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Whose Is Crimea? #4 (110) April 2017 Why the ORDiLO blockade Transformations in Ukraine’s parties: What protests in Belarus say became official policy Petro Poroshenko Bloc and Samopomich about social sentiments WHOSE IS CRIMEA? WWW.UKRAINIANWEEK.COM Featuring selected content from The Economist FOR FREE DISTRIBUTION CONTENTS | 3 BRIEFING FOCUS 5 Aggressive awakening: 30 The key to Crimea: The scale and reasons of conflict The autonomy of the indigenous escalation in Eastern Ukraine people of Crimea in the framework of Ukraine’s territorial integrity POLITICS 7 Courts, sanctions and the blockade: 34 Chase down and chase out: How the A consolidated strategy to hold Russia policy of quiet expulsion of Crimean accountable for its armed aggression Tatars from the peninsula works against Ukraine SOCIETY 12 Blockade vs Minsk talks: 36 From trenches to business: What pushed President Poroshenko Entrepreneurship as therapy for ATO to make the blockade veterans of the Donbas into official policy NEIGHBOURS 14 What about your money? 38 Constrained? Is America’s system of What is wrong with new NGO checks and balances working? income declaration amendments 42 A change of mind: 16 Closing for repairs? An overhaul ECFR Poland’s Piotr Buras on three of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc – new paradigms of EU integration reasons and goals 44 Unfreedom day: Why the breaking up 18 The growing pains of self-reliance: of Minsk protest rallies does not dent How Samopomich survives in the role opposition to Alexander Lukashenka of the democratic opposition in Belarus society 20 Seven circles of freedom: 47 Grzegorz Motyka: "Nothing divides International law and clarity Poles and Ukrainians except disputes on the status of the conflict as tools about one piece of history – the Volyn to liberate citizens persecuted crimes" in Russia and Crimea Polish historian on the dilemmas 24 Building up armour: of Ukraine’s and Poland’s historical Current state and plans memory in Ukraine’s defense industry CULTRE & ARTS 27 Finding the balance: 50 Film and sound, documentary What it takes to fill the deficit photography and primitive art: of modern armament The Ukrainian Week offers a selection in Ukraine of events to attend this month E-mail [email protected] www.ukrainianweek.com Tel. (044) 351-13-00 The Ukrainian Week #4 (110) April 2017 Office address Kyiv, Ukraine, 36A, vul. Bohdana Khmelnytskoho, apt. 3 Founder ECEM Media GmbH. Publisher ECEM Media GmbH Print run 15 000. Free distribution Address Austria, Am Gestade,1, 1010 Vienna Our partner State registration certificate КВ № 19823-9623ПР 19.03.2013 Chief Editor Dmytro Krapyvenko Editors Anna Korbut, Lidia Wolanskyj #4 (110) April 2017 | THE UKRAINIAN WEEK THE UKRAINIAN WEEK | #4 (110) April 2017 BRIEFING Aggressive awakening Yuriy Lapayev n March 20, Ukraine’s positions were attacked by the terrorists using Grad MB-21 MRLSs and artillery. For the first time in a long while, this kind of attack came in broad daylight, starting at 10 in the morning. Under cover of the artillery fire aimed at the Otrenches of Ukraine’s forces, a platoon of Russian-militant forces tried to break through, but the attack was repelled. Official reports from ATO headquarters stated that three Ukrainian soldiers were killed and another nine were wounded. Considering the heaviness of the fire and the use of Grads, the Ukrainian side was pretty lucky. The OSCE SMM mission reported that on March 20 alone, there had been nearly 1,550 ex- plosions, nearly 90% of which were centered around Mariupol, near Shyrokyne, Vodiane, Hnutove and Lebedynske. By comparison, the mission’s observers had recorded “only” about 200 attacks the previous REUTERS PHOTO: day, none of them from Grads. #4 (110) April 2017 | THE UKRAINIAN WEEK 6 | BRIEFING | In addition to the Mariupol area, other infamous too effective for both military and political purposes points along the front continue to fall under regu- for pro-Russian forces in Ukraine and the Kremlin lar fire, such as the Avdiivka industrial quarter and to change. As a pretext, any current event that can the Butovka mine. More and more frequently these potentially divide Ukrainian society is fair game: days, tanks are involved in the attacks on Ukrainian from the language issue to IMF credits. All the more positions, but generally only one unit at a time be- so, that there are few in the world who will respond cause the locations are not suitable for massive at- appropriately to this kind of aggravation. tacks. Every day, heavy artillery, grenade launchers This is typically evident in Russia’s diplomatic and anti-tank missiles are fired. Only the Luhansk sleights of hand with the “Yanukovych letter” sup- area is relatively quiet, where mostly small arms are posedly calling for Russia to bring its troops to being used. Ukraine. After the death of UN Ambassador Vitaliy On one