IAEA-TECDOC- 262

EMERGENCY RESPONSE PUNNING FOR TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS MVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

A TECHNICAL DOCUMENT ISSUED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, VIENNA, 1982 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNIN TRANSPORR GFO T ACCIDENTS INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, IAEA, VIENNA, 1982

IAEPintee th AustriAn y i d b a March 1982 PLEASE BE AWARE THAT ALL OF THE MISSING PAGES IN THIS DOCUMENT WERE ORIGINALLY BLANK The IAEA doe t maintaisno n stock f reportso thin si s series. However, microfiche copie f thesso e reportobtainee b n sca d from MicrofichS IM e Clearinghouse International Atomic Energy Agency Wagramerstrasse 5 0 10 x P.OBo . A-1400 Vienna, Austria on prepayment of Austrian Schillings 40.00 or against one IAEA microfiche service coupon. FOREWORD

Radioactive materials are a part of modern technology and life. They are used, for example, in medicine, industrial manufacturing, research, defense, electrical power productio hosa f wayn o ti sd thaan n t affect r dailou y lives.

Like other materials, radioactive material e transportear s d from place to place by all modes of transportation. It is estimated that 8 to 10 million packages containing radioactive material e transportear s d each year throughou worlde th e amount Th . f radioactivitto thesn i y e packages varies from virtually negligible amounts use n consumei d r productse th , small amounts used for medical purposes, to very large amounts such as in shipments of irradiated nuclear fuels. The vast majority of these package e transportesar d safely wit o damaghn theo t er releasmo f o e their contents.

Very strict standards are applied in the design of transport packaging for radioactive materials. However, with the continuing and expandin f theso e eus g materials correspondine th d an , g e growtth n i h numbe f shipmento r inevitabls i t i s e that some accidents will occure Th . very small number of these accidents which do result in a release of radioactive materials, have had and will have negligible consequences, or consequence scontrollee b whic n ca h mitigater o d y propeb d r emergency plannin d preparednesan g r respondinfo s theso t g e accidents.

The kind of emergency planning and preparedness that is needed for respondin o transportatiot g n accidents involving radioactive materials i s very simila o that r t require r respondinfo d accidento t g s involving non- radioactive hazardous materials such as flammables, explosives, poisonous gases and toxic chemicals which are in transport daily. Many of these non-radioactive hazardous materials pose significantly greater threato t s public health and safety than do most radioactive materials. Accidents involving these hazardous materials occur almost daily aroun worle th d d and are a matter of record. Therefore, emergency response organizations and personnel need to be prepared with emergency response plans and procedure respono l t types al f hazardouo o st d s materials accidentd an s they must have the basic knowledge, skills and equipment to deal effectively wity consequencean h f theso s e accidents.

To determine what practical guidance material should be contained in a document of this type and to commence work on the document itself, the Agency convened an Advisory Group in October of 1977. The draft material produced by the Advisory Group, along with comments received on it from interested parties, was reviewed by a small group of consultants in December 1978. During 1979 these consultants made further refinement of the draft material. In 1981, it was then reviewed and commented upon by a small number of knowledgeable experts and staff members in the Agency's Divisio f Nucleao n r Safety.

The text is now issued as an Agency Technical Document which may be of some benefit to Member States. Readers of this document should be aware that it is neither a collection of rules or a list of approved steps and actions. Rather, it is a basic discussion of the various aspect d philosophiean s f emergenco s y plannin d preparednesan g s along with a consideration of the problems which might be encountered in a transportation accident involving a release of radioactive materials. e e readerresponsiblTh ar o swh r preparinfo e g emergency pland an s procedures will have to decide on how best to apply this guidance to their own organizational structures and will also have to decide on an emergency plannin d preparednesan g s philosophy suitabl o theit en ow r situations.

Comments from interested parties are welcome and should be addressed

The Director (Ref: IAEA TECDOC-262) Divisio f Nucleao n r Safety International Atomic Energy Agency P.O. Box 100 A-1400 Vienna, Austria CONTENTS

Page

SECTIO INTRODUCTIO. NI N ...... 7 .

Purpose ...... 7 . Scope ••••••>•«•««•«••«•••••••••«••••••••««•••••••••••••••••••*•• 7

SECTION II. INTENT OP TRANSPORT REGULATIONS ...... 8

SECTION III PLANNINE .TH G BASIS ...... 9 .

General »•«••••»•••••*•«••••«•••«•••••••••«•«••••«••»•••••••••••9 • Transportation Systems ...... 9 . Type Packagef so s ...... 1 .1 Basic Consequences of an Accident Involving Release of Radioactive Materials ...... 16 Accident Assessment ...... 9 .1 Protective Measures ...... 3 .2

SECTIO . PHILOSOPHNIV Y CONCERNING RESPONDINO GT TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENTS ...... 28

General ...... 28 Response Philosophy ...... 0 .3 Initial Phase ...... 1 .3 Evaluation Phase ...... 33 Cleanup Phase ...... 4 .3 Special Considerations Relating to Modes of Transport other than Highway Transport ...... 3 .3 Radiological Monitoring Teams ...... 36 Instruments and Equipment ....«...•«•»...••••«*•«••••««.»•«.«•«•• 37 Communication Notificatiod san n •••••«••*•««••••«••••••«•««*•*••8 3 « SECTIO . NRESPONSIBILITIEV EMERGENCR SFO Y PLANNIND GAN PREPAREDNESS ...... 39

General ...... 9 .3 Carrier and Consignor Arrangements/Responsibilities ...... 40 Provincial| Stat Locad ean l Responsibilities ...... 1 4 National Responsibilities ...... 41 Lead Agency Concept ...... 2 .4

SECTIO . PUBLINVI C INFORMATION, TRAINING, EXERCISED SAN UPDATING THE EMERGENCY PLANS ...... 43

Public Information ...... 43 Training ...... 44 Exercises ...... 45 Updating the Emergency Plans ...... 46

GLOSSARY ...... 9 .4 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 5 5 . LIST OP PARTICIPANTS, CONSULTANTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ...... 57 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNIN TRANSPORR GFO T ACCIDENTS INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

I. INTRODUCTION

Purpose

1.01 The purpose of this publication is to provide guidance to public authoritie e responsiblar o wh s ensurinr fo e g public healt d safetyan h , anconsignoro t d d carrieran s f radioactivo s e materials, concernine th g kin f emergenco d y response arrangements which shoul establishee b d r fo d dealing effectively with accidents involving transport of radioactive materials. This guidance should assist in the preparation of emergency response plans. The additional intent of this document is to provide information which will assist both those countries where involvement with radioactive material s jusi s t beginnin d thosan g e which already hava e developed nuclear industry and attendant emergency plans, but may need to revie d improvwan e those plans e neeemergencr Th .fo d y response plans waye whicn th i s d han thee implementear y d will vary from countro t y country.

e emergencTh 1.02y response planning basi d responsan s e philosophy are outlined, including identification of emergency response organizations and emergency services that can become involved and required durin a transportatiog n accident e guidancTh . n thii e s publication is based upon consideration of conditions which could prevail during an accident involving the transportation of radioactive materials with or without a release of radioactive materials to the environment. e guidancTh e acknowledge sa spectru f accidento m d en e son boundee th t a d by low-hazard high probability-of-occurrence events, and at the other end by high-hazard very low-probability-of-occurrence accidents. It is not possible to describe in detail all of the conditions which may exist for this wide spectru f accideno m t scenarios. Emergency planning shoule b d based primarily on mitigating the consequences of any accidents and restoring the situation to normal. Because transportation accidents can occur at almost any place, these plans of necessity must be very flexible, s beyoni e scopt I th df thi1.0eo 3s guidance publicatio o providt n e detailed information concerning the nature and hazards of radioactivity and radioactive materials. This can be found in many standard texts on the subject and in Agency publications listed in the bibliography.

II. INTENT OF TRANSPORT REGULATIONS

e carriagTh 2.0 f radioactiv1o e e vas e materialth t n majoriti , is s y of cases, governed now by transport regulations developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These have been incorporated into the national regulations of many countries and international regulations such as those of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Internationa Transporr lAi t Association (IATAd )an Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), with the result that a very high standard of safety has been achieved. The intent of the regulations is to establish standards of safety for the transport of radioactive material. These should provide an acceptable level of control of the radiation hazards to persons, property and the environment. Transport is defined as any operation incidental to the whole course of carriage, such as loading, movement, unloading and storage in transit.

2.02 Radioactive materials are transported in a variety of types of packages e basiTh . c principle appliee desigth d construction i nan d f no these packages amd implied in the IAEA Regulations is that the package shall retain its integrity under conditions of handling and most foreseeable accidents. Even in severe postulated or actual accidents, e releasth f radioactivo e e materials y desigb s d constructioni ,an n , limitevase th t n majoriti d o f casereleasn o y o smalo t t s r lo e quantity releases. Therefore, integrity is built into the packages used to contain radioactive materials. Design requirement r thesfo s e packages e IAE e founth A ar n i Regulationd Safe th e r Transporfo s f Radioactivo t e Materials (Safety Series No.6). Consignors (shippers) have the responsibilit properlr fo y y packagin e radioactivth g e materials. e RegulationTh 2.03 e applicablar s wida o et e variet f radioactivo y e materials that spa nlarga e rang radiotoxicitf eo y values r thesFo . e reasons the package standards are based on both the quantity to be contained within the package and its radiotoxicity.

2.04 The Regulations require that emergency provisions, established by relevant national and/or international organizations e observe,b n i d order to protect public health and the environment.

PLANNINE IIITH . G BASIS

General e developmenTh 3.01 d establishmenan t f emergenco t y response plans and emergency preparedness procedures require development of what can be calle e planninth d g basis e planninTh . g basi r emergencfo s y response plan d preparednessan r transportatiofo s n accidents involving radioactive materials is determined by a consideration of: (1) transportation systems used for transport radioactive materials; (2) the types of packages used to contain radioactive materials; ) basi(3 c consequence accidenn a f o s t involving releasf o e radioactive materials; ) assessmen(4 accidente th f o td an ; (5) protective measures which may be required at the scene of an accident and during cleanup.

Transportation Systems

3.02 Radioactive materials are transported by land, sea, inland waterway d airsan . Radioactive materia s transportei l y commob d n carriers, contract carriers, government vehicles and private vehicles. It is transported by railway and road, through major cities, small towns and village d ruraan s l areas A radiologica. l emergency response plan with attendant emergency procedures for responding to transportation accidents involving radioactive material must, thus be very flexible to cope wit wida h e variet f situationo y d locationssan .

3.03 Not all materials move through all types of areas or by every mode of transport listed above. For example, spent (used) reactor fuel, whic highls i h y radioactive e normallb n ca , y limite movemeno t d n o t certain routes whic l possibleh al avoid t a f i ,, populated areass i t I . also transported in heavy shielded containers (casks or flasks) which are constructe exactino t d g specification d move an sy speciab d l truckr so special rail cars, sometimes accompanied by trained escorts. Escape of these materials, because stringenth f o e t requirements impose n theio d r containment, is highly unlikely. In developing an emergency plan, consideration should be given to identifying those areas where an accident involving these materials is more likely to occur and could cause great inconvenience and hazard, such as railway yards, shipping terminals and routes which pass near to heavily populated areas.

3.04 Other radioactive materials, on the other hand, may be moved by nearl y conveyancy roa an yr an street o d n o d . ean Although these typef o s s hazardoumateriala t no s e spena sar s t fuel, they could cause radiological problems in an accident. The majority of these types of material e radiopharmaceuticalar s s being transported from manufacturers o hospitalst d radioactiv,an e material use n industri d d researchan y .

3.05 The movement of radioactive material by aircraft can be by commercial passenger flights or by cargo flights which can carry many types of radioactive material. The nature of aircraft accidents can cause radioactive materials involve e fairlb n the i do t my widely dispersed under some circumstances. Most accidents witr shipmentai h f o s radioactive materials occur at tne airport in handling of the radioactive materials packages.

