Südosteuropa 58 (2010), H. 3, S. 414-435
DOKUMENTATION
EVANGELOS KOFOS
The Macedonian Name Controversy. Texts and Commentary
Abstract. This contribution documents the Greek attitude towards the so-called “name issue” between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). It presents key documents and contextualizes their origins, thereby illustrating both the Greek official posi- tion and Greek public opinion. The article gives an overview of developments from 1991 to the present. In conclusion, the author suggests a sustainable solution to the matter.
Evangelos Kofos has dealt with the “Macedonian Question” both as a political advisor and as an historian. For close to two decades he has been a Special Advisor for the Balkans to the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Athens. For several years, he served as Special Counsellor on Balkan affairs in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Introduction
In the late hours of 16 December 1991, the European Community Council of Foreign Ministers concluded a lengthy session on procedures for the recognition of several of the former Yugoslav federative republics’ independence. The next day, readers of the “Declaration on Yugoslavia”, may have been perplexed by a cryptic paragraph at the document’s end: “The Community and its member States also require a Yugoslav [unnamed] Republic to commit itself, prior to recognition, to adopt constitutional and political guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claims toward a neigh- bouring [also unnamed] Community State and that it will conduct no hostile propaganda activities versus a neighbouring Community State, including the use of a denomination which implies territorial claims”1 It was obvious that this sentence was included at the insistence of the Greek government. Despite its vagueness, the sentence revealed that a charged issue, one which had, on and off, negatively affected Greek-Yugoslav relations since
1 European Political Cooperation Press Release, P. 129/91, 16 December 1991, reprinted in: Yannēs Valinakēs / Sotirēs Dalēs, To Zētēma tōn Skopiōn. Episēma Keimena 1990-1995 [The Issue of Skopje. Official Documents]. Athens 1996, 51. The Macedonian Name Controversy 415 the Second World War, had emerged on the European level at the critical mo- ment of the imminent collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It seemed as if, at the end of the century, the European politicians were faced with a modern edition of the early 20th century “Macedonian Question”, an issue of contested territories and identities. The key words in the foreign ministers’ text sounded ominous enough: The mention of “territorial claims” revealed long-entrenched Greek concerns over their northern provinces; “hostile propaganda”, a peculiar expression for mi- nority claims, which, in the eyes of Greek political elites, involved security risks for the country; and, finally, an issue defined as the “name”. The final issue, strangely enough, was linked to the aforementioned “territorial claims”, yet its true focus was on issues of conflicting identities. Two decades later, the first two key issues of the December 1991 declaration have faded to a considerable degree. The “name issue”, however, has survived to this day, stirring endless debates in international fora, and negatively affect- ing relations between Athens and Skopje. Moreover, by means of the internet and numerous blogs, negative and at times hostile messages are spread to wider audiences, and particularly to younger age groups in the neighbouring countries and the various diasporas. The following pages seek to approach the key parameters of this “name is- sue” by means of a selected documentation and a commentary, focusing on the Greek side of the problem. In displaying the current diplomatic imbroglio which has directly involved three international organizations – the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO – the author provides the readers with some insight on (a) the origins of the dispute, (b) the involvement of the international community, (c) the various stages of formulating and carrying out Greek official policy, (d) the role of public opinion, and (e) proposals for an exit scenario.
The Origins of Greece’s Policy with Regards to the Current “Macedonian Issue”
A Brief Historical Aperçu
The original “Macedonian question” emerged in the last decades of the 19th century and covered the two first decades of the 20th. Simply stated, it was a contest between three young Balkan states, vying with each other to inherit the possessions of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. The vaguely defined “Macedo- nian” lands were both the prize and the apple of discord for Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs. For the European powers, the treaties of the Balkan Wars (Bucharest 1913) and the First World War (Neuilly 1919 and Lausanne 1923), terminated the armed conflicts in Southeast Europe, rendering the “Macedonian Ques- 416 Evangelos Kofos tion” a challenging subject for historians rather than politicians.2 Not so for the locals. Perceptions of an endured “historical injustice”, lost homelands for hundreds of thousands of uprooted natives, various types of population exchanges, all followed by suppressive measures for the induction of varied ethnic groups into new unified political environments, kept the issue alive. Out of the peace settle- ments, Greece had emerged as a status quo country, Bulgaria as an irredentist one. Former Serbia, subsequently Yugoslavia, had turned introvert seeking to put its multi-ethnic state entity in order. Soon, new international actors emerged in the region, intent on plying the murky Macedonian terrain for their own benefit. The first to challenge the recently established status quo was the Communist International (Comintern) which was quick to introduce a novel blueprint for a future Balkan Communist Federation. A Macedonian state, to be composed of the Macedonian provinces of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria was expected to be one of its constituent members. The initial reference to a “Macedonian people” included all inhabitants of the Macedonian regions, irrespective of their ethnic background. Gradually, however, the Comintern’s documents began to attach an ethnic identity to the name, compelling all Balkan communists to adhere, nolens-volens, to Moscow’s constructions.3 The second intervention was Nazi Germany’s occupation of the Balkans in the Second World War and its apportionment of Greek and Yugoslav Macedonian lands to its allies, Italy and Bulgaria. For Greece, the four year occupation of its Macedonian provinces (1941-1944) and the subsequent Civil War (1946-1949) opened traumatic wounds on issues of security and identity. For decades, those wounds were still visible in Greek state policies as well as in public perceptions of the country’s security. They certainly influenced and shaped Greek political
