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Forthcoming titles Amanda Hammar (ed.), Displacement Economies in Africa Margaret C. Lee (ed.), Trading Africa Mary Njeri Kinyanjui, Gender and the Informal Economy in Urban Africa Karuti Kanyinga, Duncan Okello and Anders Sjögren (eds), Kenya – The Political Economy of a New Constitutional Order

Titles already published Fantu Cheru and Cyril Obi (eds), The Rise of China and India in Africa Ilda Lindell (ed.), Africa’s Informal Workers Iman Hashim and Dorte Thorsen, Child Migration in Africa Prosper B. Matondi, Kjell Havnevik and Atakilte Beyene (eds), Biofuels, Land Grabbing and Food Security in Africa Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad (eds), Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta Mats Utas (ed.), African Conflicts and Informal Power Prosper B. Matondi, Zimbabwe’s Fast Track Land Reform Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War? About the editors Fantu Cheru received his PhD in Political Economy from Portland State University. He is a socio-economist who specialises in rural development, small-scale enterprise environmental planning and resource manage­ment, urban and regional planning, participa­ tory research methods, and institutional building and training. His latest publications include The Rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, ­Opportunities and Critical Interventions (co-edited with Cyril Obi, 2010) and Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century (co-edited with Scarlett Cornelissen and Timothy M. Shaw, 2011).

Renu Modi is a senior lecturer and former director (2008–10) of the Centre for African Studies, University of Mumbai. She is a ­political scientist who graduated from the Lady Shri Ram College for Women, Delhi ­University. She received her PhD from the School of Inter­national Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. Her recent books are Beyond Reloca- tion: The Imperative of Sustainable Resettlement (editor, 2009) and South–South Cooperation: ­Africa on the Centre Stage (editor, 2011), and she has published on issues relating to India–Africa economic relations from a historical as well as a contemporary perspective in reputed journals. She has also served as the social development consultant with the Inspection Panel of the World Bank. Agricultural development and food security in Africa

The impact of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian investments edited by Fantu Cheru and Renu Modi

Zed Books london | new york Agricultural development and food security in Africa: the impact of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian investments was first published in association with the Nordic Africa Institute, PO Box 1703, se-751 47 Uppsala, Sweden in 2013 by Zed Books Ltd, 7 Cynthia Street, London n1 9jf, uk and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, ny 10010, usa www.zedbooks.co.uk www.nai.uu.se Editorial copyright © Fantu Cheru and Renu Modi 2013 Copyright on this collection © Zed Books 2013 The rights of Fantu Cheru and Renu Modi to be identified as the editors of this work have been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 Set in OurType Arnhem, Monotype Gill Sans Heavy by Ewan Smith, London Index: [email protected] Cover design: www.roguefour.co.uk Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4yy Distributed in the usa exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of St Martin’s Press, llc, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, ny 10010, usa All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or otherwise, without the prior permission of Zed Books Ltd. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data available isbn 978 1 78032 372 5 hb isbn 978 1 78032 371 8 pb Contents

Tables, boxes and figures | vii Abbreviations | ix Preface | xi

Introduction: peasants, the state and foreign direct investment in African agriculture 1 fantu cheru and renu modi

PART I Overview 1 Catalysing an agricultural revolution in Africa: what role for foreign direct investment? 15 fantu cheru, renu modi and sanusha naidu 2 Agrarian transformation in Africa and its decolonisation . . . . . 38 sam moyo

PART II India 3 India and Africa: new trends in sustainable agricultural development 59 gurjit singh 4 India’s strategy for African agriculture: assessing the technology, knowledge and finance platforms ...... 76 renu modi 5 Up for grabs: the case of large Indian investments in Ethiopian agriculture 93 dessalegn rahmato 6 Indian agricultural companies, ‘land grabbing’ in Africa and activists’ responses 107 rick rowden

PART III Brazil 7 Brazil’s cooperation in African agricultural development and food security 125 thomas cooper patriota and francesco maria pierri 8 Brazil, biofuels and food security in Mozambique ...... 145 kai thaler 9 South–South cooperation in agriculture: the India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum ...... 159 alexandra arkhangelskaya and albert khamatshin

PART IV China 10 China’s food security challenge: what role for Africa? 173 simon freemantle and jeremy stevens 11 China’s agricultural and rural development: lessons for African countries ...... 190 xiuli xu and xiaoyun li

12 Conclusions and the way forward ...... 211 fantu cheru and renu modi

Notes | 224 About the contriburors | 228 References | 230 Index | 253 Tables, boxes and figures

Tables 1.1 Chinese-aided agricultural technology: demonstration centres in Africa (2010) 29 1.2 African countries receiving assistance under the FAO South–South Cooperation initiative 30 2.1 Number of tractors and harvester-threshers in selected African countries 44 2.2 Value of imports and exports of cereals: world versus Africa (US$ billion) 45 2.3 Consumption of key commodities by sub-regions of Africa in 2004 (percentages) 46 2.4 Agricultural land acquisitions in Africa (2011) 50 2.5 Estimated landholdings by farmer groups in Zimbabwe (1980, 2000 and 2010) 52 3.1 Proposed locations of agriculture-related institutes in Africa (2012) . . . 63 3.2 Africa–India trade growth in eight main agricultural commodities (US$ million; 2005–10) ...... 66 3.3 Beneficiaries of India’s DFTP scheme (2012) 68 3.4 Agricultural and related projects funded through LOCs from EXIM Bank (2003–12) ...... 69 4.1 India’s imports and exports of agricultural commodities compared with total national imports/exports (crore rupees; 1990–2011) ...... 80 4.2 Africa’s share of India’s top food imports (US$ million; 2007–11) 81 4.3 Impact of KBL on the output of rice in Senegal (2011) ...... 84 4.4 Distribution of the Indian government’s LOCs among world regions (30 August 2012) 88 4.5 EXIM Bank LOCs extended to African countries and regions (January 2010 to June 2012) ...... 90 5.1 Land available for investment with the Federal Land Bank of Ethiopia (2010) ...... 99 5.2 Indian agricultural investments in Ethiopia (2007–12) ...... 102 7.1 Official amounts of Brazilian international cooperation (2003–09) 130 10.1 Selected Chinese agricultural and agribusiness SOEs operating in Africa (2010) ...... 186 11.1 Share of gross output by sector in China (percentage and value; 1980–2010) ...... 196

Boxes 1.1 CAADP priorities ...... 18 1.2 Chinese support for African agriculture ...... 28 vii 1.3 First India–Africa Forum Summit (2008) ...... 31 1.4 Second India–Africa Forum Summit (2011) ...... 32 10.1 Agriculture in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan 179 11.1 Lessons from China’s agriculture-led industrialisation experience 204 12.1 Land and Africa’s development: recommendations of the eighth African Development Forum 220

Figures 1.1 Foreign direct investment inflows by region (1990–2010) ...... 25 4.1 Major imports of agricultural commodities in India (crore rupees; 2010–11) ...... 78 4.2 India’s total imports and agricultural imports (crore rupees; 2007–11) . . 79 4.3 Distribution of the Indian government’s LOCs among world regions . . 89 9.1 IBSA’s institutional mechanisms ...... 162 10.1 Global food price hikes (2008 and 2011) 173 10.2 China’s large and increasingly urban population (1950–2050) 174 10.3 China’s increasing food consumption (kilograms/litres consumed per capita) 176 10.4 Household income inequality in China ...... 178 10.5 China’s equilibrium in major markets, plus stockpiles ...... 178 10.6 The rise in China’s food imports (US$ million) ...... 181 10.7 Chinese agricultural imports from Africa (US$ million; 2010) 182 11.1 Growth in grain production in China (1978–2010) ...... 194 11.2 Percentage share of gross output value by sector in China (1980–2010) 197 11.3 Employment and output values of TVEs in China (1978–2010) 200 Abbreviations

ABC Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (Brazilian Cooperation Agency) AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act (US) Apex Agência Brasileira de Promoção de Exportações e Investimentos (Brazilian Trade and Investment Promotion Agency) AU African Union AUC African Union Commission BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme CII Confederation of Indian Industry DAC Development Assistance Committee DFTP Duty-free Tariff Preference (scheme) ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States Embrapa Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation) EU European Union EXIM Bank Export-Import Bank of India FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations) FAOSTAT Statistics Division of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FARA Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa FDI foreign direct investment FGV Fundação Getulio Vargas FOCAC Forum on China–Africa Cooperation G8 Group of Eight G20 Group of Twenty GDP gross domestic product GTP Growth and Transformation Plan GVO gross output value HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Country HRS Household Responsibility System IAFS India–Africa Forum Summit IAIARD India–Africa Institute of Agriculture and Rural Development IBSA India, Brazil and South Africa ICAR Indian Council of Agricultural Research ICT information and communications technology IIFT Indian Institute of Foreign Trade KBL Kirloskar Brothers Limited LDCs least developed countries ix LOC line of credit LSCF large-scale commercial farming M&M Mahindra and Mahindra MDA Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário (Ministry of Agrarian Development) METASIP Medium Term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan (Ghana) MOARD Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (Ethiopia) NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development REC regional economic community RMB renminbi SBR Standard Bank Research SFAC State Farm and Agribusiness Corporation SNNPR Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region SOE state-owned enterprise TVE township and village enterprise UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme US United States (of America) WAPCOS Water and Power Consultancy Services WTO World Trade Organization

x Preface

As the global food crisis deepens, owing to declining agricultural productivity as a result of climate change, shortages of fertile land and water to expand production, the growing competition for land to grow biofuel as a cheap energy source, and high population growth in the developing world, agricultural development and food security are back at the top of the development agenda. Increasingly, both sovereign and private investors have set their eyes on the continent of Africa, with its abundant land, as a potential source of global food and commodities. This growing interest in African land has brought with it competing approaches on how to unleash the continent’s agricultural potential. On one side stand domestic and foreign actors who want to see agricultural transformation along the lines of Western Europe, the United States and other major agricultural exporting countries, with the emphasis on advanced industrial agriculture, mechanisation and chemical fertilisers. On the other stand domestic forces that see great potential in investing in small-scale farms, with increased emphasis on environmentally sound production systems aimed at meeting family food security. The proponents of the ‘small is beautiful’ approach regard the overemphasis on industrial agriculture as a threat to the existence of small-scale farm­ ers and to the land and water resources on which they rely. The debate on small-scale versus commercial farming does not adequately address the root causes of the productivity crisis in African agriculture. Many of the key blockages to realising ambitious develop­ ment goals lie in political and institutional issues that influence the content and direction of agricultural policy making in Africa. In the present context, concern over the speed and scale of recent foreign acquisitions of African land has overshadowed the need to formulate and implement agricultural policies conducive to unleashing the productivity of both small-scale farmers and big commercial farmers in a mutually complementary way in order to achieve national food security, provide jobs, reduce poverty and establish the agricultural sec­ tor as an engine for Africa’s industrialisation. It is particularly urgent to draw lessons from highly successful developing countries such as India, Brazil and China, which have been able to embark on a programme of agriculture-led industrialisation, lifting millions of their citizens xi out of poverty in a relatively short 30-year period and building a highly competitive industrial sector. The task of transforming African agriculture and achieving food security has been reaffirmed by the African Union, as exemplified by the adoption of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). This priority task is obviously complex and multif­aceted. One thing is clear: huge investments in vital infrastructure will be needed, and new inputs and innovative technologies have to be introduced on a massive scale in order to improve productivity, reduce poverty and raise Africa’s competitiveness in world markets. The extent to which emerging countries such as Brazil, China and India can help the continent realise these objectives is a matter of great interest among African policy makers, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and farmers’ organisations. The three emerging countries, besides being able to share their respective experiences in transforming their backward agriculture, can also become a source of technology, skills and finance to build the critical infrastructure that African agriculture needs. Needless to say, increased direct investment in African agriculture by foreign investors, particularly from emerging countries such as China, India and Brazil, has been the subject of much criticism from civil society organisations, since these investments are often erroneously equated with widespread land dispossession of local populations. While the land deals that African governments have signed with private investors from Europe, the Middle East and Asia must be interrogated carefully for their possible downstream impact on peasant farmers and pastoralist communities, it would be a mistake to dismiss the potential contributions of foreign direct investment for unleashing African agriculture, which in turn will promote industrialisation, social transformation and broad-based poverty reduction on the continent. The aim of this book, therefore, is to examine critically whether private and sovereign investments from China, India and Brazil create new op­ portunities for the transfer of appropriate farm technology, build local capacity and know-how, reverse the persistent productivity decline in agriculture, generate local employment, improve local living standards and ensure food security. This book would not have been possible without the assistance and support of several benefactors who participated in the conference on South–South cooperation in agriculture organised jointly by the Nordic Africa Institute and the Centre for African Studies, Mumbai University, xii Preface ­ ­Africa Institute, Uppsala, xiii some by the excellent data collection and analytical input pro Fantu Fantu Cheru and editors Renu Modi, and Mumbai Stockholm The production of this volume, an arduous task, was made less vided by Johan Salazar, vided a bygraduate research assistant Johan Salazar, at the Centre for African Studies. Last but not least, our thanks go to Ken Barlow at Zed Books without for which his we would ‘gentle probably reminders’, have taken much longer to this conclude book, and to Peter Colenbrander, for his meticulous editorial assistance.are also We grateful to the two anonymous reviewers. Any errors that may remain are ours. burden­ in in January 2011 in Mumbai. First and foremost, we acknowledge with gratitude the financial assistance extended by the Centrefor African Studies in addition to three sponsors: the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India; the Nordic Africa Institute; and the South–South Cooperation Unit of the United Nations Development Programme. They were extremely supportive of this venture and helped finance the­ attend ance of several national and international to delegates the conference. Special thanks are due to Mr Kuruvila, deputy director at the World Centre in Mumbai, for Trade providing the venue for the meeting, logistical support and other encouragement.also extend We our thanks to Professor Aparajita Biswas and Dr Manendra Sahu, faculty members, the support staff and the students at the Centrefor African Studies, which hosted the conference. At the Nordic we would like to extend our appreciation to Nina -Nygård, Tania Klinge Ingrid Andersson, Annika Berger, Franklin and Sonja Johansson, who in one way or another were involved in providing logistical and other support for the Mumbai conference.

Introduction: peasants, the state and foreign direct investment in African agriculture

Fantu Cheru and Renu Modi

India, China and Brazil are striving to build their relationships with Africa in a spirit of South–South cooperation. One significant dimension of this engagement has been agriculture. The three countries have become an im­ portant source of finance, technology and infrastructure, critical for boost­ ing the productivity of African agriculture, thereby increasing domestic food security and exports to world markets. Private enterprises and state-owned companies from the three emerging countries have started to invest in the agricultural sector of many African countries, ranging from agricultural in­ puts and ­irrigation services to farming, food processing and distribution. For China and India, however, concerns about their own domestic food security have been the main driving force for their growing engagement with African agriculture. With huge populations, growing urbanisation and a rising middle class in both countries, demand for food is expected to outstrip the capacity of local production due to diminishing arable land and serious water short­ ages for irrigation. In turn, African governments have been willing to put at the disposal of foreign investors huge tracts of land for the purpose of growing commercially viable agricultural products, such as cut flowers, biofuel crops, cotton and some edible produce. These large-scale land investments by foreign investors have received mixed responses. Critical reports on the ‘bonanza’ reaped by foreign capital have appeared in the world media and on the websites of international organisations (Oakland Institute 2011a; 2011b; World Bank 2011a). Land rights advocacy groups have singled out investors from China, India and Brazil for criticism, alleging that their investments have resulted in unfair land acquisition, involuntary resettlement and environmental damage. They argue that small-scale farmers and pastoralists, who own land according to customary legal systems and cannot present to the authorities legally certified ownership documents, have been victimised by large-scale land acquisitions. Some of these charges are true in some instances, and the global attention they have drawn may be well deserved, given the image of Africa as a land of poverty and hunger. The aim of this book, however, is to go beyond the current heated debate 1 on ‘land grabbing’ and to examine the status and potential contribution of sovereign and private investors from the three emerging countries to the transformation of African agriculture. A more evidence-based understand­ ing of foreign firms, their current and planned African footprint, as wellas the potential synergies in key African markets, would add value to the wider Africa–emerging countries discourse. No country has ever made the transition to industrialisation successfully without first developing its agricultural sector, and Africa certainly needs a radical transformation of its agriculture. The contributors to this volume take the position that foreign direct invest­ ment (FDI) can become a catalyst for modernising Africa’s low-technology subsistence agriculture if it is placed within a broader national strategy on rural development that gives priority to improving the productivity of local farmers. A strong and effective development-oriented state can play a critical role in promoting fairer investment models structured to support local ­farmers while at the same time strengthening national technology, research and development­ and management capacities for pursuing efficient and sustainable agricultural development compatible with African realities. This could take the form of contract farming, whereby multinationals procure local produce, or through the extension of commercial farming hubs to enable communities to share in expensive large-scale infrastructure, such as irrigation systems. With proper regulation and state guidance, FDI can aid badly needed development rather than be exploitative. This is not to suggest that FDI does no harm to local populations or the natural resource base, particularly in host countries with weak regulatory capacity and poor democratic governance. Much depends on local context, the investor’s track record, the terms of the lease and whether these reflect the free, prior and informed consent of local landholders, and the capacity of the host government to regulate and monitor projects. The issue of land rights is just one part of the bigger puzzle of what needs to be done to bring about a successful ‘agricultural revolution’ in Africa. It is for this reason that we take a second look at the issue with an open mind, and let the empirical evidence speak for itself. While land rights should remain central to the discourse on African agricul­ ture, it would be erroneous to dismiss or downplay the potential contribution of FDI to technology transfers, skills development and the financing of vital rural infrastructure, all of which are critical for the transformation of African agriculture and for strengthening local productive capacity and employment generation. FDI’s role in this field could be positive if such investments are handled properly from the start. Through detailed case studies from China, India and Brazil, the book draws lessons that can be applied to the African context.

2 Introduction 3 accelerated ­accelerated degradation’, according to the United Nations’ Food and class class farmers and their foreign partners, to the detriment of the small- often attributed, wrongly, to the­often refusal attributed, wrongly, by the peasantry to embrace modern Land has always been central to the livelihoods of the majority of Africans, Twenty or more years after theend of the Cold War,the debate ‘new on who are subsistence farmers. Since independence, there have been numerous efforts by African governments and donorinstitutions toimprove rural­ liveli hoods by increasing the productivity of ment African in agriculture rural through infrastructure ­ invest and other key inputs, improved land technology, but tenure with disappointing reforms results. and These repeated failures are Agriculture Organization. Therefore, the impetus provided by FDI in agriculture might augur well for the continent. Needless to say, however, the media hype about land rights (or the pejorative term ‘land grab’), important as deflected it attention is, from has the need examine to seriouslybution of the FDI potential contri­ to unlocking the continent’s productive agricultural potential. technology, rather than to the inappropriateness of the Steeped models in themselves. a culture of ‘blaming the victims’ magic and a of misguided the belief marketplace, in proponents the of -scale large to acknowledge industrial the farming contribution fail of small-scale farmers in Africa to development. national Small-scale farmers can be as productive as commercial ers farm­ if given the same level of support. As strategies a throughout consequence, Africa, rural by development and large, have mainly benefited local elites, middle- scale farmers in whose name these strategies exceptions, agrarian reforms were in post-independence Africa have implemented. not created the With few imperialisms’ imperialisms’ and how monopoly capital influences, iftrajectory of not Africa’s development is back in determines,the limelight. The the renewed ­ schol arly interest in the possible deleterious effect prompted of by two neoliberal important globalisation developments: is the scramble for African foreign investors, land and the by competing interpretations of the increasing ­ engage ment of emerging powers such as China and India with the African continent. While the debate about ‘land grabbing’ has primarily focused on the actions of foreign investors and their governments, little critical attention has been paid to the roles and responsibilities of African governments in facilitating scale - large land acquisitions in a non-transparent way and with little consultation with local communities. Therefore, terms such as ‘neocolonialism’ and ‘land grabbing’ are inaccurate for two main reasons. First, the land is acquired long-term on leases at the invitation and with governments. the Second, it facilitation is of too host soon country to the rush foreign to investors conclusions, has as only farming just by begun. unused Moreover, or the underutilised, land given may that well only be 14 hectares per of cent arable land of is Africa’s under 184 cultivation million and 21 state million of hectares ‘ are in a Neocolonialism or new opportunity? or new opportunity? Neocolonialism conditions for the ‘emancipation’ of the peasantry from exploitative patterns of production and accumulation. The increasing engagement of foreign investors in African agriculture, par­ ticularly after the 2008 global food and energy crisis, has set off alarm bells as concern grows that the rush for more of Africa’s productive land for food and biofuel production might result in the same disastrous mass displacement and super-exploitation of small-scale farmers and pastoralists that the policies of colonial and post-independence governments produced in earlier years. Growing peasant resistance in response to ‘land leases’ to private capital, the scale and speed of land acquisitions and the non-transparent nature of the deals warrants critical examination of the policies and strategies of African governments, and whether the expected windfall from such deals – technology transfer, employment, technical know-how and other transferrable lessons – has actually materialised. Foreign investors and host country African governments proudly declare that the main objective of large-scale land leases is to increase the productivity of African agriculture through ‘green revolution’-type interventions. These, it is argued, will enable host countries to achieve food security and export high-value agricultural products to generate badly needed foreign exchange. They further argue that global demand for food and agricultural commodities offers new opportunities for African farmers to earn more through expanded exports by putting into active production much of Africa’s supposedly idle land. It is not, therefore, surprising that in the aftermath of the 2008 global food and energy crisis, the quest for more African land for food and agro­ fuel has accelerated on an unprecedented scale. The World Bank (2011a), the International Institute for Environment and Development (Cotula et al. 2009) and the Oakland Institute (2011a) have documented the scale of land leases around the world. An estimated 60 million hectares of land worldwide have been leased to foreign investors to grow either food for consumption in the investors’ own countries or to produce agrofuels to offset the rising cost of oil. According to current reports, two-thirds of the land acquired was in Africa. It is difficult to ascertain the exact scale of these land deals since the actual documents are kept secret.

The glass is neither ‘half full’ nor ‘half empty’: the need for pragmatism Accumulation by dispossession has been a central feature of agrarian rela­ tions under colonial and postcolonial development strategies. The African peasantry has borne the negative consequences of the misguided and top- down rural development policies of post-independence governments as they attempted to ‘mimic’ the industrialisation experience of Western Europe and North America. This inherited ideology viewed peasant agriculture as backward 4 Introduction called -rich’ ‘land countries in - 5 scale scale farmer strategy are having second thoughts. The - accumulation ­accumulation by He dispossession’. warns that if African governments fail The book is divided into five sections. In the first,approach the to the As Africa entered the 1980s, not only were economies in a shambles, but Almost two decades later, both national governments and the very donors ‘modernisation craze’ is back in the limelight. The global commodity crisis of 2007–08, during which there were severe shortages on the world food market accompanied by a dramatic rise in grain prices, provided the impetus for both private and sovereign investors to rush to so Africa and elsewhere to acquire land for growing food and export. biofuel However, these crops -scale large for acquisitions are contested on the grounds that they violate the land rights of local inhabitants and that the lease arrange­ ments have been made without consulting them. research research is elaborated, and the contemporary and historical role debates of on foreign the capital in Africa’s agricultural development are Chapter 1, Fantu Cheru, Renu Modi and Sanusha explained. outline Naidu the parameters In that should be used to measure the development. contribution They of note FDI that to the host exclusive countries’ focus vestors in on land acquisitions the misses or role underestimates the of potential of foreign FDI to in­ support technology transfers, skills development and asset creation. In Chapter 2, Sam Moyo provides a historical account Southern Africa, of suggesting that the it has role been associated with of what he foreign refers to capital in as ‘ Scope ofScope the book food food production had declined and half the continent faced chronic famine as a result of bad weather and declining productivity. The agricultural failure development of export -led meant that African countries were themselves, unable and to the feed drawbacks of undue emphasis became on increasingly commercial clear farming as repeated famines claimed the lives of people. of Soon millions after, the narrative on African agriculture changed,emphasis shifting to the central role of the with small-scale farmers in achieving family food security. National governments, with the support course by of directing policy donors, towards changed these smallholder farmers. who supported the small and traditional and sought to transform it in the image mechanised of Western farming, largely oriented towards the global market. It was believed that modernisation the of African agriculture, if successful, could serve dation as for the the ­ continent’s foun industrialisation dream. In pursuing this strategy, millions of peasants were forcibly displaced from their traditional grazing areas to make way for export agriculture. With from higher agricultural foreign commodity exchange exports, earnings it was believed that needs of both African governments the and security their drive towards industrialisation could be achieved. On both counts, however, African governments failed miserably. to put in place appropriate checks and balances, FDI in African agriculture could perpetuate these disastrous results, namely the destruction of the liveli­ hoods of millions of Africa’s smallholder farmers and the unsustainable use of land and water resources. The second section examines the scope and content of India’s private and public sector engagement in African agriculture. It must be stated at the out­ set that the two Indian contributors present an analysis that in many ways mirrors the official views of the Indian government and the Indian private sector. In its public diplomacy, the government of India has tried to project itself as a ‘rising power’ whose time has come to shape global development in a positive direction, particularly in Africa and South Asia, through its aid, investment and technical assistance programmes. This posturing often does not pay sufficient attention to the more complex and controversial elements of Indian agriculture domestically and Indian investment abroad that have been raised convincingly by Dessalegn Rahmato and Rick Rowden in this volume. In Chapter 3, India’s former ambassador to Ethiopia, Gurjit Singh, outlines the policies and strategies of the government of India for strengthening eco­ nomic relations with Africa, and discusses the instruments currently in place to assist Indian entrepreneurs in expanding their investments in Africa. Singh states that India has no ulterior motives other than to help African countries tackle the crisis in agriculture through aid, technical assistance and lines of credit to encourage Indian private sector operators to invest in Africa. This view is corroborated by Modi, who in Chapter 4 examines Indian private sec­ tor investments in African agriculture and the role the Export-Import Bank of India plays in financing such investments. Both authors present India as a ‘rising power’ committed to helping African countries escape poverty and underdevelopment, asserting that Indian private sector investment and official aid are helping African partner countries build the policy and institutional foundations necessary for reversing the productivity decline in agriculture, generate jobs, reduce poverty and ensure food security on the continent. Beneath their invocation of the principles of mutual respect, mutual benefits and non-interference as central elements in India–Africa relations, however, others might argue that their analysis contains elements of the same pat­ ronising views often associated with Western donors, who claim that only outsiders can put the African continent on a transformative path. In Chapter 4, Modi acknowledges briefly the chronic problem of widespread hunger and malnutrition, the large number of farmer suicides, the deeply alarming de­ cline of the water table and other environmental problems that characterise Indian agriculture today. A detailed discussion of the shortcomings of the agricultural sector in India has not been undertaken, as it is beyond the scope of the present project. Nevertheless, both Singh and Modi present evidence to confirm the commercial nature of contemporary India–Africa relations in 6 Introduction ­ 7 owned company credited with Brazil’s agricultural boom in dominated dominated production for agrarian relations in Ethiopia as well as In fact, the governments of Africa have the advantage of hindsight. They can In pursuance of this objective, the first chapterstwoof this segment provide strategyBrazil’s to transform African agriculture is the focus of section three. avoid avoid the massive social and environmental pitfalls of the green revolution in particular and of the Indian agricultural sector in general. While incorporating the success stories of the green revolution, safeguards need to be established and preventive measures need to be adopted with by the adverse consequences that have countries been faced by the in Indian agricultural Africa to deal sector. Section two of the book aims to provide India’s engagement in a the agricultural comprehensive sector picture of Africa of and therefore includes various versions of the same story. important insight into the Indian government’s and the corporate sector’s per­ spectives vis-à-vis investments in African agriculture. The upbeat and positive assessment presented by Singh and Modi on India’s engagement agriculture is in balanced by African Rahmato (Chapter 5) and Rowden (Chapter 6), who critically examine -scale large land acquisition by Indian companies from a land rights perspective. Focusing on an Indian company, Karuturi Global, and acquisition its of 300,000 hectares of land in the Rahmato examines the Gambella consequences of a region shift from small-scale of to -scale large Ethiopia, and - foreign for the environment and for biodiversity. In Chapter 6, content Rowden, analysis based of on the a lease agreements of five Indianinvestors in Ethiopia, arrives at the same conclusion. Without passing judgement, both contributors point out one critical challenge: how to reconcile the investment need in for land more with private the urgent need to protect the scale land farmers rights and pastoralists. of The small- editors address this strategic challenge in the concluding chapter. In Chapter 7, Thomas Cooper Patriota and the increasing Francesco commercial ties, including FDI, Maria between Brazilian ­ multination Pierri examine als and a number of African compared countries. with Chinese and Indian investments in While Africa, Brazil pursues more current initiatives are small structured and -sectoral multi cooperation in agriculture and sustainable rural development that could potentially bring enormous benefit to initiatives Africa.include a more These systematic approach to sharing tropical agricultural technologies provided through Embrapa (Empresa Brasileira de Agro Pesquisa the field ofagriculture, which has thepotential to produce the same destruc ­ tive environmental and social outcomes if African governments precautionary do measures. not take pecuária), a state- the last decade; a concessional financingfor platform importing Brazilian farm machinery; and a knowledge -sharing platform that offers aboutfour decades of Embrapa expertise aimed at poor smallholder farmers. In Chapter 8, Kai Thaler examines Brazil’s investment in the production of biofuel feedstock in Mozambique and criticises the prioritisation of biofuel production in a country where the vast majority of the population experiences high levels of food insecurity. He questions whether the emphasis on biofuel production can be reconciled with enhancing food security and furthering the government’s goal of poverty reduction. In Chapter 9, Alexandra Arkhangelskaya and Albert Khamatshin discuss the contributions made to agriculture in Africa through IBSA, a trilateral forum comprising India, Brazil and South Africa. Although the resources of IBSA are minuscule, it complements the bilateral strategies of Brazil and India to improve agricultural productivity in order to reduce poverty and enhance food security in the least developed countries. One such country is Guinea-Bissau, where targeted projects are increasing the cultivation of rice through improved lowland rehabilitation, water management and animal husbandry. The fourth section focuses exclusively on China’s engagement with African agriculture within the framework of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). In Chapter 10, Simon Freemantle and Jeremy Stevens describe the domestic dimensions of China’s growing interest in investing in the agricultural sector in Africa and other developing regions. The authors note that China’s role in land acquisition in Africa has so far been minimal in comparison with India and Middle Eastern investors. Indeed, the authors point out that China’s 20-year food security strategy, unveiled in 2008 by the National Development and Reform Commission, did not include foreign land acquisition as a pivotal feature, with the exception of soya bean production in Brazil. In future, how­ ever, foreign land acquisitions will certainly become part and parcel of China’s food security strategy for two compelling reasons. With increasing incomes among average Chinese consumers, demand for agricultural commodities is likely to grow during the coming decades and this demand cannot be met through domestic production alone because of diminishing local resources, principally arable land and irrigable water. In Chapter 11, Xiuli Xu and Xiaoyun Li, professors at the China Agricul­ tural University, discuss in detail China’s post-1979 agriculture-led development strategy that is credited with the country’s unprecedented scale of poverty reduction over the past 25 years. The authors persuasively argue that China’s success was the outcome of strong incentives provided by government through land tenure reform and pricing policies, coupled with major public invest­ ment in infrastructure (roads, irrigation and energy), research into seeds and soils, greatly expanded fertiliser production and use, farmer education and, crucially, off-farm employment through local enterprise development. Central to the Chinese approach, from which Africa can learn much, is the existence of a strong, effective development state with a long-term vision. The authors conclude that China’s approach has been pragmatic and is based on learn­ 8 Introduction tivity. tivity. 9 There is no doubt that Africa’s agriculture is in need of major ­ transforma In the final chapter (Chapter 12), editors,the based on the evidence pre­ The issue of land rights goes beyond policies on agricultural development. tion, given the sector’s contribution to the growth of gross domestic product, employment and livelihoods. This urgent need has been acknowledged by the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme of the especially ­Union, in the current context of global food price volatility and African of low food stocks, both of which have had a particular impact on the marginalised Changing course: harnessing foreign direct investment to transform transform to investment direct harnessing foreign Changing course: agriculture African sented by the contributors, conclude that the actual impact of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian private and sovereign investment in African agriculture has been positive in the short and medium term transfers, skills development, provision thanks of infrastructure to and finance, and the enhanced technological creation of the conditions needed to unleash agriculturalAfrica’s ­ produc It is part and parcel of the unfinished governance agendain Africa. That said, a more transparent governance framework on property relations that protects the land rights of local communities should be a precondition for FDI into attracting the agricultural This sector. would entail the development of policies that delineate the roles and responsibilities of the domestic and foreign capital in a consultative The and state, editors transparent way. the peasantry and question the relevance and legitimacy of international voluntary guidelines efforts on FDI to in introduce the agricultural sector by arguing tary that ­ guidelines volun are poor substitutes for strong and transparent national laws and regulations governing the operation of FDI in insist African that agriculture. a They robust and nationally owned institutional framework such governing FDI in terms of technology transfer, skills development, and asset compliance creation with international labour and environmental standards is necessary a precondition for monitoring compliance by foreign and investors domestic and for evaluating their overall contribution to the of transformation African agriculture. ing ing from others, adapting to local circumstances, scaling up what works and abandoning unsuccessful experiments, a lesson that is instructive for African countries. At the same time, the editors highlight ultimately determine the effectiveness of the two current approach to South–South important problems that will agricultural cooperation. The firstto relates the sensitive issue of theland rights of local communities affected by-scale large land concerns the downstream effect investments. of technology and The infrastructure designed for second commercial agriculture on the surrounding communities, and how to ensure that smallholders also benefit from these costly ruralinfrastructure networks. and the poor. Agricultural research, supportive rural infrastructure, adequate development finance, skilled personnel and strong institutions have remained relatively underdeveloped. National budgets devoted to the agricultural sector remain low and few African countries have a coherent strategy to mobilise resources domestically. Given the urgency of raising agricultural productivity on the continent, attracting FDI should be a priority for African governments, since such investment can play a critical role in addressing longstanding constraints. At the same time, initial efforts by a handful of African governments to attract FDI to the agricultural sector have met with scepticism. Activist civil society organisations point out that FDI in African agriculture has largely contributed to the displacement of subsistence farmers and pastoralists from the land they depend on and that most of these investments are directed at producing non-food items, such as cut flowers and biofuel crops, and not necessarily food for local consumption (see Chapter 6). To some degree, these criticisms have made important contributions by highlighting the issue of land rights and the lack of transparency in decision making in large-scale land deals. Where the critics go wrong, however, is in apportioning blame to the foreign investors. One of the major problems has been the failure of host governments to take decisions on land leases in light of a broader strategy on rural development. While corruption remains a problem, many African countries lack the technical and human resources to monitor and regulate large-scale agricultural projects. Not all land deals, whether with foreign or domestic investors, are im­ plicated in the dispossession and wanton destruction of the livelihoods of local communities. If undertaken with proper due diligence, large-scale land ­investments can create opportunities in food-deficit African countries. Such investments could improve the local infrastructure and economy, ensure technology transfers and provide long-term employment. The real focus of the critics should be on the role and responsibilities of national governments in establishing the ground rules for FDI in African agriculture, and in ensuring that they get the best out of any investment deals. Africa’s need for develop­ ment finance, technology and human capital development is huge and cannot be met with local resources alone. Attracting FDI to the agricultural sector is, therefore, critical, as long as it is within the context of a long-term national development vision. The exclusive focus on ‘land rights’ or ‘land grab’ unfortunately leaves little room for a thorough evaluation of the potential contribution of FDI to asset creation through capacity building and skills development in farming, enhanced transfers of appropriate technology and the provision of finance for infrastructure development – all of which are critical to a successful agrarian revolution in Africa. Moreover, pejoratively equating all FDI in agriculture with ‘land grabbing’ could potentially stop investment altogether as potential foreign 10 Introduction 11 investors investors try to avoid reputational and financial risks. Thecivil society roleand the media is indispensable vigilant of a in holding national governments accountable so that the benefits of international investments channelled are to strengthen the productivity of small-scale farmers, promote value addition through technology transfer and innovation, expand opportunities for non-farm employment by diversifying the rural economy, and improve competitiveness and economic transformation. This approach demands high levels and of sustained investment in key public infrastructure irrigation), in (such agricultural research as and rural new technology, roads and in and -related input industries in areas such as fertilisers and seeds – all of which can be provided sufficiently China,by India and Brazil.

PART I Overview

1 | Catalysing an agricultural revolution in Africa: what role for foreign direct investment?

Fantu Cheru, Renu Modi and Sanusha Naidu

Introduction Today, food insecurity is one of the most urgent problems facing sub-­ Saharan Africa, where more than half the population is dependent on subsist­ ence farming as their only source of livelihood. However, it must be stated at the outset that the countries of Africa are diverse and asymmetrical in terms of area, population, and endowment of natural resources such as cultivable land and water, and therefore the agricultural potential of different countries varies. Despite this, this chapter attempts to focus on general trends in the agricultural sector, and, most notably, on trends in subsistence agriculture. Subsistence farming is under massive threat from population growth, land scarcity and worsening ecological degradation as a result of climate change. Continued underinvestment by national governments in agricultural research, technology and infrastructure further aggravates the productivity decline in African agriculture. Consequently, Africa is one of the regions in the world where a ‘green revolution’ in agriculture has failed to materialise, despite the importance of agriculture to the majority of Africans. Since the early 2000s in particular, however, the issue of transforming ­African agriculture has featured prominently on the policy agenda of national govern­ ments, the African Union and external development partners. First, there is a growing resolve by African leaders to take decisive steps to address the many obstacles to growth and structural change in the agricultural sector and the larger economy as a whole. The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Develop­ ment Programme (CAADP), which was formulated in 2003, is now the basic reference point for African governments for improving agricultural productivity and reducing hunger on the continent (African Union 2003; 2006). Second, there has also been increasing interest from Africa’s official develop­ ment partners, philanthropic foundations and private international investors in reversing Africa’s productivity decline in agriculture, ensuring food security and using agricultural transformation as the foundation for Africa’s industri­ alisation. Emerging from the dialogue process with Africa that began with the Kananaskis Group of Eight (G8) summit in 2002, the Global Food Security Initiative was launched at the L’Aquila G8 summit in 2009, with initial pledges 15 of US$22 billion over the two following years. Subsequently, the Group of Twenty (G20) initiated a trust fund, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), administered by the World Bank, to support public and private sector agricultural investments in Africa in order to operationalise the L’Aquila Food Security Initiative. So far, the GAFSP has allocated a total of US$223 million to CAADP-aligned investment programmes in Ethiopia, Niger, Rwanda, Togo and Sierra Leone. This support is being tracked to ensure that the overall effort is optimised and the momentum is sustained. In addition to the collective initiatives by G8 members, many countries are increasing their bilateral support for the agricultural sector in Africa. The current US administration under President Obama has scaled up assistance to African agriculture through its Feed the Future programme, while Japan is undertaking a major reorientation of its aid from Asia to Africa, with agricul­ ture, and particularly rice technology, a major element. The traditional Western development partners are now joined by emerging countries such as Brazil, India and China, which are increasingly engaged in the development of African agriculture. Each of these new partners has a perceived comparative advantage: China in infrastructure development and rural-based special economic zones; India in green revolution and skill-intensive learning in agriculture; and Brazil in high-technology farming and agro-processing coupled with social protection measures to combat food insecurity and poverty. CAADP has also shown considerable potential to catalyse and leverage partner­ships with the private sector. The activity of the African Agricultural Growth and Investment Task Force, in which the African Union Commission (AUC) plays a leading role, is a case in point. The task force is linked to the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, headed by former UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan, and the New Vision for Agriculture initiative of the World Economic Forum, and its aim is to expand partnerships, catalyse investment and integrate best practices in international private sector support for agricul­ ture in Africa. These private sector and philanthropic initiatives are leading the way in transforming smallholder farming through the application of yield- enhancing technology and through improved provision of vital infrastructure such as roads. The AUC’s engagement with this task force has been informed by the need to broaden the mobilisation of investment resources for CAADP- aligned agricultural plans, programmes and projects. One particular development in recent years has been the increasing pres­ ence in the African agricultural sector of foreign investors from the emerging countries of Asia and the Middle East. With the rapid economic turnaround of the continent since the early 2000s, foreign direct investment (FDI) from non- Western countries, particularly from Asia, has been growing steadily: China, India and Brazil are forging ahead in developing economic relationships with Africa in order to exploit its untapped strategic resources such as oil and gas 16 1 | Cheru, Modi and Naidu O’Keef O’Keef and 17 cutting cutting issues and of integrating livestock, fisheries andforestry into the CAADP is the basic continental framework guiding the process of ­ agricul The existing literature on the impact of FDI on food security offers contra­ The aim of this book is to evaluate the extent to which FDI from China, agricultural planning processes. Among the many priority issues identified by CAADP for transforming African agriculture, we highlight four interventions that could unlock the agricultural sector’s potential. tural development in Africa. As noted four in ‘pillars’ Box as well 1.1 as below, recognising CAADP the importance focuses of on cross- addressing a range of Transforming African agriculture: new opportunities agriculture: African Transforming dictory evidence. While the proponents of FDI take the position that FDI can help as a catalyst for increased agricultural productivity- (Mihalache India and Brazil is contributing to the transfer of modern agricultural techno­ logy to Africa, improving rural infrastructure building such indigenous research and as knowledge capacity roads in and modern agriculture, irrigation, and helping African host governments overcome the financing increased access gap to finance through (both public and private)in order to enable them to invest in strategic areas and unlock agriculture. In the the productive ‘framework potential of of cooperation’ agreements African signed between separately African heads of state and the leadership of China (under the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation or FOCAC process), India (under the India–Africa Forum Summit – IAFS-I and IAFS-II) and Brazil (under South the Africa India, or Brazil IBSA umbrella), and cooperation in agriculture has been assigned a prominent role. By focusing on the infrastructure and four know-how, vectors this book of assesses finance, the actual technology, contributions FDI of to the modernisation of African agriculture. In so polarised approach doing, to it foreign takes investments in a Africa’s less agriculture. and to capture the growing African consumer Africa market. by This new investors interest from in emerging economies also to Africa’s includes ample gaining arable access land to grow scramble food for as African well as land produce intensified biofuel. particularly The afterenergy crisis global the of 2008, and food when prices Although for some critics basic from civil society food organisations have and characterised this energy skyrocketed. as ‘land grabbing’ and a new form of neocolonialism, such characterisations are too simplistic and overlook the potential catalytic role of FDI in ­ transform ing African agriculture within a transparent policy framework regime that and take into institutional consideration the interests of local communities. Li 2011) in food deficit countries, otherssuggest that FDI penetration can lead to food insecurity by concentrating production on export crops and agrofuels, and accentuating the process of land alienation on a wider Bedi scale 2002; Oakland (Shiva Institute and 2011a; Matondi et al. 2011). Box 1.1 CAADP priorities

Pillar 1: Extending the area under sustainable land management and reliable water control systems. Pillar 2: Improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access. Pillar 3: Increasing food supply, reducing hunger and improving responses to food emergency crises. Pillar 4: Improving agriculture research, technology dissemination and adoption.

Cross-cutting issue 1: Capacity strengthening for agriculture and agribusiness; academic and professional training. Cross-cutting issue 2: Information for agricultural strategy formulation and implementation. Companion document: Integrating livestock, forestry and fisheries subsectors into CAADP.

Increasing land under cultivation (Pillar 1) It is estimated that 60 per cent of cultivable land in Africa is not under production. This provides considerable scope for increasing agricultural production, both for staples as well as for exports (McKinsey Global Institute 2010; UNECA 2009a). Instituting a radical land reform programme, starting with a comprehensive review of archaic tenure systems and allowing for different types of property ownership and use, is an important first step. Land tenure reform either can be initiated from the top down or, in other cases, could be led from the bottom up through small-scale experiments at the local level. By utilising diverse approaches that take into account local conditions, huge tracts of unused land could be brought under production. Of particular importance in the African context is the need to increase irrigated land and to rehabilitate large areas of degraded land through soil and water conservation measures. Besides the need to transfer new technology to the peasant sector, new modalities of ownership and land use would help to attract FDI in agriculture through joint land-lease ventures. These land-lease arrangements should not be permitted if they displace communities that are already using the land for production (African Union/AfDB/UNECA 2010).

Linking farmers to markets through innovation in the value chain (Pillar 2) While the majority of African farmers produce for subsistence, consider­ able scope exists to help them begin more lucrative farming by producing high-value products for local, regional and global markets. This could be done 18 1 | Cheru, Modi and Naidu enhancing enhancing practices processing, -processing, packaging, A critical dimension for -Saharan Africa). This is only 15 High rates of population growth, ­ in 19 defined upstream and downstream links that spawn new manufactur­ An emphasis on food production for local consumption is required, given the scale of poverty and hunger that afflict the continent, the ever-rising cost of basic foods and Africa’s persistent dependence on imported food and food aid, which tends to undermine the productivity of local farmers. In pursuing this strategy, a balanced and pragmatic approach is needed in terms of ­ inter ventions to capture export markets for cash crops without sacrificing national food security in staple foods. But as African economies become more ­ diversi fied and more people move out of agricultureinto the manufacturing sector, a more open-minded approach will be needed on agricultural development. creasing creasing urbanisation and agricultural declining output due to change, climate coupled with high global food prices, are putting pressure on governments to increase yields of staple foods (NEPAD 2009). This is particularly challenging for Africa, where basic investment in critical infrastructure, agricultural research technology is and inadequate, and the use of - yield (fertilisers and pesticides, mechanisation and irrigation) is very low compared with the situation in other developing regions (UNECA 2009a). As an example, on average African farmers use only 22 kilograms of arable fertiliser land per (10 hectare kilograms of per hectare in sub per cent (or 7 per cent) of the number of 144 tractors per kilograms 1,000 per hectares of hectare arable land used is three in times greater Asia. Asia in The and eight times greater in Latin America than in Africa. transforming transforming African agriculture is agricultural research. Increasing adding value to agricultural products and raising yields, the efficiency of resource use – from water to land – will not happen without determined adequate efforts resources to devote to research and technological innovation. In what a is nutshell, needed in Africa is more investment in research and development, Investing more in research and technology (Pillar 4) Increasing Increasing yields of staple foods (Pillar 3) in in three ways. First, there is capacity extension services and building new demonstration for centres – farmers and expanding – access to by credit, providing seeds, fertilisers and affordable technology to enable them to produce high-value products. The second is to link the farmers to the market through regional value chains (World Bank 2007). This small- requires and -scale medium the rural industries such development as agro of agricultural input, cold storage, marketing, clearing, freight handling at ports and quality assurance and certification, all of which are vitalin gaining access to global and regional markets. The third is by attracting FDI with - well in agriculture, ing and service sectors related to agriculture (Gibbon and Ponte 2005; Bank World 2007: 118–34; UNECA 2009a). science and technology, and expanded intervention to promote yield-enhancing practices, particularly those aimed at raising the productivity of small-scale farmers, given the strong multiplier effect of the agricultural sector (UNECA 2009a: 134). To date, however, actual expenditure on agriculture fell far short of the 10 per cent of public expenditure agreed at the 2003 Maputo summit. According to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), only four African countries allocate more than 10 per cent of their national expenditure to agricultural development. Many countries hardly reach 4 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and have to depend on official development assis­ tance for funding agriculture and other sectors (Benin et al. 2010). The share of resources allocated to research and technology as a proportion of overall agricultural budgets is generally too low, despite the fact that the rate of economic return of agricultural research is very high (Ehui and Tsigas 2006). Public expenditure on agricultural research as percentage of agricultural GDP is considered adequate at 2 per cent or more. For Africa, the figure stands at 0.7 per cent (UNECA 2009a: 124). Investment in agricultural research is meaningless unless accompanied by appropriate institutional arrangements to transmit research results directly to farmers. Experience from countries that underwent a successful green revolution shows that the provision of science and technology to farmers via research institutes and demonstration centres closely related to farm-level practice is critical in unleashing the potential of small-scale farmers, and these institutions should be developed along with agricultural extension centres to disseminate knowledge (Zhang et al. 2010; Dollar 2008; Gulati and Fan 2007; OECD-DAC/IPRCC 2010). In the case of Africa, however, the problem is compounded by the con­ tinuing disconnect between agricultural universities and the farmers on the land who lack the knowledge and technology required to improve agricultural productivity and to penetrate niche markets for high-value agricultural pro­ ducts. As Calestous Juma (2011) rightly points out, the challenges facing African agriculture require fundamental changes to the way in which universities train their students. To date, most African universities do not specifically train agri­ culture students to work on farms in the same way as medical schools train students to work in hospitals. The traditional separation between research and teaching, with the former being carried out in national agricultural research institutes (NARIs) and the latter in universities, has produced a situation where scientific and technical knowledge is not transmitted from research facili­ ties through a network of demonstration centres to the farms that need the information the most. The challenge is how to strengthen the educational, commercialisation and extension functions of the NARIs through innovative institutional arrange­ 20 1 | Cheru, Modi and Naidu tion tion carbon growth Efforts to unleash the The demand for financial services 21 ment traps will further enmesh African countries in the already existent. In countries where microfinance institutions exist, their potentially ­potentially forcing millions to migrate to urban areas (Low 2005). A priority for African governments in the coming decades should be the Though not explicitly stated in the CAADP priorities, three important and While African countries will suffer most fromchange,climate the crisis also broadening broadening of financial intervention in rural areas.by This liberalising could the financial achieved be and banking sectorscompetition among different and providers, by encouraging from credit both unions savings and loan associations and to domestic commercial banks, and the spread of banking services across the country. The National Microfinance Banka good Tanzaniain is example of an institution considered that unreachable. is trying to reach clients previously in in rural Africa is huge, but in many cases financialfew service or providers non- too are coverage is limited due to either insufficient requirements capital that discourage the or potential high borrowers. collateral Moreover, microfinance institutions focus more on lending and less on encouraging the lation rural to ­ popu save more. The underdevelopment of the rural become a banking major impediment to sector mobilising savings has and to providing essential financial services to rural economic agents. complementary topics must be addressed in the agricultural transformation of Africa. These are discussed below. Investing in climate change adaptation and mitigation Reaching Reaching rural areas with financial services Additional dimensions to consider dimensions Additional ments. It is imperative that universities improve their curricula to make them relevant to the communities in which they are located critical so hubs in that local they innovation systems serve or clusters. as For example, innovation universities located near coffee productionsites should develop expertisethe in entire value chain of the industry. potential potential of African agriculture would be incomplete if insufficient atten­ were were paid to mitigating the ill effects ofclimate change. If it goes unchecked, climate change will alter rainfall patterns and able for will agriculture, decrease the the length of area growing suit­ seasons and while crop yield potential, These ­ develop and clean development. This will obviously require African governments to crippling ­crippling downward cycle of poverty, disease and food insecurity (World Bank 2007: 200–1). presents the continent with new opportunities to profit from its sinks, leapfrog vastdirty carbon technologies and embark on a path of low- take decisive and proactive steps to mainstream climate change adaptation and mitigation policies in development planning practices, and to institute supportive policies and incentives to assist the private sector and ordinary citizens in adopting clean technologies and production practices in order to build climate-resilient economies and ways of life. A continental-level initiative exists for coordinating climate change-related actions at the Regional Economic Community and AU member state levels. The AU-NEPAD Agriculture Climate Change Adaptation-Mitigation Framework is a response to calls by the thirteenth AU summit as part of its mandate to coordinate and oversee implementation of CAADP as a mechanism for agricultural development and food security in Africa. The framework aims to support national and regional strategies and programmes for integrating climate change concerns into agricultural development objectives. It also pro­ vides important pointers for engaging AU-NEPAD agencies in supporting the implementation of agriculture-based climate change adaptation and mitigation programmes in Africa.

Promoting agriculture-led rural industrialisation On its own, productivity growth in agriculture will not be able to solve the problem of chronic food insecurity, underemployment and poverty in rural areas. The agricultural sector has to be used as a basis for wider African industrialisation (African Union 2007). This requires a wide range of innovative experiments involving production, modes of property ownership, financing, infrastructure, research, institutional and governance arrangements and so on to harness local produc­ tive resources and diversify the economy (Fan et al. 2010; Li et al. 2012). This is arguably an even greater challenge for development than the technological rehabilitation of agriculture itself. Agriculture-led rural industrialisation can enhance the dynamism of rural economies, provide non-farm employment in industrial clusters engaged in value-added packaging, processing and shipping, and produce the vital input and services agriculture needs to become more efficient and productive. The designation of selected regions and ecological zones as nodes of innovation for agriculture-based rural industrialisation can produce local and regional corollaries by increasing access to dynamic markets and strengthening links between farmers, industry and services (World Bank 2007: 202–21). In this regard, African countries should leverage the comparative advantages of China, India and Brazil, which have extensive experience of the green revolu­ tion and of agriculture-led rural industrialisation. Africa’s needs and potential in agriculture, especially in terms of food security and employment, mean that China, India and Brazil are well placed to help the continent move forward (AEO 2010). In the final analysis, the full realisation of the broad objectives of CAADP will require deliberate and hands-on state action on many fronts: 22 1 | Cheru, Modi and Naidu ­ -aligned pro -based agriculture and food security 23 -aligned investment plans and to garner linked -linked investments will depend on the contribu­ Implementation of the CAADP framework is in its early stages, with some If African small-scale farmers are to improve their productivity significantly Successful Successful implementation of CAADP objectives will also depend on the 40 countries currently at different phasesin the process, ranging from formally recognising CAADP as having value to efforts toformulate CAADP and develop a profitable nichein the agricultural valuechain, the state must play an active supporting role by investing in agricultural research and exten­ sion, technological innovation, and a transport and communications network. It must also ensure the availability of credit and agricultural timely inputs delivery (Chambers of essential 1989: 20; UNECA 2009a; -Pratt Diao Nin et al. 2008). et In addition, al. government has 2009; an important role in providing, where necessary, sustainable price support mechanisms and land tenure systems in to improve reforming access to land and ensure security of tenure. it must Finally, develop a supportive rural administration and network of rural finance institutions to help farmerspurchase tools and fertilisers. tions of development partners. ability of African states to mobilise development finance. In the Maputo Dec­ laration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa, adopted by state AU and heads government of in July 2003, African countries 10 were per cent urged of their to national budgets allocate to agriculture within fiveyears. A recent assessment of progress in CAADP implementation, however, between indicates six that and ten countries have either cent reached GDP or allocation surpassed to the the 10 agricultural per sector, although increased several their budgetary others allocation, have and the average for Africa remains per at cent 6 (African Union and NEPAD 2012; Benin et al. expected funding 2010: for 22). CAADP Most of the grammes and projects for implementation. As of September 2011, 27 countries have completed the CAADP round-table process and signed Of these, their some compacts. 20 have developed CAADP investment plans and have been subjected to AUC technical and reviews the led National by Peace the Corps Association. convened CAADP To business date, meetings 14 to countries showcase the have outcomes pendent of technical the reviews ­ inde of CAADP domestic support and international assistance. These activities are considered as demonstrating strong commitment by governments, the private civil sector, society, farmers and development partners to a common vision and for strategy the agricultural sector. The Economic Community of West African States has also signed its regional compact (African Union 2011; Benin et al. 2010). Progress in the implementation of in the implementation CAADPProgress based -based broad institutional and administrative reforms; competition policy; and financial, technological and human resources development policies. Implementing the CAADP strategy will, therefore, require planned and sus­ tained efforts spearheaded by state machinery in the agricultural and support­ ing sectors. While the state in Africa has been part of the problem, it would be wrong to underestimate its critical role in any effective rural development strategy (UNECA and AUC 2011; UNCTAD 2007a). Fostering the emergence of a responsible, development-oriented state with a political consensus that reaches across competitive elites and ethnicities is critical for pushing forward the economic transformation agenda (Fosu 2009; China–DAC Study Group 2011a).

Attracting Southern FDI to develop productive potential FDI is an important source of private capital for developing countries. It has the potential to increase national income and promote economic growth and diversification by creating employment opportunities, enhancing the development of skills and facilitating technology transfers and access to for­ eign markets. It can also boost the competitiveness of local firms by creating ­capacity and spawning the development of new value-added manufacturing and service sectors (Ajayi 2006; UNCTAD 2005). Moreover, FDI can help in removing productivity and growth constraints such as poor infrastructure, technology and skills development in priority sectors. Both Malaysia and Mauritius have used FDI successfully in this way, using public investment in infrastructure, training and skills to attract FDI into goods and service sectors with a high value-added component. Unfortunately, historically Africa has never been the most popular destina­ tion for FDI (see Figure 1.1), the bulk of which has continued to be directed towards Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries (over 80 per cent of global FDI flows) and other successful developing regions. This is despite the fact that profitability from FDI is higher in Africa than in any other region of the world. Africa’s unattractiveness in this regard has been ascribed to political instability, the lack of transparent regulatory and corporate governance regimes, poor infrastructure and a shortage of skilled labour. These negative perceptions have been exaggerated and in many instances are generalisations that tend to obscure the continent’s diversity of economic performance and the huge economic opportunities individual countries offer (UNCTAD 2007a). Since the crisis period of the 1980s and 1990s, the political landscape of Africa has been changing fast and economic policy making has improved significantly. One of the most important regional frameworks in this regard has been NEPAD, which has not only identified FDI as a crucial source of financing for the continent’s development, but has also clearly articulated the steps, including governance reforms, needed to attract greater FDI flows to the continent (Bhattacharya et al. 1997; UNECA 2006). FDI’s contribution to structural transformation will largely depend on the host country having a vision of how FDI fits into its overall development 24 1 | Cheru, Modi and Naidu

Middle East and and East Middle Africa North 25 business -business investment strategies, these efforts Rest of the world the of Rest Sub-Saharan Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia and Pacic and Asia East Europe and Europe Asia Central Foreign direct investment inflows by region, 1990–2010 (%) region, 1990–2010 by inflows investment direct Foreign

Historically, foreign agricultural investment in sector Africa’s Historically, has been highly 1.1 : Calculations made using the World Development Indicators/World Bank Bank Indicators/World Development made using the World : Calculations Source US$) current of payments, (balance net inflows investment, direct data on foreign 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 0 20 60 80 controversial, controversial, given the negative impact of settler colonialism and export -led agriculture. From Kenya to South Africa, African peasants were evicted their lands from to make way for export agriculture. The terrible it is memories difficult to Consequently, colonial havesystem an honestlinger. discussion of the about the potential contributions of FDI to particularly when revitalising this involves African investments by agriculture, Chinese, Brazilian and Indian investors. The role of FDI in African agriculture: overcoming the burden of the burden overcoming agriculture: of FDI in African role The history strategy. strategy. While most African countries have made encouraging efforts to attract FDI and have more elaborated pro have have been undercut by the poor state of the continent’s human and physical infrastructure. The quality of both of these elements strongly influences FDI flows, as well influencing as value the transfers (Saggi and Glass 2002). added For example, large investments in associatedof the education technology and training were partly responsible for the move by Singapore, China, Malaysia up and the Taiwan -added value ‘ladder’ from -intensive ­ manu labour unskilled, facturing (Wade 2003; Haggard 1990; Chang 2003). In Africa, however, there is a disjuncture between the policy to attract FDI and the lack national of strategy it) (or on human capital and priorities infrastructure were mutually development, exclusive. as This disjuncture if has the to be two addressed as condition a for attracting FDI to the continent. 40 100 Recent analyses of FDI in African agriculture by advocacy groups and the international media have tried to implicate the emerging countries and Gulf states in ‘land grabbing’ and dispossession of whole communities from an­ cestral lands they cultivate to sustain their livelihoods. The problem with the current debate on ‘land grabbing’ is that it is full of sweeping generalisations based on anecdotal evidence and cursory reviews of draft agreements, without any genuine attempt to verify what is in the agreements through field visits or through structured dialogue with host governments, provincial authorities, individual farmers and foreign investors. An additional shortcoming of these analyses has been that critical reporting has been disproportionately directed against foreign investors from China and India, while Western investors have not been labelled ‘neocolonialists’ and ‘land grabbers’. Ironically, while the number of private investors from Asia and the Middle East is growing, Western multinationals are still the largest investors in African agriculture. These observations aside, where our research uncovers cases of ‘land grabbing’, we will dig further to uncover the conditions under which ‘land grabbing’ has been permitted, the cost to the community and pro­ cesses of redress, if any. At the same time, we cannot oppose the technological modernisation of agriculture and keep the African peasant in a cave. It is important that we take a second look at the topic with an open mind and debate the merits and pitfalls of FDI in African agriculture, and the appro­ priate remedies and safeguards that host governments must put in place so that these investments make a positive contribution to Africa’s development. It must be stressed that the potential contributions of FDI to national ­development will depend on the capacity of the host government to negotiate well-informed and mutually beneficial outcomes.

