ISSUE BRIEF 05.29.18 Working Under Constraints: The PJD in the Aftermath of the 2016 Elections Driss Maghraoui, Ph.D., Al Akhawayn University, Ifrane, Morocco have had electoral success and popularity THE CURSE OF THE MULTI-PARTY among the electorate, but they have been SYSTEM IN MOROCCO unwilling or incapable of challenging the A fragmented multi-party system is a regime in ways that can significantly fundamental feature of the Moroccan advance democracy. The PJD is no exception. political system and is often considered Moroccan politics has been shaped by what a critical conduit for political reform and is known in Morocco as the makhzen, also 4 democratization in the long term. While referred to as the deep state, which is the a multi-party system could be seen as political authority that is associated with an opportunity to encourage the political the monarchy and its hegemonic state participation of different political forces, apparatus. In what follows, I argue that, in elections also carry the prospect of its relations with the makhzen, the PJD faces sustaining authoritarian rule.1 The latter constraints similar to those experienced is indeed the case in Morocco, where by other parties, and, as a result, is unable the monarchy has used elections as a to change the underlying dynamics of mechanism to structure and control the Moroccan politics. country’s political arena. The power of the monarchy is preserved by preventing the MONARCHICAL POWERS AND THE emergence of a strong party, maintaining a CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF THE balance among political parties, and further Via formal and PARTIES dividing an already fragmented political elite. informal institutions The Moroccan political landscape In order to evaluate the PJD’s status and practices, the comprises 33 parties. Some, like the PAM, within the Moroccan political system, we monarchy keeps were rapidly established and rose quickly must consider the following questions: in order to serve as a counterweight and constitutionally, what inhibits a greater political parties under a balancing political force against the political role for parties, and what obstacles its control, especially rising popularity of the Party of Justice and impede the growth of powerful parties in when it perceives that 2 Development (PJD). This development is Morocco? The first form of power that is part of the palace’s long-term strategy of one has gained more defined in the Moroccan constitution is that of strength or popularity. “segmentary politics,” which allows it to the “commander of the faithful.” Accordingly, 3 maintain control of the political field. In Sections 41 and 42 define the dual functions this regard, the monarchy has strategically of the king as “commander of the faithful” used elections within the multi-party and “head of state.” Article 46 states system to integrate popular parties and that “the person of the king is inviolable, subsequently curb their potential rise. Over and respect is due him,” adding that “the the years, a number of different parties integrity of the person of the king shall not RICE UNIVERSITY’S BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY // ISSUE BRIEF // 05.29.18 be violated.” The acts of the king also enjoy itself with El Othmani—and subsequently complete immunity. Constitutionally, the remaining part of the government—or siding king is unaccountable and, hence, remains with Benkirane, who had become persona above the law. Under these constitutional non grata in palace circles, and shift to the provisions, the role of Moroccan parties in opposition. The fact that the intraparty vote the country’s political system is significantly on party leadership favored El Othmani by a limited; they lack autonomy. In addition, the slim margin—51% for El Othmani and 49% majority of Moroccan parties are aligned with for the mayor of Fez, Driss el-Azami—further palace politics, which further constrains their pushed the PJD into a position of weakness independence and freedom of action. As a vis-à-vis the monarchy because, from the result, parties exist as instruments of the perspective of the voters, it showed the makhzen. Via formal and informal institutions party’s predisposition to be as acquiescent The PJD faces a dual and practices, the monarchy keeps political and submissive as other parties. The PJD’s dilemma: the factors parties under its control, especially when it compliance is therefore more likely to that might contribute perceives that one has gained more strength create a credibility gap and a sense of or popularity. disenchantment among its own electorate in to its popularity with future elections. the electorate can be Religion is also an important aspect of perceived as a threat THE PJD AND THE DIALECTICS OF these dialectics because both the monarchy POPULARITY AND VULNERABILITY to the Moroccan and the PJD can be viewed as direct competitors who use Islamic