The majority of shipments of radioactive material by ocean-going vessels involve international shipment f reactoo s r fuel cycle materials. This limit e accidenth s t potentia r waterbornfo l e accidents mainlo t y seaport locations. However, ther s somi e e transpor f radioactivo t e materials on inland waterways and by coastal vessels, and accidents in these areas may require response from land-based organizations.

3.06 An emergency response plan should be developed for responding to y typ an f transportatioo e n accident, than occuca t r withie th n jurisdictio f thosno e organization e requirear o respono wh st d o suct d h an accident. The responsible authorities should conduct an analysis of the transportation systems used for radioactive materials and generally

10 determine what type f shipmento s s pass through these systems, where they are going, and place the major emphasis in planning and preparedness in the more likely areas of accidents. These areas should be identified based on an analysis of the statistical data concerning accidents which have occurred in the areas.

Types of Packages 3.07 The types of radioactive materials packages which are transporte e describear d generan followine i d th n i l g sectionse Th . technical standard d requirementan s r thesfo s e package e specifiear s n i d the IAEA Regulations previously mentioned in Section II.

) Exemp(1 t Packages 3.08 These packages contai smallese th n t quantitie f radioactivo s e material e exempar d t san from various packagin d labellinan g g requirements provided that they meet the general requirements specified Regulatione th n i s with respec o radiatiot d contaminatioan n n leveld an s packaging. Example f sucso h package e thosar s e that contain devices which use very minute quantities of radioactive material, such as, some watches, certain ionizing type f smoko s e detectors, pharmaceuticalsd an , very low-level radioctive sources used for testing instruments. Typically, exempt package f fibreboaro e sar d construction.

(2) Packages containing: Low Specific-Activity Materials (LSA)— Low-Level Solid Radioactive Materials (LLS) —'

3.09 Materials suc radioactivs ha e ores, low-level waste materials, e carrieb y etc.containersn ma i d, , suc s boxesa h , sacks, steel drumd an s 2 / tanks. Usually thecarriee ar y"Fula s a dl Load r "Exclusiv"o e Use"—. e containerTh s and/o vehicle th r e must hav n appropriata e e marking indicatin e presencth g f radioactiveo e material.

e currentlar procese _L'ThS th LL n f ei beind yo s an term gA redefinesLS d nexe fo.th tr revisio IAEe th A f no Transpor t Regulations expecte n 1984i d . j£/A "Full Load" or "Exclusive Use" is defined as any load from a single consignor that has the sole use of a vehicle, of a large freight container, of an aircraft, or of a hold or compartment of a ship, and all loading and unloading is carried out in accordance with directions of the consignor or consignee.

11 3.10 S materialLL Becausnatured s an it e normall A f ar so e LS , y carried in large quantities and, although the specific activity of the radioactive materials is very low, the total activity in a consignment coul e significantb d n accidenA . t might lea dispersao t d f thio l s activity. Unles e totas th mos lf o tconsignmen disperses i t n a n i d accident, the amount of activity released will usually be low, as will be the potential hazard. Procedure e cleaninth f suco r fo p hsu g accidents, althoug t significantlno h y hazardous e likele tediou,ar b o t yd an s complicated.

(3) Type A Packages

3.11 The quantities of material permitted to be transported in a Typ eA packag e strictlar e y regulated e quantitTh . y limite ar s determined on the basis of the hazard involved as determined by radiation levels, type of radiation, type of radioactive material and half-life, together with the physical form of the material, e.g. powder, liquid, gas, or "special form" (e.g., encapsulated or solid not readily dispersable)..

3.12 Type A packages are expected to withstand normal transport handling without loss or dispersal of their contents or change in external dose rates. Becaus e quantit contente th e th f o ys limited i s , y severan e damage causen accidena y b d t n excessivwil a t lea o no lt d e exposure to personnel. Although the design of these packages is simple, experience has demonstrated that, despite severe external damage and distortio accidentsn i n , onl a very y small fractio f packageno s shipped have suffered loss of contents or change in external dose rates. Typically, Type A packages are of wood or fibreboard construction. n increasinA 3.13 g numbe f theso r e package e beinar s g used thean dy are often found in multiple consignments; i.e., several packages held together in an overpack. In the case of simultaneous destruction of a numbe f Typro eA packages , with attendant releas f theio e r radioactive contents consequencee th , s would f courseo , e greateb , ra singl thar fo ne package. Package damage tha s followei t y dispersab d f radioactivo l e contents would generall more b y e hazardou confinea n i s d space n a tha n i n open area.

12 3.14 The small quantity limits prescribed for Type A packages limit the immediate hazard in the vicinity of these packages when their integrity has been destroyed. Even if all the shielding of a Type A package were to be lost in an accident, the quantity of radionuclides is so limited that the external exposure rate (dose equivalent rate) from an unshielded encapsulated radioactive sourc e greateb wilt no lr tha0 1 n mSv/hr (1 rem/hr) at 3 meters from the source. However, depending upon th e releasee th for f o m d radioactive materiadispersios it d an l whic- n h can only be detected by proper radiological monitoring - there could be a hazard from inhalation or accidental ingestion of the involved radioactive material, that would resul n internai t l radiological exposures.

) Typ(4 PackageB e s 5 3.1 Quantitie f radioactivso e materials, greater than Typ eA limits , are shipped in Type B packages. Type B packages are expected to withstand not only normal transport handling, but also all but the most severe accidents than arisca t e during transport, without releasingn i , principle y mor,an e than what Typ A epackage e normallsar y expecteo t d release from accidents. Type B packages may range in size from those weighin w kilogramfe a g o largt s e flasks containing irradiated reactor fuel (spent fuel) weighin abouo t metri0 p 10 tu g c tonnes.

3.16 This limit is prescribed by the Regulations and verified by analytical review and package testing procedures employed by the national competent authority in its approval of use of designs of such packages. Typically, Type B packages are of steel construction with shielding materials. Experienc o dat et s confirme ha e e suitabilitth d e th f o y package s showdesignha nd san thae probabilit th t f exceedino y g design basis release f radioactivso e materia vers i l y low. Howevere th r ,fo purposes of preparing emergency response plans, in spite of the good recor s o desirabldatei t d t i , o postulatt e e package failures that could contaminat environmene th e t and/or create health risks. Such accidents y arisma e from: i) very severe impact which breaches the package containment system; ii) an intense fire of several hours' duration resulting in loss of shielding in the package; ) failur e sealpackaga iii th f so f o e e droppe s whei t ni watern i d , allowing water to seep into the package and leak activity from its radioactive contents inte surroundinth o g water; 13 iv) a defective package which is not strong enough to withstand stresses.

Classification of Type B Packages

3.17 Type B packages are divided into two basic categories with respect to approval of design.

I/ (a) Type B(M) (M=MultilateraD—' e desigTh 3.1 f theso n8 e packages mus e approve b tcountre th y f b do y origi d validatenan l countrieal y b d s through whic e e packagb th ho t s ei transported e safetTh . y documentatio package th r s requirei efo n o t d contain emergency information (procedures) that is specific to the package. Since the documentation is examined by the countries concerned, they shoul y speciaaware an b d f d uniquo e an l e requirements including emergency arrangements pertaining to these packages in the event of an accident.

3 / (b) Type B(U) (U=Unilateral>— e desigTh 3.1 f thesno 9 e package approves i scountre th y f b do y origin, but does not require validation by each country through which the e transportedb packag o t s i e . Only general emergency information (procedures) is provided for these packages.

) Fissil(5 e Materials Packages (Type B(M)F, sAF . B(U)F)

3.20 Fissile materials must be carefully controlled in transport to assure safety against their accidentally undergoing a sustained nuclear reaction (criticality). Fission is the process of the splitting of an atomic nucleus into fission products accompanies i d e releas,an th y b de of a large amount of radiation and heat. While this is desirable under controlled condition a nuclea n i s r reactor s decidedli t i , y unwanten i d

Ji'Type B(U) packagehighese th e tar s quality packagess i t ;i considered that safety is entirely built into these packages. Type B(M requiremente )th packagef o t meel no al to sd s applicabl Typo t e e B(U) packages; therefore, operational controls must be taken to achiev e samth ee leve f safetyo l .

14 any uncontrolled environment, and certainly unwanted during transport. Fission reactions only occur with heavy elements suc uranius a h d an m plutonium. Safety in transport is provided by assuring that the contents of each package of fissile material is properly limited as to quantity and geometric configuration of the fissile material. This limitation is dependen package th n o te design e numbeTh . f packagero s allowee b o t d carrie a singl n o d e vehicl controlles i e o assurt d e thamateriae th t l wil e subcriticab l l unde l conditional r s likele encountereb o t y n i d transport, including accidents and handling errors. Emergency information (procedures requires )i r thesfo d e packages.

Package Radiation Levels limite Th radiation so 3«2 1 n levels under normal transport conditions whed an n evidenthero n s ei t Ttypr fypeo packagB eA e daaage thae ,ar t the maximum exposure rate (dose equivalent package rateth t )a e surface greatee shoul"b t dno r tha mSv/hn2 r (200 mrem/hr maximue th d )man exposure rate (dose equivalent rate) at 1 meter from the surface should not be greater than 0,1 mSv/hr (10 mrem/hr)• For Type B packages involved in accident moro sn e severe than those accidents considere regulatorn di y standards exposure ,th e rate (dose equivalent rate) shoulmoro n e ed"b tha mSv/h0 n1 rem/hal ( r mete 1 t )a r fropackage mth e surface.

Special Arrangements

3.22 Consignments of radioactive materials which do not satisfy all of the applicable requirements of the Regulations may only be made under "special arrangements". These arrangements include precautiono t s compensat r deviationfo e s from requirement ensuro t s e thae overalth t l safety in transport and in-transit storage is at least equivalent to that which woule applicabl th e provide b dl al f i ed requiremente th f o s Regulations had been met. Special escort personnel who are responsible e provideb l timea al ty r thessma fo d e shipments.

Radioactive Materials Contents of Packages, Labelling and Marking

e typeTh f radioactiv3.2o s 3 e materials containe packagen i d s prepared for transport are numerous and diverse with respect to specific- activit d radiotoxicityan y .alpha-e b Then ca y, beta-, gammad -an

15 neutron- emitters. For a listing of radioactive materials that can be foun n transporti d e IAEth A e Regulatiose , r Saffo ne Transporf o t Radioactive Materials (Safety . SeriePackage6) . sNo s containing radioactive materials (except exempt packages e labelle)ar d with distinctive markings indicating the contents of the package. Vehicles transporting these materials may also be placarded indicating that the vehicle is carrying radioactive material. (See IAEA Safety Series No. 6 for detailed information).

Basic Consequence Accidenn a f o s t Involving Release of Radioactive Material

General e natureTh , 3.2characteristic4 d consequencean s f transporo s t accidents involving radioactive materials depen numbea n o df factors ro . These includ type f th packageeo e , physical form, radiotoxicitd an y amount of the contents, the mode of transport and the severity of the accident as it affects the integrity of the involved package. Other factor e locatios th accidene suc th s a h f d prevailinno an t g weather conditions also determin consequencese th e .

Accident Characteristics

3.25 Transportation accidents can generally be classified into two types: 1) low-hazard, with high-probability of occurrence of an accident; and 2) high-hazard, with low-probability of occurrence of an accident. These classifications of course bracket a middle range of probabilities and attendant hazards. For all types of accidents, a technically competent person should evaluate the accident to determine whether or not a radiological hazard to members of the public or emergency workers exists. Basically e low-hazardth , , high-probability accidents would be those involving exempt, LSA/LLS, and Type A packages containing relatively limited quantities of radioactive materials. The low-probability, high-hazard accidents would involve Type B packages containing relatively large quantitie f radioactivo s e materialr o s fissile materials packages.

16 case Examptf th eo d Typ n I an eA packages S , LL 3.2LSA6, , limitn o s the amount f radioactivso e materia t inte packagpu th ol e e whicb ar en hca e relativbaseth n o d e hazard d toxicitiesan materialse th f o s .

Generally, depending upon the type of radioactive raaterialfType A packages contain no more than 1000 curies. If there were a breach of the package, destroying its integrity, the area affected from a radiological safety standpoint would normall e limitegenerae b y th o t dl vicinitf o y the acciden d theran t e o wouldnecessityn e b r radiologicafo , l

reasonst for taking protective actions for the general public beyond this immediate area.