Harnessing new partnerships with China, India and Brazil The increasing role of emerging countries such as India, China and Brazil in global trade, finance and investment has opened up new economic co­ operation opportunities for Africa (Kaplinsky and Farooki 2010; Cheru and Obi 2010; Ajakaiye 2007). These new Southern powers have relatively large financial resources and the skills and technology that African countries need to address their development needs. They also have a growing middle class of consumers that Africa can supply with agricultural products and other consumer goods. At the same time, these new development partners see Africa as a growing market for their exports and a major provider of the natural resources they need to feed their growing industries. Moreover, these countries increasingly seek African support on global issues. Therefore, it is not surprising that African countries have scaled up their efforts to seize the opportunities presented by the growing economic influence of these emerging economic powers. The growing relationship between these countries and Africa is a welcome 26 1 | Cheru, Modi and Naidu African developing out national and regional -regional economic communities 27 South–South cooperation in agriculture with emerging countries offers real Already, several large developing countries are investing heavily in ­ agricul As the list of countries involved in Africa’s agricultural development grows, The real impact of South–South cooperation on African agriculture will opportunities for the transfer of the policy experience, technologies and finance necessary to boost African agricultural productivity and field to for new level investment and the market opportunities. playing Indeed, such cooperation could be expanded into a truly sustainable green revolution in Africa if man­ aged strategically (Juma 2011; UNCTAD 2009). Through finance, technology, skills, research and increased development, African countries could access to increase agricultural output to meet domestic food demand while developing an export niche in high-value products that source of would foreign exchange be (UNCTAD 2009). a more predictable ture in a number of African countries, ranging from irrigation agricultural inputs services and to farming, food processing and distribution. The long China, India and Brazil in African agriculture: an overview agriculture: China, India and in African Brazil it is important to ensure that CAADP serves as a framework South to guide cooperation South– so that any engagement is development consistent needs. with The the AUC and region’s the sub ultimately depend on the ability of African countries to maximise the benefits and minimise potential risks through -thought- well countries countries in Africa’s total merchandise trade increased from 8 per cent in 1980 to 29 per cent in 2008, and the share of inward FDI flows to the continent rose from an average of 12 per cent in 1995–99 to 16 per cent 2010: in 2000–08 1). (UNCTAD Infrastructure is one area where Africa’s new development partners, particularly China, are making significant contributions. This has had avery visible and tangible impact on productivity in agriculture and services. Besides South Korea China, and India, Turkey, many Gulf states are making significant investments in agriculture and infrastructure. need to be more active in setting the agenda and ensuring policies the with coherence regional of plans. strategic measures. The benefits of South–South cooperation will accrue only to those countries that have taken proactive steps to exploit the complementar­ ities between trade, investment and official flows with the emerging Southern economic powers. Strategic engagement should be decided how on trade, the investment and basis development of assistance support African national interests in terms of promoting economic growth and structural change. development development given that Africa’s current share of global merchandise trade is around 3 per cent and its share trade of and investment global gap is FDI being filled by flows the growing about engagement of Africa 5 perwith these cent. emerging powers. For example, the share This of non- list of countries includes China, India, Brazil, Malaysia, Turkey, Indonesia, Egypt, South Africa and several Middle Eastern countries (United Nations 2010a; UNCTAD 2010: 20). These new development partners bring a commercial approach to cooperation, with agro-industry enterprises playing an important role by introducing management and technical know-how and high-tech seeds and other supplies. The agricultural cooperation programmes of all these assistance providers can help to harness commercial capacity in support of emerging African agricultural strategies. The most notable actors are China, India and Brazil, which are expanding agricultural cooperation with Africa with a focus on transferring technologies that meet the real needs of small-scale farmers. There has been a strong focus on capacity building in water resource management and irrigation systems; combating agro-based diseases; sharing experience of storage and processing technologies; cooperating in livestock management, breeding technologies,

Box 1.2 Chinese support for African agriculture

The Fourth FOCAC, held at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt (8 November 2009) The commitments include: Climate change: 100 clean energy projects for Africa covering solar power, biogas and small hydropower. Science and technology: 100 joint demonstration projects on scientific and technological research to be carried out, with 100 African post­ doctoral fellows to conduct scientific research in China. Financing capacity: US$10 billion in concessional loans to African coun­ tries to be provided, and a US$1 billion special loan for small- and medium-sized African businesses to be set up. Trade: Zero tariff for 95 per cent of the products from the least devel­ oped African countries that have diplomatic relations with China. Agriculture: 20 agricultural technology demonstration centres to be built, 50 agricultural technology teams to be sent to Africa and 2,000 agricultural technology personnel to be trained. Medical care and health: Medical equipment and anti-malarial medica­ tions worth RMB 500 million to be provided, with 300 doctors and nurses to be trained. Human resources development and education: 50 China–Africa ‘friend­ ship’ schools to be built. Cultural exchange: A China–Africa joint research and exchange pro­ gramme to be launched.

Source: Fourth FOCAC key commitments, www.focac.org/eng.

28 1 | Cheru, Modi and Naidu moved into technicians -technicians to 29 Major focus of the centre Crop cultivation demonstration and farming technology training Rice and corn cultivation training, technology transfer, development of plant varieties Agriculture technology demonstration, technology transfer and training Crop cultivation demonstration, development of improved plant varieties, training Crop cultivation and demonstration irrigation technology, and training Soya bean and corn cultivation and demonstration processing, and training Horticultural plants cultivation and farming livestock demonstration technology, and training Rice, mulberryjuncao, cultivation, soil and water conservation, technology demonstration and training Agriculture technology demonstration and training Corn cultivation technology transfer and training technologyResearch, demonstration and training on freshwater aquaculture and Research training on agricultural technology technologyResearch, demonstration and training on agricultural technology Crop cultivation demonstration and training -aided Chinese agricultural technology: demonstration centres in Africa Among the new Southern partners, China’s engagement in Africa has : MOFCOM 2010: 16 been the most extensive. Agriculture has been a top priority economic cooperation, involving over in 40 countries and over 200 China–Africa projects. From the mid-1990s, China took an enterprise-based approach to its cooperation, and considers joint ventures, with ongoing Chinese involvement at the management and technical levels, the best way to ensure Alongsidesustainability. the official programme, some Chinese emigrants, acting independently, have farming farming and distribution to supply urban centres, as they have done historically in many other parts of the world. China has sent 10,000 agro Benin Liberia Uganda Tanzania Sudan Mozambique Ethiopia Rwanda Zambia Zimbabwe South Africa Togo Cameroon Republic of Congo Source Country (2010) 1.1 Table China meat meat processing and dairy development; fisheries and aquaculture; hancing and cooperation en­ between training and research institutes FOCAC 2006). (IAFS 2008a; Table 1.2 African countries receiving assistance under the FAO South–South Cooperation initiative

Host country Implementation period Number of agricultural experts and technicians

Phase I Ethiopia 1998–2004 56 Mauritania 1999–2006 32 Mali 2000–2003 9 Ghana 2000–2004 17 Nigeria 2003–2007 496 Sierra Leone 2007–2009 18 Gabon 2007–2009 34 Phase II Mauritania 2008 1 Nigeria 2009–2012 56 Malawi 2011–2013 18 Mali 2011–2013 17 Sierra Leone 2011–2013 19 Total 773

Source: Ministry of Agriculture of People’s Republic of China 2011: 66

Africa to train local farmers and provide technical support (Chaponniere et al. 2010a; Cheru and Obi 2010). There has been a strong focus in China–Africa cooperation on land manage­ ment, breeding technologies, food security, agricultural machinery, agricultural processing and training Africans in practical agricultural technologies. China is already supporting the establishment of 20 agricultural technology demonstra­ tion centres in Africa, to be constructed and started by Chinese agro-industry enterprises. The centres will have support from the Chinese foreign aid budget for the first years, but the aim is to make them a sustainable part of a hybrid rice-based farming system in Africa, which would be helped by the centres by being connected to broader, related initiatives. Table 1.1 shows the main areas of focus of the demonstration centres in the various African countries. In addition to its bilateral aid and technical cooperation programmes, China has been supporting African agriculture through the South–South Coopera­ tion initiative under the auspices of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO’s) Special Programme for Food Security since 1996. By the end of October 2011, the Ministry of Agriculture of China had sent 865 agricultural experts and technicians to some 21 developing countries, of which 90 per cent were allocated to eight African countries (see Table 1.2) (Ministry of Agriculture of People’s Republic of China 2011: 5). 30 1 | Cheru, Modi and Naidu government level, - business -business meetings, ministry 31 First India–Africa Forum Summit (2008) Forum India–Africa First Box 1.3 Box : IAFS 2008a. Increase in existing lines of credit to Africa from about US$2 billion to US$5.4 billion. Duty-free tariff preferencefor the 34 least developed African coun­ tries. The scheme will cover 94 per cent of total tariff lines and prod­ ucts, such as cotton, cocoa, ore, aluminium copper ore, cashew nuts, and clothing diamonds. non-industrial cane sugar, The doubling of trade from $25 billion to $50 billion by 2011. A $500 million budget allocation for capacity building and human resource development, expanding existing training programmes for African students and technocrats. Support regional to integration Africa’s efforts andfinancial support This $200 to includes million the in and AU lines NEPAD. of credit to NEPAD. India, too, India, is too, engaged heavily in African agriculture through the first IAFS, Key commitments in the Delhi of Declaration 8–9 April: 1 2 3 4 5 Source China’s strategyChina’s is to contribute to and participate in the growth of African Against Against this backdrop, Africa sees India as a partner of choice and ‘agri­ agriculture for domestic food supplies, rather than farming to for promote China’s -scale large food needs. Additional ­Chinese businesses measures to increase investment in African include agriculture and focusing stimulating on infrastructure development, the production of agricultural machinery and processing of agricultural produce in Africa. launched launched in April 2008. This is aimed at through agricultural reinforcing technology cooperation, transfers especially appropriate to the needs of scale small- African farmers (IAFS 2008b). There is a requirement for convergence finance between and technical Africa’s know-how and India’s expertise based on its successful green revolution in the 1960s (see Chapter 4). culture has been at the forefront of relations’ (Ernst the & recent Young transitions 2011: in 12). India–Africa At the government-to cooperation in this sector has been spelled out at the IAFS II (in 2011) the and annual at Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and Export-Import Bank of India (EXIM Bank) Africa conclaves held since 2005 (see Box 1.3 and Box For 1.4). example, at the March 2011 conclave, during the agriculture and capacity building session and several ensuing -to business of agriculture personnel from Malawi Mozambique, and Limpopo South Africa’s India Box 1.4 Second India–Africa Forum Summit (2011)

Key commitments in the Addis Ababa Declaration: 1. New initiatives that include financial flows from India to Africa in terms of grants, FDI and concessional loans to the agricultural sector. 2. A common position on climate change and support for combating drought and desertification in Africa, as well as support for Africa’s ‘Great Green Wall Project’. 3. Shared concern on issues relating to ‘the global food, energy and financial crisis’. 4. Reiteration of the need to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 and to support NEPAD and CAADP.

Source: Ministry of External Affairs of India, Second India–Africa Summit 2011, Addis Ababa Declaration.

Province requested Indian expertise, investment and assistance to create a stock of quality seeds and technologies in their home contexts. Delegates also requested that India assist them in strengthening agricultural infrastructure, including irrigation and water management, and ancillary food processing to add value to agricultural products (Modi 2011: 70). Indian companies such as Karuturi Global and Kirloskar have become major investors in Africa’s agricultural sector. However, some of these investments have been controversial, including Karuturi Global’s investment in the Gam­ bella region of Ethiopia discussed in Chapter 6 (see also Chapter 5). India is also an active player in the interregional IBSA initiative for Africa, which established the IBSA Facility Fund for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger in Africa in 2003. South Africa, itself a leader on the continent in agricultural technology, is also a key player in the transfer of technologies to African countries (Arkhangelskaya 2010; IBSA 2006).

Brazil Within the context of IBSA, Brazil is actively involved in South–South cooperation in agricultural development. The establishment of Embrapa in Ghana points to a new phase in Brazil’s engagement with African agriculture. Embrapa is a Brazilian agricultural research and training institution that has been a driving force in agricultural development at national, regional and inter­ national levels. Several African countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana, Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea and Kenya have signed technical cooperation agreements and have begun implementing joint projects with Embrapa. The Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA), which is 32 1 | Cheru, Modi and Naidu - ­ To To conclude, China, 33 oriented commercial farming (see Chapter 7). Unleashing the potential of African agriculture will undoubtedly require huge require undoubtedly will agriculture African of potential the Unleashing In addition, the Brazil–Africa Dialogue on Food Fight Security, against Hun­ India India and Brazil are newchampioning technologies and production systems in Africa as the continent attempts to move from old -intensive resource ­ produc tion methods to the more efficient andeffective use and management of natural resources (both land and water) in order Tapping into these to countries’ vast knowledge boost and expertise should be agricultural a major productivity. priority for African states. At the same appropriate time, land African policy states frameworks should and develop guidelines investments to do ensure not compromise that the foreign land rights of local populations. land Where currently used by local communities is re-zoned for agribusiness opment, ­ devel the communities affected should be consulted mechanism for compensation andand restitution an appropriate should be put in place (African Union/AfDB/UNECA 2010). investments in agricultural research, extension, transport, communications and transport,communications extension, research, agricultural in investments irrigation, as well as an enabling policy environment. In this connection, FDI from China, Brazil and India could play a catalytic role in modernising African agriculture through the diffusion of innovative technology, are countries African that be could result net infrastructure.The and knowledge inputs, finance, production the increase to and citizens their for food enough produce to enabled of high-value exports for local and international markets. Measuring the contribution of FDI to African agriculture: technology, technology, agriculture: of FDI to African the contribution Measuring finance, and know-how knowledge South–South South–South cooperation in agriculture: the way forward ger and Rural Development, which gathered more than 40 African of agriculture ministers in Brasília in 2010, agreed on the sharing of expertise on family farming policies, such as public purchase schemes linked aid to and domestic school food feeding programmes; concessional loans to import farming machinery; and investment in and technology Brazilian transfers for the produc based based in Ghana, engages in regular dialogue and joint research with Embrapa (see Chapter 7). Brazil has also provided technical assistance and technology transfers to the cotton sector in Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali (the so called Cotton-4 countries) with the aim of It increasing is productivity. expected that, as a result, the incomes of producers will improve, jobs and will foreign exchange will be be generated created to purchase food and other essentials. tion of biofuels on African soil (Government of the Federal Republic of Brazil 2010). Through these initiatives, including the programmes the provided IBSA under forum, Brazilian know-how could be crucial agricultural in potential, unleashing Africa’s in terms of both increasing and expanding -scale large export- smallholder productivity This book, therefore, aims to empirically assess the contribution of FDI to modernising African agriculture by overcoming the constraints set out in the following sections.

Addressing the research and technology gap With regard to innovation, African institutions of higher agricultural education, research and extension are poorly staffed, ill equipped and underfunded. Africa cannot resolve the interlocking problems impeding the continent’s growth and development unless intellec­ tual capital is nurtured and maintained and a predictable flow of resources is invested in universities and research institutions. At present, FARA is one of several institutions providing the knowledge component of CAADP via in­ tegrated national, regional and continental agricultural research systems. The key questions in this regard are listed below:

• In what ways do Brazil, China and India contribute to the strengthening of agricultural research and technological innovation in Africa? • What kind of equipment and inputs (fertiliser, machines, etc.) could achieve an improvement in productivity per cultivator and per hectare? • What contributions can Brazil, China and India make to enhance techno­ logical modernisation?

Addressing the infrastructure gap Poor infrastructure (roads, electricity, tele­ communications and irrigation) has been identified as the biggest constraint on growth in many African countries. Average public investment in infra­ structure in Africa is between 2 and 3 per cent of GDP. As a result, the rural landscape in Africa is still characterised by subsistence smallholdings, low levels of technology and weak knowledge-based agricultural systems. Given this state of affairs, the following questions need to be asked:

• To what extent is FDI from China, Brazil and India oriented to transforming rural infrastructure in Africa? • Are the governments of the three emerging countries prepared to extend financial resources (in the form of loans and grants) to African countries to enable them to make the needed investments in infrastructure? • How much of their technological expertise are emerging countries willing to share with African countries?

Bridging the financing gap The key to achieving CAADP’s objectives is adequate financing. Huge obstacles stand in the way of mobilising external finance for the agricultural sector in Africa. Outside South Africa, few African countries can hope to attract large volumes of FDI to finance large-scale agriculture- oriented infrastructure development. In this regard, the following questions are raised: 34 1 | Cheru, Modi and Naidu access ­access piloting ­piloting oriented oriented and competent - 35 owned enterprises] or black [FDI or private] as on on leadership from the supportedtop, by a goal - ­financial services; disseminating technologicalinnovation; access toin­ Are there innovative best practices ­India, and China and institutional Brazil that approaches can from be tried in ­farmers Africa (for example, to institutions service for consolidating property smallholder rights; to formation)? What kinds of rural social administration (that is, organisation and utilisa­ tion of property; ground rents and or agricultural producer cooperatives) wages; can marketing, help movement credit in the desired direction, or obstruct it? What kinds of administration systems for trade and industry (state holdings; cooperatives; local and foreign private capital) may also agricultural help progress? to promote Are there lessons from the Chinese, Brazilian and Indian African experience countries that should avoid repeating? As the implementation of CAADP moves forward, experimenting, China, China, India and Brazil have been successful in transforming their agri­ If we take China as an example, rural transformation required pragmatic, What What are the -term long prospects of African countries attracting public and private financing for the agricultural sector? What has been the particular role of government-supported institufinancial ­ tions (export-import banks, the China–Africa Development Fund, the IBSA Facility etc.) Fund, in mobilising finance to support agricultural development in Africa?

• bureaucracy committed to building the country’s unique strengths. This ­ im institutional plied innovation selectivity, at central and local levels, an emphasis on experimentation, and the piloting and promotion of public–private alliances to identify and address concrete constraints (Zhang et al. 2010; Bruce 2009; Li and et Li al. 2010). To borrow a line from Deng Xiaoping: ‘It does not matter whether the cat is white [state- long as it catches mice [increased Pragmatism output].’ also implied flexibility in deploying limited human and financial resources where theywere needed most, based on a thorough assessment of performance. The questions in this regard that are explored in this book are the following: • • • cultural sectors in a relatively short 30-year different period. approaches and Each institutional of modalities them adopted to achieve African modernisation. countries can certainly draw many without lessons having from to adopt these them in approaches their entirety. hands Sharing experience on the institutional imperatives of imperatives on the institutional an agricultural experience Sharing revolution • • and capturing best practices for wider application should be the modus oper­ andi. Policy reforms should begin with modest and pragmatic interventions that bring together small-scale farmers, the state and markets so that they can work together to gradually unlock the potential of the agricultural sector. Experimentation and piloting can improve the likelihood of successful and sustainable reform and the elimination of policy options that could have potentially disastrous consequences (Hofman and Wu 2009; Ravallion 2009). Proper sequencing of programmes, along with the synchronisation of each programme intervention with other critical sectoral reforms (such as infra­ structure, finance and human resources development), will be critical for achieving structural change in the agricultural sector. In this regard, policy makers must search for transferrable lessons from China, India and Brazil as they push forward with CAADP.

Conclusions An ambitious and comprehensive approach is needed to tackle the interlock­ ing problems preventing an African green revolution in agriculture. This must involve the diversification of products and markets, the development of skills and human resources, the modernisation of technology and infrastructure, the re-engineering of business processes, the creation of incentives for small- and medium-scale farmers to grow and export, and the improvement of the investment climate to attract FDI that is compatible with an African-owned and African-driven development agenda. Enhancing the FDI climate also entails wide-ranging government involve­ ment: instituting sound and predictable economic policies in law; delivering adequate public services; and stamping out corruption and inefficiency. The legal system must uphold order, act as a check on government and protect property rights, human rights and contract rights. The financial system must promote household savings and channel them to productive enterprises. At the same time, we must recognise the challenges inherent in attracting and sustaining FDI flows. As much as FDI is important to revitalising Africa’s agricultural sector, it can also promote interstate rivalries, including competition between investor states that can lead to the politicisation of FDI in terms of which sectors are developed and whether it is aligned with national development priorities. Moreover, there is no guarantee that FDI promotes sustainable and environ­ mentally sound agricultural practices (Mihalache-O’Keef and Li 2011). The main lesson from China, India and Brazil is that Africa’s green revolu­ tion should remain a state-driven project. Benefits from FDI can accrue to countries where the state has the capacity to guide FDI to strategic sectors and to ensure that technology and knowledge transfers build indigenous productive capacity and help lay the foundations for industrialisation. 36 1 | Cheru, Modi and Naidu 37 good practices in order to capture lessons that can be applied - This, This, then, brings us back squarely to the issue of the role of the state in In considering the above, this book seeks to stimulate policy debate, to national national development. Transformational change that moves African people to higher standards of living simultaneous, requires significantinvolvement of the three major drivers of change: the developmental state, the private sector and civil society. Without healthy cohesion between these three drivers, the of goal poverty reduction or food security will remain a dream. Thus, of institutional innovation the that China, India and models Brazil respectively adopted to -startkick the transformation of their agricultural sectors is of utmost interest to African policy makers. The aim of this book is to document and both the the not-so best exchange knowledge, and to create awareness about how Africa’s agricultural revival can be No advanced. country has entered the age industrial without first modernising agriculture, and so Africa certainly needs a green revolution if it is to lift millions of people out of poverty and embark industrialisation. on to the African context. 2 | Agrarian transformation in Africa and its decolonisation

Sam Moyo1

Introduction: peasantries and agrarian transformation The failed agrarian transition in Africa is the consequence of two centuries of land alienation and the super-exploitation of rural labour on large farming estates and in mines, historically most extensive in Southern Africa as well as in non-settler former European colonies, and the failure of the former colonies to integrate successfully into the unequal world capitalist trade regime. The lack of integration of African agriculture into the global food system intensified after 1980 with the implementation of structural adjustment programmes by African states under the watchful eye of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The policy of privatisation of the land market accelerated the concentration of Africa’s agricultural land into the hands of a few, mainly foreign, investors, while the emphasis on the production of export commodities undermined the production of food for local consumption. This export bias gave priority to the interests of monopoly capital while the politically weak peasant farmers were left to fend for themselves. As Africa has entered the second decade of the twenty-first century, a ‘third wave’ of land alienation, aptly referred to by activist non-governmental organisations as ‘land grabbing’, has started to spread across the continent. Many African governments have embarked upon a strategy to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to the agricultural sector, supposedly to reverse the productivity decline of peasant agriculture. It was hoped that FDI would bring the necessary modern technology, infrastructure and inputs to kick-start an African green revolution. With the triple crisis in the energy, food and finance sectors in 2008, the scramble for African land by private capital from Europe and the emerging countries of Asia to grow both agrofuel and basic food items has intensified. This ‘third wave’ in the rush for land further marginalises the already impoverished peasantries, thus fuelling new political and resource conflicts in many countries where large-scale land leases are being granted. This chapter examines the diverse forms and phases of land alienation and dispossession of the peasantries, the destruction of food production systems and the underdevelopment of agrarian productive forces within a historical context. It is argued that the current phase of land alienation is part and 38 2 | Moyo operated farms, spatially economic coercion of labour 39 colonial colonial countries, characterised the first wave of alienation industrial -industrial estates heavily subsidised by the state. Disposses­ Settler estates were also created in the Lusophone territories (Mozambique Accumulation ‘from above’ through land dispossession and displacement of By the 1960s, the Africa of the labour reserves (Amin 1972) or ‘settler Africa’ in in Southern Africa, from the eighteenth century until the mid-1900s 1973; Harvey (Arrighi 2006). Given a veneer of legality by the British Crown, land settlement European led to monopolistic control over national water resources and public infrastructure investments for the benefit of white settlers and LSCFs. The remaining peasant farmers were destroyed not but only also through by discriminatory land commodity markets. alienation This resulted in a shift from the production of food by peasants modities towards dominated by the large production farmers of supported com­ and by European state merchants. marketing This boards mode of accumulation the Southern and African state, including its institutions political of taxation and rule the social of segregated segregated from the black African communal areas. enclaves of These agro included some in former settler- and Angola), and on a smaller scale in various migrant labour ‘sending’ states (such as Zambia Malawi, and Mozambique). While these developments did not lead to the complete dispossession of peasant lands, the resulting disposses­ sion was so extensive that it undermined in the South peasantry Africa) (almost and completely led to the the creation region. of This resulted a not migrant in labour enclaves but system in across a subjugated functional labour dualism, and which repressed peasant farming. the peasantry, and through economic and extra- sion of African peasant lands by the British South Africa Company and others led to widespread displacement and landlessness, which ensured the exploitation super- of cheap labour (compelled both economically while destroying and the peasant otherwise) economies (Denoon 1973; Magubane 1979). (mainly (mainly in South Africa, Rhodesia, Namibia, Kenya and Algeria) had witnessed the first wave of extensive ‘land grabbing’ byEuropean settlers. Settler colonial states created -scale large commercial farming (LSCF) systems based on private property rights, assigned mainly as individual family- Accumulation by dispossession in Africa: historical and contemporary historical dispossession in Africa: by Accumulation trends parcel parcel of the long history of primitive accumulation by collaboration with monopoly local elites. capital The destruction in of African peasantries is being promoted in the name of making those same peasantries efficient producers to meet their own needs as The well central question as posed in participate this book is in the following: the would Brazil, China global marketplace. and India, as external investors in African agriculture, intensify the historical process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ or ameliorate it? security systems, were racially discriminatory, undemocratic and repressive (see Mkandawire 2010), while placing the burden of social reproduction on the labour of the peasantries. In ‘non-settler Africa’, two broad land alienation histories prevailed through an indirect mode of colonial rule (Amin 1972; Mamdani 1996). In the ‘Africa of the concessions’ (largely in Central Africa), land alienation by European trading and mining companies led to the creation of a few significant enclaves formed around agricultural plantations, with rudimentary agro-processing facilities, as well as mining enclaves. This mode of primitive accumulation entailed the plunder of raw materials and limited infrastructure investments. The history of resistance to this enclave dispossession (for instance, in Cameroon) is well documented (Crowder 1968; Amin 1972; Palmer and Parsons 1977; Baye and Khan forthcoming). Elsewhere, in the Africa of the ‘économie de traite’ (Amin 1974), which evolved from two centuries of European mercantilism, there was widespread African resistance to Lord Lugard’s attempts to alienate land in the British colonies (Mamdani 1996; Crowder 1968). This led to a pervasive growth of ‘petty (agri­ cultural) commodity production’ among differentiated peasantries (Bernstein 2001) or ‘small cultivators’ (Mafeje 2003). Critically, this mode of colonisation also involved institutionalised labour migration, including the incorporation of migrant farmers from the northern territories of West Africa into the coastal and forest region economies. This led to the creation of diverse peasantries, including independent traditional producers, farming labour tenancies and various forms of sharecropping arrangement (see Amanor 2008). Smaller-scale agricultural estate enclaves (for example producing palm oil) also emerged in various countries. Moreover, pockets of semi-feudal agrarian structures persisted (as in Northern Nigeria and Ethiopia) or were created under colonial rule (for example, in Uganda). This colonisation pattern brought diversity to Africa’s agrarian transition in relation to land alienation, agrarian structures and patterns of accumulation.

The post-independence experience in agrarian reforms In general, from the 1960s, post-independence governments halted land alienation and initiated either the nationalisation of alienated lands or the creation of new leasehold land tenures on restricted estates. This restricted foreign land ownership slowed down the commodification of agricultural lands by limiting the freehold private property regime, which had been pushed by colonial rulers. These governments also abolished the exploitative labour regimes by rescinding rural head and other farming taxes, and by reversing institutionalised labour migration systems. Armed struggles in Kenya, Mozam­ bique and Angola culminated in substantial but inadequate land redistribution (Hanlon 1983; Leys 1975). 40 2 | Moyo 41 owned marketing boards, underinvestment - After being admonished by theWorld Bank (in the BergReport; Berg 1981) independence, independence, Post- African governments sought to promote expanded The ‘modernisation’ of agriculture from the 1970s onwards was largely As Africa entered the 1970s, the gap between the state and the peasantry for for failed agricultural experiments, for the largely urban bias of agrarian policy and for the putative inefficiencies of state intervention (trade protectionism, production production among the peasantry, using state marketing support boards programmes, and although input they tended to extract the agrarian surpluses purportedly for substantial various national ‘development’ schemes. shares of After independence, the agrarian reforms different in African countries were meant to enable local state accumulation from agricultural surpluses, through an increased focus on agricultural production for export. This increasing was aimed foreign at exchange revenues in order to import finance substitution industrialisation the designed expansion to of produce goods that otherwise would have to be imported (Bates 1981; World Bank 1989). pursued through bimodal farming strategies. On the sought to one nurture hand, middle- the and -scale larger policy capitalist agricultural production systems, and, on the other, to promote among peasants by a directing their produce towards degree state marketing boards of so increased productivity that a portion of the earnings could go towards developing national infrastruc ­ tureeven and the However, industrialisation. national agrarian capitalists were subordinate to the extraction of surplus value by transnational corporations, which were protected by centralised state marketing 1980; Leys 1975). Up until the 1970s, various African regulations states attempted to establish (Swainson a few -scale large farming (cropping and ranching) estates, building mostly on nationalised colonial agricultural estates (for and example Malawi), in Tanzania and to encourage private African capitalist farmers through land redistribution (as in Kenya) and, in some cases, on lands newly alienated under tenures (as in Botswana and customary Malawi). Surplus extraction continued to be at the expense of African peasantries (Shivji 1975; 2009; Chachage labour 2009) was provided and to large estates cheap (Kitching 1980; van Zwanenberg and King 1975; Brett 1973). Excessive widened. taxation by state Agrarian reforms in the structural adjustment period of the 1980s adjustment period in the structural reforms Agrarian in in infrastructure and vital agricultural services in rural areas, forced removal of peasants from fertile areas to make way for -scale large export agriculture – and the downright mistreatment of peasants by central government authorities – created the conditions for the peasants to post-independence resist. period was Rural largely viewed development by the in peasantry the as a deliberate attempt by the authorities to reduce them 1985; Cheru to 1997: destitution 153–69). (Watts 1983; Scott state marketing regulations, participation through commodity boards, etc.), as well as inefficient state farming (see Mkandawire and Soludo 1999), African states were compelled to stop subsidising agriculture. The state-owned agri­ cultural estates were gradually dismantled and privatised in the 1980s with the implementation of structural adjustment programmes. It is in this context that, from the mid-1980s onwards, domestic capitalist farming elites and foreign capital expanded large-scale farming in many parts of Africa, while subsistent peasant farmers were left to fend for themselves (Cheru 1989; Onimode 1989). Indeed, the neoliberal land policy reforms unleashed during the 1990s (Manji 2006) resuscitated the commodification agenda and laid the legal and political basis for the current wave of land alienation. In countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, the expansion of large-scale ranching took place through the dispossession of pastoralists of their land and water resources (Molomo 2008). This second wave of land alienation, as with the first wave of ‘land grabbing’ in settler Africa, was popularly resisted, albeit unsuccessfully, including through armed rebellion, given the feeble response of the burgeoning national ‘civil societies’ (see Moyo and Yeros 2005; Moyo 2008). The policy focus on LSCF in the period following the 1980s has been incorrectly premised on the belief that small farmers are inefficient, not in­clined to adopt technological innovation and uninterested in capturing larger markets through increased productivity. On the other hand, the larger ‘commercial’ farmers are presumed to be more capable of leading agricultural transformation in Africa (Mafeje 2003), despite their historical dependence on imported farm technologies (machinery, equipment, seeds, fertiliser and agro-chemicals) and their focus on the export of agricultural raw materials rather than food production for domestic consumption. This exclusive focus on export-led agriculture has, in reality, created a disarticulated economy and has increased the dependence of African countries on food aid and expensive food imports. Besides an overemphasis on export agriculture, the policy of structural adjustment also brought about significant changes in land tenure relations in Africa. The orthodox view was that the supposed absence of clear tradable land property rights in Africa limited ‘tenure security’, and thus constituted a barrier to agricultural investments and technological innovations, leading to underproduction and food insecurity. Allegedly, the traditional tenure systems undermined ‘individual’ incentives and restricted the mobilisation of agricul­ tural finance. On the basis of these erroneous assumptions, land tenure reforms became part of the package of deregulating domestic markets and investment policies, and of trade liberalisation. Land reforms attempted to formalise and individuate land through titling, establishing larger-scale (commercial) farmers and ‘decentralised’ land ‘governance’ (Migot-Adholla 1994). Consequently, by the late 1990s, many African countries had reformed national land policies 42 2 | Moyo regional -regional drawn traction and 43 The decline in Africa’s food production per oriented reforms were designed to reverse the ­ produc -Saharan Africa) compared with 150 kilograms per hectare in Asia and 90 The structural distortion of Africa’s agrarian system since independence Land ownership began inequities to reflectclass, gender and ethno has been socially reconstituted through neoliberal policy undermined agricultural regimes production structures and have led to low productivity. that have The post-1980s - market tivity decline but have had the opposite of effect, industrial agriculture increasing at the the expense development of smallholder farming (Moyo It 2000). was the reversal of agricultural structural and adjustment wider and interventionist the fiscal policies crises under peasants experiencedthe growth halted that of peasant productivity (see also Patnaik 2008: have 9). produced the These results policies outlined below. Underinvestment Underinvestment in agriculture The consequences of neoliberal agricultural reform for food security food security for consequences ofThe reform agricultural neoliberal into into homogeneous legal and administrative positions focused on enhancing land transactions (Manji 2006; UNECA 2004). hand-and-hoe ploughing and weeding dominate farming practices, while some demographically smaller countries are highly mechanised. capita was a consequence of both limited access to land and by various small on-farm producers production constraints, including the exploitative input and output markets. Low levels of farmers, state who are vulnerable to extreme investment weather also volatility, played a critical to support small-scale part. The deceleration of agricultural technological transformation, through reduced per capita utilisation of inputs (improved seeds, constrained land and fertiliser, labour particularly productivity, among etc.) small producers. has Fertiliser use, in terms of kilograms used per hectare nently on cropped arable and land, perma­ is also low compared On average, with African that farmers in apply other about continents. 20 sub kilograms per hectare (nine in kilograms per hectare in Latin America (FAO 2005). The mechanisation level in of agricultural the region varies between countries (see relatively low Table compared 2.1) with that and in is other continents. Ox- cleavages, cleavages, creating growing land ‘scarcity’ and landlessness (Moyo the process, subsistence farmers 2008). and pastoralists have been In squeezed by ­ inter nal population growth and externally led displacements. Consequently, small farmers are being forced to produce on on agricultural physically land has marginal resulted in land. rapid Pressure soil exhaustion, which exacerbates the decline in yields, overgrazed grasslands and high (UNEP 2002). This further undermines the livelihoods of rates small producers while of deforestation fuelling widespread conflicts over land and natural resourcesof in the many continent. parts Table 2.1 Number of tractors and harvester-threshers in selected African countries

Country Tractors (number per 1,000 hectares) Harvester-threshers (number per 1,000 hectares) 1999–2001 2003–05 2006 2007 2008 1999–2001 2003–05 2006 2007 2008

Algeria 12.5 13.1 13.7 13.9 14.0 1.1 1.1 – – – Botswana 12.9 13.6 11.7 11.3 13.5 – – – – – Egypt 30.6 33.2 35.4 36.6 37.2 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.1 Eritrea 1.0 – – – – 0.2 – – – – Ghana 0.5 0.5 – – – – – – – – Kenya 2.4 – – – – 0.2 – – – – Madagascar 0.3 0.2 – – – – – – – – Mali 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 – – – – – – Morocco 4.9 – – – – – – – – – Nigeria 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 – 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 – Senegal 0.2 0.2 – – – – – – – – Somalia 1.0 1.0 1.2 – – – – – – – South Africa 4.9 4.4 – – – 0.8 0.7 – – – Sudan 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2 0.1 – – – – Swaziland 17.1 8.5 8.6 8.7 – 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 – Tanzania 1.8 – – – – – – – – – Togo 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 – – – – – Tunisia 11.5 12.7 14.1 14.9 14.3 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2

Note: Dashes in the table indicate that no figures are available. Source: FAO 2010 2 | Moyo ­ 1.2 The pro 22.5 2008 108.5 120.1 1.0 17.6 85.2 79.3 2007 0.8 11.9 51.9 58.7 2006 thirds -thirds of African countries are net 45 In addition, many African countries be­ 9.9 0.7 50.5 44.6 2003–05 7.4 0.4 36.0 40.5 1999–2001 enhancing enhancing social and economic investments. Value of imports Value and exports of cereals: world versus Africa (US$ billion) : FAO 2010 : FAO The failure of the state to promote food security and agricultural production Africa was a net food exporter during the 1960s but now imports 20 per has resulted in an increased dependence on food imports, affects which the negatively terms of trade, asrelatively low shown in from 1961 Table until 2.2. the Cereal importation early was from 9 1970s, million after tonnes in which 1971 time to 34.8 million tonnes increased it from 1990 to 1999. ductivity decline is also caused by investment the in dramatic critical infrastructure reduction such in as government rural roads, and irrigation, development. Less than research 2 per cent of 1 Africa’s billion hectares of cropped area (and only 13 million hectares of 43 million hectares of potentially irrigable land) is irrigated (UNEP 2002). Livestock productivity trends are equally low. cent of the cereals it consumes, and two importers of agricultural products while only 14 countries (UNECA are 2009b). net In exporters 2002–04, Africa’s trade deficit in food billion, amountedand this figureUS$9 to has been growingin recentyears. From 2000Africa’s average to 2005, food trade bill was US$17.34 billion for exports and US$24.00 billion for imports, resulting in a deficit of US$6.06import billionbill rose (ibid.). from below US$20 food The billion in 2000 to more than US$33 billion in 2006, when the deficit wasclose to US$9.6 billion, anincrease per ofcent aboutcompared with 45 2005. Thus, these food imports have diverted limited foreign currency resources from agricultural productivity and capability- other human came even more dependent on food aid in order to Food fillaid the deliveries foodto supplythe gap. African continent increased sharply in 1990–92 due to drought in most regions of Africa and then shipments to declined Africa thereafter. were Food over 5 aid million tonnes in 1990–92 before declining to less than 3 million tonnes in 2004–06. However, total aid increased to over 3.5 million tonnes in 2006, reaching 115 million people at a cost of over US$2.4 Increasing Increasing dependence on food aid

2.2 Table Declining Declining productivity and increasing dependence on imported food Africa imports World imports World Africa exports World exports World Source billion (WFP 2007). In Southern Africa, food aid increased sharply from 2001 until 2007, when it returned to the 1998 levels. Between 2001 and 2003, US$1 billion was provided (an average of US$333 million per year). Import dependency means that food prices within Africa are influenced by the vagaries of global markets, as well as by various shortcomings of intra-­ regional trade. In the Southern African Development Community (SADC) ­region, for example, consumers of imported foods and farming inputs have been cap­ tive ‘price takers’2 of food and inputs produced in South Africa and elsewhere because of South Africa’s pivotal role in the region. The unequal regional food trade and food import dependence, therefore, shapes the SADC region’s agrarian system, including underinvestment in domestic food ­production.

Under-consumption of food and increased poverty Underproduction in agri­ culture is directly correlated with under-consumption of food and increased poverty. Over the past decade, food prices have been volatile across Africa. The situation has been more severe since the 2008 food and fuel crisis, which has put basic food out of reach of the poor while the middle classes are spending more and more of their earnings on procuring basic food items. The consumption and production of high-value foods (meat, milk products and pulses) are relatively low. However, per capita consumption of higher-cost protein-rich foods varies significantly across regions, and differences in access to these foods are even more pronounced than those in access to staple foods (see Table 2.3). Chronic vulnerability to food insecurity is common, particularly among peasant populations dependent on rain-fed agriculture.

Table 2.3 Consumption of key commodities by sub-regions of Africa in 2004 (percentages)

Commodity Central East North Southern West Total

Maize 2.6 30.6 17.0 32.0 17.7 100 Beans 5.4 44.6 2.1 9.8 38.1 100 Rice 2.4 19.9 22.0 7.2 48.5 100 Oilseeds 8.1 20.8 4.1 5.1 61.9 100 Beef 5.7 26.0 30.6 23.1 14.6 100 Milk 2.5 22.5 52.0 15.0 8.0 100 Poultry 2.7 7.8 38.2 36.6 14.7 100 Fish products 7.9 38.0 21.2 10.1 22.8 100 Cassava 5.0 45.9 0.4 14.2 34.5 100 Millet 3.6 10.7 5.0 3.1 77.6 100 Sorghum 5.7 17.0 23.3 3.8 50.2 100

Source: UNECA 2009a

46 2 | Moyo ­ agricultural pro

Cereal deficitsin domestic 3 Recent Recent increases in the prices of oil 47 consumption consumption has resulted in complex food and social crises Almost 30 years after African countries first embarked neoliberal on agri­ This under - ­ invest agricultural critical for budgets government in reduction the Moreover, cultural reform, many countries face chronic food especially insecurity, among and food the production remains poor, inadequate. whereby whereby the unavailabilityrelative and high cost of food have affected millions of people for decades (Wiggins 2005). This droughts and was the rise in exacerbated world food prices by since then. The the debilitating health 2001–03 and social effects of reduced consumption (calorific intakes) or consumption behaviour changes (for example, switching the types reducing the of number of food meals) consumed have long or been apparent. Absolute of undernourished people numbers between 1990–92 and 2005–07 in Africa ranged from 171.3 million to 208.5 million (FAO 2010). Family assets in are weak eroded, resulting resilience and failing livelihoods. Morbidity and because mortality of also increased rise vulnerability to waterborne cholera diseases and diarrhoea. such as malaria, and basic foods have triggered a rush to secure arable land in Africa and other ments, such as irrigation, rural transport, bulk food storage and ancillaryservicesand storage food transport,bulk rural irrigation, as such ments, (for instance, electricity), significantly constrained peasantsin their ability to expand production of and access to food. This, alongside trade liberalisation, reduced the purchasing power of the poor and restricted produce peasant for demand local multipliers repressed to leading income, and employment such as and farm inputs. Preferential support to large farms producing for the export the of power political unequal the reflecting development,uneven to led market peasants vis-à-vis large farmers and the corporate capitalist sector. Therefore, the renewed interest in land acquisition through must FDI be in examined African to agriculture determine whether such food investments security, increase build an Africa’s indigenous technological base, and truly increase productivity the of African agriculture without undermining food security. duction duction system, which emanates from a of lack integration into the speculative world food market and the farm-input capital markets. The expected benefits of liberalisation of agricultural/technological transfer and the availability infrastructure of finance and scientific know-how have so to far transform African not agriculture. materialised Instead, neoliberal policies undermined the capacity of small producers, failed to increase technological and transformation led to income deflation through wage 2008; Dorward repression et (Moyo al. 1998). 2000; Patnaik Capitalist crisis, ‘third-wave’ ‘land grabbing’ and peasant ‘third-wave’ incorporation Capitalist crisis, The triple crisis: finance, food and energy regional regional production on the continent are common, while food prices have been volatile. These vulnerabilities persist because of the distorted developing countries. The rate of increase in the prices of food grains, edible oil and livestock products, particularly between 2006 and 2008, was the most dramatic (Mitchell 2008) experienced over the last 30 years, given that in real (US dollar) terms food prices had been on the decline.4 Some argued that the price increases reflected a mismatch between global supply and demand, due to increased grain consumption in Asia (Minot 2008; Krugman 2008 cited by Patnaik 2008); the reduction of ‘Western’ grain stocks due to weather-induced harvest failures, especially in Australia (Minot 2008); the rise of farm input costs as a result of oil price escalation (Ghosh 2008; Mitchell 2008; Minot 2008); and commodity speculation (Tabb 2008). While many investors from the Middle East, particularly the Gulf states, seek to secure land in Africa to grow food for home consumption, others, especially from Europe and energy-dependent emerging countries, are mainly concerned about energy security and the production of biofuels. The shift in the uses of African land to the production of agrofuels has resulted in an escalation in land prices. Although the precise area of land being converted to biofuel production is unknown, there is increasing evidence that the trend is growing, threatening the survival of many peasant communities. The diver­ sion of grain to agrofuel production automatically contributed to food price escalation and the price of land and farm inputs skyrocketed in the face of declining supplies (Ghosh 2008; Mitchell 2008). The agrofuel production process was influenced by the political pressures and security concerns of the Western energy industry, capital funds, the ­science and technology industry and the aid system, reflecting ‘high levels of rent seeking strategies’ led by professional lobbies and think tanks (Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009) as well as the so-called bureaucratic stasis and warped incentives that drive aid officials (Bird et al. 2003). The underlying drivers, however, were the speculation activities of finance capital in oil and com­ modities (Tabb 2008; Ghosh 2008), including futures pricing of commodities (oil, food and others), irrespective of the actual trends in their physical supply and consumption. Wider systemic mechanisms drove the underproduction of food in the South and the related food price increases, given that the global food system is embedded in financial and commodity markets. A major reaction by capital to the recent food price crisis has been a new scramble for land in Africa, mainly to produce food and biofuels for export, using the large estate production model (Moyo 2008). At least 5 million hectares have been leased in over 20 African countries to ‘foreign investors’ (Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Cotula et al. 2009; Thompson 2008; Tabb 2008). The large-scale land acquisitions through leasing and outright purchase by foreign capital in African countries have escalated during the 2000s (GRAIN 2009), with the explicit and tacit approval of governments and sections of the elite (Alden Wiley 2008). This represents a third wave of land alienation in all the 48 2 | Moyo opted opted small ‘out growers’. - scale scale foreign land acquisitions (or - 49 A new rush for African lands for agriculture, mining and natural resource Indeed, most of the former settler countries in Southern Africa have en­ Apparently popular resistance and policy regarding the ‘land deals’ are not Moreover the issue of unequal power relations is considered to arise from The recent wave of deals in Africa by foreign investors has its supporters. African regions, creating numerous enclaves of large farming, frequently plantations alongside ‘buffer or zones’ estate of co extraction, extraction, which entails a growing East–West–South rivalry to gain footholds on the entire continent, is predicted (Yeros 2011; 2011). The Moyo land investors hail 2011; from as far Matondi afield as the et US and European al. coun­ tries, to China and South Korea, and to the Gulf states 2.4; and GRAIN Brazil (see 2009; Table Petras 2008). This trend not only raises concerns extent of about land the alienation and concentration, but also suggests the intensified subordination of the continent’s peasantry and labour by during the monopoly present capital crisis. countered this as a third wave of large against the principle of FDI per se. The resistance centres on the scale, speed and non-transparent nature of the land deals. In Mozambique, the for resettlement of example, 1,000 Chinese agricultural workers without prior consulta ­ tion or debate in parliament provoked huge opposition as local Mozambicans felt threatened by the possible loss of employmentthe Similarly, leasing of opportunities 1.3 million for hectares in them. Madagascar to a South Korean investor provoked a political crisis and a regime in coup power. in 2009 that overthrew the land deals between the investors and local communities in a situation where local elites and host governments are found to be on the This side of has the prompted former. the African Union to devise a framework deals in governing Africa and land a special programme within the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa to monitor such land deals and ensure that they comply with principles that respect the rights of local communities and the make need such to deals transparent (African Union 2008). While some social movements warn of extensive dispossession and ­ displace ment of small-scale farmers and pastoralists (GRAIN 2009), many other civil ‘land ‘land grabbing’). This new trend builds on the inherited land tenure regime, which is racially skewed and historically has excluded the Africans. The majority critical of difference is black that it mainly is previously alienatedfarms large (owned by private and public corporations and individual white LSCFs) that are being sold and/or leased to new foreign ‘investors’ from Asia, Europe and the Middle East. The agrarian accumulation model continues to be based on an outward -looking agricultural strategy, except in the case of Zimbabwe, which is veering towards internal markets, food sovereignty and autonomous development (Matondi et al. 2011). Table 2.4 Agricultural land acquisitions in Africa (2011)

Investor Target Acquired land Arable land Acquired land as % Acquired land as % (million ha) (million ha) of arable land of total land

China Democratic Republic of Congo 2.8 6.7 41.8 1.2 Zimbabwe 0.1 3.7 2.7 0.3 Cameroon <0.1 6.0 0.2 <0.1 Egypt Uganda 0.9 5.7 15.1 4.4 Ethiopia <0.1 13.6 0.1 <0.1 South Korea Sudan 0.8 13.6 5.6 0.8 Jordan Sudan <0.1 20.7 0.1 <0.1 United Arab Emirates Sudan 0.4 20.7 1.8 0.2 Saudi Arabia Sudan <0.1 20.7 0.0 <0.1 Tanzania 0.5 9.6 5.2 0.6 India Ethiopia 0.8 13.6 5.6 0.8 Libya Mali 0.1 4.9 2.0 0.1 Liberia <0.1 0.4 4.3 0.2 Qatar Kenya <0.1 5.3 0.8 0.1

Source: Ibrahim Forum 2011 2 | Moyo ­ 51 owned farms. exploitation of the peasantries were abolished. In much of Southern Africa, extensive land expropriation and the systematic It took protracted armed struggles to repossess land in settler colonies However, the However, search for African land is premised on the erroneous assump regulation regulation of migrant labour through organised recruitment and peasant taxa­ tion initiated a proletarianisation process (Arrighi 1973; and Sibanda Yeros 1988; 2005). Moyo Large farming estate schemes and migration systems institutionalised undermined the land labour rights and the productive capacity of subsistence farmers, while subsidising capital’s labour costs through migration forced of Africans into European- such such as Kenya, Zimbabwe and the former Lusophone states and of Angola. Mozambique In countries such as Tanzania and Zambia, some of sessed the land dispos­ was nationalised immediately after independence measures aimed and at coercive the - super However, as However, Africa entered the second decade of independence, new economic policies, as coercive as the policies of the name colonial of economic powers, reform and were the introduced modernisation of in agriculture, thereby fundamentally altering agrarian relations from the 1980s onwards. While the policies favoured commercial agriculture in a deregulated market the economy, role of the state in determining was the significantly direction curtailed. of Land national markets, development delivery marketing of of goods and basic services inputs were privatised. and the In this deregulated environment of market the 1980s and 1990s, the ‘second wave’ of land alienation took place, leaving small-scale farmers vulnerable to a market dominated by local Agrarian resistance to neoliberalism: the case of to neoliberalism: Zimbabwe resistance Agrarian society organisations consider these investments as developmental ‘opportuni­ ties’ to reverse the stagnation of agricultural productivity and food insecurity in Africa (Cotula et al. 2009; World African Bank agriculture 2011a). take The the proponents position of that the FDI threat in peasantry of can dispossession be to mediated the through internationally supervised guidelines on best practices. tion that there is abundant unutilised land, which (formal) owners and is which should be brought presumed into production (see Von Braun to have no and -Dick Meinzen 2009). Critics of -scale large land leases, on the other hand, argue that what is considered ‘unutilised land’ is in fact livelihood the for main source pastoralists of and is important to these territories should be migratoryleft alone and protected from wildlife, commercial farming. and that Moreover, the critics point out that land alienated in favour of agribusiness is primarily turned over to the production of new exports, such as biofuel, food grains and timber, and for tourism purposes at the expense of households. These discourses eschew alternative endogenous poor agrarian reforms peasant aimed at accumulation from below. Table 2.5 Estimated landholdings by farmer groups in Zimbabwe (1980, 2000 and 2010)

Farm category Farms/households (000) Area (000) Average farm size (ha) 1980 2000 2010 1980 2000 2010 1980 2000 2010 No. / % No. / % No. / % Ha / % Ha / % Ha / %

Family farms* 700 / 98 1,125 / 99 1,321 / 98 16,400 / 49 20,067 / 61 25,826 / 79 23 18 20 Small / middle-scale commercial farms** 8.5 / 1 8.5 / 1 30.9 / 2 1,400 / 4 1,400 / 4 4,400 / 13 165 165 142 Large farms 5.4 / 1 4.956 / 0.4 1.371 / 0.1 13,000 / 39 8,691.6 / 27 1,156.9 / 4 2,407 1,754 844 Agro-estates 0.296 / 0.1 0.296 / 0.02 0.247 / 0.02 2,567 / 8 2,567 / 8 1,494.6 / 5 8,672 8,672 6,051 Total 714 / 100 1,139 / 100 1,353 / 100 33,367 / 100 32,726 / 100 32,878 / 100 46.7 28.7 24.3

Notes: *Combines communal, old resettlement and A1 areas **Combines A2 and small-scale commercial farmers areas Source: Moyo 2011 2 | Moyo owned owned cluding cluding The response of the gov­

owned and is mostly allocated 53 industrial -industrial ventures with foreign capital industrial -industrial sugar estates and wildlife conservancies (see Table 2.5). Meanwhile, the state expanded land for its estate farming from 18 to 24 Independence Independence in former settler states from the 1960s onwards compromised Only in Zimbabwe, and only since 2000, was a genuine effort made to estates, and resurrected farming by state corporations. About 20 such per state cent farms of are now joint agro from the East combined with domestic state and private capital. Over cent of agricultural 95 Zimbabwe’s land is now state- per through land user grants to peasants and through leases to new middle-scale ‘commercial’ farms, while a few farms retain freehold land rights (Moyo 2011). The Fast Track Land Reform Programme of 2000 social social transformation and eschewed mechanisms for the equitable redistribu ­ tion of wealth, incomes and landed property, since social changes were left to the markets and protected by ‘the rule of law’ (Eicher and Rukuni 1994; Bratton 1994; Alexander 1994). Land redistribution was minimal and - foreign remedy the historical injustices of settler colonialism as well as the failure of the -based market land reforms implemented in the post-1980 period with the support donors. of Even Western this effortfeeble had its domestic and external opponents, who had much to lose from a government effort to empowerpeasantry the (Moyo 2011; Scoones et al. 2010). elites elites and foreign capital. The process of marketisation the pretext was of undertaken modernising peasant on agriculture. farming estates even expanded during the second wave of land alienation the in neoliberal structural adjustment period of the (Moyo mid-1980s 2000). and The the concentration 1990s of land in social polarisation. Liberalised agricultural policies and land the tenure, ­ in hands of a few intensified constitutional reforms, initiated in Africa in the conditions for 1990s the second wave onwards of land created alienation and the the intensified margin­ alisation of the peasantry, which was incorporated into capital through various means. These radical transitions in agrarian relations for prepared the recent the ‘land ground grabs’. ernment of Zimbabwe to the inherited inequality concentration of in land as land a result and of structural the adjustment was further the Fast Land Track Reform Programme (FTLRP), which it began to onwards implement (Matondi 2012). from FTLRP 2000 led to the extensive redistribution of ­ Zimba bwe’s agricultural land and the socialisation of property rights. It expropriated large farmlands owned by over 3,000 white farmers and 20 large - foreign estates and allocated the land free of non-landed beneficiaries, charge comprising mainly families from to within the about peasantry and 150,000 poor urban working people. However, it also provided ‘middle class’ land and ‘elite’ to beneficiaries, while retaining over some of 20,000 the core lands black of the agro Most beneficiaries perceive their land tenure to be secure, with only 5 per cent having experienced evictions, and many of them are investing in the land, although some of the new middle-scale farmers and finance capital call for private property rights in order to attract ‘investment’. Fewer than the expected number of former farm workers gained land, ­although in general rural labour has been freed from the monopoly of a few large farm employers, while retention of the retrogressive ‘compound farm labour tenancy’ now faces resistance from agricultural workers. Land reform has integrated the previously divided territorial authority and spatial economic barriers that segregated the peasant land from the former LSCF areas, leading to greater flows of people, goods and services between them (Moyo 2008). The extension of hereditary local authority into the redistributed land areas has the potentially retrogressive implication of reinforcing patriarchal relations, which undermine women’s land and labour rights. A key regressive feature of the disproportionate representation of middle-class and elite beneficiaries is that some of them, including those with multiple plots, argue for even larger land allocations and call for freehold property rights, while a few sublet their land to former large farmers. The consequence is a new interclass inequal­ ity in the control of public resources and influence over agrarian policies. Within a comparative context, however, the land reform programme signifi­ cantly altered property relations in terms of the relative distribution of land and the socialisation of property rights. This has created a situation whereby the prospect of realising socially progressive agrarian change in Zimbabwe has become ever more difficult. Just and progressive agrarian change entails the broadening of the food production base and increasing productivity among small- and medium-scale farmers who are the majority. Needless to say, these innovative goals are constrained, largely due to shortages of fertilisers, irriga­ tion facilities and farm machinery. Such shortages arise from reduced domestic agro-industrial inputs and supply capacities, as well as from foreign exchange constraints on imports, partly due to Zimbabwe’s international isolation. These shortages and new inequalities in access to agricultural inputs, subsidies and limited available finance have mostly affected the peasantry. The recent return of agrarian merchant capital to subcontract tobacco, sugar and cotton produc­ tion has reintroduced a degree of obsession with export-oriented farming at the expense of producing food grains for domestic consumption (Bird et al. 2003; Kalibwani 2005; Moyo 2011). Unless properly managed, FDI from China, India and Brazil can become part of the problem in African agriculture, further reinforcing the historical process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’. New alliances of multiracial domestic and foreign capital now dominate the restructured agrarian input and output markets, which are increasingly managed through exploitative subcontractual relations, while exposing new farmers to unfair international terms of trade. The prices realised by mostly 54 2 | Moyo exploitation of labour and European capital, but financial

55 input -input industries. Private contract farming -industry remain inadequate (Moyo 2011). class class nationalist coalition still has to operate called ‘illiquidity’ of the financial ostensibly sector, because of the absence Mainstream Mainstream debates on Africa’s allegedly failed agrarian transition or its The Zimbabwean experience suggests that, even under neoliberalism, the - unequal unequal trade relations in restricting domestic agrarian extroversion, a accumulation restriction that and underlies food production deficits. The effects of unequal trade on agricultural and industrial development in the Africa 1970s have been up well documented to (Amin 1974), while the evolving internal class relations and alliances with capital associated and the with mechanisms of surplus value extraction have been unequal noted (Shivji 2009). exchange The longer-term history of extraction in economies colonial state transfers and of resources from industries the South and through the illogical attempts to argue that ‘comparative advantage’ determines agrarian development have also been exposed (Patnaik 2011). ‘agricultural ‘agricultural and food crisis’ have tended physiocratic to limitations, land tenure deficiencies and the putative technological focus narrowly on presumed backwardness of peasant producers as the sources of have failure. neglected the However, effectsof they land alienation, super- Conclusion scale -scale small producers of maize, cotton and some prevailing on oilseeds the world are market, below although Chinese those inputs and contracts ting rela­ to commodity buying have improved them somewhat. Current state and donor support for smaller producers is and little minimal, includes agricultural machinery and infrastructure investment, largely because it does not support the recovery of the domestic agro and commodity merchants dominate agrarian markets because of the reduced fiscal capacity of the statein a ‘dollarised’ economic policy framework and the so of investor confidence. China has expanded financing agrarian for reform to fill the financing gap left by the departure of allocations to farming and agro within neoliberal policy structures, which soon lead to agrarian distributional bias, including bias arising from class, ethnic and gender cleavages. Moreover, since capital was not totally ousted by Zimbabwe’s land reform and autonom­ ous sources of agrarian financing are limited, have internal enabled class politically contradictions unaccountable international capital unequal to agrarian relations, using liberal domestic markets reconstitute tied to the unequal world trade regime (Moyo 2011). potential potential for extensive land reform in support of the peasantry exists, especially where land grievances that relate to the monopoly of large a small tracts minority of of land white by farmers are challenged by a radicalised coalition nationalist that well includes organised peasant movements (Scoones et al. 2010; Moyo 2011). However, the cross- Africa’s agrarian question – the enhancement of the productivity of the ­majority of its peasant farmers – remains unresolved. Disarticulated develop­ ment, unequal trade relations and uneven regional development reflect the political influence of narrow middle- and upper-class consumer and export markets, at the expense of the majority poor, under the direction of monopoly agribusiness and finance capital with the support of local elites who control political power. This process is integral to the exploitative logic of the unequal world food system and the crisis of capitalism, and has fuelled new ‘land grabbing’ and new aid conditionalities that seek to subordinate the peasantry further. The interests of agribusiness and finance capital cannot be directed spon­ taneously at promoting increased African food productivity and ensuring food security for the majority of Africans. Policies have to compel such reform (Patnaik 2003). Instead, foreign capital and domestic elites seek to universalise the commodification of land and water and expand contract farming relations with the peasants, thereby reinforcing accumulation by the dispossession of peasantries at the expense of food sovereignty and social reproduction. In the absence of coherent and proactive policies by African governments, investments from Brazil, China and India in African agriculture may end up reproducing the same destructive and unsustainable system of industrial farming at the expense of the majority of African small-scale farmers and the natural resource base that they rely on to sustain themselves. Indeed, the recent export of capital to Africa for the exploitation of agricul­ tural land, water, minerals and other natural resources reflects the escalation of the speculative tendency of capital to accumulate by dispossession, in the wake of the collapse of the housing, energy and derivative financial markets. The effects of the prolonged crises of the oligopolistic capitalist system (see Tabb 2008; Ghosh 2008; Patnaik 2008; Moyo 2010) have been to undermine the African peasantry and agriculture in general and to depress their overall economic well-being. This trend can only be reversed by national and regional policies that seek food sovereignty, including by protecting land rights, access to water and control over biodiversity resources in favour of the peasantry and in order to prevent further dispossession. Enhancing human capabilities among peasantries is key to restructuring the food system – including through endogenous research and extension capaci­ ties, enhanced consumer trade protection and farmers’ movements – and to peasant involvement in agrarian policy making and programme implementa­ tion (Moyo and Yeros 2005). Addressing the agrarian question in Africa could be enhanced by promoting regional integration in the agricultural input and output markets, equitable industrialisation and the creation of state-supported food reserves and a food trade based on solidarity. The inalienable land rights of small-scale producers are central to this. 56 PART II India

3 | India and Africa: new trends in sustainable agricultural development

Gurjit Singh

Introduction India’s engagement with Africa is currently in a transformational stage, from good political relations historically to a diversified functional relation­ ship. Agriculture is at the forefront of this new engagement. At the time of the first India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), held in New Delhi in April 2008, the Framework of Cooperation was adopted between India and Africa. Subse­ quently, at the second IAFS, held in Addis Ababa in May 2011, the Framework of Enhanced Cooperation was adopted. In both these documents, agriculture was the top priority for collaboration between India and Africa. Agriculture in Africa suffers from low productivity owing to a lack of tech­ nology, capital and investments, and a lack of consistent commitment to transforming the sector in which the majority of Africans earn their living. Ironically, this food-deficient continent is also a major exporter of agricultural commodities, as national development priorities have been sidestepped in favour of commodity exports of fruit, vegetables, tea, coffee and the like to generate foreign exchange. Besides the preoccupation of governments with expanding export production, the rules of international trade and the utilisa­ tion of duty-free concessions offered by the US and the European Union (EU) often lead to such distorted production patterns, which in turn lead to asym­ metrical trade flows, so that the countries of Africa import basic staples such as maize, rice or wheat while exporting coffee and cocoa to Western markets. It is pertinent to note that, other than Egypt and South Africa, almost all African countries depend on between one and six commodities for 75 per cent 1 of their total exports (Broadman 2007), and often export earnings remain the most important aspect of their revenue generation, given the slow pace of domestic production, which would contribute to local taxation (Singh 2007).