references in The PJD faces a dual dilemma that is inherent monarchy. And the their political discourse. The PJD has been in the Moroccan political context. On one factors that can able to establish a moral basis and religious hand, the factors that might contribute to legitimacy that resonate with many voters. contribute to the PJD’s the PJD’s popularity with the electorate can Although formally detached from the party, acceptance by the simultaneously be perceived as a threat to the Movement of Unity and Reform (MUR)— the Moroccan monarchy. On the other hand, regime can undermine an Islamic movement—is an important the factors that can contribute to the PJD’s the party’s popularity factor in the PJD’s popularity; many PJD acceptance by the regime can undermine among voters. members and leaders are active in the the party’s popularity among the voters. MUR, and the separation between the two For example, the former secretary general organizations remains blurred.6 The MUR of the PJD, Abdelilah Benkirane, was able has moral standing among many Moroccans. to win a great following among Moroccans. In principle, the MUR exclusively focuses While his widespread popularity, open on da’wa (an Islamic call or missionary style, and implicit strategy of exposing the activism), but the relationship between contradictions of the Moroccan political politics and preaching is symbolically system5 made him more popular with important. However, regardless of the PJD’s the people, he was gradually perceived efforts to downplay its religious message as a nuisance to the regime and a clear and symbolism,7 from the perspective of justification for undercutting his efforts to makhzen, the party was gradually perceived form a coalition government after the as a potential threat. This perception was 2016 elections. largely based on the PJD’s use of religious However, when Benkirane’s charismatic “symbolic capital”—such as social work and leadership was replaced with that of the occasional references to religious codes and lackluster new secretary general of the principles—which has served the monarchy PJD, Saadeddine El Othmani, the PJD faced for ages and become its “special domain.” a different dilemma. El Othmani won the By the end of the 2015, it was evident blessing of the palace but thus far has that the palace did not want Abdelilah failed to gain popularity among the broader Benkirane to remain the head of government. electorate or even within his own party. In The palace sought a strategy that would the aftermath of the 2016 elections, party curb the popularity of the PJD in critical and members were torn between keeping the gradual ways, but would not necessarily blessing of the monarchy that clearly aligned require the removal of the party from power. 2 WORKING UNDER CONSTRAINTS: THE PJD IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 2016 ELECTIONS Signs of this strategy began appearing during an election campaign that incited Moroccans CRACKS WITHIN THE PARTY against Benkirane and his party. This included Following the decision to remove Benkirane a well-orchestrated but surreptitiously from office in what was perceived as a organized rally against the so-called humiliating experience for many within the “Islamization of the state” by the PJD. PJD, it became clear that internal “cracks” might turn into long-lasting divisions. The AFTERMATH OF THE 2016 ELECTIONS party engaged in a heated debate over a proposal to change its internal bylaws Following the September 4, 2015, municipal to allow Abdelilah Benkirane to serve a and regional elections in which the PJD third term as the secretary general of the managed victories in major cities such as PJD. Those opposed to the bylaw change Casablanca, Fez, Marrakech, and Tangier, believed that the party should not be based the party continued to be an important on the “personality cults” that characterize force in Morocco’s electoral landscape, as other parties in Morocco. This group also demonstrated by its success in the 2016 argued that the party should not embark parliamentary elections. Yet the party’s on a path of confrontation with the palace. growing popularity was not well received by Some in this group even referred to the those in the inner circles of power. In 2016, changing international context and the the PJD increased its number of seats in fate of Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia. parliament from 107 to 125, while the Party of This group was primarily associated with Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) won only individuals integrated into the political and 102 seats—and this is a party created under administrative system. The MUR did not the auspices of the king’s advisor, Fouad Ali favor the extension of Benkirane’s term. The PJD’s use of Another group of PJD members supported El Himma, with the goal of undermining the religious “symbolic growing popularity of the PJD. the extension.