Working Under Constraints: the PJD in the Aftermath of the 2016 Elections

ISSUE BRIEF 05.29.18 Working Under Constraints: The PJD in the Aftermath of the 2016 Elections

Driss Maghraoui, Ph.D., Al Akhawayn University, Ifrane, Morocco

have had electoral success and popularity THE CURSE OF THE MULTI-PARTY among the electorate, but they have been SYSTEM IN MOROCCO unwilling or incapable of challenging the A fragmented multi-party system is a regime in ways that can significantly fundamental feature of the Moroccan advance democracy. The PJD is no exception. political system and is often considered Moroccan politics has been shaped by what a critical conduit for political reform and is known in Morocco as the makhzen, also 4 democratization in the long term. While referred to as the deep state, which is the a multi-party system could be seen as political authority that is associated with an opportunity to encourage the political the monarchy and its hegemonic state participation of different political forces, apparatus. In what follows, I argue that, in elections also carry the prospect of its relations with the makhzen, the PJD faces sustaining authoritarian rule.1 The latter constraints similar to those experienced is indeed the case in Morocco, where by other parties, and, as a result, is unable the monarchy has used elections as a to change the underlying dynamics of mechanism to structure and control the Moroccan politics. country’s political arena. The power of the monarchy is preserved by preventing the MONARCHICAL POWERS AND THE emergence of a strong party, maintaining a CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF THE balance among political parties, and further Via formal and PARTIES dividing an already fragmented political elite. informal institutions The Moroccan political landscape In order to evaluate the PJD’s status and practices, the comprises 33 parties. Some, like the PAM, within the Moroccan political system, we monarchy keeps were rapidly established and rose quickly must consider the following questions: in order to serve as a counterweight and constitutionally, what inhibits a greater political parties under a balancing political force against the political role for parties, and what obstacles its control, especially rising popularity of the Party of Justice and impede the growth of powerful parties in when it perceives that 2 Development (PJD). This development is Morocco? The ﬁrst form of power that is part of the palace’s long-term strategy of one has gained more defined in the Moroccan constitution is that of strength or popularity. “segmentary politics,” which allows it to the “commander of the faithful.” Accordingly, 3 maintain control of the political field. In Sections 41 and 42 deﬁne the dual functions this regard, the monarchy has strategically of the king as “commander of the faithful” used elections within the multi-party and “head of state.” Article 46 states system to integrate popular parties and that “the person of the king is inviolable, subsequently curb their potential rise. Over and respect is due him,” adding that “the the years, a number of different parties integrity of the person of the king shall not RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.29.18