2 For an up to date Greek and international bibliography on the subject consult the recently published book by Vasilis Gounaris, I Istoriografia tou Makedonikou Zitimatos, 19os to 21os aiones [The Historiography of the Macedonian Question, 19th to 21th centuries]. Athens 2010. 3 That was a time when Stalin’s Soviet Union was engaged in creating or recognizing new ethnicities for its own political ends (“Belorussians”, “Moldovans”etc.). Much later, on 7 June, 1946, in a meeting with Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders in the Kremlin, Stalin reprimanded Georgi Dimitrov for his reservations to assigning a “Macedonian” ethnic identity to the in- habitants of Bulgarian Pirin Macedonia which would be opening another Pandora’s box for the Macedonian Question: “You do not want to grant autonomy to Pirin Macedonia. The fact that the population has yet to develop a Macedonian consciousness is of no account. No such consciousness existed either in Belarus when we proclaimed it a Soviet republic. However, later it was shown that a Belorussian people did in fact exist.” Minutes from the Archives of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, published in Otecestven Vestnik, 19 June 1990. The Macedonian Name Controversy 417 thinking vis-à-vis the former Socialist Republic of Macedonia’s declaration of independence and various related identity issues.4 Nevertheless, the reactions of Greek political leaders and the masses in 1991- 93, particularly in the region of Macedonia, were not an instinctive, backward jump into the vicissitudes of the 1940s. On the contrary, in December 1991 Greece merely stressed, perhaps with a dose of hyperbole, what had been a traditional policy, shared by all parliamentary parties. Particularly enlightening in this respect is an August 1983 circular letter ad- dressed to Greek missions abroad by the first PASOK Foreign Minister in An- dreas Papandreou’s government, Yannis Haralambopoulos.5 The text reflected the policy of all post-Civil War Greek governments on the issue of the “Mac- edonian nation” and the identity of the Slavs of the wider Macedonian region.
DOCUMENT A
Foreign Minister Yannis Haralambopoulos on 13 August 1983, in a letter to diplomatic and press missions abroad.6 “The Greek policy on the Macedonian issue consistently pursues the same line since 1950 [the end of the Greek Civil War]. Greece raises no territorial or minority claims to the Macedonian lands of Yugoslavia or Bulgaria, but [for its part] does not accept the existence of a “Macedonian” minority on its territory. More specifically, Greece pursues the following line vis-à-vis the Yugoslav position on the ‘Macedonian nation’: – It does not recognize the existence of a ‘Macedonian’ nation, language etc. This negative position refers to the appropriation of a geographical term – which also is in use in Greece – by a nationality which was constructed in Yugoslavia for political reasons, after the Second World War. If another name is adopted, Greece would have no problem to accept it.7 – It insists on the use of the term ‘Macedonia’ solely as a geographical concept. Not wishing to interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign country, it does
4 For English language books on the Macedonian problem during the decade 1940-1950 consult Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia: Civil Conflict, Poli- tics of Mutation, National Identity. New York 1993 (First edition: Thessaloniki 1964); John S. Koliopoulos, Plundered Loyalties: Axis Occupation and Civil Strife in Greek Western Macedonia, 1941-1949. London 1999; Dimitris Livanios, The Macedonian Question: Britain and the Southern Balkans, 1939-1949. Oxford 2008. For more recent developments on the Macedonian issue cf. James Pettifer (ed.), The New Macedonian Question. London 1999. 5 The text was published in Thodoros Skylakakis, Sto Onoma tis Makedonias [In the Name of Macedonia]. Athens 1995, 24-28, from a copy submitted to the Greek Parliament in the early 1990s by the then Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis. 6 Excerpts follow in an unofficial English translation. 7 The emphases in bold characters in all documents were added by the author. 418 Evangelos Kofos
not raise the issue of the name of the southern Yugoslav republic, ‘Socialist Republic of Macedonia’, as this is an issue of internal [Yugoslav] law. – If Yugoslavia abandoned the tactics of monopolizing the term ‘Macedonian’ to adopt, for example, a name such as ‘Slavomacedonian’ or ‘Macedonoslav’, exclusively for the Slav inhabitants of Yugoslav Macedonia and persons sharing their ideas, there would be no negative response on the Greek side. – Referring to the novel interpretations of Yugoslav historiography for the ‘Macedonian nation’, Greece rejects them. On this issue, it is only natural that Greek and Bulgarian positions coincide, although they are not harmonized on purpose […].8 About the Macedonian nation – It is not possible to recognize the existence of a 13-century old ‘Macedonian na- tion’, as claimed by Skopje, because no historical sources exist which justify the existence of a Macedonian nation, either in Byzantine or Ottoman times […]. Turning now to post-war developments in Yugoslavia, it is possible to accept that in the span of four decades, in the well-known social and political conditions, a new ethnicity was constructed in southern Yugoslavia, although erroneously named, ‘Macedonian’. The formulation of a nationality is an internal issue and concerns the national-political state structure of a neighbouring country. Nevertheless, the appropriation by a Slav nation of an ancient Greek