To what extent does a corporate-state security consensus undermine human rights?

Oil extraction in Arauca: , the United States and Occidental Petroleum

Annabel Short September 2004

Dissertation submitted for MSc in Development Studies Birkbeck College, University of London

Annabel Short Development Studies MSc Dissertation Sept 2004 Birkbeck College

Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 3 The case study ...... 4 Structure and research method ...... 5

Chapter 2: Theoretical framework ...... 7 A corporate-state security consensus ...... 7 The importance of oil ...... 8 Inter-state dynamics: the preservation of inequality ...... 8 A particularist approach to security ...... Error! Bookmark not defined. A comparison with human security ...... 11 Protection ...... 12 Empowerment ...... 12

Chapter 3: The national context – Colombia ...... 14 Struggles over territorial control and the consolidation of the elite ...... 14 Illegal armed actors ...... 15 Oil and conflict in Arauca ...... 17 The government’s response: A ‘Democratic Security Policy’ ...... 18 The Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zone in Arauca ...... 19

Chapter 4: The international context – the United States and Occidental Petroleum ...... 22 The United States ...... 22 United States military assistance for the protection of the Caño Limón- Coveñas pipeline ...... 22 United States foreign aid human rights certification ...... 23 Occidental Petroleum ...... 24 Levels of corporate involvement in human rights violations...... 24 The Santo Domingo bombing ...... 26 The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights ...... 27

Chapter 5: Conclusion ...... 30

Bibliography ...... 33 Interviews ...... 43

Appendices ...... 44 Appendix 1: Map of Colombia ...... 44 Appendix 2: Location of the three Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones ... 45

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‘Just as the Enlightenment represented a sustained effort to identify universal rights, there is a need, more than three centuries later, to revisit how both capitalism and the nation-state have advanced, and impeded, the realisation of rights, and to envision new ways to reconcile the common aspirations of humankind with structures of authority that can implement them.’ (Ishay et al, 1997: 397)

Chapter 1: Introduction

Globalisation has been accompanied by a widening awareness of and commitment to universal human rights. However the central argument of this essay is that the current form of neo-liberal economic globalisation favours a narrow consensus between state and corporate security interests that inhibits the realisation of rights.

Modern society can be described as consisting of three major components – state, capital, and the ‘people’, or civil society (Galtung, 1994). The essay will argue that the interests of state and capital, while originally conceived to protect and further the interests of individuals, are not only moving away from people’s interests, but can work together to undermine them. In the global political arena, increased threats to the power of dominant states (in particular the United States) have encouraged a return to a narrow focus on state-security per se, despite the emergence of broadened notions of ‘human security’ and of wider security threats within development and international relations theory. States are willing to prioritise their own national security interests over and above the interests of individuals who live both within their own territories, and within other states. Meanwhile the economic arena is characterised by a narrow focus on the profit-motive per se. Economic actors, including national and multinational corporations, operate within a globalised marketplace in which generating profit is the end-goal in itself, not the means to achieve broader goals of economic and human development, and in which ‘costs’ tend to be defined purely in financial, not social or environmental, terms.

These two sets of narrow (and powerful) political and economic interests converge into what shall be described here as a ‘corporate-state security consensus’. While on the one hand economic globalisation can be seen to obliterate national boundaries and therefore be antithetical to national security interests (Cobb et al, 1989), on the other, national security is now intricately linked with economic security (Klare, 2001; Staples, 2004), and the direction and impacts of the global economy are determined to a large

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extent by the foreign policy of dominant states. This convergence of political and economic security interests is epitomised in the case of oil. Oil’s geographical immutability and its central importance to the survival of industrialised societies means that the protection of supplies is a primary concern to states and plays a pivotal role in their relationship with one another.

There is an urgent need – in particular now that security discourse has re-entered centre-stage in global politics – to review the impact of the political and economic security interests described above on the security and wellbeing of individuals. The essay will argue that the corporate-state security consensus undermines human rights by weakening two conditions that are essential for their realisation – protection and empowerment. The protection of human rights rests on the fact that they are meaningless without their corresponding duties. Yet the corporate-state security consensus uses the disjuncture between the fragmented political arena of nation-states (with national laws and enforcement mechanisms), and an integrated, global economy, to break down lines of accountability and therefore the clarification of duties for the protection of human rights. In contrast to the ‘top-down’ process of protection, empowerment can be seen as the ‘bottom-up’ pre-requisite for the realisation of rights. It is through empowerment – ‘people's ability to act on their own behalf, and on behalf of others’ (UN Commission on Human Security, 2003: 11) – that people are able to demand respect for their human rights. This essay will argue that the narrow, particularist approach to security applied by the corporate-state security consensus dis- empowers individuals by restricting political space. It has a bottle-neck effect on civil society, narrowing the policy options available to individuals and to organisations and thus reducing their ability to secure their own and others’ rights.

The case study

The essay uses the case of oil extraction in , north-east Colombia (see map, Appendix 1, pg 44) to examine the impacts of the corporate-state security consensus on individuals. Arauca is placed directly at an intersection of concentrated interests representing the three constituents of global society – nation states (Colombia and the United States), capital (the focus here is on multinational corporations, in this case Occidental Petroleum) and ‘people’ (Araucan civil society). On a national level, the Colombian government has used Arauca as a testing ground for its militarised

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‘democratic security’ policy to combat insurgent groups. At the international level, the United States is providing military assistance to the Colombian government for the dual purpose of protecting its own national economic interests in the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline, and assisting the Colombian government’s counter-insurgency efforts. And the interests of Occidental Petroleum in protecting its own investment and assets and expanding exploration in the region are converging with both the Colombian and United States’ national security priorities. This convergence of interests has coincided with an increase in human rights violations in Arauca.

Structure and research method

Chapter two establishes a theoretical framework for the case study, based on an overview of the relevant literature. The framework brings together sources from a range of disciplines, recognising that this integrative approach is necessary for a practical understanding of the interactions between state, capital and people. The bodies of literature consulted fall roughly into five types: international relations texts on security studies (for example Buzan, 1983; Buzan et al, 1998; Nye et al, 1988; Ullman, 1983; Walt, 1991); recent development theories on broader approaches to security, including the concept of human security (ul-Haq, 1998; Foong Khong, 2001; UN Commission on Human Security, 2003; Ogata et al, 2003; Pathania, 2003); studies on the development implications of resource-rich economies and oil extraction (Frank, 1966; Collier et al, 2000; Pearce, 2002); human rights texts, including core international human rights standards, and texts on human rights philosophy, approaches, and practice (such as Ishay et al, 1997; Steiner et al, 1996; Ignatieff, 1999, 2001; Forsyth, 2000; Evans, 2001; Brysk, 2002); and texts on multinational corporations and corporate responsibility (Renwick, 1957; Addo, 1999; Bakan, 2004; Nelson, 2000).

Chapters three and four apply the framework to the case study of Arauca, first looking at the Colombian context, then the international context and the roles of the United States and Occidental Petroleum. Research for these chapters was based on historical texts about the region; reports by national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) including Amnesty International, International Crisis Group, Plataforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA); Colombian and non-Colombian media sources; reports of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia; and

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four semi-structured interviews with representatives of Occidental petroleum and civil society (see pg 43 for details). Time and resource constraints limited the number of interviews conducted, and also meant that a visit to the region was not possible, which has restricted the scope of the case study. Much would be gained through further development of the case study involving an investigation of the situation on the ground in Arauca. Further comparative research of case studies from other regions within and outside Colombia (such as Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Indonesia and Iraq), which were beyond the scope of this essay, would also be beneficial. The final chapter draws conclusions from the literature review and case study, and outlines recommendations for realigning the interests of states and corporations with the interests of people.

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Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

This chapter will first define ways in which a security consensus has arisen between state and corporate interests. It will then demonstrate how this consensus is re- enforced by the importance of oil in the global economy, and operates between as well as within states to maintain structural inequality. It will go on to examine the nature of the consensus’ approach to security – a particularist approach that undermines the universalism of human rights. This has been brought about by a narrowing of purpose: narrowed on the part of the state to protect its own interests and power within the global community of states, rather than those of its people as a whole; and narrowed on the part of corporations in the pursuit of profit at the expense of all other considerations. Finally, it will contrast this corporate-state approach to security with the concept of human security to demonstrate ways in which the former undermines the principles of protection and empowerment that are essential for the realisation of human rights.