India–Africa cooperation in agriculture: scope and content Against this backdrop, the government of India has been working closely with the African Union (AU), the regional economic communities (RECs) of Africa and bilaterally to create a new cooperation agenda for transforming African agriculture. This cooperation covers five areas, which are discussed below. 59 Capacity building Under the Framework of Cooperation issued during the first IAFS (IAFS 2008b), Africa and India agreed that agricultural development is an effective approach to ensuring food security, eradicating poverty and improving peoples’ livelihoods, and agreed to strengthen Africa–India cooperation in this sector to improve the food security of countries as well as to increase their exports to world markets. The parties emphasised the sustainable development of agricultural and animal resources through effective support for scientific research into the conservation of land and the environment. Cooperation will focus on several areas, including:

• capacity building and sharing of experience in policy analysis and planning relating to the agricultural sector; • water resource management and irrigation practices, agro-infrastructure development, transfer of applied agricultural technology and skills transfer; • combating agro-based diseases; • capacity building or training to increase the capacity of African small-scale landholders to comply with required food quality and safety standards, including extension activity and agricultural credit policies; • sharing experience and information on appropriate storage and processing technologies and jointly promoting the uptake of African- and Indian- developed technologies in order to diversify and add value to food and agricultural products; • sharing of expertise and information between commodity boards in Africa and India with a view to learning from each other about farm mechanisation, post-harvest technology, organic farming, policy and regulatory frameworks and the setting up of cross-border commodity exchange boards; • enhancing market opportunities for African value-added agricultural products; • livestock management, breeding technologies, meat processing, dairy industry development, fisheries and aquaculture, including the exchange and transfer of applied technology; • establishing links between agriculture and industrial development in order to support and nurture agro-processing industries; and • enhancing cooperation between agricultural training centres and relevant research institutes (ibid.).

These commitments are in various stages of implementation and it is too early to assess their effectiveness in addressing the capacity gap in African agriculture. Where experience sharing is concerned, there are several avenues for implementation, including through agricultural scholarships, the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme and postdoctoral fellow­ships. On other aspects, for instance enhancements of market opportun­ 60 3 | Singh ­ ­ access, ­access, specific ­specific essential ­essential ented as 61 country training’ and the ‘provision of Africa and India reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate demonstration centres; and regional farm science centres 2 cum- African institute to be set up in consultation with the AU. Three Under Under the Framework of Cooperation action plan, and in order to enhance India also provides customised ‘short-term training related to transferable Among the decisions taken at the second forum summit, India agreed to Under Under the Framework for Enhanced Cooperation (IAFS 2011a) issued during agricultural education, science and research, India is and 50 providing masters’ scholarships in 25 agriculture per doctoral annum to African students in Indian institutions, covering different disciplines.To ensure equitable skills focusing on training of trainers who will transfer expertise to stakeholders at national level’ This (ibid.). is to be achieved through ‘targeted visits of Indian professionals for field demonstrations based on mutually agreed objectives and missions with beneficiary stakeholders’ (ibid.). This approach willinclude ‘on- the-spot consultations and - in ities for agricultural products, the offer to Africa to establish anintegrated food processing cluster and integrated textile cluster would be a way of these achieving objectives. The implementation of these ideas the context has of specific to offers be institutionsfor seen training, and within as ships, as scholar­ well and there is adequate scope for new programmes fulfilment of to these be objectives. developed in the CommissionAU coordinates the process of prospective selecting candidates in conjunction with the government of India and its embassies in Africa (IAFS 2008c). institutions are to be established Africa in regional consultation soil, with water the and tissue RECs: testing - production India– laboratories; agricultural seed in in order to increase agricultural output and achieve the Millennium Develop establish several agriculture-related institutions at various levels. The India– Africa Institute of Agriculture and Rural Development (IAIARD) is a proposed pan- ment Goal of halving the proportion malnutrition of by people 2015. suffering The parties from emphasised hunger the and importance of the latest harnessing scientific researchfor raising productivity and conservingland and the environment to ensure food security for currently the rising people food prices, and making to food affordable bring and down accessible all. to order In to do this, they agreed Comprehensive to Africa collaborate Agriculture Development on Programme the (ibid.). implementation of the the second IAFS, hardware and software in field demonstrations’, alongliterature, seed, ‘exchange[s] with and of planting material, as well in as agriculture’ sharing (ibid.). of The best field practices demonstrations areagriculture fellows return to to their own implem­ be countries and after the establishment of the RECs. The setting up of agriculture is training an ongoing and process. ITEC programmes relating to (IAFS 2011b). They are offered to all eight RECs, and some RECs have already sent nominations for host countries. Furthermore, scientists and experts from the Department of Agricultural Research and Education and Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) will visit Africa before mid-2013 to train more than 600 people with the aim of building capacity across the continent to enhance crop production, fisheries production and the post-harvest processing of food grains and marine products. The proposed locations of agriculture- related institutes in Africa are set out in Table 3.1. IAIARD, patterned on the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Develop­ ment (NABARD) in India, will be implemented through NABARD Consultancy Services. This will be a pan-African institution, the location of which is to be decided by the AU. Once the decision has been made, work with the host country will start. The proposed IAIARD institute will help in building and enriching human resources by sharing knowledge acquired in India with participating countries in Africa; capacity building in agriculture and rural development; bridging the information gap; and helping forge closer cultural links between Africa and India. IAIARD is expected to emerge as the premier training institute in Africa, offering training and consultancy services in agriculture and rural development, with poverty alleviation its focus, and it will cater to the needs of bankers, government officials, the staff of rural financial institutions and microfinance institutions, non-governmental and civil society organisations, donor agencies and others in the field. It will also provide training in broader areas suchas approaches to lending, natural resource management, post-harvest techno­ logy, institutional development, microfinance, general banking modules and cooperatives, rural infrastructure, agro-export zones, credit planning, liveli­ hood support and financial inclusion. The proposed institute, once it is fully operational, will be an important piece of infrastructure for Africa, focusing on human capital formation and agricultural and rural development. At the regional level, it was decided to establish three different kinds of in­ stitution through the RECs to support agricultural development. Farm ­science centres are proposed as agricultural innovators and diffusers of new techno­ logies important to developing countries’ quest for food security. Farming in resource-poor areas must be sustainable to provide dependable long-term support for rural households. To achieve this, farmers must have access to sustainable technologies in cropping, livestock, forestry and fisheries. The farm science centre is an innovative institution developed by ICAR and has played a vital role in the application of technology on farms in India. Since 1974, the farm science centre concept has grown into a large network in India, totalling 630 units by 2012.3 It is proposed that similar centres will be set up in each of the eight RECs in Africa. These centres will undertake on-farm testing to identify the appropriate 62 3 | Singh Countries Zimbabwe Republic of Congo Malawi South Sudan Côte d’Ivoire Republic of Congo Benin Zimbabwe Gambia Chad Uganda Cameroon Ghana Mali Angola Benin Burkina Faso Chad Mali Malawi Uganda Nigeria Location to be decided by the AU Location to be decided by the AU Kenya Democratic Republic of Congo Burkina Faso Ethiopia Central African Republic Liberia South Sudan Republic of Congo Togo 63

cum- Proposed Proposed locations of institutesagriculture -related in Africa (2012) : Information collected from various implementing sources, including agricultural technologies under various farming systems; organise front-line demonstrations to establish the production ­farmers’ potential fields; of train technologies farmers on updateand modern agricultural technologies; train extension personnel to familiarise them their knowledge of and in skills with new technological developments; and serve as agricultural technology 3.1 Table Type of institution Rural technology park -testing laboratoryFood -processing business Food incubation centre assistance programme Technical (TAP) in in the cotton sector -processing India–Africa food cluster IAIARD Regional water soil, and tissue testing laboratory Regional farm science centre Regional agricultural seed - production demonstration centre Source agencies and the Indian Ministry of External Affairswebsite (http://mea.gov.in) resource and knowledge centres in support of public, private and voluntary initiatives to improve the agricultural economy in the districts. As a result of India’s experience of increased fertiliser use, an essential component in the green revolution, over the past 40 years India has followed a site-specific balanced nutrient management approach. This is known as the targeted yield approach, and it was adopted by ICAR. Based on soil testing, this methodology seeks to fertilise both the crop and the soil and helps the farmer to harvest the yield he can expect from a given piece of land. The technology has been perfected under integrated nutrient management, which envisages the use of local organic resources available to farmers and involves fertilisation practices for the whole cropping system rather than for individual crops. India has agreed to share its green revolution experiences and col­ laborate with countries in Africa to increase crop yields through soil, water and tissue testing laboratories in African countries. This proposed project involves establishing soil and water testing laboratories (SWTLs) and the generation of balanced nutrient prescriptions based on available organic resources and chemical fertilisers. The centres will aim to achieve specific objectives, in­ cluding developing soil-test-based fertiliser prescriptions for important crops and providing training in soil testing to people who could extend this work to other parts of the country and could also educate farmers. Eight SWTLs will be established in consultation with the RECs. Each SWTL will be associated with two mobile soil testing laboratories so that proactive efforts can be made to assess soil fertility. The ultimate goal is to galvanise local stakeholders, including farmers, to open many more laboratories and promote soil-test-based and balanced fertilisation of crops and soils. Given that the quality and appropriate variety of seed are the most criti­ cal inputs for enhancing the production of high-quality pulses and oilseeds, seed production-cum-demonstration centres in Africa have been proposed (ibid.). To ensure the availability of quality rapeseed/mustard seed and pulse crops in eight African countries, centres with required infrastructure are to be identified. Exploratory trials will be undertaken to identify appropriate oilseed and pulse cultivars, with farmers participating in varietal selection. The most appropriate varieties of seed will be produced at each centre, and the centres will also serve as demonstration sites for production technology suitable for oilseed and pulse crops. Good agronomic practices will be followed at these centres to ensure apposite rates of seed production. A recommended package of practices will be followed to maximise the production potential of each crop variety. The seed production blocks will also serve as demonstration blocks, covering production management practices including weed management, nutrient and water management, and integrated disease and pest management. All agricultural activities, from land preparation to harvest, will be monitored by experts in oilseeds and pulses. Post-harvest 64 3 | Singh 65 commodities such as legumes and pulses, the key elements of the Cotonou Agreement (previ­ 4 The rapid growth in India’s trade with Africa has been due toor toor dal (yellow pigeon peas), are significant import items well. as The vision behind such capacity -building support, through special ­ scholar It is my belief that India is responding adequately to Africa’s desire for An assessment of the overall growth in India–Africa trade between 2005 Among the commodities listed 3.2, in cashewTable nuts are by far the largest The terms of trade and concessions offered to Africa through the Economic Trade Trade dimension ships ships and programmes in India as well as through building the institutions creation of in capacity- Africa, is to enable human resources Africa and to productive have capacity, its both own of the trained which expansion of will sustainable agriculture. The contribute institutions that to India proposes to establish will help regional and national support systems in many African countries and will provide a basis for linking productive assets with process­ ing facilities and for attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) in agriculture. operations operations such as threshing, storage and processing strated will in these also centres, be which demon­ will play a and catalytic oilseed production. role in enhancing pulse value value added in its agricultural products, both by supporting research (through ously the Lomé Accords) between the EU and its former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific, and the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000 have often made African countries important sourcescommodities of agricultural that are in demand in traditional markets. Luxury intensive and crops - labour such as horticulture, floriculture, coffeethe main products for export,and mainly to tea the developed countries among are of the North. However, most of these products are also exported by India and there is little complementarity in the trade of agricultural commodities between India and Africa in this category, unless there is an unexpected shortage. and 2010 shows that eight main agricultural commodities (see 3.2 Table below) were exported from Africa to India, accounting for 73 per cent and 71 per cent of African exports in 2005 and 2010 respectively. component, with imports worth over US$500 million per annum for three years shown the in the last table. Agri- Partnership Agreements, mainly mainly to the import of commodities such as oil, coal and gold; these imports have strengthened India’s trade relationship with Nigeria in and particular. Although South agricultural trade Africa is much smaller, there are growing imports of agricultural commodities from Africa food and products exports from India of to Africa. processed such as Imports in this category of legume family rose about and 2007 -fold five and between approximately 20 2005 times between 2005 and 2009, although there was a slight decline from US$169 million in 2009 to US$139 million in 2010. Table 3.2 Africa–India trade growth in eight main agricultural commodities (US$ million; 2005–10)

Product Subcategory product description 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Cashew nuts in shell 409.42 361.07 385.90 525.30 579.07 555.09 Other legumes 9.17 8.76 44.40 49.24 169.22 138.91 Tur (arhar) 8.75 8.72 44.10 49.24 168.95 138.84 Cotton, not carded Cotton, other than India, of all staples 78.92 63.44 114.10 185.60 105.57 53.18 Cloves and stems 12.21 18.10 16.64 13.14 19.86 18.02 Cloves extracted 4.49 7.31 5.38 2.80 3.95 5.66 Cloves, not extracted (other than stem) 3.89 7.97 8.12 6.86 10.02 6.74 Other cloves 3.83 2.82 3.13 3.48 5.75 5.59 Other seeds Other seeds (broken) 6.63 20.83 27.29 15.92 19.93 14.62 Fermented and other 7.25 6.03 6.70 8.82 11.08 14.02 < 20 kg (fermented) and other partly fermented tea 4.54 3.11 4.01 4.99 3.69 5.22 Tea black, leaf in bulk 1.01 0.28 0.17 1.42 2.69 2.57 Tea black, dust in bulk 1.02 1.25 1.70 1.73 4.37 5.06 Other seeds 6.01 6.14 7.25 10.26 8.92 11.92 Other bark, husk and rind, fresh/dried w/n cut/crushed/powdered 3.49 4.30 6.16 8.82 6.72 9.03 Other roots and rhizomes, fresh/dried w/n cut 0.11 0.34 0.12 0.12 0.17 1.38 Decaffeinated arabica 0.61 3.98 19.45 14.70 8.70 10.01 Coffee arabica plantation, other grade 0.13 1.53 9.34 8.59 1.09 1.22 Coffee rob parchment, other grade 1.03 6.27 8.67 Total 530.22 479.59 621.73 822.98 922.35 815.77 Total of all agro-imports 724.5 634.1 907.4 1,160.0 1,358.8 1,149.0 These eight products as a percentage of total agro-imports 73.18 75.62 68.51 70.94 67.88 71.0 Total of all imports (US$ billion) 24.7 25.6 32.0 Agro-imports as a percentage of total imports 4.69 5.30 3.59

Source: Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce, FT (Africa) Division 2010 3 | Singh 67 Several countries have used the provisions However, However, crops such as cashews and pulses, for which there is growing There is, however, no doubt that incentivisation through duty concessions, Benin, Benin, for instance, has added edible fruits and nuts to its basic exports Duty-free Tariff Preference scheme demand in India, provide opportunities for accessing the vast Indian market, opportunities that have been recognised and seized on by some countries Africa, in for example Malawi. Thus, trade in agricultural commodities between India and Africa can be increased in sectors where there is complementarity. In 2010, India’s imports of agricultural commodities from Africa at was a total valued of US$1,149 million, of which the top eight 3.2 products accounted cited for 71 in per Table cent by value. Agricultural imports accounted for per 3.6 cent of total imports in from 2010, the a previous year decline (see of Table 3.2). about 1.7 percentage points the Cotonou Agreement and AGOA have led to about exports 30 going per to cent Europe of and African another 30 per been a cent surge of to exports the to Asia, US. mainly India There and China, has although this also is due more to the availability of markets and to demand than to incentivisation. a slew of institutions detailed earlier) and those dealing with food processing, diamonds and textiles, by which will not only establishing clusters such as impart skills but will actually create value chains. Indian investment takes an integrated approach, for example sugar plantations and growing sugar and mills, yarn factories, cotton palm oil cultivation and oil mills, and so on. of cotton and oilseeds. Although the 2009), value these is products comprise modest 64 at per US$96 cent of million Benin’s total (in Faso exports exports. cotton, Burkina edible fruits and nuts, which account for 90 its per exports cent to India. Cameroon, of Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Nigeria Mali, and Sierra Leone are major exporters of wood and wood products to India. For most of these countries, increased exports to India through DFTP have increased the value of their trade basket. of the Duty-free Tariff Preference (DFTP) scheme to enhance Indian markets. Under this scheme, announced by the prime minister their of India to access at the first IAFSin April 2008, India is unilaterally providing ‘preferential market access for exports from all 50 least developed countries are in Africa’ (LDCs), (IAFS 2008d). The scheme 34 covers 94 per of cent of total India’s which tariff lines. Specifically, the scheme provides preferential market accessfor 92.5 per cent of the global exports of all LDCs. Products covered est of to Africa immediate ­ inter include aluminium ore, cashew nuts, cane sugar, cocoa, copper cotton, ore, fish fillets, ready-made garments and (ibid.). At non-industrial present, 19 diamonds African LDCs are beneficiaries of India’s DFTP scheme. In addition, there are 15 other countries in Africa eligible for preferential tariffs under the scheme (see Table 3.3). Table 3.3 Beneficiaries of India’s DFTP scheme (2012)

Beneficiaries of the DFTP scheme Eligible for the DFTP scheme but have (19 countries) yet not acceded (15 countries)

Benin Angola Burkina Faso Chad Burundi Comoros Central African Republic Democratic Republic of Congo Eritrea Djibouti Ethiopia Equatorial Guinea Gambia Guinea Lesotho Guinea-Bissau Madagascar Liberia Malawi Mauritania Mali Niger Mozambique São Tomé and Príncipe Rwanda Sierra Leone Senegal South Sudan Somalia Togo Sudan Tanzania Uganda Zambia

Source: Compiled by the author from data available on the Indian Ministry of Commerce website (http://commerce.nic.in/trade/international_tpp_DFTP.pdf)

Line of credit support to agriculture Lines of credit (LOCs) are offered by the Export-Import Bank of India (EXIM Bank) to support the development of infra­ structure and to provide integrated support to African countries and regions. The choice of projects is largely made by the African countries themselves. Analysis of LOCs to African countries between 2005–06 and 2011–12 shows that 18 countries presented proposals for agriculture-related support and received a total of US$1,225 million during this period (see Table 3.4). Among the biggest projects financed by India was US$640 million for the development ofthe sugar industries in Ethiopia. Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland and Tanzania sought India’s assistance to acquire tractors and other agriculture-related equipment (Singh 2009a). LOCs helped raise crop productivity levels in four of the Team 9 countries of West Africa,5 namely Cameroon (maize and rice), Chad (cotton), Côte d’Ivoire (cocoa, rice and coffee) and Togo (maize and wheat), and in the Southern African country of Mozambique (maize and wheat) (see Chapter 4). Of the LOC-supported projects, 25 projects related to agricultural develop­ ment, including irrigation projects but excluding hydropower projects, which are 68 Table 3.4 Agricultural and related projects funded through LOCs from EXIM Bank (2003–12)

Country Year Projects Value (US$ million)

Burkina Faso 2005–06 Acquisition of tractors, harvesters, agro-processing equipment 30.0 Cameroon 2008–09 Maize plantation project, rice plantation project 37.7 2011–12 Cassava plantation 42.0 Chad 2005–06 Cotton yarn plant, agro-processing plant, irrigation equipment 50.0 Côte d’Ivoire 2005–06 Vegetable extraction, fruit and vegetable chips, cocoa and coffee production 26.8 2007–08 Fishery processing unit, coconut fibre processing plant 5.5 2009–10 Rice production programme 30.0 Ethiopia 2007–12 Development of sugar industry 639.5 Gambia 2005–06 Supply of tractors 6.7 Ghana 2008–09 Fish harvesting, fish processing 11.0 Guinea-Bissau 2005–06 Purchase of tractors and water pumps 2.5 Lesotho 2003–04 Irrigation equipment 5.0 Malawi 2007–08 Irrigation storage, tobacco threshing plant 30.0 2010–11 Cotton processing, green belt initiatives 50.0 Mali 2009–10 Agriculture and food processing 15.0 Mozambique 2010–11 Enhancing productivity of rice, maize and wheat 20.0 Senegal 2004–05 Purchase of agri-machinery and equipment 15.0 2005–06 Irrigation project 27.0 Sierra Leone 2008–09 Procurement of tractors, harvesters, rice threshers, rice mills, maize shelters, pesticides 15.0 Sudan 2006–07 Supply of agricultural inputs 15.0 2007–08 Mashkour sugar project 25.0 Swaziland 2011–12 Agricultural development, mechanisation of agriculture 37.9 Tanzania 2007–08 Export of tractors and pumps 40.0 2011–12 Biodiesel production 35.0 Togo 2011–12 Farming and cultivation of rice, maize, sorghum 13.1 Total 1,224.7

Source: Compiled by the author from data available on the EXIM Bank website (www.eximbankindia.com) also supported by India. Table 3.4 illustrates the Indian government-­supported LOCs to the agricultural sector in African countries through EXIM Bank.

The foreign direct investment dimension While there are challenges facing India’s agricultural sector, there have been achievements as well. One of the major focal points has been India’s transition from being a food-importing country to a country that has attained food security for its billion people with occasional surpluses for export. For African countries, this model of agriculture is one they aspire to emulate and is a source of inspiration. Ironically, the current context of transnationalisation of agribusiness has sometimes led to the subordination of national priorities to global market forces. As a consequence, the so-called new agricultural countries of the global South, including those in Africa, have become net exporters of products such as tea, coffee, poultry, horticulture and animal feed on the international market. Since their national development agendas did not prioritise national food sufficiency, they have ended up as major importers of food such as maize, rice and wheat. Having realised that international markets incentivise these distortions, African countries have now prioritised the achievement of food security. There is an evident gap between food demand and supply in many African countries that could be reduced significantly through enhanced domestic agricultural production, the preferred option. Although the gap can be bridged through imports of food grain, this option has its pitfalls, as there can be uncertainties of supply due to the vagaries of international markets. Since 2008, the acceleration in the global food price index and the demand for biofuels have led to growing investment by other countries in the African agricultural sector (Cotula et al. 2009: 4–5). Agriculture-related FDI is being under­ taken mainly through increasing private sector participation in international agriculture in order to expand the acreage under cultivation and achieve food security. The challenge now is whether these trends can be harnessed, providing self-sufficiency in food and reducing dependence on imports through increased domestic agricultural production. For this to happen, large areas have to be brought under cultivation and the output of existing areas has to be maximised. While the countries of the global South seek ways to alter the distorted structure of international trade in agricultural commodities, farmers often lose out when commodity prices go up dramatically due to their inability to supply the market with goods in time, and in the quantity and quality needed. Due to lack of finance and technology, they are unable to respond quickly to price changes.

Supply is very inelastic, which means that it does not respond quickly to price changes. Typically, aggregate agriculture supply increases by 1 to 2% when prices increase by 10%. (Von Braun 2007: 5)

70 3 | Singh 71 Thus, the sustainability of free markets 6 Various Various studies have shown that the acquisition of land by international The growth in international trade and investment in agriculture has led to The driving force behind investments by Arab countries, including Bahrain, While While many countries look to agricultural outsourcing to ensure a supply Africa, with its vast tracts of underutilised or unutilised land, seems to be investors investors has increased around the world, particularly America, in and Africa to a and lesser Latin extent in about Asia. 46.6 million hectares Accordingof land were acquired by to such interests in a 2008–09 World Bank report, and covered 464 projects (World Bank 2011a cited in Guzman 2010). It is note­ worthy that about 70 per cent of the land acquired and half the projects were in Africa; according to International Food Policy estimates, 15 to 20 Research million hectares were Institute acquired under 180 agricultural deals (IFPRI) between 2006 and 2009 (IFPRI 2009 cited in Guzman 2010). IFPRI also out points that 32 million hectares were acquired in cases covered a by the single IFPRI year. study, large In investments have some been made of by the West Asian and East Asian countries, including China ous and African countries, South particularly Korea, Cameroon, in Ethiopia, vari­ Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Tanzania (Von Braun and -Dick Meinzen 2009) (see Chapters 2 and 6). a surge in land acquisitions in African countries, which many see as a useful tool to attract FDI. It is significant thatabove, most are of not the African oil economies, countriesand mentioned therefore they see fallow arable as land a major source of economic development. Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and many Asian countries such as of agri-products and to reduce pricing vagaries, of 2008 the that global led to financial a crises sharp rise in to food prices export saw control many countries measures, resorting limiting the export domestic food of security (Kapur food 2009). products to ensure a lucrative proposition in terms of expanding areas under cultivation. African countries, therefore, by providing surplus arable land for cultivation, can find new avenues to attract FDI; ways to increase the domestic supply of food and thus reduce dependence on food imports over whose control; prices and a they means of have increasing exports little of those agricultural commodities whose prices are rising. for for food has come into This question. situation also heightened understanding of the fact that the gap between demand for and likely supply to of grow food in products the is years ahead, a cause of countries concern and an for investment net opportunity -importing food for those willing to take the risk trading of in agricultural commodities. The current scenario: how sustainable is the Indian approach of sustainable is the Indian how approach scenario: current The land leases? through food security promoting China, Japan, Malaysia and South Korea, is the achievement of food security for their home markets.7 Countries such as Mauritius and Djibouti have acquired farm land in Mozambique,8 Ethiopia9 and Sudan to ensure a sustainable supply of agricultural commodities for their domestic use. Africa’s arable land has also attracted attention because rising oil prices and the consequent demand for biofuels has led to increased investment in the production of the latter alongside agricultural commodities (see Matondi et al. 2011: 1). Africa, with its vast swathes of arable land, was the natural ‘growth frontier’ for absorbing the increased investments in food and biofuels. Studies have shown that private investment funds, including hedge, pension and private equity funds, have invested in agricultural land in developing countries during the early part of the twenty-first century, thereby producing a wave of FDI in agriculture (United Nations 2009). There are several approaches to agricultural outsourcing for food sustain­ ability and for investment purposes. The Gulf states, which have limited ­access to water and land but have surplus capital, form one group of countries looking at agricultural outsourcing for food sustainability. Similar efforts are being made by Japan and South Korean companies. However, China, which is self- sufficient in food at present, is looking for a reserve that could both support food exports from Africa to China and enable the transfer of Chinese labour into agricultural areas in Africa. Much of China’s offshore investment in agriculture is in rice, soya bean, sugar cane and cassava, some of which can be used for biodiesel production. These projects bring with them labour and workers from China. Although China’s private companies have led this investment push, as with all other Chinese engagements with Africa, the private sector is formally backed by the government and its resources. It is significant that in the case of many of the Gulf states, Japan and South Korea, there is intergovernmental collabora­ tion as well as facilitation of such investments, since the overall purpose is not merely to promote trade and investment but to achieve sustainable food security for these countries.

Indian investments in Africa: historical and contemporary trends It is interesting that Indian investment in agriculture in Africa has perhaps attracted the most attention. While there are no confirmed figures for invest­ ments by Indian companies in African countries, there is no doubt that such companies are among the leading investors and that their investments have been solicited and welcomed by African countries. Indian investors have been invited because they are a major source of local capacity building through the transfer of technology, the creation of local employment, and contributions to intra-African trade as well as exports. It is this approach that endears Indian investment to many African countries, especially investment that encourages 72 3 | Singh ­ independence, independence, but the real surge in - 73 There was investment in cotton in East Africa 10 ment for Indian companies to link up with their African cane cultivation after the railway Mombasa–Uganda line was built, known Indian companies post - The early movement of plantation workers through indentured labour to By the time the FDI boom in agricultural outsourcing peaked, Indian com­ Significantly, many Indian companies withthe necessary expertise and largely largely by Indian engineers. Mauritius, Mauritius, for instance, contributed significantly tothat country’s ment establish­ and subsequent growth of its sugar sector. This sector has been central to the country’s development following its independence many -infested malaria ‘bad in lands’ in western Kenya 1968. and Uganda were brought Similarly, under - sugar the agricultural sector. It the is agricultural also engagement with sector. significant Africa that India’s in the agricultural sector has largely met expectations. by well panies were already established and were in of a investment position to to large expand farms. the The flow role that of they Indian work companies with has African evolved countries in as investors exports, to and the increase success third of such countryventures has coincided with moves by many African countries to look at agriculture as a ment viable of FDI India vehicle. The offered govern­ no incentives move or specific into directions commercial agriculture for for companies outsourcing agricultural to requirements. However, there is no doubt that the general Africa, thrust mainly of through Indian investment the in India–Africa conclaves since an enabling 2005, ­ environ has provided ping ping away of preferential access to European markets, as Zimbabwe, well led as Indian turmoil companies in to seek new agricultural lands, the mainly cultivation for of roses, in other countries The such development as of Ethiopia cashew (Singh nuts 2009b). in many Indian investment. African countries also attracted counterparts in order to strengthen trade and investment in Africancluding agriculture. The Indian DFTP which was scheme, investment relationships, in­ announced at the first IAFSin April 2008 (IAFS 2008d) and covers all LDCs, 34 of which are in Africa, focuses mainly on enhancing access for African products to the growing Indian market. Given the limited range of such products, this has partly incentivised investments that, as they are aimed at export earnings, will now also look at the possibilities for exporting agricultural goods to India. However, this is not an official policy of the government India. of knowledge of local conditions invested in floriculture seized and the horticulture opportunities and offered by the Cotonouaccess Agreement to European preferential for markets and by AGOA a for significant access growth to the Indianin US. private There investmentHowever, was the upgrading of in floriculture Kenya to a in Kenya. -income middle country and the strip Indian Indian investment abroad came with the liberalisation of the Indian economy in 1991, and mainly after 2000. Interestingly, as Indian companies moved into commercial agriculture, they attracted much criticism from think tanks, non-governmental organisations and the media. Furthermore, while large-scale farms owned by Africa’s tradi­ tional partners in Europe and elsewhere were defended, the new wave of Indian investment drew a sharply negative response. Indian investments in Africa are generally seen by Indian officials as responsible as well as respon­ sive to local laws and enabling legislation (see also Broadman 2007), as they are required to be. Investors have to realise that there are variations in the socioeconomic practices prevailing in India and in different African countries. Even the concept of the transfer of land rights is often very different from one African country to another. In most African countries, land is state-owned and the concept of private ownership of land is evolving. Consequently, in some countries land can be leased, in others purchased in conjunction with local partners, and in yet other countries private–public partnerships can be entered into. Significantly, in some African countries, Indian companies have engaged with local communities to secure land rights but have preferred to opt out where the community does not have clear rights to that land.11 Similarly, many companies are willing to engage in contract farming and have a cellular model whereby there is core investment in leased farms and incentives and technical support to bring the productivity of contract farms into line with the leased farms. In general, Indian companies have been good about meeting their corporate social responsibilities by creating local employment, transferring technology and contributing to domestic and intra-African trade (see also ibid.). It is possible that Indian companies will seek to expand further into commer­ cial agriculture and venture into the production of food crops such as rice, wheat and palm oil and also move away from horticulture and floriculture into commodities that could play a bigger role in the world market. In fact, the increase in the area under food crops and the possible entry by Indian companies into the market for these products are seen not only as expanding opportunity but also as enhancing market access and consequently influencing international pricing.

Conclusion Most Indian companies should view investment in commercial agriculture both as a source of profit and as a contribution to sustainable development. They must also interact appropriately with local communities, even where these communities are not legal land owners, and engage with them so that their cultural rights are not violated and to ensure that economic benefits are shared with local stakeholders. Indian companies should focus on areas where there is underemployment or unemployment and bring in major mechanisation in areas where there is 74 3 | Singh 75 a lack of labour. They must take adequate precautions to undertake able sustain­ development approaches, prevent the degradation of land of common or waters, pollution and ensure that sustainable environmental practices followed are that will also benefit local communities.would like Most to Indian become companies models of change sustainable standards and of to agricultural practice. bring in higher and more 4 | India’s strategy for African agriculture: assessing the technology, knowledge and finance platforms

Renu Modi1

The subject of Indian investment in African agriculture is invariably overshad­ owed by media reports that highlight large-scale investments in commercial farming by a handful of Indian private sector companies. The discourse has become mired in the accounts of alleged ‘land grabs’ and the food insecurity that such investments could trigger. In the process, the actual contribution of Indian investments to African agriculture and related sectors through finance, technology transfers, building knowledge platforms and capacity building through manpower training has largely been sidelined or gone unacknow­ ledged. This chapter sets out the contributions made by private companies and public sector companies of the government of India towards the develop­ ment of agriculture and related sectors in Africa. Through statistical data, the first section briefly highlights the growth of India from a food-aid-dependent to a food-sufficient country. Second, it outlines the contributions of several companies to the development of the agricultural sector in various African countries. Third, it explores the provision of credit by India to African countries to support agricultural and other development. The data used in this chapter are sourced from scholarly works on the subject, brochures of companies and the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of India, interviews with some of these stakeholders at India–Africa conclaves held since 2005 and participation in meetings and conferences on this subject.

India’s economic miracle: from food-deficient to food-sufficient country India has charted an upward course by developing its agricultural sector since gaining independence in 1947. This has enabled India to attain self- sufficiency in food grains and to feed its population, the second largest in the world. After independence, agriculture and irrigation were accorded top priority in the First Five Year Plan (1951–56). Productivity increased and imports of food grains declined. However, soon after, with the unveiling of the US government’s massive food aid programme under the Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act (also known as Public Law 480), the country grew complacent 76 4 | Modi ­ 77 -poor social policy to provide food security to those outside However, the country needs to respond to growing domestic demand 2 Despite this spectacular success in producing more food, there are severe The earlier priority accorded agriculture was dropped as a matter of delib Imports under concessional terms not only relieve us of our immediate foreign exchange commitments but also help us build a rupee fund which can be utilised for developmental purposes. (cited in Bhatia 1970: 135) During During this period, India’s dependence on food aid was used by President and increase productivity, inter alia by augmenting investment in agricultural infrastructure, for example irrigation and water resource management. problems associated with India’s agrarian development and intense debates around issues of concern, including land reforms, use of appropriate techno­ logy, diversion of cultivable land allegedly for farmers’ ‘development suicides, purposes’ that and have remained unresolved. A population significant still part goes hungry. This the of has much sustainable agricultural to policy and do an inclusive growth with strategy buttressed the by absence of a functioning a pro the safety net. Furthermore, the country also needs to tion improve of the food distribu­ grains at subsidised prices to families below the is poverty ironic line. that It a country that needs all it produces to feed its own population Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration to leverage India’s support for US policy in the Vietnam War, with which India episode, did among others, spurred India to not focus on food -sufficiency. Inself fact, agree (Douglass 2006). This a combination of events, mainly famines in eastern India and US arm twisting, led to a rethinking among policy planners and to the realisation that on relying food imports was not a sustainable economic or political the proposition India country. Consequently, adopted the for ‘green revolution’ model to raise crop productivity. High-yield seeds and advanced agricultural technology were adopted to build up stocks of food grains and to achieve national -reliance. self In 2010–11, the country produced about 100 million tonnes food grain production of reached 242 million tonnes, rice enough to and feed the ­ popula total tion. erate choice. Budgetary allocations were diverted to Second heavy and industries Third Five in Year Plans the (1956–66). Until the late 1960s, the met country its food requirements through bilateral trade agreements through the and Public Law food 480 programme. aid Food imports under the programme spiralled from about 3.2 million tons in the first purchase agreement (1956–59) to a total of 17 million tons of food grains (wheat and rice) in the fifth (1960–64) agreement (ibid.: 134–6). Moreover, in 1966 alone, in famine the conditions in the wake states of of Bihar, Orissa and the Rajasthan, to severe avoid mass starvation imports of cereals escalated to ‘10.4 million tons’ (ibid.: 137). about about building national reliance - self in food grains (Bhatia 1970). to the According Food Grains Enquiry Committee Report (1957): 29,442

6,980

3,684 2,787 2,480 1,359

Vegetable oils Pulses Fruits and nuts Sugar Cashew nuts Spices excluding cashew

4.1 Major imports of agricultural commodities in India (crore rupees; 2010–11) Note: 1 crore rupee is equivalent to US$185,710 at the present rate of 54 rupees to US$1 Source: Government of India 2012a: 141 also wastes about 100,000 tons of its grains (admittedly, less than 1 per cent of total production) through a lack of proper ‘management, procurement, storage and transportation’ (Mathew and Narayanan 2012: 38–9). Today, national self-reliance and improved agricultural productivity provide the basis for India’s policy. However, inclement weather – drought and poor rainfall, the El Niño effect and factors such as climate change – along with other issues lead to shortfalls in agricultural commodities, especially oilseeds and pulses. These shortfalls are met through international trade. In addition to oilseeds and pulses, sugar, fruits and nuts, cashew nuts and spices are India’s top agricultural imports (see Figure 4.1). Such imports constitute a small percentage of India’s total imports, as shown in Figure 4.2. According to the Department of Agriculture:

Agricultural imports recorded an overall decrease from Rs. 59528.33 crore in 2009–10 to Rs 56196.20 crore in 2010–11 registering a decline of −5.6 per cent over the corresponding previous period. Decrease in the value of agricultural imports during this period was primarily due to lower imports of pulses, sugar and cotton. The share of agricultural imports in total imports also decreased from 4.37 per cent in 2009–10 to 3.50 per cent in 2010–11. (Government of India 2012a: 140)

Table 4.1 shows that agricultural imports have declined in the past decade as a proportion of all imports, and that average agricultural imports for 2006–11 constitute about 3.5 per cent of total national imports. Table 4.1 shows that in 2010–11 the percentage share of agriculture in India’s 78 4 | Modi ­ exports, 56,196 2010–11 1,605,315 59,528 2009–10 1,363,736 79 37,183 2008–09 1,374,436 29,906 2007–08 India’s total imports rupees; imports 2007–11) and agricultural (crore India’s Total agricultural imports Total agricultural Total national imports Total national

1,012,312 4.2 The above statistics on India’s state of agriculture and imports affirmthe Table Table 4.2 demonstrates that Africa’s contribution to India’s agricultural : Compiled from Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics and Statistics Intelligence Commercial of General Directorate from : Compiled Source India 2012b of in Government (DGCIS) data cited following: following: first, India is-sufficient self in food grains to meet domestic­ require ments; second, shortfalls in certain products such as oilseeds, pulses, cotton, sugar and spices are met through international trade; third, Africa’s share of India’s agricultural imports is insignificant and over imports of agricultural commodities are from the global market. This evidence 95 per cent India’s of dispels the ongoing discourse that India’s engagement in agriculture on continent the (including in land) is being undertaken to meet the country’s food requirements at home. tions. Besides, the major import items (cashew nuts, along with some spices such as black pepper) are not for imports home Africafrom West and certain spices are consumption. for ‘processing and re- Instead, raw cashew as domestic production is not adequate to meet capacity installed the in demand the country’ of (FICCI processing n.d.). imports is insignificant. The important import items by quantitynuts, arepulses, cashew spices, tea, fruits and nuts cashew) (excluding and cereal prepara total imports was 3.5 per cent. During this share totalperiod, Africa’s of India’s imports was 3.6 per cent (Reserve Bank of India 2012: 1122). When we consider that most of this is made up of oil, petrochemicals and raw materials – crude petroleum (68.5 per cent), gold (11.2 per cent), coal, per coke cent), inorganic chemicals and (3.7 per briquettes cent) and (3.8 metalliferous ores and metal scrap (3.1 per cent) (CII-EXIM Bank 2012: 64) – it agricultural is evident imports that from the Africa share is, of in fact, minuscule. Table 4.1 India’s imports and exports of agricultural commodities compared with total national imports/exports (crore rupees; 1990–2011)

Year Agricultural Total national Agricultural imports Agricultural Total national Agricultural exports imports imports as % of total national exports exports as % of total national imports exports

1990–91 1,205.86 43,170.82 2.79 6,012.76 32,527.28 18.49 1991–92 1,478.27 47,850.84 3.09 7,838.04 44,041.81 17.80 1992–93 2,876.25 63,374.52 4.54 9,040.30 53,688.26 16.84 1993–94 2,327.33 73,101.01 3.18 12,586.55 69,748.85 18.05 1994–95 5,937.21 89,970.70 6.60 13,222.76 82,673.40 15.99 1995–96 5,890.10 122,678.14 4.80 20,397.74 106,353.35 19.18 1996–97 6,612.60 138,919.88 4.76 24,161.29 118,817.32 20.33 1997–98 8,784.19 154,176.29 5.70 24,832.45 130,100.64 19.09 1998–99 14,566.48 178,331.69 8.17 25,510.64 139,751.77 18.25 1999–00 16,066.73 215,528.53 7.45 25,313.66 159,095.20 15.91 2000–01 12,086.23 228,306.64 5.29 28,657.37 201,356.45 14.23 2001–02 16,256.61 245,199.72 6.63 29,728.61 209,017.97 14.22 2002–03 17,608.83 297,205.87 5.92 34,653.94 255,137.28 13.58 2003–04 21,972.68 359,107.66 6.12 37,266.52 293,366.75 12.70 2004–05 22,811.84 501,064.54 4.55 41,602.65 375,339.53 11.08 2005–06 21,499.22 660,408.90 3.26 49,216.96 456,417.86 10.78 2006–07 29,637.86 840,506.31 3.53 62,411.42 571,779.28 10.92 2007–08 29,906.24 1,012,311.70 2.95 79,039.72 655,863.52 12.05 2008–09 37,183.03 1,374,435.55 2.71 85,951.67 840,755.06 10.22 2009–10 59,528.34 1,363,735.55 4.37 89,341.33 845,533.64 10.57 2010–11 (provisional) 56,196.20 1,605,314.63 3.50 120,185.48 1,148,169.56 10.47

Source: DGCIS data cited in Government of India 2012b Table 4.2 Africa’s share of India’s top food imports (US$ million; 2007–11)

March 2007 to March 2008 March 2008 to March 2009 March 2009 to March 2010 March 2010 to March 2011 Imports Total Imports Total Imports Total Imports Total Commodity from Africa imports from Africa imports from Africa imports from Africa imports

Cashew nuts 385.941 425.902 525.311 581.102 579.071 642.402 – 544.302 Cereal preparations 1.68 40.17 0.00 37.06 0.06 39.70 0.03 49.58 Fruits and nuts 2.10 461.76 2.74 516.74 3.52 606.02 8.31 808.48 Pulses 74.54 1,334.58 67.27 1,360.28 203.95 2,069.90 253.29 1,531.70 Spices 21.57 241.53 18.50 234.34 26.41 302.11 28.29 298.17 Sugar 0.02 1.46 0.00 126.99 11.82 1,258.34 3.40 611.65 Tea 7.06 32.54 10.15 42.90 11.93 58.33 13.74 41.02 Vegetable oils (edible) 0.00 2,558.75 0.00 3,448.92 0.00 5,586.02 2.91 6,460.85

Notes: 1. DGCIS cited in Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) conclave brochure 2012 2. DGCIS cited in Reserve Bank of India 2012 Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy data accessed through EXIM Bank Indian investments in the agricultural sector of Africa Against this background, we turn to Indian engagement in Africa’s agri­ cultural sector, which takes place on many levels and involves both private companies and Indian government entities. The latter includes engagement in the agricultural sector through the government of India’s: i) public sector enterprises; ii) grant assistance; iii) knowledge transfer and capacity building through training, scholarships to African students and practitioners under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation programme; and iv) lines of credit (LOCs) through the EXIM Bank of India (see Chapter 3). India’s engage­ ment on the continent is demand-driven and unconditional. It is based on the development priorities of the recipient countries and on the principle of mutual benefit. Public sector development assistance has other spin-offs as well, namely the ‘promotion of Indian exports … access to natural resources … and bolstering goodwill vis-à-vis India in the recipient country’ (Roche 2012).

Indian private and public sector engagement in African agriculture This section highlights the transfer of advanced agricultural technology, particularly for farming mechanisation and in irrigation. Food production in Africa is almost entirely rain-fed and high agricultural productivity is impeded by insufficient rainfall and frequent droughts.

Irrigated area as a share of total cultivated area is estimated at only 6 percent for Africa, compared with 37 percent for Asia and 14 percent for Latin America (FAOSTAT, 2009) … Moreover, more than two-thirds of existing irrigated area is concentrated in five countries – Egypt, Madagascar, Morocco, South Africa, and Sudan – which each have more than 1 million hectares of irrigated area. For the remaining countries, the irrigated area varies from a few thousand hectares to almost half a million hectares each for Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia ... [Further], the 2005 Commission for Africa Report (2005), for example, called for a doubling of the area of irrigated arable land by 2015. Faures and Santini (2008) report that 58 percent of the rural population in Sub-Saharan Africa could bene­fit from some type of investment in water. Finally, irrigation development is a key investment priority for NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Develop­ ment). (You et al. 2010: 1)

It is against this backdrop that several Indian companies are engaged in agribusiness and in supplying modern farm technology. Case studies of ­select private sector companies such as Kirloskar Brothers Limited (KBL), Jain ­Irrigation Systems, Tata Group, Mahindra and Mahindra (M&M), Sonalika International and others show the positive contribution by Indian companies to increasing agricultural productivity on the continent. The above companies provide modern agri-equipment and transfer technology through, inter alia, the sale of their irrigation pumps or solutions, tractors and harvesters. Long-term 82 4 | Modi ­ A (af­ industrial -industrial units 83 (100,000) Kirloskar pumps have been installed along the River Nile, In addition, the company trained farmers and technical staffin various gov­ The story of technical assistance and capacity building has been repeated In the pages that follow, the contributions of Indian private companies to KBL is a global company that offers innovative hydraulic machines and lakh ernment departments and provided customer education on the maintenance of the pumps installed in the country. Thus, over the past three decades over a in Senegal, where the company commenced operations of that in year, 2005. the In company showcased March its expertise by displaying - triple cal equipment for nine pumping stations in Lower Egypt. Other government departments, such as the ministry of public work’s mechanical and electrical department followed suit and KBL requested technology for pumping stations. Through projects financed by the Islamic Development Bank and other sources, these ministries acquired KBL pumps for the and Upper agricultural Egypt. KBL sector machinery was in also imported Lower for agro adding value to sugar cane, processing paper and other activities. in addition to 40 pumping stations. Through techniques, the company advanced has contributed water to the greening management of 200,000 hectares of desert land for agriculture (Kirloskar Brothers Limited 2012). fordable, adaptable and appropriate) irrigation systems at the first Bank CII-EXIM conclave in New Delhi to African a states. select Senegal, which group had of been ministers grappling from with high import food over bills, insecurity has 25 succeeded and in reducing rice imports in ner. a Through phased a man­ detailed field study, the increase government the area of Senegal under planned irrigation to to achieve US$350 food million sufficiency, per save annum around in foreign exchange and produce an exportable African agriculture are explored through a case study of two of them, namely Kirloskar Brothers Limited (KBL) and Jain Irrigation Systems; a public sector undertaking, the Water and Power Consultancy Servicesnumber of other private (WAPCOS); companies. and These examples are a merely illustrative of the private and government sector engagements in the agricultural sector Africa, in and do not provide an exhaustive view of the ment scale in of African Indian agriculture. ­ engage systems. The company has had a notable role in enhancing Africa. KBL made food its firstforays into Egypt securityin thelate 1940s to provide pumping in solutions to the Egyptian government’s General Authority for Projects Rehabilitation and Agricultural Development. The company began with the supply of 3,000 pumping units for sprinkler irrigation as well as electromechani Case studies ofCase studies Indianenterprises engagement engagement with these companies has the potential to dramatically augment agricultural output in the African recipient countries. surplus ­thereafter ­(Kirloskar Brothers Limited 2011). Initially, the KBL team visited the rice ­cultivation farms in the north Société d’Aménagement des Eaux du Delta, in the south (­Casamance), and along the border with Mauritania in the north and Mali in the east to collect field data. Topics examined included average rainfall, crop patterns, landholdings, actual and potential irrigated areas and irrigation systems and annual costs of rice imports. Subsequently, the company drew up a phased implementation programme involving pump sets and allied equipment of various types, sizes and quantities sufficient to usher in a green revolution. The Senegalese ministry of agriculture signed a contract to install 2,394 pump sets and various accessories, including pipes, trolleys, hoses, pontoons and valves. Machinery with a total value of US$27 million was procured to irrigate 65,000 hectares of farmland across the northern provinces of Dagana, Podor, Matam and Bakel and to rehabilitate the Grandik pumping station in Saint-Louis, which had been defunct for several years. The project was financed in early 2006 with a soft government of India loan to the government of Senegal through the EXIM Bank. By October 2006, the KBL team had distributed and installed the pumping systems to farmers in various provinces, and trained them in their operation and maintenance. The whole process took over three months, after which the stage was set for the first ever dry season sowing of rice. Two years later, in July 2008, Le Soleil, the Senegalese newspaper, reported that Senegal had harvested over 60,000 tonnes of paddy in the first ever dry season harvest, thanks in part to KBL’s appropriate irrigation systems. By 2011, this figure had risen tenfold to over 760,000 tonnes of rice, as shown in Table 4.3 (Kirloskar Brothers Limited 2008; 2011).

Table 4.3 Impact of KBL on the output of rice in Senegal (2011)

Parameter Before the project After the project

Rice production Less than 100,000 tonnes Over 760,000 tonnes Local rice production Meets 19% of demand Meets over 65% of demand Land under irrigation 24,500 hectares Over 80,000 hectares

Source: KBL corporate brochure 2011

In Phase II of the Food Sufficiency programme in Senegal, over 100,000 ­hectares of farmland will be irrigated and the country should be able to ­generate an export surplus of rice by 2013 (ibid.). Jain Irrigation Systems is another company with a presence in several Afri­ can countries. It supplies customised and affordable agricultural equipment, including small tractors, drilling and micro-irrigation equipment for smallhold­ ings. The company works to conserve water and increase productivity through 84 4 | Modi industrial -industrial irrigation -irrigation systems (Jain ­ Irriga end solutions from production to - efficient tractors withJapanese partner 85 quality products and efficient mechanisation solutions, ITL manufactures - fuel 3 grid locations where the cost of laying on grid power is prohib­ of-the-art water resource management, irrigation technology and agri­ As an illustration, in Sierra Leone Sonalika equipment has been used for In addition, a public sector undertaking, WAPCOS, part of India’s ministry State- tech -tech high agriculture and provides end-to rice cultivation. Two years after theintroduction of the machines, the country reported increased productivity. More recently, the Cameroon judged Sonalika tractors as being the most suitable agricultural government for Cameroon’s conditions. The company has shipped 1,000 tractors plus 4,225 implements to Cameroon, one of the largest orders of tractors and agricultural implements to date, for the cultivation and harvesting of maize and rice. This was made Yanmar Yanmar and hence exports advanced technology products to Africa. itive. itive. By offering high- processing. processing. Lately, the company has moved into alternative introduced energy solar and pumping has and irrigation systems to in provide remote off- water supplies the company has the potential to transform rural productivity, living incomes standards. and The core component of the Jain business model is and training capacity building. Jain’s corporate motto, ‘More crop per drop’, has been implemented through drip or sprinkler micro of water resources, provides consultancy services in water resources, power and infrastructure development and irrigation in Africa. Key agricultural projects in Africa have recently been undertaken in Ghana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Senegal, Sudan and has In Uganda. provided Ethiopia, WAPCOS consultancy services for the development of an irrigation network for 100,000 hectares of land Gambella in region (Phase the I). In Senegal, the company has provided consultancy services and construction supervision for the lifting of water from the Senegal River valley to irrigate areas in Dagana, Podor, Matam and Bakel in northern Senegal (Times of Africa 2011). Furthermore, in Ghana WAPCOS has experts provided for irrigation development, while in Lesotho, Uganda and Zambia the company has completed feasibility studies on water resource development. cultural mechanisation are critical inputs in any strategy for agro tion Systems Ltd 2011). development in the In world. Africa, farm is mechanisation at an abysmally low level. For example, the use of tractors on the continent (excluding Egypt Mauritius) is and only 28 per 1,000 hectares compared with an average for Bangla­ desh, Brazil, China, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, South and Vietnam Korea, of Thailand 241 (Ernst & Young 2011: 11). Given diseases such the as those prevalence borne by of tsetse animal in several African countries, machines, agricultural reinvigorating for traction animal to preferable are affordable, where productivity. The Indian Sonalika Group’s International Tractors Limited (ITL) sow‘harvesting,­ for required machinery farm of countries African 32 in sales has ing and tillage’. possible by an LOC for US$37.65 million to the government of Cameroon (Times of Africa 2012; Sonalika International Tractors Ltd 2012).4 Farm equipment and tractors are also supplied by M&M and Tata Africa. M&M have introduced their fuel-efficient multipurpose machines and transformed the way in which African farmers use tractors. Using a single machine they can cultivate, plough, harrow, haul and do many other things at a low run­ ning cost. Their major market is West Africa, specifically Nigeria, Mali, Chad, Gambia and Ghana. Egypt is also a major buyer of Mahindra tractors, which are predominantly used in the Nile Valley, Aswan, Asyut, Al-Menia and Delta regions for cultivating, ploughing, haulage and harrowing on cotton, rice, wheat, sugar cane, citrus and various cereal farms (EXIM Bank 2010).5 The company has set up a tractor assembly plant (Mali Tracteurs S.A.) in Mali that is financed through a concessionary loan under an EXIM Bank LOC of US$27 million to the government of Mali. This loan is to be used for rural electrification as well as setting up the tractor assembly plant. Fuel-efficient tractors have lowered the cost of production and represent a transfer of modern technology to user countries in North and Southern Africa, including Angola, Sudan and Morocco.6 The very first Indian company active on the continent was the Tata Group, which set up Tata Zambia way back in 1977.

The agricultural division, Makumbi Agricultural and Technical Services Company Ltd (MATCO), set up in 1982, distributed Swaraj tractors from India, and other agricultural and irrigation equipment. Tata Farms and Foods was established in 1989 and grew field crops such as maize and wheat, vegetables and roses on a 500-hectare plot at Ngwerere, near Lusaka. (Agrawal 2005)

Today the farm is leased out, but Tata has a strong presence in the com­ mercial vehicle sector – such as trucks for transporting agri-produce – as well as in chemicals, hospitality, iron and steel, ICT and other areas. Cotton in West Africa is yet another sector to which Indian private and state enterprises are contributing, potentially catalysing output and export earnings. There­ fore, through the sale of India’s agri-products and services, African countries have gained access to farm technology and services that they do not have the ­capacity to produce at home.

Transfer of technology and capacity building in cotton At the second India– Africa Forum Summit (IAFS II) held in Addis Ababa in May 2011, the Indian government announced a technical assistance programme for cotton, to be implemented by the department of commerce and funded by the external affairs ministry. This was based on a request from Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria and Uganda at the World Trade Organization and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development meeting in 2008. The programme was officially launched in March 2012. Its main objectives 86 4 | Modi

­ 9 Africa 8 enabled networks for -

7 87 cials cials and industry representatives; IT African countries have sought assistance in cotton production development development interventions and technology transfers to enhance 10 Cotton, the white is gold, one of the most important fibrecrops despite and, The Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services Ltd (IL&FS) Cluster Develop Private enterprise has also been assisting with capacity building in this and some 20 million farmers in over 30 African for countries their depend livelihoods. In on Central cotton and West Africa, cotton and related activities involve about 6 million people and account for a large share of rural employ ­ ment and poverty reduction (IL&FS 2012). agricultural export The and constitutes a major share of export earnings in fibreBurkina is the most important Faso (51 per cent), Benin (38 per cent), cent) Chad (ibid.). (36 per cent) and Mali (25 per accounts for 10 to 15 per cent of global cotton production (Lucky Group 2011), serious competition from synthetic fibres, is preferred to them on account of people’s increasing health consciousness. India is the second largest producer (after China) of cottonin the world, aswell as animporter of the fibre. are capacity- upstream upstream and downstream capabilities in cotton and assist design governments programmes to aimed at improving the competitiveness over a of three-year period, this 2011–14 sector (IL&FS 2012). because productivity continues to be hampered by outdated techniques, low smallholder output, insufficient organic fertiliser, low-yielding plant varieties, insect infestations, unavailability of hybrid cotton and use of restrictions Bt on (Bacillus the thuringiensis ) cotton. Ginning facilities resulting are in poor also recovery outdated, and fibre damage, with theresult of thatcotton 94is being cent per exported in raw form, with only 6 per cent being converted into products (IL&FS 2012; Lucky Group 2011). ment Initiative has been engaged as the project management agency implementation, for overall the coordination and monitoring of the technical assis­ tance programme, while other institutions with competency in the value chain are also involved: the Central Institute for Cotton Research, Central Institute for Research on Cotton Technology and the ate Indian of government’s Cotton Director­ Development. At the conclusion project of outputs the in programme, capacity intended building are: the training technical of and over extension 600 officials; scientists, capacity building government for offi­ over 2,500 farmers, sector in Sudan, where cotton is produced by smallholders and accounts only for 10 to 15 per cent of collaboration with the Agricultural Research Corporation the of the Sudan govern­ area under cultivation. The Lucky ment, has undertaken Group, projects to improve in cotton yield. sixSpecifically, hybrid varieties as well as Bt cotton were introduced from India for trial at the Rahad research station in Sudan (Lucky Group 2011). crop improvement; infrastructure and skilled manpower development for the textile industry; and the design of a policy framework for host governments. Export-Import Bank of India in Africa Many countries on the continent have received LOCs from the EXIM Bank to support the setting up of various projects by private and public sector Indian companies (EXIM Bank 2011). The government of India has undertaken a number of initiatives to identify potential areas of bilateral trade and in­ vestment, as well as focusing on the role of banking institutions in funding India–Africa projects, including in agriculture and related sectors. Among the initiatives are the Focus Africa Programme (2002–03), the annual India–Africa partnership conclaves (since 2005) and the IAFSs (New Delhi in 2008 and Addis Ababa in 2011). By mid-August 2012, EXIM Bank had approved a total of 157 LOCs, of which 111 have been channelled directly through African sovereign governments or via African regional institutions such as the PTA Bank (Eastern and Southern African Trade Development Bank) and the African Development Bank.11 Africa accounts for over 50 per cent of EXIM Bank’s LOCs (see Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3).12

Table 4.4 Distribution of the Indian government’s LOCs among world regions (30 August 2012)

Region Number of LOCs Value of LOCs % of total allotted allotted (US$ million) value

Africa 111 4,270.925 54 Asia 27 3,288.738 42 Other 19 344.590 4 Total 157 7,904.253 100

Source: EXIM Bank 2012; www.eximbankindia.com/loc.asp

Of these, a substantial number are used to support the agricultural and related sectors. Table 4.5 below provides further details of the LOCs extended between January 2010 and June 2012. Several of the allocations have been for the development of overall enabling infrastructure, for example hydroelectric pro­ jects, generation of solar energy, rural electrification and water development. Others have been more immediately focused on agriculture and related sectors, including support for the cultivation of rice, wheat and maize; production of compost; purchase of tractors, harvesters and irrigation pumps (for details, see Chapter 3); value addition to agri-products such as cotton ginning and spinning, and fish processing; and rehabilitating the sugar industry. Financing has also been provided for capacity building through vocational training of women, youth empowerment and building medical infrastructure. External funding from India and other emerging economies has broadened 88 4 | Modi cost and Distribution of the Indian government’s the Indian government’s of Distribution

89 4.3 LOCs among world regions among world LOCs 2012; www. EXIM Bank from : Compiled Source eximbankindia.com/loc.asp -based development will play a decisive role in poverty Africa (54) of-the-art irrigation, plant and seed technology, low- Other (4) Other Asia (42) The evidence in this chapter demonstrates that India is a -sufficient food The analysis in this chapter indicates that India’s engagement with the It is clear that the countries that enjoy food security are those that have country and that about 96 per mainly cent pulses of and vegetable shortfalls oils, in are certain acquired on commodities, through the global international market. trade Despite the serious challenges cultural that sector, mar the India’s agri­ Indian case study this also segment. Most highlights notably, the case the of India underscores achievements the importance in of achieving national food -sufficiency self so that fooddonor aid countries cannot as a be used by bargaining chip to policy solicit objectives. African support for foreign agricultural sector of Africa, through direct aid tor and Indian private investment, has and helped lay public a sec­ durable foundation for transforming African agriculture. The transfers of technology, finance and contributing knowledge to are enhanced human resources and of capacitystateTransfers - on the continent. reduction reduction and inclusive growth for years to come. accorded a central place in their national policies and to have designed the strategies to agricultural achieve this sector challenging goal. The experience of the BRICS countries shows that ‘one percentage at least growth two in to agriculture three times is more effective in reducing povertygrowth than emanating from non-agriculture same the sectors’ (Government of India 2012a: 1). Given that the agricultural sector in the Africa population, agro employs over 65 per cent of Conclusion the financial resources available countries to in Africa,with development challenges, which budgetary grappling are deficits and curtailed funding from traditional partners, especially after the 2008 global crisis. Table 4.5 EXIM Bank LOCs extended to African countries and regions (January 2010 to June 2012)

Country/region Details

Angola Two LOCs, for US$30m and US$15m for setting up an industrial park and textile project (cotton ginning and spinning) (July–September 2010) Burundi LOC of US$80m for the Kabu Hydro Electric Project (January–June 2011) Central African Rep. Two LOCs of US$20m and US$39.69m for development of a mining project and two hydroelectric projects respectively (January–March 2012) Chad LOC of US$40.32m for four projects: i) compost production unit; ii) rural electrification project (solar energy); iii) production unit for livestock feed; and iv) extension of spinning mill (addition of weaving and processing capacities) (January–March 2012) Côte d’Ivoire LOC of US$30m for rice production programme (January–March 2010) Democratic Rep. of LOC of US$42m for the Kakobola Hydroelectric Power Project (July–September 2010) Congo LOC of US$168m for financing the Ketende Hydroelectric Project (July–September 2011) Republic of Congo LOC of US$70m for a rural electrification project (October–December 2011) Djibouti LOC of US$14m as an additional amount for completing a cement plant (January–June 2011) Ethiopia LOC of US$213.31m, the third tranche of the total credit commitment of US$640m, for financing sugar industry rehabilitation (October–December 2010) LOC of US$91m, the fourth tranche for financing sugar industry rehabilitation (January–June 2011) LOC of US$47m, the fifth tranche for financing sugar industry rehabilitation (April–June 2012) Ghana LOC of US$21.7m for financing exports of equipment for improved fish harvesting, fish processing and waste management and a management support project (April–June 2010) Kenya LOC of US$61.6m for power transmission lines (October–December 2010) Lesotho LOC of US$4.7m for setting up a vocational training centre for youth and women (January–March 2010) Malawi LOC of US$50m for financing: i) cotton processing facilities; ii) a green belt initiative; and iii) the One Village One Product Project (January–June 2011) Mauritania (Islamic LOC of US$21.8m for financing a potable water project and an agriculture development project (January–March 2010) Rep. of Mauritania) Mauritius LOC of US$48.50m for financing an offshore patrol vessel to be built by Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, Kolkata (January–June 2011) Mozambique LOC of US$25m for financing rural electrification projects in the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Manica and Niassa (July– September 2010) LOC of US$20m for enhancing rice, wheat and maize cultivation (January–June 2011) LOC of US$13m for financing a solar photovoltaic module manufacturing plant (July–September 2011) Nigeria LOC of US$20m to the Nigerian Export-Import Bank for financing the export of goods and services from India (October– December 2011) Rwanda LOC of US$60m, the second and final tranche (of US$80m) for construction of the Nyabarongo Hydro Power Project by Bharat Heavy Electricals (January–March 2010) Senegal LOC of US$5m for financing the supply of medical equipment, furniture and other accessories to four hospitals (January–March 2010) Sierra Leone LOC of US$30m for the rehabilitation of facilities and addition of new infrastructure to supply potable water to six districts (January–March 2010) Swaziland LOC of US$20m for setting up an information technology park (January–June 2011) Tanzania LOC of US$36.56m for the purchase of 723 vehicles from India (January–June 2011) Togo LOC of US$15m for rural electrification (October–December 2011) Zambia LOC of US$50m for part-financing the 120 MW Itezhi-Tezhi Hydropower Project (January–March 2010) LOC of US$50m for prefabricated health posts in Zambia (January–March 2012) ECOWAS1 LOC of US$100m to the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) for financing the importation of various types of equipment, goods and services from India to the 15 member countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo) (October–December 2010) LOC of US$150m to EBID, for the same purpose (July–September 2011)2

Notes: 1. ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States 2. India’s major export items to the ECOWAS region include ‘pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals, machinery and instruments, transport equipment, electronic goods, cotton yarn fabrics, and primary and semi-finished iron and steel’ (Investment & Technology Promotion Division n.d. [www.indiainbusiness.nic.in/trade/loc1.htm]) Source: EXIM Bank; EXIMUS Newsletters (January 2010–June 2012) at www.eximbankindia.com/newsletter.asp fuel-efficient tractors, water management skills and knowledge are helping African countries increase their agricultural productivity. The private and public sector engagements on the continent have been financed by the concessionary LOCs extended to several countries in Africa. This has facilitated the purchase of agri-equipment and other services vital to building agriculture and agro-based industrial sectors. The deepening rela­ tions between India and Africa and the growing engagement between the two partners have the potential to further drive, and to transform, Africa’s agricultural growth.