name which, moreover, is in use today in Greece as a geographical appellation, has no scientific basis. Moreover, it is politically unacceptable because, through a process of adoption of a geographical name, it has attempted to appropriate a significant part of the Hellenic political and cultural heritage associated with the region of Macedonia. If, however, Yugoslavia adopted the names, ‘Yugoslav Macedonians’ or ‘Slavomacedonians’, for the inhabitants of the Yugoslav Re- public of Macedonia, there would be no reason for objections, as the former component would indicate the national identity, while the latter, the regional provenance of each inhabitant of Macedonia, at large. […] The geographical meaning of Macedonia Another important point to keep in mind when dealing with Macedonia, is the indisputable historic fact that the geographical region of present Yugoslav Macedonia has not been part of ancient Macedonia – apart from a narrow belt of a few tens of kilometers north of the Greek frontier. Consequently, it has no historical title to appropriate the term ‘Macedonia’ […]. Nevertheless, Yugoslav authors have a tendency to present the entire geographical region of Macedo- nia as an ethnical, historical and geographical entity. Moreover, they refer to the ‘three parts’ [i. e. the Macedonian regions in the three neighbouring coun- tries, Yugoslavia, Greece and Bulgaria] as ‘Vardarska del [part] na Makedonija’, ‘Egeiski del na Makedonija’ and ‘Pirinski del na Makedonija’. Such denomina- tions, however, are inadmissible because they reveal tendencies for territorial claims. Since the three regions have been finally and legally passed under the
8 A rather lengthy paragraph follows, refuting historical tenets of Yugoslav historiography on Macedonia, from medieval times to the establishment of the SFR of Yugoslavia. The Macedonian Name Controversy 419
jurisdiction of three neighbouring states, the correct appellations should be ‘Greek Macedonia’, ‘Bulgarian Macedonia’ and ‘Yugoslav Macedonia’.” The importance of this document is that it was issued by Andreas Papandreou’s first PASOK Minister of Foreign Affairs, just eight years prior to the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. Later, however, Andreas Papandreou both as the opposition leader (1992-1993) and as Prime Minister (late 1993 to the end of 1995) rode the popular bandwagon and emerged as a staunch supporter of the Greek position to firmly oppose the Macedonian name or any of its derivatives for the newly independent neighbouring country. Yet, Haralambopoulos’ circular of 1983 reveals that in fact the Greeks adopted a policy on the name issue as early as the termination of their Civil War, and that there is a continuity to be drawn to their stance towards the emergence, in late 1991, of an independent Macedonian state in their neighbourhood. Compared to post-1991 polemics, certain points of the 1983 circular, referring to Greek objections to Yugoslav claims, appear milder in tone and open to con- structive dialogue. For example, Athens appeared ready to acknowledge that a new ethnicity had been constructed in the SFR of Yugoslavia. At the same time, serious objections to the use of the Macedonian name for the Republic and its inhabitants within the federated state already existed then. Nevertheless, the Greek side appeared willing to accept a number of hyphenated or compound names, including the adjective Macedonian, for the different Macedonian geo- graphical regions and their respective inhabitants. On the other hand, these aspects do reveal, in a succinct way, the key Greek concerns as they pertain to security and identity issues. Over the course of four decades, the security elements of the Macedonian issue for Greece, so pronounced during the 1940s, faded away. Still, Athens was seriously annoyed by the Yugoslav practice of referring to Greek (and Bulgarian) Macedonian provinces as parts of a united region, a practice that, according to the Greeks, could contribute to eventually reviving irredentist claims to Greek regions. Secondly, the Greeks objected to attempts to monopolize the Macedonian name as the ethnic appellation of a Slavic people; a monopolization that, according to them, could eventually lead to wider encroachments into the Macedonian Greek patrimony, with reference to all historical eras. However irritating such tactics were to the Greeks, and more so to the Greek Macedonians [the Make- dones], on an international scale their political significance was rather minimal. After all, these tactics originated from a provincial – federated – republic of the Yugoslav state. At least until Tito’s death in 1980, Athens could expect Belgrade to somehow contain nationalist excesses in Skopje, should they occur. It is such considerations that were dealt a serious blow, when on 17 September 1991 the parliament in Skopje declared the independence of the “Republika Make- donija”. 420 Evangelos Kofos A Bilateral Dispute on the International Scene
Official Greek Positions
The official Greek stance on the international recognition of the independence of the former Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM) has been duly recorded in numerous Greek documents. They cover the period between December 1991 and the admittance of the state to the United Nations in April 1993, under the provisional name, of “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM). The policy displayed in these documents was officially finalized during a coun- cil of the party leaders on 13 April 1992, under the chairmanship of President Constantine Karamanlis, and in the presence of Prime Minister Constantinos Mitsotakis, opposition leader Andreas Papandreou (PASOK), and the leaders of two smaller leftist parties, Maria Damanaki of Synaspismos and Aleka Papariga of the Communist Party of Greece (Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas, KKE). The specific reference to the name issue was as follows: “In reference to the Skopje issue, the political leadership of the country, with the exception of KKE (Communist Party of Greece) agreed that it will recognize the independent state of Skopje only if the three terms, set out by the EC in 16 December 1991, will be observed, with the understandable clarification that the word “Macedonia” will not be included in the