A corporate-state security consensus

After the second world war United States elites equated the ‘national interest’ with the global spread of capitalism and were therefore able to forge an ‘unstoppable alliance between state and private power’ (Ishay et al 1997: 389). Now in the post cold-war world, with the ideological challenge to the predominance of private power in inter-state relations dissolved (at least at a global level), this unstoppable alliance has gathered speed. Economic globalisation and deregulation have strengthened the state’s power to promote corporations’ interests and facilitate their profit-seeking missions, for example through corporate, property and contract laws and international trade agreements, while diminishing the state’s capacity to protect the public interest, for example through labour laws, environmental laws, and consumer laws (Bakan, 2004). Staples (2004) has described the emergence of a ‘corporate-security state’, in which it is the government’s imperative to provide security for its corporate interests in order to fulfil its national interests: ‘the security functions of the state – the military, police, and security agencies – are put at the service of the domestic corporate agenda, whether it is defending investments overseas; ensuring the security of trade routes for oil, natural resources and goods; or monitoring and suppressing popular movements arising from

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the disaffected and excluded’ (Staples, 2004: 6). This has also been referred to as an ‘econocentric’ approach to national security and foreign policy (Klare, 2001).

The importance of oil

Econocentric national security depends on the protection of imported supplies of critical resources, in particular oil, which stands out for its pivotal role in the global economy and capacity to ignite combat. This affects not only the geographic dimensions of security strategy but also its operational aspects, for example with a focus on oil-field protection and the defence of maritime routes (Klare, 2001: 7). As several writers have observed (see Collier et al, 2000; Ross, 1999), the conflict dynamic generated by oil supplies operates at an international, national, and local level. These levels of conflict cannot be seen in isolation: a metaphorical pipeline of power-relations escalates local conflicts up beyond national boundaries to an international level, while foreign states’ interests are channelled back down to become implicated in the local conflicts: ‘Oil is vehemently and simultaneously local, regional, national, and global…conflict is driven by local dynamics, but it is essential to see the way in which these dynamics relate to the goals and actions of a range of national and transnational actors’ (Dunning et al, 2002: 6).

Inter-state dynamics: the preservation of inequality

The linkages highlighted above also re-enforce a centre-periphery framework in which it is in the interests of dominant states to subordinate and restrain weak states. Galtung (1980), for example, argues that the centre-versus-periphery class divide that exists within states is reproduced globally in the centre-versus-periphery relations between industrialised and non-industrialised states, echoing the arguments of dependency theorists, such as Frank (1966) and Cardoso et al (1979). Therefore the internal security preoccupations of the periphery states arise not only from their newness and their particular problems of state-building, but also from the nature of their economic and class ties to the centre. In the absence of any higher regulatory power at the international level, this centre is increasingly dominated by a hegemonic leader that is unlikely to be able to separate its own domestic interests from its managerial role in the international system (Buzan, 1983). (The United States is currently in this hegemonic position, although this will be increasingly challenged as, for

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example, its demand for resources competes with those of rapidly-industrialising countries, and as those who have been disenfranchised by its model of globalisation organise in their attempts to undermine it). The centre’s intervention in the periphery maintains governments which service the needs of the centre and of the international economy, but which may not serve the local interests of building viable states. This situation is intensified in relationships between oil-producing states such as Colombia and powerful oil-consuming states such as the United States. As Birdsall et al state: ‘Oil and mineral wealth can be bad for growth and bad for democracy, since they tend to impede the development of institutions and values critical to open, market-based economies and political freedom: civil liberties, the rule of law, protection of property rights, and political participation’ (Birdsall et al, 2004: 77).

There are clear parallels between a national security emphasis on the protection of hegemonic power, and the enhanced inequality that capitalism, despite its benefits, has brought in tow. This point was made clear when, in the same year that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted (1948), head of the US State Department’s policy planning staff George Kennan said: ‘We have about 50 percent of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3 percent of the world’s population…Our real task in the coming period is…to maintain this position of disparity…We should cease to talk about vague and…unreal objectives such as human rights’ (quoted Ishay et al, 1997: 391). A brief note is in order here in response to Kennan’s comment, on the value and role of universalism, bearing in mind that ‘rights have to be universal or do not exist at all’ (Restrepo, 2001: 111). Kennan’s statement encapsulates the realist argument against the universalism of human rights, namely, that as humanity is founded on power concepts it will always be inherently unequal, therefore efforts to work towards illusory universal goals are misguided and destined to fail. While it is true that humanity can be defined by its inequality, that is only half of the definition. It can also be defined as the perpetual struggle against inequality and against the abuse of power. Universalism is the expression of this struggle, and without it history and indeed human existence itself are rendered meaningless.

A particularist approach to security

The corporate-state consensus approach to security is a particularist one – serving to protect narrow, particular interests rather than universal ones. It combines a narrow

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focus on state security per se with a narrow focus on profit making per se.

While the philosophical origins of the state were as a framework within which individuals could seek protection from war, there is a permanent tension between the security interests of individuals and those of the states that protect them. Indeed, it was the fact that the ultimate power granted to the sovereign state in return for protecting its people was inevitably abused and applied for its own ends that the concept of universal human rights emerged, as a means to protect individuals from states’ abuse of their power. Ishay et al (1997) place this tension within a discourse of rights. They argue that the universal rights of individuals, such as the right to physical protection, political liberty and social justice, are always potentially endangered by particularist concepts of rights belonging to states or nations, including the right to national self-determination and the right to national security (Ishay et al, 1997). National security, for example, does not specify whose interests are being secured, and assertions that national security concerns must prevail over universal human rights can be no more than a means to secure elite power, regardless of the security and well-being of ordinary citizens. This tendency to prioritise particularist/national, rather than universalist/individual, referent objects of security, is accompanied by a militaristic definition of threats and the required response to them. Reasons for this include: the fact that it is easier to instil the political will to counter a military threat than broader, more long-term threats such as poverty, internal repression or epidemics; the ‘public good’ can be more easily defined in the case of military threats; particular interests can be more easily co-opted (or over-ridden); it is easier to justify extraordinary measures; and the possible consequences of the threat are more apparent (Ullman, 1983).

Just as the reality of states’ practices has moved far from their original purpose to focus on security for security’s sake, the role of capital and its agents, in the form of companies, has also narrowed. The etymology of ‘company’ suggests a community of interests, a mutually beneficial partnership of employers, employees and investors (Albert, 1993). And Bakan writes that, although it often seems to the contrary, ‘the corporation is not an independent “person” with its own rights, needs and desires that regulators must respect. It is a state-created tool for advancing social and economic policy. As such, it has only one institutional purpose: to serve the public interest’ (Bakan, 2004: 158). However, capitalism has intrinsically favoured particularist and

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commercial interests over its theoretical promise of universal political liberty (Ishay et al, 1997), and profit has become the end-goal, rather than a means to achieve broader objectives. The global presence and influence of multinational corporations is not mirrored by global ownership of, and control over, their activities. Instead, the marketplace forces a narrow focus on the short term generation of financial value for a small group of shareholders, at the expense of the interests of all other stakeholders – employees, customers, suppliers, and the community (Chandler, 2004), and of any ‘value’ other than financial value. Just as a narrow definition of state security leads to a focus on protection from military threats, the narrow definition of corporate security focuses on protection from threats to assets, infrastructure and the bottom line.