3.27 Type B packages can contain material having an activity ranging from a few curies to several millions of curies in the case of a spent fuel container s witA . h Typ eA packages y radiologicaan , l impact would be limited, in most cases, to the general vicinity of the accident site. Large quantities of radioactive material which are shipped in Type B packages or containers may contain hundreds of thousands of curies. A breach to one of these containers might cause serious health and safety impacts over areas near the accident site. If the package were damaged s integritit d an y somehow significantly destroyed a ,rapi d response might be required. Although highla thi s i s y unlikely event because th f eo stringent requirements of package design, this possibility cannot be entirely excluded. Therefore, response plans shoul developee b d r fo d responding to such an accident, even if only to verify that there would be no hazard from such an accident if it were to occur.

3.28 Radioactive materials are shipped either in dispersable form (powder, liquids, gases) (e.g., radiophamaceutical materials for use in medical diagnosis or treatment, uranium concentrates) or in non-dispersable form (i.e., "special form" suc s solida h r o s encapsulated) (e.g., large medical teletherapy radioactive sources, industrial radiographic sources, etc.).

3.29 If a transportation accident involving a dispersable material were to occur, the conditions encountered by emergency response personnel could possibly include radiation fields, injured persons, contaminated persons, vehicles, wreckage, road and earth surfaces, actual or potential e otheth firrd hazardan e s normally encountere n transportatioi d n accidents. Because the material could also become airborne in the form

17 of particulate material or aerosols, there might also be an inhalation hazard and contamination to varying degrees, surrounding the accident site and particularly downwind of it.

3.30 If the materials were non-dispersable, there would probably not y contaminatioban e r signficanno t contamination t therbu , e mighe b t localized areas with radiation fields which coul e hazardousb d . This migh e cause b tr rearrangemen o y losb , d of s e shieldinth f o t g materials within the package.

3.31 Direct exposur o radiatiot e y beinb n g withi na radiatio n field, can occur in accidents involving both dispersable and non-dispersable form f radioactivo s e materials.

3.32 The loss of a radioactive source, such as an industrial radiography device from a transport vehicle, may pose a very serious hazar o persont d se transpor eveth f i n t vehiclt involveno n s a i en i d accident. If the radioactive source has lost its shielding or if it is removed from its shielding by curious unknowledgeable persons who may find the source, they could be exposed to the high radiation field which exists withimeterw fe a f nsuco s h unshielded source d receivan s a e radiation dose with serious consequences. Therefore, accountabilitr fo y radioactive material n transporti s e consignoth y ,b d particularlan r y b y the carrier is necessary. If a hazardous radioactive source or other radioactive material e lostar s , every effort shoul e expendeb d o t d quickl publie yth locatf co materiale newe f th eo us s e e b medi Th n . ca a assistance in both locating the material and warning people of its potential hazard.

3.33 Emergency response personnel should be prepared to deal first wite typicath h l characteristic y seriouan f o s s accident (rescud an e medical aid for the injured, fires, and traffic control.

3.34 Fires and the air currents they create, and the use of water or chemicals to suppress fire, can easily spread radioactive materials about the accident site. Personnel working at an emergency scene where radioactive material may have contaminated the area, could track contamination around in their emergency efforts. However, the spread of contamination or solid materials is of secondary consequence compared to

18 saving live d fightinsan g fires, which should always receive first priorit y accidentan n i y .

3.35 Radioactive contamination can not only be a hazard to those persons in the vicinity of an accident, but could be a potential hazard to persons hundreds or thousands of kilometers away if undetected radioactive material contaminates a vehicle such as a train, truck or aircraft vehicle th d e,an continue n servici s e under such circumstances.

3.36 Dispersable radioactive materials can contaminate local agricultural product d drinkinan s g water supplies, whic n turi n h nca cause a hazard via ingestion of these products and the affected water. Similarly, domestic agricultural animals (suc s daira h y cows), eating contaminated forage, can pass these contaminants on to humans via the food chain (e.g. milk).

Accident Assessment

3.37 Initial radiological assessmen a transportatio f o t n accident involving radioactive materials involves evaluatio e situatioth f o n t a n the accident site from the standpoint of making three basic observations determinationsr o . They are ) confirmatio:(l presence th f o nf o e radioactive materials ) ascertainin(2 ; integrite gth whethet no f o yr o r shipping containers or packages has been breached; and (3) ascertaining a radiatiowhethe t no r o rn hazard exists y monitorinb , g with appropriate instrumentation operate y qualifieb d d personnel.

Confirmatio Presence th f o nf Radioactiv o e e Materials

3.38 The initial problem will probably be one of recognition. Some radioactive material e shippeb y n corrosivesma i d , toxi d chemicallan c y irritating forms, but many radioactive materials are not in these forms and f thee releasei , ar y d t advertisno the o d y e their presency b e distinctive smoke, fumes or flames. Any vehicle markings (placards), shipping paper r packago s e e destroyelabelb y sma r obliterateo d e th y b d accident. Involved vehicle operators (truck driver, train crew, aircraft crew) may be incapacitated. Fire can change the chemical and physical composition of the radioactive materials.

19 3.39 If package labelling is intact and visible, it can also confirm the presence of radioactive materials. If the shipping papers can be located, they should confirm the quantity and type of radioactive material r othe(o s r hazardous materials) thae beinar t g transporten i d the vehicle. These papers are normally carried in the cab of trucks, the caboos r locomotivo e a freigh f o e t train e cockpi n aircrafth ,a f o td an t on the bridge of a ship. absence th n markingsf I o e3.4 0 , distinctive containers suc metas a h l cask r flasksso , drums heavr ,o y shielded containers, shoul e suspecb d t as containers of either radioactive or other hazardous materials. Some radioactive material e alssar o shippe n woodeni d , fibreboardr ,o cardboard cartons.

3.41 If radiation monitoring equipment of a suitable type is available to the emergency personnel responding to the accident, its use might confir e presencth m r absenco e f radioactivo e e materials. Some types of radiation are difficult to detect without proper instrumentation.

Integrit f Shippino y g Container Packager o s s

3.42 Depending upon the nature of the accident, the integrity of the shipping containers or packages may be relatively easy to ascertain or on the other hand quite difficult. The presence of fire, smoke and fumes could preclude an initial determination in this regard. The presence of other toxic materials which have been released as a result of the accident will also hamper this part of the assessment. Saving lives, suppressing of fire and dealing with any other toxic materials will generally take priority before any assessment of package integrity can or should be made.

3.43 External damage to a container or package of radioactive materials doet necessarilno s y mean that interior packaging materials containing the radioactive material have been breached, but external damage is an indication that the package should be thoroughly examined by personnel properly equipped with instruments. If leaking liquids, gases or powders are visible, this is of course, a positive indicator that package integrit s beeha y n destroye releasel al d an dd material shoule b d considered hazardous. Package integrit n alsca yo have failed wito n h visible indication, (such as a cap coming off an inner container) and

20 this can only be determined by radiological monitoring of the package with appropriate instruments.

Determinin Therf a Radiatioi g s i e n Hazard

3.44 A thorough evaluation of radiological conditions at an accident site requires considerable knowledge and experience with radioactive materials and the specialized instruments used to detect them. It can be a time-consuming process especially in cases involving contamination of persons, e environmentobjectth d s an slikeli t I e yvas. th tha tn i t majority of accidents there will be no radiation or contamination hazards d eve an ;f the i n y exist, thee unlikelar y o pos t yn immediat a e e threa emergenco t t y rescue personnel accidene th vera f I s .yi t severe n termi f damage o s on vehicleo t e d injuriesan s , this shoul e takeb d s a n a general guid emergenco t e y personnel that container d packagean s y sma have been damaged d necessaran , y emergency work suc s rescuina h e th g injured should be performed quickly, followed by a cautious assessment of any radiological hazard.

3.45 Radiation monitorin s besi g qualifiee t th lef o t t d expert, If . however, radiation monitoring equipment is available to first-on-the- scene personnel such as police, fire and rescue and emergency medical services, information concerning intensit f radiatioo y n fields, losf o s radioactive material shielding, and the release of radioactive material from a container or package may be obtained. If such instruments are made availabl o thest e e personnel, they mus e specificallb t y trainen i d the operation of such equipment. These personnel should also be trained with respect to the limits on radiation levels for packages under normal transport conditions. Such early on-scene information would be useful in determining that there is no hazard or in preventing unnecessary radiological exposur emergenco t e y workere generath r o sl public. Early information would also be of use to medical personnel caring for any injured person o mighwh se contaminatedb t .

Radiation Monitoring Instruments

3.46 The availability of appropriate radiation monitoring instruments and qualified personnel to operate them is the key to determining if radiological hazards exist. Notwithstanding the usefulness of observation of such things as labels, package damage and leaking of

21 contents from packages, no real assessment of a radiological hazard can be made without instruments. 3.47 Radiation monitoring instruments suitable for first-at-the- scene emergency personnel shoul e lightweightb d , eas o reat yd an d operate, and of rugged construction. Generally, these instruments will e civith f blo e defence variet r simplo y e instruments equivalen o thet t m with scale n Roentgeni s r milli-Roentgeno s r houpe s r (R/h r rmR/hr)o . Other instruments with units suc s "rad/hra h r "rem/hro " n i alsy e b oma " e todayus . Some newer instrument r instrumento s s wher e scaleth e s have been converted to the International System of Units (Si) e.g., Sieverts per hour (Sv/hr), millisieverts per hour (mSv/hr), may also be in use. Useful general purpose instruments a battery-powereare ) (1 : d low-range Geiger Muller (GM) tube survey meter, with headphones d rangan , e scales of about 0-.5 mR/hr, 0-5 mR/hr and 0-50 mR/hr. The instrument should hav a closable e e probshielth o permin t eo d t discrimination between beta and gamma radiation; (2) a battery-powered, high-range ionization chamber survey meter for measuring gamma-ray exposure rates. The instrument should have scale f abouo s t 0-500 mR/hr 5 R/hr0- , , 0-50 R/hr and 0-50 ) 0pocke (3 R/hr d tan ; ionization Chamber dosimeters (direct reading o rangestw f o ) , battery-powere d A 0-200-20an . R R 0m 0 d dosimeter charger must also be available to "zero" (charge) these dosimeters. These types of instruments, although somewhat limited in accuracy, provide some response for most radioactive materials likely to be encountere n transportationi d radioactivw .fe a Ther e ar ee materials whose radiation will not be detectable by these instruments and the instrument's respons s i dependane t upon many factor e squantit th suc s a h y and physica e radioactivl th for f mo e material s distancit d an , e froe th m instrument. These instruments although they may underestimate the hazard in some situations, are nevertheless useful since they can detect, if not precisely quantify, most hazardous radioactivity.

3.48 More sophisticated radiation monitoring instruments are, or should be, available to professional radiological monitoring teams. These include low-, medium- and high-range, gamma radiation measuring and beta radiation sensitive instruments, alpha radiation detectors, neutron detectio measurind nan g instruments, high volum r samplersai e , spectrometers, liquid scintillation counters s ,beyon i etc t e I th .d scop f thio e s documen o covet t e multitudth r f instrumento e s available,

22 but their characteristics are well known to the professional personnel specially trained in their use. Characteristics of many of these types of instruments can be found in standard texts on instruments, manufacturers' literature accompanyin instrumentse th g IAEn i Ad ,an Technical Reports Serie . 152No s , "Evaluatio f Radiatioo n n Emergencies and Accidents - Selected Criteria and Data", Vienna 1974.

Protective Measures

General e eventh tn I that 3.4radioactiv9 e materia s releasedi l r shieldino , g is lost from packages or containers during a transportation accident, some protective measures shoul e implementeb d o protect d t emergency workers, the transport crew of the involved vehicle and the general public near the accident scene. Because the nature of the accident, the type and physical form of the radioactive material and the quantity of it that might be released are unpredictable variables in any given accident, the emergency personnel respondin accidene th o t g t must first ascertain which protective measures are necessary, if any, and second, to apply those protective measures considered pruden o avoit t minimizr o d e radiological exposures e protectivTh . e measures chosen mus e flexiblb t e in order to apply to a wide variety of potential situations. In general, the protective measures which are applicable to these types of accidents are alse protectivth o e measures employed during accidents involving other toxic or hazardous materials in transport.