92 5 | Up for grabs: the case of large Indian investments in Ethiopian agriculture1

Dessalegn Rahmato

Introduction The Ethiopian government has leased out huge tracts of land to investors in recent years. For this, it has attracted criticism from the world media and international activist organisations, which have drawn attention to the ­bonanza reaped by foreign capital and raised doubts about the merits of the programme and the benefits to the country. It must have been difficult for many inthe international community to reconcile the image of the country (‘Ethiopia means famine’) with the colossal give-away of lands, of which the main bene­ ficiaries are foreign investors (GRAIN 2012; Oxfam International 2011; Oakland Institute 2011b). Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in Africa, beset by persistent food shortages and frequent famines and dependent on food aid from the international community. As recently as 2002–03, a severe food crisis threatened the lives of nearly 13 million people, and at present some 8 million peasants are supported by a safety net programme financed by Western donor agencies (Rahmato 2010). The government, however, claims that the leased lands are unused public lands and that their transfer to in­vestors does not threaten the livelihoods of rural people. However, in many cases the evidence on the ground does not bear this out. The lands in question include arable land, pasture and rangeland, woodland and forest, wetlands, water sources and wildlife habitats, most of which are vital to people’s livelihoods, and their transfer has been contested in various ways by the peasants, pastoralists and minority groups that have been affected directly. What is taking place in Ethiopia must be seen as part of the response by countries and international capital to the global commodity crisis of 2007–08, during which there were severe shortages in the world food market accom­ panied by a dramatic rise in grain prices. This was a crisis that threatened many countries in the Middle East and Asia not ordinarily subject to food insecurity. The response was an unprecedented global land rush, in which private and sovereign investors from these and other countries went out to acquire land in so-called ‘land-rich’ countries in Africa and elsewhere for the purpose of growing food and biofuel crops for export. While some of the investors were driven by the profit to be gained, it is quite clear that there was a strong food 93 security element for many, who saw such investments as an opportunity to ensure access to food for their home countries. By the end of 2009, more than a dozen countries in Africa, including Ethiopia, had parcelled out millions of hectares of farm land to foreign capital on highly concessionary terms (see Cotula et al. 2009; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; World Bank 2011a). In this chapter, I look at the extent of foreign capital penetration in the country’s agricultural sector, the conditions under which this has taken place and the impact on the livelihoods of smallholders. The land investment pro­ gramme is still under way and it will be some time before a clear picture emerges and we can gauge the full consequences. Therefore, this study should be taken only as indicative. It is based on information gathered from fieldwork in the Gambella and Oromia regions and on interviews with peasants, minority groups and public officials in communities there that have been affected by investor projects. I have also had interviews with public officials at federal and regional levels,2 had access to primary documents and data from relevant public agencies, and made use of material from web sources as well as reports in the international and local media.

Policy shift: from peasant farms to large-scale agriculture Until recently, the government in power was strongly committed to small­ holder agriculture, which it tried to support through a variety of programmes, many of them financed by donor countries and international organisations. This commitment was spelled out in a policy framework issued in the mid-1990s and subsequently elaborated in which it was established that the country would fol­ low a rural-centred and agriculturally based development strategy (Assefa 2008). Under this framework, peasant agriculture was to provide the country with food self-sufficiency and also serve as the engine of growth for the whole economy. The state was to enhance this effort by providing new technology packages and improved farming practices, which were to be disseminated through an exten­ sion system and a network of development agents established at kebelle level throughout the rural areas. Peasant agriculture was to provide any agricultural surplus not just for the food needs of the country but also for the needs of industry, as well as for the demands of the export market, which was almost entirely dependent on agricultural products. This essentially neoliberal policy did not envisage structural changes to the rural economy or reforms to the land system then in place. Rather, the success of the strategy was to be dependent on the uptake of new technologies by peasants and the increased effort of farming households. Thus, immense expectations were placed on the shoulders of smallholders, most of whom were burdened with deep poverty, persistent food insecurity and tiny and uneconomic landholdings (Rahmato 2009). No incentive was provided to them as part of the new strategy and any form of price subsidy for new technology inputs or other financial support mechanisms 94 5 | Rahmato concentration of landed property, with 95 thirds -thirds of family farms are too small to produce , personal engagement in farming, ‘proper’ management kebelle -based farming system, anyone who works half a hectare is considered 3 Some understanding of the landholding system and the structure of hold­ The shiftin policyin favour oflarge-scale agriculture and foreign investment of the land and other restrictive conditions that we need not discuss here. The government has the right to remove holders from the land the if land it is decides that needed for ‘public purposes’ or if be it more valuable considers if utilised that by investors, the cooperative societies land or will other public or private entities. Most peasant holdings are small and, according available estimates, nearly to two many food to sustain the family for a whole year (ibid.). The average holding in the country as a whole is less than 1 hectare, although in more densely populated areas and in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region (SNNPR) enset ings ings is needed to get a clearer picture are of discussing. the Through shift various in federal agricultural and policy regional we legal government has instruments, established a land the system in which holders have only limited rights, which are conditional and subject to abrogation at any time. Landhold­ ers do not enjoy robust security land of certification programme. Land tenure, – both urban and despite rural – is the state property recently concluded and private ownership is not permitted. Land users (cultivators and pastoral­ ists) have only use rights over the land in their care, mortgage which or they exchange cannot in sell, any way. The use right of residence in holders a is dependent on was considered anathema. This approach was thanks to the ideology peddled by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, which the had government endorsed wholeheartedly by the beginning of the period under discussion. occurred in fits and starts from institutional the grounding in the early 2000s. It became subsequently an important end of the 1990s, wasbut given finally agenda for change in 2007–08. The firstindication of thisimpending shift may be found in a document published in 2001 rural by development policy the and strategies government are set in out. which While emphasis its was still placed on the critical role of small-scale farmers, the an document important established role for -scale large farming enterprises The and document speaks foreign of investors. an inevitable ‘role change’ from peasant cultivation to capitalist farming, from small entrepreneur to large foreign main investor. arguments The for the anticipated change are expressed thus: fortunate. Moreover, until the end of the 1990s -scale large there farms, was only too a few handful to of be statistically of significant. holding Therefore, structure, there in terms was a de- emphasis given to family farms and This the -labouring household. holding self structure was largely the result of the regime, radical which the present government land had maintained. As we reform shall see below, of the preceding this is now beginning to change. [T]here is a direct correlation between agricultural growth and the role of pri­ vate investment in the sector. This in turn means that assuming the objective of accelerated agricultural development is achieved; it is likely that there will be a role change. The key actor in the sector’s development will be relatively large-scale private investors and not the semi subsistence small farmers … There are two investment areas that seem to be particularly suited for foreign investment in the agricultural sector. The first is to develop here-to-for [sic] unutilized vast land with high irrigation possibility … The second invest­ ment opportunity is to produce high-value agricultural products (e.g. flowers, vegetables) where the scale of operation could be small or medium … The country’s demand for participation in both areas is immense, and assurances are given that government institutions at all levels will do their level best to facilitate and assist foreign investors. While … underlying [sic] the importance of encouraging domestic private investment through well-conceived incentives, the focus of attention should be on attracting foreign investors. Historically, efforts made to attract foreign in­ vestment are almost exclusively directed towards non-agricultural sectors. This needs to change if Ethiopia is to achieve its agricultural objectives. (MOFED 2003)4

Other public documents also allude to the emerging ‘role change’ in various ways. The government’s last poverty reduction document, Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), the drafting of which began in 2004, states that one of the eight pillars of the government’s development strategy is ‘a massive push’ for accelerated growth, which is grounded on two policy thrusts: the commercialisation of agriculture and accelerated private sector development (MOFED 2006). The assumptions behind this policy shift are several: i) the country has reached a stage where it should invite foreign capital to invest in the agricul­ tural sector; ii) there are ‘vast unutilised’ lands with ‘high irrigation potential’ in the country; iii) attracting foreign capital (as opposed to domestic) should be the focus of government efforts; and iv) foreign investors should be allowed to engage both in larger-scale and smaller but high-value and technology-based farm enterprises. Domestic investors will be given a role but they are seen as less effective partners because they have neither the capital nor the technology to meet the government’s expectations.

The turn to foreign capital The turn to large-scale agriculture was accompanied by several policy initiatives to attract foreign capital and to enable it to play a major role in agriculture. Of these, the most significant was the investment proclamation of 2002 (amended in 2003), which was subsequently augmented by regulations for

96 5 | Rahmato ­ ­ -industry such as cotton and 97 Foreign investment is expected to: i) enable the country to 5 export their products: the greater the planned exports, the greater Subsequent Subsequent regulations issued by the Council of Ministers (Federal Demo What are the expectations of the government and how exactly is foreign As we shall see, so far there is no evidence that many of the objectives investor investor incentives largely designed to encourage the flow ofinvestment into the country. The investment legislation is very generous to foreign investors. The capital for requirements foreign businesses wishing to invest in the country range from zero (for those that export 75 per cent or more of their US$25,000 output) (if to they are a joint venture with domestic investors) to US$100,000. Foreign investors have the right to fully the profits repatriate and dividends, in principal and convertible interest payments currency on external loans, and proceeds from technology transfers, as well of as liquidation asset of the sales investment and in proceeds the from the event transfer of ownership shares to or a domestic investor. Expatriates employed in an enterprise may remit salaries and other payments accruing from their employment in foreign currency. Investors, foreign or domestic, are guaranteed against expropriation or nationalisation except as required by the happen, public full compensation interest. will If be this paid should at foreign the investors prevailing may market repatriate value this and in hard Republic of currency Ethiopia 2002; (Federal 2003a). Democratic capital to benefit the country and contribute agricultural to development?clear and A succinct statement defining the government’s objectives is difficult to come by, but the following benefitsdocuments are as frequently well alluded as to in in speeches public made MOARD 2009e). by senior officials (MOFED 2003; cratic Republic of Ethiopia 2003b; 2008) provide attractive financial incentives. Any investment project, foreign or domestic, engaged in agriculture and other sectors that exports more than 50 per cent of its output is eligible for income tax exemption for five years or more, while projectsare entitled exportingto only two years’ exemption. Investors less are also allowed to this than import, free of customs duty, all capital goods, construction materials and spare parts for the establishment or upgrading of their enterprise. In brief (and this is an important point for our discussion) strong encouragement is given to tors ­ inves who the benefits. The shift towards large-scale agriculture priority is of thus exports driven and by foreign the earnings and food ignores security. the need for domestic vide the opportunity for technology transfers; and v) promote energy security. sugar sugar cane; ii) create employment opportunities in the localities iii) benefit concerned; local communities through the construction ofinfrastructure and social assets such as health posts, schools and access to clean water; iv) pro produce produce export crops and hence increase the country’s foreign earnings, and to expand production of crops needed for agro have been met. On the contrary, the evidence we have been able to gather, both through our own fieldwork and from written documents, indicates that at present the damage done by the projects outweighs the benefits gained.

Land and foreign capital Both the federal government (through the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development or MOARD) and the regions began actively promoting large- scale land investments and seeking foreign capital soon after the controversial national elections of 2005. By 2007, a number of promotional documents had been prepared, and some efforts had been made to identify lands said tobe suitable for large-scale projects and foreign investors.6 The transfer of land to investors had in fact been going on since the second half of the 1990s, but the investors involved were predominantly local and the lands leased out were small in size, frequently less than 500 hectares. Foreign investors began to show keen interest following the enactment of the investment proclama­ tion and as the success of floriculture in winning market share in Europe and elsewhere became apparent in the mid-2000s. The demand for land by investors grew sharply from 2006, and in 2008 there was what amounted to a mad rush to get land, with many applicants requesting large estates, often exceeding 10,000 hectares. More than one-third of land allocated to investors, including foreign ones, by the regions from the late 1990s to 2008 was handed out in the latter year. In that same year, the government designated MOARD as the lead agency for large-scale land deals, with wide-ranging responsibilities including approval of investor projects, signing contracts, monitoring environmental impacts and oversight. MOARD was to receive and administer all consolidated investment lands of 5,000 hectares or more from the regions. These lands were to be put into a federal land bank to be accessed by investors through MOARD. While all aspects of the land deals were to be concluded by and through MOARD, income from the transactions, namely land rent, income tax and other pay­ ments, was to be utilised for the benefit of the regions concerned. Table 5.1 below shows the lands ‘voluntarily’ transferred by the regions to MOARD between 2008 and 2010. It is not clear from the available documents how much land has actually been transferred to investors to date, and it is quite likely that the government itself does not have full information on the matter. According to a data­base prepared by MOARD, some 8,000 applications for land, totalling over 3 million hectares, were approved by the regions between 1996 and 2008. The great major­ ity of investors held the land idle (many simply did not have the resources to put the land to use) and some used the land for purposes for which it was not approved. The records show that slightly less than 20 per cent of applicants had started project implementation and operation by late 2007. Of the 8,000 98 5 | Rahmato hectares were 829,199 180,625 691,984 409,678 420,000 3,589,352 1,057,866 Land in hectares

99 -industry crops, such as sugar and cotton,

Land available for investment with the Federal Land Bank of Ethiopia : MOARD 2009c; 2010; interviews with Oromia Land and Environment The new -year five Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), launched in the last last quarter of 2010 and expected to agriculture will grow runat the rate of from 14.9 per cent 2011 and annually, for farm to output 2015, envisages to double that by 2015. This rapid growth strong will role be the private made sector, possible especially in foreign part capital, and is for by which the expected government the will provide to all necessary play, support. The govern­ ment envisages that a total of 3.3 million hectares of land, in addition to land already given out, will be leased to investors in the GTP period (MOFED 2010a; 2010c), and recent statements by senior about government half officials of this indicate is expected that to be taken up by by foreign the investors. end of Therefore, 2015, the total land transferred to investors (that is, all the land leased out before and after the GTP) will exceed 7 million hectares, of which transferred transferred to foreign businesses (World Bank 2011a). In almost all cases, the investors’ interest is to use the land to export grow market, food together and with energy agro crops for the both for the domestic market and for export. approved investment projects, more than one-third are small enterprises hold ­ ing 100 hectares or less (MOARD 2009a). and On 2009 the a other few hundred hand, foreign between investors 2003 were granted own land or either on as their part of joint ventures amounting to over with 1 million hectares. local As a rule, businesses, the lands allocated with to foreign total holdings investors are much bigger than those to domestic investors, given for above. the reasons Moreover, in 2009 and 2010, close lotted to to 500,000 investors hectares both were by al­ MOARD and evidence the suggests regions. that, by In the brief, end the of 2010, available a land total had been of committed 3.5 to million investors, of hectares which over of 1 million Afar Region (2010) 5.1 Table Amhara (not yet transferred) Benishangul Gambella Oromia Total Source Bureau Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s Region some 3 million will be held by foreign capital. On the other hand, in the same period, land under peasant production is expected to increase from 13.3 mil­ lion hectares in 2011–12 to 14.7 million hectares in 2014–15. Thus, large-scale agriculture will account for an area about half the size of the lands under peasant production and equal to nearly one-third of total cultivated land in the country. Clearly, investor projects are set to become a dominant force in the rural economy within a short period of time. Most of the investments are concentrated in three large regions – Benis­ hangul, Gambella and Oromia – but a few are also to be found in the SNNPR areas. The first two regions have sparse populations and are said to possess abundant unused land suitable for large investment projects, but the reality on the ground does not bear out these claims. Gambella, where we have done fieldwork, possesses some of the largest wildlife resources in Africa, and many of the animals engage in seasonal migration across the border to the Sudan and back, as well as within the region itself. There is also a large national wildlife park set up in the 1970s, as well as several protected areas. The lands given out to investors lie within the park, protected areas and other wildlife habitats, thus depriving the animals of access to their habitual feeding grounds and blocking their free migratory movement (Trans-Frontier Conservation Initiative Task Force 2010b). These rich wildlife resources are now seriously threatened, and unless urgent measures are taken, the region and the country will lose an asset far more valuable than what private investment can possibly offer. In the case of Oromia, much of the leased land consists of pasture and rangeland, woodland and wetland, much of which is vital to local populations, who depend wholly or in part on livestock raising for their livelihoods. Occasionally, investors have been given forest land, which they have cleared for crop planting in the face of protests by local communities.

Indian investments The foreign investors now active in the country are many and diverse, but, unlike in the past, European or American capital is not playing a dominant role at present. On the contrary, while considerable investment is flowing into the country from the Middle East, the most aggressive and the most numerous investors are private companies and interests from India. At present, over 35 firms from that country have acquired extensive lands in various regions, including Benishangul, Gambella and Oromia. This figure does not include Indian investments in floriculture, where they have a strong pres­ ence. The biggest holding by an investor in the country belongs to Karuturi, a company based in Bangalore, India, which has leased 300,000 hectares in Gambella region and 11,000 in Bako woreda in Oromia. Indian investors hold the largest allotments of land in the country so far, although the full extent of their holdings is difficult to determine because of poor record keeping and lack of data. A partial list of the larger Indian acquisitions is given in Table 100 5 | Rahmato

7 ecent ecent mage ­mage Heckett ­Heckett as well as r­ woreda Many Indian and other foreign 8 101 Based on data reported in government media and the independent press, I have already noted some of the incentives provided to foreign capital, but Evidence from our fieldworkin Gambella and Bako studies by environmental groups in the country paint an of Indian managers unflatteringrunning investment i projects (Kelbessa et al. 2009; and Aklilu 2008). Indian projects pay very low sensitive wages, to and local custom their and staff cultural are practices in­ and hold local low employees in esteem, often treating them disrespectfully. Some interviewed local observed employees that we the projects use poor farming practices, in part there has been a dramatic increase in Indian investment in the country in the last five years. From a lowly figure ment of aboutgrew to US$400nearly US$5 million billion in 2011. According in to invest­ 2005, Ethiopian government sources, the amount is expected to grow by US$1 billion every year. There are now over 500 Indian firms in Ethiopia, and manufacturing while and engineering many sectors, of them a sizeable in the are number agriculture, particularly food and biofuel production, sugar estates, floriculture are engaged in and dairy processing. In contrast, by the end of 2009 China had invested US$1 billion in the country, mostly in manufacturing and construction, and it has only a limited presence in the agricultural sector. there are also others, which Indian investors have found particularly appeal­ ing. These are, first, the government’s assurances thatland is plentifulin the country and there is virtually no limit on how and, second, the much for, low rental fees land charged for land leased investors to investors. Rents may ask are ridiculously low by any standard: indeed, one Indian investor who had just been given a sizeable area of land in the west of the countryas described ‘throw-away them prices’. Investors are expected to pay an from annual less rate than ranging US$2 to less than US$10 and access per to irrigation, transport hectare, and basic depending services. In on contrast, rents location in the Punjab area of India, for example, vary from 25,000 to 30,000 rupees (approx­ US$550 imately to US$670) per hectare per year. 5.2 below. The government seems to be particularly well capital disposed and to is keenly Indian encouraging it. Several -level high missions have India to attract visited investors, and local media reports the quote Ethiopian minister of agriculture as saying on a recent visit to earmarked India for that half investment of in the the total GTP land – be set about aside 1.8 for Indian million investors if hectares there is – sufficient could interest their on part. investors investors have been overjoyed at the rates as incentives well for which as they the are eligible. generous The financial rents are so low that encouraged investors to are request more land than they can possibly manage, leave the land and idle since they suffer no many adverse consequences as a result. There have been suggestions by MOARD and others that rents should be increased, but many regions have yet to make firm decisions on the matter. Table 5.2 Indian agricultural investments in Ethiopia (2007–12)

Investor Region Investment Land size Capital registered Land rent per year type (hectares) (million birr) (million birr)

Ruchi Gambella Soya bean 25,000 1,451 2.775 White Field SNNPR Cotton 10,000 32 1.580 BHO Gambella Rice and sesame 27,000 918 2.997 Sannati Gambella Rice 10,000 160 1.580 Verdanta Gambella Tea 3,000 631 0.334 Shapoorji Benishangul Biofuel 50,000 984 7.170 CLC Spentex Benishangul Cotton 25,000 1,117 5.549 Karuturi Gambella Palm oil and rice 100,000 2,110 2.000 Gambella Rice and palm oil 300,000 Oromia Rice and biofuel 11,000 Lucky Exports Gambella Tea 5,000 Sunrise Industries Oromia Food crops 15,000 Vatic Oromia Biofuel 20,000 Kanan Devan Hills SNNP Tea 10,000 Emami Biotech Oromia Biofuel 80,000 Chadha Agro Oromia Sugar and biofuel 122,000

Source: Gambella Investment Commission; MELCA Mahiber 2008; local press; Ethiopian Agriculture Portal, Ministry of Agriculture (MOARD) 5 | Rahmato door policy to foreign and domestic 103 concentration of land in the hands of a small MOARD, MOARD, at the federal level, and the regional investment commissions As it noted may earlier, be too early to pass judgement on the consequences are responsible for signing contracts with investors, projects monitoring investment and ensuring that contract obligations are from our not findings in flouted. the As field isand from clear interviewsnone in of Addis however, Ababa, these bodies has the technical or human out resource capacity the to two carry important tasks that namely will monitoring help and to oversight. make The investors contract agreements responsible, in place force heavy do obligations not on investment projects. are On free the to contrary, choose what investors crops to grow grown, and where without to any market what interference they from have their hosts. supply the They local or are national not market: indeed, obliged they are to strongly export encouraged most or to all of their products, as we saw There earlier. are no provisions in the contracts aimed at meeting the Moreover, project managers food have no securitycontractual obligations to needs provide social of the country. services to the communities concerned or invest fact, in in basic a number infrastructure. of In instances it is the the government infrastructure, such as that roads and constructsirrigation schemes, used by some the projects. of group of domestic moneyed elites, foreign capitalists and state In bureaucrats. a way, the programme of land investment time will of the imperial regime, return when a minority the of propertied countryelements – landed to the local nobility, gentry and urban bourgeoisie – owned the greater portion of the country’s agricultural land. This grossly unjust agrarian system was abolished as part of the radical reforms of brought the about military the government, distribution of the the Derg, land, which parcelled farming households under the framework of public ownership out (Rahmato 2009). in small plots, to The assumption behind the new open- capital is that -scale large agriculture will be more efficient and more­ produc tive, bringing great gains in food production and greater earnings of exchange. foreign However, the evidence from other countries does not confirm that large operations are invariably better than small ones. of the government’s policy shift towards foreign large-scale capital into the farms agricultural sector. The and fact that both the are taking place flowof at a very rapid pace and under circumstances dictated bydoes not external bode well pressures for the future of Ethiopian agriculture and certainly poses a serious threat to family farms and outcome at peasant present livelihoods. is The the most re- visible The balanceThe sheet because because of lack of knowledge of local conditions, about which management is unwilling to seek information from employees or other knowledgeable people in the community. One item common to almost all contracts is the obligation on projects to plant native tree species on at least 2 per cent of project land. However, this will be of limited benefit since more trees and vegetation will be destroyed by the projects during land clearance. The environmental impact assessments conducted by the projects as part of their acquisition of land are also meant to ensure that land management practices employed by them do not damage the environment or the land. However, many of our informants at the two sites we visited considered the land clearing that projects are currently undertaking as being destructive of the natural vegetation, which, they say, is leading to the loss of natural resources and the exposure of the land to serious soil erosion. Most of the community residents we interviewed in Gambella and Bako were not convinced that anything good would come of the transfer of their land to outside investors. On the contrary, respondents expressed the fear that destruction of natural vegetation through land clearance, the closing off of access to water sources and the loss of woody vegetation and wildlife assets will bring social and economic hardship to them and their families. There were even some local officials, in Gambella in particular, who saw little benefit to communities, since in their view what was produced by the projects was destined for export and there would be nothing left to benefit the local market. Gambella is not self-sufficient in food: indeed, for several months of the year there are food shortages, which can become severe if there is a drought, a not infrequent occurrence. On such occasions, families depend on forest resources for food and income. The following response by one of the women interviewed in a village in Gambella expresses the general sentiment of many, and especially of women, in the community:

Two years ago, for example, there was a severe shortage of maize because of the drought. We managed to survive the hunger that ensued because we were able to collect roots and other edible plants from the forest. We were able to eat because of the forest. Since the forest has been cleared, I do not know what we are going to eat if there is another food shortage. When there is a food shortage it is we women and our children who suffer most because the men go to the towns to look for daily labour. In the past we depended on the forest to get food but now that the forest has been cleared I fear that our children will die of starvation. Another thing … in the future the private investors may ask us to buy the wood and grass that we used to get from the forest for free. In our tradition it is women who collect grass for house building, but now there is a shortage of grass [because of the clearance by the project] and wood is also scarce; the men bring the wood from long distances … They say the river will be diverted for the benefit of the project farm; if this is the case, we will be confronted with a water shortage, and also fish will disappear … Therefore we are not happy with the coming of the project. In brief, the investors will not

104 5 | Rahmato 105 ) -kebelle The land deals were conducted and property transferred without consulta­ There are no formal or informal obligations on the part of investment To a large extent, the government’s objectives in promoting -scale large ­ in provide any benefits to us; theyhave comefor their owninterest. (Aryat Oujolu, sub Turkodi tion or consent; all our informants at both sites confirmed thatknowledge they that no had property in their locality had many said been that they leased would have opposed to the plan investors, if they had and been consulted. the Indeed, criticism voiced by informed opinion here and in the country is that the investment programme lacks transparency and accountability. Moreover, in Gambella, which has attracted a large investors, number the regional of authorities foreign have and launched a domestic resettlement programme to relocate rural people in designated villages and communities. All pondents our in res­ the villages where we interviewed them said that this was meant to move them away so that the relocation programme land has been announced in could the Benishangul region, which, be given to investors. A like similar Gambella, is host to a large number of investors. projects to contribute to the food security needs of the country. The contracts signed by investors and the business plans approved do not contain provisions requiring projects to supply the local market, whether as a matter of course or under emergency circumstances. As has been noted above, there food is security element in the ongoing global a rush for particularly land, in Africa, strong although we should not ignore the opportunity for high profits tofrom exports gained be to the world market at a time of they relatively high have food been prices, in as recent years and to are come. expected One to reason remain why for Middle a East investors long are Africa, time keen including in to Ethiopia, acquire is land to in grow food crops for markets. export Indian to companies are their rushing home to acquire land in Ethiopia partly for their own country’s food needs and partly for paradoxical that the the export government market. of It one is of the thus most the vulnerable world countries is in handing out vast land and water to resources help to the foreign food investors security efforts of for their their home companies, countries, without adequately safeguarding or taking to or into gain profits account the food security needs of its own people. vestments have not been met, nor are some of them likely to be met under the present circumstances. There is, for example, hardly any technology transfer at the moment. The projects are operated using a high level of this technology, but is not transferable to or affordable for smallholders.agriculture Indeed, large-scale is managed quite differently from family farms, meeting ground and there between the is no two in the present have seen, policy and environment. as As some preliminary we works have already suggested (Kelbessa et al. 2009; Heckett and Akilu 2008), many projects have made scant social investments for the benefit of the communities around them. Moreover, since foreign investors are allowed to raise up to 70 per cent of their operational costs from local sources, and since their export earnings may be repatriated fully, it is difficult to see how the government is expected to gain much hard currency. Furthermore, the disproportionate favouring of foreign capital is counterproductive in that it obstructs the growth of a vigorous local entre­ preneurial class, and, in the long run, is bound to lead to economic depend­ ency. Experience in other countries shows that domestic capital, under proper regulation, is more likely to act in ways that are socially responsible than its foreign counterpart. The programme of land investment the government is eagerly promoting and the bonanza offered to foreign capital will have far-reaching consequences. It is therefore important that there is informed debate on the subject within civil society, between concerned citizens and among the public at large in Ethiopia. The emerging new agricultural system will marginalise small farmers, herders and minority groups, create opposing social classes and widen the gulf between the haves and the have-nots in rural society. Capitalist inves­ tors, especially foreign ones, will be driven solely by the profit motive and the need to supply the export market. This will mean adopting systems of land management, for example industrial forms of mono-cropping, that will not be environmentally friendly and in the long term will leave the land and ecosystem exhausted and unusable by future generations.

106 6 | Indian agricultural companies, ‘land grabbing’ in Africa and activists’ responses

Rick Rowden

New trends in global ‘land grabbing’ Recent years have witnessed an unprecedented increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) by international companies seeking to lease or purchase large tracts of agricultural land in developing countries. The increase in the trend has been striking, from a previous average annual increase in global agricultural land use of about 4 million hectares before 2008 to tens of mil­ lions of hectares leased or purchased just since 2009, with about half the deals occurring in Africa (Oxfam International 2011; World Bank 2011a). In April 2012, the Land Matrix Project, a global network of 45 research and civil society organisations, released the largest database to date on these types of land deals, gathering data from 1,006 deals since 2000 and covering 70.2 million hectares around the world. The data show that the bulk of these acquisitions have taken place between just 2008 and 2010 (Worldwatch 2012). The major factors driving this steep increase include new international markets for biofuel production; increased demand for animal feed owing to growing international meat consumption; and asset price speculation as institutional investors have come to view agricultural land in developing countries as a new commodity (De Schutter 2011; GRAIN 2011; 2012; Oakland Institute 2011a). Beyond traditional business and commercial goals, however, another factor is driving the trend. This is increased concern about national food security among a set of wealthy and emerging market economies such as China, ­Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and South Korea, which are increasingly dependent on food imports and face limited arable land or water at home. Such countries have been developing ‘food security strategies’ that will enable them to avoid de­ pendence on volatile global markets. To this end, they have been establishing programmes to outsource their domestic food production by having their agri­ cultural firms go abroad to lease land in Africa and elsewhere for the express purpose of producing food that can be shipped home for domestic markets. India has also recently joined the trend. Although it arrived on the scene relatively late, by 2012 it was among the top ten countries involved in the large-scale land acquisitions, according to Land Matrix Project data. In just a few years, India had acquired around 3.2 million hectares in East Africa, 107 mainly in Ethiopia and Madagascar, and 2.1 million hectares in South-East Asia (Indonesia and Laos). Together, foreign investors from Brazil, India and China accounted for 16.5 million hectares, or around 24 per cent of the total hectares sold or leased worldwide during the recent dramatic increase. Interestingly, India is also among the top ten countries whose land has been acquired by other nations, with 4.6 million hectares of Indian land having been acquired by foreign investors since 2000 (Worldwatch 2012; Nandi 2012). The sudden and sharp rise in the number and size of the land deals has raised many concerns. The trend has deepened fault lines within a set of controversial issues, ranging from the costs and benefits of foreign invest­ ment and the best models for commercial agriculture in developing countries to how foreign investors should best be regulated and the civic obligations of citizens to rein in the excesses of their national corporations’ behaviour overseas. Networks of national and international human rights groups and advocacy associations for small-scale farmers have raised a number of concerns and have referred to the trend as ‘land grabbing’ by foreign investors and speculators. Such critics have pointed to a systemic lack of due process, prior informed consent and adequate compensation for local peoples, who have often been displaced in the process across many countries, particularly in Ethiopia, Uganda, Madagascar and other countries with poor records of governance. Such concerns have been raised by many research institutes, scholars and environmental and human rights organisations, including GRAIN (2012; 2008), the Oakland Institute (Oakland Institute 2011a), Friends of the Earth (FOEI 2010) and Oxfam (Oxfam International 2011), and have given rise to several critical media reports. Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs described the agricultural land acquisitions as ‘power grabs’:

The rise in food prices is leading to a land grab, as powerful politicians sell foreign investors massive tracts of farmland, brushing aside the traditional land rights of poor smallholders. Foreign investors hope to use large mecha­ nized farms to produce output for export, leaving little or nothing for the local populations. (Sachs 2011)

Documented human rights abuses and forced displacement of small-scale farmers to enable the land deals by foreign investors have been referred to as a form of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 2006; Vadala 2011). David Hillam, deputy director of the United Nations’ (UN’s) Food and Agriculture Organization­ (FAO), was perhaps the highest-profile figure to first raise concerns about the trend. At a conference in Washington in 2009, he cited labour issues, ecological impacts, rights abuses in the context of weak domestic governance and a lack of beneficial technology spillovers for domestic firms. Many of these criticisms stand in stark contrast to the purported benefits for citizens that governments and investors originally claimed would result from the ventures. 108 6 | Rowden ­ controlled controlled - ecological approach based Le Monde 2009). - 109 scale, scale, more biodiverse and community - both [this] diagnosis and remedy are incorrect … Hunger and malnutrition are not primarily the result of insufficient food production;they are the result of poverty and particularly inequality, in rural areas, where 75 per cent of the world’s poor still 2011) reside. (D’Almeida The policy implications are that reducing poverty particularly and inequality, Also questioning the efficacy of corporatethe agriculture model has been On labour issues, concerns have been expressed about the numbers of new Ecological concerns the include use or overuse of water by the new corporate in in rural areas, by addressing issues of social exclusion, rights lack violations of and accountability may be a more efficient waythan is offered improve to by thefood security large-scale foreign investor model. Political and improvements policy to ensure that citizens can exercise their rights ernment and is that held gov­ accountable for enforcing such rights are the more political Olivier De Schutter, the UN’s special rapporteur on the right to noted that food. the initial attraction of supporting He -scale large land investment arose has from the belief that addressing hunger was dependent on increased food pro models models of agriculture could be more efficient supporting environmental increasingin sustainability production than the and -scale large corporate model (De Schutter 2011: and 33–44; Vanloqueren FOEI the 2010). foreign Yet investors signing the largest land deals are replacing small-scale with subsistence the farming corporate agriculture model. duction, and that long-term chronic underinvestment in agriculture in many developing countries had led to food scarcity. popular This conclusion that if private investors could in be lured into the agricultural turn gave rise to the sector, they should be encouraged to stay. However, according to De Schutter: jobs created by the investments for the work local workforce will (since become much mechanised), of the the quality of for such jobs, and and working conditions financialand labour compensation rights for workers. Another concern relates to the fate of many more subsistence farmers, who lose access to land but do not get new jobs (Bagchi 2009; Dawit Mihretie 2010; 2010; Vadala 2011; Goswami McLure 2010; 2009; GTZ 2009; farms, particularly in the context of future water depletion water and sources diversion from of the surrounding areas. A soil further degradation issue from is highly pollution intensive and chemical use. Critics wide and growing also body of research that is point critical of the ecological to impact and a unsustainable nature of -scale large corporate farming based on monoculture, as opposed to an alternative, -scale, smaller agro on sustaining biodiversity and local community control (Altieri watch 2011; Byerlee 2011; 2009; Braun Von and -Dick 2009; Meinzen Cotula ­ et World al. 2008; Haralambous et al. 2009). The policy implications improved support for smaller of this research are that aspects of improving food security. Yet the fast-paced momentum of land acquisition seems to leave little room for the needed and much slower-paced governance improvements. On rights abuses, serious concerns have been raised regarding the lack of prior informed consent by local subsistence farmers displaced by new large land leases, and the lack of effective political recourse for the displaced. Such concerns have been particularly acute in countries such as Ethiopia and Mada­ gascar, which lack meaningful democratic procedures or social accountability mechanisms for government (Metho 2010; Ethiopian Review 2011; Afrol 2011; Rakotondrainibe 2011; Goswami 2010; EchoGéo 2010: 2–17). With regard to beneficial technology spillovers, although such benefits may be occurring, there is little evidence to date that foreign agricultural firms have effectively transferred new agricultural technologies to domestic farmers or have engendered other beneficial links to domestic firms. Partly because of the recent nature of investments and partly because of lack of transparency and accountability in many projects, there is no adequate documentation yet on the extent of beneficial spillovers into the domestic economy. Proponents of the investments argue that they provide a number of bene­ fits: capital inflows, technology transfers leading to innovation and domestic productivity increases, improved infrastructure, upgrading of domestic produc­ tion, quality improvement, income and employment creation (including for local input and service suppliers), export earnings, and a possible increase in food supplies for the domestic market and for export. Indeed, investments in agriculture should be able to boost food security (Hallam 2009). However, a major concern is that these benefits will not materialise if invest­ ments result in an enclave of advanced agriculture in a ‘dualistic system’ with traditional smallholder agriculture, particularly if smallholders cannot attain this advanced agriculture. Studies on the effects of FDI on agriculture show that such benefits do not always come about. These studies catalogue concerns regarding highly mechanised production technologies with limited employment- creation effects; dependence on imported inputs and hence limited domestic multiplier effects; adverse environmental impacts of production practices such as chemical contamination, land degradation and water depletion; and limited labour rights and poor working conditions. At the same time, there is also evi­ dence of longer-term benefits such as improved technology, product quality and sanitary and phytosanitary standards. In considering the question of benefits, it is therefore important to take a comprehensive view (ibid.).

The role of India in the global ‘land grab’ In recent years, many Indian agricultural companies have participated in the land rush. They include Allied Chemicals, AVR Engineering, BP Jewellery, Kankaria Group, Karuturi Agro Products, Kommuri Agrotech, KSR Earthmovers,­ 110 6 | Rowden accounting ­accounting for over 15 per cent 111 -imports. The government is increasingly bique bique and Senegal (see Chapter 5). This increase in overseas agricultural investments is just a small part of the production. food outsource to efforts recent India’s driving are factors Several Consequently, Consequently, the government has become concerned about the long-term In recent years, the Indian government has used a combination of trade broader increase in outward FDI by Indian companies over the following a past series of decade, liberalisations of inward and outward FDI that were part of wider free market reforms begun in the 1990s. The reforms enabled Indian firms toincreasingly raiseinvestment capital abroadand through mergers and acquisitions with foreign private equity firms to sprees. go Today, India’s international international on companies buying invest across a wide range sectors of and countries, and, quite unusually for than a half of developing India’s outward country, FDI more is invested in advanced economies. pulses, oilseeds, today, -sufficient self food large, countryand bythe Although is, sugar and cashew are the major agro Nelvo Nelvo International and Surya Electrical, Ruchi Soya, Shapoorji and Pallonji Company, Emami Biotech, which have either and leased or bought large tracts of land in Africa. Estimates suggest that as owned many companies as have 80 Indian invested and in - Indian land Mozam­ in Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, depend­ growing the on securitybased food long-term ensuring about concerned tables groundwater diminishing the of light in and imports food certain on ence at home (see Chapter 4). Given limited farmland and a rapidly increasing ­ popu lation, India’s national food grain production has been more or less stagnant for a decade. Imports of pulses dropped in 2010–11 to 2.69 million tonnes from 3.51 million tonnes in 2009–10 because of a bumper importscrop. However, are expected to increase to 2.8 million tonnes in 2011–12 because of steadily rising demand. India is the biggest buyer of pulses, availability and market price of imports of oilseeds and lentils. Only about half of half about Only lentils. and oilseeds of imports of price market availabilityand dependent rest the with irrigation, to access has currently land cultivable India’s on Policyerratic rainfall. makers were alarmed by a 2009 NASA studysatellite of northern and central India that found that the country is losing about 1 foot of groundwater each year (NASA 2009). In Punjab, a major -producing food region, it is predicted that by 2020 groundwater levels will fall to below 100 feet, so that all existing pumps and irrigation systems will stop working. This will represent a ‘water which bomb’, some experts say is already going off (Rodell et al. 2009: 999–1002; NASA 2009). Additionally, there are concerns about longer-term geostrategic risks that other could worsen the water possible crisis in India, such as the possibility that China may dam some of the main that flow tributaries through to India (India–Latin rivers America Conclave 2010). policy and -level high commercial diplomacy to facilitate Indian investment overseas in agricultural order to further its food security strategy. Indian firms of global trade purchases (Tiwari and Tiwari 2012). interested in expanding overseas investment have called on the Indian govern­ ment to develop a national policy on transnational farming supported by a legal and regulatory framework that reflects the nuances of overseas farmland acquisition and protects investors against associated risks. They are also call­ ing for specific tariff duties to be lowered for imports into India from certain countries as well as other incentives (Kapur 2009). On commercial policy, the Indian government has stepped up its coopera­ tion with leading domestic trade and industry organisations to facilitate the outsourcing of India’s food production. Business groups such as the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India, the Confederation of Indian ­Industry (CII), and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry have organised several buyer–seller conferences involving African and Indian business delegations. At these conferences, in addition to the exploration of business opportunities in various sectors between the two part­ ners, agricultural investments are pursued, often by official government trade delegations. Since 2005, the most important initiative has been the annual CII-EXIM Bank (Export-Import Bank of India) conclaves of India–Africa Project Partnership, where African government officials discuss business opportunities with Indian businesses, with the Indian government working as a catalyst. Certain Indian business associations are directly pursuing overseas agricultural investments on behalf of their members, such as the Consortium of Indian Farmers’ Association and the Solvent Extractors’ Association of India. In addition, the Indian government has stepped up the granting of lines of credit (LOCs) through EXIM Bank to governments as part of its official foreign aid programmes, which are often tied to the purchase of goods and services from Indian companies. As of July 2012, there were 156 LOCs involving foreign governments or financial entities, although very few of them were for agriculture. These LOCs can provide purchase orders for Indian goods and services in Africa. For example, the Tanzania government received a US$40 million LOC from India’s EXIM Bank to buy 1,000 tractors from India’s Agri Machinery Group, a subsidiary of Escorts Ltd (Doya 2011). However, there is no evidence that EXIM Bank LOCs have been used directly to facilitate the purchase or lease of agriculture land by Indian companies. An agency that may play a role in facilitating such outward FDI by Indian agricultural companies is the Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd (ECGC). Although ECGC provides a range of credit-risk insurance to Indian exporters, it also provides overseas investment insurance to Indian companies investing in joint ventures abroad in the form of equity or loans. The insur­ ance covers the risks of war, expropriation and restriction on remittances, and usually is to cover Indian FDI risks in countries that already have investment treaties or agreements with India. However, it remains unclear whether Indian companies receiving various 112 6 | Rowden growing state of 113 In 2011, amid growing controversy over Indian investments in Ethiopia, the The contract with Karuturi Agro Products PLC was for 100,000 hectares To assist To in exploring such options, in 2010 the department a requested study At the same time, many African governments eager for foreign investments Ethiopian Ethiopian minister of agriculture and rural development publicly disclosed 12 contractual agreements for land leases between Ethiopia and or individuals, 24 including contracts companies with five Indian companies. Their content confirmed many of the critics’ deepest concerns about the largeland deals. with the option of 200,000 additional hectares; with BHO for 27,000 hectares; Bio Ruchi Agri PLC, 25,000 Products hectares; Sannati Agro PLC Farm Enter­ prises, 10,000 hectares; and with Verdanta Harvests PLC for 3,012 hectares. All of the contracts were in Ethiopia’s Gambella regional state and had terms of between 25 and 50 years, with options for renewal. The contracts’ terms gest sug­ that the Indian companies are being given everything and being asked Review of with Indian companies contracts Review in Ethiopia agricultural five to be undertaken by the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT) tural Outsourcing: on Possible ­ Opportunities ‘Agricul for India’ (Dey 2011; Government of India 2012a: 139). This is part of a larger effortof under commerce way and industry to in draft athe department new overseasinvestment policy that will update and streamline procedures and provide incentives and other support for outward Indian FDI. The department of agriculture was requested to provide input on that part of the new policy that and supports efforts to Indian outsource agricultural India’s firms future production food (Dey 2011). have been courting Indian agricultural investors, offeringthat special include long-term incentives leases on massive tracts of arable land on very ous gener­ terms – and at much cheaper prices For example, Ethiopia has especially welcomed Indian agricultural for companies, land and water than in and India. has offered 1.8 million hectares farmland of equal to to 40 investors,Indian per cent nearly of the total area of the principal - grain types of assistance from Indian government programmes are obliged their to produce sell back in India or may questions are expected sell to be it clarifiedin a in new comprehensive overseas third direct country markets. investment policy Such that the Indian government began draftingin 2011.Report ­ the new edly, policy will address all aspects of overseas foreign investment and will include special provisions to facilitate, encourage agricultural and investments by expand Indian overseas companies for exports back to the Indian market. To this end, the department of Africa and agriculture South America has for been the lease focusing or purchase on of lands discussions and with various has embassies to started facilitate further outsourcing of India’s food production overseas. Punjab in India (Economic Times 2011). for very little in return that would benefit Ethiopian small-scale farmers or workers or would safeguard the environment. There are virtually no limits on groundwater use or environmental pollution, or obligations relating to labour, wages or working conditions, transfers of technology or purchases of local goods or services (Rowden 2011). Each contract specifies that the companies are to ensure that environmental impact assessments are undertaken and submitted to the authorities shortly after operations commence and that the investors will abide by current Ethio­ pian conservation laws. However, they do not specify who exactly will undertake the environmental impact assessments, their quality and scope (would they consider impacts on neighbouring areas and underground water tables?), or the transparency of the process by which they are to be undertaken. Nor is it clear what remedial action would be undertaken by the companies or how this action would be enforced in the event that the assessments identify environmental threats. All five contracts state that the Indian companies have the ‘right’ but not the ‘obligation’ to provide power, health clinics, schools, etc. to local communities. The contracts do not specify whether these services are to be provided to the local population or only to company workers. The fact that this provision is cast as a non-enforceable right suggests that the companies may choose not to act or to provide improved infrastructure for their workers or local com­ munities. Yet the provision of such improvements had earlier been given a high profile by the Ethiopian government in explaining why investors should be allowed to make these investments (SMNE 2011). Regarding water usage, the contracts specify that the companies have the right to build dams, sink boreholes and use irrigation systems as they see fit. Only the smallest contract, with Verdanta for a tea plantation, does not mention water rights. Interestingly, only the biggest contract with Karuturi includes an additional clause stating that the company has the right to ‘use irrigation water from rivers or groundwater’. But there are many other cru­ cial details omitted from the contracts, such as payment for this water; how much water can be used over what period; how usage would be monitored; and the environmental impacts on surrounding areas arising from diversion of the water by the companies. The length of the leases also has a bearing on this, with relatively short leases possibly encouraging overexploitation for short-term gains, while longer leases may involve excessive use of groundwater, thus depriving neighbouring farmers and affecting the water table over time. On taxation, all five contracts include clauses that state ‘in view of the im­ portance of this proposed major investment’, the companies will enjoy ‘special investment privileges, such as exemptions from taxation and import duties on capital goods and repatriation of capital and profits granted under the ­investment laws of Ethiopia’. In addition, Indian companies are afforded legal 114 6 | Rowden ­ ­ 115 tection tection against nationalisation of their investment properties and other Nowhere in the Karuturi contract, which is similar to the others, are there The lessor shall ensure during the period of lease, the lessee shall enjoy peaceful and trouble free possession of the premises and it shall be provided adequate security, free of cost, for carrying out its entire activities in the said premises, against any riot, disturbance or any other turbulent time other than force majeure, as and when requested by the lessee. None None of these contracts mentions labour laws or specifies wages or working The contracts do not seem to address one of the claims trumpeted by the Furthermore, one of the most disturbing aspects of the contract with Karu­ statements regarding compensation or other benefits to theindigenous Ethio pian pian people or communities affected by these land leases. Earlyernment on, promised the gov­ that such investments would benefit the people of in terms jobs, clean water, improved healthcare and contracts, schools. investors However, are under not the obliged to offer any and servicesKaruturi is simply ‘given the to right’ to the localbuild infrastructure people as it wants and needs (Rowden 2011). conditions for local employees. Nor is there anything in the contracts requiring the companies to dedicate a portion of the harvests for to local the food domestic security market needs. The absence of detail on these points ing, is given ­ alarm their potentially negative impacts on local populations in terms of work, decent wages, workers’ rights and protections and local food security. companies and government regarding the increase in agricultural productivity and the transfer of new technologies to local farmers. If the omission suggests that Indian companies alone will retain the higher-value technology, then is unclear it how this will help other farmers in Ethiopia in the future. turi is the suggestion that the Ethiopian government will evict local people in the way of the commercial project, by force cases the land if in question has been necessary. or still is Although home to thousands in of Ethiopian many citizens (Metho 2011), Article 6.1 of the contract states: ‘The lessor [government of Ethiopia] shall be obliged to deliver and hand over the vacant possession of local people unwilling to leave their Arguably, leased free land of impediments.’ land constitute ‘impediments’ and the lessor is now contractually suggest to seems 6.6 Article obliged company. the for problem theya that not ensure are to that the government will provide police or military support against resistance: pro­ in India and between Ethiopia treaty signed investment bilateral a under benefits agreement, protection and promotion investment bilateral the to According 2007. Ethiopia provides Indian investors with tax holidays of up to fiveyears, exemp tion from import duties, government guarantees against nationalisation, duty incentives and foreign exchange remittances (Financial Express 2006). India and Ethiopia also signed a -taxationdouble avoidance agreement in 2011 (PIB 2011). In sum, the five contracts suggest that the Indian companies are being given extremely generous terms and being asked for very little in return that would benefit Ethiopian small-scale farmers and workers or safeguard the environment. Under Indian laws and democratic safeguards, and given India’s history of dynamic civic activism on land rights, it is difficult to imagine that foreign investors in India would be allowed to impact local communities and use their agricultural land and their water on similar terms. As many Indian small-scale farmers know from experience, questions of access to and control over water resources are highly important, and yet the contracts in Africa are extremely vague on these issues.