state name.”9 This agreement politically bound the parties – with the exception of the KKE leaders, who expressed their disagreement “with the general orientation of the handling of the issue” –, yet it imposed no legal obligations, as the meeting of the party leaders contained no formal, let alone constitutional legitimacy. Its core decision was that Greece could not recognize a neighbouring country bear- ing the name “Macedonia” or any of its derivatives. In the months and years to come, this agreement became the “battle cry” of mass demonstrations (“Ohi sto onoma Makedonia kai sta paragoga tou” – “No to the name Macedonia and to all its derivatives”). Under such circumstances, political leaders found it difficult to deviate from the self-imposed constraints that originated with this meeting. Yet mostly they stuck with this position because of its broad endorsement by the masses, both in Greece and in the diaspora. Excerpts of two official documents are cited below. Readers are advised to compare the points raised in Haralambopoulos’ circular of 1983 (Document A) with those issued both by Mitsotakis’ Nea Dimokratia government (1991-1993; Document B) and Andreas Papandreou’s PASOK government (late 1993-end 1995; Document C). The President of the Republic, Constantine Karamanlis (1980-1985 and 1990- 1995), played a decisive role in formulating the Greek policy on the issue, al-
9 The document is contained in Valinakis / Dalis, To Zitima ton Skopion (above fn. 1), 93. The Macedonian Name Controversy 421 though, constrained by his office, he avoided publicpresentation of his views.10 One of his rare, but often-quoted public comments was: “Η Μακεδονία είναι μία και αυτή είναι ελληνική.” [Macedonia is one, and that is Greek.] Although Greek audiences easily understood that by the term “Macedonia” the Greek President referred to both ancient Macedonia and today’s Greek Macedonia, in certain foreign commentaries the statement has frequently been miscon- strued as supposedly indicating Greek territorial claims (sic!) on FYROM. It represents hence a typical example of the confusion created by the use of the name “Macedonia” without a clear identification of the divergent Macedonian appellations and regions.
DOCUMENT B
Memorandum of Greece Concerning the Application of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for Admission to the United Nations, New York, 25 January 1993 (excerpts).11 “1. Greece believes that the application of the former Yugoslav Republic of Mac- edonia for admission to membership in the United Nations under the denomina- tion mentioned in its application introduces an element of further destabilization of the southern Balkans both in a short and a long term perspective […].” Subsequently (paragraphs 4-8), the Memorandum lists a number of issues which, in Greece’s view, reflect territorial aspirations. “8. […] There are numerous indications that the expansionist propaganda aimed at the neighbouring Macedonian province of Greece continues unabat- ed. This is shown, in particular, through the wide circulation within F.Y.R.O.M. of maps portraying a greater Macedonia, i. e. incorporating parts of the territory of all its neighbouring states, and of hostile literature usurping Greek symbols and heritage. […] 10. The name of a state is a symbol. Thus, the fact that the authorities in Skopje have adopted the denomination ‘Republic of Macedonia’ for their state is of paramount significance. It is important to note that they have explicitly adopted the name of a wider geographical region extending over four neighbouring countries, with only 38.5 % to be found in the territory of F.Y.R.O.M. This fact by itself clearly undermines the sovereignty of neighbouring states to their re- spective Macedonian regions […]. Moreover, the territory of F.Y.R.O.M., with the exception of a narrow strip in the south, had never been part of historic Macedonia. Nevertheless, F.Y.R.O.M. insists on monopolizing the Macedonian
10 Evangelos Kofos, Ο Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής και η αντιμετώπιση του Μακεδονικού Ζητήματος [C. Karamanlis and the Handling of the Macedonian Question]. Athens 2006. 11 The text was published as an offprint by the Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). Athens 1993, available at
name in the denomination of the state, and thus pretends to be the sole title deed holder of a much wider geographical region. There is no doubt that the exclusive use of the Macedonian name in the republic’s official denomination would be a stimulus for expansionist claims not only by present national- ist activists in Skopje but by future generations as well. After all, the name conveys in itself expansionist visions both over the land and the heritage of Macedonia through the centuries […].” The following document presents excerpts from a pamphlet issued by the Greek Secretariat for Press and Information in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The pamphlet was to be disseminated during Prime Minister Papandreou’s visit to the United States in April 1994. It contains the traditional argumentation about Greece’s security apprehensions for its Macedonian re- gion, the negative impact on Greece’s Macedonian heritage that would result from the eventual monopolization of the Macedonian name by an independent country, and on the massive demonstrations in Greece and abroad. What is unique are its concluding points with regard to the name issue. Given the fact that Papandreou’s rallying slogan at that time was “no to the name Macedonia and its derivatives”, it is surprising that, in the document, ideas that the state name “should identify the exact region”, or “the specific ethnic composition” of FYROM were put forward. It took Greece and the FYROM a year and half, with a lamentable embargo in between, before they finally concluded an “Interim Accord”. Signed in September 1995, the accord normalized their relations, with the exception of the name issue. The drafters of that accord had hoped that a normalization of relations would imply a solution also to the name issue. Fifteen years later they have been proven wrong. Instead, the opposite occured: The failure to resolve the name issue spelled retreat not only from the normalization procedure but also from bilateral relations in general.