Type f Protectivo s e Measures

3.50 The types of protective measures which may be useful in transportation accidents where radiation fields or radioactive contamination might exise losa resul th f integrits o s a t f o t f o y package r containersso , include contro f accesslo , protective actions withi cordoned-ofa n f area, personal protective measures, evacuation, decontamination in affected areas and control of food and water supplies.

Contro Accesf o l s

3.51 Control of access to the site of an accident is the most effective way to both facilitate the essential work of emergency

23 personnel and to control any potential exposure to radiation, radioactive contaminatio r otheo n r hazards. Temporary barriers using available vehicles and other materials which lend themselves to cordoning off affected area e use y ar straffib d c police everywher n controllini e g access to accident sites; this practice is well known and commonly used. Appropriately enforced barrier t distancpu s e betwee hazare th nd an d e affectet needeth no n e personi dar d o areaswh .

3.52 Whe n placi barriert e pu aroun e ar sn acciden a d t site where radioactive materials are either exposed or have leaked from their packages, it is important to establish radiological monitoring control points at the barrier perimeter as soon as possible, when appropriate radiological monitoring personnel and their equipment arrive on the scene. The control points serve as access and egress points, radiological monitoring station d assemblan s y point emergencr fo s y workers and their equipment.

3.53 Traffic should not be allowed to proceed through a contaminated area. Where possible, detours should be arranged.

Protective Actions Within a Cordoned-Off Area

3.54 Emergency personnel working within the barrier or cordoned-off area may coursef o , exposee ,b varieta o t d hazardf o y o t s they a s tr y rescue persons, provide critical first aid and fight any fires. These persons and the injured persons may be exposed to radioactivity or be contaminated with released radioactive material. Emergency workers should complete their wor s quickla k s possibl a ye cordoned-of th n i e f area. Injured person e takeb o a hospitanee o swh o t t nd l shoule b d wrapped in blankets or other available covering which will help to contro spreathe l contaminationof d . Rarely, unless first-at-the-scene emergency worker e equippear s d with radiological monitoring instruments, e possiblb wil t i l o confirt e m that anyon s contaminatedi e . Where lives e involvedar , injured persons should immediatel e transporteb y o t d medical facilities with instructions to the drivers and attendants of the emergency medical service vehicles that the injured persons may be radioactively contaminate d thaan d t they shoul o infors d m medical facility personnel who are to care for them. The receiving medical facility should be advised as far in advance as possible by radio or

24 telephone of the impending arrival of these injured persons. Emergency workers and other persons involved in the accident who are not critically or seriously injured should wait to be radiologically monitored at a safe distance upwind from the accident scene. Where possible, they should remain withi e establisheth n d perimeter barrier, typically within roadblock t 100-20a p u t 0 se smeter o froe accidens centre th th mr so f o e t site, unless other hazards dictate otherwise.

3.55 Packages or containers of radioactive material which have been ejected from the vehicle as a result of the accident should also be cordone f awaitinof d e arrivath g f traineo l d personne o examint l e them and conduct radiological monitoring.

3.56 Run-off water froy fire-fightinan m g efforts r leakago , e from damaged containers or packages, should be diked within the cordoned off area, using shovel r availablo s e tools f possiblei , .

3.57 Vehicles, material, equipment or other items suspected of being contaminated e permitteshoulb t e removeb no d o t d d froe areth ma unless release y qualifieb d d radiological monitoring personnel.

3.58 Eating, drinking and smoking should be prohibited in an area suspected of being contaminated. 3.59 Emergency response personnel should approach froupwine th m d direction, any accident site where radioactive materials may have been released minimizo t , e inhalin y airbornan g e radioactive material. Plastic sheets or tarpaulins can be used to cover loose materials to help minimize their dispersion by wind or rain.

Personal Protective Measures

3.60 Personal protective measure e essentiasar n transportatioi l n accidents involvin a releas gr loso f shieldin, so eof , radioactivof g e materials. These measure n involvca s e using relatively simple techniques suc: limitinas h g a radiatiotim n i e n field minimizo t , e radiologicath e l exposure dose; keeping a distance from radioactive materials, to minimize the radiological exposure dose; using shielding, where available, to minimiz e radiologicath e l exposure dose. More sophisticated techniques f respiratoro involve us e th e y protection equipmen d protectivan t e clothing.

25 3.61 Fire-fighting personnel and radiological monitoring team personne e generalllar y well equipped witstandare th h d protective clothin d respiratoran g y protection equipment use n theii d r everyday work. This equipment provides good protection against radioactive contamination and inhalation of airborne radioactive material. It does not, however, protect them from direct gamma radiation fields.

3.62 Police, emergency medical services personne othed an l r emergency worker e e lesgenerallb s ar o st suitablt ap y y equipped d they hav,an ma y e to employ simple respiratory protectio y coverinb s a nmoute d th nosg an h e wit n articla h f clothino e r eveo g n soft absorbent paper products. Nearly all clothing, if it covers most of the body, provides a certain degre f protectioo e n against contaminatio skine th .f no

Evacuation

3.63 Evacuation of an area is the ultimate protective measure that implementede b n ca onlt vern ,bu i y y rare circumstances would thie sb necessary for transportation accidents involving radioactive materials.

3.64 A surface-level transportation accident with release of dispersable radioactive material under high wind conditionsn a r ,o aircraft accident involving the dispersion of radioactive material, might requir e evacuatioth e y populatean f no d areas threatene e releaseth y b d . Such accidents are possible, but unlikely. Precautionary evacuation of a limited area could be ordered while awaiting the arrival of trained radiological monitoring team o woulswh d the e abl b nasseso t e y hazarsan d that might exist.

Decontamination of Persons 3.65 Generally e removath , outef o l r clothin d shoean g f personso s contaminated with radioactive material will remove a great deal of the hazard. Contaminatio e skith n f wilo n l require showe d washinan r g facilitie d possiblan s y some medical assistance d thes ,an e unlikel ar e y te availablob a e transportatiosit th f o et a e n accident. Persons contaminated or suspected of being contaminated should be taken to an appropriate facilit monitoree b o t y d decontaminatedan d a chang f I f .o e clothing can be provided to them at the accident site, their contaminated clothes should be collected in suitable containers for later washing or disposal. If no change of clothing is available, wrapping in blankets or

26 other covering will help limit the spread of contamination while they are being taken to decontamination facilities.

4/ Decontamination in Affected Areas— 3.66 Decontamination of areas, equipment, vehicles, buildings, roads, land, etc. protectiva s ,i e measure that appliee "clean-uth o t s p phase" of the accident, discussed in Section IV. This protective measure involves mainl e removae radioactivth yth f o l e contamination from surfaces to another controlled location using suitable containment and transport.

3.67 Several decontamination method employede b y sma , suc: as h Washing (with collectio wastf no e water vacuur )o m sweepinf o g roads and other objects and surfaces; this can be done with fire-fighting or industrial equipment.

Fixation of contaminants using paints, liquid-to-solid strippable plastics d pavinan , g materials suc s asphalta h . Depending upoe typ th f radioactivitno e y involved, this techniqu y involvema e subsequent removae fixativth f o l e agent s solidifiedafteha t i e fixativr th r o , ee lefb agenn i ty tma place.

Washing (with collection of waste water) and cleaning of hard surface d equipmenan s t with wate d appropriatan r e detergentr o s other chemicals, accompanied by collection of as much of the waste water as possible.

Removal of surface layers of roads or earth to a suitable storage place.

Ploughing agricultural land d othean s r earth. This technique does not get rid of contamination, but relocates it to deeper layers in the soil. The future use of agricultural land, after ploughing under these circumstances dependens i , t upo varieta n y of factors such as the radiotoxicity, quantity and radioactive half-life of the contaminants.

4/ -—Tor a relatively detailed treatise on decontamination methods, see the U.S. Reactor Safety Study (NUREG-75/014, formerly WASH-1400, Appendix K of Appendix VI (October.1975).

27 Control of Food and Water Supplies unlikels i t I 3.6y 8tha t protective measures involvin e controth g l and distribution of agricultural products or potable water would have to be implemented becaus f contaminatioo e n fro a transportatiom n accident involving radioactive materials. Althoug s possibli t i h e than a t accident could affect these products, any contamination is likely to be localized to a specific area. Under such circumstances, the agricultural products would undoubtedl ye confiscateb hav o t e d destroyedan d a f I . potable drinking water suppl contaminates i y y disperseb d d radioactive materials t shouli , e contaminants e testeth b d r fo d d controe ,an th f o l supply at its sources may have to be invoked.

PHILOSOPH. IV Y CONCERNING RESPONDIN TRANSPORTATIOO T G N ACCIDENTS

General

4.01 The type of emergency plan needed for response to radioactive material accident basicalls i s e sam th n structuryi e e planth o st e needed for respondin o othet g r hazardous materials transport accidents; manf o y the same organizations are involved. Therefore it is preferable, wherever possible o integratt , emergence th e y plar radioactivfo n e materials with plans for responding to hazardous materials accidents, and to develo mastea p r plan with nationa r regionao l l communication centres for all types of transport accidents involving hazardous materials. Such a system would be activated more frequently than would separate arrangements for each hazardous material, and the experience gained will strengthe e reliabilitth n d effectivenesan y response th f o s e system. Plans made should be flexible to provide response both for accidents which will have minor consequences, e.g., those involving exempt packages S consignments,LL A consignment,LS Typd an seA packages n i d ;an addition e lesth , s likely t potentiallbu , y more severe accidents involving Type B packages. Responsibility is, in most situations with the consignor and carrier to ensure that they have adequate emergency plans and preparedness arrangements, in addition to governmental arrangements. In developing the plans, consideration should be given to the likely area f consideratioo s f transporno f radioactivo t e materials, the quantities and types of material being transported and the potential for accidents in these areas.

28 n transporI 4.02 t accidents majoa , r consideratio s thai n t then ca y take place either in remote areas where access may be difficult or in populated areas where controe b o f accese publit o l th s y ha csb instituted. Response plan e implementey havb sma o t e difficuln o d t terrain and under adverse weather conditions. It is essential that clear step by step procedures should be prepared, to implement the emergency plan in a graded response (e.g., local, State, Provincial, National response) as required by the severity of the accident and its consequences. This could range from simple confirmation that o thern s i e radiological hazard (which is most frequently the case) to situations where large-scale remedial measures may be required and must be brought to bear at the accident site (which is the more unlikely case).

4.03 It is possible that persons arriving first on the scene will be membere publicth f r o slocao , l emergency services suc s policea h , fire brigad r emergenco e y medical services personnel. Response planr fo s dealing with accidents involving radioactivity confor s closela m s a y possibl existino t e g general arrangement r dealinfo s g with other transport accidents. Eithe e policth r r firo e e organizations will provide the first line of action. The members of the public who may be directly involve d initiall an dn accidene scen a th f o en o y t will most likely contact the police. The carriers's employees (the crew of the vehicle) shoul e giveb d n advance instruction y theib s r organization o notift s e th y polic r whateveo e r organizations woulo takt mose eb t d ap tinitia l case action movementth f o e n a I thi.se sy b sstag f responso et no s i e likel o involvt y e member e publith f co s excep n coastai t l areas, seaports n oinlano r d waterways.