hand, this major uptick is probably re- Churkin, who actually read this letter at an emer- lated to the recent arrival in DNR of the latest “hu- gency session of the UNSC in 2014, the Kremlin has manitarian” convoy from the Russian Federation. officially denied that such a request from Ukraine’s On the other, the militants appear to have switched fleeing president ever existed. to a new tactic: focusing on certain parts of the front Meanwhile, Russia’s State Duma passed a law as a kind of response to the “creeping advance” of recognizing documents issued by the occupying re- the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The line of contact gime in ORDiLO, is considering a bill offering easy between the two sides in Donbas is now about 430 terms to residents of DNR and LNR in gaining Rus- kilometers long, making it very difficult to simulta- sian citizenship and finding a job in Russia. These neously carry out an offensive along the entire front steps suggest that Moscow has decided to complete- without enormous quantities of personnel, equip- ly ignore the Minsk process and the likely accelera- ment and resources. The new approach is making tion of processes to return the occupied territories it possible to gain certain tactical advantages even to Ukraine. Presumably it is doing all this to prepare with relatively small forces. for a larger number of residents to abandon the re- gion once the Ukrainian government takes control again. GIVEN THE ALREADY-TENSE POLITICAL SITUATION Needless to say, the RF has enough problems of IN UKRAINE, COMBINED MILITARY its own in the international arena, even without this. The International Court of the UN recently ended AND INFORMATIONAL ATTACKS WILL CONTINUE its public hearings in a case against Russia brought TO BE USED BY RUSSIA TO DESTABILIZE THE COUNTRY about by Ukraine in The Hague. It’s too optimistic by half to think that this issue will be quickly re- solved, but the very fact that a court case has started So far, this tactic has not led to much progress against the aggressor is already a plus: Russia is go- for DNR, as events near the Svitlodarsk Bulge, Avdi- ing to have more and more trouble presenting itself ivka and now the Mariupol area has shown. Still, it’s as an innocent party with good intentions. Indeed, too early to hope that these attacks are over: with Russia has admitted that it provided air defense sys- real spring coming in, we can expect the appearance tems in response to Ukraine’s using military aircraft. of more “brilliant green” and with it, enemy diver- In the short term, a court decision to institute sionary groups. temporary restrictions against the Russian Federa- Provocations along the front line are intended tion would be a victory for Ukraine. Such a ruling to help Moscow deal with another objective: to get could be handed down in April. Still, despite state- sanctions lifted. Less than two months remain un- ments by Putin spokesman Dmitry Peskov that of- til June, when the EU permanent representatives ficial Moscow is participating in the judiciary pro- committee meets to once again consider the exten- cess and is therefore prepared to accept its rulings, sion of these penalties for another half year. Dur- enforcement will likely be a problem. The Interna- ing this next while, Russia has to be able to show tional Court has no leverage to ensure the proper that Ukraine is the aggressor and is in violation of carrying out of its decisions, especially with regard the Minsk accords. This is similar to last year, when to Russia, which ignores any and all rules. heavy fighting took place outside Mariyinka and Av- Other developments have been no less unpleas- diivka. ant for Kremlin: the exposure of a huge money-laun- In the usual fashion, increased military aggres- dering operation of budget money of at least US $22 sion has been accompanied by increased media billion through Moldova and Great Britain, accusa- and blogger aggression as well. Some are trying to tions against two members of the FSB for hacking spread panic in the social networks by exaggerating Yahoo! servers, and difficulties with the supposedly the number of soldiers KIA in the Ukrainian Armed pro-Russian US President Donald Trump. Trump Forces or falsely reporting the loss of key positions. was almost openly accused of treason against his One new topic that has popped up is a fake story country and deep ties to the RF during recent hear- about a phenyl factory in Torets where supposedly ings held by FBI Director James Comey. A deep Ukrainian units are holed up and potentially threat- split in American society is almost inevitable given en a chemical catastrophe. all this, and this will certainly play into the hands It’s entirely possible that, given the already- of Russia, which will take advantage of the confla- tense political situation in Ukraine, combined mili- gration on Capitol Hill.
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