DOCUMENT C
“Macedonia. More Than a Difference Over the Name.” Secretariat General for Press and Information. Athens, April 1994 (pamphlet).12 “The name adopted by the new independent state not only implies territorial as- pirations, but, inherently, it perpetuates such claims to future generations […].” Following a detailed presentation of the Greek historical and political argu- ments, and a strong criticism of Tito’s Macedonian policy, the paper goes on to denounce FYROM’s current political objectives and practices:
12 Available at
“[The new regime] passed a Constitution that clearly contains references to ter- ritorial expansionism; it adopted as the denomination of the state the name of a much wider region extending over three neighbouring countries; it tolerates and, in fact, it has become captive of the most extremist nationalist forces in FY- ROM and abroad, which publicly demand the annexation of Thessaloniki; it has usurped Greek symbols (the “Sun of Vergina”) as the emblem of the national flag; and it has launched an educational program for the youth in ‘free’ Macedonia, whereby the landmarks of history, the cultural achievements, the symbols, the monuments and personalities belonging to the Greek heritage – as well as the heritage of other nationalities which had inhabited the Macedonian lands over the centuries – fell prey to Macedonism’s insatiable appetite.” Describing, then, the public reaction to FYROM’s use of the name Macedonia and the mass manifestations in Greece and abroad, the paper ended by risking a glance into the future. Fifteen years later, it has proven not to have been too far from the mark: “In the space of only a few years from now, the Greeks sense that some of the most cherished elements of their history and culture would be paraded to the world as the heritage of a different people; the Greeks of Macedonia would be pressed to abandon their name Makedones in order to avoid identification with the FYROM’s Makedontsi, as both would be internationally identified by the same appellation ‘Macedonians’; hundreds, if not thousands of Greek busi- ness firms, professional and cultural institutions,bearing the Macedonian name (makedonikos, makedoniki, makedoniko) would risk being involved in complex and prolonged legal controversies accused for appropriation [sic] of the Macedo- nian name. […] Worse yet, any attempt on the part of the Greeks to resist such encroachment upon their national identity and their name might well trigger chauvinistic reactions in Skopje.” And the paper concluded by proposing: “The name of an independent state, as contrasted to that of a former province within a federal state, should in no way transgress over the territory of neigh- bouring states or use the cultural heritage or identity of a neighbouring people. […] A new name should be adopted which preferably would identify the exact region, or the specific ethnic composition of the land to which the jurisdiction of FYROM extends.”
The “Name Dispute” as an Issue of International Concern
The definition of the problem as ”the difference over the name” was sanc- tioned by the United Nations Security Council Resolution no. 817 on 7 April 1993. The choice of the wording indicates that the Security Council considered the problem not just an issue of the state’s name, but a wider one involving a whole set of problems connected to it. This was the guiding principle which led 424 Evangelos Kofos the assigned UN mediators, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, to negotiate with the two sides and produce a draft covenant regulating all bilateral relations, but also settling sensitive issues of territorial security, identities, and finally pro- posed also a name, “Nova Makedonija”. Negative political reactions in Greece compelled Prime Minister Mitsotakis to reserve his instant consent, which was also followed by a similar response by FYROM’s President Kiro Gligorov.13 As an international issue, the “difference over the name” was initially handled by the European Union, when the former Socialist Republic of Macedonia asked for the recognition of its independence by the member states. From the outset, despite certain constitutional amendments and a favourable opinion expressed by the Badinter Commission,14 the European Community throughout 1992 refrained from extending recognition, both at Foreign Ministers meetings and in two summit conferences. Finally, recognition was granted following the United Nations Security Council Resolution no. 817/ 7 April 1993, by which the applicant country was admitted to the UN under the rovisionalp denomination, “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. Documents referring to the decisions of European Community bodies in this regard are cited below. In addition, the reader may wish to consult two long reports prepared by the Portuguese and British EC presidencies, respectively, for the 1992 first and second semester summit meetings. They provide interest- ing material with regard to the argumentation both of Athens and Skopje, not only on the state name dispute but also on a wide range of bilateral differences. The origins of some of these differences date back to Yugoslavia’s involvement in the Greek Civil War. The first statement,15 drafted by the Portuguese Foreign Minister João Pin- heiro – the so-called “Pinheiro package” – consisted of two documents: a draft treaty acknowledging the existing borders of the two countries, and a draft letter to be addressed by Skopje to Athens, taking into consideration Greece’s basic grievances, as outlined in the EC Council. As said, Pinheiro orally suggested the name “New Macedonia” to Greek Foreign Minister Antonis Samaras, which was turned down by the council of political leaders in Athens. The second statement16 was drafted by a representative of the British presi- dency, Ambassador Robin O’Neil, who spent months commuting between Athens and Skopje. In December 1992, he prepared a lengthy report on the totality of bilateral differences. His proposal for the name was “Republic of
13 Cf. the relevant document in Valinakis / Dalis, To Zitima ton Skopion (above fn. 1), 152-161. 14 Badinter Commission, Opinion no. 8 for the Case of the Recognition of FYROM, 11 January 1992, in: Valinakis / Dalis, To Zitima ton Skopion (above fn. 1), 65-71. 15 Valinakis / Dalis, To Zitima ton Skopion (above fn. 1), 87-90. 16 Ibid., 111-122. The Macedonian Name Controversy 425
Macedonia (Skopje)” – a name intended for all international uses, i. e. in inter- national organisations and all relations with third countries. O’Neil indicated that the government in Skopje had concurred to his proposal, which, however, bypassed the decision of the Lisbon summit.17 When Greece rejected this also, the EU Council decided that it had exhausted its means for finding a solution. The road for Skopje led now to New York, where, in no time, an application for admission – which would signify international recognition – was in the hands of the UN Secretary General.