be violated.” The acts of the king also enjoy itself with El Othmani—and subsequently complete immunity. Constitutionally, the remaining part of the government—or siding king is unaccountable and, hence, remains with Benkirane, who had become persona above the law. Under these constitutional non grata in palace circles, and shift to the provisions, the role of Moroccan parties in opposition. The fact that the intraparty vote the country’s political system is significantly on party leadership favored El Othmani by a limited; they lack autonomy. In addition, the slim margin—51% for El Othmani and 49% majority of Moroccan parties are aligned with for the mayor of Fez, Driss el-Azami—further palace politics, which further constrains their pushed the PJD into a position of weakness independence and freedom of action. As a vis-à-vis the monarchy because, from the result, parties exist as instruments of the perspective of the voters, it showed the makhzen. Via formal and informal institutions party’s predisposition to be as acquiescent The PJD faces a dual and practices, the monarchy keeps political and submissive as other parties. The PJD’s dilemma: the factors parties under its control, especially when it compliance is therefore more likely to that might contribute perceives that one has gained more strength create a credibility gap and a sense of or popularity. disenchantment among its own electorate in to its popularity with future elections. the electorate can be Religion is also an important aspect of perceived as a threat THE PJD AND THE DIALECTICS OF these dialectics because both the monarchy POPULARITY AND VULNERABILITY to the Moroccan and the PJD can be viewed as direct competitors who use Islamic references in The PJD faces a dual dilemma that is inherent monarchy. And the their political discourse. The PJD has been in the Moroccan political context. On one factors that can able to establish a moral basis and religious hand, the factors that might contribute to legitimacy that resonate with many voters. contribute to the PJD’s the PJD’s popularity with the electorate can Although formally detached from the party, acceptance by the simultaneously be perceived as a threat to the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR)— the Moroccan monarchy. On the other hand, regime can undermine an Islamic movement—is an important the factors that can contribute to the PJD’s the party’s popularity factor in the PJD’s popularity; many PJD acceptance by the regime can undermine among voters. members and leaders are active in the the party’s popularity among the voters. MUR, and the separation between the two For example, the former secretary general organizations remains blurred.6 The MUR of the PJD, Abdelilah Benkirane, was able has moral standing among many Moroccans. to win a great following among Moroccans. In principle, the MUR exclusively focuses While his widespread popularity, open on da’wa (an Islamic call or missionary style, and implicit strategy of exposing the activism), but the relationship between contradictions of the Moroccan political politics and preaching is symbolically system5 made him more popular with important. However, regardless of the PJD’s the people, he was gradually perceived efforts to downplay its religious message as a nuisance to the regime and a clear and symbolism,7 from the perspective of justification for undercutting his efforts to makhzen, the party was gradually perceived form a coalition government after the as a potential threat. This perception was 2016 elections. largely based on the PJD’s use of religious However, when Benkirane’s charismatic “symbolic capital”—such as social work and leadership was replaced with that of the occasional references to religious codes and lackluster new secretary general of the principles—which has served the monarchy PJD, Saadeddine El Othmani, the PJD faced for ages and become its “special domain.” a different dilemma. El Othmani won the By the end of the 2015, it was evident blessing of the palace but thus far has that the palace did not want Abdelilah failed to gain popularity among the broader Benkirane to remain the head of government. electorate or even within his own party. In The palace sought a strategy that would the aftermath of the 2016 elections, party curb the popularity of the PJD in critical and members were torn between keeping the gradual ways, but would not necessarily blessing of the monarchy that clearly aligned require the removal of the party from power. 2 WORKING UNDER CONSTRAINTS: THE PJD IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 2016 ELECTIONS

Signs of this strategy began appearing during an election campaign that incited Moroccans CRACKS WITHIN THE PARTY against Benkirane and his party. This included Following the decision to remove Benkirane a well-orchestrated but surreptitiously from office in what was perceived as a organized rally against the so-called humiliating experience for many within the “Islamization of the state” by the PJD. PJD, it became clear that internal “cracks” might turn into long-lasting divisions. The AFTERMATH OF THE 2016 ELECTIONS party engaged in a heated debate over a proposal to change its internal bylaws Following the September 4, 2015, municipal to allow Abdelilah Benkirane to serve a and regional elections in which the PJD third term as the secretary general of the managed victories in major cities such as PJD. Those opposed to the bylaw change Casablanca, Fez, Marrakech, and Tangier, believed that the party should not be based the party continued to be an important on the “personality cults” that characterize force in Morocco’s electoral landscape, as other parties in Morocco. This group also demonstrated by its success in the 2016 argued that the party should not embark parliamentary elections. Yet the party’s on a path of confrontation with the palace. growing popularity was not well received by Some in this group even referred to the those in the inner circles of power. In 2016, changing international context and the the PJD increased its number of seats in fate of Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia. parliament from 107 to 125, while the Party of This group was primarily associated with Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) won only individuals integrated into the political and 102 seats—and this is a party created under administrative system. The MUR did not the auspices of the king’s advisor, Fouad Ali favor the extension of Benkirane’s term. The PJD’s use of Another group of PJD members supported El Himma, with the goal of undermining the religious “symbolic growing popularity of the PJD. the extension. They argued that the decision Benkirane’s charisma was an important to remove Benkirane countered democratic capital”—such as social factor for the party’s success in the October principles and contradicted the will of the work and occasional 2016 elections. However, because he lacked people. They also suggested that under references to religious current conditions, it would be much better a majority in the parliament, Benkirane had codes and principles— to search for partners to form a coalition for the party to be part of the opposition. This government. This was exactly the terrain group was associated with many parliament is perceived as a where the palace could engage in formal members and younger party members. potential threat and informal politics to make the task The cracks in the party’s cohesion because it has served impossible for Benkirane. The party’s former became obvious during the PJD’s National the monarchy for ages ally, the National Rally of Independents Assembly session in November 2017, (RNI), asked to include two other parties when 126 assembly members voted and become its in the coalition talks, a condition that against amending the party’s internal laws “special domain.” Benkirane refused. In the end, an electoral (articles 16 and 37) while only 101 members victory did not translate into a win during supported the amendment that would have the government formation process for paved the way for Benkirane’s third term. In the PJD, and for Benkirane in particular. the opening speech before this extraordinary Behind-the-scenes political maneuvering session, Benkirane acknowledged the and the utilization of other political parties existence of rifts within the party and tried by the palace were sufficient to block to reconcile the two opposing groups. He the formation of a coalition government hoped to calm the conflict by affirming that headed by Benkirane. This situation the party was established, able to withstand became popularly known as the “blockage” external pressures, and could reach (deadlock).8 After six months of deadlock, independent decisions through democratic Benkirane was replaced by El Othmani, who processes. After the vote, Benkirane stated, was finally appointed by the king to form a “The king has dismissed me, the party new coalition government. has put an end to my responsibilities.”9 3 RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.29.18

