• Lllllllllllllllll RECLAMATION of CONTAMINATED URBAN AND

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• Lllllllllllllllll RECLAMATION of CONTAMINATED URBAN AND Vordisk Nordisk Polijoismaincn Nordic kerne- karn- ydin- nuclear sikkei ht'ds- sakcrlicts- turvallisuus- safety "orskning forskning tutkimus research NKS(97) 18 97-10-10 II• lllllllllllllllllHI., ISBN 87-7893-017-0 II mil IIIIII in mil mil inn mil mil milmi II l DK9800053 RECLAMATION OF CONTAMINATED URBAN AND RURAL ENVIRONMENTS FOLLOWING A SEVERE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT Nordic Nuclear Safety Research BER6 Edited by: Per Strand1, Lavrans Skuterud1, Judith Melin' Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority 2 Swedish Radiation Protection Institute Preface This project was funded by the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research (NKS) programme. NKS is a co-operative body in nuclear safety, radiation protection and emergency preparedness. It's purpose is to support Nordic research projects, organise exercises, provide information and make recommendations to decision makers. The project was initially co-ordinated by Judith Melin at the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute, but as she change place of work, Per Strand continued. The other contributors are acknowledged at the front page of their respective parts of the report. Reviewers have been John Sandalls (AEA Technology) and Brenda Howard (Institute of Terrestrial Ecology), UK. Their help is gratefully acknowledged. Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, 0steras October 1997. Informationsservice, Rise, 1997 NKS(97)18 ISBN 87-7893-017-0 Rapporten er udgivet af: N KS -sekretariatet Tlf. +45 4677 4045 Bygning 100 Fax +45 4677 4046 Postboks 49 E-mail annette.lemmensfaMsoe.dk DK-4000 Roskilde http://www.risoe.dk/nks TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction i Executive Summary ii 1. CONTAMINATION AND RECLAMATION IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 1 2. FACTORS AFFECTING DISTRIBUTION AND LEVELS OF CONTAMINATION IN URBAN AREAS __________ _ 2.1 IMPORTANT RADIONUCLIDES 2 2.2 DEPOSITION, DISTRIBUTION AND RETENTION ON URBAN SURFACES 2 2.2.1 DRY DEPOSITION 3 2.2.2 WET DEPOSITION 3 2.3 SEASONALLY 5 3. DOSE REDUCTION BY NATURAL PROCESSES 3.1 WEATHERING 5 4. FORCED DECONTAMINATION OF URBAN SURFACES 6 4. l STREET CLEANING WITH BRUSHES AND VACUUM CLEANERS 6 4.2 HIGH PRESSURE WATER-HOSING 7 4.3 CUTTING AND REMOVING GRASS 7 4.4 PRUNING TREES AND BUSHES 7 4.5 DIGGING SMALL GARDENS 7 4.6 PLOUGHING LARGE GARDENS 8 4.7 REMOVAL OF LAYER OF SOIL FEIL! BOKMERKET ER IKKE DEFINERT. 4.8 WASHING HARD SURFACES WITH AMMONIUM NITRATE SOLUTION 8 4.9 STEAM-CLEANING 8 4.10 SAND-BLASTING 8 4.11 ROAD PLANING 8 5. AN OUTLINE STRATEGY FOR DOSE REDUCTION IN THK CONTAMINATED URBAN ENVIRONMENT 9 6. REFERENCES 16 7. CONTAMINATION AND RECLAMATION IN THE CULTIVATED AGRICULTURAL ENVIRONMENT 18 8. FACTORS AFFECTING MAGNITUDE AND DURATION OF THE CONTAMINATION 19 8.1 DEPOSITION AND RETENTION ON SOILS AND CROPS 19 8.1.1 SEASON ALITY 19 8.1.2 NATURAL FIELD LOSSES 20 8.2 MID-LONG-TERM ASPECTS 20 8.2.1 SOIL-TO-PLANT TRANSFER 20 9. NATURAL MIGRATION OF RADIONUCLIDES IN SOILS 21 10. DISTURBANCE OF DEPOSITED RADIONUCLIDES THROUGH CULTIVATION 22 11. INFLUENCE OF SOIL PROPERTIES ON SOIL-TO-PLANT TRANSFER 25 11.1 CRITICAL SOILSANDCROPS 31 12. COUNTERMEASURES IN AGRICULTURE 31 12.1 MITIGATION OF SHORT-TERM CONSEQUENCES 32 12.1.1 REMOVAL