DOCUMENT D
EC and UN Decisions Relating to the Recognition of FYROM 1. Excerpt of the European Community extraordinary Council of Foreign Minis- ters statement, outlining the terms for recognition of FYROM, 16 December 1991. “The Community and its member States also require a Yugoslav [unnamed] Republic to commit itself, prior to recognition, to adopt constitutional and political guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claims toward a neigh- bouring [also unnamed] Community State and that it will conduct no hostile propaganda activities versus a neighbouring Community State, including the use of a denomination which implies territorial claims.”18 2. Excerpt of the European Community Foreign Ministers statement, issued at the meeting in Guimaraes, 3 March 1992. “The European Community and its country-members […] had an in depth discussion on the request of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to be recognized as an independent state. They are ready to recognize this state as an independent and sovereign state, within its existing boundaries and under a name which might be acceptable to all the interested parties.”19 3. Excerpt from the Statement of the European Council for the former Yugosla- via, Lisbon, 27 June 1992. “The European Council reiterates the position adopted by the Community and the country-members at Guimaraes in reference to the application of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to be recognized as an independent state. It expresses its intention to recognize this Republic within its present borders, according to their statement of 16 December 1991, under a name which will not include the term Macedonia.”20
17 Statement of the European Council for the Former Yugoslavia, Lisbon, 27 June 1992; see Document D. 18 European Political Cooperation Press Release, P. 129/91, 16 December 1991 (above fn. 1). 19 Valinakis / Dalis, To Zitima ton Skopion (above fn. 1), 87-90. 20 European Council Declaration on Former Yugoslavia, Lisbon, 27 June 1992, available at
4. Excerpt from the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council, regarding the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Edinburgh, 12 De- cember 1992. “The European Council examined its policy concerning the recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in connection with the Lisbon statement and on the basis of the report of the special representative of the Presidency. The European Council asks the Foreign Ministers to continue the study of this subject.”21
The Greek Public Opinion
During the decade from 1995 (the signing of the Interim Accord) to 2005 (the United States’ recognition of FYROM’s constitutional name), Greek public opinion remained rather dormant.22 This had led certain foreign observers to suggest that the prevailing climate in the country allowed for the government to resolve the issue without severe political consequences. The new PASOK Prime Minister Costas Simitis (1996-2003), a seasoned academic and politician, knew that he could not rely on appearances. For the Greeks, the perception that their cultural identity was being systematically undermined posed an emotionally charged problem requiring careful handling. Subsequent events and repeated polls proved Simitis right (Document E). The Greek public’s hibernation was brought to an end following a series of developments which touched “existential nerves”23 and were particularly felt by the Makedones of Greek Macedonia and the Greek diaspora. Among such developments were the unexpected recognition of FYROM’s constitutional name by the George W. Bush administration; the public revelation that Skopje’s diplomacy had succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with over 100 countries world-wide, all of them accepting the country’s constitutional name; and finally the ascendance to power of the nationalist party Vnatrešna Make- donska Revolucionerna Organizacija-Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno Edinstvo (VMRO-DPMNE), led by a young generation of politicians and headed by Nikola Gruevski. This new leader’s active engagement with the promotion of a new ethnogenetic program – lightly termed antikvizacija – aimed at tracing
21 Conclusions of the Presidency, Edinburgh, 12 December 1992, available at
24 Boris Georgievski, Ghosts of the Past Endanger Macedonia’s Future, Balkan Insight, 27 October 2009, available at
Greek Polls MRB Hellas Two months after the re-election of Costas Karamanlis in November 2007 and four months prior to the Bucharest NATO summit, the private research agency MRB Hellas between 22 November and 3 December, 2007 polled 2,100 individuals:25 1. Are you interested in the developments over the “name issue”? – A lot / Sufficiently 71.9 % – Not much / Not at all 26.2 % 2. After 15 years and with 119 countries having accepted the constitutional name, would you consider a compound name as the best solution? – Certainly YES / Rather YES 19,7 % – Rather NO / Certainly NO 69.0 % 3. Should Greece place a veto in NATO? – Certainly YES / Rather YES 74.3 % – Rather NO / Certainly NO 15.9 % ALCO Following FYROM’s failure to gain admittance to NATO, the ALCO polling agency conducted an opinion poll from 8-10 April, 2008.26 1. Following Greece’s veto, which of the following names would you accept for the name of Skopje? – Upper Macedonia 18.7 % – New Macedonia 9.2 % – None of the two 67.7 % Public Issue The Greek newspaper Sunday’s Kathimerini of 10 October 2008 published the results of Public Issue’s polling results:27 1. Should Greece accept the compound name “Republic of North Macedonia”? – YES / Rather YES 43.0 % – Not at all 53.0 %
25 The results of the survey were published in MRB’s Taseis (Athens), 15 December 2007. 26 The results were published in the Sunday edition of the Athens newspaper Proto Thema, 13 April, 2008. 27 The Attitude of Public Opinion Toward FYROM and the Name Issue, Sunday’s Kathi- merini, 10 October, 2008. The Macedonian Name Controversy 429