Activism against the trend Pointing to concerns about the trend towards ‘land grabbing’, former FAO Director-General Jacques Diouf has said that the manner in which foreign in­ vestments in agricultural land have recently unfolded could give rise to conflict and would probably be unsustainable unless future deals were implemented more equitably. Specifically, Diouf has stated that future investments should ‘recognise the rights of local stakeholders and domestic food security and rural development concerns’, and that agreements between governments and foreign investors ‘should be based on balanced contracts and partnerships safeguarding the interests of all stakeholders’ (FAO 2011a). However, rather than address this enforcement of ‘rights’, a group of inter­ national agencies has instead moved ahead to establish a softer mechanism based on voluntary standards; under these standards, foreign investors pledge to improve the terms upon which they engage in such investments. In 2009, the FAO joined with the World Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to draft responsible agricultural investment principles, a set of best practices and principles to which foreign agricultural investors can pledge to adhere. The FAO and its partners claim that such principles can make foreign investments a ‘win-win’ situation for all parties. Moreover, the IIFT study recommends, inter alia, that:

India should enter into bilateral framework agreements with countries which are willing to facilitate Indian investments, formulate Responsible Investment Principles on the basis of international norms, in consultation with investors, co-ordinate interventions of the Government of India under the India–Africa Framework for Cooperation and private investments by Indian entities in Africa to maximize the impact, and have a special focus on Latin America, where our Missions and the host countries are eager that India should take the initiative in this regard. (Government of India 2012a: 139)

However, the responsible agricultural investment principles have been widely 116 6 | Rowden governmental organisations (NGOs) 117 centred land governance that is firmly anchored inhuman a In May 2012, afterthree years of negotiations following an from outcry The fact that the document highlights the protection of rights is extremely The UN guidelines support the calls by many scientists, farmers’ and ­ in land land rights advocates, NGOs and human rights organisations, the UN adopted new voluntary global guidelines to defend and the recognise land informal indigenous rights claims of to land. poor This farmers move was advocates hailed as by a step against ‘land grabbing’. companies The to be guidelines transparent call and on to consult private local populations, recognise as the well as ‘customary to tenure systems’ of also indigenous call populations. on governments They to ‘provide appropriate recognition and of protection the legitimate tenure rights of indigenous to peoples’, ‘safeguard legitimate tenure rights against threats and infringements’ and to ‘provide effective and accessible means’ to resolve tenure disputes. On the issue of expropriation, the guidelines state that governments should ‘ensure a fair valuation and prompt compensation for farmers’ and expropriate only when the land is needed for a public purpose (AFP 2012). -state‘Non actors, including business enterprises, have a responsibility to respect human rights and they go legitimate on tenure to rights,’ say. important and this is what differentiates it from theweaker responsible agri­ cultural investment principles. The International Land Coalition, an alliance of civil society groups, described the UN document as ‘a remarkable advance towards people- digenous peoples’ organisations, social movements and civil for society better groups policy approaches that safeguard the rights of local populations criticised criticised by activists and scholars as an inadequate response that can actually legitimise land deals. Critics say the fact that the principles are only voluntary and neglect the key issue of rights means that forcement of they rights, actual fall laws and far strict short regulations. An of international state­ the ­ en ment by farmers’ associations and non- calls instead for more democratic, transparent and accountable structures of decision making and the enforceability of rights of local communities at to the be centre of procedures for future the deals. citizens’ This right would to prior include informed upholding consent of all refusal, adequate compensation, proposed and accountable and transparent mechanisms deals, rights of for redress in the event of damage (NGOs 2010). adding that rights ‘non-stateframework’, actors, such as multinational ­ corpora tions, are given clear responsibilities to respect human the international rights’. In farmers’ addition, movement La Via Campesina has urgent said: that ‘It governments is use now these guidelines to adopt legislation to farms protect from this flagrant violation theirof rights’(ibid.). that However, citizens will clear is it still need to mobilise to such rights ensure and that hold companies governments to enforce account. in future land deals, backed up by the strict enforcement of rights, prior informed consent, transparency and accountability mechanisms for citizens. There is also a need for enforceable regulations to stop excessive land deals and for more international support for national political reforms to enshrine and enforce land rights and other human rights for citizens, specifically for small-scale farmers. Additionally, national and international coalitions of smaller farmers’ associ­ ations and advocacy organisations are stepping up their criticisms of the global corporate monoculture model of large-scale production. In its place, they are advocating smaller-scale, agro-ecological approaches to sustainable agriculture. Advocates are calling for policies that keep land in the hands of local com­ munities and implement genuine agrarian reform. The specific objectives of such policies would include ensuring equitable access to land and natural resources; increasing participatory research and training programmes to sup­ port agro-ecological peasant and smallholder farming, fishing and pastoralism; overhauling farm and trade liberalisation policies to prioritise national food sovereignty and support local and regional markets; promoting community- oriented food and farming systems based on local control over land, water and biodiversity; and, in place of voluntary codes of conduct, enforcing strict mandatory regulations that curb access by corporations and other powerful state and private actors to agricultural, coastal and grazing lands, forests and wetlands (NGOs 2010; FOEI 2010; Oakland Institute 2011a; Oxfam International 2011; Worldwatch 2011). Growing evidence in support of such alternative models came from the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development conducted by the UN in 2008. In undertaking the assess­ ment, the UN drew on evidence from a wide range of international scientists and concluded that small-scale, family-based farming systems that adopted agro-ecological approaches were among the most productive systems in de­ veloping countries (Meinzen-Dick and Markelova 2009; Ong’wen and Wright 2007). Advocates of these models share ‘a recognition that hunger, poverty, and climate change are inter-related through the medium of agricultural policies’ and have widely distributed the evidence against the global corporate model of commercial, high-input farming that employs biotechnology and genetic engineering to meet short-term commercial market objectives (Goswami 2011). But the issue of who has the power to push their model is more a matter of politics than of science. This vast body of research favouring smaller-scale, agro-ecological approaches has been universally ignored by many global cor­ porate agricultural investors and international aid donors and their institu­ tional supporters, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa. The financial and political power of the international­ agriculture industry and its financial investors is faced with 118 6 | Rowden based -based 119 called globalisation and multilateralism, what does - Africanist and scholar Ama Biney has observed: ‘It is ironic that It is this common struggle that has led groups of small-scale farmers in So as a result of this so Unlike citizens in Ethiopia and many other developing countries, Indian Despite these provisions and promising developments, small-scale farmers democracy in India look like today? Poor people are fighting a company owned by Street Wall [and] are refusing to give up 2011) their land. (D’Almeida Human rights groups have documented the challenges faced by local ­ activ For Indian citizens, local political resistance to foreign corporate takeovers while Indian farmers commit suicide, the Indian purchase government land for is growing food seeking in to Ethiopia and Sudan’ (Biney 2009). citizens can legally object under the decentralised democracy Raj of as well Panchayati as under India’s Forest Rights Act. everywhere face illegal land evictions and dispossessions. Patel how the (2007) ‘win -win’ language of notes international corporate agribusinesses conceals the fact that ‘as lands have fallen before chased, the suicide banks, rates repossessed for and farmers across repur­ the world have soared’, including India. in Pan- ists working against overseas land acquisitions on the countries, ground such in as their Ethiopia, Madagascar own and Uganda. In Uganda, national two organisations, ­ inter Oxfam and Uganda Land Alliance, with de-registration were for threatened what the government claimed amounted violence to over inciting land issues in a controversial in 2011 Uganda, Indonesia, report Guatemala, on Honduras ‘land and grabbing’ South stated that Sudan. 22,500 Ugandans The living in report the Kiboga and neighbouring Mubende districts had been thrown out of their homes to make way for the UK of farmland is Many nothing new. have witnessed for fiveyears the local­ resist ance by citizens in Orissa against the South (POSCO) steel plant project. Korean Environmental rightsShiva notes activist Vandana Pohang Steel Company that ownership of POSCO has largely passed hands of from Western institutional South investors. She Koreans asked: into the growing local and international civil society resistance, and it remains seen to which side be will win this battle over agricultural models and land rights. New Forests Company, and that security forces had been deployed in 2010 to enforce the evictions (Oxfam International 2011). The groups successfully ­ pres sured the government to act on behalf of these local communities in Uganda, and ultimately the government announced a review new process of for agricultural the deals, in contract which New and Forests Company a agreed to participate. This was an important first step in ensuring that people’sare voices heard. This case shows how important effectivecitizen mobilisations can be, but also how much more advocacy work gains lies are ahead actually enforced to in ensure Uganda and that elsewhere. such India, such as the National Alliance of People’s Movements, who have been fighting forced evictions and dispossession in rural India, to take increas­ ing note of the global nature of their problems. As Indian companies move overseas, some activists say that there is now a need for local Indian activists fighting for the rights of small-scale farmers to link with small-scale farmers and advocates around the world to stop the large-scale corporate land acquisi­ tions internationally. Some of the new solidarity links are asking Indian land rights activists to support activists in Africa by getting the Indian government to better regulate the overseas activities of Indian companies. For example, in a June 2011 ‘Open Letter to the People of India’, the Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia asked India’s citizens to take steps to stop the harmful ‘land grabbing’ in Ethiopia by Indian companies (Metho 2011). In May 2012, Ethiopian activists issued a public statement at a protest outside the Indian embassy in Washington DC calling on the Indian government to pressure Indian firms to desist from illegal land acquisitions, disclose the terms and conditions of individual land deals to the Ethiopian public and recognise the risks to India’s reputation and the real risks to investors, and warned that a future ‘representative gov­ ernment’ in Ethiopia would not recognise or enforce current or future land deals (Birara 2012). Many believe it is urgent that citizens who are free to raise their political voice should do so and forge alliances among the grassroots activists, organisa­ tions and movements that are challenging land deals both in India and Africa (Mittal 2011). For example, Ashok Choudhary of the National Forum of Forest People and Forest Workers has acknowledged that:

as Indians, it is our responsibility to be sensitive to Indian companies taking other countries’ land overseas ... Today the corporates are going everywhere, so we all have a common struggle. (Choudhary 2011)

Medha Patkar of Narmada Bachao Andolan and the National Alliance of People’s Movements has stated:

We are very concerned about what the Indian international companies are ­doing overseas, and we want to see international linkages of citizens get together to address this. Indian citizens must get involved with their partners in Africa and Southeast Asia to address this common crisis. (Patkar 2011)

The international advocacy links also include public protests outside the meetings of big agribusiness associations in New York City and the growing efforts by university students in the Responsible Endowments Coalition, which monitors university endowments and investments and advocates for more responsible university investments, including divestment of those institutional investors financing land deals. 120 6 | Rowden ­ 121 colonial colonial race to take over land in poor African nations to outsource food - What does India want to be remembered as having achieved in the 21st century: exploitative colonization of less powerful nations and peoples, or leadership in the welfare of all humans in peace with the earth? and energy production. Through direct and indirect facilitation, the Indian government is encouraging its corporations to turn into 21st century versions of the British colonized East has India Yesterday’s become Company. today’s (Mittal colonizer. 2011) there Yet is also a long tradition of domestic citizen activism on land rights In its new avatar as an economic India superpower, has also joined the neo For For their part, many Indian companies reject the allegations of ‘land grab within within India, and a growing recognition among its activists and international networks of a responsibility on citizens to take steps at abusive actions home of to Indian companies rein overseas. in In light the of India’s involvement in the ‘land grabbing’ trend, Mittal poses a challenge to Indian citizens: bing’ and insist that the land deals are simply strategies for expansion. Sharad Pawar, India’s agriculture minister, also rejected claims that the government supports a new colonisation of African farmland: terested in ‘Some buying agricultural companies land for are sugar cane ­ in and then selling it on international the markets. It’s business, nothing more’ (Nelson 2009). critics of role India’s in the However, new ‘land grabbing’ trend suggest that the current behaviour of India’s companies does not bode well for the country’s growing role in the world economy. For example, Mittal the says: Oakland Institute’s Anuradha Conclusion

PART III Brazil

7 | Brazil’s cooperation in African agricultural development and food security

Thomas Cooper Patriota and Francesco Maria Pierri

Introduction Over the past decade, three major international evolutions have run in parallel with a similar number of shifts in Brazil’s political and economic trajectory. These interactions have in turn raised the emerging South American country’s profile in global development and food security debates, and in a particularly relevant way for African countries. First, the international commodity export boom driven by the growth of East Asian economies coincided with the first government led by the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) after the election of President Lula da Silva in 2003. While the commodity windfall enabled Brazil to pay off its external debts and to accumulate substantial foreign reserves,1 these goals were achieved through the initial adoption of orthodox macroeconomic policies and a reliance on commodity exports – an unwelcome reminder of the persistent political weight of traditional socioeconomic structures even as Brazil launched its first-ever ‘popular democratic’ government. However, the orthodox package had been steadily abandoned by the end of the first Lula mandate, giving way to a return to policy-making sovereignty and the reactivation of the developmental state, thereby enabling Brazil to enter a new and consistent cycle of state-led economic growth. Brazil’s positive reversal of its balance of payments situation was partly enabled by two major technological advances in its national agro-industrial sector resulting from decades of state-led investment. On the one hand, the Brazilian economy was able to raise production levels quickly to take advantage of rising international demand for commodities. In part, this was thanks to considerable productivity gains brought about by investments in tropical agriculture led by the Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (Embrapa), a public research enterprise created in the 1970s. Indeed, since 2008 Brazil has become the third biggest global agriculture exporter after the US and the EU (the largest for sugar, beef, poultry, coffee, orange juice, tobacco and alcohol; second for soya beans and maize; and fourth for pork) (Landim 2010).2 On the other hand, thanks to its national biofuel programme and industrial 125 ­innovation in developing flexible-fuel (flex-fuel) engines for its national car fleet (Schütte and Barros 2010), Brazil achieved energy self-sufficiency and reduced its dependence on imported oil. The new engines enable cars to run on any combination of oil and ethanol, giving consumers the option of switching to whichever fuel is cheapest at any time. More than 90 per cent of all cars currently built in Brazil are equipped with flex-fuel engines. Brazil’s growth in recent years has been driven mostly by a gradual expansion of the domestic market (while at the same time a policy of strategic integration into global markets has been pursued) and a reduction in income concentration, a growth strategy quite different from the state-led and ‘trickle-down’ growth approach of the 1970s. Indeed, along with the accumulation of foreign reserves, a tightly regulated domestic-oriented banking system and the diversification of trade relations with countries of the global South, it was the expansion of the domestic market that greatly reduced the country’s vulnerability to international shocks, such as the financial and economic crisis of 2008–09. Exports have accounted for less than a quarter of gross domestic product (GDP) in recent years (23 per cent in 2008), while household consumption expenditures totalled almost two-thirds of GDP (60.7 per cent in 2008), more than in India (54.5 per cent) or China (35.3 per cent) (Leo and Watanabe 2010; World Bank 2011b). With the gradual reduction of the external constraints by the end of the first Lula mandate, state-induced growth policies, such as massive public in­ vestment in infrastructure, expansion of access to credit, steady rises in the minimum wage above the inflation rate and a comprehensive array of social protection and promotion benefits, created the conditions for rapid economic growth and a reduction in the number of people living in poverty. Growth was broad-based, covering all sectors. During the last decade, although Brazil’s GDP grew by a modest 4 per cent on average (2003–10), notably less than during the 1970s, the quality of growth was considerably better. Thus, the Gini index decreased from 0.5957 to 0.5448 (2001–09), 29 million people entered the ‘new middle class’ (2003–09), rising from the two lowest income quintiles (D and E) to the third or C class – statistical categories used by Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics – and 15.384 million jobs were created (2003–10) (Neri 2010). The combination of an inclusive growth strategy along with expanded social protection programmes produced dramatic results in terms of growth and social welfare. The minimum wage rose 80 per cent in real terms from 2003 to 2011. The social safety net includes ‘targeted’ programmes such as the Bolsa Família (conditional cash transfers distributed to more than 12 million families, almost a quarter of the population), as well as universal coverage systems such as social security pensions (34.8 million direct beneficiaries, of which 8.4 mil­ lion were in rural areas in 2011). These pensions directly and indirectly benefit 104 million people, according to IBGE. This more recent trend, and its gradual 126 7 | Patriota and Pierri 127 called G20 developing nations, which called - 4 mechanisms as IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa ­ dia 5 At the same time, Brazil was being increasingly recognised as 3 As a result of these policies, Brazil drastically reduced food insecurity and Third, these changes have coincided with the gradual economic and poli­ rural poverty in the midst of the 2007–08 world food crises. Indeed, from 2003 to 2009, of the 29 million people who 4.8 rose million above were rural the dwellers. national From poverty another statistical line, perspective, families 869,000 operating under family farming tenure left poverty behind them, the result of an upward rural income trajectory marked from by agricultural increases (+18 per in cent) income and non-agricultural (+30 per cent) (Del activities Grossi 2010). Child malnutrition (0–5 years) cent in also 1996 to dropped 7 from per cent 13 in 2006 per (CONSEA et al. 2009). tical rise of emerging countries and fundamental shifts policy. Whereas in previous Braziliangovernments had foreign mostly concentrated on ­ maintain ing close ties with the developed world foreign and policy neighbouring strongly countries, reinforced Lula’s political and economic global relations South. with South America the was prioritised as the main geopolitical area regional integration, of but ties with the African continent were also reaffirmed, and there was increasing coordination with other emerging countries through such ‘plurilateral’ consolidation consolidation through a wide range of government policies, can be seen as a true departure from previous neoliberal arrangements (Fagnani 2011). This sec­ ond and most crucial element in Brazil’s domestic policy plans directly relates to the return of the food security issue to the top of the international agenda following the sudden hike in food prices social and in political implications (Group 2007–08, of Eight with – G8 its – Summit considerable in Hokkaido Toyako, Japan, 2008; United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization – FAO – World Summit on Food Security, Rome, 2008; African Union Summit, Sirte, Libya, 2009). a relevant player in global food security. This recognition was the success influencedof its by Zero Hunger strategy, which combined expanding access to food to the low -income population (Bolsa Família beneficiaries, primaryand secondary school students) with the concomitant strengthening of domestic family farming (França 2009). for for an end to agricultural subsidies in developed unfavourable countries deal and at rejected the an Cancun WTO ministerial conference 2003. in The second September was Brazil’s leadership in rejecting, and effectively burying, a Free Trade Area of the Americas in the last round of negotiations in Miami logue forum), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China (Brazil, and South South Africa, Africa), BASIC India and China), the nations (World Group Trade Organization of or WTO), 20 the (G20) G20 developing major economies, in the and various multilateral governance forums. There were two crucial turning points, of which the first was Brazil’s central role (along with India, China and South Africa) in creating the so in November 2003. This new foreign policy of forging a South–South tactical alliance has resulted in increased trade and investment relations between Brazil and developing countries. As mentioned above, these three developments not only relate to the global development debate but are also specifically relevant to African countries. With regard to the reactivation of the developmental state, policy makers in most Southern countries, including in Africa, have also benefited from the recent windfall in commodity prices, which has arguably given them more room to manoeuvre in their policy making. Also, the rise of emerging countries such as China and other South-East Asian states is very much driven by an export-led strategy based on productivity gains resulting from investments in innovation coupled with temporarily undervalued wages to achieve a com­ petitive advantage. Since most African countries have not yet experienced knowledge-intensive growth, and are mostly agriculture-driven economies in tropical settings, it is not surprising that the technologies that enabled Brazil’s agriculture to achieve high productivity gains have attracted the attention of many African policy makers. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that until the late 1990s these gains happened largely to the detriment of family farmers in Brazil, under what is often referred to as a ‘painful’ and ‘conservative’ agricultural modernisation process undertaken after the mid-1970s (Graziano de Silva 1981). During this period, the military regime’s development strategy led to the concentration of natural resources and the means of production, and to the monopolisation of knowledge and research in the hands of big agribusiness. The result was a rural exodus, which in turn led to the concentration of poor, marginalised populations in urban slums in Brazilian cities. Indeed, between 1960 and 1990, Brazil’s Gini index of income inequality rose from 0.5367 to 0.6091 (Neri 2010). Unfortunately, the same political, cultural and economic constraints that long hampered the development of family farming in Brazil persist to some extent in African policy-making circles as a result of the dismantling of post-independence state-building advances under the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s (Moyo 2008). Indeed, even though many African countries have a predominantly rural population, most of them have invested less in their agricultural sectors as a proportion of GDP than other developing countries over the last three decades. For instance, African public investment in agriculture only rose from 5 per cent to 7 per cent of national budgets between 1980 and 2005, while that of Asian countries rose from 6 per cent to 15 per cent (Fan 2009). Moreover, in those African countries that actually have invested in agriculture, these investments have usually privileged a large-scale export-oriented model, to the point where these countries have become important food exporters even as significant portions of their populations suffer from hunger and malnutri­ 128 7 | Patriota and Pierri - As with down nature of North–South - 129 driven driven and devoid of conditionalities or commercial oriented agriculture investments reflects not only the rise The number of development projects has risen exponentially over the past Indeed, with regard to African countries, more than 100 cooperation agree­ Brazil–Africa cooperation in agriculture: scope, content and directions tion. tion. On the one hand, the neglect of public investment in agriculture in past development international of weight disproportionate the reflects often decades agencies in African governments’ policy decisions. On the prioritisation other, of -scale, large export- of foreign investment by ‘land grabbing’ transnational firms – public or private – but also, and perhaps most a importantly, still pervasive perception of family farming as structurally unproductive. According to this view, those engaged in family farming are destined either to be absorbed into urban labour markets or to become recipients of rural social assistance programmes. decade, putting Brazil among the key players (although with a less sizeable financial portfolio than most emerging in countries South–South cooperation until now). According to the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (Agência Brasileira de Cooperação or ABC), total cooperation amounted to US$90 million between 2003 and 2009 (of which US$45 million was for African countries, as shown in these figures 7.1). However, Table do not takeinto account channelled resources through several other mechanisms (ibid.). Indeed, a study conducted Instituto by de Pesquisa Econômica the Aplicada (Ipea) (which included mechanisms such as contributions to international organisations, humanitarian scholarships aid as well and as TCDC) concluded that Brazil’s cooperation amounted to US$1.4 billion between 2005 and 2009 (Ipea 2010a). ments were signed between 2003 and 2009 (amounting to a total of more than 250 projects when combined with the existing 176), than 300 and initiatives were under way in in 37 African countries, 2010 with a total alone budget more cooperation (Ayllón Pino and Costa Leite 2010). More asspecifically, embodied by the concept of ‘solidarity diplomacy’, in cooperation principle is Brazilian demand- South–South interests. It aims to ‘reinforce institutions and human resources through the development of capacities’ (ABC 2010a). other emerging countries in the past decade, Brazil’s cooperation profile has gradually shifted from ‘recipient’ to ‘donor’. However, latterthe should term be distinguished from its traditional use by the Organisation for Economic Co operation and Development (OECD) countries in that it follows the principles of South–South or horizontal cooperation (ABC South–South 2010a). cooperation is In frequently used in Brazil, reference to the one of term its specific modalities, namely technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC). As defined by the Buenos Aires the plan global South of in action 1978, adopted one of the by 138 main ity, of countries principles in of contrast TCDC to is the horizontal­ frequently criticised top Table 7.1 Official amounts of Brazilian international cooperation (2003–09)

World region Total amount (US$ million)

Africa 45 Latin America and Caribbean 40 Asia (East Timor) 5

Source: Ipea 2010b6

of US$65 million and for an estimated period of three years (ABC 2010b). Of the cooperation project proposals submitted by recipient countries to ABC, a majority are from Africa, while agriculture is the most frequently requested field of expertise (ABC 2010a). With the aim of laying the ground for a more systematic agricultural co­ operation strategy between Brazil and Africa, the Brazil–Africa Dialogue on Food Security, Fight against Hunger and Rural Development convened more than 40 African ministers in Brasília between 10 and 12 May 2010. The ensuing declaration gave Brazil’s agricultural cooperation with Africa a strong political mandate (in a similar way to the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation or the India–Africa Forum Summits) and laid out a roadmap of the main actions to be taken. One may distinguish two main pillars of Brazil’s current agricultural coop­ eration in Africa. First, there is the sharing of tropical agriculture technologies (mainly provided by Embrapa) with many countries of the continent, often in tandem with investments in and technology transfers for the production of food crops as well as biofuels. Second, there are various forms of support for African family farming (mainly coordinated by the Ministry of Agrarian Development or MDA – Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário), ranging from the sharing of policy expertise aimed at this sector (such as public purchase schemes linked to domestic food aid and school feeding programmes) to concessional loans for importing Brazilian small-scale farming machinery. The differences in scope and underlying economic model in these initiatives very much reflect Brazil’s prevailing dual system of agriculture, in which a large-scale agribusiness sector mainly geared towards exports coexists with a medium- to small-scale family farming sector that produces most of the food consumed by the national population.

Technology transfer and capacity building in food crop and biofuel production Technical cooperation for productivity increases in food crops A great variety of institutions (ministries, universities, research enterprises, vocational ­training 130 7 | Patriota and Pierri ­ amples amples ­Ex­ ­machinery researchers ­researchers Similarly, in 8 called ‘structuring - África online portal. - 131

7 The Brazilian government has limited human resource capacity to attend Also worthy of mention are fairs to promote Brazilian agricultural In addition, since 2008, ABC has started promoting so to all these demands, as most cooperation is handled by government officials who must also cope with daily business set in up Brazil. permanent Consequently, offices Embrapa in Accra, Ghanato respond in more 2008 systematically to the as exponentially part ofAfrican growing countries recent efforts interested requests in Brazil’s from expertise in tropical agriculture. Also, in May 2010 (during the Brazil–Africa Dialogue), Embrapa launched the Centre for Strategic Studies and Training in Tropical Agriculture (Centro de Estudos Estratégicos e Capacitação em Agricultura Tropical or CECAT) division specifically in intended to offer Brasília, technical training courses to a centres, centres, rural extension service providers) participate in agricultural Brazil’s co operation through myriad training and technology transfer projects. of the more than 300 small cooperation projects being implemented or under negotiation with African countries include technical training in agement cattle for man­ beef and milk production in Senegal; development support in for Cape horticultural Verde; development of fishstrengthening farming cocoa production in Tanzania;in Congo and (ABC 2010b). from tropical countries. At the same time, the Africa–Brazil Agricultural Inno­ vation Marketplace, a technological innovation platform, was Embrapa in partnership with the Forum for Agricultural launched in Research Africa and by several international donors (International Fund for Agricultural Development, World Bank, UK Department for International Development Foundation). By means of and the latter platform, joint the research projects involving Gates African agricultural research institutions and Embrapa are selected through a competitive process and financed by the project’s donors.Currently, projects are being implemented in Ethiopia, Burkina Kenya, Mozambique, Faso, Ghana, Tanzania and Togo. 2010, Câmara Setorial de Máquinas e Implementos sector-specific Agrícolas chamber (CSMIA), for the machines and agricultural implements,an agreement signed with Embrapa to create the Agrishow Pró and equipment, such as Brazil Agri-Solutions organised by the Agência Brasil­ eira de Promoção de Exportações e Investimentos (Apex), the Brazilian trade and investment promotion agency, in 2009 in Dakar, Senegal. This will provide information promoting Brazilian and agricultural technology both machinery online and at fairs to be held in site African will countries. The also include contact information for Brazilian companies (Casale in 2011). CSMIA projects’ with the intention of concentrating resources on larger projects with a more durable impact. These include the Cotton-4 project volving in Burkina Faso, Benin Mali and Senegal); (also the Rice ­ in Culture project in Senegal (also benefiting Guinea-Bissau and Mali); and the Triangular Cooperation Programme for Agricultural Development of the African Tropical Savannah (the Pro-Savannah Japan–Brazil–Mozambique project) in Mozambique (see also Chapter 8). The Cotton-4 project is related to the Doha development round negotia­ tions, specifically the common concerns voiced by Brazil and West African cotton-producing states (C4) about US and EU subsidies. Indeed, these were ultimately deemed unlawful by a Brazil–US dispute panel at the WTO.9 The panel ruled that the US subsidy to its cotton farmers artificially drove down global cotton prices, thereby harming production in poor countries. Em­ brapa’s experience in developing cotton varieties over the past 20 years in Brazil (whose soils and climatic conditions are similar to those of the C4 countries) is ­being t­ransferred with the aim of increasing C4 countries’ com­ petitiveness in inter­national ­markets. Adaptation of Brazilian cotton ­varieties by a Malian experimental farm as well as integrated pest management has allowed ­Malian farmers to increase cotton yields from 1,000 kilograms per hectare in 2008 to 3,000 kilograms per hectare in 2009. In addition, 56 re­ searchers from participating countries’ agriculture research centres were given advanced training (World Bank 2011b).10 The Rice Culture project in Senegal aims to support the country’s strategy of developing rice culture in various forms with the goal of achieving self- sufficiency.11 A partnership between Embrapa and the Senegalese Institute for Agricultural Research aims to mechanise local production by training Senega­ lese technicians and includes the testing of several varieties of rice developed by Embrapa for the local production of adapted seeds. The Pro-Savannah project is a trilateral cooperation partnership between Japan and Brazil’s cooperation agencies (Japan International Cooperation Agency – JICA – and ABC) and the Institute for Agrarian Research of Mozam­ bique (Instituto de Investigação Agrária de Moçambique), and aims to develop the so-called Nacala corridor in the northern provinces of Nampula, Zambézia, Niassa and Cabo Delgado, an area of approximately 540,000 square kilometres. As with the Maputo and Beira corridor initiatives, Mozambican authorities aim to take advantage of the strategic assets of Nacala (the deepest natural port in East Africa) and the railway that links it to landlocked Malawi and further to Tete province (where Brazilian iron ore multinational Vale has multibillion dollar investments in the extraction of mineral coal). The Nacala air base is also being converted into an international airport by the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht, while the Japanese government is financing the construction and rehabilitation of the port of Nacala, as well as local roads, schools and hospitals (Mourão 2011). The Pro-Savannah project aims to replicate the experience of developing the Brazilian cerrado region (a similar biome to Mozambique’s savannah), which 132 7 | Patriota and Pierri

­ ­ cerrado PD); PD); and - 133 region was fraught with long-lasting ­ nega cerrado cerrado cerrado project began in the mid-1970s with Japanese PI); PI); ii) Plan for Agricultural Development (ProSavana - País Económico 2012). However, it is not clear what proportion of Savannah’s Savannah’s stated aim is to transform the region’s subsistence agri - -Savannah is a threefold programme: i) Project for Improving Research Project for Rural Extension (ProSavana-PE). With an initial estimated cost Pro Brazilian Brazilian private investment is integrated into this initiative: the Mozam­ Pro In the research centres, cotton, soya bean, maize, sorghum and culture in order to achieve ‘food security additionally ‘generating exportable surpluses through an -led agribusiness agri­ through the rise of productivity’, culture’ (O production is destined for internal sale (although this would probably be the ment ment (ProSavana and Technology Transfer Capacity for Nacala Corridor Agriculture Develop tive tive social and environmental consequences, Embrapa has taken steps not to repeat the same negative outcomes in the Mozambique project. bican Ministry of Agriculture is putting some of the land in the programme at the disposal of Brazilian farmers on very favourable terms (50-year concessions priced at US$1.38 per hectare per year), provided that 90 per cent of the labour they employ is Mozambican, with the possible additional benefitof fiscal ­ incen tives to import Brazilian machinery. The attractiveness for Brazilian farmers, apart from the low price of land and the much cheaper freight absence charges for exports of to China from a Nacala than from language barrier, lies in any Brazilian port, as well as preferential African trade terms countries accorded under low -income such arrangements as the Opportunity Act US or the African EU’s Everything Growth but and Arms initiative. Some 40 from farmers the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso made a first visitSeptember 2011 to Mozambique (Mello in 2011). was converted from barren land into one of the most productive agricultural regions in the world. The cooperation and the implementation of technologies developed by Embrapa. Although the project in the bean seeds are currently being adapted to northern Mozambican (Mello conditions 2011). The remaining two branches of the programme (PD and PE) are still being formulated. ProSavana-PD will be a -term long plan, aiming, among other things, to ‘identify areas that have more vocation for family farming as well as those with potential for -scale large agribusiness’ (Pires 2011). iii) of US$13.48 million over a -year five period, -PI ProSavana is planned to benefit 500 Mozambican researchers and rural extension officers and 40,000 farmers ‘through the construction of integrated agricultural research centres, equipped with -purpose multi laboratories and seed processing units’, training as and capacity -building well modules for as rural ‘two extension technicians’ (ABC 2010b). In 2011, 150 Mozambican researchers completed a course at Embrapa’s CECAT training centre in Brasília and are expected to transmit knowledge the to acquired colleagues in Mozambique (Pires 2011) (see also Chapter 8). case for staple crops such as maize, sorghum and beans) to ensure Mozam­ bican food security, or will be destined for export markets (as can be expected for soya beans and cotton). Nonetheless, both the Mozambican government and other Brazilian cooperation projects do offer complementary strategies for achieving food security as a main goal. For instance, Embrapa’s four-year technical support to a food security and nutrition project, co-financed by the US Agency for International Development (US$8 million) and ABC (US$4 million) for the period 2011–15, ‘aims to strengthen capacity for horticultural produc­ tion and distribution … as well as to consolidate family-based agriculture’ in Mozambique (World Bank 2011b; Chichava 2011). Moreover, although technology transfers, capacity building and national employment guarantees, as well as the stated objectives of enhancing local farmers’ productivity through sustainable and environmentally sound prac­ tices, are encouraging (Mourão 2011),12 it remains to be seen whether the land leased to Brazilian or other foreign companies will result in conflicts with local peasants in cases where they have to relinquish plots. Official declarations (as well as Mozambican land laws) indicate that companies should be allocated mostly idle land. According to official sources, only 2 million hectares or 4 per cent of Mozambique’s 55 million hectares of tropical savannah are currently cropped (Kumashiro and Paiva 2011). In the programme’s initial phase, 120,000 hectares have been partly allocated by provincial governments to Mozambican ex-combatants, family farming communities or producers’ associations (Pires 2011). Similarly, although Brazilian companies tend to be considered relatively labour-friendly, such conditions are not universal. Indeed, labour conditions in parts of the Brazilian countryside are still appalling and have been rightly decried by national and international critics. Thus, it would be commendable for Brazilian and Mozambican government authorities to ensure that decent labour conditions prevail in the Brazilian investment projects in the Nacala corridor.

Technology transfers in biofuel production Food security, environmental and labour conditions and how these relate to land use and tenure are also the three main issues at stake regarding the potential and pitfalls of biofuels, whether in Brazil or Africa. Indeed, during the food price hikes of 2007–08, Brazil’s biofuel industry was accused of driving up sugar prices. However, while the US ethanol industry did have a serious impact on corn prices (and consequently on food security in countries such as Mexico, for instance, where corn is a staple), so far ‘Brazil’s sugarcane production has risen sufficiently to cover demand for both sugar and ethanol’ (Schütte and Barros 2010). Even so, since that time Brazil’s ethanol promotion abroad has become more cautious, and now specifies that the cultivation of sugar cane devoted to ethanol should take place only in parallel with productivity gains in food 134 7 | Patriota and Pierri ­ day day etha

-Ecological Zoning of Sugar 135 largest largest producer and the prime exporter of - thirds -thirds of world exports), while its sugar cane-based The Brazilian government’s Structured Support Programme to Developing This This precaution also relates to environmental concerns, since Brazilian For African countries, provided that these issues are addressed effectively, Brazil is the second world’s Cane Law approved in 2009 does restricting at sugar least cane create expansion some and legal the safeguards building biomes, by including the of Amazon region. refineriesLabour conditions in in sugar cane sensitive fields have also made some progress, partly as a result of international pressure and a government crackdown on farmworker exploitation and cases of modern- ethanol is almost five times more energy efficient than US corn-based ethanol and uses half the land per litre (Schütte and concentration in a handful of countries currently Barros prevents ethanol ­ from acquir 2010). However, market ing global commodity status, making it more difficult to trade internationally than other established commodities. It is therefore in the interest of Brazil’s ethanol sector to increase the number of producer and consumer the transfer -producing of technologyMoreover, biofuel Brazil’s to African countries. coun­ tries may also generate demand for equipment linked to its processing and ethanol-specific car manufacturing industries. ethanol production has frequently been accused of contributing to deforesta­ tion. Although sugar cane plantations in Brazil are located kilometres from the Amazon more rainforest, the concept of indirect land use change than 2,000 (ILUC) rightly illustrates the risks of crop substitution. Indeed, in some cases sugar cane expansion has displaced soya bean and low-productivity extensive cattle into ranching Amazon lands, thus indirectly causing deforestation. While not directly addressing the ILUC issue, the Agro and depending on each country’s characteristics, Brazilian biofuels can reduce energy cooperation dependence on in oil imports, contribute to national refineryindustries, generateincome in the countryside and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, the riots that erupted 2007–08 in were many linked African not countries only in to rising costs food of prices public but transport also as to a the with result higher food of sovereignty, the lower parallel energy hike dependence in is by oil many seen African prices. countries, as hence As their a interest in strategic acquiring Brazilian biofuel goal production technology. crops, crops, and only in countries where there is sufficientarable landto make this combination viable. Official discourse has also production come should to preferably stress take ethanol that place in zones or already pasture. under The cultivation more recent Brazilian hyperbolic discourse debate is on biofuel indeed and ‘land relevant grabbing’ to in Africa. the slavery. However, working conditions remain dire on many sugar cane estates (see Chapter 8). nol (accounting for two Countries in Renewable Energies (Pro-Renova) has promoted capacity building by means of research and technology transfers through African regional bodies such as the Southern African Development Community and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). A memorandum of understand­ ing was signed with the West African Economic and Monetary Union (Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine or UEMOA) in 2007,13 and is to be extended to the other ECOWAS members in cooperation with this regional bloc’s recently inaugurated Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency in Praia, Cape Verde (World Bank 2011b). African countries’ biofuel strategies usually relate to several strategic goals, such as diversifying domestic energy resources, generating refinery capacity and diversifying exports, and are sometimes combined with sugar produc­ tion strategies. Moreover, unlike other commodities, sugar cane is difficult to export unprocessed, which creates opportunities for building local processing industries (ibid.). Most cooperation projects involve financing by Brazil’s development bank, BNDES (Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento) and the building of local ­refining plants, as in Angola, Ghana and Mozambique (US$1.5 billion credit line for Angola in 2006; US$3.5 billion for Ghana and Mozambique in 2010) (ibid.). Joint ventures have been signed between Brazilian and African companies in Angola (Odebrecht has participated in building ethanol plants with Damer and state-owned Sonangol) and Ghana (with Northern Sugar Resources), with loans of US$400 million and US$260 million respectively from BNDES. Furthermore, Dedini has built a plant in Sudan (with the Kenana Sugar Company) while Petrobras’s biofuel subsidiary, Petrobras Biocombustível, as well as Guarani, are collaborating with Mozambique’s Companhia de Sena and state-owned Petromoc (CEIRI 2011). Several African countries have established national laws and regulatory mechanisms for compulsory minimum percentages of ethanol and biodiesel in national oil distribution circuits (Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya) (Guarany 2011). Indeed, several of these countries are significant importers of Brazilian ethanol: Nigeria (tenth largest importer), Ghana (six­ teenth) and Angola (twenty-second) in 2008 (Freemantle and Stevens 2010). Other countries have concentrated on export markets with the assistance of Brazil’s cooperation and private sectors, as part of its ethanol commoditisation strategy, thereby helping to create international links between ethanol producer and consumer countries. In this respect, several tripartite partnerships have been signed, such as the international long-term supply contracts between Sudan and the UK, or between Ghana and Sweden. These contracts arise from the EU countries’ goal of mixing minimum percentages of biofuels for their car fleets (Bravo 2011).14 National strategies in countries such as Angola and Mozambique clearly 136 7 | Patriota and Pierri can be of great 16 owned and private In recent years, family farm­ and increasing demands for 17 as well as creating the conditions 15 137 Brazil–Africa Brazil–Africa cooperation in biofuels has thus involved several research Brazil’s Brazil’s Zero Hunger strategy succeeded in creating virtuous social and relevance relevance (Cassel 2010). There are many other examples of policies strengthening aimed family farming at in Brazil, and this approach forms the basis of the other main branch of Brazilian agricultural cooperation with Africa. refining companies. However, the-refining companies.potential biofuel benefits However, ofcoopera ­ Brazil’s tion for generating income in rural areas and in the general economy largely depend on the African country’s own national strategy. With regard to family farming, for instance, the Biofuels Association of Zambia has expressed interest in small-scale projects, particularly those that combine biofuel production with electricity generation from sugar cane bagasse (i.e. refuse from the processing of sugar cane). In this sense, although still at an initial stage, Brazil’s National Programme for the Production and Use of Biodiesel Produção (Programa Nacional e de Uso do Biodiesel), which processing gives firms special that discounts acquire to minimum - biodiesel percentages(soya of beans, castor their oil, materials raw palm oil, etc.) from family farmers, institutions as well as sugar cane growing and/or state- for for both large agribusiness and family farming country. Born out ventures of agreements signed in by the each Brazilian government with recipient the US in 2007 and the EU in Central 2011, American and and technical African countries, cooperation the agreements project with is financed by investors, including the a pool International of Development Bank and Organization of American States, Brazilian government agencies (Financiadora de Estudos Projetos e and Apex), as well as Vale (Pires 2011). agricultural research and technology that have since resulted in sector-specific policy and technological innovation. Championing Championing small farmers: a strategy that pays Family farming for food security and sovereignty: policy dialogue and dialogue policy Family and farming sovereignty: for food security the value chain across technical cooperation recognise recognise the need to reconcile ethanol and sugar production and food security, given the large tracts of land earmarked Brazilian think tank Fundação for Getulio (FGV’s) Vargas’s Belt Tropical project ethanol is production. Similarly, conducting studies aimed at reconciling food and biofuel private investments in Central American and African countries, ing ing has been legitimised as a ‘national development actor’ in Brazil. its Besides essential contribution to food security, it is prominent also role recognised in as the playing achievement a of other strategic of goals, inflationary such as pressures, control stabilisation of balance occupation of of payments, rural sustainable areas and countering the rural exodus. has This gradually recognition resulted in the allocation of public funds fically to mandated a ministry stimulateto speci­ familyfarming, economic circles in the countryside by linking public support to family farming with food distribution programmes at the onset of the international food, financial and economic crises of 2008. This success turned Brazil into a prominent actor in policy dialogue and technical cooperation on agricultural and food security matters. Brazil has thus been able to promote its own food security paradigm in the various international forums opened up by its foreign policy, such as the BRICS and the G20 agriculture ministers’ meetings. The adoption of a programme promoting national public procurement policies – partly inspired by Brazil’s recent experience – by the World Food Programme (Purchase for Progress), as well as the election in 2011 of José Graziano da Silva, a leading mentor in Brazil’s food security strategy, as the FAO Director-General, bear testimony to the international recognition of Brazil’s new food security paradigm. Starting in 2003, the government created a ‘network of permanent and simultaneous public policies geared towards family farming, encompass­ ing credit, technical assistance, agriculture in­surance, price guarantee and public procurement policies’ (ibid.). These policies have provided efficient support to family farmers across the value chain, with outstanding results. Seventy per cent of the food consumed by Brazilians is produced by a dynamic, land-intensive and diversified family farming sector, whose productivity per hectare is today estimated to be 89 per cent higher than that of large-scale monoculture (França 2009). An important lesson to be learned from the policies supporting Brazilian family farming is that, for this strategy to be effective, all elements of support must be present. For instance, access to more credit without proper technical assistance to increase yields will only mire family farmers in debt. Similarly, potential rises in productivity could lead to overproduction without increases in income if farmers are not given proper access to markets, especially of the predictable and guaranteed kind that public procurement schemes can provide. As a result, MDA’s international cooperation efforts have aimed to replicate this value chain approach by structuring projects as a coherent ensemble of policy dialogues and training modules. On the supply side, the following programmes deserve mention: a comprehensive credit system (including the use of national networks of public finance institutions and the creation of specific credit lines for women and/or young farmers); family farmer insurance,­ which reimburses farmers in the case of unexpected harvest losses due to severe climatic events, or income losses from market price falls at the time of sale below guaranteed prices, calculated from average production costs; building a national technical assistance and rural extension system based on Brazil’s experience of rebuilding its own system to address the specific needs of small-scale farming, including ‘post-green revolution’ sustainable practices; and sharing the technological and equipment platform created under the More Food programme. 138 7 | Patriota and Pierri

18 139 Based on the priorities voiced by African ministers of Grown School Feeding (HGSF) programmes, often based The Geography of Hunger (1946) and a leading academic and PNAE PNAE is Brazil’s oldest national food distribution programme, and was On the demand side, the Brazilian government has created public procure ­ As a result, the Brazilian government signed a cooperation agreement with The joint FAO–Brazil umbrella project for trilateral cooperation (Linking political figure in Brazil’s struggleagainst hunger.became closely intertwined with agricultural In policy after the passing of 2009, federal the programme law 11.947. This determined that at least 30 per cent of PNAE resources must first created in the 1940s underthe influence the world famous of de Josué Castro, author of cooperation). cooperation). ment ment programmes, namely the Food Purchase Programme or PAA (Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos) and the National School Feeding PNAE Programme (Programa or Nacional de Alimentação Escolar), that farmers predictable have and given guaranteed family access to markets for their a products, way as of complementing sales to the private sector. Moreover, the creation of institutional markets was also based on the groups and public understanding food distribution systems that could benefit vulnerable from the supply of family farming products as part of a national food security strategy. Brazilian Brazilian support to family farming in Africa: public purchase and More Food for Africa programmes on Brazil’s PNAE, include Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Zambia Cape and São Verde, Mozambique, Tomé and Principe (the last three established with FNDE the FAO on the implementation of public created procurement an export programmes, and credit line to convert international initiative. its Moreover, More other Food elements programme of into Brazil’s an programmes family were farming also ultimately integrated into these projects so as to serve pre­ the integrated value chain approach. Family Agriculture to School and Feeding Food Assistance – A Model for Africa), signed on 11 February 2011, is to be implemented over three years with a total budget of US$2 million, in partnership with national and local governments, farmers’ organisations and the World Food Programme. to The transfer the pilot PAA methodology projects will be in Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Malawi, Senegal, Ethiopia and countries with Niger. Home- African agriculture, the international cooperation priorities in the 2010 Brazil–Africa Dialogue final declarationgave particular emphasis Brazil’s to family two farming main aspects strategy: of public procurement programmes the implementation of (through ten pilot projects, based on PAA, as well as expanding school meal programmes in African countries, based on PNAE); and support for family farming modernisation (through an international adaptation of the More Food programme). be used to purchase family farming products, prioritising agrarian reform beneficiaries, indigenous people and traditional communities (whenever pos­ sible, located in the school’s municipality). PAA was instituted in 2003 as a pillar of the Zero Hunger strategy, and acquires family farming products both for distribution to beneficiaries of social programmes and as price stabilising stocks.19 This cooperation effort therefore focuses on strengthening African governments’ institutional capacity to establish and operate sustainable public procurement and food distribution programmes based on the stimulation of local food production. Brazil’s leading PNAE and PAA policy makers believe not only that these programmes, when adapted to African countries, simultaneously address issues of social protection and access to markets and income generation, but also that the very process of building them is a relevant policy-making exercise. Particularly noteworthy is the participatory empowerment of all the actors (farmers, school directors, students, parents, nutritionists, supply agencies) and the fact that such projects create capacities on both the demand (various forms of public procurement) and supply side (technical assistance, rural extension, storage and marketing capacities) (Mielitz Netto 2011). The More Food for Africa programme is inspired by its More Food domestic equivalent, a credit line created in 2008 by MDA to address strategic food sovereignty needs at the onset of the international food price crisis by seizing the political opportunity presented to raise the productivity of Brazil’s family farming sector. The programme provides family farmers with credit on pref­ erential terms (2 per cent interest rates, a ten-year term and three-year grace period) to purchase at subsidised prices (up to 17.5 per cent discounts) a wide variety of agricultural equipment and machinery geared towards small- and medium-scale farming. In addition, there is technical assistance to identify specific mechanisation needs and transfer the operational skills. In thetwo years since its inception, the More Food programme has provided about US$2.2 billion in credit (with up to US$56,370 per family) through over 100,000 con­ tracts, dramatically increasing family farmer productivity per area (89 per cent) and income (30 per cent) (Cassel 2010; França 2009). It has also provided the industrial sector with steadily increasing demand, enabling it to plan investments in mass production of new machinery and equipment tailored to family farming. Thus, in 2002, tractors of up to 78 hp accounted for 37 per cent of total production, but by 2009 this had risen to 75 per cent. Moreover, the synergy generated by family farmers’ access to the programme and the consequent demand for agricultural machinery has amounted to a true national-scale countercyclical industrial policy.20 This was demonstrated at the height of the global financial crisis: from January to May 2009, the More Food programme drove 61 per cent of Brazil’s tractor sales and benefited 41 per cent of the agriculture machinery workforce. 140 7 | Patriota and Pierri ­machinery Zimbabwe (Agricultural 21 141 owned agricultural development plans. It is structured : A concessional loan is provided for each country to import the As mentioned before, the to initiative make the same agricultural agricultural equipment the parties consider necessary countries’ for national the family recipient farming development strategy. The More for Food Africa credit line was approved on ministers November of the 2010 Brazilian by Chamber the of council Foreign Trade of (Câmara cio Exterior de or Comér­ CAMEX) under the PROEX (Programa de Financiamentò às Exportacoes) concessional modality. CAMEX budgeted US$640 million for an initial two years on the following conditions: 2 per cent interest rate (or Libor, if this rate is below 2 per cent at the time of approval), and 15-year term three-year grace period; the reimbursement conditions to are 17 and extended five years respectively for Heavily Indebted Poor Country recipients. (HIPC) Agreement with the industrial sector: Recipient African countries draw up list a of machinery items while MDA negotiates prices with the manufactur ­ ers’ unions on the following conditions: firms are ranked accordingagreed methodology, to an based on their capacity to export to the African country as well as on buyer guarantees (convergent technological quality, repair -aid first kits and after-sales service); a unique price item, is determined regardless for of each brand; and items must number of be different bought companies from to ensure a marketfair access. minimum As of February 2012, five African countries had signed TCPs Brazil with Technical Technical cooperation project : (TCP) A TCP is signed facilitate with exchanges each on country technical assistance to and rural extension during activities field visits in Africa and Brazil. agreed The by the activities parties and and priorities generally include are policy social dialogues technologies to applied share in the Brazilian public policies. Credit

• based on their national agricultural development strategies: Ghana - (Medium term Agriculture Sector Investment Plan, 2011–15); • • as a threefold programme: and equipment available on similar bylaunched conditions President Lula during the Brazil–Africa Dialogue, thereby basically to African countries was converting the national credit line into an export finance concessionalThe ensuing loan. More Food for Africa programme was built to provide both ‘soft’ and ‘social’ technologies (technical assistance and policy dialogue) and ‘hard’ ones (machinery and equipment), and to link them in to support cooperation of African- projects Growth Strategy for the - Medium to Long-term Plan, 2011–30); Kenya (National AgriculturalDécennal Stratégique ­ de Mechanisa l’Agriculture); Senegal (Plan tion Strategy); and Mozambique (Plano Estratégico para do o Setor Desenvolvimento Agrário, 2011–20). In addition, Namibia, Tanzania, Cameroon, Benin and Sudan have formally expressed interest in entering the programme. The CAMEX ministers’ council has approved export credits of US$95.5 million, US$98.7 million and US$97.6 million for Ghana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique respectively.22

Conclusion Brazil’s agricultural cooperation in Africa is shifting from small localised projects to more structured ventures capable of having larger and more ­durable impacts on African rural development. Nonetheless, it still suffers from in­ adequate coordination between relevant ministries and other governmental bodies. However, the coexistence of two agricultural development paradigms in Brazil’s cooperation should not be seen as incoherent. Rather, it is a direct reflection of the two-tiered structure of Brazil’s agricultural policy framework, with support for agribusiness provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento) and for family farming by MDA. Consequently, the Brazilian government has attempted to present both as part of the Brazil–Africa Dialogue to enable African ministers to learn about the wide range of policies implemented in Brazil. Combined with demand-driven horizontal cooperation, the approach has enabled African countries to choose between (and sometimes combine) approaches to promoting their agriculture. The larger cooperation projects also represent a transition in Brazil’s co­ operation paradigm, which calls for an aggiornamento of its conceptual frame­ work of South–South cooperation. Indeed, although all Brazilian cooperation remains demand-driven – in line with traditional foreign policy principles of respect for people’s sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs – in practice its theoretical commitment to separate cooperation from com­ mercial interests and, arguably, from conditionalities has been bypassed in recent programmes. However, it is important to distinguish these from typical North–South tied aid or conditionality-driven cooperation. While technically More Food for Africa can be considered a case of tied aid,23 most critics of the latter usually focus on how it reinforces economic dominance by Northern countries, for example by simply exporting products or handing out ‘turnkey solutions’ without transferring the relevant technology or know-how: in short, ‘providing the fish without teaching how to fish’. The ‘trade not aid’ paradigm criticises ‘international development aid’ along the same lines, as merely a palliative for structurally unequal trade relationships. Conversely, Brazil’s South–South cooperation does not involve ‘aid’ in the form of money transfers. Rather, it focuses on capacity building and technology transfers. However, in the case of More Food for Africa, training in the use, maintenance and repair of machines is directly linked to the small-scale family farming technological package, and it would indeed be counterproductive for 142 7 | Patriota and Pierri Similarly, biofuel Similarly, cooperation 24 143 25 The degree of conditionality in the More Food for Africa programme, which However, while Brazil’s rural landscape is under a dual system that mixes However, the design However, of the More Food for Africa programme, which restricts Furthermore, More ultimate goal Food for is Africa’s to raise the productivity ­majority of the population, it becomes clear that what is needed, perhaps also requires applicant countries to present a pansion of national family strategy farming, is, for more the broadly ex­ speaking, a comprehensive reflection value of chain MDA’s approach. This ultimately reflects government’s push for the a food security Brazilian and rural development paradigm based on the promotion of family farming, although tary not strategies excluding for complemen­ the development of given -scale large that agriculture. in most Undoubtedly, African countries small-scale farming is still a practised by 1970s-style -scale large agriculture with family farming, African policy makers are able to incorporate Embrapa’s tropical agriculture productivity gains in a more socially sustainable way, and to avoid Brazil’s past tinent that mistakes is still much in less urbanised. a With a con­ coherent set of policies, those more than additional ‘aid’ funding, is a paradigm shift. Indeed, recent Brazil­ ian experience of support to family farming has be shown part that of this the solution sector if can given the proper set of incentives. the credit line to the same equipment available (in to spite Brazilian of family frequent farmers African requests to could purchase be -scale considered larger an equipment), ex post conditionality idea of that sorts, recipient with countries the will underlying use the acquired machines farming only purposes. for However, family recipient countries have complete choice about which aspects of Brazilian domestic policies they participation wish in to one adopt, programme and does their not cooperation determine their modalities. access Again, this to differs other from whatNorth–South cooperation. frequently occurs in reflects both solidarity and pragmatism, industrialisation as and it productivity is an opportunity gains through African for technology transfers, sugar cane growing from to refining, but alsoclearly serves a long-term interest on the part of Brazilian industries in ethanol commoditisation. of family farming in African countries, which has clear implications for their efforts to reduce dependency onfood imports. Brazilian Brazilian technicians to attempt to transfer technology for foreign machines they are not used to operating. the Moreover, programme’s credit line is more akin to government industry stimulus than to forms of rentier protectionism, and is destined for countries generally lacking local machinery industries that could be harmed by the preferential treatment It is afforded also Brazilian worth industry. mentioning that Brazil and recipient in countries are discussions currently about setting up joint ventures equipment workshops for as well building as other machinery industrial facilities and in loco. African countries that are still predominantly rural can create the conditions for a smoother transition – only barely initiated in Brazil – to a post-Fordist, geographically decentralised economy, with a greater rural–urban balance, based on small- and medium-scale employment-generating and technology- intensive establishments, which will hopefully bring about more socially and environmentally sustainable production and consumption patterns.

144 8 | Brazil, biofuels and food security in Mozambique

Kai Thaler

Introduction Brazil today stands as one of the great development successes of the twenti­ eth century. The country has greatly reduced its burden of poverty and hunger; it successfully transitioned from dictatorship to a vibrant democracy; and it has moved from a marginal role as a ‘sleeping giant’1 in international affairs to an increasingly assertive position as one of the so-called emerging powers of the twenty-first century. Brazil has many lingering social problems, among the greatest being persistently high levels of inequality, but in its new posi­ tion as a global leader and aspirant to greater power, the country has begun to turn its attention outward and take an active interest in other countries’ development. One of the main drivers of Brazil’s twentieth-century development process was its advances in agricultural production, which drove economic growth while also helping to alleviate hunger in its rapidly expanding cities (though often at the cost of the food and land sovereignty of the rural population). As Brazil has increased its involvement abroad, agriculture has become a pillar of its development assistance programmes and foreign direct investment and is seen as one of Brazil’s particular strengths as it seeks to cultivate stronger relationships with other countries in the global South, particularly in Africa. Food insecurity in Africa remains a constant concern for the continent’s governments and the international community. Many of the developing coun­ tries of Asia and Latin America greatly expanded agricultural production during the green revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, but the impacts of this shift in agricultural technologies and practices failed to take hold in Africa, leaving observers wondering when and how Africa should best achieve its own green revolution (see Diao et al. 2008; Gowing and Palmer 2008).2 Brazil’s experience in greatly increasing its own agricultural production has granted it expertise that may be useful in helping African countries to meet their food needs. Brazilian agricultural assistance and investments have not been limited to food production, however. Brazil has long been a global leader in the produc­ tion and usage of biofuels – combustible liquid fuels produced from agricul­ tural crops or crop waste.3 Biofuels have grown in prominence over the past 145 two decades as they have been presented as one potential option for meeting global energy needs while reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, seri­ ous concerns remain about the balance of costs and benefits provided by the production of biofuel from different feedstocks, including the effect of biofuel feedstock cultivation on food security (see Chapter 7). This chapter, therefore, explores the role of agriculture in Brazilian develop­ ment assistance programmes and direct investment in Africa, focusing on the potential tensions between biofuel feedstock and food production. After a brief overview of the history of Brazil’s own agricultural development and the country’s relations with Africa, the chapter delves into an examination of Brazilian engagement in the conjoined agricultural and energy sectors of Mozambique, a country that possesses large tracts of arable land and is considered a prime site for biofuel production. The chapter critiques Brazil’s development assistance and investment model and presents ways to improve its effectiveness in order to generate greater benefits for the Mozambican people.

Brazilian agricultural development and relations with Africa Both Brazil’s engagement with Africa and the country’s agricultural develop­ ment have grown by leaps and bounds during the period from the early 1970s to the present day. Throughout the 1960s, as Portugal was waging wars to hold on to its African colonies, Brazil remained deferent to its former colonial master. With the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal that overthrew the Salazar–Caetano dictatorship, Brazil seized the opportunity to rapidly shift its approach, becom­ ing the first country allied with the ‘West’ to recognise Angola’s independence, and quickly recognising the independence of Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, an ‘astute strategic manoeuvre’ that has engendered goodwill to­ wards Brazil in these countries up to the present day (White 2010: 224). In the 1970s and 1980s, Brazilian policy in Africa was focused primarily on securing oil supplies, so diplomatic emphasis was given to relations with Angola and Nigeria. Brazilian development assistance was unheard of at the time, as Brazil remained focused on its own domestic socioeconomic develop­ ment. Alongside increasing industrialisation, Brazil’s economic policy was based around the expansion of agricultural production to promote growth, combat poverty and increase food security.

Brazil’s domestic priorities: food and energy security as catalysts for growth Achieving food security: priority number one To achieve increases in agricultural production, Brazil relied on a dual strategy of expansion of the area of land under cultivation and research and technological innovation. Brazil began to expand agriculture into its internal frontiers in the Amazon and the savannah of the cerrado region of the south-east and central western parts of the country, a process also aimed at consolidating state control of 146 8 | Thaler cerrado soils, Beyond food sec­ two cane farmers, whose investments in 147 y: curity: priority number National efforts were organised through foundingthe in1973 of 4 to use as a substitute for imported petrol. The choice of using sugar cane Embrapa’s Embrapa’s first major task increasingwas agricultural production in the The benefits of biofuelproduction for the Brazilian economy been have these these regions. To increase production, especially in the technological acidic innovations were needed. In addition to global advances taking in fertilisers advantageand mechanisation, Brazil of began to ramp up its own agricultural research capacity, which had been et extremely al. low 1987). (Graham hieving hieving Ac energy se the Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária (Embrapa, ian Agricultural or Research the Corporation), which Brazil­ is affiliated to Ministrythe Agriculture, of to test and create crop varieties country’s different suitable climates. for cultivation in the cerrado region, and in this it was highly an Reifschneider, Embrapa successful. researcher: ‘The According general to impression was Francisco that this was wasteland. Today this “wasteland” produces more the than total 45 grain of per this cent country’ of (Akinola 2010). Brazil exporter has of now food, become and a net food insecurity has inequality, lower fallen prices thanks due to to reduced greater income domestic efforts of food the production, administration of and President Luiz the Inácio Lulada Silva (2003–10), the keystone of whose social policy Hunger) was initiative the (see, for multifaceted example, Neves Fome do Zero Amaral and (Zero Peduto 2010). agriculture The and livestock sector grew at an average annual rate from of the 2 1970s per cent to 2005 (Akinola 2010) and is cent currently per year (De Onis 2008: 113), making growing Brazil today the second-largest world’s at over 6 per agricultural producer, behind only the United States. was also made in order to support - sugar quite quite clear, as it has given the country greater energy security and kept more wealth within Brazil. The social and environmental impressive. impacts Sugar cane ethanol production have has mainly benefited been the wealthier less urity, urity, Brazil has also used its improved agricultural energy becoming security, an international leader in production the production of biofuels. to boost its Biofuels are liquid fuels produced directly from (i.e. plant feedstocks renewable or biological waste). In natural the mid-1970s, in sources response to the 1973 oil crisis, Brazil began to pursue the cane production of ethanol from sugar mechanisation and modernisation had been followed by falling sugar prices (see, for example, Hall et al. 2009). Thanks to come this early an start, international leader Brazil in has biofuel be­ production. In fact, exporting Brazil its has biofuel been expertise to Africa for several the decades 1970s now; a as Brazilian early company as had installed its methanol plant production in technology Zimbabwe (Forrest in 1982: 14). a states in the country, has contributed to land concentration, and has led to the consolidation of the market under the control of a small group of large corporations. Efforts have been made to avoid this outcome as Brazil steps up its production of soya bean and castor seed-based biodiesel, with policies in place to keep more feedstock production in the hands of small-scale farmers. However, stakeholders in the biodiesel industry believe that this strategy will fail, stating that without massive government intervention ‘biodiesel is going to be another [ethanol] with only large-scale producers’ and that ‘the whole social program is not going to work’ (Hall et al. 2009: S83). These issues remain concerns as Brazil becomes increasingly involved with African countries as a development partner and investor, at the same time as many of these countries are seeking to convert arable land to biofuel feedstocks. Biofuel crops are frequently competing with food crops in Africa, a serious problem in countries struggling with food insecurity. In Mozambique, biofuel production is currently expanding and is seen as holding great potential for economic development, with involvement from the Brazilian government and private sector, but it is also contributing to social and political conflict. The next section examines the rise of biofuels in Mozambique, Brazil’s role, and the implications of biofuel production for food security in the country.

