador Burns’ good judgment. And that is his declared—he doesn’t hide it—his declared membership in the Red Sox nation. (Laughter.) Now I understand – as a New Yorker, I understand that Nick, as a Bostonian, is understandably driven by very strong loyalties. But I would leave you with this question. Given his extraordinary experience in international leadership, how, in his—understanding of great baseball powers, has he made such a bad mistake? (Laughter.) Now, ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming Nick Burns. (Applause.) R. NICHOLAS BURNS: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Marshall, thank you. That was an extraordinarily generous introduction. I’ll reply in kind about your allegiance to the New York Yankees in due course. But ladies and gentlemen, it’s a pleasure to be here in Chicago. I arrived this morning from Boston, Massachusetts, which, I assure you, is at least 20 degrees colder than Chicago, Illinois. You have a beautiful city, and I’ve walked around this city and seen the extraordinary architecture and the revival, what you’ve done to rebuild this city over the last 30 or 40 years. It’s a jewel, and there’s no wonder that President Obama has decided that the NATO summit should be here in the third weekend of May.
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