A comparison with human security: the case for protection and empowerment

The concept of human security, in contrast to the narrow economic and political focus of the corporate-state security consensus, gives central importance to the security of the individual, and identifies a broad range of threats. Its emergence can be traced from the work of Willy Brandt's Independent Commission on International Development Issues in the 1970s, to the 1994 UN Development Programme report Redefining security: the human dimension, and the creation of the Commission on Human Security, which published its report Human Security Now, in 2003. As defined by the Commission, human security is concerned with ‘safeguarding and expanding people’s vital freedoms, which requires both shielding people from acute threats and empowering people to take charge of their own lives’ (Commission on Human Security, 2003: iv). Human security has been criticised for being too broad to be useful, for over- securitizing issues and the human being itself, and for conflicting and contradictory approaches within the field itself (Foong Khong, 2001). It is in recognition of these challenges with the relatively new concept of human security that this essay focuses on realisation of human rights, which are widely-recognised, long-established, and well- tested principles, founded in international law. However, the two are intimately connected. Human security places human rights at its core, and significantly calls for human rights to be examined not only in relation to states which have the primary obligation to uphold them, but also in relation to other actors such as armed non- governmental groups and corporations. The conditions of protection and empowerment that the Commission identified as the foundations of human security, are also fundamental conditions for the realisation of human rights. Both these conditions

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– protection and empowerment – are weakened by the corporate-state security consensus.

Protection

On protection, the Commission on Human Security said it requires upholding people’s fundamental rights and freedoms, through the development of national and international norms, processes and institutions. These ‘must address insecurities in ways that are systematic not makeshift, comprehensive not compartmentalised, preventative not reactive’ (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 11. Italics added). The corporate-state security consensus described above is not systematic in that it is implemented by and on behalf of an elite without involvement from a wide range of actors, and is dominated by short-term political and economic interests. It not comprehensive, but compartmentalised, or particularistic. And it is reactive rather than preventative in that it fails to address the root causes of insecurity. The report also states that the importance of human rights in achieving human security lies in rights’ association with corresponding duties to protect them – duties which consist of ‘perfect obligations’ (or specific demands), and ‘imperfect obligations’ (general demands on anyone in a position to help). However, as the case of oil extraction in Arauca will demonstrate, the corporate-state consensus operates within a framework that obscures lines of responsibility for human rights violations and encourages a climate of impunity.

Empowerment

Definitions of empowerment abound, but from a human security perspective it is defined as ‘People's ability to act on their own behalf – and on behalf of others …people empowered can demand respect for their dignity when it is violated…and they can mobilise for the security of others’ (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 11). It requires a public space that tolerates opposition, encourages local leadership and cultivates public discussion, and a supportive larger environment with ‘freedom of the press, freedom of information, freedom of conscience and freedom to organise…’ (Commission on Human Security, 2003: 41). These freedoms are closely associated with choice. They involve both broadening the choices available to individuals as to how they lead their lives, as well as understanding and removing the cultural frameworks that constrain choice (Ignatieff, 2001: 71). However, features such as

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openness to pressure groups, the tolerance of difference, and intricate checks and balances for the abuse of power can be directly at odds with national and corporate security interests. The corporate-state security consensus, by working on behalf of an elite and characterising those who oppose its interests as a potential threat, restricts political space and choice, rather than broadening them. ------

This theoretical framework has established that economic globalisation has forged an alliance between state and corporate power, which defines relationships between states and works to maintain an unequal status quo. While states prioritise their national security interests above all else, and economic actors their profit-motive above all else, the interests of individuals are undermined. The structures of accountability that are required to protect their rights, and the conditions of political space and freedom required to empower them to demand those rights, are dismantled. The following chapters contextualise the above arguments within the case study of the oil- producing department of Arauca, Colombia.

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Chapter 3: The national context – Colombia

This chapter will examine how in Colombia, at a national and regional level, a corporate-state security consensus is undermining human rights by fostering impunity (undermining protection) and restricting political space (empowerment). An overview of the Colombian conflict is beyond the scope of this essay. Instead, the chapter will begin by using a historical and political context to suggest that the present conflict can in part be attributed to patterns of unequal land ownership/territorial control, and to the failure of the state to manage economic modernisation in a ‘socially equitable and politically inclusionary way’ (Pearce, 2002: 6). The chapter will go on to examine how oil extraction has exacerbated these conditions in the north-eastern department of Arauca, provoking a security crisis. The state’s response to this crisis is a highly- militarised policy which, far from achieving stabilisation in the department, has been accompanied by an increase in violations of human rights. Its implementation is ‘squeezing’ Colombian civil society, further and further restricting its options and arguably exacerbating the root causes of the conflict by barricading national politics as the preserve of the elite.

Struggles over territorial control and the consolidation of the elite

Colombia is enmeshed in an internal conflict that has created one million international refugees and 2.9 million internally displaced people (International Crisis Group, 2003c), following a pattern of population expulsion and displacement that can be seen as a new phase in historic dynamics of land expropriation and appropriation (Pearce, 2002). Since its independence in 1824, large swathes of Colombia’s territory have been controlled not by the state, but by local armed groups, landowners and guerrillas. The construction of a unified national state was further impeded by the fact that the first truly ‘national’ organisations were not the state itself but the two main political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals (Livingstone, 2003). Of the eight civil wars during the nineteenth century, six involved the two parties. However, while the rifts between the two parties ran deep among the lower classes, the elite repeatedly overcame its differences to form coalition governments. This consolidation of the elite continued with the privatisation of public lands, benefiting the big landowners who incrementally increased the size of their estates and pushed waves of peasants into lowland areas with minimal state presence. When in the 1920s Colombia’s coffee market attracted a

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flood of foreign money, the benefits again reinforced rather than reduced differences between the landowning elites and majority population. 1946-1964 saw a period of protracted violence, La Violencia, which was part civil war between the Conservatives and Liberals, part social uprising against landlords, and, in some areas, an attempt to carry out a revolution. Towards the end of La Violencia a power sharing agreement, the National Front, was introduced by referendum, and from 1957-1974 Liberals and Conservatives alternated the presidency every four years, equally dividing the seats in all legislative bodies. The aim of the National Front was to bring peace and order but in reality it closed the doors to political alternatives. The political system became the ‘exclusive property of the elite’ (Livingstone, 2003: 69).

Illegal armed actors

The armed opposition groups FARC and ELN

It is in this context that Colombia’s guerrilla groups, and later their adversaries the paramilitary self-defence groups, emerged and accumulated their support bases. The largest guerrilla group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) originated as groups of peasants in areas dominated by large coffee estates who organised to defend themselves from eviction. They were forced south by the military under the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla and formally established the FARC in 1966. Their philosophy has been described as a mixture of radical agrarianism and anti- imperialism, aiming to defend or improve conditions in their immediate locality rather than having a global political vision (Livingstone, 2003). The second largest group, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) was founded in 1964 by a group of middle class students and intellectuals. The ELN initially made headway in north-eastern Colombia, including Arauca department, winning support from displaced peasants and oil workers. Their central cause is an end to foreign – in particular the United States’ – involvement in the Colombian economy and politics, and the nationalisation of Colombia’s oil reserves. Multinational corporations are one of their prime targets.

The paramilitaries

In the early 1980s groups of cattle-ranchers, large landowners and regional politicians facilitated the creation of armed self-defence groups to contain the advance of the

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guerrillas, arguing that in areas where the state was incapable of protecting their lives and property they had the right to defend themselves (International Crisis Group, 2003a). Although illegalised in 1989, these paramilitary groups have grown rapidly in size and influence, with several groups uniting under the umbrella of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) in 1997. They are responsible for a high proportion of human rights abuses in Colombia. For example of the 317 massacres in 2003 (defined as three or more people killed at the same time in the same place for the same reason), 70 percent were committed by paramilitary groups (Comité Permanente por la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, quoted in Leech, 2004). Human rights organisations frequently raise concerns about established links and collusion between the paramilitary groups and the government’s armed forces, demonstrated by paramilitaries having inexcusable knowledge of the security forces’ movements, statements made by military forces concerning the imminent arrival of paramilitary groups, and inaction by military forces in spite of the presence of fixed paramilitary bases near their installations (OHCHR, 2004).