4.04 Information concerning radioactive materials packages is given (excepcase f th "Exempo e n i t t Packages" e labe th markinr o ly ) b g on the package, the shipping papers and for certain shipments by placards on the vehicle. Assuming that these markings and papers will be seen and understood, this information should be available to the persons arriving initially at the scene of an accident. The placard indicates the nature e hazardouoth f s material being carrie y standarb d d words, sucs a h "Radioactive", "Corrosive", "Flammable", with a picture symbol, etc. The package label for radioactive material indicates, by colour marking and written information nature th ,d quantit an e packag th f o ye contentse th , maximum radiation dose rate at 1 meter from any accessible surface of the

29 package (which is called the transport index). Other marking on the package identifies the type of package design, e.g., LLA, LSA, Type A, d whetheTypan B e r Fissile e shippinTh . g papers should identife th l al y hazardous materials in cne shipment along with pertinent information for radioactive materials, such as the transport index, type of material, radioactivity of the package contents, quantity of the contents, and physical state or whether "special form", etc. A visual check of the package should determine if it has sustained any damage and it should also be observed for possible leakage on package surfaces, possible penetration, tearin meltinr o g f shieldingo g r otheo , r damage. s unlikela e firepackagi Ith n fi t i , s i ey thas integritit te b n ca y ascertained t outunti pu e fir .s th li e

4.05 In general, efforts should be made to immediately inform the consignor and the carrier. The responsibility rests, in principle, with the consigno e carrieth d assuro t an r e that adequate arrangemente ar s available to effectively deal with accidents to these shipments. In practice e carrieth , y contracrma t wite consignoth h o providt r e such emergency services, consignoe tn d an r mus e abl b to providt e e hazards information concerning the shipment.

Response Philosophy

4.06 In*«re o transportatiost pon g din n accidents e actione th ,b o t s taken are:

) a rescu d providan e e emergenc y victimsyan medicao t ;d ai l ) b control fire d othean s r common consequence f transportatioo s n accidents; c) control any radiation hazard and prevent the spread of radioactive contamination; ) accidene d cleath p u n t site. s previouslA 4.07 y mentioned, responsibilitie r respondinfo s o t g transportation accident e generallar s y divided among several parties. The consignor, carrier, national, provincial, state and local government organizations may all have a role in the response. To provide guidance for developing an emergency response plan(s), the -response can be divided into three phases: the initial phase, the evaluation phase, the cleanup phase. 30 Initial Phase

4.08 During the first minutes after the accident occurs, emergency e requireactiob y r nma savin fo d g lives, attendin e injuredth o t g , preventin r puttino g t firesou g , identifyin e hazardth g f i anys d ,an determinin e actioth g n require o prevent d t further threa o lift r t o e property. Local public safety officials invariably are the persons who exercise this responsibility and they are generally, first on the n accidentscena f o e . Their capabilitie r handlinfo s g radiological accident e oftear s n strained becaus f theio e r lac f knowledgo k d an e because assistance from persons having specialized radiological knowledge s rareli y available during this early period followin e accidentth g e Th . vehicl ea responsibilit cres wha o notift y e propeth y r government authorities, the consignor and the carrier management at the earliest practicable moment. However, the crew members are often injured in the accident and may not be able to act. Others who may happen on the accident reporsity e accidenema th t t most likel o locat y l government authorities. Furthermore n somi , e cases sufficient information aboue th t e immediatelb t e no naturcarg y th f oma o ye availabl o assest e e th s hazard. For this reason, local government emergency response planning must e propeprovidth r rfo e initial step o acquirt s e this information. Generally, local governments should seek assistance from the consignor f possible)(i , carrier, provincial, stat r nationao e l authorities which should have access to expert advice and resources. If the shipment is accompanied by the required shipping papers and if packages are properly marked, then these documents and markings can be used to guide the initial response and will also be of help to experts as to what steps should be taken. This assumes that these documents are found and the markings are recognized.

4.09 Essentially the only information readily available to those first on the scene will be visual. It is important that they should not over-react, but it is equally important that they should not under-react. Police, firemen or first-on-the-scene personnel should be traine o assest d e situatioth s meany nb f standaro s d accident investigative procedures which will enable suitable decision made b eo t s o what s ta further actio s i necessaryn publie Th . c shoul e kepb d t away from the accident site. Police, firemen or other qualified emergency personnel should ensure that an appropriate distance around the scene is

31 kept clear (typically, clos e streeth e t bothXnda t a bloca tow f o n si nk or city, close the approaches to an intersection; oS close the lanes of a highwa r roao y d wher n accidena e s occurredha t . Generally, distances fro n accidenma t a roadblocsit o t e k range from 100-200 meters unless other hazard r circumstanceo s s dictate otherwise) minimizo T . e th e possibility of spreading contamination, only persons involved in rescue and life-saving activities shouln thii e sb d areanamee d Th an s. addresse f persono s havo ewh s been involve e accidenth t a d t scenen i r o , e immediatth e vicinity, shoul e obtaine b de policth r y otheo b de r emergency personnel f contaminatioI . s i laten r foun o existt d d an , people have e lefscenth t e beforehand ,e re-contacte b havthey o t yema d for radiological monitoring. The initial investigative procedures should include inquiries which would ascertain such things as: a) Are there any injuries to personnel? s I therb) e visible e radioactivdamagth o t e e material packages? s therI e) c evidenc f leakago e e froe radioactivth m e material packages? s therI d ) a efir e neae radioactivth r e material packages? e) Are large quantities of flammable liquids or gases in the immediate vicinity of the accident site? e therar fe) explosive r toxio s c material e immediatth n i s e vicinity of the accident site? g) Is contamination present, or are radiation fields detected? e don b f first-at-the-sceny thib (i en ca s e personnel) s therI h) e precipitatio r higo n h winds? i) Where is the location, and what is the access to the accident? ) e radioactivj th Wha s i t e material involved havd an e, paperr o s labels on the packages been found? (The foregoing should also forn e initiabasia th m f o s l reporo t t expert person a centra t a s l contro communicationd an l s station). cleaA 4.1r 0chai f communicatioo n n shoul e establisheb d d froe th m "perso e e relevanscene n chargth th i n n o t o " e t authoritiess i t I . most likely that communication will be by police radio, but in some cases

JVNote e "persoTh : scenee designatee chargn b ni th y n "eo ma n i d variety of ways in the emergency plan, and will vary considerably from country to country.

32 telephone communicatio e availableb y ma ne perso Th . n in-charge th n o e scene should ensur e recontacteb n e ca tha e h giviny t b d e telephonth g e s numbelocationhi e radit a th r r oo , communication information necessary o reestablist h contact.

Evaluation Phase emergence th a par f s o tA 4.1y 1plannin g process, prior arrangements to contact properly qualified or experienced persons or teams from a nuclear establishment, the military, or from an institution, hospital or university where radiological protection services exist, should be made. These persons or teams who are qualified or experienced in radiation protection techniques should be able to give specific advice if they are provided with the answers to the basic inquiries. They can then explain what further action or protective measures should be taken. Initial givee advicb n nca e ove r communications links until arriva f expero l t assistanc e sceneth t a e. Assistanc e scenth et a e should include assessment base measuremenn o d f radiatioo t n levels f personneo , l contamination and of environmental contamination. The experts should be aware of the type of radiation materials involved in the accident and the problems involve makinn i d g appropriate recommendations. They shoule b d traine d knowledgeablan d e abou e transporth t f radioactivo t e materials. Generally, expert advice wil e scenneedee lb th f ther a i et a ds i e release of radioactive materials or damage to the container.

decidee b t thiA o 4.1t s d s 2 stag whaha t i te needdone b eo t swit h the package and what further remedial action is necessary.

4.13 Safety precautions and later cleanup actions will be very dependen e content th e packag th n o tf so r container eo e typf th ,o e e severitreleas accidente th th d f ean o y e terrainweathee th , th d ,an r conditions. Actions which may be required in this phase may range from the provisio f simplno e barriers adjacen e affecteth o t d vehiclo t e evacuatio populatioe th f o n n from areas aroun accidente e scenth th df o e .

4.14 Where a release of radioactive material in a transportation accident necessitates a decision concerning evacuation of persons from certain areas, the decision and subsequent actions should be made by the responsible local public safety officials based upon expert advice.

33 These same officials also make similar decisions concerning evacuation after transportation accidents involving other hazardous materials.

Cleanup Phase

4.15 This phase include removae th s damagef o l d packagesy ,an radioactive material contamination, or other residue of the accident and restoratio s origina it e are th o t af o nl state. Generallyn i d ,an principle e carriee basith th , cs rresponsibilitha assuro t y e that cleanu s completei p d thaan dt vehicles, building, areas r equipmen,o t which have been contaminated by radioactive materials are not occupied or returne o servict d e until they have been decontaminated an d radiologically surveyed.

4.16 Since mann i , y cases carriee ,th r will have neithee th r technical expertise, nor the experience and equipment to handle radioactiv r hazardouo e s materials e carrieth , y fin necessart ma ri d o t y contract with others to perform certain cleanup functions. In many cases e consigno, th e abl b provido t ey rma e such expertis d equipmentan e ; however, the basic burden of assuring that such provisions are made remains with the carrier. Since in most releases of radioactive material, handlin unshieldedf go , uncontained radioactive material (repackaging, disposal, or removal) is necessary, some responsible e personexperiencear o swh d equippean d handlo t d radioactive th e e material must be present. In carrying out its responsibility for cleanup and decontamination, the carrier may also have to use the technical service governmenf o s t radiological protection personnel, technicians from nearby hospitals, universities, industrial or military installations r othe,o r radiological safety personnel. emergence th para f s o tA 4.1y 7plannin g efforts, formal arrangements should be made to summon persons with additional expertise and equipment suitable for dealing with the more severe accidents. These persons may be drawn from nuclear facilities r froo , m government agencies, sucs ha national laboratories, public health organizations, civil defence organizations, emergency services, etc. The arrangements should be made on a national or other appropriate governmental level basis.

34 Special Considerations Relating to Modes of Transport Other Than Highway Transport

Water Transport

4.18 Emergency response plannin d preparednesan g s arrangementr fo s highway transport of radioactive materials may be generally applicable to inland waterway transport, but not to sea transport. If ships are chartered for the exclusive large-scale shipment of irradiated fuel container r flaskso s n accidena , a mighse t a t necessitate long range communicatio d emergencnan y actionunlikels i t I . y that such shipments can be covered in detailed national level emergency response plans. Such shippers hav a responsibilite r thei fo n yoperations ow r d thu,an s for their own emergency arrangements, which could require international assistance s difficulti t I . t feasible,bu deviso t , e general emergency response plan r gettinfo s y needean g d technical assistanc vessea o t et a l sea. Bilateral agreements between countries involve shippinn i d g this material froe countron m anothero t y , concerning provisio f technicano l assistanc seat a ee als ar ,o feasible. emergence th a par f s o tA y plan4.19 s covering cargo-carrying ships, the ship's master shouln possessioi e b d f informationo n concernine th g authorities to contact in the event of an emergency in those ports at s likelwhici e callo h t y . Maritime authoritien i s wite b hy whoma e mh contact during a voyage should also know whom to contact in an emergency so that, should the ship need to go into port, the emergency services will have been alerte n advancei d . Whil t seaa e , emergency e advicb n ca e e shigive th y radi b po necessaryt f ni o e eventh tn I .tha a ship't s master needs to take his ship into a port which has little or no resources to assist him in an emergency involving radioactive materials, e coulh d request assistanc y radib e o froe Inter-Governmentath m l Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These organizations could give technical advic y radib e o and also arrange to have technical assistance sent to the port that the ship has entered.

Rail Transport

4.20 Emergency response planning and preparedness arrangements for highway transport are generally applicable to rail transport. Railroads, maie whicth n e likel e carrierb ar h o t y f irradiateo s d fuel shipments, 35 usually have their own internal network of communication encompassing train crew, railway control point d consigninan s g organizationsA . railway emergency response system, properly integrated with governmental emergency response systems would be very useful. Any such system should include provision o infort s m local governmental authoritie aree th a n i s n accidenoa f whao t ts a temergenc y service e requireb y ma sf themo d .

Air Transport 4.21 Emergency response planning and preparedness arrangements for highway transpor e generallar t t applicablno y r transporai o t e t excepn i t the case wher e accidenth e t occurn airpora a result a ss a tf carg o t o handling operations. An accident which occurs as a result of the crash n aircrafoa f y requirma t e respondin n t remoteasili gno r o ey accessible areas or may pose problems with locating and collecting the radioactive material ove a fairlr y wid e lattee th area n rI .case ,a ver y flexible response is necessary, tailored to suit the circumstances at the time. However, even in this case, the general philosophy governing responding to transportation accidents can be applied. In the majority of cases air transpor f radioactivo t e material involves radiopharmaceuticalf o s limited hazard.