AND DISPOSAL OF CONTAMINATED CROP 32 12.2 MITIGATION OF THE LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES 32 12.2. l REMOVAL OF SHALLOW LAYER OF SOIL 32 12.2.2 PLOUGHING 33 12.2.3 APPLICATION OF CHEMICAL FERTILISERS 34 13. FACTORS TO BE CONSTOERED BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION OF AGRICULTURAL COUNTERMEASURES 35 14. AN OUTLINE STRATEGY FOR DOSE REDUCTION IN THE CONTAMINATED CULTIVATED AGRICULTURAL ENVIRONMENT 36 14.1 THE AGRICULTURAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE TYPE OF COUNTERMEASURES 36 14.2 MODEL AREA 37 14.3 ASSUMPTIONS ON FALLOUT NUCLIDES AND THEIR TRANSFER IN THE CASE STUDY AREA 39 14.4 COST EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNTERMEASURES 40 15. REFERENCES 47 16. CONTAMINATION OF ANIMALS 52 16.1 IMPORTANT RADIONUCUDES 53 16.2 TRANSFER OF RADIONUCLIDES TO ANIMALS 53 16.2.1 FARM ANIMALS 54 16.2.2 WILD ANIMALS 59 16.3 LONG TERM BEHAVIOUR OF RADIONUCLDDE CONTAMINATION 63 16.3.1 FARM ANIMALS 63 16.3.2 WILD ANIMALS 67 17. COUNTERMEASURES _ 68 17.1 RESTRICTION OF FOODSTUFFS FROM HUMAN CONSUMPTION 69 17.1.1 BANNING CONTAMINATED FOODSTUFFS 69 17.1.2 DIETARY ADVICE 69 17.2 ADDITIVES GIVEN TO ANIMALS TO REDUCE GUT ABSORPTION OF RADIONUCLIDES 70 17.2.1 RADIOCAESIUM BINDERS 70 17.2.2 RADIOSTRONTIUM ANALOGUE 72 17.3 CHANGE IN ANIMAL MANAGEMENT 74 17.3.1 PROVIDING CLEAN FODDER OR REMOVAL OF ANIMALS 74 17.3.2 CHANGING SLAUGHTER TIME 75 17.3.3 CHANGING FROM MILK TO MEAT PRODUCTION, OR CHANGING ANIMAL SPECIES 76 18. AN OUTLINE STRATEGY FOR REDUCTION OF DOSE VIA ANIMALS. 76 19. REFERENCES 83 20. CONTAMINATION IN FORESTS 88 20.1 IMPORTANT RADIONUCLIDES 89 20.2 DEPOSITION AND RETENTION OF RADIONUCLIDES 90 20.3 LONG-TERM PATHWAYS OF RADIONUCLDDES IN FORESTS 90 20.4 LONG-TERM CHANGES IN EXTERNAL EXPOSURE 94 21. COUNTERMEASURES IN FORESTS 96 21.1 CLEAR-FELLING 96 21.1.1 PLOUGHING AND TILLING OF A CLEAR-FELLED AREA 96 21.2 PROCESSING OF TREES 96 22. REFERENCES 97 23. THE FRESHWATER ENVIRONMENT 98 23.1 INTRODUCTION 99 23.2 IMPORTANT RADIONUCLEDES 99 23.3 SEASONALITY 99 23.4 CONTAMINATION OF SURFACE WATER 100 23.5 CONTAMINATION OF FISH 100 23.6 REDUCTION OF CONTAMINATION BY NATURAL PROCESSES AND ENVIRONMENTAL HALF-LIVES 100 23.7 TRANSFER FACTORS 102 23.8 COUNTERMEASURES FOR FISH 107 23.8.1 LIMITING CONSUMPTION OF FISH 108 23.8.2 TREATING FISH BEFORE CONSUMPTION (BRINING) 108 23.8.3 ADDITION OF CHEMICALS (LIMING) 108 23.9 COUNTERMEASURES FOR DRINKING WATER 108 23.9.1 USE OF AN ALTERNATIVE WATER SUPPLY 109 23.9.2 ION EXCHANGE METHOD 109 24. AN OUTLINE STRATEGY FOR DOSE REDUCTION IN THE CONTAMINATED AQUATIC ENVIRONMENT „ lift 24. l DRINKING WATER 110 24.1.1 ESTIMATION OF CONCENTRATIONS 110 24.1.2 STRATEGY 112 24.2 FISH 112 24.2.1 ESTIMATION OF CONCENTRATIONS 112 24.2.2 LAKE LIMING 114 25. REFERENCES 115 26. MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE FROM CLEAN-UP OPERATIONS 117 26.1 INTRODUCTION 118 26.2 AMOUNTS AND ACTIVITY CONCENTRATIONS OF CLEAN-UP WASTE 118 26.3 ESTIMATION OF AMOUNTS AND ACTIVITY CONCENTRATIONS 118 26.4 CLEAN-UP WASTES FROM URBAN AREAS 120 26.5 CLEAN-UP WASTES FROM RURAL AREAS 122 26.6 CLEAN-UP WASTES FROM FORESTS 124 26.7 SUMMARY OF THE AMOUNTS AND ACTIVITY CONCENTRATION 126 26.8 TRANSPORTATION OF CLEAN-UP WASTES 126 26.8.1 SAFETY IN WASTE TRANSPORTATION 126 26.8.2 TRANSPORTING WASTES WITHIN THE CONTROLLED AREA 126 26.8.3 TRANSPORTING WASTES OUTSIDE THE CONTROLLED AREA 127 26.9 FINAL DISPOSAL OF CLEAN UP WASTE 128 26.9.1 INTERIM STORAGE 