Cubides argues that the paramilitaries’ behaviour is essentially that of a capitalist adventurer, operating as part of ‘an enormous business that combines economic power and private use of force’ (Cubides, 1998: 133). They are also known to provide both direct and indirect protection to foreign business investments. Paramilitary groups have a strong presence in Arauca close to Occidental’s operations, in other north- eastern areas near Drummond’s coal mine and Coca-Cola bottling factories, in near BP’s operations, and in Urubá near the Panama border, where Dole and Chiquita have, or have had, their banana plantations (Chiquita recently withdrew from Colombia, shortly after revealing to the US State Department that it has been paying protection rent to paramilitaries). Paramilitary assistance often extends beyond the direct protection from attacks. It can involve the suppression of any perceived civilian support for the guerrillas through terror tactics such as massacres, selective killings and threats, and targeting groups such as human rights defenders, social and trade union activists, journalists, teachers and health workers in order to silence denunciations of human rights violations (Amnesty International, 2004).

One of many reasons for the emergence and strength of both the rebel groups and the paramilitaries in Colombia is the restricted legitimate options available to significant numbers of the population – the suppression of people’s empowerment to secure their

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rights. As Bard O’Neill states in his analysis of insurgency and terror tactics, ‘the most immediate reason for a disgruntled individual to join an organisation is to increase options open to him for attaining the things he values or desires’ (O’Neill, 1990: 71). The fabric for the protection of human rights is also weak in Colombia. Colombian society is splintered by particularist interests, and the conflict is characterised by ‘extreme individualisation’ (Restrepo, 2001: 98), undermining the principle of universality at the heart of the protection of human rights. There is a pervasive culture of impunity – a lack of punishment, investigation, and justice for human rights abuses – due not only to an overburdened judicial system but also pressure, threats and direct attacks on investigators.

Oil and conflict in Arauca

The absence of a single, legitimate state power and the intensity of the conflict are particularly striking in Colombia’s resource-rich regions (Pearce, 2002). As oil has steadily become more important to the Colombian economy, establishing control over oil installations, pipelines and the political and economic spoils of production has become a strategic priority for all of Colombia’s armed groups, including the military. This supports Collier et al’s thesis (2000) that economic viability is the predominant systematic explanation of rebellion, and that access to sources of revenue creates an ‘opportunity to rebel’, fuelling conflict. These oil-fuelled conflict dynamics are epitomised in Arauca department, where the US company Occidental Petroleum discovered the Caño Limón oilfield in 1983 and began pumping oil two years later, converting Colombia from a net importer of crude oil to a net exporter. Although its reserves are still in decline, the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline still accounts for 20% of Colombia’s total oil production (Washington Office on Latin America – WOLA, 2003). The pipeline is owned jointly by the Colombian state oil company Ecopetrol (50%), Occidental (44%) and the Spanish company Repsol-YPF (6%).

The discovery of oil in Arauca generated a bonanza in a poor region where politics was already dominated by a struggle for the personal accumulation of wealth. In the absence of state monitoring and action, oil royalties and extortion soon began to transform the local conflict, militarising political disputes and benefiting all the armed actors (Pearce, 2002). By May 2003, there were an estimated 2,000 FARC, 1,000 ELN, and 800 paramilitaries in Arauca (WOLA, 2003). The ELN already had a small

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but diminishing presence in the department when oil was discovered, and the pipeline construction provided the opportunity for it to re-establish itself and acquire new weaponry and recruits. Its revival in Arauca has, in particular, been attributed to US$4m in extortion payments from the German contractor involved in the pipeline construction, Mannesmann AG, for the release of four kidnapped engineers (Dunning et al, 2002: 11; Pearce, 2002: 15). From the late 1990s, the FARC also expanded into Arauca, taking control of the rural areas while the ELN retained control in the cities, and intensifying the attacks on the pipeline in order to shut down the ELN’s main funding source. Between 1986 and 2002 the two guerrilla groups hit the pipeline over 900 times (Dudley, 2002). After these attacks forced the pipeline to close down for 240 days in 2001 the two groups reached an agreement that the attacks could continue but not at a high enough level to reduce their mutual extortion profits (Miller, 2004). Paramilitary groups secured their own stronghold in the department in 2001, in the wake of large-scale operations carried out by the Colombian military against the guerrilla groups (Amnesty International, 2004). They are engaged in efforts to protect Arauca’s oil resources from guerrilla attack, to prevent the guerrilla groups from extracting their own protection rent from the oil companies operating there, and to control the region’s increasingly important coca industry.

The government’s response: A ‘Democratic Security Policy’

The Colombian government of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez has responded to these conflict dynamics with a narrow, militarised approach which has fed into a discourse of national security at the expense of the security of individuals. It is using Arauca as a testing ground for its Democratic Security Policy, which intends to defeat the rebel groups and secure state control over the whole of Colombian territory through expanded police presence and the co-operation of all members of society. One of the core elements of the policy is increased military protection of oil pipelines: currently the primary duty of a quarter of Colombian soldiers is to protect pipelines (Staples, 2004). Other elements include a new network of one million ‘civilian informants’, who are paid to provide information to the security forces about insurgent groups; and a semi-trained ‘peasant militia force’ whose members operate in home communities. While the policy’s stated goals include the ‘protection of the rights of all citizens’ and the ‘protection of democratic values, plurality, and institutions’ (Colombian Ministry of Defence, 2003: 13), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

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(OHCHR) in Colombia has reported that in practice the strategy’s strong focus on military enforcement has not been accompanied by the strengthening of civil institutions, with the former sometimes applied to the detriment of the latter (OHCHR, 2004). The human rights situation continued to be critical in 2003, with the OHCHR registering complaints of violations of the rights to life, physical integrity, security, due process and judicial guarantees, independence and impartiality of the judicial system, respect for privacy and intimacy, as well as fundamental freedoms of circulation, residence, opinion and expression (OHCHR, 2004).

The Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zone in Arauca

In September 2002 the government established three Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones (RCZs), using new powers granted by the declaration of a state of internal emergency. Within the RCZs the government ceded special judicial and police powers to the military. Restrictions were placed on civilian’s mobility, individuals without identification could be detained for 24 hours, censures were carried out to determine where people lived and worked, and the presence of foreigners and journalists was restricted (WOLA, 2003). The positioning of the three RCZs highlights in a striking way the connection between oil extraction and conflict in Colombia. One covered the three northern municipalities in Arauca province (Saravena, Arauquita, and Arauca municipality) that are crossed by the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline. The other two, in Sucre and Bolívar departments, were in the area where the pipeline reaches the sea (see appendix 2, pg 45).

Two months after their creation, the Constitutional Court declared that it would be unconstitutional to renew the status of the RCZs for a further period, but conditions adopted while they were in force have continued to be applied (WOLA, 2003; Amnesty International, 2004). And while Arauca was intended to be a security priority and a showcase for the government’s security strategy, instead violence has increased over the past two years. A report from the Procurator General’s Office1 on Arauca states:

‘The measures adopted [within the RCZs] and their execution have not had the expected results…The threat against local leaders continues and has now

1 The role of the Procurator General’s Office is to carry out disciplinary investigations into allegations of misconduct by public officials, including human rights violations

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been extended to municipal public officials…and the application of rights, especially the right to life, has not improved in the area. For this and other reasons it has to be concluded that the RCZ experience in Arauca is a failed experiment in quantitative and qualitative terms, especially if viewed from a human rights perspective.’ (Procuraduría General de la Nación, 2003: 30).

Statistics from the province uphold this view. In Arauca department as a whole, the murder rate in 2003 was 160 killings per 100,000, compared to a United States average of 6 per 100,000 (WOLA, 2003). In the town of Saravena, homicides increased from 3.58 per month in 2002 to 12.5 in 2003 (American Friends Service Committee, 2003). And in the municipality of Tame, just south of the RCZ, at least 175 people were murdered in 2003, compared to 144 in 2002, 86 in 2001 and 41 in 2000 (Banco de Datos CINEP, quoted in Lara, 2003).