Radiological Monitoring Teams General o supporT emergence th t 4.21 y response organization o generallswh y respond to all transportation accidents, specially trained and equipped teams are needed to properly assess any consequences of an accident involvin release th g f radioactivo e e materials. Depending upon governmental organizatio d resourcesan n , radiological monitorind an g assessment teams can be established at any or all levels of government. The teams should be formed as a part of the emergency planning process, and qualified team members can be drawn from governmental organizations, the nuclear industry, universities, industries using radioactive materials, consignors, some carrier d medicaan s l facilities. Team members shoul e experienceb d d persons with professiona r technicao l l training in the radiological safety field or nuclear field.

Team Response 4.23 Communications capability must exist on a 24-hour basis, in order to notify the team members that their assistance is required at

36 the accident scene. After notification, the team and its equipment must be provided with rapid means of transport from their locations to the site of the accident.

Team functions 4.24 The team should be prepared and equipped to: ) (i Evaluat radiologicae th e l hazard (ii) Minimize personnel exposure to radiation and/or radioactive materials (iii) Minimize the spread of radioactive contamination (iv) Provide technical informatio o appropriatt n e authorities d advican e that woul de treatmen th hel n i p f injurieo t s complicated by exposure to radioactive contamination ) (v Carr t otheou y r general emergency measure requireds a s .

Instrument d Equipmenan s t e teaTh m4.2 member5 s shoul e provideb d d wit basia h c instrument kit, well maintained and properly calibrated for radiological monitoring. Initial work accomplished at the accident site will be done with this kit which should contain equipment for measuring radiation fields and contamination levels such as low- and high-range beta and gamma monitoring instruments, alpha monitoring equipment, pocket dosimeterf o s various ranges ,a dosimete r charger, badges containing fild othean m r detectors, alph d betan a a instrument calibration sources, instruction manuals for instruments, lighting, tape, pencils, tags, paper, protective clothing and respiratory protection equipment. Portable two-way radios for communications should also be provided.

4.26 If large area monitoring and assessment are required, additional team r personneo s augmeno t l accidene th t t sit e requiredeb teay ma m . Equipmen collectinr fo t d radiologicallan g y assessing environmental samples, field generators for power supply, additional protective clothing and equipment, supplied air equipment, repair and replacement supplies, contamination control and decontamination equipment may be needed mobilA . r fielo e d radiological laboratory with gamma spectromete d alph an rd bet an a a counting equipmen e y b hav tma o t e dispatched in the event of severe accident circumstances.

37 Communications and Notification

4.27 The communication system needed is similar to that required for the handling of most transport incidents involving other hazardous materials e agencieth d ,an e sames th involve .e b Thereforey ma d y ma t i , be desirable to set up a general communication plan to provide broad co-ordination of the response to all transport incidents involving hazardous materials. Such a system would be activated more frequently than separate arrangement r eacfo s h typ f hazardouo e s materiale th d ,an experience gained would strengthe e reliabilitth n e responsth f o y e system.

4.29 A national or regional communication centre for hazardous materials that could be manned 24 hours per day by staff trained for the task shoul e considereb d warrantedf i d an d , established. This would provide a liaison centre to alert the appropriate agencies (except those that provide basic local emergency services who will usually already know abou y accidente actionan tth o t s s )requireda . Trie centre should have informatio areae th f jurisdictioo sn o ne agencie th l al sf no tha t might become involved, and should have on hand updated lists of names and phone number f agencieo s e notifieb o t sd e teamb an d n f expertso ca o wh s dispatche e accidenth o t d t scene. Ideally e centr e stafth th ,t ea f should also have the capability to give advice on how to handle accidents involving a broad spectrum of hazardous materials. Such centres could prove particularly advantageou n acciden a casn i sf o e t wher a elarg e numbe f agencieo r y becomsma e involved centre th s usef i eI .d solelr fo y accidents involving radioactive materials, and it is not given the responsibility for coordinating activities concerning all hazardous materials accidents e cos f th ,establishino t woult i g d probable b y prohibitive. Whethet sucno centra h r o r desirabls i e e froa m cost-benefit standpoint will depend upon the numbers of shipments of hazardous materials and the safety record of the transport systems. The functions of such a centre could be incorporated into an existing facility where appropriate expertise is available.

4.29 An important requirement with respect to communications and notification is that access to an emergency response organization must be available at all times, 24 hours a day, every day of the year.

4.30 A simple notification scheme, which can be implemented upon the recognition that an accident involving the transport of radioactive 38 materials has occurred, should be developed. The specific procedures concerning the scheme should be available to consignors, carriers and governmental emergency response organizations.

4.31 The notification scheme should be geared to both the severity of the accident and the resources required to mitigate the consequences that either have developed or may develop. Depending upon the type of response required, this can be accomplished by notifying the appropriate component overale th f o sl emergency response organizatio whao t ts a n resources are needed.

A listin4.32 f appropriatel o g y traine d equippean d d expertd an s organizations throughou a regiot countra r no y shoul e prepareb d d an d distributed to consignors, carriers and emergency services organizations. This listing should be periodically updated, at least ever months6 y e listinTh . g should contai e telephonth n e numberr o s other relevant communications informatio o thas n t these expertd an s organizations can be contacted along the routes being used for the transportatio f hazardouo n s materials.

V. RESPONSIBILITIE EMERGENCR SFO Y PLANNIN PREPAREDNESD GAN S

General

5.01 As previously pointed out in this document, the responsibilities for dealing with a transportation accident are generally divided among several involved organizations and persons. The severity of the accident n termi f consequenceo s s generally determine levee th sf governmenta o l l response and involvement.

5.02 A primary responsibility, in principle, rests with the consignor o muswh t ensure that, before undertakin e transporth g f radioactivo t e materials, carrier e fullar s ye procedure awarth f e o followeb o t s n i d the n accidentevena f o t . Whe n accidenna t occurs, public healtd an h safety organization d personnean s l have responsibilitth e o respont y o t d mitigate the consequences of the accident. In most situations surrounding transport accidents, this response consist f life-savingo s , medical aid, fire suppressio normad controe nan th d l lan polic e work associated wity accidentsan h f radioactivI . e materials have escaper o d

39 e likelar o escapt y e from their containers, specialized organizations, trained to deal with radioactive materials, may have to be called in to assess the accident and implement protective measures used to contain, contro r eliminato l y radioactivan e e hazard.

Carrie d Consignoan r r Arrangements/Responsibilities

5.03 Althoug prime th h e responsibilit r properlfo y y packaging shipments is with the consignor, the carrier also has safety responsibilities, namely to ensure that the shipment arrives safely at its destination n principleI . e carrieth , y contracma r t wite th h consignor to provide supporting emergency services.

Carrier Responsibility e responsibilitth s i t I 5.0 f eac4o y h carrie knoo t d rcompl wan y with l applicablal e international, national, provincial, state r locao , l regulations, pertaining to the carriage of radioactive materials. In principle, this includes ensurin) a : g tha prompa t d propean t r response is initiate e n evenaccidenta th f o tn i d ; ) providinb r obtainino g g appropriate resource r resoponsfo se th o t e incident, when needed; and c) maintaining working contact with the responsible governmental authority until the latter has declared the incident to be satisfactorily resolved and closed.

5.05 Carrier personnel shoul e instructeb d d that f thee abli , ar o yt e , thedso o y should immediately infor e locath m le consignopolicth d an e r office when an accident has occurred. Carrier personnel should know the type d quantitiesan hazardoue th f o s s material thee carryinar y d an g should have emergency procedures with them which outline the basic steps which must be taken in the event of an accident.

Consignor Responsibility e responsibilitth s i t I 5.0 f eac6o y h consigno o kno t rd compl wan y with all applicable international, national, provincial, state or local regulations pertaining to the shipment of radioactive materials. He shoul e prepareb d o assisn emergenct da n i t y respons n accidena o t e t s radioactivinvolvinhi f o y an ge consignment y providinb s g information

40 abou s shipmen e hi shoulth d dan deao tt kno lw wwitho accidente th h e H . should designate on, or append to, the shipping document a list of 24-hour telephone number f persono s s knowledgeabl e shipmenth f d o e an t its characteristics.

Provincial, State and Local Responsibilities

5.07 Provincial, stat d locaan e l governments should develop thein ow r emergency response plans which would gover operatioe th n f theio nn ow r organizations and deployment of their own resources. Coordination in the development of these plans is necessary among local, provincial, state and national levels.

National Responsibilities

5.08 In developing a national emergency response plan and procedures r accidentfo s involvin e transporth g f radioactivo t e materialss i t i , first necessar e governmenth r a countrfo y f o t assigo t y n responsibilitie o designatt d an sd defin an e e function th evarioue th f o ss national public authorities having expertise in that field.

It wil e necessarb l : to y

) 1 Establis nationaa h l emergency response plan; 2) Prescribe standards or guidelines on radiological protection matters; establis a Radiatioh n Protection Servic r Agencyo e ; ) 3 Define area f responsibilitso d authoritan y y among agencies; ) 4 Identify authoritie notifiee b o t s d whe a ntranspor t accident involving radioactive materials occurs; :>) Assign, to a national agency, as "Lead Agency", the responsibility for coordinating the development and operation of the national emergency response plan; 6) Determine and periodically review and test the adequacy of the plan, as well as the trained personnel and equipment available; 7) Provide for the periodic revision of the plans; ) 8 Establish, where appropriate e necessarth , y liaison with authorities in neighbouring countries for notification about accidents whose consequence y extensma d beyond national boundaries;

41 ) 9 Defin e responsibilitth e r publifo y c informatio d educationan n concerning transportatio f radioactivo n e materials; ) Establis10 h applicable training programmes; ) Provid11 e necessarth e y resource o implement s e plath tn when required.

Lead Agency Concept e concepTh f assignino t 9 5.0 g "Lead Agency" responsibilitr fo y coordinating the development of national, provincial, state and local emergency respons ee usefulb plan n t eacca A sf . theso h e governmental levels, several organizations and agencies which have responsibilities concerning transport accident f theo me y on exisshoul sma d e an tb d assigned the Lead Agency responsibility, with the others being assigned supportive roles. Assignin a gLea d Agency should provid a focae l point for developing the emergency response plans. The concept of Lead Agency is also applicable in cases where only a single national plan is envisioned.

5.10 The Lead Agency should consult with other organizations and agencie o ascertait s n their functions, roles d responsibilitie,an n i s responding to an emergency. It should also, in advance and as part of the planning process, determine what resources these organizations and agencies hav e usefub tha y n respondini lma t a transportatio o t g n accident involving radioactive material.

5.11 The Lead Agency concept can also be extended to the assignment of coordination and control responsibility at the accident site during an emergency. The agency assigned this operational responsibility may or t (dependinno y ma g upon governmental organization same e th on e e )b assigne e responsibilitth d coordinato t y e developmenth e f planso t e Th . Lead Agency selecte r thifo ds operational response function should have the authorit o direct y d controan t activitiee th l f supportino s g agencies d organizationan s durin e actuath g l emergency onc s representativeit e s arrive on the accident scene. Until the Lead Agency representatives arrive n arrangemena , t shoul e pre-establisheb d emergence th n i d y plans to designate one organization to control and coordinate actions by first-at-the-scene emergency response personnel. Generally, this responsibility wil le loca th fal o lt l police organization.