Biofuels, land use and food security in Mozambique Mozambique has made great strides towards reconstruction in the two decades since it emerged from almost 30 years of war. Yet peace has not significantly changed the country’s status as one of the world’s poorest and most deprived states. Mozambique currently ranks as 184 out of 187 coun­ tries in the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index­ (HDI), and while its overall HDI score has been rising slowly, it has not kept pace with the advances of other countries (UNDP 2011). The country’s child mortality rate is one of the highest in the world at 142 per 1,000 (ibid.). Accord­ing to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), over one-third of all Mozambicans (38 per cent) are undernourished (FAOSTAT 2011), and the majority of those in poverty suffer from acute malnutrition. One study in 2006 estimated that malnutrition has productivity costs in Mozambique of at least US$185 million annually, or about 6 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) at the time (Dista and Vicente 2009). Poverty and hunger are incendiary political and social issues in Mozam­ bique, as the global community was reminded in September 2010 when riots erupted in the capital of Maputo and the nearby industrial city of Matola in response to government-mandated price increases on staple foods and other necessities, such as water and electricity. In the aftermath of the riots, which occurred against a backdrop of high global commodity prices, many commentators referred to the events as ‘food riots’ and sought to tie them to 148 8 | Thaler 6 to to but it has also begun 7 has been focused mainly on 5 Mozambique Mozambique is considered to have -tiered development system whereby 149 nise the need to invest in agriculture as part of its development strategy. Much Much of Mozambique’s economic growth has occurred in the energy and The agricultural and fisheries sectorsin Mozambique provide employment The PARP is consistent in its calls to improve the situation of small-scale, recog­ mining sector, as foreign capital mining sector, has been used to undertake -scale large ­ explora tion and exploitation of the country’s coal, oil, gas and mineral meet resources the to global demand for fossil fuels and these metals. types of The projects, however, human tends to be capital imported, reducing for the potential job creation impact, and projects are often initiated onbreaks theor conditionexemptions, depriving the of tax state of potential revenues that could be used to fund social programmes. The Mozambican government continues focus focus on industrial -projects mega to drive growth, one of the greatest potentials in the world for the production of biofuels due to the availability of uncultivated or underused land, favourable climate and The development of biofuels in Mozambique and subsistence for over 80 2011), per with cent the of the population (FAOSTAT vast majority of this activity taking place on small family farms. Mozambique’s development strategy, which has frequently been externally determined to the due country’s high level of aid dependence, food food prices on the international market, although food prices in fact remained lower than in 2008, when riots had previously taken Mozambique place, was and a the crisis result in of deeper structural the problems country’s that development (see have Thaler 2010a hobbled for a longer discussion). -scale large extractive and industrial projects. These projects have succeeded in allowing the country GDP, boosting to Mozambique’s be presented as a success story by groups such as the World Bank, yet they have done little to uplift the majority of the population, creating a two domestic elites and transnational corporations prosper from the country’s nat­ ural resources while the poor masses are accorded secondary attention unless they create a situation, such as the 2010 riots, in which their voices are heard. to The government’s 2010–14 Poverty Reduction Action Plan (Plan d’Action pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté or PARP) makes the improvement of agricultural and fisheries productivity itsprimary objective, with promoting employment given the next most importance (Republic of Mozambique emphasis 2011), in a the welcome face of the continued growth of extractive industries. family farmers, through improved access to factors of production and better market access. This supposed focus on small-scale farmers is however, belied by and the actions of the food Mozambican government in advancing crops, its overall agriculturalInstead of policy. to seeking improve small-scale ­ agricul ture to boost food production, the government has sought foreign investment to capitalise on the global spike in demand for biofuels. low population density (see Nhantumbo and Salomão 2010: 7). According to government estimates from 2006, only about 10 per cent of Mozambique’s 36 million hectares of potential agricultural land are currently under cultivation; however, more recent land-zoning exercises have determined that only 7 mil­ lion hectares are ‘available for allocation to land-based economic activities, including biofuels’ (ibid.: 13) and there are questions as to the accuracy of the zoning that has been conducted. Mozambique’s population has also been growing at an increasing rate since 2000, so land use estimates may quickly become outdated as demand from family farmers increases. Critics are wary of government statistics on the stock of so-called ‘uncultivated or underused land’, as quite often it refers to land that is used by the community ascom­ mon land or to forest areas that are useful for maintaining the country’s biodiversity – both flora and fauna. New zoning efforts are planned, but, in the meantime, Mozambique’s gover­ nment, in concert with foreign investors, has made a strong push to turn the country into a world leader in biofuel production. The ultimate goal of this endeavour is clearly to increase foreign investment and exchange; a study by Mozambique’s national oil company has determined that domestic demand for biofuels is essentially negligible, due to the small size and unindustrialised character of the Mozambican economy (Petromoç 2008). Mozambique began its biofuel initiatives in the mid-2000s, with the 2007 rural development strategy including a specific objective:

to promote the production, consumption, transformation and export of fuels alternative to conventional ones, namely biofuels produced from crops such as sugarcane, soybeans, sunflower, ground nuts, and jatropha, among others. (Republic of Mozambique 2007: 46)8

This initial official catalyst for biofuel development was followed in2009 by the formulation of an elaborated national ‘Policy and Strategy for Biofuels’ (Republic of Mozambique 2009). The policy was presented as possessing two primary motivations: i) the promotion and exploitation of agriculturally pro­ duced biofuels to improve energy security and sustainable development (while reducing greenhouse gas emissions); and ii) responding to a need to reduce the importation of processed fossil fuels. The policy includes a laudable statement of principles, which highlights the need for inclusion of small-scale farmers; for transparency in the development of biofuel projects; for environmental and social sustainability; and for fiscal sustainability. Special mention is also given to the necessity of evaluating potential biofuel projects ‘to avoid unacceptable risks in terms of food security, loss or degradation of habitat or biodiversity, and other environmental damage’ (ibid.: 16). Surprisingly, though, given the pessimistic assessment by Petromoç (a semi-government entity dealing with energy issues) of the potential for a domestic biofuel market in Mozambique, 150 8 | Thaler southern ­southern 151 Sugar Sugar cane ethanol has been the major biofuel that has en­ Brazil’s Brazil’s official cooperation with Mozambique in the area of biofuels dates More recently, the increased interest in biofuel production in Mozambique Since the initial political and strategic groundwork was laid for biofuel back back to 2007, when Mozambique’s President Guebuza signed an accord with Lula, the Brazilian president at the time, to establish technical assistance and exchange programmes and to explore market development, been reaffirmed goals and further formalisedin that subsequent agreements, with Brazil have Africa has increased sharply in recent years soared, with sugar as production and exports global nearly quintupling in Mozambique ethanol demand has from 2000 to 2008 O. Licht (F. in Richardson 2010: 926). African countries have been attempting to emulate Brazil’s success in sugar cane ethanol production, and to do so have relied greatly on Brazilian expertise and development assist­ ance, their demand coinciding with Brazil’s desire cooperation to and increase leverage South–South its historical and cultural ties to economic Africa development. for mutual tered into production in Mozambique. Sugar production throughout Sugar Sugar cane ethanol in in response to European Union (EU) requirements for biofuel use has spurred a further examination of the sustainability of biofuel production in the country. To help meet the sustainability provisions of the EU regulations, the Brazilian government partnered with the EU to create Bioenergy a project. Under Sustainable the auspices Development of this of project, an investigation is cur­ rently being carried out by the Brazilian Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) the into viability of sustainable, environmentally responsible biofuel production in The Mozambique. study is funded with US$800,000 from Brazilian mining giant Vale (Companhia Vale do Rio Doce) (Agência de Informação de Moçambique 2011), which operates the Moatize coal mine involved in in sugar cane Mozambique ethanol production and in Brazil. has This Brazilian been assistance is imbued with a heavy dose of -interest self – Brazilian high ethanol EU tariffs, is but ethanol subject produced by to Brazilian companiesin Mozambique is taxed minimally (Reuters 2010). development in dozens Mozambique, of projects have been although proposed, few have come to fruition. The biofuel strategya called few for feedstock concentration crops, on namely sugar cane production and jatropha and coconut for the production of biodiesel and (Republic sweet sorghum for ethanol of Mozambique 2009: 17), but the vast majority of projects have involved sugar cane and jatropha. the strategy emphasises plans for the market; establishment these plans required the of enactment in 2012 of a regulations stating that national biofuel all petrol and diesel should be blended with ethanol and biodiesel respectively, forcing the creation of a market. planning to invest US$6 billion in biofuel development in Mozambique (for example, Katerere 2009). The two countries joined with the European Com­ mission in 2010 to sign an agreement establishing ‘their commitment to work together with the objective of fostering the development of the bioenergy sector, focusing on biofuels and bioelectricity’ (Agência de Informação de Moçambique 2010). Biofuels may even provide a nexus for South–South cooperation among the emerging economic powers, with the director of Mozambique’s Investment Promotion Centre, Mahomed Rafik, suggesting, in light of Mozambique’s free trade agreement with China, that a sugar cane project could emerge in which:

A South African company in partnership with a Mozambican company, and with the raw material being processed by a Brazilian company, may gain access to the Chinese market, because the product will be regarded as Mozambican. (Agência de Informação de Moçambique 2009)

A number of Brazilian corporations have developed plans to produce ethanol in Mozambique, generally through partnerships. Açúcar Guarani, a Brazil­ ian subsidiary of transnational sugar company Tereos, has been involved in projects since buying a 75 per cent stake in Mozambican Companhia de Sena for US$17.5 million in 2007 (Benitez 2007). The Sena mill is capable of process­ ing 1.2 million tons of sugar cane per year, and plans have been developed with the Brazilian national oil corporation, Petrobras, to use molasses from Sena to make ethanol (Caminada and Nielsen 2011). As part of the partner­ ship between Petrobras and Guarani, Petrobras is investing 1.6 billion reais (about US$900 million) to purchase a 45.7 per cent share in Guarani (Tereos Internacional 2010). In August 2011, Petrobras announced plans to build its own ethanol factory in Mozambique for production for the domestic market in response to new Mozambican government requirements for ethanol to be added to all petrol at a 10 per cent level; Petrobras stated that if plans go forward, the factory would be built by Guarani (Macauhub 2011a). Brazil’s sugar industry trade association, União da Indústria de Cana-de-Açúcar, has argued for increased involvement in biofuel development in Mozambique to attempt to replicate Brazil’s success in producing ethanol and integrating it into the economy (UNICA 2011), and in 2009 ETH Bioenergia, a subsidiary of Brazilian construction giant Odebrecht, announced plans to build an ethanol plant in Mozambique, with an anticipated investment of approximately 2 billion reais (US$1.1 billion) (TheBioenergySite News Desk 2011). Brazilian diplomats have also suggested that other corporations, such as oil and biofuel producer Cosan and sugar company Copersucar, may be interested in starting ethanol operations in Mozambique (Reuters 2010).9

Jatropha biodiesel Jatropha is a hardy plant that until recently was used mainly for windbreaks and to avoid erosion, although in Africa its oily seeds have 152 8 | Thaler 153 while jatropha can indeed grow on lands with minimal water and poor nutri­ tion, ‘if you plant trees in a marginal area, and all they do is just not die, it doesn’t mean you’re going to get a lot of oil (Luoma from 2009) them’. In order to be produced profitably, jatropha needs significant rainfall or The most successful jatropha project to date was that of Sun Biofuels, a Another major jatropha project was initiated by German company Elaion irrigation, irrigation, for it requires more water than (Gerbens-Leenes any et other al. 2009). It biofuel is possible feedstock that crop climate change in the coming decades will see increased rainfall in Mozambique, which could help alleviate this problem, but change models climate remain highly variable and uncertain (see Tadross 2009). British company, which cultivated jatropha British for company, the production of biodiesel that it planned to export to Europe for airline use. from Sun made its its fields first in shipments the central provinceLufthansa in mid-2011, of Manica and was to planning to the German expand company from 3,000 hectares its to 11,000 hectares. achieve this To expansion, the company jatropha production was, according to Manager for Corporate Affairs draw Sergio in smallholder farmers Gouveia, to disperse seeking jatropha cultivation beyond to a planta­ tion model. Gouveia dismissed concerns about impacts on suggesting that farmers food could use the income from jatropha production to buy security by food (TradeMark SA 2011), yet given the instability of food the 2008 prices and that 2010 riots, led substituting jatropha to cultivation for subsistence food production would seem to be a wholly irresponsible choice. However, shortly after its initial shipments, Sun Biofuels collapsed, destroying livelihoods the of farmers in Mozambique and Tanzania who had become dependent on the company (Carrington 2011). Africa in Sofala province, with plans to cultivate After plantinginitial test plots, 1,000 the however, company determined that the soil hectares of jatropha. quality was too low for profitablejatropha production, andinstead switched to a forestry project on the land (Nhantumbo and Salomão 2010: illustrates 10). a This problem case that has emerged as research fied: on as jatropha expressed has byRob ­ intensi Bailis of theYale University School ofForestry Environmental and Studies: been been used for bioenergy in Mali since the early 1990s (Henning 1996). Jatropha has frequently been touted by biofuel advocates on because marginal, it degraded is and able semi-arid to lands grow where impossible to it cultivate other plants, would thus avoiding be concerns about difficult displacing or food crops. This is perhaps one of such emphasis in the Mozambique, where reasons President Armando Guebuza why has been jatropha has received personally involved in the promotion of jatropha cultivation, as noted in the official biofuel strategy(Republic Mozambique of 2009: 14). While most jatropha investors have been European, this sector has also felt Brazil’s influence. The overall growth in biofuel production and policy develop­ ment in Mozambique has been seen by some as galvanised by the interest and engagement of Lula, and Mozambican government plans for jatropha biodiesel production were modelled on a Brazilian system of smallholder cultivation of feedstocks to be sold to biodiesel companies, ‘thereby increas[ing] rural incomes’ (Justiça Ambiental and União Nacional de Camponeses 2009: 9). The Portuguese and Mozambican-owned Moçamgalp biodiesel project has also used Brazilian seeds for its jatropha plantation in Chimoio, with plans to grow 1,250 plants per hectare on a total of 10,000 hectares (ibid.: 36). Petrobras also signed an agreement in 2007 with Italian oil company Eni to jointly explore biodiesel production in Mozambique (Petroleum Africa 2007), though these plans have not yet resulted in any concrete projects.

Policy versus practice in Mozambican biofuel projects and effects on food security The ProCana project provides a stark illustration of the potential social, economic and environmental problems posed by biofuel production in Mozam­ bique and other developing countries, and also demonstrates the failure of the government of Mozambique to uphold the principles it outlined in its own biofuel policy. ProCana was a project developed by a British corporation that planned to grow sugar cane and produce ethanol on 30,000 hectares in Massingir, in the southern province of Gaza. ProCana had signed a renew­ able 50-year lease on the land; all land in Mozambique is the property of the government, allowing favoured investors to secure huge tracts of land under long-term contracts with limited input from local stakeholders. This is symptom­atic of the larger international problem of ‘land grabbing’, whereby foreign governments and corporations are buying or securing long-term leases to large portions of the arable land in developing countries (see, for example, GRAIN 2008; Cotula et al. 2009; Thaler forthcoming). Plans were made for Brazilian sugar company Dedini to supply a turnkey ethanol plant that would make use of Brazilian technology and would be capable of processing 438 million litres of ethanol per year (Christiansen 2008). The allocation of land was immediately problematic. Despite claims that the land ProCana was acquiring was marginal and that therefore the project would not conflict with food production, outside researchers found the land in fact to be highly suitable and used for agricultural production, charcoal making and livestock grazing by local communities (Borras et al. 2011). The ProCana project also called for the displacement of several communities, including taking over land that had been allocated to people displaced by the creation of the Limpopo National Park (ibid.; Manuel and Salomão 2009). ProCana followed the letter of the law in that consultations were held with affected 154 8 | Thaler 155 Promises of job creation by ProCana and by biofuel projects that have been Some jobs may be created by biofuel projects, but the livelihoods of other fully fully implemented have been dubious at job best. creation ProCana’s estimates fluctuated based on assumptions about whether or implemented not the on project could be a mechanised basis or a non-mechanised plantation with basis, the latter option creating more jobs (Borras et industry al. also has relatively low 2011: labour intensity, with many 224). jobs only seasonal, The sugar and labour requirements far below those of other ‘while 7,500 crops; are formally employed in the around sugar industry, 200,000 people in nearby Zambia, are informally engaged as outgrowers in the similarly sized (Tschirley cotton and Kabwe industry’ in Richardson 2010: 993). Brazilian ethanol production, meanwhile, may be the most advanced in the but world, and Mozambique other countries should not emulate the manner in which the sugar cane that feeds it is produced: by workers toiling in dangerous ‘slavery’ conditions for wages of approximately US$1,000 or less for a - five to -month six season (Höges 2009). community members are threatened. Biofuel projects frequently involve permanent of clearing forests, the removing opportunities for localised sustainable forestry and charcoal production. Sugar cane, like jatropha, also uses massive amounts of water, with the ProCana project, for instance, planning to irrigate its sugar cane with 407 million cubic meters of water per year dam, depriving from downstream subsistence farmers a of water needed to nearbygrow their own crops and competing with cleaner hydroelectric power production (Borras et al. 2011: 223). The biofuel boom has also driven up land prices the in developing much world, of increasing the pressure on smallholder farmers to sell their land, while the relatively high prices of energy crops in comparison with food crops may farmers induce to join outcropping in schemes which they grow feedstock for large corporate producers. Increased landholding by bioenergy producers or industrial export farmers, as well as outcropping, shrinks food local production and shifts subsistence farmers from being autonomous food producers to being consumers at the mercy of the market and its fluctuations. The ProCana project collapsed in late 2009 similarly, Mozambique after Principle Energy’s investors ethanol factorypulled project out, has and, ground to a halt and may also collapse due to market conditions (Macauhub 2011b), communities, communities, but agreements over land boundaries were as then ProCana disregarded encroached on family farmlands (ibid.), imbalance of and power between there an international corporation, was which had a already clear secured government support, and a group of et poor al. 2011). peasant This farmers power imbalance (Borras has been a elsewhere problem with in biofuel Africa projects and in the rest and Franco of 2010). the Consultations world also tend (see, to for be example, attention -biased, gender paid with Borras to greater male members of communities, even though women make up the majority of the rural labour force (Nhantumbo and Salomão 2010: 35). highlighting the volatility of biofuel investments and the potential for negative outcomes for those whose livelihoods come to depend on the biofuel industry. Brazil has been involved in some more general or food-focused agricul­ tural initiatives in Mozambique. Embrapa is working on a US$4.6 million soil conservation and recuperation project in northern Mozambique, looking to develop a successful model that can be applied across Africa (Barbosa et al. 2009: 77). Brazil is working with Japan to develop new crop varieties and to disseminate agricultural techniques and technologies that will allow a trans­ formation of the Mozambican savannah into productive agricultural land, as occurred in Brazil’s cerrado, and there are other collaborative efforts to improve agricultural research in Mozambique (ABC 2010c; World Bank 2011b). The Brazilian embassy in Mozambique also launched a programme in 2003 to give food subsidies to families in exchange for their children’s school attendance, an initiative funded with donations from the Brazilian business community (Massingarela and Nhate 2006). In its initial stage, the programme provided grants of US$20 to 100 families (ABC 2012), and total project costs were under US$90,000 (AidData 2012). More recently, Brazil has committed to working to give about US$2.4 million to the World Food Programme and FAO for a scheme to provide locally produced food to schools and vulnerable groups in Mozambique and four other African countries (FAO 2012). These projects are tiny, however, when compared with the hundreds of millions of dollars being invested in the biofuel sector in Mozambique, sending a strong signal about Brazil’s priorities in Mozambique and in the rest of Africa.

Conclusions: Brazilian ambitions, African economies and defining development Brazil has sought to position itself as an equal development partner of, rather than a more detached donor to, African countries, building on its cul­ tural ties and its own experience of socioeconomic development during the twentieth century. In practice, Brazil has taken a middle road in comparison with the competing emerging economies:

between the Chinese-style of engagement – which is highly political and supported by the weight of the state-run machinery behind investments and development initiatives –and the Indian approach – which is characterised more by private sector investments and entrepreneurial activities across the continent. (White 2010: 229)

So far, Brazil has been successful in constructing a ‘softer’ approach, in contrast to China, developing local capacity and building new markets rather than simply extracting resources (see, for example, Lewis 2011). To its credit, Brazil has created and become involved with a number of initiatives in Mozambique and elsewhere in Africa that have the potential to 156 8 | Thaler mercantilist’ -mercantilist’ industrial firms-industrial in outcropping 157 Brazil’s Brazil’s programmes are beginning to put more emphasis on the inclusion Brazil that claims its overseas development assistance is to help other coun­ For food security to be promoted and protected in Mozambique and ­ else of smallholder farmers, and Mozambique’s biofuel policy their in inclusion the production of feedstocks (Republic of Mozambique 2009: specifically seeks 19). However, this inclusion may come at the cost of the them subjugating to the demands of farmers’ large agro autonomy, tries emerge from poverty, yet Brazil’s interests and its corporate in investment interests are development tied together in a assistance ‘neo where in Africa, notions of development must be decoupled from the concept of economic growth within a capitalist the system. global market Agricultural has led production to an unsustainable for system in which crop diversity has plummeted; small-scale farmers have been forced offthe their land service of into or large corporations; and a the small production group and of distribution of companies inputs controls and processed products, instance, with, five transnational for corporations controlling 65 per cent of the global boost boost food security and improve livelihoods, such as cultural Innovation the Marketplace, which Africa–Brazil brings together ­ Agri Embrapa and African researchers, and efforts to create seed banksfor family farmers. The majority of Brazilian aid and aims investment, to however, improve agricultural ­ produc tion for the global market in ways that are in not Mozambique are sustainable. designed Biofuel to meet projects the demand created by EU regulations. These regulations are supposed to reduce fossil fuel dependence and house gas emissions, but the carbon- green­ and water-intensive farming practices and land use changes involved in the production of biofuel feedstocks may offset any environmental benefits (see, for example, Solomon 2010 leaked internal World for a review).Bank memo A places the blame for the rising prices that sparked the 2008 global food crisis squarely on increased biofuel production (Mitchell 2008), and biofuel production worldwide has been linked to negative effects on theland tenure andfood security of smallholder farmers and other rural residents (for example, Dauvergne and Neville 2010). schemes, forcing them to switch to more expensive technologies, and curtail­ ing independent food production, changes designed to bring the farmers into the transnational capitalist system that is limited already resources. exploiting Mozambique’s web (White 2010: 239), making it difficult to view Brazil’s altruistic rhetoricas sincere and giving some credence to the critique that emerged as early as the 1960s of Brazil’s interest in Africa as seeking a piece of the ‘new scramble for Africa’ (Ribeiro 2010: 76). The recent ‘land grab’ of over 6 million land hectares in of northern Mozambique for Brazilian farmers to corn produce and cotton soya for beans, export (IHU 2011) bears out these suspicions of neocolonial Brazilian leanings. pesticide market (Gonzalez 2004: 425). Biofuel feedstocks in Mozambique are symptoms of a broken system of agriculture and aid; these crops are pro­ moted and consumed by international actors who either blindly or wilfully ignore their negative effects. Emphasis needs to be placed on production for domestic markets, on production of food crops, and on the improvement of less capital-intensive farming techniques that will allow small-scale ­farmers to sustain themselves while maintaining their independence. At present, Brazilian development assistance and investments are more benign and less cold-bloodedly profit-driven than those of China and some other competing countries, but they remain exploitative nonetheless.

158 9 | South–South cooperation in agriculture: the India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum

Alexandra Arkhangelskaya and Albert Khamatshin

Introduction Agriculture in many low-income countries has the potential to be an engine of development and poverty reduction. Moreover, raising agricultural produc­ tion in regions such as Africa, with abundant arable land, is critical to global food security in coming decades. However, achieving these objectives on a large scale would require a significant increase in public investment in agricultural research, rural infrastructure and skills development in the context of more supportive policies for agriculture at the national and global level. The transfer of experience and technology to African countries through South–South cooperation can be particularly important for building a supportive international environment. An analysis of the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, a trilateral initiative between three emerging econ­ omies to promote South–South cooperation and exchange, is an excellent case study in the promotion of such cooperation in agriculture. The present study closely examines the IBSA Trust Fund, created in 2004 to combat poverty and hunger by emphasising local ownership and encouraging capacity building in the beneficiary community through the sharing of knowledge and experience.

South–South science and technology cooperation The history of South–South cooperation dates back to the 1955 conference in Bandung when certain African and Asian nations agreed to promote eco­ nomic and cultural cooperation. The conference provided the impetus for the development of various South–South organisations in the 1960s and 1970s, with the Non-Aligned Movement (1961) and the Group of 77 (1964) being the most important. While South–South technical cooperation was discussed in some of these initiatives, there was no strategic framework for such collaboration until 1978, when the Buenos Aires plan of action was adopted at the United Nations (UN) conference on technical cooperation among developing countries. The plan described the technical cooperation approach as a:

vital force for initiating, designing, organising and promoting co-operation among developing countries so that they can create, acquire, adapt, transfer

159 and pool knowledge and experience for their mutual benefit and for achieving national and collective self-reliance, which are essential for their social and economic development. (United Nations 1978)

Since the adoption of the Buenos Aires plan of action, the UN has played a crucial role in supporting South–South cooperation. To coordinate its work in this area, it has set up a special unit for such cooperation managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the plan of action, in December 2009 the UN convened a high-level conference on South–South cooperation in Nairobi. At the confer­ ence, the need to strengthen this cooperation as an additional mechanism for enhancing growth and addressing the challenges facing developing countries was reiterated. Interest in South–South cooperation in science and technology among de­ veloping countries has grown since the early 2000s. There are several reasons for this trend:

• The internet and other information and communication technologies facili­ tate South–South cooperation, allowing for the sharing of knowledge to the widest possible extent at minimal cost. • The growing technological prowess of emerging countries such as India, Brazil and China has enabled them to take the initiative in collaborative ­research (including the provision of financial support) and to transfer techno­logy to and share experiences with less developed countries. • There is a continuing shift of research activities in developed countries from the public to the private sector. Private companies in developed coun­ tries are reluctant to share technology with public institutions in develop­ ing countries, preferring instead to preserve their technological advantage. This has shifted the focus of some developing countries on science and technology cooperation from the North to the South. • Improving economic circumstances in certain developing countries have led to greater research and development spending, which itself creates ­opportunities and an impetus for greater collaboration.

Finally, the idea of South–South cooperation has gained renewed momen­ tum with the rise of a handful of emerging countries, such as India, Brazil and China, which have become a major driving force in the world economy. These countries possess enormous technological and financial resources as well as expertise, which they are using strategically to promote South–South cooperation among developing countries through entities such as the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, the India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) and IBSA. Official statements from these governments suggest that their relationship with Africa is based on the need and desire to pursue mutually beneficial 160 9 | Arkhangelskaya and Khamatshin ecological condi­ - resistant strains of - 161 effective transfer of appropriate and advanced IBSA is a trilateral initiative intended to promote South–South coopera­ Africa, on the other hand, needs technology and technical expertise from Cooperation in the agricultural sector is also increasingly shaped by the tion in the field of development. It emerged out of a dialogue­leaders, between three Atal Bihari Vajpayee (India), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Brazil) and The India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum Dialogue Africa India–Brazil–South The India, India, Brazil and South Africa to address its development needs, particularly for agricultural development. At present, much private and public agricultural research and development in the world is devoted to corn, wheat, maize and rice, and very little is focused on widely consumed African cassava, millet products public and agricultural sorghum. research institutionsMoreover, such as in Africa suffer from significant funding shortages, and are thus unable to ex­ pand research on -resistantdrought crops. In this regard, cooperation between IBSA member states and African countries with similar agro cooperation cooperation for common the development.emerging countries Moreover, need natural resources from Africa, to fuel their growing economies, and access to Africa’s untapped market, as well as political support from African states major on global economic and governance issues. concept of food outsourcing. There is growing concern about food security in some countries that previously had achieved agricultural India, where farmers have drilled some -sufficiency. self 20,000,000 water wells, irrigation tables In are falling and wells are starting to dry Indians are being fed grain produced by over-pumping. In China, over -pumping up. It is estimated that 175,000,000 is concentrated on the North China Plain, wheat and which a produces third half of its of corn. China’s In Saudi ing Arabia, because wheat the production non-replenishable is aquifer ­ collaps the country uses largely depleted for (Brown irrigation 2011). At is the same time, there is a great potential boosting for the productivity of agriculture in Africa. Therefore, these should be countries interested in the cost- tions could provide a unique opportunity to technologies, locally relevant skills and share successful institutional modalities that experiences, appropriate African countries can replicate. Although IBSA is relatively new, the initiative has begun to promote joint research between African institutions and leading research centres in IBSA countries, focusing on cassava and disease sweet potatoes (IAASTD 2009). clean technologies to Africa to help initiate another green revolution continent. It on is the also important to note that, in a sense, South–South coopera­ tion in agricultural outsourcing does not mean acquiring land for production of food for one’s own use (‘land grabbing’), but a ‘win-win’ situation whereby high productivity in African agriculture is to be achieved food and is the to surplus be of shared with partner countries.

IBSA forums: IBSA Fund for Alleviation of Academic Poverty and Heads of Business Hunger state and/or Women (manag ed by government Editors UNDP) (summit) etc.

Ministerial (trilateral joint commission) Senior Senior ocial ocial (focal (focal

point) point)

9.1 IBSA’s institutional mechanisms

Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), during a Group of Eight (G8) summit in 2003 in Evian, France. The establishment of IBSA was formally announced on 6 June 2003, with the adoption of the Brasília Declaration by the ministers of foreign affairs of the three countries. The declaration focused on issues ofcommon concern, including reform of the UN, threats to security, social equity and inclusion, racial discrimination and gender equality. The forum’s institutional mechanisms include consultations at senior official (focal point), ministerial (trilateral joint commission) and heads of state and/or government (summit) levels (see Figure 9.1). In addition, the forum facilitates interaction among academics, businesspeople and civil society. IBSA has an open and flexible structure and has no branches or permanent executive sec­ retariat or even a formal document promulgating its organisational structure. The last summit was held in Pretoria from 17 to 19 October 2011. To deepen mutual knowledge and explore common points of interest in different sectors, 17 joint working groups were established, including agriculture, science and technology, climate change and energy (IBSA 2012). Each IBSA member country has ambitions to play a leading role in its respective region as well as in global affairs. IBSA supports the role of the UN in global matters and the three member countries take a leading part in the organisation’s activities, particularly in resolving major global challenges such as peace and security, environmental issues and global development and poverty reduction. The IBSA countries subscribe to the Millennium Develop­ ment Goals and actively develop joint positions in order to achieve shared international aims. They also actively seek major reforms in global govern­ ance, particularly the reform of the UN Security Council, with each seeking a 162 9 | Arkhangelskaya and Khamatshin ­ India ­India wants pro 163 operation and Development countries. - tariff barriers to trade. On agricultural trade, for example, India’s - IBSA’s achievements IBSA’s can be divided into four areas: political achievements; With regard to reforming the multilateral trading system, the IBSA countries One of the main indicators of the effectiveness of theforum is trade. Intra- Despite the potential of IBSA to promote African development, a number of working working group achievements in particular areas Fund for of Alleviation of cooperation; Poverty and the Hunger; and achievements IBSA in other fields (Arkhangelskaya 2010). The political achievements are evident positions expressed in in the the declarations joint of heads of state and and in ministerial communiqués. government Although the three countries do not agree on everything, they take common positions on a number of issues at lateral the level. ­ multi Joint coordination is most evident at the UN, per where cent there vote is 96 convergence among IBSA countries on global the institutions, issue especially of the reforming UN Security Council. also IBSA been countries vocal have about the reform of the governance International Monetary of the Fund. World Bank and have been the most vocal critics of the unbalanced global trade regime (IBSA 2011). While in principle there is general consensus among them on the need to level the playing infield global trade, they nevertheless take opposing positions on agricultural subsidies, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights and non IBSA trade grew from impressively US$3.9 billion in 2003 to about US$12 billion in 2009. The target for 2010 was US$16.1 billion, this and amount was all significantly surpassed. The indications new are goalfor that intra-IBSA trade by 2015 is US$25 billion per annum (Campbell 2011). obstacles stand in These the the include way. trade restrictions of other associ­ ations in which they are participating; the relatively small African economy; size the need to of standardise internal processes; simplification the of South the visa regime; language barriers; and geographical distance. There are also limited complementarities between the three markets due to the fact that all three countries produce similar goods and compete for access to the markets of Organisation for Economic Co tection for its farmers, while Brazil and South Africa advocate comprehensive liberalisation of agricultural trade. In some respects, India’s position is closer to that of many African countries, which regard liberalisation indiscriminate of agricultural trade as a threat to their small-scale farmers, who will be unable to compete in a liberalised global trade regime. Achievements and challenges Achievements permanent permanent seat. These countries have also actively campaigned for improved market access for developing countries’ products as well as of the foreign cancellation debt owed by developing countries to creditor nations. position is differentquite from that of Brazil and South Africa. Moreover, each country is part of a regional trade bloc, and there are no mechanisms to extend reciprocal trade arrangements between these blocs. South Africa is a member of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) while Brazil is a member of the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), both of which forbid individual members from signing free trade agreements with any other country outside the free trade zone and extending its benefits to other members. This is one of the main obstacles to development cooperation within IBSA. Mercosur comprises Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela, with a population of 250 million people, while SACU comprises South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, with a population of 51 million (Arkhangelskaya 2010). In addition, the three IBSA countries are also members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping, and it is too early to tell how dual membership affects policy coherence in IBSA. On 15 April 2010, the first joint BRICS/IBSA business forum was hosted, with business delegations from Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa discussing the commercial interests of these major emerging economies with a view to furthering commercial ties. Therefore, it seems that dialogue among the groupings could be more effective than integration of such blocs. As a result, IBSA can be seen as an emerging ‘bridge’ between the three continents of the South.

IBSA–Africa cooperation in agriculture Agriculture in India, Brazil and South Africa plays different roles. In 2010, the agricultural sector contributed about 19 per cent to gross domestic product (GDP) in India, 5.8 per cent in Brazil and 3 per cent in South Africa. The agricultural share of GDP has been declining in these countries, which is consistent with theories of economic development. However, agriculture remains an important source of employment, especially in India. About 52 per cent of the total popula­ tion in India, 14 per cent in Brazil and 13 per cent in South Africa depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. The amount of arable land per agricultural person is the lowest (0.28 hectares) in India, followed by Brazil (2.2 hectares) and South Africa (2.5 hectares). In Brazil, about 50 per cent of farms are of less than 10 hectares in size (compared with an average farm size of 68 hectares) and cover about 3 per cent of the land. On the other hand, in India farms larger than 10 hectares are rare. Over 86 per cent of the farms in India are of less than 2 hectares, and they cover 45 per cent of the land (IBSA 2010). Each IBSA member state is deeply involved in South–South agricultural cooperation with Africa. India, through the IAFS launched in 2008, aims to strengthen cooperation, especially with the transfer of agricultural technologies that meet the real needs of small-scale farmers in Africa. India is one of the lead actors in tropical technology, not only in high-technology packages but particularly in lower-level technology, which is important in meeting farmers’ 164 9 | Arkhangelskaya and Khamatshin ­ Benin, ­Benin, energy, energy, - cost and low-risk plant bio­ 165 cooperation. cooperation. The main coordinating body in this sector is the joint

growing farmers use biotechnology for development and to make the Food : processing Food Brazil and South Africa have the most advanced food processing sectors, particularly in processing and adding value to a wide variety of tropical products. They are positioned to share this expertise with African countries that need to improve their agricultural value chain. Brazil’s Brazil’s projects in Africa were initially focused on the Lusophone countries South Africa is a leader on the continent in agricultural technology and As IBSA countries have developed substantial capabilities in the ­ agricul • working working group on agriculture. This working group meets at least once a year and is presided over by a representative of each country At on a the rotating fourth basis. summit of IBSA heads of April state2010, the and group adopted government the ‘Future in of Agriculture Brasília Cooperation in in IBSA’ document, which indicated the following areas for coordination: of Angola, Mozambique and -Bissau. Guinea However, following the opening in Accra in 2006 of an office Empresaof Brasileiraor PesquisaEmbrapa de (the Agropecuária Brazilian agricultural research and training institution estab is a key player in joint research and development projects of with many the AU. examples One is the development of low- tural sector, there are significant synergies between agricultural them with regards to needs. needs. The Indian experience is being shared through the National Research Development Corporation, the Central Food Technological Research Institute, the Council of Scientific andIndustrial Research, and Indian the Agricultural Council Research of (Kumar 2010). lished in 1973, which has been a driving force in national and international agri­ cultural development), a number of other countries, including Ghana, Guinea, Kenya and Ethiopia have signed technical Brazil cooperation is looking towards agreements. a broad partnership with all members of the African Union (AU) in the transfer of technology, emphasising the specificof demands each country in projects for agricultural development. Moreover, Embrapa Africa develops technical assistance initiatives and opportunities for training and development of human resources as well as exploring Brazilian opportunities agribusiness. Embrapa Africa’s work for covers the areas of agro growing and processing tropical fruit, cassava technologies, and beef vegetables, and milk post-harvest production and managing forests. technology techniques, which may be within reach of rural and disadvantaged farmers and allow them to obtain increased and Kenya, sustainable for crop example, yields. tissue In culture of disease-free banana plantlets, obtained through cooperation between the Kenya Agricultural InstituteResearch and the South African Institute for Tropical and Subtropical Crops, has helped former - coffee transition to a new source of income (Da Silva et al. 2002). • Food safety measures: One key impediment for African countries in access­ ing markets for agricultural products in developed countries has been their inability to meet the strict sanitary and phytosanitary measures. IBSA coun­ tries are in a position to share their experiences in complying with these measures. • Promoting joint agricultural research and development: IBSA countries have developed significant technological capacity in different fields of agricul­ tural research. As Brazil has already done by establishing an Embrapa office in Accra, the three countries can undertake a joint initiative to provide regular training and undertake joint research with African countries, and to transfer well tested, suitable agricultural technology to African countries. • Information and communications technology (ICT) for agricultural development: As the IBSA countries move up the technological ladder, particularly in ICT, they have increasingly relied on such technology to promote development and share information and experience with governments, the private sector and civil society actors. In terms of South–South cooperation, they have identified ICT as the best way to reach farmers and research institutions so that African countries can strengthen their own capacities. • Capacity building and exchange of human resources: Already, each of the IBSA members has established bilateral programmes for capacity building and exchange of human resources. Each provides long- and short-term scholar­ ships to African students and civil servants in a number of agricultural fields.

These programmes need to be expanded further. The IBSA document pro­ poses a study to highlight the synergies, complementarities and comparative advantages of each country. This study will include scenario planning and analysis, which will provide broad projections for agriculture over the next 25 years or so. This attempt to establish long-term agricultural cooperation planning is unique among South–South initiatives (IBSA 2010). According to the ministerial communiqué from the seventh IBSA tri­lateral commission meeting (held in March 2011 in New Delhi), the agriculture joint working group is interested in collaborative activities that focus on the diag­ nosis and control of trans-boundary animal diseases; viticulture training programmes; integrated pest management; soya bean production; and value addition (South Africa Government 2011). Other working groups are also in­ volved in agriculture-related cooperation. The energy working group signed a memorandum of understanding on biofuels as early as 2006. Although biofuels appear to be controversial, cooperation in this area continues among IBSA countries. A workshop on the production and use of biofuels was held in Brazil in September 2010 and a workshop on technical specifications and standards for biofuels was hosted by South Africa in December 2010. 166 9 | Arkhangelskaya and Khamatshin This This

Training in ­ im Training West West University has

167 satellite -satellite project and the initiative on nano­ proved agricultural as techniques well as water management and control was provided. A new rice seed that IBSA introduced in -Bissau Guinea ­allowed the country to have a second harvest every thereby to helping year, combat hunger. waste of to Collection in solid violence reduce Carrefour Feuilles, Haiti: programme has promoted a culture of waste disposal, collection and Development Development of agriculture in and : Guinea-Bissau livestock At the fifth IBSA heads of state summit, the leaders emphasised the need Each IBSA country contributes US$1 million per year to the fund. The UN In addition, the IBSA micro • • to support small-scale and subsistence agriculture and to grant greater market access for their products, as well as the need lectual property for that could provide greater resilience increased in addressing agricultural sharing of ­ intel development (IBSA 2011). The IBSA Fund Trust demonstrates the true potential of the IBSA grouping and was created in 2004 within the IBSA dialogue forum. Projects are carried out under the Fund IBSA in Trust collaboration and ­ consul tation with partner countries through South–South cooperation mechanisms. The fund, managed by allows the IBSA UNDP, countries to initiate and finance poverty reduction projects in other developing countries. honoured the governments of India, Brazil and South Africa by awarding IBSA the 2010 Millennium Development Goals Award for South–South Cooperation for the innovative and successful projects undertaken through the IBSA Fund. This cooperation was recognised as ‘a breakthrough technical model cooperation’. So of far, three South–South projects have been completed: technology were announced at the conclusion of the fourth summit in Brasília to address common challenges in climate studies, agriculture and urity. The nanotechnology food project is a sec­ collaborative research and development programme between the departments of science and technology of the three countries. As part of this initiative, South Africa’s North- built a treatment plant that incorporates ultrafiltration membranes brackish groundwater clean to in a rural village. The plant removes pollutants such as chloride, nitrate, phosphate and sulphate to produce safe drinking water for domestic and community use. In Brazil, Embrapa is tion system developing using nanofilters a toclean biodiges­ irrigation supplies and make the water safe for drinking. Embrapa is also developing magnetic nanoparticles to treat water contaminated with pesticides. This class of technology seems especially suitable for removing organic pollutants, salts and heavy metals from liquids (de Paula Herrmann and Brum 2009). IBSA Fund for Alleviation of Poverty andcase of Hunger: the of Guinea- for Alleviation Fund Poverty IBSA Bissau recycling,­ thereby generating employment, reducing disease, preventing flooding in garbage-clogged canals and reducing environmental impacts. • Support to the infrastructure of the island of São Nicolau, Cape Verde: This in­ cludes the refurbishment of two isolated health clinics by employing local workers.

In addition, other initiatives are being implemented: an HIV/AIDS test­ ing and counselling centre in Burundi; a sports complex in Ramallah and a school in Gaza, Palestine; infrastructure and capacity development to provide quality services to special needs children and adolescents in Cambodia; and supporting an irrigation scheme in Nam Sa, Laos. In Guinea-Bissau, IBSA partnered with the ministry of agriculture to im­ prove agricultural yields and improve food self-sufficiency. The initiative had four elements: improving livestock production; climate change mitigation through water management and anti-erosion measures, including hydraulic infrastructure (small dams, canals, drainage, etc.); skills development through the sharing of experience; and rural electrification. The climate mitigation initiative is expected to reduce soil salinity and enable the use of 700 hec­ tares of low-lying land for rice production. The skills development component specifically targeted 4,500 poor farmers (2,600 of whom were women) and provided training in modern farming techniques to enhance rice, citrus and mango production. The project ran from February 2006 to April 2007 and cost roughly US$0.5 million (Task Team on South–South Cooperation 2010). The rural electrification component was designed to extend the benefits ofsolar energy systems to 25 villages, a step deemed essential for increasing agricultural productivity (UNDP 2012). These interventions are expected to improve food security and reduce poverty in 13,000 rural households; enhance livelihood opportunities in 24 villages through sustainable natural resource manage­ ment; and increase non-farm employment by strengthening the processing and marketing of agro-products and by facilitating transportation to markets. In sum, IBSA has shown through its activities in Guinea-Bissau how small, targeted interventions can make a huge difference in raising the productivity of small-scale farmers through capacity building and experience sharing.

Conclusions and the way forward More than 30 years have passed since the adoption of the Buenos Aires plan of action, but South–South cooperation has only recently emerged on a significant scale. Southern nations share the possibilities and problems of development. Developing countries did not train a sufficient number of quali­ fied scientists to whom they could turn for advice on the problems they faced or in the practical application of knowledge to agriculture in particular. Most of the countries cannot afford their own systems of agricultural research, so 168 9 | Arkhangelskaya and Khamatshin - cost solutions to existing 169 Growing technological advances in India, Brazil and South Africa allow them to pursue mutually beneficial cooperation with African countries. IBSA, along with other South–South cooperation forums, is an instrument for accelerating agricultural production and for facilitating institutional development and the transfer of technology, skills and experience among the developing countries themselves. The key question is whether Brazilian development practices or are adapted Indian to local technology African realities or on the basis of thorough a assessment of the challenges and opportunities. The for way IBSA forward must be based on adaptive tion cooperation the that interests takes of into African­ considera countries. Existing on the institutional ground, arrangements such as the Comprehensive Programme Africa and the Forum for Agricultural Agriculture Research in Africa can serve Development as the appropriate platforms for learning about and sharing successful experiences from Brazil, India and South Africa. that much closer cooperation with other countries is necessary and desirable. South–South cooperation facilitates sustainable, low- down development aid. problems. problems. It also helps fill the gaps the poorest in research and facilitates technology and experience sharing relevant as to well as skill cooperation transfers. Such should be driven by the principle of form horizontality of and a take mutually the beneficial partnership that goes beyond traditional top

PART IV China

10 | China’s food security challenge: what role for Africa?

Simon Freemantle and Jeremy Stevens

Introduction The world’s population surpassed the 7 billion mark in 2011. Based on current growth projections, by 2050, 9 billion people will occupy the earth, igniting Malthusian concerns about the world’s ability to provide sustenance for this rising population (United Nations 2010b). Indeed, the United Nations’ (UN’s) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that by 2050 food production will have to increase by 70 per cent from today’s volumes in order to feed the globe’s larger, more urbanised and increasingly affluent population (FAO 2010). As such, a total average annual net investment in world agricul­ ture of around US$83 billion is necessary. Importantly, the nexus of demand is originating in the world’s swiftly advancing, highly populated, emerging economies. Yet many emerging markets are faced with the challenge of meet­ ing the rising demand with diminishing local resources – principally arable land and irrigable water. Two recent and pronounced global food price hikes, in 2008 and 2011 (see Figure 10.1), underscore the challenge of meeting rising demand in the face of diminishing resources. Within this climate, attention is turning to those nations or regions offering great agricultural potential. Unsurprisingly, China and Africa, respectively, have

250

200 Cereals price index

150 Food price index

100

50 / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /

10.1 Global food price hikes (2008 and 2011) Source: FAO; Standard Bank Research (SBR)

173 been thrust to centre stage. Emotionally fuelled debates are commonplace because it is frequently assumed that China is laying an expansive agricultural cooperation framework across Africa, tapping into the continent’s immense potential as a means of securing long-term domestic food security. As with much Sino-African discourse, the predominant, and often untested, estimations are overwhelming. Separating truth from fiction is vital but difficult. This chapter attempts to assess China’s current agricultural demand and supply challenges, considering where (if at all) Africa is positioned with regard to Beijing’s critical response to ensuring long-term food security for the country.

Rising demand in China Food consumption in China has increased at an average annual rate of 23.4 per cent (five times faster than in India, for example), from US$57 billion in 2000 to US$463 billion in 2010 (BMI 2012). While per capita food consumption levels in China are comparatively low when measured against other advanced and emerging economies, China’s large (and still growing) population means that absolute consumption is vast. In fact, China consumes the second-highest amount of food in the world, after the United States (ibid.). Domestic food demand is expected to grow at double-digit rates over the next ten years (Trinh et al. 2006). The dramatic increase in China’s demand for agricultural commodities is unlikely to abate. Two mutually reinforcing factors (rising incomes and urban­ isation) principally underpin this assertion. Indeed, the pace of urbanisation has been so rapid that, where in 1980 China’s urban population amounted to around 190 million people, or 20 per cent of the population, today this figure stands at almost 650 million and roughly 47 per cent (United Nations 2010b). In a few years, China will cross an important threshold in that, for the first time in the country’s history, more than half of its population will be urbanised (see Figure 10.2).

1,600 1,400 1,200 Rural population 1,000 800 600

400 Urban population 200 0

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2015 2025 2035 2045 10.2 China’s large and increasingly urban population (1950–2050) Source: UN; SBR 174 10 | Freemantle and Stevens of of 175 quarter quarter of worldwide rubber consumption. Looking ahead, food demand will increase further. Income growth, especi­ Urbanisation Urbanisation has given rise to, and been prompted by, increasing affluence Rising incomes are not only increasing the amount but also the variety of An inevitable offshoot of this shift has been a tremendous spike in demand the world’s the soyaworld’s beans, 20 per cent of the corn world’s and 16 per cent of the world’s world’s wheat (ibid.). Meanwhile, adding to supply tensions, industrial activity has also spurred demand for certain agricultural commodities. For instance, motor production vehicle in China has stimulated demand for rubber: in 2006, China accounted for almost one- ally compensation to employees in both rurala compelling and force in urban driving areas, personal consumption. will Meanwhile, prove favourable demographics, urbanisation, a generalised asset deficit, low levels ofindebted­ ness and currency appreciation will provide support for result, consumption. the As average a per capita consumption of meat in increase China from is expected 7.2 to kilograms in 2010 Similar to growth 8.2 is kilograms expected by in 2015 fruit (USDA anticipated 2011). and that China’s vegetables total food (see consumption Figure expenditure 10.3). will over double US$1 It trillion by to 2015 (BMI 2012). is And, of course, should an average person in China consume just half of Chinese what consumption an would be average more American than consumes, double that total of the US. In short, corn, feed grains and soya bean meal. of Today, China consumes 25 per cent And between 1998 and 2007, textile manufacturing tripled demand for cotton (ibid.). Moreover, China is also investing in biofuel production as part strategy of to reduce its its dependence on expensive oil imports and its high level of greenhouse gas emissions (Freeman et al. 2008). in in China. Indicatively, China’s gross domestic product per capita has more than grownfivefold in the past decade, from US$1,038in 2001 to over US$5,800 today (IMF 2012). Naturally, urban incomes have according to expanded CEIC data, between at 2002 and a 2010 urban faster income per capita rate: rose from around RMB (renminbi) 8,000 to over RMB 21,000, compared with rural income per capita in 2010 of just over RMB 7,000 (CEIC 2011). food consumed by China’s largely urban middle class. In essence, as incomes go up, per capita consumption of staple foods declines proportionately, while the demand for protein (particularly meat) increases, often Con­ substantially. sumption patterns in relatively wealthy urban centres confirmannual this:urban per Chinese capita consumption of beef and mutton has increased from 1.7 kilograms in 1980 to 3.4 kilograms in 2008; poultry 8.0 kilograms; and from milk from 4.1 1.2 kilograms to 15.1 kilograms kilograms (USDA 2011). This to new demand has meant that China currently produces and than consumes half the more world’s pigs each year. for the agricultural produce that feeds animals. In fact, in China, much like in the US, the animal feed industry is by some margin the largest purchaser 400

1990 2000 2010 2015 300

200

100

0 Vegetables Meat Fruit Fish Milk

10.3 China’s increasing food consumption (kilograms/litres consumed per capita) Source: Economist Intelligence Unit; SBR

demand for agricultural produce will continue to rise and supply will need to respond.

Increasing strains on agricultural supply While demand is relentlessly surging, China’s agricultural sector is facing pressure on a number of fronts. Perhaps most prominently, rapidly accelerating urbanisation and industrialisation have encroached on farmland, and have led to the diminution of China’s water resources. Environmental concerns are epitomised by spreading desertification: about 4.5 billion tonnes of soil are scoured away each year by erosion in China, at an annual estimated cost of RMB 200 billion (approximately US$32 billion) this decade alone (Marks 2008). Between 1996 and 2006, China is believed to have lost almost 9 mil­ lion hectares of farmland. It is also estimated that China’s total cropland is expected to further decline from 135 million hectares in 2003 to 129 million hectares in 2020. Importantly, China is approaching the point established by its leaders as the ‘red line’ for food security: 120 million hectares of arable land (Bräutigam and Xiaoang 2009). Meanwhile, by 2000, almost half of China’s cities were already facing water shortages. Worryingly, agriculture is unable to compete with industry in terms of the productivity of water usage: for instance, 1,000 tonnes of water produces 1 tonne of wheat, which has a market value 70 times lower than the manufactured output the same amount of water yields. Since the early 1990s, industrial water demand in China has grown at an annual rate of some 6 per cent (Amarasinghe et al. 2005). If this pattern continues, industrial water use will increase fourfold by 2025. Meteorologists have estimated that the western regions of China will lack about 20 billion cubic metres of water from 2010 to 2030, and in 2050 the regions would still need 10 billion more cubic metres of water (ibid.). 176 10 | Freemantle and Stevens 177 urviving the China’), agricultural sector plays a critical role in keeping Given Given the large weight of food in the consumer basket (especially for ­ ‘s people fed. Rising food prices have a profound influence on the inflation trajectory, meaning that managing the supply and demand in equilibrium China is important. Recent pressures in this regard have been According profound. to the National Bureau of Statistics in inflationNovember had 2011, China’s averaged 6 per cent so with far as during the much as year, 2 percentage points of this increase due to rising pork prices alone. The agricultural sector employs totalone-third of labour China’s force. In fact, nearly seven out of every ten rural workers are employed in ­ agricul ture. to Related this, one of the principal ambitions of Chinese policy makers in redistributing wealth and elevating socioeconomic prosperity in the ­ coun try is to raise incomes in rural areas. The divergence in incomes between rural and urban households has widened by around 10 percentage points each decade since 1985, causing deep cleavages between different strata of society (see Figure 10.4). (and Farming even food prices) is a primary tool income distribution towardsfor China’s rebalancing rural areas. Given the sector’s importance, it is no surprise that agriculture is placed at China’s China’s propensity and ability to boost domestic agricultural production Much Much analysis simplistically ends with an assessment of China’s profound • • • the centre of a host of structural and cyclical priorities in China, exemplified • in in light of increased demand is incontrovertible. Indeed, turning to domestic sources of supply will be Beijing’s principal objective, particularly because of agriculture’s broader role in maintaining social harmony in China. agricultural challenges without delving into the manner in coordinating which a Beijing national response is to these shifts, through both domestic and foreign policy adjustments. Freeman et al. (2008) have suggested has that China five core short - and long-term policy security: options investing to in ensure the long-term development food of domestic reducing agricultural import production; costs; protecting domestic supplies by use restricting of exports; aid and cooperation mechanisms to adopting policies boost to boost production outward abroad; investment and in agriculture. For Africa, and aid outward investment (which are congruentlargely on the continent) as well as China’s trade-related options matter most, as this is is where the best continent positioned to play a role in security increasing in - medium China. and -term long food Domestic agricultural production Domestic agricultural China’s agricultural supply response supply agricultural China’s 22,000 80 Urban (left axis) Rural (left axis) 16,500 68 Rural-to-urban ratio Percentage (right axis) 11,000 55 RMB per annum 5,500 43

0 30 1985 1991 1997 2003 2009

10.4 Household income inequality in China Source: CEIC; SBR

by its prominence in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. A range of policies have been supportive of agriculture in China since 1978, when reforms to the agricultural sector spurred wider economic liberalisation. While Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations have reduced agricultural subsidies by 6 per cent in 2010 (to US$227 billion), resulting in a fall in farmers’ incomes derived from subsidies from 22 per cent in 2009 to 18 per cent, China has increased its subsidies by 40 per cent (to US$147 billion) (AFP 2011). More effectively, farmers are permitted to apply for 30-year leases. Extending property rights to farmers has proven to be four times more effective in generating income than subsidies, because, according to the Landesa survey of rural China, farmers with rights to the land are twice as likely to make capital investments (80 per cent do so within

Supply Demand Accumulated stockpile Stocks-to-demand (right axis)

160 60

120 48 Percentage

80 35

40 23 Metric tonnes (millions)

0 10 Wheat Rice Grain Soya beans Cotton Sugar

10.5 China’s equilibrium in major markets, plus stockpiles Source: World Trade Organization (WTO); SBR

178 10 | Freemantle and Stevens 179 drought/flood programmes; and ensure by preserving farmland of approximately 1.2 million security , modernisation while deepening urbanisation, by improving the Box 10.1. Agriculture in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan Five-Year in the Twelfth 10.1. Agriculture Box productive productive capacity by farmland accelerating consolidation, extend square kilometres; square protect arable land from erosion; enhance irrigation, water storage capacities and anti- quality and safety of raw foods. Grow benefits to individual farmers increase and production540 million tonnes (Delegation of of the to grains European Union in China 2011). Promote long-term supporting apparatus for agriculture industrial and upgrading transport, logistics and storage infrastructure. Maintain Government prioritisation has worked so far: China is currently a net exporter net a currently is China far: so worked has prioritisation Government China has not had to pursue sizeable supplies of soft commodities off­ Investments in agriculture -related machinery have complemented ­ speciali of food, notably corn and rice. It has also accumulated enormous stockpiles of most soft commodities –importantly wheat, rice and grain (see Figure 10.5). shore because its vast geographical reach means that different regions within the country have been able to develop instance, various Hainan (melons), comparative Heilongjiang (green advantages. vegetables), Shaanxi For (apples), Xinjiang Ugyur (cotton) and Shandong (vegetables) have emerged as pockets of specialisation. As a result, agriculture plays an the different important regions role China. in in linking sation, with total agricultural machinery power kilowatts jumping in from 2000 to 525 874 million million kilowatts in 2010 (China Statistical 2011). Yearbook Together with these capital investments, China dation has of seen the farming consoli­ plots (often under cooperatives),(often facilitated bywhich the fact that farmers can assume 30-year flourished have land leases). The confluence of specialisation and targetedinvestment, along with consolidation (unlocking efficiencies and economies of scale),innovation, resulted led has by globally competitive companies in such a flurry of as Sinograin Wilmar (soya beans) and others. (corn), China ranks firstin worldwide farm output of cotton, millet, barley, oilseed, peanuts, potatoes, rice, sorghum, tea and wheat. China’s agricultural yields are significantly superior to global norms, for corn except and soya bean, which are broadly on a par with In global late competition. September, an agricultural scientist from China, a Yuan new Longping, world set record of 13.9 tonnes of rice per hectare (up from 13.5 tonnes). 12 months of receiving rights). In 2010 alone, these investments boosted rural incomes by nearly US$500 billion (Landesa 2011). Each of these drivers has allowed China to remain broadly self-sufficient in agricultural production by doubling and then re-doubling agricultural output. According to a recent OECD/FAO report, China’s agricultural output is predicted to see growth of around 26 per cent to 2019 (OECD-FAO 2010). Hence, for Beijing, much of the expected spike in food demand will be met with a substantial increase in domestic productivity by increasing yields per hectare and by modernising, commercialising and improving the country’s agricultural output.

Trade While domestic investment will carry most of the burden brought about by increased demand for agricultural produce, externalisation will undoubtedly play an increasingly vital role in addressing China’s overall food security. The principal channel through which China will seek external sources of nutrition will be trade. We know that in the past 30 years China has been the most successful nation in the world at attaching itself to global supply chains: China now accounts for more than 10 per cent of world trade (up from less than 2 per cent in 1980), and has become the world’s largest exporter and second largest importer. However, as a result of its bid to internalise the means for maintaining domestic food security, agricultural produce accounts for just 5 per cent of China’s imports (down from 16 per cent in 1980) (ITC 2011). Already, bolstered by its accession to the WTO in 2002, China has, over the course of the past decade, dramatically reduced tariffs on certain core agricultural com­ modities. For instance, in 2002 the maximum tariff on soya bean imports was reduced from 114 per cent to 3 per cent, leading to a significant increase in soya bean imports. It is necessary that the trend continues in order to meet the growing demand for soya beans from Chinese consumers. Consideration of China’s soya bean demand and supply dynamics provides a cogent indicator of the importance of increased trade. Today, China is the world’s largest importer of soya beans, virtually all of which are used in crush to feed its animals. Indeed, where in 2001 China imported just US$2.8 bil­ lion worth of soya beans, in 2010 this had increased almost tenfold to over US$25 billion (amounting to 43 million metric tonnes, compared with 12.7 million metric tonnes imported by the entire Eurozone) (ibid.). Demand for soya beans in China is expected to increase to 60 million metric tonnes by 2020. Considering that, according to the State Administration of Grain, China would need to open up an additional 13.3 million hectares of farming land for soya bean production in order to become self-sufficient in the commodity, it is clear that import channels will be critical (Ping 2008). Raised import demand has been material not only in soya beans. Over the last decade, imports of several important, largely ‘land-intensive’ agricultural commodities increased. In particular, between 1998 and 2007, according to UN 180 10 | Freemantle and Stevens 32,000 24,000 2010 2001 16,000 chemicals chemicals consumed 54 million tonnes - 181 8,000 0 Fish Meat Wool Sugar Cocoa Cotton Rubber Cereals Tobacco The rise in China’s food imports million) (US$ food The rise in China’s Wood pulp Vegetables Soya beans ethanol each Much year. of this will need to be supplied by imports. In

- Live animals Fruit and nuts Coee and tea Demand overhangs are inevitable. For instance, in 2008 China imported A more affluent China will also increase demand for -fed grain meat, particu­ As a result of these shifts, the Food Agriculturaland Policy Research Wooden articles 10.6 SBR : UN Comtrade; Source Dairy, eggs, honey data, the imports of products such as oilseeds, wheat, cereals, palm cassava, oil vegetables, and textile fibres have increased2010, rubber sixfold. imports Between increased 2001 from and US$2 billion to US$16.9 other products have billion. shown remarkable Several growth: for instance, imports of dairy, eggs and honey expanded by over 800 per animals by cent 690 betweenper cent, vegetables 2001 by and 630 per 2010, cent and live coffee and tea byper 620 cent (see Figure 10.6). around 28 million tonnes of cotton against domestic production of 7 million tonnes. And, while rice yields in China are impressive per at hectare and 4.79 stock levels metric (45,188,000 tonnes metric tonnes) are as much as a third of annual demand, should the government require surplus stocks to manage price, new external sources will be important (USDA 2011). larly pork, thereby increasing demand for feedstock. According to the National China Grain and Oils Information Centre, in 2010 over 100 million of tonnes corn were used by the livestock industry, a 27 per cent increase from 2009. Meanwhile, China’s move towards biofuels will also of be initiatives to significant. reduce As greenhouse part gas emissions, China million tonnes aims of oil to with 2 replace million tonnes of 12 biodiesel and 10 million tonnes of bio 2010 alone, Chinese producers of bio of corn (much of which was imported from the US), up 12 per cent from 2009 (ITC 2011). Raw hides and skins Raw hides and Animal/veg. fats/oils Animal/veg. 1,200 100 2001 2010 Share of total imports (right axis) 80 800 Percentage 60

40 400 20

0 0 Fish Wool Cocoa Cotton Rubber Tobacco Oilseeds Raw hides Wood pulp fats and oils Articles of wood Animal, vegetable

10.7 Chinese agricultural imports from Africa (US$ million; 2010) Source: UN Comtrade; SBR

­Institute (FAPRI) estimates that China’s soya bean imports will increase from 33.7 ­million tonnes in 2007–08 to 52 million tonnes in 2017–18, and palm oil imports from 5.5 million tonnes to 10.8 million tonnes over the same period. Also according to FAPRI, China will change from being a net wheat exporter of 2.3 million tonnes in 2007–08 to a net importer of 1.4 million tonnes in 2017–18, while cotton imports will double from 3 million tonnes to 6.1 million tonnes. Importantly, FAPRI expects rice exports to buck the trend, increasing from 435,000 tonnes to 739,000 tonnes (FAPRI 2011). Of course, given China’s size, any substantive increase in agricultural imports is likely to be meaning­ ful globally. China will increasingly need to lean on international markets for the provi­ sion of certain core foodstuffs, particularly those used to feed China’s animals. The vast majority of imports will be produced close by, in Asia.