While this situation was a testament to became the secretary general of the RNI the PJD’s democratic process, it did make and emerged as the key political figure in divisions within the party public, which the formation of the 2016 government. could cause further disunity. The divisions The new government follows a pattern set were still evident during the party vote on by those that preceded it: key ministries new leadership. Saadeddine El Othmani are kept under the control of technocrats barely won with 1,006 votes out of 1,943 and individuals associated with the PJD delegates against 912 delegates for the palace. In sharp contrast to Benkirane’s mayor of Fez, Driss el-Azami, who was candor and charisma, El Othmani’s clearly supported by Benkirane. uninspired leadership, acquiescence, and nonconfrontational style have exacerbated the party’s weakness. THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT AND THE For many Moroccans, El Othmani does SYMBOLIC WEAKNESS OF THE PJD not exude confidence and fails to give the impression of a strong leader who can Given the nature of the political system effectively manage the government. The in Morocco, the government is effectively government appears ineffective in the face powerless; Benkirane regularly made it clear of the Rif and Khribga protests. On October that the real power resides with the king10— 24, 2017, when the king dismissed four which is possibly another reason the former ministers and barred five former ministers PJD secretary general became persona non from assuming their official duties, the grata within palace circles. While at the structural deficiencies of the government beginning of his term, Benkirane made were on full display. These dismissals came Benkirane regularly every effort to denounce corruption and only a few months after a major speech by made it clear that the everyday problems associated with the the king in which he blamed the country’s makhzen, he regularly emphasized that his the real power resides political paralysis on parties and the hands were tied. The palace controlled the with the king—which political elite. In his speech, the king stated so-called “les ministères de souveraineté” is possibly another that “the evolution witnessed in Morocco (the ministries of sovereignty): the Ministry in the political domain and in the area of reason the former of Foreign Affairs under Salaheddine development has not led to the kind of PJD secretary general Mezouar, the leader of the National Rally positive reaction you would expect from of Independents; the Ministry of Education became persona political parties, leaders, and government under the technocrat Rachid Belmokhtar; non grata within officials.”11 Meanwhile, Benkirane and the Interior Ministry under another remains a presence in the party; his public palace circles. technocrat, Mohamed Hassad. These pronouncements still stir debates and ministers were known for their close highlight the differences between him and El relationships with palace circles. Othmani. Benkirane said in March 2018 that Under El Othmani, the weakness of “we want the monarchy but we don’t want the PJD has become even more evident, the makhzen.”12 especially in view of the difficulties related to the formation of the cabinet. For example, Moroccans regularly read the following WILL THE PJD OR MOROCCAN PARTIES phrase in newspapers: “El Othmani’s CONTRIBUTE TO DEMOCRACY? government, which is headed by Aziz Akhennouch.” Akhennouch is a billionaire, Extensive research on the democratization a friend of the king, and currently serves process documents a well-established as the minister of agriculture. Because the consensus about the crucial role of political PAM and its leader, Elyas Eloumari, fell out parties. Political parties are the link between of favor in palace circles due to the party’s society and policymaking and their role failure to serve as a political counterweight is essential to any polity that aspires to to the rise of the PJD, Akhennouch has democracy and democratic representation. seemingly replaced Eloumari in that Whether it is the PJD in the current context same mission. Akhennouch unexpectedly or other parties in Moroccan history, 4 WORKING UNDER CONSTRAINTS: THE PJD IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 2016 ELECTIONS