These escalating death rates have been accompanied by the repression of human rights organisations and trade unions, intensifying the climate of fear and therefore impunity for human rights abuses. Amnesty International has reported that while Arauca has a well-established human rights and trade union movement which is active in denouncing human rights violations by all parties to the conflict, these groups have been targeted by a military-paramilitary ‘strategy to stigmatise civil society’ (Amnesty International, 2004: 19). There have been frequent detentions of human rights defenders, social activists and peasant leaders, sometimes in operations known as pescas milagrosas, or ‘miraculous fishing trawls’, in which large groups are detained at one time. The largest of these was on 12 November 2002 when 2,000 people were rounded up at gunpoint and taken to Saravena’s stadium where they were videotaped, questioned, and their background checked, then their arms marked with indelible ink (Amnesty International, 2004). These mass detentions violate people’s right not to be arbitrarily detained. They label whole groups as subversive, and can also expose them to paramilitary attack after their release. Amnesty has also raised concerns over the role of the Support Structure, created to facilitate criminal investigations into attacks against the infrastructure of the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline. While officially the Support Structure aims to reduce the risk of attacks by rebels against judicial investigators, it is often used specifically to target human rights defenders (interview with Amnesty International researcher, June 2004). ------

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This chapter has demonstrated that power struggles between competing particularist interests have defined the course of Colombian history. The fabric of society has been compartmentalised by the state’s prioritisation of elite interests over the interests of the population as a whole. In the absence of the political institutions to protect their rights and the political space to lay claim to them, many Colombians have turned to armed struggle, while many more find themselves inescapably caught up in the midst of state, paramilitary and guerrilla violence. The economic opportunities presented by oil- producing regions exacerbate this situation. The government’s response has been a narrow, militarised one that exacerbates rather than addresses the root causes of the conflict, by further restricting political space, suppressing civil society and disabling the realisation of fundamental rights, without which true security cannot be achieved. The following chapter will examine how powerful international interests are strengthening these barriers to political and social reform in Colombia.

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Chapter 4: The international context – the United States and Occidental Petroleum

This chapter will argue that the corporate-state security consensus in the United States is impeding the realisation of human rights in Colombia. The United States government is increasingly structuring its foreign policy around the military securing and protection of strategic energy sources (Dunning et al, 2002), adopting an ‘econocentric’ approach to national security and foreign policy (Klare, 2001). The chapter will first examine how the United States is applying this approach in Colombia through its military assistance for the protection of the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline. It will look at the impacts of this assistance on the human rights situation in Arauca, highlighting the disparity between the human rights conditions that are applied to it and compliance with these conditions on the ground. The second part of the chapter will consider the role and responsibilities of Occidental Petroleum, as the United States-based oil company operating the pipeline. It will use the case of an aerial bombing in which 12 civilians were killed to demonstrate how the convergence of national and corporate security priorities can have fatal consequences. Finally it will use the case of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights to examine the potential and limitations of a voluntary approach to corporate responsibility.

The United States

United States military assistance for the protection of the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline

The United States’ pipeline protection programme in Colombia signals a new rhetorical and practical approach to its involvement in the Andean region, under which the protection of strategic resources combines with anti-narcotics and anti-terrorism objectives to legitimise an expanded United States military presence (WOLA, 2003). Colombia is the third largest recipient of United States military aid in the world, after Israel and Egypt, receiving over US$2.5 billion in assistance since 2000. The 2003 foreign aid bill, approved by Congress on 4 February 2002, included US$98 million to assist the Colombian army with the protection of the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline. This was used to buy approximately 12 troop helicopters, training, intelligence and equipment for the Colombian army’s 18th brigade, which is posted in Arauca, and the creation of a new 5th mobile brigade initially assigned to protecting the pipeline (WOLA,

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2003). Further military assistance was released for the 5th and 18th brigades in 2004, and the 2005 foreign aid bill proposes additional munitions, equipment and training for them (Centre for International Policy, 2004). Shortly before the release of the 2003 aid new legislation was passed enabling the Colombian government to use all past and present aid for counter-terrorism purposes.

Statements by key United States figures make clear the direct convergence of corporate security with national security interests, of a strategy of pipeline defence with an offensive strategy against the rebel groups. Former United States Ambassador to Colombia Anne Patterson has said of the military assistance: ‘It is something we have to do…it is important for the future of the country, for our petroleum supplies, and for the confidence of our investors’ (quoted in WOLA, 2003: 6), while Major William White, in charge of the United States Special Forces in Arauca, has said: ‘Our mission is to train the Colombians to find, track down and kill the terrorists before they attack the pipeline.’

United States foreign aid human rights certification

Since 2002 United States foreign aid to Colombia has been subject to human rights certification. The aid is conditional on evidence that Colombia’s armed forces are suspending members alleged to have violated human rights or assisted paramilitaries, co-operating with civilian investigators and judges in human rights cases, and taking effective measures to sever links with the paramilitaries. The State Department has certified that these conditions are being met, but several human rights organisations have presented evidence that the army has fallen short of each of these requirements (Center for International Policy, 2003). Senator Patrick Leahy, who was involved in establishing the human rights conditions, said in September 2002: ‘During the 1980s, US officials repeatedly certified that the Salvadoran military was respecting human rights, even when they knew that to be false. The State Department today is perilously close to repeating that mistake in Colombia…The big picture and a close look at the facts do not support this certification’ (Leahy, 2002).

An agreement passed in 1996 forbids the United States from supporting any military unit with credible evidence of human rights violations and requires the United States embassy in Colombia to vet any brigade due to receive aid. While the 18th brigade in

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Arauca has been vetted, the 46th Counterguerilla battalion, also based in Arauca, has not been vetted, as Embassy officials say that it is not part of the ‘organic’ structure of the 18th brigade. However, a general in charge of the 18th brigade, General Carlos Lemus, has said that he has also controlled the 46th battalion since 2000 (Dudley, 2002; WOLA, 2003). The 46th battalion is currently being investigated by the government for its involvement in the 1999 paramilitary killings of over 145 people in Arauca’s neighbouring province of Santander.

Occidental Petroleum

Levels of corporate involvement in human rights violations

The United States’ military involvement in Arauca through its pipeline protection programme raises the question of the extent to which Occidental Petroleum, as the corporation whose investments are being protected, is fuelling the conflict there, and is responsible for/can be held accountable for violations of human rights in the vicinity of its operations. Foreign corporations inevitably have an impact on conflict dynamics, which is intensified in the case of immutable and extortion-prone resources such as oil. This impact includes the effect of a company’s own presence and its security arrangements (increasingly contracted to private security firms) on the ground, as well as the macro-level implications of its lobbying influence on host and home governments.

Dunning et al (2002) highlight a clear correlation between companies’ presence in conflict zones in which several groups are competing for control over armed violence, and increasing levels of militarization. When a single armed group has supplanted the state and gained monopoly over violence in a particular region, companies or contractors will often comply with this existing authority in a fairly straightforward relationship in which regular extortion payments are factored in. However if the company finds itself being asked to pay off several competing groups (whether guerrillas, paramilitaries, or common criminals) they prefer to pay off one group to ‘finish off the others’ (Dunning et al, 2002: 12). This provokes a shift towards militarization in an attempt to regain official control in the region, which can take the form of the request for army protection of pipelines and installations, or the further privatisation of control through independent security contractors. By 1997 Occidental

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was spending approximately 10% of its operating budget for Colombia on state and private security arrangements (Dunning et al 2002: 17).

A company’s relationship with state security forces, in particular in countries where they are a source of frequent human rights violations against the local population, can increase the risk of its complicity in human rights abuses. There are various ‘degrees’ of corporate complicity in human rights violations. At the most direct level, a company can be actively involved in assisting state forces in carrying out abuses. Or, it can be involved in a joint venture in which it knows the state partner is abusing human rights to fulfil its part of the agreement; benefiting from the opportunities or environment created by human rights violations (including the repression of labour unrest – such as that occurring in Arauca); or remaining silent or inactive in the face of human rights violations (International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2002). A company can also help foster a culture of impunity towards human rights violations if it fails to report and investigate allegations of abuses in its areas of operation, to consult regularly with other companies, host and home governments and civil society to monitor the human rights situation, or to promote the observance of international law enforcement principles with the host government. Further human rights considerations and questions arise from the increasing privatisation of security providers, such as to whom are private security firms accountable, and is it in their interest to exacerbate, or at least sustain, violent conflict? Are they responding to genuine security needs or are these needs distorted, sometimes in collusion with client governments? Will their involvement increase tensions between national security forces and civil society? (Nelson, 2000).