2. What is your opinion on the “double name” formula (as proposed by FYROM)? – One name for every use 77 % – Double formula 11 % 3. Your views for the handling of the issue by the Greek government? October 2008 November 2007 – Rather correct 50 % 40 % – Rather wrong 42 % 42 % 4. Is there a need for improving relations between Athens and Skopje? – Necessary 79 % – Not necessary 19 % 5. Given the recognition by 120 countries of the constitutional name, would you say that the “name issue” can be won? February 2008 October 2008 – Could possibly be won over 67 % 48 % – It is rather lost 30 % 48 %
The Current Phase of the Name Dispute
After successfully carrying out the Athens Olympic Games in 2004, the new Greek government of Costas Karamanlis set out to tackle a series of stagnant foreign policy issues. Among them was, in popular Greek parlance, the Sko- piano, alias the Macedonian name dispute – an issue that for almost 15 years had been hampering bilateral relations between Athens and Skopje. Now, on Greek initiative, the good offices of UN mediator Matthew Nimetz were put in motion. Athens, again, appeared willing to accept a compound name which would include the term “Macedonia”, on the conditions that guarantees were given to the Greek side regarding issues of identities. In return, Greece would raise no obstacles to the neighbour’s petition to gain EU candidate status.28 Nimetz in fact proceeded to draft a detailed agreement which the Greek side considered a basis for discussion. The proposed name was, again, “Republika Makedonija – Skopje”.29 When Skopje rejected this, Nimetz presented another text, which Athens refused even to receive, leading to yet another stalemate. The stalemate was quickly resolved, however. A few days after his victory for a second term, U.S. President George W. Bush accepted FYROM’s constitutional
28 The references here are several interviews the author held with Deputy Foreign Minister Yannis Valinakis at that time (2005). 29 Matthew Nimetz’ text was published in the Greek newspaper Eleftherotypia, 13 April 2005; in English, it is available at
30 The full text of the letter, dated 18 May 2009, with signatures is available at
32 Articles by Haralambos Kondonis, Bilateral Relations Between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in: Kofos / Vlasidis (eds.), Athens-Skopje (above fn. 19), 55-88; and Kofos, The Unresolved Difference (above fn. 19), 125-224. 33 In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, 1 April 2008, Bakoyanni had said that Greece would support a compound Macedonian name with an added adjective. 432 Evangelos Kofos negotiations. Yet, these are the issues that cannot be bypassed by negotiators who aspire at reaching definitive and lasting political solutions.
Suggestion for an Exit Scenario
Over the past two decades, international government experts, scholars, and a multitude of non-governmental organizations have provided a rich array of proposals for solving this issue.34 They all failed. Several among them have abandoned their efforts with the phrase “We do not understand it.” Undoubt- edly, they were sidetracked by the exaggerations on both sides. In the midst of the cataclysm caused by the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation, as well as the general destabilization caused by the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of a bipolar Europe, it was only natural to focus on more visible and permeable issues of security rather than on abstract debates over identities. Fortunately, the Macedonian name dispute has not reached extremist stages of confrontation, such as the century-old religious identity clashes between Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants, or, for that matter, of Jewish Israelis and Muslim Palestinians. The protagonists of the matter documented here, the Greek Macedonians and the Slav Macedonians (or the Makedones of Greece and the Makedonci of FYROM) initially had based their argumentation on issues of security. They are now tied up with issues of contested identities. What follows is an abridged version of an article that originally appeared on the webpage of a reputable Greek think tank.35 Its aim is to analyse those aspects of the name dispute that affect identity issues on both sides, in order to produce proposals of how to accommodate the divergent and sensitive views. The author of this documentation had previously presented his views in this regard.36 As expected, exposing his views ensued both favourable comments and criticism – the latter from both sides and particularly from those who are determined to defend their “red lines”.37 On the positive side, however,
34 International Crisis Group , Macedonia’s Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve it, ICG Europe Report 122, 10 December 2001, available at
DOCUMENT F
Evangelos Kofos, The Current Macedonian Issue Between Athens and Skopje: Is There an Option for a Breakthrough? ELIAMEP Thesis 3/2009.39 “Conclusions and recommendations In order to resolve the dispute, one has to approach constructively those ‘exis- tential’ elements, which are of particular concern to both parties. It is evident that the dispute is not simply the state name of Greece’s neighbour; it is what is conveyed through it. Skopje – and third parties offering their services for a compromise solution – need to understand that the geographical region of Macedonia, which includes the entire region of ‘Greek Macedonia’, is not and cannot be considered the ‘tatkovina’ (fatherland) of the makedonski people living in FYROM. This is a red line for Greece and the Greeks! Similarly, Slav Macedonians need to realize that their newly conceived ethno- genetic dogma, extending to classical antiquity, encroaches upon the Hellenic cultural heritage and the identity of their Greek neighbours to the south. As such, it threatens to ignite a clash of identities in the region as a whole. The use of the Macedonian name as a state appellation in no way confers the right to appropriate everything and anything derived from or pertained to the entire region of Macedonia. This needs to be legally clarified and remain bind- ing erga omnes. the other side, diametrically opposite critical comments were published on 14 April 2009, by the Skopje based Institute for Democracy “Societas Civilis”, Flawed Arguments and Omitted Truths. A Commentary of the “ELIAMEP Thesis” on the “Name Issue”, available at