128 26.9.2 FINAL DISPOSAL 128 27. REFERENCES 132 28. RADIATION PROTECTION AND SAFETY OF CLEA-UP OPERATORS 134 28.1 RADIATION PROTECTION AND SAFETY PLAN 135 28.2 OCCUPATIONAL DOSE LIMITS 136 28.3 THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTIFICATION, OPTIMISATION AND DOSE LIMITS 137 28.4 TRAINING PROGRAMMES FOR WORKERS AND DECISION-MAKERS 137 28.5 APPLIED RADIATION PROTECTION AND SAFETY OF CLEAN-UP OPERATORS 138 28.5.1 GENERAL RADIATION PROTECTION PRINCIPLES IN RECLAMATION WORK 138 28.5.2 EQUIPMENT FOR RADIATION PROTECTION 13 8 28.5.3 INFORMATION AND TRAINING ON RADIATION PROTECTION TOPICS 139 28.6 ESTIMATION OF RADIATION DOSES IN RECLAMATION WORK 139 18.6.l EXAMPLES OF RADIATION DOSES IN RECLAMATION OF URBAN AND SUBURBAN AREAS 139 28.6.2 EXAMPLES OF RADIATION DOSES IN RECLAMATION OF AGRICULTURE AREAS 140 28.6.2 140 29. CONCLUSIONS ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND SAFETY OF CLEAN-UP OPERATORS . 144 30. REFERENCES 145 31. RESOURCES AVAILABLE IN SOCIETY 146 31.1 PERSONNEL RESOURCES 148 31.2 EQUIPMENT RESOURCES 148 32. ORGANISATION FOR DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS 149 32.1 EDUCATION 151 32.2 EMERGENCY EXERCISES 151 33. INFORMATION 152 Introduction In the event of a severe nuclear accident releasing radioactive materials to the atmosphere, there is a potential for widespread contamination of both the urban and rural environments. In some instances of environmental contamination, natural processes may eventually reduce or eliminate the problem without man's intervention. The situation with respect to radioactive contamination is no different except that radioactive contamination will also disappear through normal physical radioactive decay. In other cases, man is often able to mitigate potential harmful effects by cleaning, washing, abrading or by the application of chemicals. The actions taken by man to mitigate the potential harmful effects of contamination are described as countermeasures. In the case of radioactive contamination, the objective of countermeasures is to minimise radiation doses to man. Following the deposition of radioactive material, the human population may be exposed to external and/or internal irradiation. External irradiation arises from contaminated land and contaminated exposed surfaces generally. Internal irradiation can arise from inhalation or from ingestion of food which has been contaminated directly and/or indirectly. Whether the contamination occurs in urban or rural environments, a number of effective strategies are available to minimise the resulting dose. In the urban environment, the main objective is to minimise external irradiation from contaminated surfaces (roads, roofs, gardens etc). In urban environments with agricultural production and food gathering the objective is to produce contamination-free products and to minimise external radiation doses to people such as farm workers and foresters. The decision as to whether countermeasures should be employed must be based on the net potential benefit to man. This means that considerations such as monetary cost and stress through social upheaval must not outweigh the potential benefits to be gained by reduction of radiation dose. This document is intended as a guide to those groups who may, at very short notice, be called upon to manage and reclaim radioactively contaminated urban and rural environments in the Nordic countries.
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