Companies can also be responsible for encouraging foreign policies that facilitate violations of human rights, though their significant lobbying influence on their host governments. Between 1996 and 2000, Occidental spent a total of over US$8.6 million lobbying the United States government (American Friends Service Committee, 2003), some of which was directed through the Colombia Business Partnership, a consortium of companies with business interests in Colombia, to influence United States policy towards Colombia. Occidental’s Vice President for Executive Services and Public Affairs Lawrence Meriage made clear the company’s interest in securing wider United States military assistance for the Colombian ‘counter-narcotics’ campaign in 2000, when he addressed a congressional committee: ‘The counter-narcotics battle simply

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cannot be won without a stronger, better equipped and highly disciplined military force,’ he said. He urged Congress members to ‘consider support of counter-narcotics operations in the northern regions as well as the south. This will help augment security for oil development projects’ (Meriage, 2000).

The Santo Domingo bombing

The case of an aerial bombardment of civilians in the village of Santo Domingo, Arauca, demonstrates how the convergence of private companies’ (in this case Occidental and its former security contractor AirScan) and states’ security priorities and actions can have serious, even fatal, consequences for local communities. AirScan had initially been contracted by Occidental for aerial surveillance to protect the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline. As AirScan became increasingly involved in assisting Colombian military operations against the guerrilla groups, Occidental became concerned about being dragged too far into local conflict dynamics and transferred the contract to Colombia’s air force. On 13 December 1998, a helicopter dropped a cluster bomb on Santo Domingo village, killing 11 adult villagers and six children. An investigation by the Los Angeles Times (Miller, 2002) revealed that the operation, which intended to rescue a military unit that had been trapped by members of the FARC, was planned in a room in Occidental’s Caño Limón complex, where the military were briefed by three crew members of AirScan. The mission was carried out by an air force helicopter crew, with three AirScan pilots providing surveillance and co-ordinates for the bombing from a plane provided by Occidental. The pilots were in constant contact with a commanding officer at Occidental’s Caño Limón oil complex.

Military officials initially claimed that the cluster bomb was dropped far from the town and that the deaths of the civilians were caused by a car bomb set off by the villagers. However in May 2004, following years of denials and blocked legal proceedings, a regional court ordered the Colombian government to pay $725,000 in damages to surviving villagers (Morris, 2004). Meanwhile in the United States a lawsuit has been brought against Occidental and AirScan under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), a law that provides jurisdiction in United States courts for claims brought against human rights violators who committed the alleged offence outside the United States. The case, filed on behalf of Luis Alberto Galvis Mujica, whose sister and cousin were killed

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in the bombings, claims that Occidental and AirScan provided the Colombian military with logistical support, aerial surveillance and target coordinates for the bombings and therefore share responsibility the deaths of the villagers (Girion, 2003). The outcome of the case – as indeed with the ATCA cases brought against other companies such as Unocal, ChevronTexaco, and Shell – will have important implications for defining the legal human rights responsibilities of companies. The lawsuit is also a reminder of the importance of bringing detailed information about companies’ involvement in local human rights abuses to international attention. The thorough investigation by Christian Miller of the Los Angeles Times played an instrumental role in exposing the details of the bombing and helping to bring the case to court.

The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights

To date, the prevalent approach to avoiding corporate complicity in human rights abuses has not been one of increased legal accountability, but of voluntary corporate responsibility mechanisms. Recognising that there are often tensions between the interests of companies and civil society, this voluntary approach aims to seek out common ground between them, where they can work more effectively together. The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights are a significant test case of this approach.

In 2000, seven major oil and mining companies, nine international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and the governments of the United States and United Kingdom publicly expressed their support for a set of principles that they had drawn up over a year-long dialogue process convened by the US State Department and the UK Foreign Office. The stated objectives of the principles are to ‘guide companies in maintaining the safety and security of their operations within an operating framework that ensures respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ Since 2000, several more companies, including Occidental in 2003, and two more governments, Norway and the Netherlands, have joined the process. Participants commit to ‘continuing [the] dialogue and keeping under review [the] principles to ensure their continuing relevance and efficacy’ (US State Department, 2000). The principles cover three sets of issues: risk assessment (criteria that companies should apply in assessing any risk of complicity in human rights abuses by their security operations); company relationships with state

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security forces, both military and police; and their relationships with private security forces.

The Voluntary Principles provide a valuable set of guidelines, set a precedent for focused co-operation between governments, companies, and NGOs, and some participating companies are taking practical steps to implement them. But the extent to which the principles and their associated process will alone make a tangible improvement to the human rights situation on the ground is doubtful, for two reasons. First, they are founded on a notion of security that sees an inherent contradiction, or ‘trade off’, between security and human rights. They take the particularist approach to security, dealing with threats on a reactive level rather than addressing its root causes. Bennett Freeman, at-the-time United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, who led the dialogue process for the Voluntary Principles, has described the dialogue as focusing on the ‘clash between security and human rights’ and how to ‘balance’ the companies’ legitimate need to meet real security threats in certain countries with NGOs’ and local communities’ insistence that company security arrangements reflect human rights (Freeman, 2001). This contrasts with the universalist approach to security that prioritises the security of the individual and recognises security itself as a fundamental human right. Indeed, the principles do not acknowledge the human right to security, describing it instead in the preamble as a ‘need’: ‘Acknowledging that security is a fundamental need, shared by individuals, communities, businesses, and governments alike…” (US State Department, 2000: 1).

The belief in a trade-off between security and human rights is misguided and dangerous. The companies’ perception of security as that of their investments and assets is understandable. But viewing it in isolation fails to recognise that that this security will only be achieved when the human right to security is placed first. As Colombia’s former Human Rights Ombudsman, Eduardo Cifuentes, has said: ‘In a democratic society, security as a concept is inseparable from the set of guarantees that acknowledge that individuals, without exception, are the holders of human rights’ (quoted in Amnesty International, 2002: 1).

A second reason why the voluntary approach of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights is likely to have limited impact on the ground is that while they attempt to find common ground between three sets of interests – those of states,

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companies and human rights organisations – their approach is weighted towards two of them. It is dominated by a powerful corporate-state consensus, which, as this essay has demonstrated, is incompatible with the protection of human rights. Bennett Freeman made clear the influence of the corporate-state consensus when he described the two reasons for the United States and United Kingdom’s government’s involvement in the principles: ‘We shared an economic and political stake in ensuring that those companies continued to operate in countries such as Nigeria, Indonesia and Colombia. But we also shared an interest in encouraging corporate responsibility to help rebuild the fractured post-Seattle political consensus for globalisation’ (Freeman, 2001: 1).

In a conference on business in conflict areas in 2002, Freeman acknowledged that the United States government is putting the credibility of the Voluntary Principles to the test with its military assistance for pipeline protection in Colombia. He added: ‘With the US- military increasingly called on to extend security protection to large-scale foreign- owned oil, gas and pipeline facilities in Colombia and elsewhere…the line between the national interest of those countries and the corporate interests of the companies involved also becomes blurred’ (Freeman, 2002: 2. Emphasis added).

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This chapter has demonstrated that the national security interests of the United States are increasingly converging with the protection of its economic interests, and that commitments to ensure this approach upholds the protection of human rights are not always translated into practice. Oil corporations such as Occidental operate at the frontline of these interests, where they inevitably become involved, directly or indirectly, in the violation of human rights. As yet, the legal mechanisms to hold companies to account for these violations are limited, but as the final chapter will describe, they are developing. Pressure to strengthen corporate accountability mechanisms is gaining momentum from the increasing recognition that state and corporate interests, when operating in unison, are too powerful for a voluntary approach to achieve the genuine realisation of human rights.

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Chapter 5: Conclusion

The preceding chapters have demonstrated that narrow national and economic security priorities are converging in a ‘corporate-state security consensus’ to protect the vested interests and power of global and national elites, to the detriment of human security and human rights. Precisely because it operates on behalf of elites, it is not in the interest of the consensus to maintain the necessary conditions for the realisation of human rights, namely protection – enabled by legal accountability and access to justice – and empowerment – enabled by the tolerance of dissent and freedom of information. Human rights are particularly threatened in geographical regions where political and economic security interests are concentrated, as is the case in oil-producing areas such as the Colombian department of Arauca, Colombia.