42 VI. PUBLIC INFORMATION. TRAINING, EXERCISES AND UPDATING THE EMERGENCY PLANS

Public Information

6.01 There is, in some countries, considerable public sensitivity surroundin e transporth g f radioactivo t e material y emergencan d an s y organizational arrangements must not only be capable of operating efficiently t abl o satisfbu ,t e public'e th y s perception a f o n appropriate response. n transporI 6.02 t accidents, inconvenienc d potentiaean le b risy kma created in the public domain. In fact, any damage to a radioactive material container o matten , w smallho r , tend creato t s a sense f alaro e m n somi e membere publith d migh f an co s t lea o difficultiet d s thar fa t outweigh the actual risks of any accident. This can considerably complicate implementation of emergency response plans if the public has not been adequately informed about the existence of plans or is not adequately informed during an accident as to what is being done.

generan I 6.0publie 3th l c will receiv s informatioit e e newth s a vi n media. Consequently, this emphasizes the importance that should be attache e presentatioth o t d f informatioo n mediae th e publi o Th t n. c accepts risks in everyday life because the benefits of taking such risks e obviouar r acceptableo s e generath ; l acceptanc medicae th f o el usef o s radioactivity is a case in point. In the broader sense, however, radioactivity makes greater psychological demands on people because of its unseen and possible latent effects. In order to alleviate some of these fears, consideratio f informationao ne shoulus e givee b th d o t nl films and other means of acquainting the public with the existence of emergency plans.

6.04 Inquiries by the news media may be addressed to the co-ordinator e emergencoth f y response operations e radiatio,th n e sceneexperth t ,a t carriee oth r r consignoro r minimizo T . rise f conflictinth eo k g statements being newe giveth s o mediat n desirabls i t ,i o assigt e e th n responsibility to communicate with the news media representatives. If practicable communicationl ,al newe th s o medit s a shoul e performeb d y b d professional public information personne emergence th n i l y response organization. 43 6.05 New susee medib givo t dy eama instructio publie th o ct n concerning the measures being taken to control the accident and to restor e situatioth e o normalnt .

Training 6.06 A suitable comprehensive training programme should be established for agencies which may be called upon to respond to transportation accidents involving radioactive materials.o t Howd an , whom, this training shoul e givemattea b d s r nationali n fo r , provincial, stat d locaan e l authoritie d industran s decideo t y n generalI . , training shoul e provideb d o policet d , fire brigades, emergency medical services, civil defenc r emergenco e y services, radiological monitoring teamsd an , experts within response organizations.

6.07 Industry (consignors and carriers) involved in the handling and transportation of radioactive materials, should provide training related s operationt it oe potentia th d an s l hazarde typeth f materialo sf o s s involved. This training n personnelshoulow s e giveb dit onlt o no nt y , but should be offered to appropriate personnel of governmental agencies and other appropriate personne wells a l .

6.08 Training programmes should be geared to the roles that personnel must pla n respondini y n accidenta o t go basiTw . c level f trainino s n ca g e identifiedb .

"First-at-the-Scene" Personnel e purposTh 6.0f thio e9 s training programm provido t s i e e very basic informatio o thost n e personne l likelihoodl al who n i , e ,firs th wil e tb l to reac e scena transportatioth hf o e n accident involving radioactive material. For "first-at-the-scene" personnel such as police, and fire brigades, the training programme should teach the rudimentary subjects clearly applicable to such accidents. The basic curriculum should include fundamental f firso s t aid, radiological hazards, protective measures, transportaton regulations (especially those concerning shipping papers, package labels and vehicle placards), fire control, crowd control and press relations. Basic technique o protect s t people from radiation exposure and radioactive contamination and to control the spread of contamination shoul e include b dprogrammee th n i d .

44 Technical Experts morA e6.1 extensiv0 e training programm necessars i e maintaio t y n skills of personnel with radiation protection or nuclear technology backgrounds who would be called upon for technical support and response. Section IV describes the phases of the response for which expert advice is needed. Training for these persons should include accident assessment techniques using radiological monitoring instruments, implementation of protective measures, use of protective clothing and equipment, basic meteorology, transportation regulations and packaging of radioactive materials.

6.11 Provisions shoul made periodir b d fo e c brief refresher training on at least an annual basis, in order to maintain the proficiency of all personnel in the emergency response organization and to review accident experienc d practicaan e l problems.

Exercises

6.12 Exercise-scenarios shoul developee b d d use o an tesde t d th t response, capabilities and skills of the overall emergency response organization.

6.13 Exercises serv o tes t en emergenc a t y response pla d alse an n th o coordinatio e emergencth f o n y response organizatio activitiess it d an n . Exercises designed o tes t emergencn a t y response plar transportatiofo n n accidents involving radioactive materials should be based upon realistic accident exercise-scenarios designe o tesmajol t d al t r aspecte th f o s plan.

Drills

6.14 Drills, whic more ar he limite n scopi d e than exercisese ar , designe developo t d , tes maintair o t n special skill f individualso s r Fo . example, a communications and notification drill might test the proficiency of personnel in giving notification of an accident, alerting various organizations d operatin,an g communications equipmentA . fire-fighting drill could be limited to the operation of fire-fighting equipment. Thus, drills can be considered as sub-sets of exercises;

45 i.e., many drills conducted at the same time, in a co-ordinated fashion, constitut n exercisea e .

6.15 To achieve the greatest learning experience, exercises should be carries fula t l ou ddres s rehearsals usin equipmene th g d instrumentan t s specified in the plan as much as possible. This should include, for example, emergency control centres, communications, transportation, radiological monitoring and protective equipment.

6.16 Exercises should aim at testing the effectiveness of communication links mobilizatiof o , emergencf o n y force d specializean s d teams and of the co-operation between agencies and services involved. One objective of exercises is also to strengthen the confidence of the personnel that they can adequately handle an accident. Thus care should be taken not to include in the exercise-scenario plan any decision-making r overlo w yne n complicatei d situations that havt previouslno e y beee th n subject of training. Exercises should be clearly identified as such in any communication messagesr o s .

6.17 Provision should be made for the critique of drills and exercise y qualifieb s d observers A mechanis. m shoul e establisheb d r fo d using the results of drills and exercises as a basis for improving the emergency plans appropriate.s ,a Recordin f communicationo g d videsan o taping the exercises provides a valuable aid for learning by the participants. Reports and critiques of actual emergencies should also be used as training aids.

6.18 Provision shoul made r testinb d fo e g radiological instruments, communications equipment d othe,an r equipment during drillr o s exercises e conditioTh . f equipmeno n t shoul e checkeb d d routinelyn i , conjunction with drill r exerciseso s t othea d r an ,time s warrantedsa . Any faults or deficiencies should be corrected immediately.

Updatin Emergence th g y Plans

6.19 For each plan a person should be appointed to be responsible for its maintenance and updating. Valuable experience is gained from exercise testinn i s plane th d gfro ,an m dealing with actual accidents, whethe t thee "falsno ar y r o re alarms" (i.e. o radioactiv,n e involvement

46 or release). The person responsible for maintaining the plan should ensure that the plan is modified where necessary to take account of this experience. In addition, he/she should update the information on names and telephone numbers, whenever personnel and organizational changes require it, but in any event at least once every 6 months. It is suggested that names and communication numbers be kept separate from check-list d othean s r e planpartth orden i f , o s o simplift r y their frequent updating. Whenever an exercise is held to test the effectivenes e emergencth f o s y response e persoth , n responsiblr fo e maintaining the plan should participate as an observer in order to be able to feed back the experience gained from the exercise into improvement plane th .n i s

6.20 Provision should be made, at the minimum, for an annual comprehensive review and updating of emergency plans.

6.21 An indication of the specific distribution of emergency plans shoul providee b demergence th n i d y plan itself organizationl Al . s involved in the overall emergency response organization should receive copies of the plans and changes to them. A mechanism should be establishe r plafo dn e distributiouserth n o s n lis o receivt t d an e acknowledge changee planth o .t s

47 GLOSSARY activity See radioactivity alpha (particle or radiation) [Symbol(X ]A positivel y charged particle emitted by certain radioactive materials. It is made neutron o o protontw tw f uo d p an s bound together, hence is identical witnucleaue th h f heliuso m atom. e leasth s tIi tpenetratin e th f o g three common type f radiatioo s n (alpha, beta, gamma) emittey b d radioactive materials, being stopped by a sheet of paper. It is not dangerous to plants, animals or man unless the alpha-emitting substance has entered the body. beta (particle or radiation) [Symbol u] An elementary particle emitted rro nucleua m s during radioactive decay, wit singla h e electrical charge and a mass equal to 1/1837 that of a proton. A negatively charged beta particls i e identical to an electron. A positively charged beta particle is called a positroji. Beta radiation may cause skin burns betad ,an - emitters are harmful if they enter the body. Beta particlee ar s easily stopped by a thin sheet of metal, however. carrier Any organization or private indivi- dual undertakin conveyance th g f o e radioactive materials by any means f transporto e terTh .m includes both carriers for hire or reward (know commos na contracr no t carriers in some countries) and carrier accounn ow n so t (knows na private carriers in some countries). consignor y persoAn o presentnwh a s consignment of radioactive material s r transporti fo s o wh d an , name s consignoa d e transporth n i r t documents e terTh .m "person" includes individuals, organizations and governments. Also knowa s a n "Shipper". consignment Any package or packages or load of radioactive materials presentey b d consignoa r transportrfo . contamination See radioactive contamination. 49 crit icality The state of sustaining a chain reaction, i.e., releasing nuclear energy by the splitting of atoms within the fuel. curie basie [SymboTh c] uniCi l o t t describ e intensitth e f radioo y - activit a sampl n i yf material o e . The curie is equal to 37 billion disintegration r secondpe s , which is approximately the rate of decay ogra1 f f radiummo curiA .s i e also a quantity of any nuclide having 1 curie of radioactivity. Named for Marie and Pierre Curie, who discovered radium in 1898. Another term "becquerel" [Symbol Bq] is also the base unit of measurement of radioactivity; one (1) nuclear disintegration per second 1 Curi( . 3.7xl0= e 10 becquerel). dose (absorbed) When IONIZING RADIATION passes through MATTER s , energit som f o e y s i imparte o ttit d e mattere Th . amount absorbe r unipe d t a mas n i s volume of irradiated material is called the absorbed dose, and is measure n "graysi d 1 " = (Gy y G )1 Joule/kilogra 0 rads10 m= . emitters Radioactive forms of elements that emit radiation.

Exempt Packages Packages which contain onl a minoy r amount of raioactive material. Since the hazard involved is extremely small (almost zero) such packages are exempted from certain requirements, e.g.t , no the o d y e labelleb have o th t e n o d outside. These packages are often shippe y postb d . exposure (radiological) Subjected to the effects of radiation (see dose). exposure rate (dose The increment of exposure (dose) equivalent rate) delivere r unipe d t timd an e measured, for example, the unit for dose equivalent rat s i Sieverte s (Sv) per hour (Sv/hr) or in rems r houpe r (rem/h r millirem/ho r r (mr/nr) .

50 field (radiation) Space in which radiation exists. fuel, (reactor fuel) Fissionable material used or usable to produce energy in a reactor. Also applied to a mixture, such as natural uranium n whici , h only part e atom oth e readilf ar s y fission- e mixturmade ableth b o t en f i ,ca e sustai a nchai n reaction. gamma (rays/radiation) [Symbo ] High-energy 0 l , short- wavelength electromagnetic radiation. Gamma radiation frequently accompanies alpha and beta emissions and always accompanies fission. Gamma rays are very penetrating and are best stoppe r shieldeo d d againsy b t dense materials, such as lead or depleted uranium. Gamma rays are essentially similar to X rays, but are usually more energetic, and are nuclear in origin. half-life The time is which half the atoms of a particular radioactive substance disintegrat o anothet e r nuclear form. Measured half-lives vary from millionths of a second to billion f yearso s .

Low-Level Solid Abbreviation: LLS - radioactive material Essentially indispersible material which contains a moderate concen- tratio f radioactivo n e material, e.g., radioactive waste embedden i d concentrate.