The task ahead is the search for enduring solutions to outstanding issues. Otherwise, typical ‘diplomatic’ escape clauses would bequest the problem to future generations. The following summary proposals aspire to furnish food for thought to aspirant ‘mediators’ as well as to local actors. The state name needs specifically to refer to and describe the present region of FYROM. It should apply erga omnes in multilateral and bilateral international re- lations and transactions, and should be observed by all organizations, states, and other non-governmental international organizations, including the government and the agencies of FYROM. In this writer’s opinion, the parties should accept the name used by the inhabitants of FYROM for their region of geographical Macedonia, i. e. Vardar Macedonia, or preferably Vardar Makedonija. Its derivatives should, naturally, follow the agreed state name. State identity cards, passports etc. would inscribe the citizenship in accordance to the state name. Issues touching upon the self-identification of persons, which includes their ethnicity and their right to identify themselves, should be respected. This means that their name, Makedontsi, by which they identify themselves in their language, should be accepted in all foreign languages, including the Greek. A similar arrangement might apply to the use of Makedones for the Greek Macedonians. Finally, the international community needs to share its responsibility for resolv- ing the name issue. After all, it is partially the culprit. Through the use of leading international languages – English, French, German and so on – they translate four different identities of Macedonian/Macedonians by one and the same name, “Macedonian”… In order to overcome the name problem two solutions seem possible. (1) One would be to employ a traditional method and add to the respective Macedonian versions an appropriate prefix: Slav-Macedonian/s, Greek-Macedonian/s, Bulgarian-Macedonian/s or Albanian-Macedonian/s. (2) A second approach would be to apply in international languages the derivates of the various Macedonian versions in their original form of the respective local languages. Thus, the Slavic terms Makedontsi (noun) and makedonski (adjective) would be transferred to English and other languages in an untranslated Latin alphabet. Similarly, the Greek terms Makedones (noun) and makedonikos (adjec- tive) could be adopted to identify the Greek variant of the Macedonian name. Reaching an agreement under UN auspices on all these issues the parties will replace their 1995 Interim Accord with a permanent one. A treaty, which will be patterned on the Acquis Communautaire of the European Union, with Greece assuming the obligation to support the candidate country becoming an equal partner and ally in international organizations to which Greece is an active member.” Evangelos Kofos, The Controversy Over the Terms ‘Macedonians’ and ‘Mac- edonian’: A Probable Exit Scenario, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 5 (2005), n. 1, 129-133. The Macedonian Name Controversy 435
“The different meanings and identities of the term ‘Macedonian’ There is considerable confusion and ambiguity over the derivatives of the term ‘Macedonian’. This has to do with the circumstance that there are numerous ethnic, regional, cultural, historical and legal (citizenship) variants of both the noun ‘Macedonians’ and the adjective ‘Macedonian’.
The Noun ‘Macedonians’ In FYROM the noun Macedonians (Makedonci – Makedontsi – in the local Slavic language) identifies, (a) in the legal sense, all citizens of the Republic (includ- ing Slavs, Albanians, Greeks, Roma etc.), and (b) in the ethnic/national sense, a million and a half local Slavs. In Greece the noun Macedonians (Μακεδόνες – Makedones – in the Greek lan- guage) identifies, in the regional/cultural sense, almost two and a half million ethnic Greeks of the region of Greek Macedonia. In Bulgaria the same name Macedonians (Makedonci – Makedontsi – in Bulgarian) identifies, in the regional sense, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Bulgarians. To complicate matters further, there is a fourth, historical dimension of the name Macedonians, which refers to the first ‘owners’ of the name, i. e. the Greek- speaking people who inhabited roughly the region of present-day Greek Mac- edonia in classical times and identified themselves as Μακεδόνες (Makedones) in their Greek language.
The Adjective ‘Macedonian’ The adjective Macedonian derives: (a) from the noun of the geographical region Macedonia, and (b) from the noun of the name of the people in its regional, ethnic, historical variants as described above. As such, the Macedonian adjec- tive describes identities of persons (Macedonian community, minority, peo- ple, personalities), abstract values (Macedonian history, culture, traditions), institutions/associations (Macedonian administrative, scientific, professional, educational, civic, business/commercial, religious), as well as tangible objects and items (products, publications, etc). In the Slavonic languages of FYROM and Bulgaria the adjective Macedonian, both in its ethnic and regional provenance is spelled in an identical form as makedonski. On the other hand, in the Greek language the same adjective Mac- edonian, in its regional/cultural/historical context, appears as makedonikos (-i or -o for the feminine and neuter endings).”