However, the consensus’ narrow approach to security actually encourages and perpetuates threats to its own existence. It overlooks the fact that threats to political and economic security arise directly from a failure to put the security and interests of people first. States expressed this fact explicitly when they drew up the United Nations Charter in 1945, recognising that human rights are not an ideal that can be sacrificed in the name of security, but that security cannot be achieved without them. Article 55 states: ‘With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations…the United Nations shall promote…universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’ (United Nations, 1945).

Universal human rights provide a strong framework for security in an economically globalised world. As international standards, enforceable by national governments, and applicable to the individual, they help to forge links between these three levels of global society. They also distribute responsibilities between them. As Buzan has observed, the more actors at every level that retain some control over their security, the more stable the system will be, and concentration of power at the international level is not a means to achieve stability (Buzan, 1983). The wide spectrum of rights – including civil and political, economic, cultural and social rights, and the ‘third generation’ of solidarity rights – enable an approach to security as protection from a broader range of threats than those conceived by the corporate-state security consensus. Given these characteristics of human rights they present an opportunity to

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realign the interests of state and capital with those of the third constituent of global society – the people. This will become increasingly important as rapid economic globalisation continues to shift power to economic actors, put pressure on supplies of vital resources such as oil, and widen inequality.

As this essay has demonstrated, it will be necessary to strengthen the conditions of protection and empowerment to make human rights a reality. The protection of human rights is dependent on the clear definition and upholding of duties towards them. This requires the enforcement of international standards, both by national governments, and, when this is not possible, at the international level. It will also require the strengthening of human rights responsibilities of economic actors. While states have the primary responsibility to protect and promote human rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights calls on ‘every individual and all organs of society’ to strive to promote respect for them (United Nations General Assembly, 1948: preamble). Case law is accumulating to establish that non-state actors such as corporations can also be held legally accountable for international human rights standards, and the constitutions of some African states, such as Cape Verde, Ghana, Malawi and South Africa, include provisions stating that private actors have human rights obligations (Chirwa, 2004). As the power and influence of economic actors such as multinational corporations increases, so, legitimately, does society’s expectation for them to respect human rights. In mid 2004 the United Nations initiated an international consultation process to determine the scope of existing human rights standards and initiatives applicable to companies, following the UN Sub-Commission for Human Rights’ adoption of the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights in August 2003. These developments suggest that although corporate legal accountability for human rights violations is still in its early stages, movement towards it is gathering support and picking up pace. After all, ‘today’s social or moral concerns are likely to be tomorrow’s legal obligations’ (Addo, 1999: 20).

There are several ways in which human rights standards provide substance to current – often unsubstantial – concepts of corporate responsibility, in addition to their standing in international law. They are universal and pervasive across all disciplines, therefore ideal for the international and broad-ranging activities of private corporations. A human rights approach is based on competing claims of rights and responsibilities and is

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therefore suited to the apparently conflicting demands represented by different groups (or ‘stakeholders’) that interact with or are affected by a company. And they are difficult to question. No government or company is likely to stand up in public and object to the application of human rights standards within a business context.

Strengthening and extending the enforcement mechanisms for the protection of human rights is important, but only to the extent that people are empowered to speak out about violations of their human rights and seek justice for them. This requires a political space that tolerates dissent, and within which people are able to denounce their abusers without the fear of reprisals. It also requires the tireless exposure and testimony of abuses, bringing information about local violations of human rights to an international level to ‘mobilise shame’ (Drinan, 2000) against human rights violators. Exposure at an international level is essential for two reasons. Partly because the situation on the ground can be so repressive that only international pressure will bring about change. But also because the chain of responsibility for local human rights violations can so often be traced up to the level of international interests, as the case of United States’ interests in Arauca demonstrated. There is a need to conscientise groups at this international level of the implications of their decisions – whether individual and institutional shareholders in multinational corporations, consumers filling their petrol tanks, politicians passing votes on foreign policy.

It is in the ways described above that the corporate-state security consensus can be dismantled and the interests of corporations and states re-aligned with those of people. Internationally-agreed human rights standards already provide a framework for increased global security. The challenge is to find ways to strengthen it, and put it to use.

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Commission on Human Security (2003) Human security now New York: Commission on Human Security

Cubides, F (1998) ‘From Private to Public Violence – The Paramilitaries’, Bergquist, C, Peñaranda, R, Gonzalo, S (2001) (eds) Violence in Colombia 1990-2000 – waging war and negotiating peace Wilmington: Scholarly Resources

Daly, H.E. and Cobb, J.B. (1989) For the common good Boston: Beacon Press

Drinan, R (2001) The mobilization of shame USA: Yale University Press

Dudley, S (2002) ‘War in Colombia’s Oilfields’ Nation 8 May 2002 Vol. 275 Issue 5 p28

35 Annabel Short Development Studies MSc Dissertation Sept 2004 Birkbeck College

Dudley, S (2004) Walking ghosts: murder and guerrilla politics in Colombia New York and London: Routledge

Dunning, T, Wirpsa, L (2002) Oil and the political economy of conflict in Colombia and beyond: a linkages approach Washington: Geopolitics

Evans, T (2001) The politics of human rights London/Virginia: Pluto Press

Frank, A.G. (1966) ‘The development of underdevelopment’, Monthly Review Vol. 18, No. 4, pp17-31

Foong Khong, Y (2001) ‘Human security: a shotgun approach to alleviating human misery?’ Global Governance Vol. 7 pp231-236

Forsyth D.P. (2000) Human rights in international relations Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Freeman, Bennett (2001) ‘Drilling for Common Ground’, Foreign Policy Issue 125, p50

Freeman, Bennett (2002) Managing risk and building trust: the challenges of implementing the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Transcript of speech at a conference on 13 November 2002 at the Netherlands Congress Centre: ‘Rules of engagement: how business can be a force for peace’) www.dse.de/ef/publicbads/freemann.htm (downloaded Jan 2004)

Fundación Seguridad y Democracia (2003) Evaluación Semestral de la Gestión en Seguridad del Gobierno de Álvaro Uribe Vélez, 1 Semestre 2002 – 1 Semestre 2003 Bogotá: Fundación Seguridad y Democracia

Galtung, J (1980) ‘A structural theory of imperialism – ten years later’ in Millennium Vol. 9, No. 3, pp186-7

Galtung, J (1994) Human rights in another key UK: Polity Press

36 Annabel Short Development Studies MSc Dissertation Sept 2004 Birkbeck College

Giddens, A, Hutton, W (2001) On the edge – living with global capitalism London: Vintage

Girion, L (2003) ‘Occidental sued in human rights case’ Los Angeles Times 25 April 2003

Gonález Posso, C (2003) Costos de la guerra Bogotá: Medios Para la Paz

Gray, C.S. (1994) Villains, victims and sheriffs: strategic studies and security for an inter-war period Hull: University of Hull Press

Hegarty, A, Leonard, S (eds) (1999) Human rights: an agenda for the 21st century London/Sydney: Cavendish Publishing

Human Rights Watch (1998) Human rights concerns raised by the security arrangements of transnational oil companies USA: Human Rights Watch www.hrw.org/advocacy/corporations/colombia/index.htm (downloaded Sept 2003)

Ignatieff, M (1999) The warrior’s honour: ethnic war and the modern conscience London: Vintage

Ignatieff, M (2001) Human rights as politics and idolatry New Jersey: Princeton

International Commission of Jurists (1981) Development, human rights and the rule of law – report of a conference held in the Hague 27 April – 1 May 1981 USA: Pergamon Press

International Council on Human Rights Policy (2002) Beyond voluntarism – human rights and the developing legal obligations of companies Switzerland: International Council on Human Rights Policy

International Crisis Group (2002) Colombia: prospects for peace with the ELN Bogotá/Brussels: International Crisis Group

37 Annabel Short Development Studies MSc Dissertation Sept 2004 Birkbeck College

International Crisis Group (2003a) Colombia: negotiating with the paramilitaries Bogotá/Brussels: International Crisis Group

International Crisis Group (2003b) Colombia: President Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy Bogotá/Brussels: International Crisis Group