Africa is a small player in China’s agricultural trade prospectus Currently, most Chinese agricultural imports originate in Asia and the Americas, relega­ ting Africa to the sidelines. For instance, in 2010 the Americas accounted for virtually 99 per cent of all soya bean exports to China. Also in 2010, roughly three-quarters of China’s rubber imports came from Asia (40 per cent from Thailand and Malaysia). Wood imports were more geographically dispersed. In Africa, Gabon and the Republic of Congo provided 3 per cent and 1.8 per cent of China’s total wood imports in 2010 respectively, ranking in the top 15 sources of the commodity (ITC 2011). Indeed, in 2009 total China–Africa trade in agricultural goods amounted to less than US$4 billion, compared with overall trade of over US$100 billion for the year. As indicated in Figure 10.7, only imports from Africa of wood, 182 10 | Freemantle and Stevens per per 183 cent of its fish imports came from Africa (ibid.). While the proposition of Freeman et (2008) al. conceptually separates the use Chinese Traditionally, attempts to aid African agriculture have focused on Despite relatively modest trade volumes, growth in China’s demand for That said, there is a clear disconnect between the agricultural commodities Meanwhile, reflecting the mannerin which Africa’s agricultural sector has of aid and outward investment as agricultural policy tools available to China, in reality this separation, particularly in the African context, is unfeasible. Indeed, a marked feature of China’s renewed engagement with core African has markets been the manner in which state-led developmental assistance as has a acted beachhead for wider corporate activity. In agriculture, while emphasis is placed more heavily on developmental objectives (as opposed to mining, instance), for signs of commercialism and strategic intent are increasingly visible. the transfer of technologies and training, and the operation, establishment, of and demonstration often farms. China has actively assistance used in these forging or forms supporting of strategic partnerships least in the Africa 1960s. In since all, during at the 1960s and 1970s, China assisted in over building 80 farms in Africa, covering a territory of roughly 45,000 hectares. Some Aid and outward investment investment Aid and outward African agricultural commodities has been pronounced. Imports for instance, have of expanded from just cotton, US$8 million in 2001 to US$462 million in 2010, and oilseed from US$146,000 to imports US$420 also million. jumped Meanwhile, by wood over 200 US$12 per million to cent, US$58 million, rubber and raw hides imports from US$6.7 increased million to from US$221 million between 2001 and 2010 (ibid.). that Africa principally exports and those that China is increasingly importing. When comparing the top ten Chinese agricultural imports African with the agricultural top exports, ten Chaponniere et al. (2010a) commodities, cotton and appear rubber, show on both lists, and even how trade in these only two products remains relatively modest. consistently underperformed, Chinese exports of agricultural commodities to the continent have increased at a faster rate than African agricultural exports to China over the past fiveyears. Indeed,in 2008, while total Chinese­ agricul tural imports from Africa reached US$2 billion, Chinese exports of agricultural products (principally rice, tea and vegetables) amounted to a little over US$1.5 billion. Quite clearly, while China is actively adopting increased trade agricultural as a means of supporting domestic food consumption, Africa, for now, does not feature prominently in Beijing’s prospectus. tobacco, tobacco, oilseed and cocoa accounted for more than total imports 10 of these specific per commoditiesin 2010. cent Furthermore, only of 4.5 China’s cent of China’s cotton imports, 0.4 per per cent of its rubber imports and 0.9 of these farms, such as the Mbarali farm in Tanzania, included long-term technical assistance and, at one stage, were responsible for roughly one- quarter of total domestic rice production, providing important support for national food security (Spring 2009). Other notable operations originating in this ­period included the Ubungo Farm Implements plant, also in Tanzania, which produced 85 per cent of the country’s handheld farm tools, the Fano farm in Somalia and the Chipembe farm in Uganda. In the 1980s, while the focus remained on the above tenets of cooperation, a discernible shift emerged towards ensuring that these demonstration farms became profitable. This adjustment was influenced in large part by wider ‘go global’ initiatives involving virtually all large Chinese state-owned and private entities. Ultimately, state support became a crucial tool in emboldening China’s commercial advance. Meanwhile, agriculture maintained its elevated role as a means through which Beijing sought to strengthen international partnerships in order, at least partly, to support domestic food security objectives. Thus, according to Chaponniere et al. (2010a), by the end of the 1980s, nearly one- quarter of China’s total aid programme in Africa concentrated on agriculture, touching more than 40 African countries. More recently, material support has been lent to Chinese agricultural firms in Africa through the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), principally under FOCAC’s China–Africa Development Fund (CADF), which is administered by China Development Bank. CADF has already supported the establishment of ten demonstration farms in Africa. Moreover, in the Outward Investment Sector Direction Policy of 2006, explicit provision was made for the support of the outward expansion of China’s agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors, specifically those encouraging the cultivation of natural rubber, oil-bearing crops, cotton and vegetables, as well as felling, transportation and planting of timber, animal husbandry and breeding, and fisheries. However, while no doubt important, China’s support for the outward expansion of the agricultural sector is comparatively minimal. According to Freeman et al. (2008), China’s outward investment in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries combined was only US$190 million in 2006, 0.9 per cent of total outward investment for the year. This contrasts with the US$8.5 billion invested in resource extraction. As of 2009, roughly 200 agricultural projects had been carried out by China in Africa, with a further 23 projects in the fisheries industry. The Chinese min­ istry of commerce has further claimed that over 1,100 Chinese agricul­tural ex­ perts are currently stationed in Africa, maintaining at least 11 ­agricultural research stations and over 60 agricultural investment projects throughout the continent (Rubinstein 2009). The majority of these projects have been, and continue to be, carried out by a range of large and medium-sized Chinese state-owned farming groups. At the state level, the China State Farm and 184 10 | Freemantle and Stevens aries ­aries owned enterprises (SOEs). Subsidi 185 Naturally, on Naturally, the back of state-sponsored activities, smaller Chinese private Recent Chinese activity in Latin American agriculture has been substantially Trade ties have, of course, been of principal importance (consider that Joint Joint operations between state and provincial organisations are ­ common firms andindividuals activein the broader agricultural or agribusiness space have secured new opportunities (see Table 10.1). Many Chinese agribusinesses operating in Africa are also subsidiaries of larger private or, more often, state provincial agricultural firms. more pronounced than in Africa. According to Deloitte research, between May 2010 and May 2011, China invested a total of US$15.6 billion in Latin America, a threefold increase on the previous year. China in particular has strategically invested in soya bean production. In April 2011, China and Brazil sealed a US$7 billion agreement to produce 6 million tonnes of soya beans per year. same In month, the Chongqing Grains signed a further US$2.5 billion agreement to produce soya beans in the Brazilian state of Bahia (Barrionuevo 2011). in Goiás state in Brazil, almost 70 exported to per China), but it is cent clear that China of is increasingly looking to the control soya grown sources in of 2010 external production. was However, initial forays into Latin America this in regard inspired a policy backlash. According the to deals Barrionuevo mentioned (ibid.), above, in Chinese officials werethe land but were guided favour in towards production agreements in line purchasing with of stricter regulations governing foreign land ownership recently introduced by Brazil and of these SFACs are also active on the these continent. farms A is general that characteristic they of are predominantly, run at on times a exclusively, on profit local basis, or with regional demand A production larger dynamics. based hectare 3,500- farm run by CSFAC in around Zambia, 10 for per cent instance, of provides Lusaka’s eggs (Marks 2008; Ping 2008; Zhu 2010). place. For instance, CSFAC place. and have For instance, developed the collaboratively CSFAC SFAC Jiangsu the Friendship China–Zambia Farm, which covers around 700 hectares of land in maize Zambia, growing and barley, soya beans. Another prominent state -level institution, the China National Agricultural Development Group Corporation, is believed to operate seven farms in Africa. In all, Chinese reports claim that there are 15 Chinese farms in Zambia, covering an area of 10,000 hectares and operated by six different Chinese state- Agribusiness Agribusiness Corporation (CSFAC) has been most active. Having established its first farm in Africa in 1994, across CSFAC the continent, covering an now operates area of around 8,600 hectares. Complement­ seven projects farming ing state -level firms are regional Hubei SFAC (which or in provincial2005 established a organisations, 1,000-hectare farm in such Mozambique), the as Jiangsu SFAC and Shaanxi SFAC (which has established a 5,000-hectare farm with an investment of US$62.5 million (Bräutigam in and Cameroon, Xiaoyang 2009). growing mainly rice) Table 10.1 Selected Chinese agricultural and agribusiness SOEs operating in Africa (2010)

Company Country Core operations

Da Ping Fishery Group Angola Fishing, aquatic product processing and sale of fish meal Sichuan Sanhetian Bio-Tech Ghana Planting, processing and trade of medicinal plants Shandong Xinwei Grain and Oil Mozambique Planting, processing and sale of sesame, cashew and peanuts CGC Overseas Construction Nigeria Agricultural trade, grain cultivation and processing, and livestock Huaqiao Phoenix Group South Africa Forestry, poultry and livestock Hainan Qilin Tech Tanzania Sisal research and development, cultivation, processing and sale China–Africa Agriculture Investment Corporation Limited Zambia Production and sale of agricultural and livestock products Qindao Textile Union Zambia Planting, processing and trade of cotton An Hui China State Farms Group Zimbabwe Agricultural trade and investment (including livestock and aquatic products)

Source: MOFCOM 2010 10 | Freemantle and Stevens government -leasing land - In May 2008, amid concerns 187 -Saharan Africa over the past decade, China’s contribution to this thrust -Saharan Africa over the course of the past decade – especially the failed A range of recent studies, particularly by the International Institute for In response to the allegations, MoA denied that any new policy stance had Accusations Accusations of have ‘land been grabs’ controversial Argentina, Argentina, largely in response to rising Chinese interest. tions These have reportedly new put on restric­ hold upwards of US$15 billion worth of farming projects, including a wide range of foreign investors, in Brazil alone (ibid.). Environment Environment and Development and the Oakland Institute, back assertions. up Indeed, China’s while it is estimated hectares that of between land have 50 been and acquired 60 or sub leased million for agricultural purposes in attempt by South Korean firm Daewoo Logistics to securelarge tracts of land in Madagascar for agricultural purposes (Spencer 2008), in coup part d’état triggering in a the country. China is also sensitive weaknesses about in publicly its conceding own ability to for provide its population. adequate In December security 2008, the and National Development sustenance and Reform Commission announced a 20-year food security strategy in which foreign land acquisitions were not included as a pivotal feature, with the exception of soya bean production in Brazil (Cotula et al. 2009). has been minimal (ibid.). In terms of government-to been adopted, despite claims that the document had apparently already been presented to the State Council for deliberately ratification. rebutted Chinese these officials claims, asserting since have that Beijing of has acquiring land no in intention Africa to provide for increased commodities. demand This for agricultural response is likely to have profoundly negative been reactions to a inspired wide in range of part-leasing land deals signed by in the sub stoked stoked by the global food price hikes, (MoA) is the reported Chinese to Ministry have proposed of a Agriculture new agriculture. policy According on to outward the document, investment domestic in Chinese companies would be encouraged to purchase or lease land abroad, with production, a so focus as on to support soya domestic bean food security objectives. Areas priorit­ ised for expansion included Africa, Central Asia, Russia, South-East Asia and South America, with emphasis placed on those stability countries and having enjoying strong relations political with China. The policy proposal, having leaked into public discourse, ignited a flurry of accusationsmanner focusing in which China the on was planning to engage in -scale large ‘land grabs’ in vulnerable African states. deals, activity from the water-scarce Gulf Qatar, states, has such been as Saudi pronounced, Arabia while and private Global, firms, which such operates agricultural India’sas and Karuturi horticultural Ethiopia, continue assets to play in important roles. Kenya Inspired primarily by and global food prices, speculative interest in African farmland has also increased markedly (Freemantle 2011).

Conclusion On both the demand and supply side, China’s agricultural sector is clearly under strain. For now, Beijing can and will look to its own domestic sources to provide for the bulk of new demand, implementing new technologies to stave off the effects of a reduction in cropland. Yet it is increasingly evident that China cannot ensure low-cost food for its large and demanding popula­ tion without ramping up external sources of nutrition. Such initiatives are not unique to China: Japan, for instance, has access to three times more cropland abroad than domestically. And movements are, for the most part, likely to be gradual, reflecting persistent debate within China as to the relative merits and risks associated with the externalisation of food production. Either way, given China’s scale and its pace of change, any shift in this regard is likely to have a meaningful impact on global agricultural markets. In Africa, two core areas hold an allure for China. First, given the manner in which the continent’s agricultural sector has persistently underperformed, the provision of developmental and technical assistance provides Beijing with an important avenue for fostering and building deeper bilateral ties. And, second, sub-Saharan Africa’s immense and largely untapped agricultural ­potential is increasingly viewed by China as a cog in an unfolding and inclusive food sec­ urity strategy. For now, China’s strategy is overtly developmental and, although commercialism inspires many of the cooperative farming projects, profits are generated almost entirely in local and regional markets. That said, and as indicated by China’s expansive agricultural investments in Mozambique, it is clear that Beijing is seeking to build deeper relation­ ships in agriculture with land-rich and politically stable countries ‘friendly’ to China. Investments, backed by state-directed assistance, in these countries will increasingly look to produce the types of crops, such as soya beans and cotton, for which demand in China is high. Collaboration will also be pronounced in coffee, tea, rubber, wine, sisal and tobacco production, emphasising specific strengths already evident in Africa in the production of some of these com­ modities. Most of these initiatives will look to bolster China’s agricultural trade ties with Africa, although some, as has been evident in nascent moves in Latin America, will position Chinese firms to control the external source of production. For Africa, managing Chinese interest in its agricultural sector will be criti­ cal. The continent suffers from an acute lack of skills and capital for unlocking its inherent potential. Yet, as has been evident in many of the land-leasing deals signed in sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade, too often investments are poorly structured, undervaluing the agricultural assets at stake. The role 188 10 | Freemantle and Stevens 189 of China as a developmental partner should not be understated. Increasingly, African countries must attempt to align Chinese aid packages with continental or at least regional agricultural programmes such as the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, so as to maximise socioeconomic gains. 11 | China’s agricultural and rural development: lessons for African countries

Xiuli Xu and Xiaoyun Li

Introduction This chapter highlights the key elements of China’s agricultural and ­rural development strategy, which is credited with the unprecedented scale of poverty reduction and overall economic growth over the past decades, and explores how Chinese experience could inform Africa’s strategy to transform its lagging agricultural sector and reduce poverty. It starts by reviewing the progress of agricultural and rural development since the reforms, followed by an analysis of China’s agriculture-led development strategies and policies that have underpinned its impressive performance. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the lessons China’s experiences in agricultural development and poverty reduction may have for African countries.

Agriculture in China’s post-1978 economic transformation China’s success in economic development and poverty alleviation since the economic reforms and ‘opening up’ policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping at the end of the 1970s has been startling. Robust economic growth, averaging about 10 per cent per year, has been consistently maintained over the past three decades. This phenomenal growth has enabled China to lift millions of people out of poverty and hunger, and to position itself as the second biggest economy in the world (World Bank 2001; Hu et al. 2006; Huang et al. 2007). The share of the population living below US$1.25 a day decreased impressively from 84 per cent in 1981 to 16 per cent in 2005 (Chen and Raval­ lion 2008). The achievements in agricultural growth, food security and rural develop­ ment are considered to be one of the contributing factors in the aforementioned­ economic miracle in China (McMillan et al. 1989; Fan et al. 1999; 2010; World Bank 2007: 6; Huang et al. 2008; China–DAC Study Group 2011b: 32). Indeed, China’s agricultural growth is estimated to have contributed four times more to poverty reduction than both manufacturing and services (Ravallion and Chen 2007; Ravallion 2009). This mirrors what Johnston and Mellor (1961) argue about the intrinsic, albeit intricate, link between agriculture and economic development. They note that agriculture stimulated growth in non-agricultural 190 11 | Xiuli and Xiaoyun input -input called emer­ - 191 agricultural strategy concentrated on food crops. This agricultural This crops. food strategyon -agricultural concentrated Prior to Deng Xiaoping’s decision to transform the Chinese economy, Chinese Chinese economy, Chinese the transform to decision Xiaoping’s Deng to Prior However, radical shifts and reversals in policies, such as the Leap Great The poor state of African agriculture and the prevalence of food insecurity Based on the experiences of these successful emerging countries, the agriculture did undergo some development, but on a less significant scale than in the post-reform period. The aim was to maintain mono a using minimum food security development was interrupted by the natural disasters and political struggles of the 1950s to 1970s. The Land Reform Act of the People’s Republic of China was passed in 1950 to distribute arable land in private ownership Land to reform was also all accompanied by policies peasants. to establish agricultural univer­ sities, develop national and local research institutions and develop agro Forward campaign, which forcibly organised farmers outlawed into private communes production and of agricultural crops, had During this a period, disruptive capital effect. accumulated from agriculture was heavy mobilised industry, while for critical means of production, such as land were and under labour, state control and private initiatives were not permitted. This mis­ guided policy contributed to the great Chinese famine of 1958–62, although the problem was compounded by drought and The poor ensuing weather. Cultural Revolution of 1966–76 further deflected national attention from addressing the productivity decline in agriculture and the overall stagnation of the Investment economy. in Chinese research and development, new technology and rural infrastructure was neglected and declined between 1957 and 1952–57 (Maddison 1978 2008: 77–8). relative These to misadventures, which saw a huge ­ diver sion of scarce national resources and energy, were among the critical factors influencing Deng Xiaoping to put China on a different path after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. With the gradual liberalisation of economic policy after 1978, the production potential of agriculture was unleashed. in many parts of the continent are not exceptional. Today’s so sectors, sectors, contributed to the reduction of poverty overall and economic -being. hunger well and supported production, agricultural in increase dramatic a to led initiatives These industries. particularly in food crops (Li et al. 2012). output The average and 1949–58 during tons output million 197.65 to tons million of 113.18 from food crops increased of food crops per capita increased from 208 kilograms to 299 kilograms in the same period (State Statistical Bureau 2009: 161, 637). ging ging countries, such as China, India and Brazil, experienced long chronic periods of hunger and food insecurity as a result their agricultural sectors. Over of the past 30 years, these however, countries the have underdevelopment of introduced radical economic and political reforms that have enabled them not only to transform but the also agricultural to sector, build a dynamic industrial sector and to position themselves as important players in the global economy. ­situation in Africa is not hopeless. With the right policies and strong poli­tical leadership, African countries could also transform their agricultural sectors and leapfrog into industrialisation. The African continent has lagged behind other developing regions, with a prolonged stagnation beginning in the 1970s, despite recent notable economic progress. Poverty and hunger still plague the vast continent, particularly in the rural areas (World Bank 2007: 21). The incidence of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa remained virtually constant at 50 per cent during 1981–2005, with the number of poor doubling (Chen and Ravallion 2008). Africa’s impressive economic growth over the past ten years has not been accompanied by job creation and the reduction of inequalities, indicating that structural transformation has yet to occur (UNECA and AUC 2012: 8–15). Much recent growth is accounted for by increased receipts from commodities: growth has not been broad-based or inclusive. Nevertheless, consensus has recently been reached on the importance of agriculture and rural development as powerful engines of broad-based growth and poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa (Christiaensen and Demery 2007; Ravallion 2009; Fan et al. 2010; China–DAC Study Group 2011b: 34–61). The emergence of continental and regional policy-making machinery alongside national policies provides the institutional architecture for various initiatives to enhance agricultural production and productivity in Africa (China–DAC Study Group 2011a: 36–41). The renewed focus on agricultural development in Africa is also seen as a silver lining following the multiple global crises of food, climate change and finance (Juma 2011: 11–22; Fan et al. 2010; China–DAC Study Group 2011b: 34–61). The pathway to China’s agricultural growth and poverty reduction can serve as a reference point for ongoing efforts to catalyse agricultural transformation in sub-Saharan African countries (Fan et al. 2010; China–DAC Study Group 2011b: 34–61; Li et al. 2012). This type of China–Africa knowledge exchange, particularly in agriculture, is timely in light of the recent strengthening of China’s and Africa’s economic cooperation, which offers new development oppor­tunities for African states and local farmers (Kragelund 2008; Bräutigam and Xiaoyang 2009; Bräutigam 2010; Fan et al. 2010). There are also, however, challenges, labelled in neocolonialist terms as ‘land grabs’, resource exploita­ tion, influx of Chinese labourers, environmental pollution, hindering demo­ cracy and support for tyranny (Zafar 2007; Fisher 2011). For many observers and policy makers, ‘it is perhaps in agriculture where China may have a significant impact on the continent’s future’ (Chaponniere et al. 2010a).

Agricultural and rural development in China since the reform era The way China managed to bring about the structural transformation of agriculture and the economy in general will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. In a nutshell, the policies pursued by the Chinese Communist 192 11 | Xiuli and Xiaoyun ­ -agriculture 193 After the reforms, grain production boomed based based policy making and implementation, which allowed According to Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates, the 1 input -input industry contributed to the growth of grain production in China market market development and trade liberalisation in goods; and iv) rapid ­ expan diversification of agriculture beyond grain; and iii) development of a non- Fluctuations can be clearly observed in the growth rates of grain production Comprehensive drivers such as institutional change, technological develop This This section focuses on three key elements of productivity growth and markedly, markedly, particularly in the early stages. Now China grows sufficient foodto meet the needs of a fifth of the world’s world’sthe arable land population and with a quarter of onits global water lessresources. Grain than tenth of a output per capita was 288 kilograms in 1952, 319 400 kilograms kilograms in in 2010 1978 (State Statistical and Bureau over 2009: 17; SSB 2011) (see 11.1). Figure throughout the post-reform period. Grain production increased by 4.7 per cent per year during 1978–84, in contrast to 2.8 per cent during 1970–78 (Huang and Rozelle 2009). This prominent growth soon slowed to even lower 1.7 to 0.03 per cent during 1985–95 and 1996–2000 per respectively (Huang et cent and then al. 2008). After the peak harvestin 1996 of 500 million tonnes (State Statistical Bureau 2009: 161), a sharp downturn gave rise to a substantial supply Between deficit. 2000 and 2003, China suffered million tons a cumulative of shortfall grain (Ash 2010), of but falling 245 some grain trends somewhat since 2004. an More have inspiring peak recently, yield of 4,950 kilograms been reversed per hectare was harvested in 2008 (State Statistical Bureau 2009: 161). number of undernourished people decreased from 304 million in 123 million in 2003–05, and the 1979–81 percentage of undernourished people decreased to from 30 per cent to 9 per cent of the population in this period. Grain Grain production and food security farm farm economy and urbanised society that economic were growth the and poverty foundations reduction of in overall China. sion of the development of rural infrastructure. All underpinning the institutional and policy in shifts reflect the strong commitment all, the key elements of the leading party to agricultural development and sound pro transformation in Chinese agriculture: i) grain production and food security; ii) Party since 1978 included: i) institutional innovation; ii) technological change; iii) institutional architecture. Together with this, there was gradual and - learning a commitment to agriculture-based reform to expand into broader social and economic ­ transfor mation, and thus create synergies between the state, the market and farmers. ment, price and market liberalisation, new irrigation systems and a flourishing agro in the post-reform period (Lin 1998; Li et al. land 2012). and The labour has productivity been of enhanced both since the reforms 2008: 75–7), (Ashand, given the increasing 2010; land constraints faced Maddison by China, the rise 600 450 Per capita output of grain 400 500 350 Per capitaoutput(kg) 400 300

Output of grain 250 300 200 Output (million tons)

200 150

100 100 50

0 0                                 

11.1 Growth in grain production in China (1978–2010) Source: State Statistical Bureau 2009: 17; 2011 11 | Xiuli and Xiaoyun ­Africa, culture -Saharan ­Little investment -Saharan Africa has Africa as a whole is currently the only 2 195 -Saharan African countries remain seriously food ­ produc grain weak and hunger betweensevere Africa -Saharan -Saharan Africa, with 30 per cent of the total population under­ The disappointing performance of grain production in sub The link in sub in link The The increasing grain surplus laid a solid basis for broad economic growth In stark contrast, sub tion, dominated by coarse grains, has been -perpetuating, self particularly since the 1970s. Over the last 30 years, grain production in plummeted, with productivity sub less than half the world’s average (Li et al. 2010: 1–20). Grain production per capita in 1970 was 176 kilograms, dropping to 146 kilograms in 1979 and to less than 125 kilograms in 1983. It remains lower than recoverysome despite 2005, in kilograms 141 reached it example, for 1970s: the in in the new century (ibid.). This is only half of China’s lowest level, in 1952. continent continent with net food imports, even though of -based ‘agricultural it countries’ is (World Bank made 2007: up 1) that of are a dependent agriculture as a major development on majoritycomponent; 62.5 per cent of its population are rural dwellers, and 58.4 per cent 2011b: 90, of 111). employment is in agriculture (FAO insecure, insecure, with food -sufficiency self lessof thancountries. According 50to the the perFAO, highest prevalence of undernourishment cent in African most is found in sub nourished in 2005–07 2011b: (FAO 65–6). and poverty reduction by meeting the basic food needs of population, China’s allowing for further active adoption of higher -added value farming and activities the transformation of the off-farm economy. Moreover, grain production is changing: the increase in the area sown to maize, China’s main feed grain, and the in decline that sown to rice and wheat to correlate the rapid expansion of the nation’s livestock production (Huang and Rozelle with 2009). Additionally, moderately enhanced grain production, food prices the share decreased, of food as in total consumption did expenditures of both rural and urban populations (Huang et al. 2008). This, in turn, reduced the cost of manufacturing labour and for services. in in yields, which has outstripped the rate 1978, of provides the expansion firmest of foundation for sown continued output areas growth. since With the intensification of land use labour, and production the of small-scale farmers has been characterised by a rising multiple cropping index, up from 117.2 per cent in 1996 to 126.1 per cent in 2007 (Ash 2010). ­ productiv low from mainly resulted growth, has agricultural stagnant with along ity and unfavourable policy conditions for agricultural production. Agri­ has not been prioritised in national development strategies. and modernisation technological research, in governments African by made was penalised they Instead, production. agricultural stimulate to infrastructurerural the sector through benign and sometimes deliberate neglect. Only 4 per cent of Africa’s crop area is irrigated, compared with nearly 50 per cent in China (Li et al. 2010: 121; State Statistical Bureau 2010: 55). The barely passable roads translate into formidable market access costs for remote farmers. Low and mismatched investment in modern systems, including agricultural research, extension services and education, along with urban-biased and cash crop-biased agricultural policies, have aggravated the situation further.

Diversification of agriculture beyond grain China’s agricultural production has changed significantly over the past 30 years, shifting from low-value and land-intensive cereal cultivation to higher-value and labour-intensive activities, such as fishing, livestock husbandry, poultry rearing and fruit and vegetable farming. The dramatic diversification of the agricultural economy has taken place alongside the growth in grain output and yield, thanks to rapid economic growth, urbanisation and market development (Huang and Bouis 1996; Huang and Rozelle 1998). This trend has marked the success of China’s agricultural transition towards a pattern of farm production more closely in accord with the principle of comparative advantage (Ash 2010), which confers more benefits and makes a greater contribution to poverty reduction and inclusive development. With regard to crop cultivation, cash crops such as vegetables, edible oil, sugar and tobacco have expanded rapidly after the reform, displacing the prior dominance of grain mono-production. In the 1970s, vegetables accounted for 2 per cent of total crop area, a share that had increased sixfold by 2007 (Huang and Rozelle 2009). Fruit experienced similar rates of expansion, and the area devoted to edible oil doubled (ibid.). The growth of other agricultural sectors has been even greater and steadier than that of crop cultivation in the post-reform period (see Table 11.1). The growth rate of animal husbandry reached 9.6 per cent between 1978 and 1984 and 10 per cent from 1984 to 1995, surpassing the growth of crop cultivation in the same two periods (at 7.3 per cent and 3.8 per cent respectively) (Ash 2010). Fisheries also expanded strongly, particularly in the years 1984–95; at

Table 11.1 Share of gross output by sector in China (percentage and value; 1980– 2010)3

Year Indices of gross output Gross output value (100 million yuan) (preceding year = 100) Farming Animal Fisheries Total Farming Animal Fisheries husbandry husbandry

1980 76 18 2 1,922.6 1,454.1 354.2 32.9 1990 65 26 5 7,662.1 4,954.3 1,967.0 410.6 2000 56 30 11 24,915.8 13,873.6 7,393.1 2,712.6 2010 53 30 9 69,319.8 36,933.0 20,870.0 6,440.0

196 11 | Xiuli and Xiaoyun oriented ­ agricul Fisheries - 2010 -Saharan African coun­ -Saharan African countries 2000 Animal husbandry Animal 197 1990 crop sectors has stimulated profound changes in Farming 1980 Percentage share of gross output value by sector in China (1980–2010) output value by gross of share Percentage

0 10 50 30 70 20 80 60 11.2 2011 Bureau Statistical : State Source 40 The rapid growth of - non The diversification of agricultural productionin sub Second, Second, in contrast to China’s consistent upgrading of its position in tries has different dynamics from the situationin China. First,legacy basedof colonialism, on the most African countries have cash crop one point, the growth rate reached 15.1 per cent, per although cent between it 1995 dropped and to 2007 7.2 (ibid.). China Today, produces 70 per cent the of world’s farmed fish and other aquaculture products (ibid.). the structure of agricultural production since 1978. Crop farming’s share of the gross value of agricultural output has fallen dramatically, from 76 per cent in 1980 to 53 per cent in 2010 (State Statistical Bureau trend 2011), continues. and Meanwhile, the the share of downward both animal husbandry and fishing has increased significantly. Animal husbandry accountedfor only 18 per cent of gross output value in 1980, but expanded to 30 per cent in 2010. of The share aquatic products rose even faster and 1980 more to strongly, the from peak level 2 of per 11 per cent cent in in 2000 (ibid.) (see Figure 11.2). the value chain, the proportion of cereals as ­products such against as high-value meat, vegetables agricultural and fruit in sub ture, with the most favourable land, water and other inputs to being coffee, dedicated cocoa, tea, cotton, tobacco,groundnuts and grain cashewproduction This neglected. is structure,relatively is persisting until today, whereas nuts, vulnerable to the international market; it fails to ensure food security because of overon -reliance grain imports, nor does it enhance especi­ industrialisation, ally when the price of cash crops plummets as a result of recent competition increases in from other regions. has been quite stable since the 1970s. According to the Statistics Division of the FAO (FAOSTAT), in 1979–81 cereal output accounted for 50 per cent of total agricultural output, with meat at 5 per cent and vegetables and fruit at 45 per cent. These shares remain almost unchanged in the twenty-first century, although 1–2 percentage point variations are witnessed in some years. The low agricultural yield, whether of cereal or of high-value products, con­ trasts markedly with China. It is inadequate land productivity in particular that best expresses the divergent performance of China and Africa in agricultural development (Li et al. 2010: 1–20). Insufficient growth and a focus on export crops have weakened agriculture’s contribution to poverty alleviation in Africa.

Development of a non-farm economy and urbanised society beyond agricul- ture China today is a much less rural society than it was in 1978. In that year, fully 82 per cent of the population was registered as ‘rural’. A little over 30 years later, in 2009, this share had fallen to just 53.4 per cent (State Statistical Bureau 2010: 29). Evidently, the number officially tied to the rural sector in China is still staggeringly large: at the end of 2008, China’s rural population totalled 721.35 million, equivalent to 11 per cent of the entire world population (Population Reference Bureau 2008). However, many rural citizens have migrated to cities to make a living (Zhang et al. 2004). The urbanisation rate in China has recently risen to almost 50 per cent, as opposed to 18 per cent in 1978, and the acceler­ ated urbanisation trend is likely to be maintained for the foreseeable future. Agriculture can no longer be regarded as a driver of economic growth, a role now played by the labour-intensive manufacturing and export sectors. Thanks to increased regional and global integration, productivity growth was mainly driven by the economies of scale and specialisation in coastal and urban centres (China–DAC Study Group 2011b: 34–61). Ironically, agriculture has been declining gradually in economic importance over the past three decades due to its suc­ cessful role in the transformation of the overall economy. The average annual growth rate of agricultural output throughout the post-reform period reached as much as 5 per cent, yet was surpassed by growth rates in the industrial and service sectors, as well as by overall economic growth, which have been one to two times higher, particularly since 1985 (Huang and Rozelle 2009). Thus, the share of agriculture in overall gross domestic product (GDP) decreased sharply from 30 per cent in 1980 to 10 per cent in 2009 (World Bank 2011c: 398). The diminishing role of agriculture has been accompanied by a rapid in­ crease in the rural non-farm economy and the manufacturing sector. Mean­ while, the rural economy has become much more diversified, with significantly increased output in township and village enterprises (TVEs). Agricultural GDP grew on average by 12.1 per cent annually between 1978 and 2007, while the gross output value (GVO) of TVEs rose by 24 per cent per year in the same period. In 2010, TVEs accounted for 61 per cent of the combined GVO of 198 11 | Xiuli and Xiaoyun 199 employed vending activities assisted farm­ -Saharan African countries, China’s efforts to shift towards a more Employment changes in different sectors indicate the same trend towards China’s experience is in sharp contrast to that of African countries, where At the micro non-farm level, activities have deeply penetrated farmers’ ­ liveli To sum up, in stark contrast to the disappointing performance of ­ agricul agricultural contraction and -farm non expansion. Employment in the ­ agricul tural sector amounted to 81 per cent of total share dropped employmentto less than in 50 per cent 1970, after 2000 while owing to the the rapid growth of the industrial and service sectors. Meanwhile, employment in TVEs increased from 28 million in 1978 to 159 million in 2010 (State Statistical Bureau 2011) (see Figure 11.3). One hundred and fifty million migrant labourers were engaged in non-farm activities by 1995, with the number increasing to over 200 million by 2011. Accordingly, at the household level, farmers’ incomes have become more dependent on -farm non sources: the proportion of activities has risen from 18 income per cent in 1985 to around 41 from per cent in 2010 (ibid.). non -farm the link between agricultural development, overall economic growth and pov ­ erty reduction has been regrettably absent. to The industrialisation contribution has of been quite agriculture limited, except for that small agricultural part sector of producing the cash crops to generate needed by the governments. The foreign share exchange of GDP from -added value agriculture has remained stablequite for a long time, at about 25 per cent since 1980, although it increased slightly to 30 per cent in 2009 (World Bank 2011c: 399). hood strategies, a trend that can be traced back or to long-term migrant colonial work times. or Seasonal - self ture in sub urbanised society and a higher -added value economy are China strongly holds However, to the most bearing fundamental function of agriculture, fruit now. namely to generate an increasing surplus of The food modernisation process despite in land China, triggered constraints. by agricultural development, has gradually moved forward beyond agriculture. Even so, in 2011 agriculture still accounted for over 40 per cent of the workforce, and it still plays an agriculture and TVEs, compared with only 13 per cent in 1978 (State Statistical Bureau 2009: 49–51; 2011) (see Figure 11.3). TVEs major successes are of the regarded country’s as reforming socialist one economy (Jefferson of 1993; the Unger and Chan 1999). ers to alleviate high material uncertainty in export crop production. while Second, China experienced ‘urbanisation with development’ by simultaneously pursuing successful agrarian transformation along with rapid industrialisation, urbanisation in Africa has not been accompanied by a similar outcome. African experience is one The of a ‘urbanisation ruralwithout development’, exodus from the drudgery of subsistence farming (Bryceson 2002) system and of from property a poor relations that works farmers against (Havnevik the et al. interest 2007). of -scale small 70 180

160 60 140 50 120 Employed (millions) People employed 40 100 Percentage of GVO of TVEs in combined GVO of agriculture and TVEs 30 80 Percentage 60 20 40 10 20

0 0                                 

11.3 Employment and output values of TVEs in China (1978–2010) Source: State Statistical Bureau 2009: 49, 51; 2011; GVO of TVEs in 2010 is from www.moa.gov.cn/fwllm/jjps/201102/t20110201_1815659.htm; GVO of agriculture is from http://219.235.129.58/indicatorYearQuery.do 11 | Xiuli and Xiaoyun generation, leadership is also at Agricultural development has always en­ 201 food -sufficiency, self is best illustrated in 4 ommitment c The political commitment to agricultural development, alongside the slogan Smallholder agriculture drove agricultural China’s revolution, which served san nong) is not the paradox it may seem, given the juxtaposition of national ‘agriculture ‘agriculture is the foundation of which the was economy’, coined in the Maoist era, has been passed down to Jiang Zemin today. reiterated the same theme in 1993 by emphasising the need to ‘… carry out the policy of taking as agriculture the foundation of the economy, and we must give agriculture in top our priority economic work’. The current, fourth- an old Chinese adage: ‘With food in our hands, our hearts can be at peace.’ pains to highlight the two major challenges ahead, namely achieving adequate farm output and improving farmers’ incomes. A new strategy to ‘build a new as the basis for the country’s dramatic economic transformation and poverty reduction over the last 30 years. Various secrets factors of have this been success, adduced including as institutional the innovations, Household Responsibility System (HRS) particularly in the early reform years the (McMillan et 1989; al. Fan 1991; Lin 1992); technological change (Huang and 1996; Rozelle Fan and Pardey 1997; Jin et al. 2002); infrastructure, in particular irrigation (Wang 2000); as well as market development and trade liberalisation (Park et al. 2002; de Brauw et al. 2004). This section, however, tries to provide a comprehensive picture of the ‘developmental state’ in China by to the paying various particular roles attention of government, the market and small-scale their farmers, interactions and in shaping China’s agricultural development trajectory. joyed the highest political priority and strong public vast leadership country with in a huge population but China, increasing resource constraints. a Food shortages were at the root of many of the history, and the famine dynastic of 1959–61 led to changes social turbulence. Hence, that agriculture, marked its and food security in particular, are deemed to be the basis of social harmony and political stability. The rationale for China’s concept of food security, the underlying principle being ‘basic’ rong Strong political ‘Agriculture is ‘Agriculture the foundation of the strong economy’: commitment political and sound institutional architecture China’s broad-based agricultural development strategies strategies development agricultural broad-based China’s important role in providing livelihoods for the majority of the population. This is especially the case in the poverty -stricken central the country, and where urbanisation western and economic regions modernisation of have been less marked, and a much higher proportion of farmers are crop reliant on cultivation low-return and, above all, grain farming (Ash government’s preoccupation with ‘farmers, agriculture and rural 2010). development’ Thus, the current ( agricultural contraction and agricultural dominance in poor regions. socialist countryside’ was therefore proclaimed in the new era (see also Ash 2010). A trinity of issues – agriculture, farmers and rural development (san nong) – has been put in place to better position agricultural development in a broader-based social and economic rural development context.

A sound institutional framework for driving the reform agenda A public institutional architecture was also established to ensure that strong political commitment to agricultural development was translated into effective pro-poor agricultural policy making and implementation. The prioritisation of the agricultural development agenda in the five-year national development plans is one part of the architecture, and guarantees the fiscal funding and public investment channelled into agriculture (Li et al. 2012). Long-term technological strategic and other sector-wide development plans also have agricultural components that orient the priority, goals and key tasks of technological development in agriculture. The party and administrative system dedicated to agricultural policy consul­ tation, policy making, funding, implementation, monitoring and adjustment is another impressive part of the institutional architecture. Within the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee (CCPCC), the Leading Group Office for Rural Work (LGORW) makes all key agricultural strategies and policies. It also acts as the coordination body, integrating policies for different sectors and guiding resource allocations (ibid.). For example, by 2012, 11 ‘Number One Documents’ were developed by the LGORW, with various focuses, such as the household-based HRS, market and price, infrastructure and extension. Paral­ lel to the party’s agricultural policy development process, the government’s agricultural institutions, spanning various ministries, have also developed at all levels. This is detailed below.

Evidence-based policy making: the institutional arrangement One key element in China’s evidence-based policy making is the advisory role played by various party and government research bodies, such as the policy research depart­ ment of the CCPCC, the research department of the State Council plus the research institutes pertaining to the council, for example its Development Research Centre, as well as the agricultural policy research centre of the ministry of agriculture (Ravallion 2009; Li et al. 2012). These are further sup­ ported by research institutes outside the party and government, for instance those based at universities. The policy development and advisory networks are fully financed by government and staffed by well-trained professionals to provide timely recommendations. They represent the scientific dimension of the policy-making process. In addition, the democratic dimension of policy development is normally expressed in a series of consultations, including a wide range of consultations with farmers. 202 11 | Xiuli and Xiaoyun ­ Besides institution tion a To implement To agricultural strategies 203 governors or senior county officials,have to city for implement tion organs a capa The process famously dubbed ‘feeling our way across the ing cing human ctive t implemen ‘Seeking truth‘Seeking from expanding facts’: agriculture-based reforms through - interac tion and learning building, building, individual capacity has also been enhanced formance of to the improve system. the Such enhancement ­ per has been traditional embedded administrative in practices, with China’s college or university graduates pro Effe moted to work within the system. Overseas or staff on-the-job horizons and training sharpens broadens insights through continuous learning. All senior leaders, such as provincial vice- attend -time full training in agricultural development at lege a for university six or months col­ to one year these policy -implementing (ibid.). leaders Nationwide once training a is new strategy extended or to nationally. In policy addition, different is awards initiated and job advancement based on work performance provide incentives for the employee at grassroots promoting level, close interaction between front-line workers and farmers. Successful implem­ entation is also reinforced through party discipline, which requires most staff who are members of the party to follow policy guidelines (ibid.). Enhan and policies, different ministries related to agriculture also develop their own sector plans for financing and otherinputs. These plans are coordinated by the National Development and Reform Commission under the overall direction of the LGORW. The ministry of finance follows the plans draftto then budgets, all and plans and budgets are submitted to the approval People’s (Li Congress et for al. 2012). final At the local level, each structure, province replicates designing a and similar implementing its own development policies tailored to local circumstances, strategies yet following the priorities or principles and set at the national level. This vertical central structure to local, throughout as all well levels as from the agencies, agricultural embodies policyChina’s system, ensuring that strategies horizontal structure spanning different line and policies are developed and implemented in a consistent, adjustable and adaptive way (ibid.). river’, coupled with ‘the intellectual approach of seeking truth from facts’, meant facts’, from truth seeking of approach intellectual ‘the with coupled river’, that no blueprint for the coming reforms was available However, after in over the 30 years initial stages. of exploration, an expanding reform process has become apparent, starting with land reform, price liberalisation promotion, and and market moving on to include supporting the off-farm service and industrial to outside reforms agriculture. These finally development economy and have been promoted through a pragmatic approach deriving from learning through continual trial and error. There are roughly below. outlined four are which 34–61), 2011b: Group Study stages China–DAC 2010; al. et of (Fan the reform Box 11.1 Lessons from China’s agriculture-led industrialisation experience

In China, agricultural liberalisation and gradual international integra­ tion became the two pillars of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘going out’ policy of economic transformation. A grassroots-originated experimental reform of land ownership, along with price reform for agricultural products and inputs, sparked an agricultural revolution, and a Hong Kong-linked special economic zone (SEZ), with support to small and medium-sized enterprises through microfinance and links to markets, provided a replic­able model for the growth of export-oriented manufacturing (Li et al. 2012). In particular, the SEZ played a key role as a testing ground for economic reforms, for attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), for catalysing industrial clusters and for learning new technologies and incubating new management practices (China–DAC Study Group 2011a: 33). This combination­ of pragmatic policies unleashed agricultural productivity, and the surplus generated from agriculture (supplemented with selected FDI) helped finance China’s industrialisation drive, mainly in coastal areas. The Chinese enabling environment for enterprise development in­ volved: job creation through rural and micro enterprises; labour and wage policies; training and capacity building through joint ventures and aid programmes; local autonomy and decision making; competition between regions and cities; bureaucratic and regulatory reform; access to financing; and creation of appropriate technology and infrastructure. This in turn contributed to a massive flow of people from rural areas into more productive employment in manufacturing and service sectors and out of poverty (Fan et al. 2010). Finally, the Chinese political leadership was supported in these ­reforms by the evidence and guidance research institutions such as the China Development Research Group, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Development Research Centre of the State Council. As a result of these experiments, China developed rather heterodox policy measures, which differed from the policies that would have been ­prescribed by outsiders. In addition to economic success, the gradualism of the reform process and its reliance on evidence from local experiments helped secure political support and reinforced its credibility.

Source: Extracted from notes of the China–DAC Study Group Bamako (Mali) meeting of April 2010 11 | Xiuli and Xiaoyun Meanwhile, addi­ owned enterprises tion Third, Third, from 1994 to 2001, reform 205 Second, Second, from 1985 to 1993, the policy shifted to to rural trialisa indus ional tional s market ture First, from 1978 to 1984, the major reform was dismantling the to interna centives centives in agricultural production. Consequently, rural income Openness tional reforms created incentives for local officials, banks businessesand encourage to the growth of rural industries. emergence These of were TVEs characterised to by absorb the the surplus of the labour earlier and agricultural capital reforms and released to by open the door economic transformation. Further for liberalisation of prices and China’s quotas favoured social and entrepreneurial farmers, who began to open small businesses using earnings. surplus What merits highlighting is the dynamism of TVEs and other non- state enterprises, which put competitive pressure on state- (SOEs) and triggered their restructuring. focused on gradually increased external openness, prior to China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and on further government isation, liberal­ particularly in grain procurement after the boost in agriculture and inking Linking cul agri domestic market reform and structural adjustment. The farmers’ position as the main component of the market economy was further enhanced fertiliser market through liberalisation and transformation of the procurement system from a mandatory quota system to a contract system. Prior to this reform, the ‘dual price’ system was pervasive in the economy, by and farmers both were market guided and planning price signals, Thus, with former. increasing procurement prices the for some goods latter greatly benefited higher than the farmers, even though these measures were not originally the emergence of intended markets. During the 1980s, quota restrictions to were eased and foster government contract encouraged purchasing the formation of nascent markets. During the process, the government played a crucial role in building a future market for food grains (China–DAC Study Group 2011a: 36–41). Domestic market reform rural collective system through land reform and moving from collective land management to the -based household tenure system – was started spontaneously i.e. by small-scale farmers in Fengyang county HRS. of Anhui The reform province in late 1978, who were seeking to end their food fered shortages. long-term HRS leases to of­ farmers for a period of 15 to 30 years. also Farmers were allowed greater autonomy in their planting decisions, which farmers’ unleashed ­ in doubled between 1978 and 1984 (Fan et al. 2002), and the HRS to was contribute estimated 60 per cent to the growth half of the of early total 1980s rural (Lin 1992). poverty Nearly reduction (ibid.; occurred Ravallion and in Chen this 2007). early stage of reform Land reform development of the non-farm rural economy. The monopoly of agricultural trade by state agencies ended and was opened up to non-state enterprises. These reforms resulted in increased market access. Greater integration within the domestic market was achieved, and by 2001 links to the international market were also being promoted. The creation of special economic zones (SEZs) and the liberalisation of FDI also occurred in this period.

Grain market reform Fourth, from 2002 to the present, confronted with stagnant labour productivity in agriculture and a widening rural–urban divide, reforms concentrated on raising farmers’ incomes in the broad context of building a harmonious society nationally and internationally. The grain market reforms were accelerated and the procurement system was abolished in 2004, fully liberalising the grain market. Social policies supporting education, med­ ical services and pensions in rural areas have been put in place since 2002. A new pro-farm package of policies, including extension of direct subsidies to grain farmers and strengthening control of arable land use and illegal land acquisitions, was initiated in 2004. In 2006, the Rural Land Contract Law was issued to strengthen the rights of rural families to their cultivated land. Additionally, in the same year, agricultural taxation was eliminated, marking the end of a 2,600-year tradition.

Investment in public goods Throughout the reform era, the government has played a catalytic role by intensifying its investment in public goods for agricultural and rural development. This role was later complemented by co-financing from all levels of government, public service units and farmers themselves (China–DAC Study Group 2011a: 36–41). The farmers’ contribution, in the form of voluntary labour and cash mobilised by the government even after the collective production system shifted to HRS, has been quite impressive (Yang 2010). Agricultural research, development and extension services have also been key areas attracting significant funding from government over the last 30 years. Investment has particularly intensified since China’s WTO acces­ sion, making its rise in research activity since 2000 the highest in the world.

‘Development is a process of learning’: creating synergies between the state, the market and farmers China’s sweeping reform process since the late 1970s has been largely an incremental learning process. First, agricultural strategy and policy, despite the reform, have been consistent with previous policy, in that agriculture is the basis of the national economy and the grain crop is the central component of agriculture for a secure food supply. Second, market reform for agricultural products has never been radical, but has been based on the experiences and lessons learned from policy experiments at specific places in various regions designed to bring small but widely felt successes. 206 11 | Xiuli and Xiaoyun ­ develop driven driven and farmer-based -Saharan African countries. 207 ­circumstances. This section highlights three key elements in China’s China’s remarkable success in economic growth and poverty reduction, The reforms in China have shown that the free market can serve the in­ The reform process is, to some extent, a fostering process for both the hukou). With their rights to production surplus greatly enhanced, farmers Meanwhile, China is now playing a critical role as an economic and triggered by small-scale farmer -based agricultural and rural development, has profoundly impacted the global economy and has context shaped of the other development developing states, such as sub ment partner in Africa, particularly in agricultural reduction cooperation (China–DAC and Study poverty Group 2011a: 36–41). There among is African growing countries interest in learning from China, in agricultural and and rural China’s development experiences provide valuable lessons for the trans­ formation of African agriculture, despite the ­endowments great and differences demographic, socioeconomic, in ethnic, natural political, historical and cultural Conclusions: the lessons for African countries in agricultural in agricultural countries Conclusions: the lessons for African development terests of poor people. However, China’s success letting was markets do not their work, just but was a facilitated by matter strong state of institutions that implemented supportive policies and public investments (Ravallion 2009). Both the state and the market spurred on agricultural China’s revolution, trig­ gered by the increasing incentives for family farming available through public investment and policies. the Overall, state- market -led, developed developed their capacity to participaterenascent markets, in thereby China’s in turn promoting the market’s incremental, albeit at times faltering, maturation through a process of mutual interaction and networking. market market and for microeconomic actors such as well as a farmers process of and facilitating interaction between enterprises, the state, as the market and farmers in a collective learning project. The farmers have been able, with more freedom, to respond to market signals. Meanwhile, government control command and retreated gradually with the breaking down of institutions such as collective land management through the commune system, price and control quota through the SOE monopolies, and restrictions capital within the agricultural sector through the residential registration policy on rural labour and ( For For example, as the grain market moved took more than towards 20 years to put a all the regulations free and infrastructure in market place. system, it agricultural Third, development has been well integrated with non-agricultural sector development through the encouragement of agricultural diversification and rural enterprises (Li et al. 2012). model has been the central element in the success of agricultural China’s and rural development (Li et al. 2012). China’s ­agricultural and rural development experience relevant to sub-Saharan African countries. First of all, grain production for food security and improving productivity should be the top priorities in agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa in order to break the pattern of inequality, social exclusion and poverty. China’s strategic stress on a high grain self-sufficiency target provides the necessary and consistent foundation for relatively stable and self-oriented development approaches, in addition to directly helping to alleviate poverty. In contrast, in sub-Saharan Africa, countries’ agricultural sectors have been deemed mainly a key source of foreign exchange earnings, so that production of export-oriented cash crops has been overemphasised, resulting in low grain self-sufficiency. This ultimately leads to high dependence on imports from the international grain market or foreign food aid to meet grain demand. Dependence, on the one hand, for such strategic resources as grain on the international market or aid, and limited and vulnerable foreign exchange earnings from cash crops on the other, naturally lock sub-Saharan African countries into an externally focused trajectory. To resolve the dilemma, grain production to ensure food self-sufficiency should be kept in mind. In the words of the then president of Malawi: ‘Enough is enough. I am not going to go on my knees to beg for food. Let us grow the food ourselves’ (Juma 2011: 3). The difference in productivity, particularly land productivity, best illustrates the divergent performance of China and Africa in agricultural development. China has established a high-investment and high-yield agricultural production system, while Africa is still trapped in a low-investment and low-yield cycle (Li et al. 2010: 236). Productivity matters both for enhancing grain produc­ tion to ensure food security and for increasing cash crop yields to advance inter­national competitiveness. Clearly, there is considerable potential for agri­ cultural development in sub-Saharan Africa, given its abundance of land, water and other natural resources, as well as its potential for technological, policy and input improvement. The extensive type of agricultural development of the past three decades should be transformed into intensive cultivation by combining traditional practices with modern technologies. This will contribute to employment creation and to reducing the greenhouse gas emissions result­ ing from deforestation through land expansion. Second, sub-Saharan Africa’s agricultural renewal should trigger an up­ grading of the agricultural value chain and the flowering of the non-farm ­economy. The stark contrast between China’s and sub-Saharan Africa’s eco­ nomic performance and poverty reduction indicates the importance of a flourish­ing agricultural sector in a broad-based development process, parti­ cularly when the vast majority of the poor remain in rural areas. It becomes ever more evident that once basic grain output and food security have been 208 11 | Xiuli and Xiaoyun ­ farm farm - oriented oriented -Saharan Africa. market -market policies should -poor and pro -Saharan African countries since in­ 209 grown development approach in sub -Saharan African countries, agricultural development strat­ -Saharan Africa, rather than by dismantling it under ‘good govern­ -Saharan African governments’ capacity to reform and determine strategy, In Africa, despite the existence of some high-yielding and export- Third, Third, the evidence-based policy -making and learning process should be at However, in sub achieved, achieved, the surplus of labour, land and capital will be released to naturally stimulate an adjustment of the agricultural structure and the generation of a non-farm economy. This, in turn, will ultimately strengthen the upgrading of agriculture in the value chain and thus boost farmers’ incomes. modern agricultural enterprises, the continent as a countless small-scale whole farmers is and has dominated been by trapped in low -added value sistence sub activities. Although both agricultural diversificationand ­activities non have been developed in sub dependence, an upward trend has not yet been seen. The agricultural structure has been static, and incentives for fundamental change have yet to take effect. For many farmers, agricultural diversification and de-agrarianisation are more a necessity than an option. China’s pro ance’ aid criteria, on the grounds that it blocking development. is a major institutional constraint egies and policies have been either externally or regionally (Africa) and have initiated, been poorly implemented at the country level. Agricultural policies have barely touched dispersed small-scale farmers or supported their capacity to improve productivity, and it is difficult to improve the incentives available for them to respond to market opportunities in the enhancement. interests In of strong agricultural contrast to China’s sound and administrative hierarchy policy system, which have a sub long history and are deeply entrenched, and then to adjust agricultural policies through critical feedback been largely missing loops, (ibid.: 45–82). has It is time to strengthen the current system through capacity building, as envisaged in the fostering of the ‘developmental state’ in sub the centre of the home- be taken into account in triggering agricultural upgrading. Despite negative consequences such as rural–urban dualism, wealth disparities and resource degradation, it is fair to claim that the Chinese government has adopted a consistent series of strategies, policies and measures. These can be characterised as pragmatic learning through trial and error to leverage market forces and farmers’ engagement in order to advance agricultural development and overall growth. This approach demonstrates that, with the state serving as the initial economic agent and facilitator of change, output will increase and stimulate dramatic responses by the countless small-scale farmers unleashed market incentives. The synergies to between the state, newly the market and small-scale farmers have been soundly advanced.

12 | Conclusions and the way forward

Fantu Cheru and Renu Modi

Agriculture will remain the foundation for Africa’s growth and industrialisation for the coming decade and beyond. As the experience of China, India and Brazil has shown, no country can enter the industrial age without developing the agricultural sector. In the specific case of Africa, however, the agricultural sector has been starved of essential investments, for example in infrastructure, technology, and research in and development of high-yielding seeds, as well as lacking an enabling policy environment to support the productivity of both smallholders and large-scale commercial farmers. The increasing engagement of countries such as China, India and Brazil with the African continent is an opportunity that African governments must harness effectively in order to overcome a long list of constraints, by tapping into the financial resources, technology and expertise that these successful emerging economies can offer. The collection of essays in this volume convincingly argues that private and sovereign investors from China, India and Brazil, together with official aid and technical assistance from the three countries, have made a positive contribution to improving the productivity of African agriculture through technology transfers, the building of institutional capacity, improvements in critical infrastructure such as roads and irrigation systems, and by building up a critical mass of local agricultural experts in various agricultural fields. These multiple interventions have laid the foundations for a radical transformation of African agriculture, which will enhance food security in the years ahead and propel the continent to become a major exporter of high-value agricultural products to world markets. Furthermore, Africa’s increasing engagement with these three emerging countries has helped the continent reduce its traditional dependence on Western sources of finance, technology, products and services, further expanding policy space and enabling the continent to chart an in­ dependent development path. Above and beyond the technology transfer and financing opportunities that China, India and Brazil collectively offer to the continent, the three countries have also added tremendous value to Africa’s development planning process, by sharing their respective successful experiences of how they embarked on their transformative paths, from being food-insecure countries to becoming major exporters of agricultural products to world markets in a relatively short 30-year

211 period. Therefore, for many African countries, the three emerging countries can serve as important reference points as they forge ahead with national and continental strategies to radically transform their agricultural sector. At the initial stage of their development, these three emerging countries adopted appropriate domestic policies, built critical rural infrastructure, im­ proved research capacity and undertook land reforms – all key ingredients that have helped unleash agricultural potential in their domestic contexts. Today, African countries stand at the same stage of development as China, India and Brazil three decades ago. With the right policies and committed political leadership, Africa can also become a major supplier of food and other agricultural commodities for the domestic and global markets. Africa’s engagement with China, India and Brazil is an opportunity that must be harnessed intelligently in order to build the foundations for the structural transformation of African agriculture.

South–South cooperation in agriculture: opportunities and challenges African governments have built their agricultural cooperation strategy with the emerging countries around a set of issues: building capacity in water resource management and irrigation systems; combating agro-based diseases; upgrading agricultural technological capacity and building the necessary rural infrastructure; training a critical mass of agricultural experts through enhanced cooperation between higher education institutions; and securing stable and predictable financing. The three development partners pursue similar strat­ egies, more or less, in support of agricultural development in Africa. These include a focus on private sector investment in commercial agriculture along­ side a technical cooperation strategy aimed at improving the productivity of small-scale farmers who produce for subsistence. In the case of India, emphasis has been on the development of commercial farming through large-scale land acquisition by large Indian private investors such as Karuturi Global. As far as African small-scale farmers are concerned, technical assistance and demonstration farms have been the main instrument to enhance their productivity. With respect to commercial farming, private companies have been engaged in capacity-building initiatives, technology trans­ fer and resource mobilisation facilitated by the lines of credit facility of the Export-Import Bank of India and via direct private sector investments. Private sector companies such as Jain and Kirloskar transfer water management and irrigation technology, while other established companies, such as Tata Group, Sonalika International, Mahindra and Mahindra, and Angelique International Limited, supply farm tractors, water pumps and irrigation technology at afford­ able prices. However, at the time of writing, there was little evidence to suggest that expensive infrastructure built to service large-scale commercial farming is directly benefiting small-scale farmers who cultivate at the subsistence level. 212 12 | Cheru and Modi conclusion conclusion -technology experts, set 213 As of 2011, China had dispatched 104 senior agro China, China, on the other hand, has focused less on acquiring African land to Moreover, China has also shown an interest in exploring other avenues Although a latecomer to the African continent, Brazil has started to make The Brazilian strategy of supporting African agriculture is very much of the fifth FOCAC, held Beijingin announced a in further July expansion 2012, of the the Chinese government programmes. technical China will cooperation implement an ‘Africa Talent’ programme, and and, in the exchange period 2013–15, it will train 30,000 African professionals in various sectors, offer 18,000 government scholarships and adopt measures to improve the content and quality of training programmes (FOCAC 2012). promote promote -scale large farming and more on investment in demonstration farms, improving rural infrastructure, and upgrading the -supportedChina -scale large agricultural projects in countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique that date back to the 1960s and 1970s (Bräutigam the and past, Xiaoyang technical 2009). cooperation and As human in resource development, including the building of agricultural technical demonstration centres, the dispatch of agricultural technical teams and senior experts, and the provision of vocational technical education to improve local agricultural expertise remain the centrepieces of Chinese engagement in African agriculture. The size and knowledge, of such exchanges increased significantly after the establishment of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. For example, at the of collaboration, including through private philanthropy, to improve African agriculture. In this regard, the Chinese Academy of Agriculture has partnered with a number of Chinese and African institutions to support an international initiative by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to create green super-rice, a new variety that can survive in the harsh environments of Africa (Davis and Woetzel 2010). significantinterventions in Africa’s agricultural sector throughinvestment in land and technical assistance. Although investment in land has to been grow limited so biofuel far to Mozambique, negotiations started between in August the 2012 Tanzania Investment Centre and companies seven that Brazilian are keen agricultural to invest in the corn country and cotton to (Guardian grow 2012). soya, sugar cane, up 20 agricultural technology demonstration centres, deployed 50 agricultural technology teams and trained 3,000 agricultural experts from Africa in Chinese educational institutions. One most of extensive China’s engagements has been in Ethiopia, where the Chinese government has vocational education supportedproject involving 14 an Ethiopian agricultural agricultural colleges. The programme is credited for producing more than helped 60,000 Ethiopia graduates to and establish has a complete system agricultural (MOFCOM 2011). vocational education informed by its own domestic experience. The strategy is based on high- technology commercial farming and direct support to family farmers, the approach that propelled Brazil to becoming a major supplier of food and other agricultural commodities for the domestic and global markets. Here, a major role has been played by Embrapa – the state-owned research enter­ prise that has helped Brazil’s rise to the position of leading global exporter of sugar and coffee, soya beans for animal feed and maize. The production- oriented approach was complemented by a deliberate attempt by the state to deal with the problem of food insecurity among the population through targeted programmes such as Bolsa Família, the Zero Hunger strategy and other social protection policies that have led to inclusive growth and overall poverty reduction. These lessons are reflected in Brazil’s assistance policy on the African continent. The key institutional mechanism through which the Brazilian dual model of agricultural development is being transmitted to African countries is ­Embrapa – the state institution credited for the Brazilian agricultural miracle. Embrapa’s mission is the transfer of technology and sharing of replicable experiences from Brazil. Ghana, Benin, Guinea, Kenya and Ethiopia have also signed technical cooperation agreements with Embrapa. In addition, the Africa–Brazil Agricul­ tural Innovation Marketplace brings together Embrapa and African researchers in order to create seed banks for family farmers. Embrapa is also engaged in knowledge and skills transfer in low-cost and replicable agricultural techniques, such as value addition to tropical fruits, cassava and vegetables; improving sanitary and phytosanitary standards for exportable agro-products; climate change mitigation measures through water management; the dissemination of rice seed cultivation technology to smallholder farmers; and improved livestock management. In sum, the overall impact of Chinese, Indian and Brazilian investments and technical assistance to African agriculture has been positive in terms of technology, the financing of rural infrastructure, and the building up of critical African agricultural expertise. Despite these positive developments, however, there are areas of tension in this evolving relationship between Africa and the three development partners as it relates to the current strategy to support African agriculture. Below is a brief description of each one of these areas and how to resolve them.

Areas of tensions As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, the three emerging powers from the South have undoubtedly started to make a marked contribution to revitalising African agriculture, by addressing the technology gap, by developing critical skills in agricultural research and analytical capacity, and by introducing­ new innovations in value addition to agricultural commodities which will help 214 12 | Cheru and Modi ­ ­ Of the three development 215 Although there are over 80 Indian companies that have forayed into com­ In contrast to the case of Indian investments in Africa, our research found In the present context of China–Africa relations, Chinese aid programmes Foreign Foreign investment and the question of land rights the the continent benefit from the growing global their -scale large demand investments for in food. land However, for commercial farming of produce for food or biofuels have agricultural been contested by local communities and by national and international civil society organisations, since these investments undermine local livelihoods. mercial mercial agriculture or horticulture in Africa, the largest Indian Karuinvestor, ­ turi Global, has received the most criticism and scrutiny from human groups rights and environmentalists. In a number of cases, failed to private deliver on their investors promises of have infrastructure development and support to smallholder farmers (see Chapter 5). This is partly due to the lack of robust local mechanisms to enforce compliance with investment commitments made by foreign investors. However, Gurjit Singh in accusations Chapter and 3 asserts challenges that these Indian companies are agriculture in contributing many ways. to African no conclusive or incriminating evidence to support the assertion that is China also engaged in -scale large ‘land grabbing’ in order food to for produce biofuel the or Chinese market. China’s investments in the particularly agricultural in sector, -scale large state farms, have historical antecedents. From 1960s until aid the programme mid-1980s, supportedChina’s the the establishment of large state farm complexes in a number and Xiaoyang 2009). Many of of these investments African turned out to be countries economically (Bräutigam unviable due to poor management, corruption and lack of maintenance were and consequently abandoned by African governments. have largely been focused on reviving many of these dating abandoned back to state the farms 1960s, in addition to expanding a technical assistance pro partners, India has the most extensive engagement able number of in Indian private Africa, sector investors having with entered into a land lease ­ size agreements, most notably in Ethiopia. According to civil society organisations, -scale large land acquisition by Indian private sector investors has led to forced relocation of small-scale farmers and pastoralists, often with little compensa­ tion for the loss of basic land rights (see Chapters 5 and stand 6). in These criticisms stark contrast to the purported benefits for localgovernments communities and that investors had originally claimed would ventures. result from these gramme aimed at improving rural infrastructure and human resource develop recent China’s interventionsment. Unfortunately, to upgrade -scale large farms in a few African countries have erroneously been labelled by critics as ‘land grabbing’, a charge that Chinese authorities reject, and rightly so. Compared with India and other investors from the Gulf states, China’s involvement in land acquisition has been insignificant. In fact, China’s 20-year food security strategy released in 2008 by the National Development and Reform Commission did not include foreign land acquisition as a pivotal feature of the strategy, with the exception of soya bean production in Brazil. This is not to suggest that China will never be interested in outsourcing its domestic food demand by entering into land lease arrangements with African countries in the future. As Simon Freemantle and Jeremy Stevens (Chapter 10) convincingly argued, there is a steadily rising demand from a growing middle class of Chinese consumers for high-value agricultural products, but a de­clining national capacity to meet this demand from domestic sources due to land and water shortages. This situation is likely to push China into looking at the African continent as a supplier of food to feed China’s large population. The chapters by Thomas Cooper Patriota and Francesco Maria Pierri and by Kai Thaler (Chapters 7 and 8 respectively) offer a critical analysis of Brazil’s role in Africa’s agricultural sector. The two chapters highlight that Brazil is sharing tropical agriculture technologies, mainly through Embrapa, for the production of food crops as well as biofuels in several countries on the con­ tinent. Although Brazil’s work through the Africa–Brazil Agricultural Innovation Marketplace, a technological innovation platform that works in partnership with the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa, the Cotton-4 project in Mali, the Rice Culture project in Senegal and the Triangular Cooperation Programme for Agricultural Development of the African Tropical Savannah (the Pro-Savannah Japan–Brazil–Mozambique project) have been lauded, the Latin American counterparts’ initiatives and collaborative ventures for biofuel production and related activities, such as in Mozambique, have generated intense debates around the issue of biofuel and ‘land grabbing’. Patriota and Pierri (Chapter 7) point out:

Food security, environmental and labour conditions and how these relate to land use and tenure are also the three main issues at stake regarding the potential and pitfalls of biofuels, whether in Brazil or Africa.