political parties have agreed, implicitly or 3. Rémy Leveau, Le fellah marocain explicitly, to operate in a politically inhibiting défenseur du trône (Paris: Presses de environment that gradually deprives them Sciences Po, 1985); and John Waterbury, The of their main political function, limits Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan their actions, and subsequently leads to Political Elite–A Study in Segmented Politics their demise. Moroccans’ perceptions of (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). these parties have also shifted; parties 4. The term makhzan means “storage” are increasingly viewed as spineless, and was used historically to refer to the opportunistic, able to be co-opted by the sultan’s court. The notion of “makhzan” palace, devoid of ideological consistency, has variously been used to refer to the and driven by personalities. The long-term state apparatus; the services that the state Morocco’s political policy of the palace to create the so-called provides to its citizens, such as education, parties have gradually “partis de l’administration” (parties of health care, and other forms of economic veered into irrelevance the administration) and its propensity to and social development; and all persons because there is no intervene in the parties’ internal affairs in the service of the central power (the further raises questions about the ability of monarchy) and with official and unofficial indication that a Moroccan political parties to constructively (religious, military, economic, or political) confrontation between contribute to the process of democratization. authority. See Rachida Chérifie, Le Makhzen the palace and the Morocco’s political parties have politique au Maroc: Hier et aujourd’hui political elite that could gradually veered into irrelevance because (Casablanca: Afrique Orient, 1988). advance democracy is a there is no indication that a confrontation 5. For example, Benkirane referenced between the palace and the political elite the practices of informal politics and the realistic possibility. that could advance democracy is a realistic dualism of rule, and spoke a little more possibility. In the long term, democratization openly about some of the obstacles he faced in Morocco depends on reducing the as the head of government. fragmentation of the party system and 6. Ashraf Nabih El Sherif, “Institutional establishing political parties that are and Ideological Re-construction of the ideologically coherent, aspire for democratic Justice and Development Party (PJD): governance, are independent of palace The Question of Democratic Islamism in politics, and have strong popular support. Morocco,” Middle East Journal 66, no. 4 In this regard, Europe and the United (Autumn 2012): 660-682. States can play a bigger role in promoting 7. Driss Maghraoui and Saloua Zerhouni, the growth of Moroccan political parties “Searching for Political Normalization: committed to democratic governance, The Party of Justice and Development instead of supporting authoritarian regimes in Morocco,” in Quin Mecham and Julie in the name of the “stability paradigm” that Chernov Hwang, Islamist Parties and has so far created further instability in the Political Normalization in the Muslim World Middle East and North Africa region. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014). 8. The idea of “blocage,” as it came ENDNOTES to be termed in the popular media in both 1. James N. Sater, “Parliamentary Arabic and French, was associated with the Elections and Authoritarian Rule in Morocco,” obstacles that Abdelilah Benkirane faced as Middle East Journal 63, no. 3 (Summer he sought to establish a new government 2009): 381-400. following the 2016 elections. 2. The PAM is often referred to the 9. The North Africa Post, “No Third Term new Front de la défense des institutions for Benkirane at Helm of PJD,” November 27, constitutionnelles (FDIC), which was 2017, http://northafricapost.com/20937- established by Hassan II in 1963 to counter no-third-term-benkirane-helm-pjd.html. the opposition. 10. He emphatically stated that “leading the government is not synonymous with holding power.”

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11. See “Maroc: Mohammed VI critique sévèrement l’administration et la classe politique,” Jeune Afrique, July 29, 2017, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/462066/ politique/maroc-mohammed-vi-critique- severement-ladministration-et-la-classe- This issue brief is part politique/. of a two-year research 12. See “Benkirane: le PJD est royaliste project on pluralism in mais pas ‘makhzénien,’” Le Site Info, the Middle East after February 4, 2018, http://www.lesiteinfo. the Arab uprisings. com/politique/benkirane-pjd-royaliste- makhzenien/. The project is generously supported by a grant AUTHOR from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Driss Maghraoui, Ph.D., is an associate professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Al Akhawayn University in Ifrane, Morocco. He received his Ph.D. in history from the University of California, Santa Cruz.

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Cite as: Maghraoui, Driss. 2018. Working Under Constraints: The PJD in the Aftermath of the 2016 Elections. Issue brief no. 05.29.18. Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, Houston, Texas.