International Crisis Group (2003c) Colombia’s humanitarian crisis: executive summary and recommendations Bogotá/Brussels: International Crisis Group

International Labour Rights Fund (2003) Lawsuit filed against Occidental Petroleum for involvement in infamous Colombian massacre Los Angeles: International Labour Rights Fund

Isacson, A (2003) Colombia’s human security crisis Washington: Center for International Policy

Ishay, M, Goldfischer, D (1997) ‘Human rights and national security: a false dichotomy’, Ishay, M (ed) The human rights reader New York: Routledge

Ishay, M (ed) (1997) The human rights reader New York: Routledge

Kirk, R (2003) More terrible than death: massacres, drugs, and America’s war in Colombia New York: Public Affairs

Klare, M (2001) Resource wars: the new landscape of global conflict New York: Henry Holt

Lara, J (2003) Informe de derechos humanos, Arauca 2002 Bogotá: Humanidad Vigente Corporación Jurídica

Latin America Working Group Education Fund (2003) The wrong road: Colombia’s national security policy Washington: Latin America Working Group Education Fund

38 Annabel Short Development Studies MSc Dissertation Sept 2004 Birkbeck College

Leahy, Senator Patrick (2002) Comment of Senator Patrick Leahy on the Secretary of State’s certification on September 9, 2002 Vermont: Office of Senator Leahy http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200209/091002a.html (downloaded Dec 2003)

Leech, G ‘Newsworthy and non-newsworthy massacres’, Colombia Journal online, 22 June 2004 www.colombiajournal.org/colombia187.htm (downloaded July 2004)

Livingstone, Grace (2003) Inside Colombia: drugs, democracy and war London: Latin America Bureau

Medios Para la Paz (2003) Importancia del principio humanitario de distinción Bogotá: Medios Para la Paz www.mediosparalapaz.org/index.php?idcategoria=1629 (downloaded Nov 2003)

Medios Para la Paz (2004) ‘El Embrujo Autoritario’ y la respuesta de Uribe Vélez Bogotá: Medios Para la Paz www.mediosparalapaz.org/index.php?idcategoria=1678 (downloaded Apr 2004)

Mennonite Central Committee (2003) Listening to the voices in Arauca USA: Mennonite Central Committee

Muchlinkski, P (2001) ‘Human rights and mulitnationals: is there a problem?’ International Affairs Vol. 77, No. 1, pp31-48

Meriage, L (2000) Statement of Lawrence P Meriage, Vice President, Executive Services and Public Affairs, Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation, before the House Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, hearing on Colombia 15 February 2000 www.ciponline.org/colombia/021507.htm (downloaded Jan 2004)

Miller, C (2002) ‘A Colombian town caught in a cross-Fire’ Los Angeles Times 10 March 2002

Miller, C (2003) ‘Colombia: videotape shows Americans’ role in village bombing’ Los Angeles Times 16 March, 2003

39 Annabel Short Development Studies MSc Dissertation Sept 2004 Birkbeck College

Miller, C (2004) ‘Riding shotgun on a pipeline’ Los Angeles Times 16 May 2004

Morris, R (2004) ‘Colombia to pay bombing damages’ Los Angeles Times 27 May 2004

Nelson, J (2000) The business of peace – the private sector as a partner in conflict prevention and resolution London/Washington: International Alert, Council on Economic Priorities, International Business Leaders Forum

Nye, J, Lynn-Jones, S (1988) ‘International security studies’ International Security Vol. 12, No. 4, pp 5-27

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Colombia (2003) Recommendations for Colombia 2003 Bogotá: OHCHR Colombia

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Colombia (2004) Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Colombia Bogotá: OHCHR Colombia

O’Neill, B.E. (1990) Insurgency and terrorism: inside modern revolutionary warfare Washington: Brasseys

Ogata, S, Cels, J (2003) ‘Human Security – protecting and empowering the people’ Global Governance No. 9 pp273- 282

Ota, A (2002) ‘Occidental lobbies for benefits from both parties’ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Vol. 60, No. 10, p660

Pathania J.M. (2003) Bangladesh: Non-traditional security South Asia Analysis Group www.saag.org/papers8/paper751.html (downloaded Mar 2004)

Pearce, J (2002) The resources and armed conflict debate: the case of oil in Casanare, Colombia Sheffield: Sheffield University

40 Annabel Short Development Studies MSc Dissertation Sept 2004 Birkbeck College

Pierre Claude, R, Weston, B (eds) (1992) Human rights in the world community, second edition Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press

Plataforma Colombia de Derechos Humanos, Democracía y Desarrollo (2003) El Embrujo Autoritario, primer año del gobierno de Álvaro Uribe Vélez Bogotá: Plataforma Colombia de Derechos Humanos, Democracía y Desarrollo

Procuraduría General de la Nación (2003) La Zona de Rehabilitación y Consolidación: informe especial Bogotá: Procuraduría General de la Nación

Renwick, N (1957) Multinational corporations and the political economy of power Canberra: Australian National University

Restrepo, L.A. (2001) ‘The equivocal dimensions of human rights in Colombia’, Bergquist, C, Peñaranda, R, Gonzalo, S (eds) Violence in Colombia 1990-2000 – Waging War and Negotiating Peace Wilmington: Scholarly Resources pp 58-70

Robinson, M (2003) Speech at the 20th Oxford Analytica International Conference, Blenheim Palace, 18 September 2003 www.oxan.com/about/news/2003-09- 18ProtectionEmpowerment HumanRightsSecurityRobinson.asp (downloaded Dec 2003)

Ross, M (1999) ‘The political economy of the resource curse’ World Politics Vol. 51 pp 297-322

Safford, F, Palacios, M (2001) Colombia: fragmented land, divided society New York: Oxford University Press

Sen, A (1999) Development as Freedom New York: Random House

Staples (2004) ‘Human security vs. corporate security – a paradigm shift?’ in Human security and transnational corporations Germany: World, Economy, Ecology and Development (WEED)

41 Annabel Short Development Studies MSc Dissertation Sept 2004 Birkbeck College

Steiner, H.J., Alston, P (1996) International human rights in context: law, politics, morals Oxford: Clarendon Press

Tehranian, M (ed) (1999) Worlds apart: human security and global governance London/New York: IB. Tauris

Ul-Haq, M (1998) ‘Human rights, security and governance’, Peace and Policy, Journal of the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research Vol 3. No. 2 www.toda.org/publications/peace_policy/p_p_fw98/haq.html (downloaded Jan 2004)

Ullman, R (1983) ‘Redefining Security’ International Security Vol. 8, No. 1, pp129-153

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United Nations Commission on Human Security (2003) Security now – report of the UN Commission on Human Security New York: UN Commission on Human Security

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1994) Redefining security: the human dimension Geneva: UNDP

United Nations General Assembly (1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights Geneva: United Nations General Assembly

United States Congress (2002) Public Law no. 107-206 Washington: United States Congress

United States State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (2000) Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Washington: US State Department www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/2931.htm (downloaded Aug 2003)

Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) (2003) Protecting the pipeline: The US military mission expands Washington: WOLA

WOLA (see ‘Washington Office on Latin America’)

42 Annabel Short Development Studies MSc Dissertation Sept 2004 Birkbeck College

Walt, S (1991) ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’ International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp211-239

World Bank (2003) Colombia: private sector strategy Washington: World Bank

Interviews

2 Dec 2003: David Rice Senior Policy Advisor, BP

1 June 2004: Asdrubal Jimenez Colombian former human rights lawyer, union representative and victim of a paramilitary assassination attempt, now living with refugee status in UK

16 June 2004: Marcelo Pollack Colombia researcher, Amnesty International

19 June 2004: Luís Fernando de Angulo, former director of community affairs, Occidental Colombia, currently visiting scholar, Program on Nonviolent Sanctions and Cultural Survival, Harvard University

43 Annabel Short Development Studies MSc Dissertation Sept 2004 Birkbeck College

Appendices

Appendix 1: Map of Colombia Source – Colombia Journal Online (www.colombiajournal.org)

44 Annabel Short Development Studies MSc Dissertation Sept 2004 Birkbeck College

Appendix 2: Location of the three Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones Source: Amnesty International, 2004

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