Concerns about changes in land use and its diversion for the production of biofuels and biofuel feedstock are echoed by Thaler in the following chapter (Chapter 8). A cautious approach is required in the aftermath of the food riots that erupted in many African countries in 2007–08 and in Maputo in 2010. Patriota and Pierri rightly point out that these riots were related ‘not only to rising food prices but also to the higher costs of public transport as a result of the parallel hike in oil prices’. Brazil’s official cooperation with Mozambique in the area of biofuels began only about five years ago, in 2007. It remains to be seen if Mozambique’s biofuel 216 12 | Cheru and Modi related related ­African - FDI in National laws should 1 Framework and Guidelines Framework and Guidelines IFC Performance Standards on Social 217 While these voluntary guidelines can serve as useful reference points for To To rectify the problems associated with the acquisition of land by private conflicts to spread. Many tenure problems arise because ofweak governance. Therefore, the governance of tenure is a crucial element in determining if and how people, communities and others are able to rights, acquire and associated duties, to use and control land and other resources. policy makers and investors, they are enforceable effective national only laws. when Simply allowing translated private into investors voluntary to guidelines would sign amount up to granting to them the right abusive to farming engage in practices, further creating the conditions for land on Land Policy in Africa. investors, investors, there have been a number of byinitiatives international organisations and environmental and human rights groups to introduce a set of guidelines for voluntarythe responsible governance of the tenure of land, water, forests and fisheries. The most notable ones are: agriculture can become a source for good if place appropriate to policies ensure are put that in the rights -scale large of land local acquisitions are communities protected. who Our are research has affected shown countries by that, where in the formal recognition of where land meaningful rights democratic procedures is and the accountability weakest are absent, and the incentive for -scale large foreign investors to enter into questionable land lease agreements has been strong. In countries such as Ethiopia, exercises where complete the control state over land and decision lease making, arrangements -scale large have taken land place without the prior local informed subsistence consent farmers of and pastoralists. and Environmental Sustainability ; the United Nations’ on Principles Guiding Busi- ness and Human Rights; the on Round Table Sustainable Biofuels; the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and ; Forests and Development Bank/Economic Commission for Africa the joint African Union/African How to break the impasse: democracy or voluntary guidelines? feedstock feedstock production can include smallholder farmers and whether production ethanol can lower energy dependence in the country. Or will Mozambique be used just as a conduit for the and other export countries of at ethanol lower tax to rates the due European to Union accorded the to a developing country?the assessment of Finally, preferential Brazilian develop­ terms of trade ment assistance programmes and foreign direct investment will be (FDI) based in on how Africa the Latin American giant resolve and the its potential tensions African between biofuel counterparts feedstock and food production and enhance mainly food for security, smallholder farmers, through technology transfers and capacity -building initiatives undertaken by Embrapa. protect the holders of tenure rights against arbitrary loss of those rights, and should ensure prompt and just compensation when tenure rights are taken for public purposes. The contributors to this book agree that good and democratic governance offers a panacea to the problems caused by large-scale land acquisition. While adherence to voluntary guidelines on social, economic and environmental standards have the potential to promote meaningful interaction between ­local people and international investors, they are by no means a substitute for strong national laws and regulations on a fair and transparent system of natural resource governance that will produce a win–win outcome for the investor and the host country.

Biofuel versus food crops? The debate over food production for local consump­ tion versus the production of export commodities has always been a central feature of African development options and dates back to the 1960s. In its current incarnation, the debate is centred on the production of biofuel for export. In the present study, only Brazilian investment has been implicated in the promotion of biofuel production in Africa. This should not be surprising given Brazil’s status as a leading country in ethanol production. Brazil’s investments in land used for the cultivation of biofuel feedstocks such as sugar cane, jatropha and soya beans in Mozambique have been highly controversial. Brazil’s cooperation in the biofuel sector began as recently as 2007, with Brazilian trans-national companies such as the mining giant Vale, Sena Mills and Petrobras engaged in assisting Mozambique in biofuel pro­ duction. The diversion of agricultural land to grow biofuel in food-deficient countries is viewed by civil society organisations as an irresponsible act that undermines respect for human rights.

Small-scale farmer versus commercial agriculture At present, the predominant modes of technical assistance and private investment in African agriculture are directed towards the development of large-scale commercial agriculture, with a limited number of interventions oriented towards the small-scale farmer. How­ ever, the debate on transforming African agriculture should not be confined to a choice between commercial agriculture and small-scale family farming. They can co-exist and complement each other. What is important is to ensure that small-scale farmers benefit from improvements in infrastructure and services (i.e. irrigation, roads and electricity), research and development, and science and technology made to support the development of large-scale commercial farming. This can be done by restructuring land investment deals in such a way that the value is shared with smallholders. This could take the form of contract farming with individual farmers or smallholder cooperatives, joint ventures, and community leases and management contracts (Hunt and Lipton 2011). 218 12 | Cheru and Modi 219 -tiered structure of Brazil’s policy framework to support African The evidence presented in this book clearly shows that agricultural agriculture technology, agriculture mainly providedtechnology, by Embrapa, oftenin tandem with The two In this regard, great effort must be made by African policy makers to en­ Against the backdrop of the challenges faced by countries in Africa with Ensuring that technology transfers are relevant to farmers the needs of small-scale investment investment in technology transfer for the production of food crops and biofuel. Second, there are various forms of support for African family farming, mainly coordinated by the Ministry of Agrarian Development; these range from sharing policy expertise to public purchase schemes linked to domestic food aid and school feeding programmes. The approach that Brazil implements is in a Africa direct reflection of the dual model inherentpolicy Brazil’s in framework, with support own agricultural for agribusiness provided by the Agriculture, Ministry and for of family farming by the Ministry of Agrarian Development. agriculture is a model worth pursuing. First, ical there is the sharing of trop­ Whatever business model is agreed, it should be with civil society, local developed farmers’ associations, the in private investor and consultation national and local government actors in order to delineate roles and and responsibilities, to establish how costs and benefits are consultation to are important be shared. Transparency preconditions and for such an approach to work. The IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) Fund can be used to experiment with models that link small-scale farmers with commercial farmers. technology transfer to Africa is taking place and is future. likely At to continue the in same the time, however, an the observation appropriateness can of be the made technology regarding being ity transferred of to African subsistence the farmers. vast The present major­ policy environment, which aimed is at attracting FDI into Africa, is not designed to promote links between high-technology-based -scale large commercial agriculture and the smallholder sector. The overemphasis on industrial agriculture is altering systems of land management, and this will have huge social and environmental ramifications and will further marginalise small-scale famers, herders and minority groups. sure that infrastructure and vital rural services built agriculture to also support benefit commercial smallholder farmers. Land lease agreements spell should out the obligations of the commercial to peasant farms farmers and to pastoralist downstream communities, and, benefits right from the start, system a of monitoring and evaluating compliance should be established that will involve all stakeholders on a regular workers, basis local – authorities, i.e. government representatives extension of commercial farmers farmers’ associations. and local regard to land and related issues, governments on set the continent of drew recommendations up at a the eighth African Development Forum, held in Box 12.1 Land and Africa’s development: recommendations of the eighth African Development Forum In light of the challenges and opportunities associated with the in­ creased domestic and external pressure on African land resources, governments of the continent are called upon to: a) identify established local land rights, interests and claims, and clearly determine how much land is available and where it is located before engaging in large-scale land allocations. The process should take into account land that is under traditional systems of agriculture, including shifting cultivation, fallow farming and pastoral grazing. Mapping and documenting land rights, interests and claims of communities and individuals should go beyond ownership rights and include user rights to land and related resources. Spatially referenced information on land will provide an evidence base that will be indispensable to planning at the local, regional and national levels, and will also help overcome unfair dispossession or stripping of the land right of communities; b) explore innovative and inclusive large-scale land-based investment (LSLBI) models that empower smallholder farmers and communities and offer provisions to protect national food security, thereby achieving equitable agricultural and rural transformation in Africa. To this end, LSLBIs should adhere to the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Develop­ ment Programme principles which enjoin African governments and stakeholders to reverse unhelpful and inconsistent macro and sectoral policies that are biased against agriculture in general, and smallholder famers in particular; c) adopt appropriate policy frameworks that articulate modalities for access to land by both domestic and foreign investors and recognise the land rights of local communities and investors in order to facilitate and secure profitable and equitable LSLBIs. Optimal structuring of land deals requires evidence-based, transparent and consultative negotiations on the main elements. Some of the key elements that must be care­ fully considered are: optimal land size and land lease period; potential costs and benefits and how they are to be shared and distributed; terms of further allocations; basis and terms of compensation; protec­ tion of well-being of smallholder farmers, including the women among them; community participation and a sense of ownership; provisions for withholding production for domestic use to address food and energy security; fiscal and other provisions to minimise land speculation; and regulatory mechanisms for enforcement; d) strengthen property rights, especially those falling under customary jurisdictions that serve as the principal regime under which most of Africa’s abundant land lies. In this regard, there is an urgent need to fast-track implementation of the African Union Declaration on Land Issues and Challenges in Africa, in accordance with the Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa that aims to reform land policies, laws and administration systems, with a view to entrenching the land rights of local communities and facilitating the security of all bundles of land rights, interests and claims, especially for women and other vulnerable groups; e) ensure, in partnership with other stakeholders, that LSLBIs give due consideration to environmental sustainability and climate change concerns. In addition, make effectively enforced and properly monitored environmental stewardship a central component of contractual arrange­ ments with land investors; f) strengthen institutions that govern land rights, along with those that facilitate investments and oversee the regulatory environment, to ensure that land deals attain their economic, social, gender, inter­ generational and environmental goals. Well-functioning land markets that facilitate transparent land transfers are critical to creating an enabling environment for investments by large-scale investors and smallholder producers alike. This is essential not only to reducing the yield gap, but also to providing the basis for a structural economic transformation that allows the rural population to move into non-farm employment as appropriate; g) mobilise financial and human resource capacity support for the implementation of the Nairobi Action Plan on LSLBIs in order to enhance the governance of LSLBIs in Africa. Resources are urgently needed to ensure that African governments and stakeholders validate these principles to create the sense of ownership that is critical to implementation. Support is also needed for capacity development and monitoring for responsive LSLBIs; and h) engage the land policy initiative (LPI) as a possible institutional resource for the implementation of the African Union Declaration on Land and the Nairobi Action Plan on LSLBIs. This would mean that all the activities contained in the LPI strategic plan, including capacity building, would have to be adequately mainstreamed at the national, regional and continental levels. Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2012) Draft Consensus Document of the Eighth African Development Forum on the theme ‘Governing and Harnessing Natural Resources for Africa’s Development’, 23–25 October 2012, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, ECA/ADF/8/L, pp. 4–5

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the end of October 2012, on the theme ‘Govern­ ing and Harnessing Natural Resources for Africa’s Development’. Although these recommendations are non-binding, they provide a set of people-centric guidelines to governments to help them reconcile the interests of foreign stakeholders in Africa’s land with, most notably, the rights of smallholder farmers and women in particular. The outcomes of the Development Forum are outlined in Box 12.1.

The way forward The contributors to this volume are conscious of the ongoing debate over whether the technology and farming techniques being injected into the agri­ cultural sector of Africa by investors from China, India and Brazil, particularly the use of chemical fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides, will have a negative impact on people and the environment. These concerns are not the central focus of this book, although the topic deserves thorough treatment in future research. Nevertheless, even in the present environment, where interest in African land is growing, it is not too late to design more environmentally and socially sustainable systems, and learn from the mistakes of others in order to leapfrog technologies. The onus is on African governments to do their homework first in order to negotiate with foreign investors from a stronger platform and better informed position, so that real and tangible benefits accrue to African host governments and the domestic farming constituents that they claim to represent. In situations where land lease arrangements may result in negative consequences to smallholders and the surrounding communities, such arrange­ ments should be based on free, prior and informed consultation with the affected communities as well as adequate compensation and restoration of livelihoods. To reiterate, the few instances of economic success in developing countries have been in countries where a strong and development-oriented state has actively taken an interest in mobilising the population around a common long-term national development vision aimed at improving the welfare of its people. China, India and Brazil are examples of such countries. Their success in transforming their respective agricultural sectors has been the result of a combination of factors, mainly investment in critical rural infrastructure, such as roads and irrigation schemes, the provision of fertilisers, improved seeds, innovations in technology, provision of microcredit and improved land tenure 222 12 | Cheru and Modi oriented oriented 223 systems, and a focus on raising the productivity other of words, smallholder Africa farmers. can In escape the scourge and embark of on poverty a and process of food agriculture-led insecurity industrialisation, India and Brazil did, just under the guidance of capable as and - development China, states committed to mobilising their populations around a common national development project aimed at improving popular welfare, and preserve their national independence. Notes

2 Moyo 1 The author acknowledges research standing committee on agriculture and assistance provided by Ndabezinhle rural development, 8 June 2009. Nyoni. 7 Personal communication with in­ 2 Consumers were captive ‘price ­takers’ vestors at a meeting of the India Business because they could not dictate prices or Forum, Addis Ababa, April 2009. procure from alternative suppliers. 8 Personal communication with Arvin 3 As a share of world food production Boolell, foreign minister of Mauritius, and consumption, Africa’s food consump­ January 2011. tion averages 12 per cent, while food 9 Personal conversation with Haile­ production remained below 8 per cent mariam Desalegn, foreign minister of between 1999 and 2007 (FAO 2010). Ethiopia, January 2012. 4 Traded food prices increased by 130 10 Personal communication with per cent from January 2002 to mid-2008, farming communities of People of Indian and by 50 per cent from January 2007 Origin around Lake Victoria, April 1997. to June 2008 (Mitchell 2008: 2). Grains 11 Discussions at the India Business showed the earliest and highest price Forum, Addis Ababa, October 2011. increase from 2005, although the global grain crop harvest of 2004–05 was 10 per 4 Modi cent higher than in the three previous 1 I acknowledge with gratitude the years and about 9 per cent higher than research assistance of Johan Salazar, the 2005–06 harvest. The prices of fats currently a doctoral candidate at the Tata and oils increased in mid-2006, although Institute of Social Studies. the 2004–05 and 2005–06 seasons had 2 For details, see Tables 4.1(b) and recorded a 13 per cent increase in oilseed 4.6(b) of Government of India 2012b. harvests. See also www.agricoop.nic.in (accessed 23 March 2012). 3 Singh 3 See www.sonalika.com for more 1 For more details, see Table 2A.1 in information. Broadman (2007: 114–15). 4 See also www.eximbankindia.com/ 2 Further information is available at loc.asp. www.indiaafricasummit.nic.in. 5 See also www.mahindratractorworld. 3 For a detailed list, please refer to com. www.icar.org.in/en/krishi-vigyan-kendra. 6 See also www.eximbankindia.com/ htm. loc.asp. 4 For an elaboration of the impact of 7 See also www.cottontapafrica.org Economic Partnership Agreements, see and www.ilfsclusters.com. Singh (2007). 8 It is estimated that the country will 5 The Team 9 countries are the nine import 1.5 to 2 million bales from the US, West African countries to which India Australia and West Africa due to lower provides technical assistance. domestic supply and lower prices abroad. 6 Personal communication with 9 See also www.luckygroupcompanies. members of Ethiopia’s parliamentary net. 224 Notes called ‘Arab called Spring’ ‘Arab of - a fundamental role in countries Data collected after threeyears of Indeed, Indeed, while ‘annual average con­ The WTO decision on the Brazil–US Brazil’s Brazil’s family farming sector is The study conducted by Ipea (which Twenty-five Brazilian companies and Embrapa Embrapa is linked to the Ministry of The term ‘plurilateral’, The which term ‘plurilateral’, See www.africa -brazil.org for more In 2008 alone, demonstrations 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 ­region; therefore, only official ABC experimental cultivation are to lead to recommendations in order to start - large scale production in 2012, which could eventually be extended to other African cotton-producing countries, such as Ghana and Uganda Bank (World 2011b). sumption is 74 kg ‘in per 2007, person’, dispute (DS267) issued in 2009 confirmed suspicions of US and EU dumping of products in developing markets. representatives from 16 African countries participated in the event (Freemantle and Stevens 2010). information. amounts are shown in this table. found found that total cooperation amounted to US$1.4 billion between 2005 and 2009) did not break down amounts by country or originally originally comes from WTO jargon, has been increasingly used by international relations scholars to describe groups com­ posed of a limited number of countries, but with a global agenda differing from regional integration (e.g. Mercosul) or multilateral arrangements, such as the G77. made up of approximately 4.3 million families, accounting for 84.4 per cent of farms, but only 24 per cent of agricultural land, and is responsible for 33 per cent of national agricultural output, most of it destined for the internal market (França 2009). took place in more than 30 countries, most of them in Africa (Antil and Touati 2009), while more recent food price hikes played affected by the so 2011. Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply. 225 - in -kebelle s (districts) and (districts) s and Bechera Oda Gibe Fortune, on 14 February Fortune on 15 November Fortune, on 15 November , Ouchok Ouchala sub woreda districts). The terms ‘region’ ‘region’ terms The districts). kebelle - is a product produced from a kebelle posted on its website) listed in the , all in Gambella. , Tepi s (sub s See www.cottontapafrica.org/news. Of the total LOCs to Africa, East For For details, see EXIM Bank 2011: 3. The document appeared in Amharic See the MOARD publications As reported in two local newspapers, Ethiopia has adopted an ethnic-based an adopted has Ethiopia Also reported in a local Ethiopian Reported in Enset These totalled US$352,073 billion in This research is based on extensive 8 7 6 2 5 1 3 4 1 10 11 12 Patriota and Pierri Patriota and 20 February 2010 respectively. Deccan Deccan Herald and 2009. (some ­References. business weekly, business weekly, 2009. November November 2011 (Central Bank of Brazil, www.bcb.gov.br). federal system of government. The main main The government. of system federal ), (killils ‘regions’ are federation the of units (equivalent zones into divided are which provinces), to in in 2001, and was translated into English in 2003. kebelle Prepengo kebelle fieldworkin the Gambella region. It involved individual and focus group dis­ cussions with 42 farmers in the affected areas, local government officials and em­ ployees of Karuturi Global. The districts visited sub included Tekodi 7 5 Rahmato kebelle type of banana leaf. and ‘zone’ are misleading, and do not do and misleading, are ‘zone’ and the of meaning the convey ­adequately refer. they which to entities administrative htm. Africa is the largest beneficiary, receiving over half the LOCs extended to Africa, followed by West, Central and Southern Africa. 80 percent (820,000 tons) of Senegal’s value produced in Brazil, whether they are local consumption was imported, and 16 produced by Brazilian or foreign firms. percent of the trade deficit reflected rice 21 Ghana’s METASIP plan is budgeted imports’ (World Bank 2011b). at US$1 billion, of which US$670 million 12 According to JICA, ‘actions is to be sourced abroad (Ministry of Food executed ... will be based on respect of and Agriculture, Republic of Ghana 2010). environmental agreements signed by the Given that the costs of irrigation and three countries towards the durable and mechanisation are estimated at US$256 sustainable development and preservation million (of which US$110 million will of resources for future generations’. come from foreign sources), Brazil’s credit 13 The UEMOA memorandum of to Ghana will cover about 86.8 per cent of under­standing called for feasibility required foreign investment. studies on the production of biofuels in 22 Kenya’s credits are to be submitted member countries. In 2011, a proposal to CAMEX during the second semester was submitted by Embrapa and ABC to of 2012, while Senegal’s should also be ­Senegal confirming the country’s poten­ approved during this period, pending the tial for sugar cane-based ethanol. settlement of previous debt engagements 14 In 2007, the EU ‘agreed that bio­ with Brazil. Due to the novelty of the fuels must make up at least 10% of the programme, its financial and commercial energy utilised for transport’. dimensions are still being perfected. The 15 The African countries are Senegal, Brazilian government is establishing Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mozam­ mechanisms to streamline processes such bique and Zambia (FGV Projetos 2011). as credit allocation and export guarantees 16 Since January 2010, under Brazilian to companies involved in the programme. law all diesel sold at gas stations must 23 According to the OECD: ‘Tied aid comprise at least 5 per cent biodiesel, credits are official or officially supported thus generating a national market of 2.4 Loans, credits or Associated Financing billion litres per year. In 2010, 32 busi­ packages where procurement of the goods nesses were operating under the ‘Social or services involved is limited to the Fuel Seal’ as a result of their minimum donor country or to a group of countries purchases from a pool of 54,000 family which does not include substantially all farmers (Cassel 2010). developing countries’ (OECD Glossary of 17 MDA was created in 1999 and has Statistical Terms, http://stats.oecd.org/ been given a higher profile since 2003, glossary/detail.asp?ID=3089). playing a fundamental role in the Zero 24 Although a non-negligible part Hunger strategy. Since 2011, it has been of these food imports (sugar, maize, one of the main ministries involved in wheat) comes from Brazil and should be President Dilma Rousseff’s Brazil without substituted by locally grown food if the Extreme Poverty strategy. programme delivers on its promise, most 18 The National Fund for the Develop­ Brazilian exports to Africa are for manu­ ment of Education (Fundo Nacional de factured and semi-manufactured goods Desenvolvimento da Educação or FNDE) (US$7.578 billion in 2011, with US$4.571 bil­ is a Ministry of Education fund respon­ lion in manufactured goods, and US$3.007 sible for the PNAE. billion in semi-manufactured goods) 19 Apart from their distribution to (Saraiva and Ciarelli 2012). food social programmes, these stocks are 25 Northern cooperation trade-offs also used in international food donations frequently include recipient country for humanitarian purposes. national budget funding in exchange for 20 According to BNDES’s FINAME policy choices, such as structural adjust­ code, items considered by the programme ment programmes cutting back on social must have 60 per cent in both weight and spending in the 1980s and 1990s; debt 226 Notes Voluntary Voluntary Report of the Special ­Council (2010) ­national corporations in Brazilian The fact that diplomats would In Chinese parlance, ‘basic’ means Based on the most recent complete Note: Note: data in value terms in this Food Food and Agriculture Organization The per capita requirement of 400 Cheru and Modi Cheru Xiuli and Xiaoyun 9 4 3 2 1 1 mention specific companies as potential ­beneficiaries of their policies is symptom­ atic of the increasing influence of multi diplomacy (see Marques 2010). production production as a broad strategy for rural development, biofuel producers tend to cluster where infrastructure and market access are already well established (Schut et al. 2010), limiting the potential for -scale large biofuel investments to provide benefits to the most needy rural Mozam­ bicans. the provision of at least 95 per cent of basic China’s food (i.e. grain) needs from domestic sources. table are calculated at current prices. The new classificationfor the national­ indus try has been implemented since 2003, and gross output values include services in support of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries. ­Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter: Large-scale land acquisition and leases: A set of minimum principles and measures to address the human rights - chal , lenge A/HRC/13/33. information information by country. of the United Nations (2012) on Guidelines the Governance Responsible of of Tenure Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, Rome: United FAO; Nations Human Rights kilograms is a crude benchmark con­ sidered sufficient to meet the needs of the Chinese population, as well as the feed and seed requirements of farmers, given current food consumption patterns. 12 11 227 ­ ­ dependent dependent The state of São Paulo had suc­ The 2010 riots led the government Despite the discussion of biofuel The green revolution has been criti­ Mozambique Mozambique is ranked by the World See Thaler 2010b for a brief critique Some critics prefer the term ‘agro This description has been used 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 of such -projects. mega to reduce the magnitude of some price increases and cancel others. For further analysis of Mozambican development, one of the best and most persistent critics of the development model in Mozambique is Joseph Hanlon (for example, Hanlon and Smart 2008). ment agencies and banks afteryears of fightingfor independence and to protect the country’s sovereignty from Rhodesian and South African interference (see also Plank 1993). Bank as the eleventh most aid- country in the world, with aid still respon­ sible for over 20 per cent of gross national income Bank (World 2011b), and the country has long found itself beholden to the demands of donor countries, develop cessful cessful research programmes for coffee and cotton, but this was a rare exception (Graham et al. 1987: 3). fuels’, as theyfuels’, feel it better highlights biofuels’ ‘problematic environmental and social consequences’ (McMichael 2010: 609). cised, however, cised, for however, improving agricultural production but maintaining and even exacerbating socioeconomic inequalities (Gonzalez 2004: 441). frequently frequently in the case of Brazil. For one relatively early use, see Lopez and Kepp 1984. 8 Thaler relief relief for HIPC countries in exchange for poverty reduction strategy papers in the 2000s; and ‘good governance’ conditions, which can in theory be effectivebut in practice often end up setting politically or economically motivated double standards. About the contributors

Alexandra Arkhangelskaya – head of the Agrarian ­Development, Government of Centre for Information and Inter­ Brazil, Brasília. He has previously been national Relations at the Institute for a consultant for the Centre for Agrarian African Studies, Russian Academy of Studies and Rural Development of the Sciences, Moscow. Ministry of Agrarian Development.

Simon Freemantle – senior analyst in Dessalegn Rahmato – founder and senior the African Political Economy Unit with researcher at the Forum for Social Standard Bank Research, South Africa. Studies, an independent policy research institution in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He Albert Khamatshin – researcher at the is the winner of the 1999 Prince Claus Centre for Southern African Studies Award in recognition of significant at the Institute for African Studies, achievements in the field of research ­Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. and development.

Sam Moyo – professor executive director Rick Rowden – doctoral candidate in of the African Institute for Agrarian economics at the Jawaharlal Nehru Uni­ Studies (AIAS), Harare, Zimbabwe, and versity in New Delhi, India. He works a former president of the Council for as a freelance consultant to the inter­ the Development of Social Science Re­ national affairs industry and has pre­ search in Africa (CODESRIA) (2008–11). viously worked as inter-regional adviser with the United Nations Conference on Sanusha Naidu – senior researcher at Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Open Society Foundation for South senior policy analyst with ActionAid Africa (OSF-SA) South African Foreign USA. Policy Initi­ ­ative (SAFPI) in Cape Town, South Africa. Gurjit Singh – ambassador of India to the Republic of Indonesia. He Thomas Cooper Patriota – Food and recently served as the ambassador of Agriculture Organization of the India to Ethiopia and Djibouti and United Nations (FAO) consultant at the as the repres­entative of India to the Ministry of Agrarian Development’s African Union. He has been head of the International and Commercial Promo­ Africa Division twice in the Ministry tion Advisory, Government of Brazil, of External Affairs (MEA). He was also Brasília. the sherpa for the Second India–­Africa Forum Summit held in Addis Ababa, Francesco Maria Pierri – head of the Ethiopia, in May 2011. ­International and Commercial Pro­ motion Advisory at the Ministry of Jeremy Stevens – international econo­

228 Contributors ­ ­ Xiaoyun Xiaoyun Li – professor and dean of the College of Humanities and Develop ment Studies, China Agricultural Beijing, China. University, Xiuli Xu – associate professor at the ­College of Humanities and Develop ment Studies, China Agricultural Beijing, China. University, 229 ­ated researcher of the Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS), Lisbon, Portugal. Kai Kai Thaler – doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Harvard United University, States, and an affili mist for the Standard Bank Group, Beijing, China. References

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252 Index

accountability, 55, 105, 117, 118, 219; of Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, governments, 11 16, 189 accumulation by dispossession, 4, 5, Angelique International Limited, 212 39–40, 54, 56, 108 Angola, 39, 40, 51, 136–7, 146, 165 Açúcar Guarani company, 152 animal feed: demand for, 107; industry, 175 Africa Talent programme, 213 Annan, Kofi, 16 Africa–Brazil Agricultural Innovation anti-malarial medication, 28 Marketplace, 131, 157, 214, 216 arable land, shortage of, 8 African Agricultural Growth and Argentina, land ownership in, 185–7 Investment Task Force, 16 armed struggle, 51 African Development Bank, 88 Associated Chambers of Commerce and African Development Forum, 219, 220–1 Industry of India, 112 African Growth and Opportunity Act asymmetrical trade relations, 59, 70 (AGOA) (2000) (USA), 65, 67, 133 AU–NEPAD Agriculture Climate Change African Union (AU), 9, 15, 23, 49, 59, 61, 62, Adaptation-Mitigation Framework, 22 165; Declaration on Land Issues and Challenges in Africa, 221; Framework Bailis, Rob, 153 and Guidelines on Policy in Africa, 217 bananas, disease-free, 165 African Union Commission (AUC), 27, 61 Bandung conference, 159 agrarian reform, 2, 3, 18, 54, 77, 94, 95, 103, Benin, 33, 87, 131, 165, 214; exports of, 67 203; alternative, 51; financing for, 55; in Benishangul region (Ethiopia), 100 China, 205; in structural adjustment BHO Bio Products PLC, 113 period, 41–3; post-independence, 40–1; Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 213; under neoliberalism, 43–7 Alliance for a Green Revolution in agrarian transformation, in Africa, 15–37, Africa, 118 38–56 Biney, Ama, 119 agribusiness, 28, 56, 70, 82, 97, 120, 128, biodiesel, 152–4; Chinese consumption 130, 157 of, 181 agricultural experts, Chinese, 30 biodiversity, preservation of, 150 agricultural technology demonstration bioenergy project, 152 centres, 30 biofuels, 1, 4, 7–8, 17, 33, 38, 48, 51, 72, Agricultural Trade Development and 93, 125–6, 130, 134–7, 143, 215, 216; Assistance Act (Public Law 480) (1954) and food security, in Mozambique, (USA) , 76 148–54; Chinese demand for, 175, agricultural universities and colleges, 213; 181; demand for, 149; development disconnected from farmers, 20 of, in Mozambique, 149–51; IBSA Agrishow Pró-África, 131 memorandum of understanding, 166; agro-ecological approaches, 118 versus food crops, 218 Agro-Ecological Zoning of Sugar Cane Law Biofuels Association of Zambia, 137 (Brazil), 135 biotechnology, 165 agrofuels see biofuels Bolsa Familia (Brazil), 126–7, 214 aid dependency, 149 Botswana, 41, 164

253 Brasília Declaration, 162 Central Institute for Cotton Research Brazil, 1, 7–8, 16, 17, 22, 26–33, 35, 54, (India), 87 160, 164, 211, 222–3; cooperation with Central Institute for Research on Cotton Mozambique, 216–19; development Technology (India), 87 assistance model of, 146; domestic Centro de Estudos Estratégicos e food priorities of, 146–7; energy Capitação em Agricultura Tropical interests of, 147–8; Food Purchase (CECAT), 131 Programme, 139; in African agricultural cereals: deficits of, 47; reduction of development, 125–4; involvement Western stocks of, 48; rising price of, in Africa, 213–14; Linking Family 48 Agriculture to School Feeding and cerrado region of Brazil, 132–3, 146–7, 156 Food Assistance, 139; More Food for Chad, 33, 68, 87 Africa programme, 139–42; National chemicals, intensive use of, 109 Programme for the Production child mortality, 148 and Use of Biodiesel, 137; National China, 1, 3, 16, 17, 22, 25, 26, 28, 35, 54, School Feeding Programme, 139–40; 55, 67, 72, 107, 111, 127, 128, 156, 158, operations in Mozambique, 145–58, 160, 164, 211, 222–3; agricultural 218; soya bean deal with China, 185; diversification in, 196–8; agricultural Structured Support Programme to lessons from, 190–209; agricultural self- Developing Countries in Renewable sufficiency of, 180; agricultural Energies (Pro-Renova), 135; technology specialisation in, 179; aid and outward contribution of, 34; opposition to Free investments of, 183–8; Cultural Trade Area of the Americas, 127 Revolution, 191; development of Brazil–Africa cooperation in agriculture, infrastructures, 27; development 129–30 strategy of, 8; domestic agricultural Brazil–Africa Dialogue on Food Security, production of, 177–80; evidence- Fight against Hunger, and Rural based policy making, 202–3; Five Development, 33, 130, 139, 142 Year Plans, 178; Great Leap Forward, Brazil Agri-Solutions, 131 191; investment in Ethiopia, 101; Brazilian Cooperation Agency, 129 involvement in Africa, 173–89; new breeding technologies, 28, 60 partnerships with, 26–33; non-farm BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China economy in, 198–201; Outward and South Africa), 127, 164; poverty Investment Sector Direction Policy, 184; reduction in, 89 rising consumer demand in, 174–6; role British South Africa Company, 39 in land acquisition, 216; soya bean deal Buenos Aires Plan of Action, 159–61, 168 with Brazil, 185; strains in agricultural Burkina Faso, 33, 87, 131; exports of, 67 system of, 176–7, 188; technology contribution of, 34; trade of, 180–3 Cámara de Comércio Exterior (CAMEX) China–Africa Development Fund, 35 (Brazil), 141–2 China–Africa knowledge exchange, 192 Cameroon, 68, 85 China National Agricultural Development capacity building, 18, 60–5, 72, 76, 129, Group Corporation, 185 130–7, 140, 142, 166, 203, 209; in cotton China State Farm and Agribusiness production, 86–7; institutional, 211 Corporation (CSFAC), 184–5 Cape Verde, 131, 168 China–Zambia Friendship Farm, 185 carbon sinks, creation of, 21 Chinese Academy of Agriculture, 213 cashew nuts, production of, 65, 67, 73, 79, Chinese Communist Party, 202; 111, 197 agriculture policies of, 192–3 cassava, production of, 72, 161 Chinese emigrants, 29 Castro, José de, The Geography of Hunger, Chinese labour in Africa, 72; in 139 Mozambique, 49 254 Index see see also see see also China, China, 183–4 China, 206–7; definition of, 156–8 (India), 87 accumulation by dispossession redistribution of land States 23, (ECOWAS), 136 schools, 28; provision of schools, 114, 115 sugar cane, 137; supply of, 47 Agropecuária (Embrapa), 7, 32, 125, 130, 133, 134, 143, 147, 156, 214, 216; African branch of, 131, 165, 166 133, 144, 221 of, 181; international trade of, 135; production of (from sugar cane, 147, 151–2; impact on food prices, 134); taxation of, 151 165, 187, 214; Chinese investment in, demonstration demonstration farms, established by Deng Xiaoping, 35, 190, 204 desertification, 176 development: as a process of learning, in Directorate of Cotton Development displacement of communities, 154 dispossession, 10, 26, 119 distribution of land, 103, 191 Djibouti, Djibouti, 72 use donor, of term, 129 drought, 45, 104 dualistic system of agriculture, 110 duty-free concessions, 59 DutyFree - PreferenceTariff scheme, 67, 73 Economic Community of African West économie de , traite 40 education: China–Africa friendship Egypt, 28, 83 El Niño effect, 78 Elaion Africa 153 company, electricity: access to, 218; generated from electrification, rural, 89, 168 empowerment, participatory, 140 Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa energy security, in Brazil, 147–8 ENI 154 company, enset-based farming system, 95 environmental impact assessments, 104 environmental issues, 6–7, 109, 110, 114, ETH Bioenergia 152 company, ethanol, 134–5, 217; Chinese consumption Ethiopia, 7, 16, 73, 108, 110, 111, 119, 131, 255 floriculture see see lines lines of credit see see also investment investment in, 21–2; mitigation of, 168 Development Programme (CAADP), 9, 15, 17–21, 22, 61, 169, 189, 220; implementation of, 23–4; priorities of, 18 110, 118 175 182–3; production of, 1, 54, 73, 86–7, 89, 97, 133, 134, 157, 197, 213 141, 222 Daewoo Logistics 187 company, dams, building of, 111 109 Olivier, De Schutter, decolonisation, of agriculture, 38–56 Dedini 154 company, deforestation, 43, 135, 155 democracy, 217–18 crop diversity, 157 customary legal systems, 1, 41 cut flowersindustry Chipembe Chipembe farm (Uganda), 184 Chongqing Grains 185 company, civil society, 37 clearing of forests, 155 climate change, 28, 78; adaptation, coffee, production of, 125, 165, 188, 197, 214 commodification, ofland and 56 water, commodity exports, boom in, 125 commodity prices, 128 common land, 150 Companhia de Sena, 136, 152 compensation, 220 Comprehensive Africa Agriculture concessions, in Africa, 40 conditionality of aid, 56, 129, 143 Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), 112 Congo, Democratic Republic of, 131 consent, free, prior and informed, 2, 105, contestation of land transfers, 93 contract farming, 2, 74, 218 Copersucar 152 company, corn, 179, 213; Chinese consumption of, corporate social responsibilities, 74 corruption, 10, 215 Cosan 152 company, Côte d’Ivoire, 68 Cotonou Agreement, 65, 67, 73 cotton: Chinese demand 175, for, 181, Cotton-4 project, 33, 131, 132, 216 credit, access to, 19, 23, 76, 126, 138, 140, 101, 213; Growth and Transformation (FAO), 3, 116, 148, 156, 173, 193, 195; Plan (GTP), 99; Indian investments in, Special Programme for Food Security, 93–106; irrigation in, 85; Ministry of 30; Guidelines on the Responsible Agriculture and Rural Development Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries (MOARD), 98–9, 101, 103 and Forests, 217 European Commission, 152 food and energy crisis, 4, 17, 38, 47–51, 127, European Union (EU), 217; biofuels 157, 192 regulations, 151; Everything but food market, crisis of, 5 Arms initiative, 133; Sustainable food processing services, 165 Development of Bioenergy project, 151 ‘food riots’, 135, 148–9, 216 evictions, 54, 115, 119 food safety measures, 166 Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of food security, 1, 4, 8, 15, 37, 43–7, 70, 71–2, India Ltd (ECGC), 112 77, 83, 93–4, 103, 105, 107, 109–10, 111, export crops, production of, 17, 38, 42, 48, 127, 133, 137–42, 145–58, 159, 168, 216, 51, 59, 70, 97, 103, 104, 105, 108, 130, 196, 220; Brazil’s involvement in issues 197, 199, 218 of, 125–44; in Brazil, 146–7; in China, export earnings, repatriation of, 106 173–89, 193–6, 201 Export-Import Bank of India (Exim Bank), food shortages, 201 6, 31, 68, 76, 82, 84, 212; in Africa, 88–9 food sovereignty, 56, 118, 135, 137–42 exports of food, limiting of, 71 foreign direct investment (FDI), 1–11, extension services, 19 51, 70–1, 107, 217; and land rights, 215–17; attracting of, 10, 19, 24–5, 36, family farming see small-scale farming 65, 71, 96, 219 (incentive terms, 113); famine, 5, 93; in China, 191, 201; in India, 77 effects of, on agriculture, 110; growth Fano farm (Somalia), 184 of, 16; harnessing of, 9–11; in African farm science centres, 62 agriculture, role of, 15–37; of Brazil, Fast Track Land Reform Programme 145; politicisation of, 36; southern, (Zimbabwe), 53–5 attracting of, 24–5; studies of, 72 Federation of Indian Chambers of foreign exchange earnings, 208 Commerce and Industry, 112 foreign land ownership, restriction of, Feed the Future programme, 16 40 ‘feeling our way across the river’, policy, in Forest Rights Act (India), 119 China, 203 forests, resources provided by, 104 fertilisers, 205; availability of, 19, 222; Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa shortage of, 54; of, 11, 19, 43, 64, 147 (FARA), 32, 131, 169, 216 field demonstrations, 61 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation finance capacity, 28 (FOCAC), 17, 28, 130, 160, 213; China– finance platforms for agriculture, 76–92 Africa Development Fund (CADF), 184 financial services: access to, 35; in rural Friends of the Earth, 108 areas, 21 Fundaçâo Getulio Vargas (FGV), Tropical financing gap, bridging of, 34–5 Belt project, 137 first wave of land alienation, 39 futures market, 48 fishing industry, 184; in China, 197 floriculture, 1, 73, 96, 98, 100 Gambella region (Ethiopia), 94, 100, Focus Africa Programme, 88 104–5, 113; investment in, 32; land food: export of, 45; importation of, 42, acquisitions in, 7 45; prices of, 48 (rising, 61, 70, 71, 108, gas sector, 16 127, 134, 177; volatility of, 47); under- gender bias of consultations, 155 consumption of, 46–7 Ghana, 131, 136, 165, 214; fuel supply food aid, 42, 93; dependence on, 45–6 contract with Sweden, 136; TCP Food and Agriculture Organization agreement, 141 256 Index import see see also Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), 17, Africa Institute of Agricultural and substitution industrialisation technology (ICT), 166 9, 17, 18, 19, 25, 68, 115, 126; China’s contribution to, 27; hydraulic, development of, 168; investment in, 11, 24; reduced spending on, 47; rural, 212, 213 Services Ltd (IL&FS), 87 revolution, 35 (IPEA), 129 in, in, 76–81; investments of (in Africa, 6, 72–4; in Ethiopian agriculture, 93–10); partnerships with, 26–33; protests at Washington embassy of, 120; role of, in land grab, 110–13; strategy for African agriculture, 76–92; sustainable agricultural development in Africa, 59–75; technology contribution of, 34; transfer of agricultural technologies, 164–7 31–2, 59–61, 73, 86, 88, 130, 160, 164; Framework for Enhanced Cooperation, 61; Framework of Cooperation, 59, 116 Rural Development, 61 (IBSA), 8, 17, 127, 159–69, 219; achievements of, 163; biofuels memorandum of understanding, 166; Facility Fund for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger in Africa, 32, 35, 163, 167–8; nanotechnology project, 167; joint working group on agriculture, 165–6; Pretoria summit, 162 (ICAR), 62 Cooperation (ITEC), 60–1, 82 199, 211; equitable, 56; in China, lessons of, 204; rural, 22–3 (in China, 205); transition to, 2 information information and communications infrastructure, 103, 110; building of, Infrastructure Leasing & Financial institutional imperatives of agricultural Instituto de Pesquisa Económica Aplicada insurance, for family farmers, 138 - India - India India Brazil and South Africa forum Indian Council of Agricultural Research Indian and Technical Economic indirect land use change (ILUC), 135 Indonesia, 28 industrialisation, 4–5, 36, 37, 192, 197, 257 malnutrition see see also India, Brazil and South see see Grown School Feeding (HGSF) Africa forum Environmental Sustainability, 217 67, 127, 160, 164, 211, 216, 222–3; agricultural contracts in Ethiopia, 113–16; agricultural imports of, 78–9; agriculture companies, 107–21; development of agriculture 164–7; programmes, 139 (China), 201 Corporation (Mozambique), 185 Program Program (GAFSP), 16 rise of, 5, 93; production of, 208 (in China, 193–6) 77, 83, 84, 118, 138, 145; fails in Africa, 15, 36 15 Fund in, 167–8 IBSA Trust IBSA Fund, Trust 167 IFC Performance Standards on Social and import substitution industrialisation, 41 India, 1, 3, 16, 17, 22, 26, 28, 35, 54, IBSA–Africa IBSA–Africa collaboration on agriculture, hydroelectric hydroelectric projects, 89 horticulture, 73 Household Responsibility System (HRS) Hubei State Farm and Agribusiness Human Development Index (HDI), 148 human resource development, 28 109–10 of, violations 218; 117, rights, human hunger Haiti, Haiti, waste disposal project in, 167–8 healthcare, 89, 114, 115 herbicides, 222 Hillam, David, 108 Home- Global Global Agriculture and Food Security Global Food Security Initiative, 15–16 grain: imports of, to China, 197–8; prices; GRAIN organisation, 108 grass, shortage of, 104 green revolution, 7, 16, 20, 22, 27, 38, 64, greenhouse gas emissions, 146, 150, 157 groundnuts, 197 Group of 8 (G8), 162; Kananaskis summit, Group of 20 (G20), 16, 127 Guebuza, Armando, 151, 153 -Bissau, Guinea 132, 165; operations of IBSA Gulf states, 72 integrated nutrient management, 64 La Via Campesina, 117 integrated pest management, 132, 166 labour conditions, 114, 115, 134, 135 intellectual property rights, 163 labour laws, 115 International Development Bank, 137 labour reserves in Africa, 39 International Food Policy Research land: alienation of, phases of, 38–56; Institute (IFPRI), 71 arable, shortages of, 173; foreign owner­ International Fund for Agricultural ship of, 185; scarcity of, 43; state-owned, Development (IFAD), 116 95, 191, 217 (in Mozambique, 154) International Institute for Environment land clearance by projects, 104 and Development, 4 land concentration, 148 International Institute of Agricultural ‘land grabbing’, 1, 10, 42, 48, 53, 56, 76, 135, Knowledge, 118 154, 157, 187–8, 192, 215, 216; activists’ International Land Coalition, 117 responses to, 107–21; mistaken charge International Monetary Fund (IMF), 38, of, 215–16; new trends in, 107–10; use of 95; calls for reform of, 163 term, 3, 17, 26, 38 International Tractors Limited (IRL), 85 land leases: in China, 179; scale of, 4 internet, 160 land markets, 51, 221 interstate rivalries, 36 Land Matrix Project, 107 investment, 211; in agriculture, public, land policy initiative (LPI), 221 128–9; integrated approach to, 67; land prices, escalation of, 48 legislation regarding, 97 see also land reform see agrarian reform foreign direct investment Land Reform Act (China) (1950), 191 irrigation, 1, 2, 17, 18, 27, 28, 32, 45, 60, land rights, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, 217–19, 220, 221; 68, 77, 82, 83, 89, 103, 111, 114, 178, 193, advocacy regarding, 1; transfer of, 74 196, 201, 211, 212, 218; investment in, land rush, 93, 105; in Ethiopia, 98 11; micro systems, 85; Senegal project, land tenure, 55, 222; changing relations of, 83–4; shortage of facilities, 54; solar 42; regimes of, 49; customary systems, pumping, 85; well-digging in India, 161 117 (review of, 18, 23); governance of, 217–18; security of, 54, 95 Jain Irrigation Systems, 82, 83, 84–5, 212 land under cultivation, increasing of, 18 Japan, 16, 72; access to overseas land, 188; land zoning, 33, 150 crop technology in, 156 landlessness, 43 jatropha, 218; biodiesel produced from, large-scale commercial farming (LSCF), 152–4 39, 42, 49 Jiang Zemin, 201 large-scale farming, 41, 74, 103, 105, 143, job creation, through biofuel projects, 155 215, 220; estates model, 48–9; expansion Johnson, Lyndon B., 77 of ranching, 42; expropriation of Jordan, 71 estates, 53; in Ethiopia, 94–6 Juma, Calestous, 20 Leading Group Office for Rural Work (LGORW) (China), 202 Karuturi Global company, 7, 32, 100, 110, lentils, 111 114, 115, 187, 212, 215 Lesotho, 164 Kenana Sugar Company, 136 liberalisation, of agricultural trade, 163 Kenya, 40, 51, 111, 131, 165, 187, 214; lines of credit, 68–70, 82, 88–9, 112, 143; floriculture in, 73; TCP agreement, 141 concessionary, 92; for women and Kirloskar Brothers Limited (KBL), 32, 82, young farmers, 138 83–4, 212 livestock management, 45, 60, 131; in knowledge platforms, building of, 76–92 China, 196–7 Korea, South, 72, 107 Lucky Group, 87 Kuwait, 71, 107 Lufthansa company, 153 Lugard, Lord, 40 258 Index cropping, cropping, 106, 109, 138; critique of, Brazil, More Food for Africa - 20–1 120 Development (NABARD), 62 Commission (China), 187 to, 51–5; land policy of, 42 20, (NEPAD), 24, 82 219 118 see programme 131, 132–4, 136–7, 165, 213; biofuels in, 148–54; Brazil’s involvement in, 145–58, 218; Chinese investments in, 188; cooperation with Brazil, 216–19; free trade agreement with China, 152; settlement of Chinese workers in, 49; TCP agreement, 141 reform of, 163 investment in Africa, 26 monitoring monitoring of land deals, 103 mono Nacala corridor, 132, Nacala corridor, 133 Nairobi Action Plan, 221 Namibia, 164 nanotechnology project of IBSA, 167 national agricultural research institutes, National Alliance of People’s Movements, National Bank for Agriculture and Rural National Development and Reform National Microfinance Bank 21 (Tanzania), nationalisation, 115; of land, 40, 51 native trees, planting of, 104 neocolonialism, use of term, 3–4, 17, 26 neoliberalism, 3, 55, 94; armed resistance New Forests 119 Company, New Partnership for Development Africa’s 16 Niger, Nigeria, 65, 136, 146; exports of, 67 Oakland Institute, 4, 108 Obama, Barack, 16 obligations of land lease arrangements, 132, Odebrecht company, 136, 152 oil, price of, 48, 72 oil 16, sector, 146 oilseeds, 64, 78, 111 More Food for Africa programme Mozambique, 39, 40, 42, 51, 68, 111, multilateral trading system, calls for multinational companies, 2; Western, 259 United United Nations, Millennium Development Development Goals Award 178 Korean Korean land deal, 49 82, 86, 212 Services Company Ltd 86 (MATCO), assembly plant in, 86 in China, 193; in Mozambique, 148; of children, 127; reduction of, 145; statistics 47 for, Food Security in Africa, 23 development of, 203; for grain, reform of, in China, 206; foreign, access to, 24; international, development of, for China, 205–6; linking farmers to, 18–19; reform of, in China, 205; speculative, in food, 47 production project, 154 140, 147 China, 216 institutionalisation of, 51 see also millet, 161 mining industry, 40, 149 Mittal, Anuradha, 121 Moçamgalp 154 company, modernisation, 35, 36, 41, 51, 128; in China, 73 Mombasa–Uganda railway, Madagascar, 108, 110, Madagascar, 111, 119; South Mahindra and Mahindra (M&M) company, maize, 89, 125, 133, 195 Makumbi Agricultural and Technical malaria, 73 Malawi, 39, 41, 67 Malaysia, 24, 25, 28 Mali, 33, 87, 131, 132; exports of, 67; tractor malnutrition, 6, 19, 46–7, 77, 104, 190, 195; Mao Zedong, 191 Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and markets: access to, 18, 118, 138, 139, 201; Massingir (Mozambique), ethanol Mauritius, 24, 72, 73 Mbeki, Thabo, 161–2 meat, consumption of, in China, 175 mechanisation, 4–5, 43, 74, 82, 85, 110, 132, medical care, 28 Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), 164 microfinanceinstitutions, 21 middle classes, 3, 53; growth of, 1; in migrant 39; labour, in China, 199, 204; migratory wildlife, 51 Millennium Development Goals, 61, 162 Organisation for Economic Co-operation property rights, 35; strengthening of, 221 and Development (OECD), 24 protein, demand for, 175 Organization of American States, 137 pulses, 64, 65, 67, 78, 79, 89, 111 Oromia region (Ethiopia), 94, 100 outcropping schemes, 155 Qatar, 71, 187 outsourcing of food production, 107, 111, 113, 121, 161, 216 Rafik, Mahomed, 152 oversight of land deals, 103 rain-fed agriculture, 46, 82, 111 Oxfam, 108, 119 redistribution of land, 40, 41, 53 Regional Centre for Renewable Energy palm oil: Chinese imports of, 182; and Energy Efficiency (Cape Verde), 136 production of, 40, 74 regional value chains, creation of, 19 participatory research programmes, 118 regulation and monitoring of projects, 2, pastoralism, 51 10 Patkar, Medha, 120 Reifschneider, Francisco, 147 patriarchy, 54 rents, low, 101 Pawar, Sharad, 121 research: agricultural, 166; investment in, peasantry, 1–11, 38–9; destruction of, 39, 41; 19–20; transmitted to farmers, 20 eviction of, 25; forcible displacement research and technology gap, 34 of, 5; incorporation of, 47–51; research capacities, building of, 17, 18 marginalisation of, 53; resistance of, 4 resettlement of rural populations, 105 pesticides, 222; contamination of water Responsible Endowments Coalition, 120 resources by, 167 rice: development of new seed, 167; Petrobras Biocombustível, 136 production of, 72, 74, 89, 195, 185 (in Petrobras company, 152, 218 China, 181; in Tanzania, 184; in Senegal, Petromoç organisation, 136, 150 83–4); record production of, in China, pigeon peas, 65 179; super-rice, 213 Plans for Accelerated and Sustained rice-based farming systems, 30 Development to End Poverty (PASDEP), Rice Culture project (Senegal), 131–2, 216 96 rights: enforcement of, 118; of labour, 110 population growth, 19 see also human rights and land rights Portugal, Carnation Revolution, 146 roads: building of, 17, 103, 211, 218; post-harvest operations, 64–5 investment in, 11 poverty, 6, 19; increase of, 46–7; reduction Round Table on Sustainable Biofuels, 217 of, 37, 89, 60, 62, 87, 127, 145, 157, 163, rubber: Chinese imports of, 181, 183; 168, 190, 192, 195, 207 (in China, 8, 205) production of, 188 Poverty Reduction Action Plan Ruchi Agri PLC, 113 (Mozambique), 149 rural development strategies, 3 price support mechanisms, 23 Rural Land Contract Law (China) (2006), primitive accumulation, 40 206 private ownership of land, 95 rural social administration, 35 private sector, 37, 70, 72, 87, 96, 109, 133 Russian Federation, 164 privatisation, of land markets, 38, 51 Rwanda, 16 Pro-Cana project (Mozambique), 154–5 productivity in agriculture, 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, Sachs, Jeffrey, 108 17, 43, 56, 64, 82, 129, 134, 191, 208, 212; sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 166 decline of, 15, 45, 59; improvement of, Sannati Agro Farm Enterprises, 113 34, 130–4, 138; in agriculture, in China, Saudi Arabia, 71, 107, 187; water depletion 193–6; of small-scale farmers, 20, 223 in, 161 proletarianisation, 51 scholarships for African students, 61, 65 property ownership patterns, 18 second wave of land alienation, 51–3 260 Index exploitation of rural 38, labour, 55 People’s People’s Region, 95, 100 213, 214, 218; China–Brazil deal, 185; Chinese consumption of, 175, 180, 182; production of, 157 (in Brazil, 8); tariffs on, 180 commodities, 48; in land, 220 problem, 24; developmental, 2, 37, 125, 128, 209, 222 (in China, 201); in African agriculture, 1–11; inefficiencies of intervention of, 41–2; role in green revolution, 36 41–3, 128 54–5 food, 156; in China, 178; of food grains, 77 displacement of, 10; threat to, 15 136 121, 125, 136, 143, 196, 214, 213, 218; production of ethanol from, 147, 151–2 59–75 115 (Brazil), 141 countries (TDDC), 129 Southern Southern Nations, Nationalities and soya beans, 72, 125, 133, 134, 135, 166, 179, special economic zones, 204, 206 speculation, 56; in asset prices, 107; in state: as 53; landowner, as part of the state marketing boards, 41–2 structural adjustment programmes, 38, subcontracted relations of production, subsidies, 42, 127, 132, 140, 163; for family subsistence farming, 3, 18, 42, 43, 133; Sudan, 136; fuel supply contract with UK, production of, sugar, 54, 72, 97, 111, sugar industry, 73, 89; development of, 68 suicides of farmers, 6, 77, 119 Sun Biofuels 153 company, super- sustainable agricultural development, Swaziland, 164 25 Taiwan, 41, Tanzania, 42, 51, 112, 131 Investment Tanzania Centre, 213 tariffs, 112, 180 Tata Group, 82, 212; Tata Africa, 86 taxation, 39; rural, 40, 41, 51; tax holidays, tea, 79, 188, 197 technical cooperation projects (TCP) technical development among developing 261 85; TCP agreement, 141 Corporation (China), 185 151, 154, 161 of, 24 130, 133, 137–42, 107, 109, 114, 116, 128, 155, 163, 209, 143, 148, 149, 150, 153, credit,212, 220, 222; access to 140; 137–9; commitment of, championing 3, 5, 95; forced 94; contribution of, to, 201; China, 108; in of, displacement 157; land of, 36; inclusion for, incentives 56; technologyrights of, 31 of, needs 106; productivity of, 20, 23, 134, 140, 223; shift from,in Ethiopia, 94–6; versus commercial agriculture, 218–19; viewed as unproductive, 129 (SWTLs), 64 120 212 leader in agricultural technology, 165 (POSCO), 119 142, 151–2, 159–69, 212 164 Community (SADC), 46, 136 seeds, seeds, 11, 19, 64 Sena Mills, 218 Senegal, 111, 131; irrigation project in, 83–4, Shaanxi State Farm and Agribusiness Shiva, 119 Vandana, Sierra Leone, 16, 85; exports of, 67 Silva, José Graziano da, 138 Silva, Luiz Inácio da, ‘Lula’ 125, 141, 147, Singapore, 25 skills: development of, 9, 24, 214; shortage 55, 60, 105, small-scale farmers, 9, 28, 34, small-scale farming: marginalisation of, social protection programmes, 126 soil and water testing laboratories soil degradation, 43, 104, 109, 110, 178 soil salinity, reduction of, 168 solar energy, 89 solidarity 129 diplomacy, Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia, Sonalika International 82, company, 85, Sonangol 136 company, sorghum, 161 South Africa, 28, 32, 39, 46, 65, 127, 164; South Korean Pohang Steel Company South–South cooperation, 1, 27, 30, 33, 129, Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Southern African Development technology: agricultural, 76–92; underinvestment in agriculture, 43 cooperation regarding, 159–61; underutilised land, 3, 71 dissemination of innovation, 35; Uniâo da Indústria de Cana-de-Açúcar, 152 investment in, 19–20; South–South United States of America (USA), 16 cooperation in, 160; tropical, sharing unused and underutilised land, 18, 51, 93, of, 130 96, 101, 134, 150 technology gap, 214 urbanisation, 1, 19, 21, 128, 173, 196; technology transfer, 9, 10, 18, 28, 31, 33, in China, 174–5, 178, 198–201; with 36, 72, 74, 86–7, 105, 110, 114, 130–7, 142, development, in China, 199 143, 159, 164–7, 183, 211; advanced, 82; US Agency for International Development relevance of, 219–22; tropical, 164 (USAID), 134 tenure see land tenure Tereos company, 152 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 161 third wave of land alienation, 38, 47–51 Vale company, 137, 151, 218 titling of land, 42 value chains, creation of, 67, 208 tobacco, 196, 197; production of, 54, 188 Verdanta company, 113; contract with, 114 Togo, 16, 68, 131 Vietnam War, 77 township and village enterprises (TVEs) voluntary guidelines on FDI, 9, 217–18 (China), 198–9, 205 tractors, 68, 85, 86, 92, 112, 140, 212; wages, 114, 115, 128, 155; low, 101; numbers of, 19 minimum, 126; repression of, 47 traditional agricultural systems, 220 waste, solid, disposal project in Haiti, training, 62, 131, 132, 133, 142, 212; Chinese 167–8 scheme for, 213; in cotton sector, 87; of water: access to, 56; shortages of, 1, 8 (in trainers, 61 China, 176); usage rights of companies, transnational corporations, control of 114 pesticide market, 157–8 Water and Power Consultancy Services transparency, 3, 4, 9, 24, 105, 110, 117, 118, (WAPCOS), 83–5 219, 220, 221 water resources: access to drinking water, transport: public, costs of, 135, 216; rural, 167; control of, 39; depletion of, 110, reduced spending on, 47 111, 114; management of, 28, 32, 60, Triangular Cooperation Programme 77, 85, 89, 92, 114, 116, 168, 212; overuse for Agricultural Development of the of, 109 (in China, 161); required for African Tropical Savannah, 132–3, 216 ProCana project, 155; shortage of, 173 tsetse, 85 water tables, decline of, 6 Turkey, 28 Western donors, patronising views of, 6 Western finance, dependence on, 211 Ubungo Farm Implements company, 184 wheat, 74, 89, 195; Chinese consumption Uganda, 108, 119 of, 175 Uganda Land Alliance, 119 wildlife resources, threats to, 100 UN Conference on Trade and women: as small farmers, 220; rights of, Development (UNCTAD), 86, 116 54 UN Development Programme (UNDP), 160 wood, Chinese imports of, 182 UN Economic Commission for Africa, 49 Workers’ Party (Brazil), 125 United Nations (UN): adoption of working conditions see labour conditions voluntary guidelines, 117–18; Guiding World Bank, 4, 16, 38, 41, 95, 116, 149, 157; Principles on Business and Human calls for reform of, 163; report on land Rights, 217; Millennium Development in Africa, 71 Goals Award, 167; role in South-South World Economic Forum, New Vision for cooperation, 160; Security Council, Agriculture, 16 calls for reform of, 162–3 World Food Programme, 138, 156 262 Index 140, 147, 214 agreement, 141 Zero Hunger strategy (Brazil), 127, 137–8, Zimbabwe, 49, 51, 53, 147, 213; TCP 263 132; China’s 132; accession China’s to, 180, 205, 206 World Trade Organisation Trade (WTO), World 86, 127, Zambia, 39, 42, 51, 213

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