Low Specific Activity Abbreviation: LSA- radioactive material Material which contains a low con- centratio f radoactivo n e material, e.g., uranium ore, or concentrate ("yellowcake"), certain radioactive wastes. Such material presents a low to negligible hazard. package The packaging together with its radioactive content s presentea s d for transport. (See also Exempt Package and Type A, Type B(U) and Type B(M) package). packaging The containe e radioactivth r fo r e material plus any ancillary components require r includeo d o t d

51 provide protection, suc s radiaa h - tion shielding; absorbent material; spacin r structurao g l elements; shock absorbing material and thermal insulation. plutonium [Symbol Pu] A heavy, radioactive, man-made, metallic element with atomi cs mos It numbe t. 94 r important isotop s fissionabli e e plutonium-239, produced by neutron irradiation or uranium-238. It is user reactofo d n i r fued an l weapons. rad the special uni f absorbeo t d dose whic s i beinh g supercedee th y b d "gray" (Gy) (see "dose absorbed"). radiation The emission and propagation of energy through matte r spaco r y b e means of electromagnetic distur- bances which display both wave- like and particle-like behaviour; in this context the "particles" are known as photons. Also, the energy so propagated. The term has been extended to include streams of fast- moving particles (alph d betan aa particles, free neutrons, cosmic radiation, etc.). Nuclear radia- tion is that emitted from atomic nucle n varioui i s nuclear reactions, including alpha, beta and gamma radiation and neutrons. radioactive, radioactivity The propert n elemena f o yr o t substance which emits radiation. radioactive contamination Undesirable radioactive material tha s depositei t surfacesn o d r o , is present in solids, liquids or ga se s. radioactive source An apparatus or radioactive substanc a suitabl n i e e support that constitute e origith s f no ionizing radiation. radiation level The intensit f radiatioo y n measured in Sieverts (Sv/hr or milli- Sieverts (mSv/h n rem/hi r r o ro r tnillirem/hr (mrem/hr). radiography, radiographic The use of ionizing radiation for e productioth f shadoo n w imagef o s an object on a photographic emulsion. Some of the rays (gamma

52 raysX ray r o s) pass througe th h subject, while other e partiallar s y or completely absorbed by the more opaque parts of the subject and thus cast a shadow on the photographic film.

radiotoxicity The ability of a radioactive material to produce injury, by virtue of emitted radiations, when incorporated in a living thing.

rem A uni f doso t e equivaleny an r fo t ionizing radiation used for radiation protection purposes only.

roentgen [Symbo uni A r measurin ] fo tR l g gamm r "X-rayo a " radiation, R . milli-R(mR).

Sievert [Symbol SvJ The special name of International System of Units (Si) uni f doso t e equivalen, Sv t milli-Sv (mSv).

special form A non-dispersable solid radioactive material or a sealed capsule containing radioactive material.

specific activity The activity per unit weight of any sample of radioactive material.

spent fuel Nuclear reactor fuel that has been irradiated e exten(usedth o t t) longeo n n rca thasustai t i t a n chain reaction. Contains in addition to unchanged uranium, radioactive fission products.

sub-critical Not capable of sustaining a chain reaction, (criticality). teletherapy Radiation treatment administered by using a radioactive source that is a distanc t a e froe bodyth m , usually employing gamma-ray beams from the source.

Transport Index Abbreviation: T.I. - A measure of the radiation intensity (radiation level) at 1 m from the surface of a package whose contents are not fissile material (mrem/hr). In the case of fissile material packages T.I. means either the radiation level at 1 m from the surface or a value related to the maximum number of packages which

53 e transporteb y ma r storeo d d together as a group. (This latter meaning pertains to the prevention accidentaof l criticality. Typ packagA e e packagA e which contain moderata s e amoun f radioactivo t e material. Since the hazard involved is small, it is only required that such package able b swithstano t e e th d normal conditions of transport; they are not expected to survive a serious accident intact.

Typ packagB e e A package which contains a quantity of radioactive material greater than is permitted in a Type A package. Sinc hazare th e d involved may be large, even very large, such packages must be able to withstand the effect f severo s e accidents, including fires.

o classeTw Typf so packagB e e exist:

Typ) (1 e whicr B(U fo speciao hn )- l operational control e requiredar s .

(2) Type B(M) - for which some operational controls are required, to achieve the desired level of safety. uranium [Symbo radioctivA ] U l e element witatomie th h c numbe 2 and9 r ,s a foun naturan i d l ores averagn ,a e atomic weight of approximately 238. The two principal natural isotope uranium-23e ar s 5 (0.7%f o natural uranium), which is fissionable uranium-23d ,an 8 (99.3% of natural uranium) whics i h fertile. Natural uranium also includes a minute amount of uranium-234. Uranium is the basic raw material of nuclear energy.

54 BIBLIOGRAPHY

IAEA, Regulations for Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, Safety Series No. 6, Vienna (1973 Revised Edition as amended).

IAEA, Advisory Material for the Application of the IAEA Transport Regulations, Safet yVienna , Serie37 . ,sNo (1973) (Revision i n preparation).

U.S. Departmen f Transportationo t , Respons Radioactivo t e e Materials Transport Accidents, DOT/RSPA/MTB-79/8, Washingto (1980), DC n .

U.S. Departmen f Transportationto , Handlin f Radioactivo g e Materials Transportation Emergencies, DOT/RSPA/MTB-79/6, Washingto, DC n (July 1979).

U.S. Western Interstate Nuclear Board, Guide and Example Plan for Development of State Emergency Response Plans and Systems for Transportatio nRelate- d Radiation Incidents, Denver, Colorado, (1975).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulator d Othean y r Responsibilities as Related to Transportation Accidents, NUREG-0179, R.F. Barker, Washingto , (JunnDC e 1977).

U.S. Sandia National Laboratories for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Emergency Response Scenarios for Transporation Accidents Involving Radioactive Materials, NUREG/CR-1149, SAND 79-2017, Albuquerque, New Mexico, (November 1979).

IAEA, Planning for Off-Site Response to Radiation Accidents in Nuclear Facilities, Safety Serie Vienna, 55 s , (June 1981).

IAEA, Evaluation of Radiation Emergencies and Accidents, Technical Report Serie . 152sNo , Vienna, (March 1974).

IAEA, PlanninHandline th r Radiatiof fo go g n Accidents, Safety Series Vienn, No.32 a (1969).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Reactor Safety Study (NUREG-75/014, formerly WASH-1400, Appendi Appendif o K x I xV (October 1975) 55 Lis f Participantso t , Consultant d Contributoran s s

Consultants Meetin 9 Sept2- - .g 1977

UNITED KINGDOM - E.T. Wray, National Radiation Protection Board

CANADA - D.R. McLean, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGPettersson. B - Y , Scientific Secretary AGENCY

Advisory Group (AG 123) - 24-28 Oct. 1977

BELGIUM - C.E. Cantillon, Ministry of Health

CANADA - D.R. McLean, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited - J.M. Jardine, Atomic Energ Canadf o y a Limited

FRANCE - M. Grenier, Commissariat a 1'energie atomique

FEDERAL REP. - W. Kolb, Physikalisch Technische Bundesanstalt OF GERMANY - K. Ridder, Bundes Ministerium fur Verkehr

NETHERLAND . SeegersG - S , Ministr f Publio y c Health

. IkedaK - , SciencJAPA d TechnologN ean y Agency . SumazakiI - , Power Reacto d Nucleaan r r Fuel Development Corporation - T. Sato, Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Company Limited

Siwicki. R - POLAN, InsitutD Nucleaf o e r Research

SWEDEN - J. Lindhe, Statens Stralskydds Institut

UNITED KINGDO A.H- M . Partridge, Departmen Transportatif o t o - J. Middleton, British Nuclear Fuels Limited - E. Goldfinch, Central Electricity Generating Board - E. Wray, National Radiation Protection Board

UNITED STATES - A. Grella, Department of Transportation O F. SherwoodD AMERIC - A, Energy Researc Developmend an h t Administration - H. Galley, Environmental Protection Agency - V. Hodges, Nuclear Regulatory Commission

INTERGOVERNMENTAL MARITIM Wardelma. H E- n CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION

INTERNATIONA Becke. J - Lr ATOMIC ENERGCamcigi. M - Y l . PetterssonB - AGENC,Y Scientific Secretary

57 Consultants Meetin - g18-2 2 Dec. 1978

UNITED KINGDOM - J. Middleton, British Nuclear Fuels Limited

UNITED STATES - W. Carriker, Department of Transportation OF AMERICA - H.E. Collins, Nuclear Regulatory Commission

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERG - B.CY . Bernardo, Scientific Secretary AGENCY

Contributors to the 2nd Draft (in addition to members of AG-123)

AUSTRALI. J Button - , A Australian Atomic Energy Commission

BELGIUM - L. Baeklandt, Ministry of Health

FRANCE - Y. Sousselier, Commissariat a 1'energie atomique

UNITED STATE - M.WS . Carter, Georgia Institut f Technologo e y F AMERICO A

Contributor e Finath o lt s Draft

FRANCE - Y. Sousselier, Commissariat a 1'energie atomique

UNITED STATES - R.W. DeFayette, Nuclear Regulatory Commission OF AMERICA - D. Nellis, Nuclear Regulatory Commission . GrellaA - , Nuclear Regulatory Commission - M.W. Carter, Georgia Institute of Technology

INTERNATIONAL - R.F. Barker ATOMIC ENERGY - B.C. Bernardo - H.EAGENC. CollinsY , Scientific Editor - J.R. Horan . WagmaB - n - M.C. White

58 ORDEO T W R HO IAEA PUBLICATIONS

An exclusive sales agent for IAEA publications, to whom all orders and inquiries should be addressed, has been appointed followine th n i g country:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNIPUB, 345 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10010

In the following countries IAEA publications may be purchased from the sales agents or booksellers listed or through your major local booksellers. Paymen made b n locaen i ca t l currenc r wityo h UNESCO coupons.

ARGENTINA Comisi6n Naciona Energi'e d l a Atomica, Avenid l Libertadoade r 8250, RA-1429 Buenos Aires AUSTRALIA Hunter Publications, 58 A Gipps Street, Collingwood, Victoria 3066 BELGIUM Service Courrier UNESCO, 202, Avenu Roiu ed , B-1060 Brussels CZECHOSLOVAKIA S.N.T.L., Spalena 51, CS-113 02 Prague 1 Alfa, Publishers, Hurbanovo namesti , CS-89e6 Bratislav1 33 a FRANCE Office International de Documentation et Librairie, 48, rue Gay-Lussac, F-75240 Paris Cedex 05 HUNGARY Kultura, Hungarian Foreign Trading Company P.O. Box 149, H-1389 Budapest 62 INDIA Oxford Book and Stationery Co., 17, Park Street, Calcutta-700 016 Oxford Book and Stationery Co., Scindia House, New Delhi-110 001 ISRAEL Heiliger and Co., Ltd., Scientific and Medical Books, 3, Nathan Strauss Street, Jerusalem 94227 ITALY LibreriaScientifica, Dott. Luci Biasie od o "aeiou". Via Meravigli 16, 1-20123 Milan JAPAN Maruzen Company, Ltd., P.O 5050x .Bo , 100-31 Tokyo International NETHERLANDS Martinus Nijhoff B.V., Booksellers, Lange Voorhout 9-11, P.O 269x Bo ., NL-250 Hague 1Th e PAKISTAN Mirza Book Agency , Shahra65 , h Quaid-e-Azam, P.O 729x Bo . , Lahore3 POLAND Ars Polona-Ruch, Centrala Handlu Zagranicznego, Krakowskie Przedmiesci , PL-00-06e7 8 Warsaw ROMANIA llexim, P.O 136-137x Bo . , Bucarest SOUTH AFRICA Van Schaik's Bookstore (Pty) Ltd., Libri Building, Church Street, P.O724x Bo . , Pretoria 0001 SPAIN Diaz de Santos, Lagasca 95, Madrid-6 Diaz de Santos, Balmes 417, Barcelona-6 SWEDEN AB C.E. Fritzes Kungl. Hovbokhandel, Fredsgatan 2, P.O. Box 16356, S-103 27 Stockholm UNITED KINGDOM Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Agency Section PDIB, P.O. Box 569, H Londo9N 1 nSE U.S.S.R. Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, Smolenskaya-Sennaya 32-34, Moscow G-200 YUGOSLAVIA Jugoslovenska Knjiga, Terazije 27, P.O. Box 36, YU-11001 Belgrade

Orders from countries where sales agent t bees ye hav nt appointeeno d dan requests for information should be addressed directly to: Divisio f Publicationno s International Atomic Energy Agency Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria