1111 2 Serving Whose Interests? 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 Services permeate almost every moment of our daily lives, whether they are 4 social services such as education, media and midwifery, or inputs to capitalist 5 production such as finance, transport, energy and telecommunications. Yet 6 they are being purged of their social essence in the name of ‘trade’ and 7 relegated to commodities in an international marketplace. Serving Whose 8 Interests? explores the political economy of ‘trade in services’ agreements 9 from a critical legal perspective. 20111 The complex ‘trade’ regime put in place by the General Agreement on 1 Trade in Services, and a new generation of GATS-compliant bilateral and 2 regional agreements, has the potential to constrain the policy choices of 3 virtually every government in the world. These agreements are exclusively 4 the tools of contemporary global capitalism, yet are represented as the 5 new pathway for development through the seemingly benign medium of 6 international trade law. In an evolving chess game, attempts by the major 7 powers to secure national regulations and policies that boost the profits of 8 their transnational corporations and advance their geopolitical ambitions 9 are being frustrated by reluctant Southern governments and the resistance 30111 of social activists. This book draws out the contradictions between the global 1 market model and the intrinsically social nature of services through a 2 combination of theoretical analysis of the legal texts and truly global case 3 studies of the social and political implications, leading the author to question 4 the sustainability of the trade in services regime. 5 The product of extensive research by an internationally renowned expert 6 in the area, yet written in an accessible manner, Serving Whose Interests? 7 will be of interest to trade specialists, academics, students and activists 8 working in the areas of international trade and international trade law, and 9 other informed readers with interests in the politics and regulation of the 40111 global economy. 1 2 Professor Jane Kelsey specialises in the political economy of law and policy 3 at the University of Auckland. She has been an academic and activist critic 44111 of neoliberal globalisation, especially trade in services, since the early 1990s. 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 1111 2 Serving Whose Interests? 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 The political economy of trade 4 5 in services agreements 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 Jane Kelsey 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 a GlassHouse book Published 2008 by Routledge-Cavendish 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge-Cavendish 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY10016 Routledge-Cavendish is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2008 Jane Kelsey All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Kelsey, Jane. Serving whose interests?: the political economy of international trade in services agreements/Jane Kelsey. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Service industries – Law and legislation. 2. General Agreement on Trade in Services (1994). I. Title. K3973.K45 2008 343′078–dc22 2008002089

ISBN 0-203-93393-1 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0–415–44821–2 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–415–44822–0 (pbk) ISBN10: 0–203–93393–1 (ebk)

ISBN13: 978–0–415–44821–5 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–44822–2 (pbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–93393–0 (ebk) 1111 For Upendra Baxi, 2 3 sage and friend 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 1111 2 Contents 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 Preface ix 4 Abbreviations xii 5 6 7 Introduction: taking services to market 1 8 9 1 Reading the GATS as ideology 22 20111 Case study 1 GATS 2000: going nowhere in a hurry 42 1 Case study 2 FTAs: GATS on steroids 50 2 3 2 How the GATS was won (and lost?) 58 4 Case study 3 The ‘services mafia’ 76 5 Case study 4 Understanding the ‘GATS attack’ 82 6 7 3 Trade-related development 89 8 Case study 5 The WDR 2004: making services work 9 for rich companies 104 30111 Case study 6 The closed circuit of summitry 110 1 2 4 The illusion of public services 119 3 Case study 7 Accounting for PFIs 137 4 Case study 8 Privatising power in the Philippines 144 5 6 7 5 Ruling the services infrastructure 152 8 Case study 9 Gambling on the GATS 174 9 Case study 10 Public pensions or corporate welfare? 181 40111 1 6 Trade in people 189 2 Case study 11 Call centres – the assembly line of the 3 twenty-first century 206 44111 Case study 12 Taking nurses and soldiers to market 213 viii Contents

1111 7 Minds and markets 221 2 Case study 13 The higher education supply chain 241 3 Case study 14 A counter-convention on cultural diversity 248 4 5 8 Dominion over the earth 255 6 Case study 15 Wal-Mart rules, OK? 270 7 Case study 16 The real Cancún 276 8 9 9 Energy wars 284 1011 Case study 17 Confronting ‘El Diablo’ 302 1 Case study 18 Gulf accessions: a legal invasion 310 2 3 Conclusion: serving whose interests? 318 4 5 6 Notes 327 7 Bibliography 353 8 Index 375 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 1111 2 Preface 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 I was first introduced to the notion that services might be governed by 4 global trade rules at a gathering of several hundred social activists and 5 progressive researchers that ran parallel to the General Agreement on Tariffs 6 and Trade (GATT) Ministerial Conference in Brussels in 1990. At the time 7 I knew little about the Uruguay round, even in the traditional area of trade 8 in goods. The notion of complementary ‘trade’ agreements that locked in 9 the neoliberalisation of services and investment, and US-style intellectual 20111 property laws, on an international scale seemed far-fetched. The proposal 1 for a single World Trade Organization (WTO) to oversee such agreements 2 had not yet been tabled. 3 Yet the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) also seemed a 4 logical next step in the reorganisation of international capital. Since 1984 5 I had been documenting New Zealand’s role as a laboratory for radical 6 neoliberal policies – the Economist magazine dubbed it ‘Chile without 7 the gun’. There was an obvious continuity between our experience of 8 deregulation, liberalisation, privatisation and state sector restructuring and 9 an international agreement on services that could legitimise and embed such 30111 changes – even if our trade officials insisted there was no connection between 1 international trade rules and the domestic services regime. 2 Since that 1990 meeting I have monitored the arcane world of the trade 3 in services agreements, watching the GATS become paralysed by controversy 4 and inertia and spin off in diverse bilateral and regional forms. At the time 5 of writing, the Doha round of negotiations remains moribund and the 6 US President’s Trade Promotion Authority (‘fast track’) has expired. The 7 burgeoning array of new generation free trade agreements is supplanting 8 the GATS as a site for competition between the major powers, ambitious 9 demands by transnational companies, and campaigns of resistance. 40111 This book reflects my dissatisfaction with the level of critical analysis 1 that currently informs the debate around trade in services. Most public 2 engagement with the issues is starkly polarised and expressed through 3 pro- and anti-GATS rhetoric (including my own), which is necessarily 44111 simplified and polemical. At the more technical level, the WTO, World x Preface

1111 Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and 3 other international agencies generate a plethora of reports and negotiating 4 proposals, which are supported by pro-liberalisation academic writings. 5 But critical research, with a few notable exceptions, is largely produced 6 by academics who work on specific services sectors or non-government 7 organisations (NGOs) for advocacy purposes. 8 The following 11 chapters and 18 case studies view the trade in services 9 regime through a political economy lens. Each chapter interrogates one 1011 aspect of the ideology, legal content and negotiating history of the GATS 1 and the emerging bilateral and regional agreements. The accompanying case 2 studies offer diverse insights into how trade in services agreements can impact 3 in the real world. While I have attempted to provide a representative coverage 4 of sectors and places, the examples are necessarily selective. I hope they 5 provide enough substance and stimulation for readers to identify additional, 6 different or conflicting examples and fuel a more informed engagement with 7 the issues. 8 The combination of technical chapters and empirical case studies is 9 designed to bridge the gap between the closed legal discourse of the trade 20111 in services agreements and the realities of the people and communities that 1 they seek to redefine. The book also challenges the normative premises of 2 international law by locating the substantive legal content of the agreements 3 within the political economy of globalising capitalism and the history of 4 legal imperialism. It reveals a story of power, profit, poverty and resistance 5 that is diffused through the seductive, but increasingly unstable, medium 6 of international economic law. 7 The book is full of stories that were gathered on my travels. A mass 8 of information has been obtained through both formal and unorthodox 9 channels. This posed a challenge for referencing. Official documents and 30111 informal sources have been recorded in Notes, with formal publications 1 listed in the Bibliography. All monetary amounts have been converted to 2 US dollars. 3 I have had the privilege of accumulating these insights through many 4 different pathways: as an academic, legal adviser, trade unionist, media 5 commentator, NGO activist in national and international networks, and 6 occasional consultant to governments. A sense of the dynamics and power 7 politics of negotiations was gained from attending many meetings of the 8 WTO and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as a journalist or 9 NGO representative. I am grateful to all of those who have opened doors 40111 for me, especially the Association of University Staff (NZ), Education 1 International, the Action Research and Education Network of Aotearoa, 2 the International Network for Cultural Diversity, various Coalitions for 3 Cultural Diversity, the Pacific Network on Globalisation, Our World is Not 44111 for Sale and the Asia Pacific Research Network. Preface xi

1111 Diplomats, negotiators and officials from many countries and international 2 organisations have been exceedingly generous in sharing their time and 3 views. Special thanks go to SP Shukla, India’s Ambassador to the GATT 4 in the 1980s, Geza Feketekuty, the assistant United States of America Trade 5 Representative (USTR) with responsibility for services from the late 1970s, 6 and Ambassador Oscar Carvallo, representative of the Bolivarian Republic 7 of Venezuela at the WTO, for their frank interviews. The OECD gave me 8 full access to their historical files, which was invaluable to understanding 9 the GATS’ formative years. 1011 An academic book requires a supportive intellectual environment. Since 1 1979 the University of Auckland has provided me with the freedom to 2 explore critical ideas in both my research and teaching, and supported the 3111 completion of this text through a university research fellowship. I remain 4 ever mindful of the privilege and responsibilities of academic freedom and 5 the threat that is posed by market imperatives and a climate of self- 6 censorship. I am, as always, indebted to colleagues and students in the Law 7 School for their intellectual engagement and personal support. 8 Particular thanks go to colleagues who have provided feedback on 9 the book in its various stages, including Sonny Africa, Raj Bhala, Patrick 20111 Bond, Yolinda Chan, Roger Dale, Deborah James, Ted Murphy, Garry 1 Neill, Allyson Pollock, David Price, Vidya Rangan, Susan Robertson, David 2 Robinson, Bill Rosenberg, Jean Shaoul, Claire Slatter and Elisabeth Tuerk. 3 I owe a special debt to Ellen Gould, Sol Picciotto and Amokura Kawharu 4 for their careful comments and thoughtful criticisms. A number of talented 5 and enthusiastic research assistants have helped to locate materials and track 6 down documents, including Philip Hall, Daniel Han, Helen Liava’a and 7 Bonard Metayhsa. Barbara Menzies did her best to tame my grammatical 8 idiosyncrasies. None of the above bears any responsibility for deficiencies 9 in the final text. 30111 Beverley Brown from Cavendish Press originally encouraged me to 1 write the book and was exceptionally patient as several years slipped by. 2 Colin Perrin has maintained that enthusiasm and forbearance on behalf of 3 Routledge. Diane Marther did a masterly job of the index. 4 Such a major project is impossible without the patient support of family 5 and friends, in particular my mother Peg Kelsey, Rua Rakena and Maxine 6 Gay. They doubtless hope the book will be cathartic and pave the way for 7 life without the GATS – a prospect that seems remote as its successors take 8 on new forms and pose new challenges for critical academics in a troubled 9 and uncertain world. 40111 Jane Kelsey 1 December 2007 2 3 44111 1111 2 Abbreviations 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3 ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific 4 ADB Asian Development Bank 5 ADEID Action pour un Développement Equitable Intégré et 6 Durable, Cameroon 7 AFAS ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services 8 AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of 9 Industrial Organizations 20111 AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act 1 AIG American International Group 2 ALBA Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the 3 Caribbean 4 AMEX American Express 5 ANZCERTA Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations 6 Trade Agreement 7 AoA (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture 8 APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 9 ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 30111 ATM automated teller machine 1 AUSFTA Australia US Free Trade Agreement 2 BATF Bangalore Agenda Task Force 3 BIS Bank of International Settlements 4 BITES (Bangalore) Board for IT Education Standards 5 BOT build-operate-transfer 6 BPO Business Process Outsourcing 7 CAFTA Central America Free Trade Agreement 8 CARICOM Caribbean Community 9 CARIFORUM Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific 40111 (ACP) States 1 CEC Centre for Education and Communication 2 CEO Corporate Europe Observatory 3 CERI (OECD) Centre for Educational Research and 44111 Innovation Abbreviations xiii

1111 CIDSE Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la 2 Solidarité 3 CIECA Centro de Investigación Económica para el Caribe, 4 Dominican Republic 5 CPC (UN) Central Product Classification 6 CPCprov (UN) provisional Central Product Classification 7 CPC Rev (UN) revised Central Product Classification 8 CSI (US) Coalition of Services Industries 9 CSS contractual service suppliers 1011 CTS (WTO) Council for Trade in Services 1 CTS.SS (WTO) Council for Trade in Services, Special Session 2 CTV Confederation of Venezuelan Workers 3111 CUSFTA Canada United States Free Trade Agreement 4 DHS Dairy Herd Service, Jamaica 5 DSB (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body 6 DSU (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding 7 EBRI Employee Benefit Research Institute 8 EC European Commission 9 ECOSOC (UN) Economic and Social Council 20111 EEC European Economic Community 1 EI Education International 2 EPA Economic Partnership Agreement 3 EPIRA (Philippines) Electricity Power Industry Reform Act 4 ESF European Services Forum 5 EU European Union 6 EUROSTEP European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of 7 People, Belgium 8 FCC (US) Federal Communications Commission 9 FNPF Fiji National Provident Fund 30111 FTA free trade agreement 1 FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas 2 GATE Global Alliance for Transnational Education 3 GATS (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services 4 GATS 2000 GATS round that began in 2000 5 GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 6 GAWU Guyana Agricultural and General Workers Union 7 GCHQ (UK) Government Communication Headquarters 8 GDP Gross Domestic Product 9 GE genetic engineering 40111 GNS Group of Negotiations on Services 1 GODs General Obligations and Disciplines 2 GRAPAD Groupe de Recherche et d’Action pour la Promotion de 3 l’Agriculture et de Développement, Benin 44111 HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries xiv Abbreviations

1111 ICC International Chamber of Commerce 2 ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (to 3 2006) 4 ICTSD International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 5 Development 6 IFC (World Bank Group) International Finance Corporation 7 IFSL International Financial Services London 8 ILO International Labour Organization 9 ILSA Iran-Libya Sanctions Act 1996 1011 IMF International Monetary Fund 1 INCD International Network for Cultural Diversity 2 INCP International Network on Cultural Policy 3 IPP independent power producer 4 IPR intellectual property rights 5 ISCO International Standard Classification of Occupation 6 IT information technology/ies 7 ITES IT-enabled services 8 ITU International Telecommunication Union 9 ITUC International Trade Union Confederation 20111 IUF International Union of Foodworkers 1 IYE International Year of Eco-tourism 2 JITAP Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme 3 JPEPA Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement 4 KSP (South Africa) Knowledge Sharing Partnership 5 LIBERTAD Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 6 LOTIS Liberalisation of Trade in Services Committee of 7 International Financial Services London 8 MAI (OECD) Multilateral Agreement on Investment 9 MBA Master of Business Administration 30111 MDG Millennium Development Goal 1 MEFTA (US) Middle East Free Trade Agreement 2 MFN most favoured nation 3 MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 4 MRA mutual recognition agreement 5 NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 6 NAMA non-agricultural market access 7 NASSCOM National Association of Software and Service Companies 8 NCITE (US) National Committee for International Trade in 9 Education 40111 NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development 1 NGO non-government organisation 2 NHS (UK) National Health Service 3 NPC National Power Company (or Napocor) 44111 NZMFAT New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Abbreviations xv

1111 OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and 2 Development 3 OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 4 PACER Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations 5 PDVSA Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima 6 PFI private finance initiative 7 PPIAF Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 8 PPP public-private partnership 9 PROGRES Programme for Research on the Service Economy 1011 PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 1 PSI Public Services International 2 PSIRU Public Services International Research Unit 3111 PUK Partnerships UK 4 PUP public-public partnership 5 PWC Public Warehousing Company 6 R&D Research and development 7 RTAs Regional trade agreements 8 SACCCOM South Africa Contact Centre Community 9 SAIC Science Applications International Corporation 20111 SAR Special Administrative Region 1 SERPS (UK) State Earnings-related Pension Scheme 2 SPV special purpose vehicle 3 TILMA Trade, Investment and Labour Mobility Agreement 4 TINA There Is No Alternative 5 TRIMS (WTO) Agreement on Trade-related Investment 6 Measures 7 TRIPS (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 8 Intellectual Property Rights 9 UK United Kingdom 30111 UN United Nations 1 UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2 UNDP United Nations Development Programme 3 UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 4 Organization 5 UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees 6 UNICE Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of 7 Europe 8 US United States of America 9 USTR United States of America Trade Representative 40111 W/120 Services Sectoral Classification List 1 WBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable Development 2 WBI World Bank Institute 3 WDM World Development Movement 44111 WDR World Development Report xvi Abbreviations

1111 WHO World Health Organization 2 WPDR (GATS) Working Party on Domestic Regulation 3 WPEC (WTO) Working Party on Electronic Commerce 4 WPGR (GATS) Working Party on GATS Rules 5 WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development 6 WTO World Trade Organization 7 WTTC World Travel and Tourism Council 8 9 1011 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 1111 2 Introduction 3 4 Taking services to market 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 ‘Services’ permeate almost every moment of our daily lives – buses, banks, 4 railways, shops and supermarkets, radio and TV, postal delivery, schools, 5 hospitals, rubbish disposal, water supply, electricity, telephones, old people’s 6 homes, kindergartens, universities, sports clubs, libraries, movie theatres, 7 lawyers, funerals and much more. Their role is intrinsically social, as well 8 as cultural and economic, and often has an environmental dimension. 9 The form and content of services has varied over time, aided by technology 20111 and innovation, but their essence remains unchanged. Services are the 1 glue that binds our multiplicity of daily activities into a social existence. 2 They provide formal and informal employment for over a billion people, 3 livelihoods for many small business owners and dividends for shareholders 4 of larger enterprises. Services infrastructure links us together through 5 transport and communications networks, while water supply, health care 6 and electricity provide the necessities of life. The relationships between 7 those who provide services – teachers, shopkeepers, midwives – and those 8 who use them are often highly personal and spill over into our families and 9 communities. Through cultural and knowledge-based services we engage in 30111 dynamic exchanges that stimulate our creativity, innovation and sense of 1 identity, and strengthen the foundations for informed political participation. 2 The quality, affordability and accessibility of services therefore hold the key 3 to social wellbeing, cohesion and stability – and often the sustainability of 4 life itself. Decisions about which services are provided to whom and how they 5 are regulated are at the heart of national and local politics. 6 At a more theoretical level, the social nature of services is integral to the 7 capitalist economy – even one that purports to be borderless and globalised. 8 As Ben Fine reminds us: ‘Capital is embroiled in social relations, social 9 structures, in social reproduction involving social power and conflict, and 40111 is attached to definite economic and social tendencies’ (Fine, 2001, p 33). 1 Services, and the markets through which they are increasingly delivered, 2 shape today’s international division of labour. The quest to extract super- 3 profits through a globally integrated labour market exposes stark class 44111 distinctions between managerial and mundane labour and reflects the old 2 Serving whose interests?

1111 geography of colonisation. Even the idea that ‘services’ constitute a distinct 2 category oversimplifies their function, as the activities it describes are 3 inseparable from agricultural and industrial production, which are 4 themselves intrinsically social activities. 5 Because social relations and structures involve questions of wealth and 6 power, the way that services are regulated and the goals of that regulation 7 are heavily contested. This dynamic is constantly evolving. For much of the 8 twentieth century, policy and regulation on services was defined nationally. 9 Governments in various parts of the world adapted the paradigm of a 1011 centrally regulated mixed economy or state socialism to suit their local 1 conditions, economy, social values and political mandates. Governments or 2 administrations in colonies or satellites had less autonomy: what is referred 3 to today as ‘international policy transfer’ (Evans, 2004) was shaped for 4 them by colonial and imperialist practices or diktats of the politburo. 5 The resulting regulatory regimes were uneven. In richer industrialised 6 countries, national and local governments sought to balance a range of 7 objectives. These included individual wellbeing, education and employment, 8 infrastructure and communications, community and regional development, 9 social cohesion, cultural nationalism and economic development. Governments 20111 were guided/constrained by their legal obligations, both within their national 1 constitutions and under international treaties on human rights, labour and 2 diverse social and economic activities. In poorer countries, governments and 3 peoples struggled, sometimes with each other, to achieve similar goals. The 4 5 ‘Eastern bloc’ delivered near-universal access to very basic services. 6 The crisis of industrial capitalism in the 1960s and 1970s generated 7 a new driving imperative: to enhance the ability of capital to harness 8 innovative technologies and expand the emerging ‘services economy’ on 9 an international scale. The market-oriented approach to the regulation of 30111 services from the late 1970s was an integral element of a new hegemonic 1 ideology of ‘neoliberalism’. David Harvey describes neoliberalism as 2 3 a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human 4 wellbeing can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 5 freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized 6 by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role 7 of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework 8 appropriate to such practices. 9 (Harvey, 2005, p 2) 40111 1 Neoliberalism meant replacing a social paradigm of services with one based 2 on reified and commodified market relations. This pitted the economic 3 imperative to regulate in ways that facilitate capital accumulation against 44111 the social imperatives of human wellbeing, just distribution and complex Introduction 3

1111 democracy (Baker, 2002). In legal and policy terms, that transition combined 2 the liberalisation, privatisation and market-oriented regulation of services 3 at the national level with binding and enforceable international treaties that 4 could complement, legitimise and lock in the new paradigm. 5 The standard bearer for that supranational regime is the General 6 Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). This multilateral treaty sets the 7 ideological parameters and minimum legal content for a plethora of bilateral 8 and regional agreements that have overtaken it in recent years. 9 The GATS was adopted in Marrakech, Morocco in April 1994 as part 1011 of a stable of agreements to be overseen by a new World Trade Organization 1 (WTO). The champions of the WTO hailed the new trade regime as a catalyst 2 for global economic policy making that could sustain a dynamic and 3111 prosperous globalising economy. This was the era of TINA (There Is No 4 Alternative). Neoliberal globalisation was in its ascendancy. Capitalism had 5 recovered from the crisis of the 1970s, the recession of the early 1980s and 6 the stock market crash of 1987. The Cold War was over and the Berlin 7 Wall had gone. Perestroika had unravelled the Soviet Union and China’s 8 communist party leaders were experimenting with ‘market socialism’. The 9 Third World solidarity of the 1960s and 1970s was fractured and fragile. 20111 Even the historically recalcitrant Indian government had embraced the 1 market. The Asian tigers posed an economic challenge to the ascendancy 2 of the US, its allies and their associated capital, but not to their geopolitical 3 or ideological hegemony. 4 The euphoria that surrounded the launch of the GATS and WTO in 5 1995 was a far cry from the anxious mood almost twenty years earlier 6 when the idea of ‘international trade in services’ was born. During the late 7 1970s and early 1980s the US needed to restore its flagging economy and 8 ascendancy, address the chronic merchandise trade deficit and create new 9 jobs to replace those being lost in manufacturing. Its trade officials gradually 30111 convinced other, less enthusiastic, industrialised countries to support the 1 creation of binding international rules that could secure unfettered access 2 for transnational corporations to the foreign services markets that were 3 being constructed around the world. 4 At one level, the GATS and its successors have met that ambition. In the 5 words of the European Commission, the GATS is ‘not just something 6 that exists between Governments. It is first and foremost an instrument 7 for the benefit of business.’1 Trade in services agreements aim to provide 8 transnational corporations with security and certainty of business-friendly 9 regulation in rapidly expanding international markets. These assurances 40111 take the form of enforceable guarantees that the current wave of neoliberal 1 policies will not be reversed. According to the WTO Secretariat, ‘bindings 2 undertaken in the GATS have the effect of protecting liberalization policies, 3 regardless of their underlying rationale, from slippages and reversals and, 44111 thus, improve domestic conditions for investment, trade and growth’.2 4 Serving whose interests?

1111 The GATS was never about ‘trade’ as it is traditionally understood, 2 because services are socially embedded, intangible and have traditionally 3 been consumed in the same place they are produced. The primary targets 4 of the trade in services agreements are the laws, policies and regulations 5 that govern services behind the national border and that foreign firms view 6 as barriers to their expansion and profitability. As the WTO Secretariat 7 observes, the aim of the GATS is to discipline the regulatory choices available 8 to governments: ‘because such a large share of trade in services takes place 9 inside national economies . . . its requirements will from the beginning 1011 necessarily influence national domestic laws and regulations in a way that 1 has only been true of the GATT in recent years’.3 2 Former WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero confirmed the profound 3 intrusion of the GATS on the state’s regulatory autonomy, noting that it 4 reaches ‘into areas never before recognized as trade policy. I suspect that 5 neither governments nor industries have yet appreciated the full scope of 6 these guarantees or the full value of existing commitments’.4 Indeed, the 7 implications of trade in services agreements for future policies and regulations 8 are literally unknowable. Existing rules and commitments can take on new 9 and previously unimagined meanings through shifts in a government’s policy, 20111 interpretations by the WTO’s dispute tribunals, or their automatic extension 1 to new technologies for delivering a service. 2 Since the late 1990s, free trade agreements at regional and bilateral levels 3 have overtaken the multilateral regime. The services components of such 4 agreements are required to be both GATS-compatible and ‘GATS-plus’ 5 by taking liberalisation further. A majority of these agreements involve 6 the major powers and reflect their competing geopolitical objectives: US 7 trade policy has become explicitly subordinated to its foreign policy, while 8 the European Union (EU) is reorganising its historical trade relationships 9 to consolidate its regional and strategic interests. The entry of Japan, 30111 China, India and, potentially, Russia into this arena foreshadows new and 1 unpredictable dynamics. All these agreements are premised on the neoliberal 2 services paradigm; but they are also generating a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of 3 pragmatic, uneven and inconsistent rules and commitments, and fuelling 4 geopolitical competition for resources and influence. 5 This complex trade in services regime has the potential to impose pro- 6 market disciplines on the policy choices of virtually every country in the 7 world, in relation to over 160 services sub-sectors. Yet, instead of constituting 8 an invincible edifice, the negotiations to extend the GATS, which began in 9 2000, became paralysed. Many of the bilateral and regional negotiations 40111 are hotly contested and outcomes that are coerced seem unsustainable. 1 This book argues that the high ambitions of the corporate lobbyists and 2 their patron states are falling victim to two fatal self-delusions: that a global 3 services market that is governed exclusively by pro-business regulation can 44111 displace the social essence that infuses services, and that simply by embedding Introduction 5

1111 that illusion in a legal treaty they can change the course of politics, law, 2 culture and social relations around the world. The contradictions this creates 3 are one element of a broader crisis facing neoliberal globalisation. 4 In adopting a political economy perspective, the book draws on Stephen 5 Gill’s differentiation between the ‘social structures of accumulation’ and 6 the ‘regime of accumulation’ that facilitates and stabilises those structures 7 (Gill, 2003). The ‘social structures of accumulation’ take the form of a 8 globalising economy where economic activity is driven by new technologies 9 and transacted increasingly in the form of commodified services. This 1011 transformation brings with it a new international division of labour that 1 perpetuates old class and colonial asymmetries. These social structures of 2 accumulation are both material and have normative or disciplinary effects 3111 through capital flows and market power. 4 Gill’s ‘regime of accumulation’ describes a new hegemony that dissolves, 5 weakens or reconfigures the state-centred regime that had sustained industrial 6 capitalism during the twentieth century. Trade in services agreements are 7 one part of that new regime. By claiming to be a neutral rules-based system, 8 they legitimise pro-market regulation and aim to consolidate the lucrative 9 new international markets in tradeable services. In practice, the resilience 20111 of the social essence of services, the negative impacts of market regulation 1 on people’s lives, and resistance to a new form of imperialism make trade 2 in services agreements highly politicised and therefore unstable. 3 With specific reference to the political economy of law, the book 4 interrogates the negotiating dynamics, legal content and application of 5 international trade in services agreements in the following terms: 6 7 The crucial questions about the origins of law always relate to the power 8 bloc behind the [treaty], the nature of the problem this bloc wants to 9 solve, the ideologies in which this problem is perceived and understood, 30111 and the political opposition to the proposed [treaty]. Law is a hybrid 1 phenomenon of politics and ideology: a politico-ideological artifact that 2 is produced in a form of political practice, that practice geared to the 3 creation, definition and maintenance of power relations. 4 (Sumner, 1979, p 268) 5 6 Those power relations are ultimately embedded in what Tony Anghie 7 describes as the imperialist project of international law (Anghie, 2005). 8 The remainder of this Introduction lays the foundations for such an 9 enquiry. It begins by examining the social structures of accumulation, with 40111 the emergence of the international ‘services economy’ since the 1970s, 1 accompanied by a new international division of labour. It then analyses the 2 steps that were necessary to construct a supportive regime – conceptualising 3 the novelty of ‘international trade in services’ and advancing that concept 44111 within national and international policy communities to the point of 6 Serving whose interests?

1111 concluding a trade in services treaty. The final section locates the new legal 2 regime in the historical context of international law as a vehicle for 3 imperialism. 4 5 Taking services to market 6 7 The ‘services economy’ is a proxy term for the transformation of capitalism 8 in the later twentieth century. By the 1960s the golden age of industrial 9 capitalism was in decline. Twenty years later it was over. The rise of a service- 1011 driven economy was hailed as the path to salvation for advanced capitalist 1 countries, in particular to extract the US from an economic quagmire and 2 chronic trade deficit (Drakich et al., 2002, pp 250–1; Hauknes, 2000; 3 cf. Madrick, 2001). 4 The unravelling of the industrial era was rapid and dramatic. The decline 5 in profitability of the Fordist assembly line in the 1960s saw large 6 manufacturers from the US and other advanced industrialised countries 7 relocate the low-value parts of their production to selected low-cost 8 countries. This was aided by the advent of container ships, the jumbo jet and 9 advances in telecommunications and data transfer. The fragmentation of 20111 production intensified during the 1970s in response to successive oil shocks 1 and a loss of US and European competitiveness to Asia. Industrial production 2 continued to integrate both vertically and internationally to take the best 3 advantage of raw materials, technology, low labour costs and proximity to 4 markets. Importers began to use ‘just in time’ inventories. A number of Asian 5 countries, in particular, developed the technological capacity to respond. 6 Strategic corporate alliances, mergers and acquisitions, mainly within 7 OECD countries, dwarfed greenfield investments. Transnational corporations 8 took on myriad forms through subsidiaries, branches, partnerships, joint 9 ventures, franchises, licences and subcontracting, and spread across a vast 30111 economic and physical geography. The growth of internationally integrated 1 production and supply chains that operated through networked firms became 2 a defining feature of a globalising economy, to the point where 3 4 the core activities of production, consumption, and circulation, as well 5 as their components (capital, labor, raw materials, management, 6 information, technology, markets) are organized on a global scale, either 7 directly or through a network of linkages between economic agents. 8 (Castells, 2000, p 77) 9 40111 The reorganisation of production transformed the function and form of 1 services and their economic significance. Different stages of transnationally 2 dispersed manufacturing required a vast range of intangible services, including 3 ground, air and sea transportation, data exchange and management, 44111 financial and technology transfers, warehousing, and wholesale and retail Introduction 7

1111 sales. Internationally integrated supply chains made the traditional economic 2 and legal distinction between trade in goods or agricultural commodities 3 and services increasingly anachronistic (Chapter 8). Michael Hardt and 4 Antonio Negri observe how the value of tangible goods came to rest more 5 on the branding and consumer appeal that is created by advertising and 6 marketing services than on the practical utility of a product. This encouraged 7 a new managerial imperative to ‘treat manufacturing as a service’ (Hardt 8 and Negri, 2000, pp 285–6). 9 Material production and intangible services are integrated in a second, 1011 related way. In 1984 Jagdish Bhagwati observed how the services transactions 1 performed within an industrial firm were traditionally treated as value added 2 in the goods sector (Bhagwati, 1984). The same transactions were described 3111 as ‘services’ when provided by separate firms. He predicted, correctly, that 4 as outsourcing of intra-firm services became more common and specialised 5 and economies of scale developed, the services market would grow and 6 become more technologically progressive. Inter-firm services transactions 7 would form a distinct and growing services sector of the economy. 8 Similar ‘splintering’ was likely within existing private services sectors, 9 such as retail, finance and banking, and transport. Bhagwati contrasted this 20111 dynamic transformation with public services, which he characterised as 1 technologically unprogressive because they lacked incentives and were subject 2 to bureaucratic and political factors. More recently, neoliberal restructuring 3 of the public sector has generated a parallel trend of splintering and 4 outsourcing of government functions and social services. That phenomenon, 5 along with the unbundling and partial or full privatisation of energy, 6 telecommunications and transport utilities, postal delivery and financial 7 8 services, has generated new private sector activities in what were previously 9 defined as public services. 30111 Bhagwati also predicted that the rapid emergence of information 1 technologies (IT) would increase the potential for ‘splintering’. A service 2 that was initially embodied in the person who provided it and required 3 their physical presence at the time of use could become disembodied and 4 delivered ‘over the wire’. He argued that this would open opportunities 5 for developing countries to establish a comparative advantage in delivering 6 low-cost services from offshore. That proved partially correct: the rapid 7 growth of cross-border supply and offshore outsourcing in a number of 8 Southern countries has become an outstanding feature of the current services 9 landscape. 40111 Large scale and internationally mobile capital was a prerequisite for the 1 internationally dispersed production of goods, food and services. That 2 requirement gave the big transnational corporations an intrinsic advantage 3 over national capital, especially from weaker countries. The mobility of 44111 capital, in turn, fostered a new rentier bloc of financiers. Their quest for 8 Serving whose interests?

1111 short-term profits increasingly displaced the longer-term focus of investors 2 on real production under industrial capitalism. The dynamic expansion 3 of transnational production and financial markets increased the pressure 4 on governments to lift capital controls, and to liberalise and deregulate their 5 domestic financial markets – and then to re-regulate them within sympathetic 6 international forums that could minimise state intrusion. 7 Globally integrated financial markets quickly emerged. The floating of 8 currencies and the flush of petrodollars in the 1970s created new risks and 9 uncertainties for importers, exporters and investors and new opportunities 1011 for the financial sector. Banks moved to mediate the risks; risks required 1 insurance and insurers required re-insurance. As financial markets expanded, 2 so did their products. Consultancies boomed, especially around corporate 3 restructuring, privatisations, mergers and acquisitions. Share markets 4 became larger, more sophisticated, interconnected and eventually privatised. 5 Derivatives and futures markets that developed around currencies and debt 6 spawned a vast array of fictitious financial products that became tradeable 7 internationally. Subsequently, booming private equity and pension funds 8 have invested trillions of dollars around the world, often in highly leveraged 9 buy-outs. All these activities require credit ratings, financial analysts and 20111 brokers, and other finance-related services. The resulting global financial 1 services markets have come to operate as if they are detached from material 2 reality. 3 The transnational economy also required a sophisticated and reliable 4 technological infrastructure that could circulate information and 5 communications. The IT revolution grew out of groundbreaking advances 6 in the micro-electronics industry. Major manufacturers such as General 7 Electric, General Motors and Boeing, and financial institutions such as 8 Citibank and Merrill Lynch, developed their own capacity and recouped 9 their development costs (and more) by selling those services to others. Manuel 30111 Castells describes the gradual progression of these technologies from the 1 original sites of techno-economic change – the high-tech firms and financial 2 sector – into manufacturing at large, and then into business services, 3 ‘gradually to reach miscellaneous service activities, where there are lower 4 incentives for the diffusion of technology and greater resistance to 5 organizational change’ (Castells, 2000, p 90). 6 By the late 1990s the term ‘knowledge economy’ had largely superseded 7 the ‘services economy’ in the globalisation lexicon. Telecommunications 8 were now as pivotal to global capitalism as finance: they provided the 9 infrastructure for production and delivery of other commercial services, and 40111 were lucrative products in their own right. The burgeoning IT market 1 generated a wealth of high-value business and professional services, including 2 consultancy, software research, engineering and design, as well as foreign 3 employment opportunities for IT personnel. At the same time, the ability 44111 of cross-border data transfer to de-link the suppliers and consumers of lower- Introduction 9

1111 value services encouraged the offshore outsourcing of services work to 2 ‘virtual’ migrants in cheap labour zones. 3 The compression of time and space did not depend solely on technology. 4 An abundance of cheap energy literally fuelled the geographical dispersal 5 of production and consumption. The global food production and supply 6 chains came to rely on ground, air and sea transport to fill the supermarket 7 shelves, as did the construction services industry for the delivery of foreign- 8 sourced materials and labour. Likewise, mass tourism, the world’s largest 9 services export industry, assumed an affordable and inexhaustible supply 1011 of oil to move people around. 1 The traditional professions responded to globalisation by reinventing 2 themselves. As production dispersed, the major law, accountancy, finance 3111 and management firms expanded offshore to service their traditional clients 4 on an international scale. Public sector restructuring and privatisation added 5 governments to their client base. The professions became self-interested 6 advocates and beneficiaries of neoliberal restructuring. The ‘Big Six’ 7 accountancy firms spread through foreign direct investment and partnerships 8 with local firms, then consolidated back to the four firms that dominate 9 accounting-cum-consultancy services internationally. Advances in IT meant 20111 that professional services could also be ‘exported’ from one centralised 1 location. As these activities became harder to regulate, the powerful 2 professional bodies generated their own international standards for the 3 recognition of professional qualifications, licensing and conduct. Academic 4 accountants remark on the accompanying erosion of the profession’s public 5 interest responsibilities, which include protecting the integrity of a country’s 6 tax base (Newberry, 2003, p 6). 7 This brief survey of the ‘services economy’ shows why the lobby groups 8 of large transnational corporations wanted an international regime that 9 could regulate services markets in their interest. It also explains why the 30111 sectoral studies that were conducted during the Uruguay round focused on 1 telecommunications, construction/engineering, tourism, transport, financial 2 services and professional services. Public and social services, such as 3 education, health care and household water supply, which dominate 4 contemporary campaigns against the GATS, were relatively peripheral during 5 the Uruguay round. Although their commercial significance has increased, 6 they are still not a priority in most trade in services negotiations. 7 8 The international services economy 9 40111 The lack of reliable statistics makes it very difficult to track the international 1 services economy. This dearth of data was especially marked during the 2 later 1970s and 1980s when the idea of a multilateral agreement on trade 3 in services was first promoted. While services enjoyed a growing economic 44111 visibility, this was primarily as domestic activity. The most common 10 Serving whose interests?

1111 measure was the proportion of services in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 2 Most of that involved social and public services that were supplied locally 3 and were not, or were only partly, marketised. Health and education were 4 by far the largest sectors. The vast bulk of private sector services jobs in both 5 the US (United States of America) and Europe were in wholesale and retail 6 trade, hotels and restaurants. Significantly, growth in the services economy 7 was not in banking, insurance, business and construction, the sectors whose 8 transnational companies were pushing for a trade in services agreement. 9 Historically, ‘international trade in services’ was not recorded as a distinct 1011 economic activity. Services were treated as a residual category: what was 1 not included in primary and secondary production. The economic assumption 2 was that production and consumption of services had to occur in the same 3 location, which made their cross-border trade literally inconceivable. The 4 most relevant international statistics were those prepared for International 5 Monetary Fund (IMF) balance of payments purposes, in which services 6 (primarily capital transactions) were treated as ‘invisibles’. The definition of 7 services used in those accounts was much less detailed than the classification 8 system subsequently adapted for the GATS. Moreover, the data was based 9 on international transactions between residents and non-residents. This 20111 excluded services provided by foreign investors within the country’s borders 1 – transactions that the advocates of international rules wanted to define as 2 ‘trade’. Only the US collected data that was based on foreign sales by the 3 foreign subsidiaries of its companies and that was notoriously subject to 4 accounting devices that distorted their income and profit estimates. 5 The lack of a clear statistical base remains a fraught issue. In 2002 veteran 6 Indian journalist Chakravarthi Raghavan described the unresolved quest 7 for data that would enable poorer countries to assess the impacts of the 8 GATS and inform their negotiating positions as ‘chasing a black cat in a 9 dark room, blindfolded’ (Raghavan, 2002). 30111 In 2005 the WTO drew on balance of payments figures to produce a very 1 rough estimate of the value of international trade in ‘commercial services’, 2 which it put at over $1,700 billion.5 The dollar value of exports over the 3 first decade of the GATS (with no proven causal connection) had doubled. 4 The figure leapt exponentially for the US, Europe and India once e-services 5 came on-stream: exports of ‘other commercial services’ rose from 37 per cent 6 of the total in 1990 to 44 per cent in 2000 and 48 per cent in 2005. The 7 distribution of the services transactions confirms the overwhelming 8 dominance of US and European transnationals. The EU claimed a massive 9 27.1 per cent of commercial services exports, not counting trade between its 40111 members. The UK (United Kingdom), Germany and France contributed two- 1 thirds of that. The US share was 14.7 per cent. Next, but far behind, came 2 Japan, the People’s Republic of China (post-WTO accession), Hong Kong 3 China Special Administrative Region (SAR), India and Canada. The EU 44111 and the US were also the largest importers of commercial services. Introduction 11

1111 It is not surprising that these governments are committed to expanding 2 the markets for their corporations. Yet they sponsor different models of 3 the ‘service economy’. Hardt and Negri contrast the ‘service industry model’, 4 led by the US, the UK and Canada, with the ‘info-industrial model’ that is 5 typified by Germany and Japan (Hardt and Negri, 2000, p 286). Both reflect 6 the heightened importance of production flows and networks and increased 7 employment in post-industrial services. But they centre on different kinds 8 of services and relationships between services and manufacturing. The Anglo- 9 American model is notable for the rapid decline in manufacturing and its 1011 replacement by services, with a dominant role for financial services that 1 manage the internationalisation of capital. The more managed economies 2 in continental Europe and Japan show a slower decline in manufacturing, 3111 with an emphasis on the integration of information into industrial 4 production. A third hybrid has emerged in countries such as India, China 5 and Brazil where sophisticated production networks and IT-enhanced 6 services markets sit alongside subsistence agriculture and fragile industries. 7 These divergent models generate different offensive and defensive priorities 8 in the GATS and bilateral agreements. 9 The distribution of services transactions reveals an international 20111 division of labour within the ‘global’ services/knowledge economy that is 1 sharply delineated by physical and social geography. The spatial distribution 2 mirrors historical North/South divisions. Some countries or regions have 3 changed their position within that hierarchy. Newly industrialised countries 4 in East and South East Asia who seized the chance for upward mobility 5 in the 1960s and 1970s have benefited most from the outsourcing of 6 manufacturing, although some struggled to survive the 1997 financial crisis. 7 India embraced the market model in 1991 and carved out a niche in 8 IT-enabled services. China is rapidly enhancing its IT capacity and expanding 9 its commercial services markets, especially since its WTO accession in 2001. 30111 These countries all have internal labour markets that are delineated by class 1 and/or migration. 2 But these ascendant countries are exceptions. Ankie Hoogvelt depicts a 3 map of the global economy that is shrinking (Hoogvelt, 2001). Shifts in 4 world trade and flows of foreign direct investment and capital are unevenly 5 spread. Many Southern countries remain submerged by a combination of 6 resource rents that date back to colonialism, technological rents that were 7 incurred through import substitution, and debt peonage from reckless lending 8 by foreign institutions for ill-conceived projects that lined the pockets of 9 corrupt national élites. The (poor quality) data that is available reveals 40111 1 a thickening network of economic exchanges within the core, a significant 2 redistribution of trade participation within the core, the graduation 3 of a small number of peripheral nations within a comparatively small 44111 population base to ‘core’ status, but above all to a declining economic 12 Serving whose interests?

1111 interaction between core and periphery, both relative to aggregate world 2 trade and to total populations participating in the network. 3 (Hoogvelt, 2001, p 76) 4 5 The social geography of the services/knowledge economy reveals a 6 widening gap in wealth and income. This trend is equally a feature of rich 7 capitalist countries in the global North, middle-income semi-peripheral 8 countries, and the impoverished global South. The nature of labour itself in 9 the post-industrial era has shifted away from manual to mental labour, 1011 especially in richer countries. Hardt and Negri use the term ‘immaterial 1 labour’ that produces an immaterial service, cultural product, knowledge 2 or communication (Hardt and Negri, 2000, pp 290–3). Because the labour 3 content in services is greater than that in tangible commodities, it is even more 4 directly determinative of productivity and profit. The informational and 5 immaterial nature of services, and the mobility of capital, fuel international 6 competition among workers. ‘Flexibilised’ labour markets become increasingly 7 precarious and erode the collective bargaining power of nationally organised 8 labour. The worker becomes disposable, at the same time as the social wage 9 is redefined as a personal responsibility (Harvey, 2005, p 168). The more 20111 explicitly social character of services labour also heightens the importance of 1 its fetishisation from the social relations in which the service is embedded – 2 as embodied in the designation of the temporary movement of natural persons 3 for the supply of trade in services such as ‘mode 4’. 4 Hardt and Negri identify three categories of immaterial labour, whose 5 class nature and function resonate with the trade in services regime. The 6 first category involves work in informationalised industrial production, 7 where manufacturing and agriculture are themselves regarded as a service. 8 In GATS terms, this corresponds to services related to manufacturing, 9 mining, forestry, fisheries and agriculture, the placement and supply of 30111 personnel in activities such as construction, and supply chain operations 1 such as transport and distribution (Chapters 6 and 8, Case study 14). 2 The second category is labour that performs analytical and symbolic 3 tasks, which Hardt and Negri further divide between creative and 4 intelligent manipulation and routine tasks. The distinction between the 5 managerial class and ‘unskilled’ workers reflects a trend to valorise and 6 differentiate labour on the basis of knowledge content and status. That 7 class differentiation has a distinct geopolitics, which infuses the trade in 8 services negotiations over ‘mode 4’ for the supply of services through the 9 temporary movement of services personnel (Chapter 6, Case Study 11). 40111 The third group of ‘affective labour’ engages in human contact and 1 interaction; examples are caregivers, teachers, health professionals, hotel 2 workers, educators and creative artists, who may deliver services in a physical 3 or virtual form (Chapters 4 and 7, Case Study 12). Again, differential treatment 44111 in the GATS reflects a combination of social class and national origin. Introduction 13

1111 The regime of accumulation 2 A globalising services/knowledge economy requires a supportive legal 3 regime that will facilitate its expansion and legitimise its inequalities. 4 Trade in services agreements are an example of what Bronwyn Morgan 5 calls ‘meta-regulation’: by regulating the process of regulation itself, they 6 institutionalise the presumption of pro-market governance and embed it 7 within everyday routines of governmental policymaking (Morgan, 2003). 8 They contain ‘constitution-like’ characteristics that pre-commit governments 9 to maintain a regime of embedded neoliberalism (Schneiderman, 2000), 1011 depriving themselves and their successors of the autonomy to explore 1 alternative ways of regulating their countries’ services. From a neoliberal 2 perspective, governments emulate Ulysses by tying ‘themselves to the mast 3111 to escape the siren-like calls of pressure groups’ (Hoekman and Kostecki, 4 1995, p 25). 5 In the mid-1970s US financial corporations, led by American International 6 Group (AIG) and American Express (AMEX), began pressing their 7 government to develop such an agreement. They had two goals: to pre- 8 empt regulation of the technologies that were beginning to revolutionise 9 the cross-border movement of capital, data and related services; and to 20111 secure a multilateral agreement on investment (Feketekuty, 1988). These 1 guarantees had to be binding and enforceable, yet generic and sufficiently 2 flexible to apply to the as-yet unknown. 3 The most analogous legal concepts were to be found in the General 4 Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). ‘Most favoured nation’ (MFN) 5 treatment could prevent discrimination against US transnationals by putting 6 them on legal par with firms from all other countries, secure in the knowledge 7 that their market power would enable them to dominate. Legally binding 8 rights of ‘market access’ could guarantee the right to compete in existing 9 and emerging services markets. Ideally, that right would extend to the entry 30111 of foreign investment and the managerial élite. ‘National treatment’ would 1 require foreign governments not to favour their domestic providers of 2 comparable services. 3 However, services would need to be radically reconceptualised before 4 they could be subjected to an ‘international trade’ regime. 5 First, and most fundamentally, services can only be traded through 6 contractual relationships between purchasers and suppliers for valuable 7 consideration if they are commodified and have an exchange value. This 8 requires an ideological transition that detaches services from the context 9 and social relations in which they are embedded and subjects them to a 40111 form and language that is ‘more marketized, individualized and linked to 1 commodity logic’ (Gill, 2003, p 117). 2 The advocates of trade in services agreements assumed this transition 3 could be achieved by technocratic means. Social regulation of services at 44111 the national level would be transformed by neoliberalism. States would then 14 Serving whose interests?

1111 entrench that new paradigm through a supranational regime that functions 2 as enabler, catalyst and enforcer of open international services markets. All 3 non-market dimensions would be stripped away or redefined within the 4 market paradigm. William Drake and Kalypso Nicolaidis describe this as 5 a process of ‘socio-regulatory adjustment’: 6 7 A boundary line between illegitimate [non-tariff barriers] and legitimate 8 regulations was required. Wherever that line could be drawn, services 9 liberalization would necessarily involve the extensive restructuring of 1011 what were once thought of as purely domestic regulations. This required 1 a sea change in social purpose. . . . Both the intellectual frameworks in 2 which services industries were visualized and the vast array of social 3 interests and institutions related to regulations would now have to be 4 judged according to the narrow commercial criterion of whether they 5 impeded trade. 6 (Drake and Nicolaidis, 1992, p 63) 7 8 The notion of ‘socio-regulatory adjustment’ confronts a number of deep- 9 seated and resilient social interests, values and institutions. This is most 20111 obvious in state provision of public goods that benefit the wider society. 1 When services are reduced to market transactions between individual sellers 2 and consumers, their public good dimensions are redefined as ‘externalities’. 3 Yet almost all governments have legal obligations to provide public goods 4 under domestic law or as rights enshrined in their national constitutions 5 and international human rights instruments. Such guarantees had been hard 6 fought for; technocrats apparently assumed they would either be surrendered 7 or subsumed. 8 ‘Socio-regulatory adjustment’ is equally contentious in other domains. 9 The social services activities of central and local government, churches, 30111 charities and local groups commonly reflect their commitment to the 1 collective wellbeing of their communities, rather than ‘narrow commercial 2 criteria’. Culture and education are widely seen as the conduits of identity, 3 human development and nation building. People’s interactions with 4 dentists, lawyers, childminders and other professionals rely primarily on trust 5 and relational, not transactional, contracts. These more explicitly social 6 dimensions of services were not the initial targets of the GATS; but the logic 7 of a trade in services agreement requires the process of ‘socio-regulatory 8 adjustment’ to apply across the board. 9 A second prerequisite for international trade in services is a multiplicity 40111 of open, competitive and mutually compatible national services markets. 1 Those markets were constructed from the early 1980s in accordance with 2 what became known as the Washington Consensus template (Williamson, 3 1994). This transition followed complementary policy pathways in 44111 richer countries through the auspices of the Organization for Economic Introduction 15

1111 Cooperation and Development (OECD) and in most of the global South 2 under the tutelage of the IMF and World Bank. As the OECD Trade 3 Committee reflected in 1991: ‘There is virtually complete parallelism 4 between adjustment policies and the objectives set at international level for 5 trade policies.’6 6 Third, the application of generic trade rules to services requires a 7 commonality across seemingly disparate services activities. Commodification 8 abstracts each service from its socially embedded context. Money provides 9 the means for exchanging these commodities within a services market. But 1011 regulatory equivalence across sectors cannot be achieved so long as 1 individual services are defined by their unique characteristics and social 2 functions. New legal concepts and formats are needed to fettishise these 3111 commodities as a class of comparable products, which can then be governed 4 by a uniform set of principles and rules that facilitate market exchange. 5 The United Nations Central Product Classification (CPC) provided the 6 mechanism for redefining services to reflect the commercial activity of the 7 supplier. Midwives became business services, cruise ships became maritime 8 transport and supermarkets became distribution services. All services could 9 potentially be defined as CPCs and reduced to a four-digit figure in a 20111 country’s schedule of trade in services commitments. 1 The premise of a level playing field for international trade in services also 2 requires parity between service providers – a natural person and a 3 transnational corporation, a national and a foreigner. This enables foreign 4 corporations to assert the right of non-discriminatory access to a country’s 5 market and the infrastructure they need to operate, and to demand the 6 removal of impediments to foreign competition. Among the discriminatory 7 barriers to be dismantled are rules for vetting of foreign investment, 8 preferential subsidies and government procurement practices, local content 9 rules, differential tax laws, restrictive licensing restrictions and distinctive 30111 qualification requirements. 1 The transactions that constitute international trade in services must 2 also be defined to include the commercial activities that are most profitable 3 for transnational services companies. This again pushed the traditional 4 boundaries. The most direct analogy to trade in goods is cross-border 5 transactions where the buyer and seller of services are physically located in 6 different countries. However, in the 1970s cross-border service delivery 7 through the post or ‘over the wire’ was relatively uncommon, and the 8 computerised delivery of most services was not considered technically feasible 9 – although those possibilities now seem almost limitless. The most lucrative 40111 international transactions in services involved foreign direct investment 1 through the cross-border movement of capital and short-term migration of 2 managerial personnel and professionals. These highly sensitive areas 3 of domestic policy had to be redefined as international ‘trade’ and then 44111 fettishised as abstract ‘modes’ of supplying services. 16 Serving whose interests?

1111 To achieve such a radical paradigm shift the role and objectives of those 2 government agencies that made policy for, and regulated, services also had 3 to be transformed. Defining services as a generic ‘trade’ issue made them 4 the business of the trade bureaucracy. The international nature of those 5 services activities and the general application of trade rules took them out 6 of the hands of sectoral ministries that had responsibility for domestic policy 7 and regulation of specific services. 8 The reallocation of regulatory responsibility had its parallel in the 9 international arena. Long-established agencies with broad international 1011 membership, such as the International Telecommunications Union, the 1 Universal Postal Union and the International Air Transport Association, had 2 a tradition of promoting co-operative cross-border regulation, rather than 3 international market competition. By contrast, an international organisation 4 such as the OECD, whose mandate was to expand the international economy, 5 could foster a pro-market consensus among the rich industrialised countries. 6 A redistribution of influence within the OECD would enable its trade committee 7 to bypass other committees that were serviced by national bureaucracies and 8 sectoral ministers, and encourage trade officials and ministers to integrate their 9 thinking on services with their other trade responsibilities. 20111 The OECD, having acted as an incubator, would pass the baton to the 1 GATT as the only international institution that could provide comprehensive 2 coverage and enforceability of trade in services rules. The final challenge was 3 therefore to reinvent the GATT. The advanced capitalist countries considered 4 the agreement was nearing its use-by date as a forum for the liberalisation 5 of trade in goods. Negotiations on trade in services under GATT auspices 6 could open new economic frontiers and provide negotiating leverage to fend 7 off demands from Southern states for negotiations in sensitive areas, such as 8 textiles, voluntary export restraints and dumping. Once inside the GATT, 9 services could be treated exclusively as a ‘trade’ concern. 30111 1 The GATS as legal imperialism 2 3 As Chapter 2 explains in more detail, the GATS was a project devised 4 and executed by the US with the support of OECD allies. Along with the 5 intellectual property agreement, it was the crowning achievement of the 6 Uruguay round. Former US trade official Jules Katz, a senior negotiator in 7 the round, boasted that: ‘The WTO was created in the image of the US. 8 We are responsible for its strengths and weaknesses’ (quoted in Jones, 1997). 9 In geopolitical terms, this achievement symbolised the ‘hierarchy of inter- 40111 state power with the USA at its apex, along with its G7 partners, and an 1 increasingly global system of political economy that serves to redistribute 2 power and intensify inequality’ (Gill, 2003, p 189). 3 India’s GATT Ambassador from 1984 to 1989, SP Shukla, described the 44111 battle over the creation of the GATS as a proxy struggle over the regulation Introduction 17

1111 of the new phase of international capitalism. The US objectives reflected 2 the prevailing geopolitical and economic (dis)equilibrium: ‘the continuing 3 need for expansion on the one hand and, on the other, the built-in tendency 4 to pass the relevant costs of adjustment onto its weaker constituents’ 5 (Shukla, 2000, p 10). Raghavan depicted the demand for a trade in services 6 agreement as the North’s counter to the South’s post-colonial vision of a 7 New International Economic Order: 8 9 If the US succeeds in its efforts, it would enable the US to rewrite some 1011 of the postwar rules and principles of international economic relations. 1 And instead of the world moving towards a New World Order, it would 2 be moving towards a Transnational World Order. In economic terms 3111 the US would then have succeeded in giving the Third World a rollback 4 to its days under the colonial era, when the role of the State was only 5 to keep law and order, and keep the natives quiet for the benefit of 6 ‘entrepreneurs’ from the metropolitan centres.7 7 8 The standard riposte to depictions of the GATS as a tool of imperialism is 9 that sovereign states chose to adopt it as the normative system of rules for 20111 regulating international services transactions. Such arguments obscure 1 the centrality of power in international law. Over centuries, rules for the 2 distribution of wealth and power in favour of historically dominant Western 3 states have become embedded through international treaties, and rendered 4 natural in ways that detach them from claims about morality and justice 5 or race, gender and culture. The legal concepts, institutions and agreements 6 through which this occurs are periodically reinvented in response to 7 changing geopolitical and economic imperatives, and to resistance. 8 Trade in services agreements are a contemporary manifestation of that 9 trend. As Chapters 1 and 2 show, the GATS is an ideological artifice. It 30111 was systematically constructed between 1979 and 1993. In 1994 it became 1 ‘law’, an expression of objective rationality and an abstract normative 2 instrument that contained general principles, rules and technical terms. The 3 legal form confers legitimacy on power through the imagery of neutrality 4 and independence. Legal concepts reify real transactions and players into 5 a technocratic realm. When disputes arise, these rules are applied to an 6 abstract problem that involves disembodied parties using positive legal 7 reasoning to produce a decision that purports to be objective. 8 The self-referencing nature of trade in services agreements leaves no space 9 for the possibility of policy or market failure or its own displacement by a 40111 new orthodoxy. Commenting on similar processes in the context of rights, 1 Valerie Kerruish observes: ‘This quality, in the legal norm, gives it a capacity 2 to replace fact with fiction, to close the door on further inquiry and so to 3 be that which we cannot go beyond in our legal understanding’ (Kerruish, 44111 1991, p 124). The process of exclusion works ‘to silence certain critical 18 Serving whose interests?

1111 modes of demanding justice, particularly those that rely on moral or 2 distributive values’ (Morgan, 2003, p 491). That is not to suggest that 3 its self-limiting nature allows the legal domain to go uncontested. But a 4 challenge to the trade in services paradigm itself can only occur outside 5 the ‘legitimate’ discourse established by the agreements. 6 The form of a treaty under international law has additional ideological 7 characteristics. Once sovereign states completed the formal requirements 8 of treaty making in 1994 the strategic, political and economic interests 9 of the major powers and the corporations that drove the creation of the 1011 GATS were obliterated from the legal discourse. Its principles and rules 1 that privilege capital became intrinsically valid and indisputable: in the 2 time-honoured words of Frederic Engels, ‘the juristic form is, in consequence, 3 made everything and the economic content nothing’ (Engels quoted in Hunt, 4 1993, p 19). 5 The pivotal ideological claim of international law is its universality. In 6 practice, the states that write the script construct a fictitious legal universe 7 that reflects their own image and interests. The rest of the world is excluded 8 from international society, then readmitted on positivist terms that 9 subordinate and disempower them, reshaping their legal, political and 20111 economic systems according to Western norms (Anghie, 2005, p 60). In 1 Gayatri Spivak’s words, ‘the coloniser constructs himself as he constructs 2 the colony’ (quoted by Anghie, 2005, p 1). Societies allegedly consent to 3 this subordination through the state’s exercise of its executive treaty-making 4 powers, even when that conflicts with the national constitution, domestic 5 laws or other international treaty obligations. International law conceals 6 the underlying paradox: sovereign states represent the people who are 7 presumed to have consented to rules that conflict with domestic laws to 8 which they are also presumed to have consented. The formal equality of 9 sovereign states under international law also disguises their substantive 30111 inequality. Relatively powerless states employ whatever institutional vehicles 1 and technical arguments they can to leverage their position and vent their 2 opposition within the predetermined framework – as seen constantly in the 3 trade in services context. 4 International law legitimises this hierarchy through the binary of the 5 universal/civilised/developed versus the particular/uncivilised/undeveloped. 6 Tony Anghie provides the geopolitical and historical context for understanding 7 this hierarchy and the institutions and instruments of international law that 8 perpetuate it. 9 Trade rules have been integral to the ‘civilising mission’ ever since the 40111 invasion of the Americas and the granting of the East India Company’s 1 charter in the sixteenth century. Anghie observes that ‘non-European 2 sovereignty suffered – and continues to suffer – a particular vulnerability 3 that arises from the system of economic power into which it was integrated 44111 even as it became sovereign’ (Anghie, 2005, p 195). The subordination of Introduction 19

1111 colonial economies to the metropole continued through the mandate system 2 of tutelage after the First World War, which posited integration into the 3 international economy as the best development option. 4 After the Second World War, the Bretton Woods institutions of the IMF 5 and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World 6 Bank) became the successors to the mandate era. As creatures of the major 7 powers, they ensured an economic structure that replicated colonial and 8 comprador relations both with and within newly independent states. That 9 power was legitimised by a new discourse based on economics. ‘Uncivilised’ 1011 societies became ‘developing’ states that were urged by the international 1 financial institutions to become the agents of their own development. The 2 end-goal was a market economy that promised a win-win outcome. 3111 ‘Development’ financing from those institutions was complemented by the 4 neutral rules of non-discrimination and market access for the export of 5 goods inscribed within the GATT – a treaty described by RH Snape as 6 being constructed ‘out of the old trade agreement lumber ready at hand’ 7 (quoted in Shukla, 2000, p 2). The political hierarchy of imperial powers 8 and former colonies became redefined as abstract contractual relations 9 between the multilateral lending institutions and their state clients, and 20111 among Contracting Parties to the GATT: 1 2 The old international law of conquest created the inequalities that the 3 new international law of contracts perpetuates, legalises and substantiates 4 when it ‘neutrally’ enforces the agreements, however one-sided, entered 5 into by sovereign Third World states. 6 (Anghie, 2005, p 241) 7 8 The Bretton Woods version of ‘development’ was confronted by the desire 9 of most newly independent countries to match their juridical sovereignty 30111 with genuine economic and political self-determination. Achieving this meant 1 breaking free of the resource bondage that ‘legally’ transferred the economic 2 surplus from the colonial periphery to the imperial centre. The Group of 3 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement emerged as the collective voices of what 4 became known as the Third World. However, rather than jettison a system 5 of international law whose hostile premises they had played no role in 6 formulating, their intellectuals sought to frame an anti-colonial position 7 within its institutional and intellectual boundaries. 8 Using their numerical majority within the United Nations (UN), 9 Third World states moved to assert the doctrine of state responsibility over 40111 Western-established protections for foreign investments, and to claw back 1 unconscionable foreign concessions to exploit their minerals (Schrijver, 2 1997). In 1974–5 the New International Economic Order spelt out a platform 3 for restitution and the realignment of North–South relations through stable 44111 commodity prices, infant industry protection and preferential access to First 20 Serving whose interests?

1111 World markets. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2 (UNCTAD), first convened in 1964, generated momentum for the inclusion 3 of Part IV: Development in the GATT. UNCTAD came to be seen as the 4 institutional vehicle through which the Third World could find its voice, but 5 still within the economic parameters set by the Western powers. The OECD 6 was formed in 1961 as the institutional vehicle for the industrialised powers 7 to develop a collective position that would reinforce the economic agenda 8 of the IMF, World Bank and GATT and neutralise the emergent Third 9 World bloc within the UN. The OECD became the direct counterfoil 1011 to UNCTAD after 1964, a role it maintained during the gestation and 1 negotiation of the GATS. 2 International economic law now assumed a new form that blended public 3 and private spheres. Multinational companies were imbued with legal 4 personality and a quasi-sovereign status to enforce contractual and property 5 rights in international legal forums. Over time, the blend of international 6 law and private behaviour generated an ‘increasing interdependence in which 7 political, legal and economic governance mechanisms clash and mesh at 8 multiple levels’ (Shaffer, 2003, p 8). That privileged relationship was central 9 to the Uruguay round negotiations on services and intellectual property and 20111 became normative through the resulting texts. 1 By the 1990s the new pathway to ‘civilisation’ was the participation of 2 ‘developing countries’ in the emerging global economy through free markets 3 and trade liberalisation agreements. Case study 3 describes how a self-styled 4 ‘epistemic community’ assumed the mantle of enlightened evangelists 5 who preached the virtue of liberalising policies and pro-market regulations 6 to govern services (Drake and Nicolaidis, 1992). ‘Developing’ and ‘least 7 developed’ countries were promised a share of the gains from increased 8 global welfare, provided they participated with self-discipline and enthusiasm 9 and abandoned the failed beliefs, practices and institutions of the past. 30111 The negotiation of the GATS during the Uruguay round heralded a new 1 assault on the regulatory sovereignty of Southern governments, or to use the 2 current euphemism, their ‘policy space’. Enduring asymmetries between 3 North and South pervaded the new international division of labour. Since 4 1994, the GATS has expanded into a multilayered trade in services regime 5 that, this book concludes, is ultimately unsustainable. The globally integrated, 6 services-driven economy is vulnerable to systemic crises, politically unstable 7 because it generates inequalities of wealth and power that provoke resistance 8 and ecologically untenable because it cannibalises nature’s scarce resources. 9 At an ideological level, the social paradigm of services has remained resilient 40111 in the face of neoliberalism, as has the expectation that national governments 1 will regulate for social objectives. Those fractures are symptomatic of the 2 deeper contradictions that infect neoliberal globalisation. 3 The first four chapters examine the trade in services regime itself. Chapter 44111 1 provides a critical and contextual reading of the legal texts. Chapter 2 Introduction 21

1111 recounts the contested origins of the GATS, which are echoed in the 2 North/South tensions that paralysed the Doha round and the GATS 2000 3 negotiations. Chapter 3 links these developments to the role of the IMF, 4 World Bank and WTO in advancing the ideological, institutional, policy 5 and operational ‘coherence’ of neoliberalism. Chapter 4 explains the failure 6 of the technocratic project of ‘socio-regulatory transformation’ to suppress 7 the traditional notions of public services, and the iconic status of water in 8 the campaigns against the trade in services agreements. 9 Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the factors of production in the transnational 1011 services markets: financial services (the brain), telecommunications (the 1 highway) and people (the labour). The commodification and reification of 2 these factors through trade in services agreements disguise the profound 3111 asymmetries and instabilities in the global services economy, and screen 4 out the social impacts of pro-market regulation on workers, businesses 5 and communities. Chapter 7 contrasts the treatment of culture and higher 6 education in trade in services agreements as static commodities with the 7 dialogical understanding of cultural and knowledge exchange as the 8 foundations of complex democracy. 9 Chapter 8 integrates the legal texts on trade in services, agriculture, goods 20111 and investment measures to reveal their systemic impacts on social and 1 environmental sustainability. It then traces how the GATS (rather than the 2 Agreement on Agriculture) operates to entrench the control of agribusinesses 3 and mega-retailers over the global food production and supply chain. 4 Chapter 9 draws disturbing links between energy services, national security, 5 militarisation and peak oil, and highlights the emerging counter-hegemonic 6 role of oil-rich Southern countries, notably Venezuela. 7 Each of these chapters is brought to life with two case studies that provide 8 an alternative entry point for readers who struggle with the technicalities. 9 The stories they tell range from call centres in Bangalore, the tourist 30111 zone in Cancún and privatised pensions in Chile and Britain to the global 1 empires of Wal-Mart and Carrefour and the incendiary potential of the 2 WTO accession for Iran and Iraq. More institutionally focused case studies 3 document how the corporate lobby launched the GATS in the 1980s, and 4 their eclipse by the anti-GATS campaigners since 2000, and explain the 5 crippled state of the GATS 2000 negotiations and the rise of ‘competitive 6 imperialism’ among the major powers through new generation free trade 7 agreements (FTAs) (Bhala, 2007). The conclusion reflects on where these 8 dynamics and contradictions might lead the trade in services regime in the 9 coming decades. 40111 1 2 3 44111 Chapter 1

1111 2 Reading the GATS as ideology 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3 Economic regulation in the twenty-first century involves a complex, 4 overlapping and often incoherent web of state-sponsored market mechanisms 5 and industry self-regulation. This regulatory network criss-crosses the 6 multilateral, regional and national domains (Picciotto, 1996). Trade in 7 services agreements form one small part of this rapidly expanding and rather 8 chaotic regulatory geography. While the GATS 1994 provides the main 9 reference point for legal analysis, its structure and content have been 20111 reorganised, refined and expanded in diverse and sometimes inconsistent 1 ways through bilateral and regional agreements. 2 At one level, these treaties have to be treated as legal texts. At a deeper 3 level, the GATS and the new generation of agreements need to be understood 4 as hegemonic constructs: their role is to reshape economic and social relations 5 in ways that reflect the contemporary requirements of transnational 6 corporations. This chapter offers a critical and contextual reading of the 7 legal texts. Case study 1 examines how the major powers have attempted 8 to address the dysfunctions of the GATS on behalf of their corporations 9 in the GATS 2000 negotiations, while Case study 2 locates the services 30111 component of the bilateral and regional agreements in their geopolitical 1 context. 2 3 The GATS as legal text 4 5 The GATS 1994 began as a US proposal for a set of multilateral rules that 6 would govern all services (Chapter 2). The text that finally emerged has 7 multiple layers of horizontal disciplines, sector-specific rules, annexes and 8 country schedules of sectoral commitments, which are complemented by 9 ministerial decisions. 40111 The schedules of commitments made by each member state under Part 1 III form part of the legal text. 2 The rules and obligations of the GATS apply to ‘measures’ by a ‘Member’ 3 ‘affecting’ ‘trade in services’. These four elements are defined in Articles I:2 44111 and XVIII. Reading the GATS as ideology 23

1111 2 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 3 4 PART I SCOPE AND DEFINITION 5 Article I Scope and Definition 6 7 PART II GENERAL OBLIGATIONS AND DISCIPLINES 8 Article II Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment 9 Article III Transparency 1011 Article III bis Disclosure of Confidential Information 1 Article IV Increasing Participation of Developing 2 Countries 3111 Article V Economic Integration 4 Article V bis Labour Markets Integration Agreements 5 Article VI Domestic Regulation 6 Article VII Recognition 7 Article VIII Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers 8 Article IX Business Practices 9 Article X Emergency Safeguard Measures 20111 Article XI Payments and Transfers 1 Article XII Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of 2 Payments 3 Article XIII Government Procurement 4 Article XIV General Exceptions 5 Article XIV bis Security Exceptions 6 Article XV Subsidies 7 PART III SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS 8 Article XVI Market Access 9 Article XVII National Treatment 30111 Article XVIII Additional Commitments 1 2 PART IV PROGRESSIVE LIBERALIZATION 3 Article XIX Negotiation of Specific Commitments 4 Article XX Schedules of Specific Commitments 5 Article XXI Modification of Schedules 6 7 PART V INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 8 Article XXII Consultation 9 Article XXIII Dispute Settlement and Enforcement 40111 Article XXIV Council for Trade in Services 1 Article XXV Technical Cooperation 2 Article XXVI Relationship with Other International 3 Organizations 44111 24 Serving whose interests?

1111 2 PART VI FINAL PROVISIONS 3 Article XXVII Denial of Benefits 4 Article XXVIII Definitions 5 Article XXIX Annexes 6 Annex on Article II Exemptions 7 Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under 8 the Agreement 9 Annex on Air Transport Services 1011 Annex on Financial Services 1 Second Annex on Financial Services 2 Annex on Negotiations on Maritime Transport Services 3 Annex on Telecommunications 4 Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications 5 6 7 8 9 Measures encompass every activity that governments employ to regulate 20111 services: ‘a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, 1 or any other form’. This alone takes the GATS into the heartland of domestic 2 governance and state sovereignty. 3 Members refers to all WTO member states, who are automatically signatories 4 to the GATS. A state’s obligations extend beyond central government. It must 5 ‘take such reasonable measures as may be available’ to ensure observance of 6 its obligations and commitments by regional and local governments, and by 7 non-governmental bodies exercising delegated powers. The GATS therefore 8 binds national legislatures, sub-federal states and provinces, local authorities, 9 and licensing or professional bodies. There is obvious potential for the 30111 state’s multilateral obligations to collide with sub-national powers. States or 1 provinces in federal jurisdictions commonly exercise constitutional authority 2 over specific services, such as education or gambling. Even in unitary states, 3 local governments enjoy an increasing level of statutory authority through 4 devolution. Self-regulatory bodies have always been a feature of professions 5 and are increasingly common across services industries, such as construction 6 or real estate, given the trend to light-handed regulation. 7 This tension is mitigated by the requirement on the state only to take 8 ‘reasonable measures available’ to ensure compliance. Because ‘reasonable 9 measures’ has not been defined, the provision has a potential chilling effect 40111 on subordinate regulatory bodies. The political and social ramifications of 1 the sub-national application of GATS rules are illustrated in Case study 9, 2 which discusses the challenge by Antigua and Barbuda (Antigua) to US state 3 and federal laws on internet gambling, and in Case study 15 in relation to 44111 local government regulation of supermarkets. Reading the GATS as ideology 25

1111 The GATS net is thrown wider still by the reference in Article XVIII(c) 2 to measures affecting trade in services. ‘Affecting’ explicitly includes 3 government policies and regulations ‘in respect of’ the purchase, payments 4 and use of a service. It also extends to measures ‘in respect of’ access to 5 and use of services that are needed to supply a service that must be offered 6 to the general public and ‘in respect of’ the presence of a foreign person 7 or investment to supply a service. In the Bananas dispute brought by the 8 US and other members against the EU (Chapter 8), the WTO’s Appellate 9 Body concluded that ‘the use of the term “affecting” reflects the intent of 1011 the drafters to give a broad reach to the GATS’ and is equivalent to ‘have 1 an effect on’ (EU-Bananas, 1997b, para 220). 2 Trade in services itself is defined in terms of the cross-border movement of 3111 factors of production – information, capital and labour. These activities 4 are characterised in Article I:2 as four modes of supply. As the Introduction 5 explained, this disembodied and disaggregated discourse divests the 6 transaction of any human dimension. Relational discourses of services 7 that reflect the experience of people and communities in providing and 8 using services are displaced by a transactional description that reflects 9 the production of services by foreign corporations or personnel. Services 20111 ‘exports’ are understood in terms of the nationality of the service provider 1 and services ‘imports’ by reference to that of the consumer. This approach 2 frees the supplier and consumer from having to be located in their country 3 of origin when the transaction takes place. 4 The service itself is the subject of the first two modes: 5 6 (a) mode 1, the supply of the service across the territorial border (for 7 example, by the internet); and 8 (b) mode 2, consumption of the service abroad (for example, by a tourist). 9 30111 The other two modes refer to the supplier: 1 2 (c) mode 3, establishing a commercial presence (foreign direct investment); 3 and 4 (d) mode 4, the temporary presence of foreign personnel to deliver a service 5 (e.g. a consultant). 6 7 The ‘trade’ rubric disguises more controversial ways of understanding these 8 activities. The clearest example is mode 3. The GATS is, in part, a multilateral 9 agreement to liberalise foreign direct investment in relation to services. The 40111 services pathway has become especially important since moves to secure a 1 Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) at the OECD were rebuffed 2 in 1998, and demands from the EU for negotiations on ‘new issues’, including 3 investment, in the WTO were rejected in 2003. Many bilateral and regional 44111 treaties have abandoned the pretence that mode 3 involves trade in services 26 Serving whose interests?

1111 and integrated it into chapters on the establishment and protection of foreign 2 investment. That approach confers broader rights on investors. For example, 3 the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and many subsequent 4 US bilateral agreements allow foreign investors in services from one party 5 to seek damages for ‘measures tantamount to expropriation’ directly from 6 another state party through an arbitral tribunal. 7 Since the late 1990s both the global balance of services exports across 8 these modes and the political dynamics of services negotiations have shifted 9 dramatically. This shift reflects the growing importance of physical and 1011 ‘virtual’ migration (e-services) for countries that are the major sources, 1 mainly in the South, and to destinations, mainly in the North. Most attention 2 is focused on mode 4, which facilitates the cross-border movement of the 3 labour factor in the production of services. While the GATS Annex on 4 Movement of Natural Persons asserts that every member retains the right 5 to regulate entry and temporary stay in its territory, such measures must 6 not be applied in ways that nullify or impair the member’s scheduled 7 commitments. Hence, mode 4 commitments can constrain immigration laws 8 and policies (Chapter 6). 9 Legally, the four modes are unconnected. Organically, modes 3 and 4 20111 are essential to transnational corporate expansion. Most Northern 1 governments therefore seek commitments that link the two modes. Although 2 the Annex and the definition of mode 4 cover all categories of services 3 workers, Northern governments also routinely treat the GATS as conferring 4 rights on intra-corporate transferees, professionals and other élite personnel, 5 and reject equivalent rights for lower strata services workers. This limited 6 coverage is often more explicit in bilateral agreements. 7 Conversely, the governments of many Southern countries are reluctant 8 to make binding commitments under mode 3; but they see mode 4 as 9 providing a way to secure temporary access to foreign labour markets for 30111 their semi- and unskilled service workers. Governments in countries such 1 as India view mode 4 (especially movement of IT professionals) and mode 2 1 (which covers back office operations and call centres) as complementary 3 sources of comparative advantage in the international services economy. 4 Further complexities over the modes arise when considering e-commerce 5 transactions, which for legal purposes must take place in one jurisdiction. 6 These can be viewed from the location of the purchaser as mode 1 (in which 7 fewer commitments have been made) or the supplier as mode 2 (which has 8 many more commitments). The US-Gambling case appears to have settled 9 that question in favour of mode 1 (Case study 9) (Mattoo and Wunsch, 40111 2004, p 11). 1 ‘Trade in services’ is defined in terms of the supply of services through 2 these four modes. Article XXVIII defines ‘supply’ as including the 3 ‘production, distribution, marketing, sale and delivery’ of a service, a 44111 description that incorporates almost every step in the service supply chain Reading the GATS as ideology 27

1111 (Chapter 8) and potentially overlaps with other discrete services sectors, 2 such as distribution or advertising. Footnote 9 to Article XVI: Market Access 3 says a commitment does not cover measures that limit ‘inputs’ for the supply 4 of services. However, there is no clear boundary between inputs and the 5 various elements of ‘supply’. Moreover, that caveat only applies to market 6 access limits in Article XVI(c); some commentators argue that quantitative 7 limits on inputs to services, such as water to hotels, could breach other 8 market access categories (Ostrovsky et al., 2003, pp 33–4). 9 These expansively defined ‘measures of a Member affecting trade in 1011 services’ are subject to (largely) horizontal disciplines in Part II and sector 1 specific commitments on market access, national treatment and other 2 commitments in Part III. 3111 4 General obligations and disciplines 5 6 The organising principles of the GATS are partly adapted from the GATT 7 and partly experimental. The South/North divisions that pervaded the 8 Uruguay round, as discussed in Chapter 2, are translated into the text through 9 the principles of development and progressive liberalisation, respectively. 20111 The Preamble acknowledges there is an imbalance between the global 1 North and South in national and international services markets: 2 3 Desiring to facilitate the increasing participation of developing countries 4 in trade in services and the expansion of their service exports including, 5 inter alia, through the strengthening of their domestic services capacity 6 and its efficiency and competitiveness; [and] 7 Taking particular account of the serious difficulty of the least 8 developed countries in view of their special economic situation and 9 their development, trade and financial needs; . . . 30111 1 This recognition was hard won. Yet it is largely hortatory, because the 2 references to development in the text are weak. Article IV: Increasing 3 Participation of Developing Countries repeats the preambular commitment 4 to enhance the capacity, effectiveness and competitiveness of services 5 exports from developing and least developed countries. But instead of 6 enforceable rights, it merely creates expectations on developed countries to 7 schedule their commitments with beneficent intentions. There is no reference 8 to ‘special and differential treatment’ for developing countries, only to 9 facilitating their participation in the global services economy. 40111 There is little room to interpret the text creatively. The Preamble describes 1 the objective of establishing a framework of multilateral principles and rules 2 as ‘the expansion of [trade in services] under conditions of transparency 3 and progressive liberalization and as a means of promoting the economic 44111 growth of all trading partners and the development of developing countries’ 28 Serving whose interests?

1111 (emphasis added). However, the potential to interpret ‘and’ disjunctively is 2 neutralised by the subsequent objective of ‘early achievement of progressively 3 higher levels of liberalization through successive rounds of multilateral 4 negotiations aimed at promoting the interests of all participants on a mutually 5 advantageous basis and at securing an overall balance of rights and 6 obligations’. Part IV: Progressive Liberalization sets the mechanisms for 7 securing this goal, effectively subsuming development within the process of 8 progressive liberalisation. Although the development rhetoric lacks legal 9 potency, it has nevertheless been important strategically as a basis for 1011 advocacy and passive resistance by Southern governments. 1 Progressive liberalisation emerges from the text as the overriding objective. 2 It is to be advanced in two ways. The first, through future rounds of 3 negotiations, is discussed below. The second is through regional (including 4 bilateral) trade agreements that involve a WTO member (Case study 2). 5 Under Article V: Economic Integration any Regional Trade Agreement 6 (RTA) must deepen the existing levels of liberalisation of members by reducing 7 or removing discrimination between the parties across a ‘substantial’ range 8 of sectors, with no a priori exclusions. In other words, they must be ‘GATS- 9 plus’ in content, and can be ‘GATS-minus’ by removing flexibilities that 20111 restrict liberalisation. Unlike the comparable provisions in Article XXIV 1 of the GATT, developing countries are allowed some greater flexibility, 2 particularly in the degree of liberalisation and the time frame for 3 implementation. What that means remains to be tested and is hostage to 4 the power politics of bilateral and regional negotiations. There is additional 5 leeway for labour integration agreements under Article V bis because they 6 7 are assumed to deal with entry to employment markets, whereas mode 4 8 of delivering trade in services purports to provide for temporary entry by 9 natural persons into a country’s services markets (Chapter 6). 30111 The GATS framework imports the primary GATT pillar of non- 1 discrimination through Article II: Most Favoured Nation and Article XVII 2 National Treatment. The MFN provision requires service providers and 3 services from all WTO members to be given equally favourable treatment; 4 national treatment requires foreign providers and services to be treated 5 at least as favourably as their domestic equivalent. The concept of ‘non- 6 discrimination’ is imbued with the virtuous human rights discourse of 7 equality and equity. Contextualised, MFN and national treatment 8 intrinsically benefit the transnational enterprises that enjoy the advantages 9 of scale, technology, research and development capacity, access to capital, 40111 distribution networks, marketing and brand recognition, combined with 1 the patronage of major powers. Articles II and XVII guarantee those 2 corporations the right to compete on an equal footing with local services firms 3 and less endowed competitors from poorer countries. The deep digital divide 44111 heightens their advantage, as very few Southern governments can genuinely Reading the GATS as ideology 29

1111 compete in providing, or survive against, cheaper cross-border delivery of 2 services (Case studies 9 and 11). 3 Non-discrimination appeals to negotiators as an organising principle when 4 it applies to others, but is problematic for sensitive sectors at home. Annex 5 II permits the service ‘importing’ country to lodge exemptions to MFN. There 6 was only one opportunity to do so, in 1994. These exemptions were, in 7 principle, to run for a maximum of 10 years to 2005; however, most remain. 8 The adoption of a ‘positive list’ approach to schedules in the GATS allows 9 members to limit their exposure to national treatment, as discussed below. 1011 Disciplines on domestic regulation are often represented as the GATS 1 equivalent of disciplines on non-tariff barriers to trade in goods. The Preamble 2 recognises ‘the right of Members to regulate, and to introduce new 3111 regulations, on the supply of services within their territories in order to 4 meet national policy objectives’. However, Article VI: Domestic Regulation 5 restricts the right of governments to choose how they regulate. This reaches 6 far beyond any traditional notion of ‘trade’ into a government’s core 7 responsibilities. A member cannot limit the application of Article VI in its 8 schedule of sectoral commitments. 9 Article VI relates to three forms of domestic regulation: qualification 20111 requirements (for example, nursing or teaching); licensing requirements 1 (for example, to run taxis, casinos or rubbish tips, or to work as a surveyor 2 or lawyer); and technical standards (for example, water purity or building 3 codes). These regulations are required to be ‘based on objective and 4 transparent criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the service’ 5 and to be ‘not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the 6 7 service’. Strong resistance to this incursion on regulatory sovereignty meant 8 the rules were initially restricted under Article VI:5 to services on which a 9 government made a market access and/or national treatment commitment 30111 and where the measure in question could reasonably have been anticipated 1 at the time that commitment was made. 2 A further general obligation in Article VIII: Monopolies and Exclusive 3 Service Supplier requires members to ensure that these kinds of operations 4 do not undermine their commitments through the cross-subsidisation of 5 activities in competitive markets. The underlying aim is to promote the 6 unbundling of monopolies and open the more profitable aspects of the 7 operations to competition and foreign ownership. As one prominent financial 8 sector lobby group observed: ‘Opening service markets to foreign providers 9 is self-evidently inconsistent with maintaining public monopolies’ (IFSL 40111 (International Financial Services London), 2003, p 4). The Article VIII 1 obligation is not enforceable but only subject to requests for information. Basic 2 telecommunications monopolies are governed by their own reference paper, 3 which was interpreted expansively in the Mexico-Telecommunications 44111 litigation (Chapter 5). 30 Serving whose interests?

1111 Sectoral commitments 2 Part III of the GATS contains three articles that apply only in relation to 3 services committed in country-specific schedules. 4 Article XVI: Market Access proscribes the policy tools that a government 5 can legitimately use to shape its services markets in the sectors that it commits 6 in its schedule, subject to any explicit limitations. The reason the ‘measures’ 7 are targeted is not because they are discriminatory. Article XVI prohibits 8 quantitative or qualitative restrictions on the number of operators, operations 9 or consumers, whether the suppliers are foreign or national. The objective 1011 is to liberalise domestic services markets, on the rationale that such 1 restrictions are likely to impede foreign access. 2 The article provides a closed list of prohibited measures. Governments 3 that make a full market access commitment cannot apply numerical quotas 4 that restrict the number of firms or outputs, or the value of services, or 5 6 impose limitations through monopolies or exclusive service suppliers. They 7 cannot prescribe the legal form of suppliers, such as joint ventures, or 8 limit foreign shareholding. Nor can they impose economic needs tests, 9 which would effectively limit the market. Contextualised, Article XVI could 20111 prohibit local content quotas for television, limitations on the number of 1 hotels or rubbish dumps in a sensitive locale, restrictions on the floor size 2 of big box department stores, requirements that foreign universities operate 3 through joint ventures, or conditions that allow temporary entry for foreign 4 professionals only where there is proven economic need. 5 Article XVII: National Treatment prohibits discrimination between 6 national and foreign services providers of ‘like’ services and suppliers. 7 ‘Likeness’ could be interpreted broadly or narrowly. It is uncertain, for 8 example, whether the supply of a library service or medical diagnosis by 9 internet and in person would be considered ‘like’, based on the principle 30111 of ‘technological neutrality’. 1 One of the most controversial aspects of national treatment is its 2 application to subsidies. Taxpayer subsidies represent a collective investment 3 at national and local levels in social objectives, such as universal access 4 to essential services, community cohesion, cultural diversity, regional 5 development and employment. Neoliberal policies have eroded direct 6 universal subsidies in favour of targeted vouchers, user charges, and 7 ‘co-payments’ to public and private providers. Despite (or because of) that 8 shift, there is still strong resistance in many countries to paying public 9 subsidies to foreign firms, especially offshore. The GATS negotiating 40111 guidelines in both 1993 and 2001 say national treatment ‘applies to subsidies 1 in the same way that it applies to all other measures’, meaning ‘any subsidy 2 which is a discriminatory measure within the meaning of Article XVII would 3 have to be either scheduled as a limitation on national treatment or brought 44111 into conformity with that Article.’1 A number of countries, such as Australia Reading the GATS as ideology 31

1111 and Canada, scheduled such reservations. Others, such as New Zealand, 2 have argued that the status of subsidies is ambiguous – in their case, probably 3 to cover for a scheduling error made in 1994 (Kelsey, 2003, p 20). 4 It is arguable, however, that national treatment does not apply to subsidies 5 under mode 1. The guidelines say: 6 7 There is no obligation in the GATS which requires a Member to take 8 measures outside its jurisdiction. It therefore follows that the national 9 treatment obligation in Article XVII does not require a Member to 1011 extend such treatment to a service supplier located in the territory of 1 another Member. 2 3111 This is only a guideline to negotiators. The same assurance is not stated in 4 the Agreement itself or in any formal interpretation by the WTO Council 5 for Trade in Services. GATS defenders commonly argue that no government 6 would test this through a dispute, as it would endanger their own subsidies 7 regimes and intensify opposition to the agreements. That may be true, but 8 it can still have a chilling effect on government decisions. 9 The third limb of Part III, Article XVIII: Additional Commitments provides 20111 for the scheduling of other measures affecting trade in services. This primarily 1 refers to domestic regulations. For example, this column in the schedule 2 is where a government records its acceptance of, and limitations on, the 3 Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications concluded in 1998 (Chapter 4 5). This is also where the GATS-plus commitments made by acceding 5 members as the price of entry to the WTO, such as promises to privatise, 6 are recorded (Chapter 4). 7 Commitments under these three articles are inscribed in members’ 8 schedules. Article XX: Schedules of Specific Commitments in Part IV: 9 Progressive Liberalization mandated a positive list approach, which gives 30111 governments the right not to schedule a particular service and to retain some 1 limitations when they do. Making a commitment binds them to maintain the 2 specified level of liberalisation. However, the positive listing of sectoral 3 commitments applies only to the rules in Part III of the agreement. It provides 4 no protection from rules on recognition of qualifications (Article VII), 5 monopolies and exclusive service suppliers (Article VIII), restrictive business 6 practices (Article IX), international transfers and payments (Article XI) and 7 aspects of domestic regulation (Article VI). The negotiating guidelines and 8 procedures adopted during the Uruguay round established a process of 9 bilateral negotiations based on requests and offers between individual 40111 governments. What they agreed to was then multilateralised and recorded in 1 the member’s schedule. 2 The use of a negative list in many bilateral agreements vastly reduces 3 the flexibility available to governments and correspondingly increases the 44111 scheduling risks. Negative lists typically involve two annexes, one listing 32 Serving whose interests?

1111 all sectors exempted permanently and the second reserving specific measures 2 at their current level of liberalisation (‘standstill’). Future governments find 3 their hands tied by their predecessors, with a presumption of further 4 liberalisation, whether a positive or negative list is used. 5 Services exporters complain that the combination of the GATS text, 6 appendices and schedules ‘are not user friendly and are somewhat opaque’ 7 (Feketekuty, 1999). It is equally difficult for national policy makers, 8 government regulators and local authorities to assess what constraints will 9 apply to their current and prospective ‘measures’ – let alone for a local 1011 firm, trade union or community to understand them. It takes considerable 1 technical skill to deconstruct the complex architecture of market access, 2 national treatment and additional commitments in the four modes of supply, 3 across the 11 sectors and more than 160 sub-sectors of services that are 4 defined by product classification, and supplemented by horizontal 5 commitments and limitations that apply across all services. An extract from 6 the US schedule is provided in Case study 9. The terminology of the schedules 7 is counter-intuitive: the entry ‘none’ means there are no limitations on the 8 member’s commitment of that service sub-sector in that particular mode 9 and sub-sector, rather than no commitments. 20111 Such complexities create the risk of unintended commitments. An analysis 1 by the WTO secretariat in 1999 concluded that 1,420 of 7,040 market 2 access commitments in GATS schedules appeared to be mis-scheduled.2 Even 3 major powers have incurred obligations they did not foresee. The EU failed 4 to list an MFN exception for distribution services in the case of banana 5 imports from the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states under the 6 Lomé agreements (Chapter 8). In its report on the internet gambling case, 7 the WTO Appellate Body accepted that the US probably never intended to 8 make commitments on gambling, but found it was bound nevertheless (Case 9 study 9). There is a much higher risk of error by poor countries with minimal 30111 resources. Moreover, the implications of commitments are literally 1 impossible to predict. The US-Gambling case applied the principle of 2 ‘technological neutrality’ so that a new means of delivering a service within 3 a particular mode of supply is automatically covered by a commitment, 4 even if the technology did not exist when the commitment was made. 5 Services are identified in the schedules using the Services Sectoral 6 Classification List, known as W/120.3 The list is based on the United Nations 7 Central Product Classification. CPCs are the ultimate symbol of fetishisation 8 – ‘the substitution of one thing for another, together with a loss or lack of 9 awareness, a forgetting, that the substitution has taken place’ (Kerruish, 40111 1991, p 166). The term ‘product’ classification and identification by letters 1 and numerals denote a commodity that is devoid of social content or context. 2 Dentistry is a business service, postal delivery a communications service, 3 rubbish dumps and sanitation are environmental services, water pipelines 44111 are transportation, and pensions are financial services. Reading the GATS as ideology 33

1111 W/120 has 11 categories and over 160 sub-sectors. So services are not 2 only abstracted, they are also fragmented. A unitary and integrated service 3 as experienced by a family or community spans a number of sub-sectors. 4 As Chapter 7 explains, a social phenomenon such as cultural exchange is 5 reconstituted through categories that include: Business: publishing, printing, 6 translating; Audio-visual: projecting, production, broadcasting; Cultural 7 services: entertainment, libraries, archives, museums; Distribution: retail. 8 When a government privatises or unbundles a previously integrated public 9 service, the relevant activities may also be dispersed across a broad range 1011 of seemingly unconnected sub-categories. Private finance initiatives (PFIs) 1 that operate schools, hospitals or railways typically involve consortia of 2 construction, finance and facilities management companies, with multiple 3111 sub-contracts in services such as catering, building maintenance, cleaning, 4 databases and technical testing (Case study 7). 5 This fragmentation, and the uneven level of commitments by members 6 across various sectors and between countries, is also counter-productive 7 for corporations – just what the adoption of generic trade rules was 8 intended to overcome. That effect is compounded because the W/120 9 classifications are based on the first provisional UN CPC dated 1993. The 20111 CPC has been updated twice: CPC1.0 in 1998 elaborated on services; 1 and CPC1.1 in 2002 included telemarketing, payroll services and business 2 support services (Mattoo and Wunsch, 2004, p 12, fn 37). A further update 3 was planned for 2007. However, W/120 is still based on the 1993 version. 4 Its static nature renders it partly obsolete. Updating it would create new 5 inconsistencies and potentially alter the meaning of original commitments. 6 In a further complication, W/120 is not mandatory, and some countries, 7 notably the US, have made up their own classifications. 8 The US did secure more commercially relevant classifications on financial 9 services and basic telecommunications in negotiations that continued after 30111 the Uruguay round (Chapter 5). Attempts were made to extend that approach 1 to other sectors during the GATS 2000 negotiations. Proposals included 2 the clustering of sub-sectors in ways that reflect the functional operations 3 of corporations in particular activities, model schedules for broadly defined 4 sectors, and horizontal commitments for particular modes of supply. These 5 approaches formed the basis of the (so far unmet) plurilateral requests tabled 6 in February 2006. The greater flexibility of bilateral negotiations has seen 7 the adoption of updated classifications and model schedules that better reflect 8 the commercial realities of their services industries. But, in doing so, they 9 add to the overall incoherence between the various agreements. 40111 Article XXI: Modification of Schedules permitted a government to modify 1 or withdraw its GATS commitments, on notice, after 1998. But retracting 2 a liberalisation commitment is considered a retrograde step, so it is extremely 3 difficult and costly to amend a schedule. A government has to negotiate a 44111 compensatory adjustment with any affected member(s) who object that the 34 Serving whose interests?

1111 change would alter the existing ‘mutually advantageous’ balance of 2 commitments. The adjustment would involve the liberalisation of services 3 to an equivalent value of the loss demonstrated by the member who objects. 4 That new concession would then be multilateralised. Disagreements can be 5 referred to the dispute settlement process. 6 This complex mechanism has been used only twice. The EC took three 7 years to negotiate adjustments to the schedules of its newly acceded members. 8 The US Trade Representative (USTR) announced in May 2007 that the US 9 would amend the commitment on ‘recreational services’ that was the subject 1011 of the adverse ruling in US-Gambling, rather than bring its domestic laws 1 into compliance. The USTR insisted that no, or minimal, compensation was 2 warranted because no government could realistically have believed the US 3 intended to make a commitment that conflicted with its domestic law (Case 4 study 9). At the same time, the US wants to minimise the risk of creating a 5 precedent, if other members come under domestic pressure to ‘clarify’ their 6 schedules by effectively withdrawing commitments. 7 Article XIX: Negotiation of Specific Commitments mandates successive 8 rounds of market access negotiations, to begin no later than 2000 and 9 periodically thereafter. The negotiating process could be ‘bilateral, plurilateral 20111 or multilateral’. The Council for Trade in Services is required to conduct an 1 ‘assessment of trade in services in overall terms and on a sectoral basis with 2 reference to the objectives of the Agreement’, including those on development. 3 This must be done before guidelines and procedures are established – a 4 prerequisite that was effectively bypassed in the GATS 2000 round. 5 The overriding objective of further negotiations is to achieve ‘a progressively 6 7 higher level of liberalization’. The comfort language promises ‘due respect 8 for national policy objectives and the level of development of individual 9 members, both overall and in individual sectors’, and to ‘promot[e] the interests 30111 of all participants on a mutually advantageous basis and to securing an overall 1 balance of rights and obligations’. But permissible national policy objectives 2 are intrinsically constrained by the trade liberalisation paradigm itself. 3 Moreover, the virtue of maintaining the existing balance is misleading unless 4 it is contextualised in terms of market and negotiating power. 5 6 Exclusions 7 8 The GATS appears to establish a number of carve-outs. Two provisions 9 are held out as excluding the coverage of ‘public services’. Their meaning 40111 is the subject of heated disagreement, as discussed in Chapter 4. 1 Article I.3(b) of the GATS, repeated in most bilaterals, excludes ‘services 2 supplied in the exercise of governmental authority’, but only where they 3 are supplied on a non-commercial and non-competitive basis. This reflects 44111 the neoliberal premise that all services that have a commercial dimension Reading the GATS as ideology 35

1111 should be subject to market disciplines that maximise transparency, efficiency 2 and competition, whether they are provided by or through the state 3 or in the private sector. The application of corporatisation, privatisation, 4 outsourcing, public-private partnerships (PPPs) and PFIs to what are 5 traditionally considered public services has severely limited the scope of this 6 exception. As a result, governments are constrained in their ability to regulate 7 such services in the way they consider most appropriate to achieve their 8 objectives, such as social cohesion, or universal access, or to meet their 9 international and constitutional obligations. 1011 Some mechanisms for providing publicly funded services, such as PPPs and 1 PFIs arguably fall within the second, temporary exclusion under Article XIII: 2 Government Procurement. Again, that provides only a partial carve-out. It 3111 does not extend to government purchases ‘with a view to commercial resale 4 or with a view to use in the supply of services for commercial sale’. The 5 exclusion also applies only to the MFN, market access and national treatment 6 rules. As noted, PFIs generally operate through special purpose vehicles with 7 multiple layers of subcontracting; this makes it unclear where the procurement 8 relationship ends and commercial contracts cut in (Case study 7). 9 Where services fall outside these exemptions, governments must rely on 20111 the limited range of general exceptions. Measures that breach a member’s 1 obligations can be justified under three provisions. 2 The language of Article XIV: General Exceptions broadly mirrors the 3 GATT Article XX. The specific grounds for the exception must be met; this 4 includes a ‘necessity’ test, which means convincing a tribunal of trade experts 5 that the particular measure adopted was not ‘unnecessarily’ restrictive of 6 foreign suppliers. The chapeau then ensures the primacy of the liberalisation 7 objective by requiring that such ‘measures are not applied in a manner 8 which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 9 between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 30111 on trade in services’. 1 However, the grounds specified in Article XIV are narrower than its 2 GATT counterpart in ways that significantly limit the scope to protect 3 societal interests. It maintains the exceptions ‘to protect public morals or 4 to maintain public order’ and ‘to protect human, animal or plant life or 5 health’. But it omits the potential under the GATT to adopt measures that 6 are ‘(f) imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic 7 or archaeological value’ and ‘(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible 8 natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 9 restrictions on domestic production or consumption’, or where services are 40111 ‘(e) products of prison labour’. As with the GATT, there is no reference to 1 ‘human rights’, ‘indigenous treaty obligations’ or even ‘consumer protection’. 2 The argument that minimal exceptions are needed because the positive list 3 approach to sectoral commitments provides states with sufficient protection 44111 is illogical, as that rationale would militate against any exceptions. 36 Serving whose interests?

1111 Some states have used bilateral and regional agreements to extend or 2 introduce exceptions that they failed to secure in the Uruguay round (especially 3 on culture) or to appease domestic pressures (for example, on indigenous 4 rights). Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 these 5 subsequent treaties supersede the comparable commitments between those 6 parties in the GATS, but cannot affect their obligations to other WTO members. 7 A second, complex exception is Article XIII: Security Exceptions. Its 8 wording is subtly different from the equivalent GATT Article XX. 9 Nevertheless, both provisions can be read as recognising the ultimate 1011 authority of states to take measures they deem necessary in their essential 1 security interest, and effectively withhold that action from WTO review. 2 The US has gone beyond this exclusion in some of its bilateral agreements 3 to make trade concessions conditional on consistency with US national 4 security policies. These issues are examined in detail in Chapter 9. 5 The third exception allows a member to adopt temporary and non- 6 discriminatory measures under Article XII in the event of serious balance 7 of payments difficulties, including restrictions on payments or transfers. 8 Such interventions are subject to ex post approval based on an assessment 9 by the IMF and following consultations with the WTO Committee on 20111 Balance of Payments Restrictions.4 Raghavan objects that the technical 1 hurdle of compliance with IMF requirements is compounded in many 2 poorer countries by a lack of objective data and human capacity (Raghavan, 3 2002, p 30). 4 The balance of payments exception is even more important than its 5 equivalent in the GATT because the GATS introduces enforceable rules 6 on capital movements, although the implications for capital account 7 convertibility are unclear (Sorsa, 1997, p 9). Under footnote 8 to Article 8 XVI: Market Access members who make sectoral commitments on cross- 9 border transactions (mode 1) must allow an unrestricted inflow and outflow 30111 of capital, where that movement is an ‘essential part of the service itself’ – 1 a term that is undefined. Countries making commitments on foreign invest- 2 ment (mode 3) must ensure at least a free inflow of capital. In addition, 3 Article XI: Payments and Transfers precludes members from imposing 4 restrictions on transfers and payments for current transactions relating to 5 their specific commitments. US bilateral agreements, beginning with 6 Singapore and Chile, have gone much further by imposing a blanket 7 prohibition on capital restrictions, even for temporary stabilisation purposes 8 during economic and financial crises (Siegel, 2004). 9 40111 Unfinished business 1 2 Four rules remained incomplete in the Uruguay round. 3 From a trade liberalisation perspective, subsidising local firms can distort 44111 the competitive services market. Article XV: Subsidies mandates the Reading the GATS as ideology 37

1111 development of any ‘necessary’ disciplines on subsidies that have ‘distortive 2 effects on trade’. The analogous term in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 3 distinguishes between subsidies that seriously distort the competitive 4 operation of world agricultural markets and those with less distorting effects. 5 The borderline is subjective and controversial. No progress has been made 6 in the GATS context. 7 Similarly, the negotiations authorised under Article XIII to bring 8 government procurement under the GATS were supposed to conclude in 1997, 9 but have made negligible progress (Chapter 5). Again, many bilateral 1011 agreements have circumvented this impasse by binding government 1 procurement of both goods and services above a threshold, subject to schedules 2 using positive or negative lists. 3111 The third piece of unfinished business involves Article X: Emergency 4 Safeguard Measures. A three-year deadline was originally set for concluding 5 negotiations on safeguard provisions; that passed, as did two extensions. 6 While Southern governments consider an emergency safeguard mechanism 7 is a pre-requisite for further liberalisation, the major powers insist it is 8 neither necessary nor technically feasible. Eight Asian governments tabled 9 a paper in March 2007 that drew on the GATT safeguard provisions. They 20111 proposed, as a threshold test, the situation where ‘domestic service suppliers 1 experience market conditions that result or are likely to result in serious 2 injury to these suppliers or seriously threaten the viability of the domestic 3 industry’.5 The GATT analogy is problematic, because the GATS includes 4 foreign investments that could be the cause of such conditions and/or their 5 potential victims (Lee, 1999). The safeguard mechanism also remains trapped 6 within the GATS logic. Any non-complying measure would be temporary 7 and could not discriminate between local and foreign, or different foreign, 8 providers. Moreover, Article X limits the relevant considerations to the 9 impact on local producers and production, and excludes interventions to 30111 address a crisis in the social function of service. 1 More progress has been made on the mandate, under Article VI:4, for 2 the Council for Trade in Services to develop any ‘necessary’ disciplines ‘to 3 ensure that measures relating to qualification requirements and procedures, 4 technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary 5 barriers to trade in services’. The placement of Article VI: Domestic 6 Regulation in Part II: General Obligations and Disciplines and its broad 7 wording suggest these disciplines were ultimately intended to apply to all 8 services, not just to those committed in a country’s schedule. 9 Some commentators have drawn sharp lines between the domestic 40111 regulation disciplines in Article VI and prohibited restrictions on market 1 access in Article XVI (discussed above). Joost Pauwelyn argues that domestic 2 regulations are only prohibited where they are discriminatory or more trade 3 restrictive than necessary, whereas the rules that apply to non-discriminatory 44111 market access restrictions are more onerous. The greater deference that is 38 Serving whose interests?

1111 given to domestic regulation reflects the fact that it often ‘goes to the social 2 and political heart of a country’s sovereignty’. He suggests that this 3 boundary was breached in the decision on US-Gambling: by treating the 4 US ban on internet gambling as a ‘zero quota’ and governed by market 5 access rules, rather than a domestic regulation, the WTO risked intruding 6 into the regulatory freedom of members ‘far beyond what was originally 7 agreed to in the WTO Treaty’ (Pauwelyn, 2005, p 133). 8 However, Pauwelyn overstates the distinction. Both provisions are highly 9 intrusive. Article VI seeks to embed a market regime for regulating services 1011 that is based on criteria of quality, competence and ability, and that screens 1 out broader social criteria, although it is currently restricted in the kinds 2 of regulations and sectors to which that applies. Article XVI likewise extends 3 beyond discriminatory ‘trade’ considerations, although its scope is limited 4 by a closed, rather than illustrative, list of prohibited measures and the 5 positive list approach to schedules. This point is reinforced by the prospect 6 of more comprehensive disciplines of general application to domestic 7 regulation under Article VI:4 and the GATS accountancy discciplines. 8 During the Uruguay round the US Coalition of Services Industries (CSI), 9 including the big accountancy firms, and the LOTIS (Liberalisation of Trade 20111 in Services Committee of International Financial Services London) financial 1 services lobby in Britain had pressed unsuccessfully for a special annex 2 on accountancy services (Arnold undated). To compensate, the Decision on 3 Professional Services in March 1995 required a Working Part to prioritise 4 accountancy in the development of domestic regulation disciplines. 5 The Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector were 6 adopted in December 1998.6 They contain light-handed, industry-driven 7 rules to govern private and public sector accounts on a global scale. Critical 8 accountants describe them as ‘Enron-style’ rules (Newberry, 2003), and 9 point out that Arthur Andersen had a major hand in writing them.7 They 30111 contain a ‘necessity test’ that requires governments to take a least trade 1 restrictive approach to regulating the accountancy profession and lists only 2 a limited number of (non-social) regulatory objectives that are accepted as 3 ‘legitimate’. These are described as ‘inter alia, the protection of consumers, 4 the quality of the service, professional competence, and the integrity of the 5 profession’.8 The disciplines do not become operative until the GATS 2000 6 negotiations conclude. Until then, governments are required to apply a 7 standstill that means they cannot strengthen their existing regulations 8 without violating the disciplines. 9 The Working Party on Professional Services was succeeded by a broader 40111 Working Party on Domestic Regulation (WPDR) with a mandate to develop 1 generally applicable disciplines. This raised the prospect that the accountancy 2 standards could be replicated for lawyers, health providers or engineers. 3 Among the most controversial proposals was one from Australia for a 44111 non-exhaustive list of ‘legitimate objectives’ for domestic regulation, and Reading the GATS as ideology 39

1111 requirements that new regulations be ‘necessary’, meaning the least trade 2 restrictive option to achieve those ‘legitimate’ objectives. These disciplines 3 would apply to all services. Governments would also ‘endeavour’ to provide 4 the opportunity for potentially affected foreign firms to comment on 5 proposed new measures that would significantly affect trade in services.9 6 At the other end of the spectrum, disciplines proposed by a cluster of 7 Southern governments would apply only to scheduled services, were sensitive 8 to the regulatory capacity of developing countries, and aimed to reduce 9 restrictive regulations affecting the temporary stay of natural persons.10 1011 In April 2007, the working party chair proposed a compromise.11 This 1 omitted an explicit reference to ‘legitimate objectives’ and a ‘necessity’ test. 2 The disciplines would also apply only to scheduled services. However, the 3111 paper proposed criteria of ‘objectivity’ and ‘relevance’, which provided a 4 back door for arguments on legitimate objectives. Further, governments 5 should make ‘best endeavours’ to provide corporations with reasonable 6 opportunities to comment on proposed new measures and respond in writing 7 to their substantive concerns (Chapter 4). Although these negotiations were 8 legally distinct from the GATS 2000, the two had become so integrated 9 that further advances on both were likely to depend on significant movement 20111 in the Doha round. 1 The GATS 1994 contained three substantive annexes, which reflected the 2 US unsatisfied ambitions for the Uruguay round (Chapter 5). The Annex on 3 Financial Services took account of national sensitivities in matters of public 4 finance and prudential regulation. At the same time, it established a broad 5 definition of financial services that went beyond the W/120 classifications to 6 include virtually every aspect of the expanding financial services industry. The 7 1994 text was also supported by an ‘understanding’ on commitments 8 in financial services that was drafted by, and primarily for, the major 9 powers. A second Annex on Financial Services mandated ongoing sectoral 30111 negotiations on financial services. The Fifth Protocol to the GATS, which 1 contained members’ revised schedules, was agreed to in November 1997. 2 The Annex on Telecommunications established rights of access for 3 foreign service providers to every member’s public telecommunications 4 network. A further Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications 5 mandated ongoing negotiations on basic, as opposed to value-added, 6 telecommunications. Again, that resulted in 1997 in revised schedules of 7 commitments, plus a Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications that was 8 modelled on the US domestic telecommunications regime. WTO member 9 governments came under heavy pressure to adopt the reference paper by 40111 amending the ‘additional commitments’ column of their schedules. 1 Pierre Sauvé and James Gillespie describe these post-Uruguay round 2 outcomes as ‘imparting a welfare-enhancing, economy-wide “user” dynamic 3 to services trade and investment liberalization’ (Sauvé and Gillespie, 2000, 44111 p 424). 40 Serving whose interests?

1111 Institutional arrangements 2 The institutional arrangements for the GATS are found in the Agreement 3 Establishing the World Trade Organization. Responsibility for governance 4 rests with all members, constituted as the Council for Trade in Services, 5 under the ultimate authority of the Ministerial Conference. In theory, they 6 operate by a convention of consensus. In practice, the major powers, 7 supported by the WTO Secretariat, dominate a process that ultimately relies 8 on exclusion and coercion (Kwa, 2003). 9 Mechanisms and rules for enforcement are set out in the Dispute Settlement 1011 Understanding (DSU). The sovereignty of member states is formally 1 recognised by requiring decisions to be adopted by the collective membership, 2 constituted as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). In contrast to the 3 disputes process under the GATT 1947, where the transgressor could veto 4 enforcement of an adverse ruling, a decision can only be rejected by a 5 consensus of WTO members. The logic of enforcement is premised on the 6 integrity of the multilateral contract and aims to ‘preserve the rights and 7 obligations of members’. The first step is consultation over an alleged breach 8 9 to achieve a mutually acceptable outcome. If that fails, the matter can proceed 20111 to a hearing before an ad hoc dispute panel and, on appeal, to the standing 1 Appellate Body. 2 Under Article 22 of the DSU a member found in breach is expected to 3 withdraw the offending measure. An offer of compensation is considered 4 a temporary, voluntary resolution. Where parties fail to agree on what 5 constitutes compliance, the DSB can authorise the suspension of concessions 6 to a value equivalent to commitments nullified by the breach. Where possible 7 these concessions are to be drawn from the same service sector and, 8 failing that, from other services. Where it is not practicable or effective to 9 do so with respect to services, and circumstances are considered serious 30111 enough, members may seek approval to cross-retaliate in goods, agriculture 1 or intellectual property. Such authorisation is rare. In December 2007, 2 Antigua was granted the right to suspend aspects of its intellectual property 3 obligations in response to the US failure to comply with the ruling on internet 4 gambling, on the grounds that it could not effectively retaliate in services 5 (Case study 9). This potentially provided Antigua with added leverage in 6 its ongoing attempts to secure compliance or more significant compensation. 7 The dispute process is intrinsically problematic. The role of panels and the 8 Appellate Body is circumscribed by Article 3.2 of the DSU, which restricts 9 them to ‘clarification’ of the legal text, albeit ‘in accordance with customary 40111 rules of interpretation of public international law’. The power of 1 ‘interpretation’ rests exclusively with state parties under Article IX:2 of the 2 Agreement Establishing the WTO. Southern governments are adamant about 3 this, because they believe that the dispute mechanism is biased in favour of 44111 the major powers and ineffectual in providing redress (Raghavan, 2000). Reading the GATS as ideology 41

1111 Yet the distinction between clarification and interpretation is illusory. 2 The GATS text is so porous that any tribunal has to engage in judicial law 3 making. The original agreement was the product of political compromise. 4 Many of its ideological constructs were experimental, at least in their 5 application to services. Deliberate ambiguities and imprecision reflect 6 matters that could not be resolved in negotiations. When these become 7 subject to dispute, the adjudicators have to ‘find’ the true meaning. The 8 panel in the Mexico–Telecommunications case remarked: 9 1011 WTO negotiators sometimes praise the political wisdom of resorting 1 to ‘constructive ambiguity’ as a diplomatic means of enabling consensus 2 on WTO rules. The limited legal task of dispute settlement findings is 3111 very different. It is to decide on the legal claims, in a particular dispute, 4 based on the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the WTO provisions concerned ‘in 5 their context’ and in light of the ‘object and purpose’ of the agreement. 6 (Mexico–Telecommunications, 2004, p 140) 7 8 The ‘ordinary meaning’, ‘context’, ‘object and purpose’ of the GATS 9 intrinsically privilege the interests of transnational services corporations, 20111 who become the legitimate, yet invisible, beneficiaries of the trade in services 1 regime. This plays out in a dynamic way, as Greg Shaffer explains: 2 3 WTO law, while formally a domain of public international law, profits 4 and prejudices private parties. . . . Private parties – particularly well- 5 connected, wealthier, and better-organized ones – attempt to use the 6 WTO legal system to advance their commercial ambitions. A more 7 effective WTO public law incites U.S. and European private legal 8 strategies, which in turn yield further WTO public law. WTO law 9 thereby becomes ‘harder’ law through which private actors exercise 30111 influence in its shadow. 1 (Shaffer, 2003, p 3) 2 3 Paradoxically, the partisan nature of the dispute settlement process 4 undermines its legitimacy. When domestic courts ‘interpret’ legislation or 5 ‘apply’ precedents they have considerable flexibility to defuse tensions 6 between competing interests. Sol Picciotto suggests the failure of the WTO 7 disputes panel and the Appellate Body to cast their net more widely has 8 undermined their ability to replicate such practices and enhance their 9 legitimacy (Picciotto, 2005). Yet their legal mandate is severely constrained. 40111 Moreover, the members of the panel and Appellate Body lack the knowledge 1 or empathy to engage with broader social and environmental considerations. 2 The DSU requires that they are drawn from the ranks of former trade 3 diplomats, negotiators and officials, or academics and other ‘experts’ with 44111 a track record of effective conduct within the trade liberalisation paradigm. 42 Serving whose interests?

1111 The reasoning in the first two disputes that dealt exclusively with the 2 GATS, Mexico-Telecommunications and US-Gambling, suggests that judicial 3 activism is likely to operate in a pro-liberalisation direction (Chapters 5 4 and Case study 9). It could be argued that the decision of the Appellate 5 Body in US-Gambling to overturn the panel finding and allow the US to 6 invoke the exception for the protection of public morals was prompted by 7 external factors, primarily to avoid a showdown with the US; but that is 8 quite distinct from empathy with human rights or environmental concerns. 9 The relationship of the GATS to other legal instruments is a further source 1011 of controversy. There is a clear hierarchy among international organisations 1 that reflects their ideological synergy (Chapter 3). The Agreement 2 Establishing the World Trade Organization mandates the WTO to co- 3 operate with the IMF and World Bank to achieve ‘greater coherence in 4 global economic policymaking’. Article XXVI: Relations with Other 5 International Organizations authorises ‘appropriate arrangements for 6 consultation and cooperation with the United Nations and its specialized 7 agencies as well as with other intergovernmental organizations concerned 8 with services’. But the GATS provides no ideological space for organisations 9 or treaties that impose conflicting obligations on WTO member states 20111 (Chapters 3 and 4). While the formal rules of the Vienna Convention seek 1 to order and reconcile international legal instruments, they are effectively 2 irrelevant in this context. The self-contained enforcement mechanisms of 3 the WTO and bilateral agreements confer supremacy on trade rules over 4 other instruments. Although the DSU recognises the application of customary 5 international law, the GATT jurisprudence in cases of conflicting multilateral 6 environmental agreements reveals the way in which the trade texts effectively 7 subordinate other treaties to the liberalisation paradigm (Pauwelyn, 2001, 8 pp 576–7). 9 In theory, the GATS text itself can be amended. In practice, that would 30111 require the consent or acquiescence of 151 fractious governments. The new 1 generation of bilateral and regional agreements is an easier route for the 2 major powers to address those dysfunctions, in the process spawning their 3 own cycle of political compromises, inconsistencies and pragmatism. 4 5 6 CASE STUDY 1 GATS 2000: GOING NOWHERE IN 7 A HURRY 8 9 The GATS Article XIX: Negotiation of Specific Commitments mandated a 40111 new round of market access negotiations to begin by 2000 ‘with a view to 1 achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization’. 2 The champions of the GATS maintained an air of optimism, and 3 foreshadowed seemingly endless possibilities for addressing its imperfections, 44111 as they prepared for GATS 2000. The extended negotiations on financial Reading the GATS as ideology 43

1111 services and basic telecommunications showed that more extensive 2 commitments and stronger rules were both achievable. Even the failure to 3 launch a ‘Millennium round’ of negotiations at Seattle in 1999 did little to 4 dent their confidence. 5 Governments encouraged, and even initiated, corporate lobbies. In 1998 6 European Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan sponsored the creation of the 7 European Services Forum (ESF) to represent powerful corporate export 8 interests in sectors such as finance, telecommunications, water and maritime 9 services. Leading advocates Pierre Sauvé and James Gillespie applauded 1011 the financial services lobby’s role in the post-Uruguay round negotiations, 1 urging them to marshal their shared transatlantic vision for GATS 2000 2 and make it 3111 4 contagious. This would encourage a greater overall dynamic of liberalization 5 within the WTO system as a whole and ensure that the GATS (and the 6 WTO more broadly) remains an efficient means of ‘civilizing’ the growing 7 integration of national economies in an orderly, predictable, fair, and 8 transparent manner. 9 (Sauvé and Gillespie, 2000, pp 424–5) 20111 Unfortunately for them, not all governments wanted to be ‘civilised’ in 1 this way. As with the Uruguay round, the GATS 2000 negotiations followed 2 a largely North/South fault-line: services exporters, mainly from the 3 North, sought to revise the GATS and secure new liberalisation, while 4 Southern governments insisted on flexibility, policy space and support for 5 development. However, the leadership of the two blocs had changed. The 6 EU, which now dominated international trade in commercial services, 7 assumed the mantle of lead demandeur from the US, India and Brazil 8 continued their pro-development stance from the Uruguay round, but India 9 had its own offensive interests and both became much more muted after 30111 they joined the inner circle of the WTO post-2003. Venezuela and Cuba 1 took over the vanguard role, while other Southern governments maintained 2 various levels active and a passive resistance. 3 It soon became clear that the development promises in the GATS 1994 4 text were a sham. Northern governments said the best way to meet their 5 development obligations was to help developing countries to liberalise and 6 participate effectively in the new negotiations. According to the US, the 7 best approach for developing countries was to make sure their consumers 8 had access to affordable, high-quality, innovative services through cross- 9 border supply and by reducing restrictions on foreign investment. It pointed 40111 to those countries who acceded after 1995 as proof that high GATS 1 commitments were not incompatible with developing country status 2 (omitting the fact that the US had extracted those commitments under threat 3 of veto), and applauded them for demonstrating ‘great leadership for the 44111 direction of the next GATS round’.12 44 Serving whose interests?

1111 Before formal negotiating guidelines and procedures were adopted, the 2 Council for Trade in Services was required under Article XIX to conduct an 3 assessment of trade in services, overall and sectorally, with reference to the 4 objectives of the agreement, specifically including Article IV on development. 5 The nature of, and process for, those assessments were not specified. 6 The WTO Secretariat started the preparatory process with an exchange 7 of information in mid-1998. Staff produced 15 background notes on the 8 economic potential, barriers and current commitments in different services 9 sectors. The Northern members argued that this satisfied the Article XIX 1011 requirement, as there was ample evidence to show the economic benefits 1 to consumers and suppliers of having open and, where necessary, well- 2 regulated services markets.13 Southern governments countered that, without 3 proper assessments, ‘it would be difficult to conclude that developing 4 countries have gained from the GATS so far’. Poor statistics and problems 5 in conducting their own assessments would make it difficult for them to 6 participate effectively. India wanted UNCTAD involved and argued for an 7 ongoing monitoring mechanism.14 8 The North won. Assessment became a parallel process.15 A ‘road map’ 9 that set out a political understanding of a work programme for the new 20111 negotiations was agreed in May 2000. The negotiating guidelines and 1 procedures were adopted in March 2001. A number of individual countries, 2 including China, Mauritius, Argentina, Zambia, Korea and Costa Rica, 3 subsequently attempted to assess the impact on them of liberalisation in 4 specific sectors, often with assistance from UNCTAD (Mashayekhi and 5 Julsaint, 2002, pp 28–34). The question of assessments was revisited in 2006, 6 when Cuba proposed that an updated compilation of these analyses should 7 form the basis for an overall assessment. As a compromise, an UNCTAD 8 paper that drew on many of the previous studies was tabled and the 9 assessments themselves were made more readily available.16 30111 Article XIX:3 also contained a nebulous provision that the negotiating 1 guidelines should include ‘modalities for the treatment of liberalization 2 undertaken autonomously’ since 1994. Southern governments argued they 3 should receive ‘credit’ for opening their markets (often implemented under 4 debt conditionality), without having to bind that liberalisation through GATS 5 commitments. India largely agreed, but was prepared to consider binding 6 its liberalisation of services such as telecommunications and education to 7 advance its export aspirations in mode 4. The US countered that it would 8 consider prior acknowledgement of recent liberalisation, provided that 9 liberalisation was subsequently bound into countries’ schedules.17 As of 40111 2007, that argument remained unresolved. 1 These were skirmishes. The real battles centred on the ‘modalities’ that 2 were inherited from the Uruguay round, especially the request and offer 3 style of negotiations, positive listing of commitments, W/120 classification 44111 list and use of inconsistent terminology in schedules. Reading the GATS as ideology 45

1111 The US interpreted the Article XIX requirement for progressive liberalisation 2 to mean that every member should open its markets in ‘a significant portion’ 3 of its economy. While the GATS 1994 was accepted as a basic framework, 4 the US complained that descriptions used in countries’ schedules were 5 imprecise and incomplete, members’ commitments were inconsistent and 6 incoherent, and there was confusion between different modes of supply. 7 The W/120 classification was obsolete and inadequate in the face of new 8 technologies. Classifications and commitments would have to change if they 9 were going to ‘reflect commercial realities [and] accurately and fully capture 1011 the service activities of our private sectors’.18 1 As far back as June 1998 Australia, followed by the European Commission 2 (EC) and the US, had begun tabling far-reaching proposals for generic or 3111 formula approaches, such as model schedules or guidelines. Their proposals 4 were actively supported by Chile, New Zealand, Hong Kong China SAR, 5 Switzerland and (a slightly reserved) Japan. Among the options they 6 suggested were horizontal commitments across all sectors or an entire mode 7 of supply (such as foreign investment), and clusters of sub-sectors that 8 spanned numerous W/120 categories. 9 Argentina, Uruguay, Turkey and Brazil reflected the views of virtually 20111 all Southern governments when they insisted that the existing architecture 1 and the request and offer approach to negotiations were essential to maintain 2 flexibility and respect for national policy objectives. They pointed to the 3 Article XIX:2 guarantee of ‘flexibility for individual developing countries 4 for opening fewer sectors, liberalizing fewer types of transactions, . . .’. 5 Moreover, the liberalisation process was required to show due respect for 6 national policy objectives ‘and the level of development of individual 7 Members’. This complemented the promise in Article IV of market access 8 in sectors and modes of export interest to developing countries. 9 The South initially prevailed on the vital question of modalities. Guidelines 30111 and Procedures for the Negotiations were adopted in March 2001, along 1 with guidelines for scheduling of sectoral commitments. The negotiating 2 guidelines reiterated the need to respect the existing GATS structure and 3 principles, and the right of members to specify commitments in sectors 4 and modes, with ‘appropriate flexibilities’ for developing and least developed 5 countries. The request-offer approach would be the main method for 6 negotiation. However, the supplementary phrase that ‘liberalization shall 7 be advanced through bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral negotiations’, 8 which was drawn directly from Article XIX:4 and the Uruguay round 9 negotiating guidelines, would later be used to justify an assault on the 40111 bilateral request and offer process.19 1 The GATS 2000 began as negotiations over market access for services. 2 Once the Doha round was launched in late 2001, it was folded into the ‘single 3 undertaking’ that created a triangular linkage of agriculture, non-agricultural 44111 market access (NAMA) and services. The Doha work programme set 46 Serving whose interests?

1111 deadlines of 30 June 2002 for members to submit initial GATS requests and 2 31 March 2003 for tabling initial offers. The round was supposed to conclude 3 no later than 1 January 2005. 4 These dates focused the minds of both the negotiators and the GATS 5 critics. The requests were treated as confidential and shrouded in secrecy. 6 However, in April 2002 the EC’s entire package of requests was leaked. 7 This generated a furore that intensified the pressure on governments not to 8 make commitments. Around 10 countries met the March 2003 deadline. 9 More offers trickled in ahead of the WTO ministerial conference in 1011 Cancún in September 2003. That meeting collapsed after different coalitions 1 of Southern governments held out over agriculture and the ‘new issues’ of 2 investment, competition, government procurement and trade facilitation. 3 Although the GATS barely featured at Cancún, the politics of the ministerial 4 changed the dynamics of the services negotiations. Brazil and India, as leaders 5 of the new Group of 20 agricultural exporting countries, joined the US and 6 EU in the ‘new Quad’ of members that now drove the Doha negotiations. 7 The paralysis that enveloped the Doha round post-Cancún infected 8 the already troubled GATS 2000 negotiations. The EC insisted it could 9 not make concessions on agriculture without some compensation for its 20111 transnationals on services. Most developing countries said they could not 1 move on services without knowing the outcome on such critical issues as 2 US cotton subsidies, export subsidies on agriculture, the erosion of trade 3 preferences and concerns over implementation. India demanded increased 4 mode 4 access for contract workers and IT specialists before making 5 concessions on agriculture and NAMA. Brazil was aggressive on agriculture 6 and more ambivalent on services. 7 In August 2004 the chair of the Trade Negotiations Committee attempted 8 to revive the Doha round by unilaterally issuing a ‘July package’.20 The 9 section on services set a deadline of May 2005 for tabling revised GATS 30111 offers. The chair of the services negotiations, Chilean Ambassador Alejandro 1 Jara, reported that only 48 initial offers had been tabled by October 2004.21 2 When May 2005 arrived, 52 initial offers (representing 76 members) had 3 been received; this left 40 outstanding, not counting least developed 4 countries.22 The demandeurs and their corporate lobbies complained there 5 were too few offers of too poor quality. 6 As the services negotiations limped along, the main demandeurs became 7 increasingly impatient. A group of OECD governments (including the 8 EC, the US, Japan, Australia, Switzerland, South Korea, Taiwan and New 9 Zealand) began floating the idea of ‘complementary approaches’ to advance 40111 their offensive interests and keep the EU actively engaged in the Doha round. 1 Despite objections, they continued meeting behind the scenes with the 2 support of Jara, and facilitated by the Secretariat. 3 Their informal papers suggested a two-tier process. ‘Quantitative’ targets 44111 would set minimum levels of commitments. ‘Qualitative’ targets would Reading the GATS as ideology 47

1111 promote ‘commercially meaningful’ liberalisation (rather than simply locking 2 in the status quo) and model schedules or checklists for particular sectors 3 or modes of supply. Their goal was to create a critical mass of commitments 4 in key sectors and increase transparency. This approach would also make 5 negotiations more time and resource efficient. 6 The most radical quantitative proposal was to create minimum 7 ‘benchmarks’. The EU circulated a non-paper in June 2005, depicting a 8 crisis that justified drastic measures. They wanted every member to commit 9 a minimum number of sectors in all modes of supply. Sensitivity to 1011 development would be reflected in different ‘levels of ambition’ for developed 1 and developing countries. Australia supported the Europeans. Others 2 contributed complicated proposals for calculating the value of existing and 3111 new commitments. In October 2005 the EC put numbers to the benchmarks: 4 developed countries should make new or improved commitments in 139 of 5 the 163 services sub-sectors, and developing countries in at least 93, including 6 the removal of all restrictions on foreign investment in those subsectors.23 7 Least developed countries would be encouraged, but not required, to make 8 commitments. The EC claimed that benchmarks maintained flexibility because 9 governments could choose which sectors to commit. 20111 The idea that countries would be compelled to make GATS commitments 1 sparked outrage. Brazil, Malaysia, South Africa and India objected that 2 the benchmarks aimed to marginalise, rather than complement, the request- 3 offer process. Worse, the rich countries would gain credit for their 1994 4 commitments; most of the new commitments would come from the South, 5 giving the developed countries a ‘round for free’. Transnational corporations 6 7 would intensify their control over international services markets and squeeze 8 out small local services providers in poorer countries. Speaking from its 9 new position of strength, Brazil took the hardest line on benchmarks, 30111 warning that departure from agreed processes could derail, rather than 1 energise, the negotiations (Khor, 2005). 2 A second ‘complementary approach’ sought to create a critical mass of 3 support for particular sectors through model schedules. Groups of like-minded 4 (services exporting) countries would design ambitious schedules on priority 5 sectors, which they would invite others (mainly developing and least developed 6 countries) to adopt. Because the idea of benchmarks was so outrageous, and 7 the negotiating guidelines referred to plurilateral methodologies, this proposal 8 attracted fewer objections. Brazil was uncomfortable, but as part of the ‘new 9 Quad’ was prepared to acquiesce. India saw possible gains from a plurilateral 40111 approach to mode 4. Critics, including Venezuela and Cuba, warned that 1 model schedules could become the new benchmarks of ambition. In the 2 intensely secretive and unequal negotiating process of the GATS, they could 3 be hard to resist, especially when accompanied by direct or indirect threats 44111 to other trade access or aid. 48 Serving whose interests?

1111 Unlike the Doha and Cancún ministerial meetings, services were shaping 2 up as a major issue for the WTO’s conference in Hong Kong in December 3 2005. The new chair of the services negotiations, Mexican Ambassador 4 Fernando de Mateo, unilaterally produced a draft text for the ministerial, dated 5 20 October. This contained a statement of principle that the basic architecture 6 of the GATS and the request-offer process would remain the main method 7 of negotiation. But it also allowed for sector- or mode-specific plurilateral 8 negotiations, multilateral approaches that could include qualitative 9 parameters, and numerical targets and indicators. Mateo said the latter, 1011 highly contested modalities could only be removed by consensus. A curt 1 statement from 14 developing countries (including Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, 2 Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Kenya, Indonesia, Malaysia, Paraguay, the 3 Philippines, Thailand, Uruguay and Venezuela) reminded him that any 4 complementary approaches had to be compatible with the GATS and the 5 negotiating guidelines. The proposals on the table for quantitative or 6 qualitative mandatory targets were not compatible. Therefore, no such 7 reference should be included in the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration.24 8 The final text of the draft declaration that was forwarded to the 9 conference omitted the reference to benchmarks. But it referred to an Annex 20111 C on services, under which members would be required to consider any 1 plurilateral requests they received. The reference to ‘Annex C’ was in square 2 brackets, indicating disagreement. Cuba and Venezuela, initially supported 3 by Kenya, the Philippines, Indonesia and South Africa, mounted a vigorous 4 campaign to have the words ‘Annex C’ – and hence the annex itself – 5 removed. India and Brazil applied enormous pressure to break down that 6 opposition. Only Venezuela and Cuba held out to the end. Annex C was 7 included in the ‘consensus’ declaration, with the protests of Cuba and 8 Venezuela ‘noted’.25 Their ambassadors later tabled a formal memorandum 9 that documented the abuses of process that occurred before and during the 30111 ministerial.26 1 The Hong Kong declaration cleared the way for groups of ‘friends’ of 2 different sectors to develop plurilateral requests and submit them by 28 3 February 2006. By the time the services negotiating ‘cluster’ was held in 4 March–April 2006 more than 20 plurilateral requests had been submitted, 5 including sectoral requests on: air transport; architecture and engineering; 6 audio-visual services; computer related; construction; distribution; (private) 7 education; energy; environmental; express delivery; financial; legal; logistics; 8 maritime; post and courier; telecommunications; plus modes 1, 3 and 4. 9 The collective nature of the drafting process restrained some of the more 40111 aggressive demandeurs. Other requests were extremely ambitious. Yet others 1 were cautious or vague. 2 The major players participated in almost all of the plurilaterals. Notable 3 exceptions reflected their areas of sensitivity, such as maritime and mode 4 44111 for the Americans and audio-visual for the Europeans. Neither the texts nor Reading the GATS as ideology 49

1111 the list of recipients was formally made public. However, each plurilateral 2 was typically directed at 20 to 25 predominantly developing countries. The 3 main targets were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Kenya, 4 Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 5 (ASEAN) countries, China, India and South Korea. The mainly developed 6 country members who made the requests were also deemed recipients. 7 Mateo declared 2006 to be the ‘hunting season’ for services. His goal 8 was to ensure that final offers were sufficiently ambitious to help bring the 9 Doha round to a conclusion. But just two days before the deadline of 31 1011 July 2006 for tabling revised offers, the Doha negotiations were suspended. 1 While the round went into hibernation, the pressure continued. The US 2 President’s fast track authority was due to expire on 30 June 2007. The 3111 US and EC identified ‘breakthrough’ sectors without which the US would 4 not actively press for Congress to renew fast track and the EC would not 5 make concessions on agriculture. A small circle of developed countries 6 set up what they called the ‘really good friends of services’. They were 7 supported by Mateo, who launched what he dubbed the ‘Enchilada talks’ 8 with the aim of engaging the larger developing countries of Brazil, India, 9 China and the big four ASEAN markets of Indonesia, Malaysia, the 20111 Philippines and Thailand. 1 Despite these efforts, only 69 initial offers (EC is one) had been tabled 2 by the time that fast track (and potentially the Doha round) expired; 3 30 of these were revised offers.27 Telecommunications and financial services 4 attracted the most offers; education, environmental and health had 5 comparatively few. 6 There was still a chance that a sudden breakthrough on agriculture and 7 NAMA would trigger an immediate movement in the services negotiations 8 and require rapid political decisions by ministers. The major demandeurs 9 therefore proposed the convening of an invitation-only ‘pledging conference’ 30111 of trade ministers from the most significant services importing and exporting 1 countries. By making this a mini-ministerial, they could exclude obstructive 2 governments such as Venezuela and Cuba, and peripheral developing 3 countries that were making demands for unskilled workers in mode 4. 4 However, that meeting would be not convened until there was enough 5 movement in agriculture and NAMA to bring pressure for a deal on services. 6 Even a face-saving compromise on domestic regulation disciplines seemed 7 unlikely without progress in the broader round. 8 The major demandeurs maintained the pressure to at least produce a 9 draft text on services to parallel those on agriculture and NAMA. Fraught 40111 discussions continued in the November 2007 services meetings on whether 1 there should be a text beyond Annex C, by when and its possible elements. 2 The US, supported by the EC, Canada, Japan and New Zealand, ‘upped 3 the ante’ by demanding an equal level of ambition for services as for the 44111 other two pillars.28 New ‘guidelines’ should instruct members to respond 50 Serving whose interests?

1111 positively to multilateral and bilateral requests and to commit at least their 2 existing levels of liberalisation, while removing further barriers. Brazil and 3 nine other members, including India, China and South Africa, tabled their 4 own room document that reasserted the essence of Annex C.29 Brazil argued 5 that Annex C, which it had helped to broker at Hong Kong, was already 6 ‘a very thin compromise’, and challenged the US and others for being 7 unwilling to liberalise in agriculture or NAMA in the way they were 8 demanding for services. Venezuela and Cuba opposed any new text, raising 9 the question of whether they could or would ultimately veto any outcome. 1011 By the end of 2007, it still seemed that the GATS 2000 might sink 1 along with the Doha round. However, even if a GATS deal was eventually 2 struck, the rules and commitments in the new generation bilateral and 3 regional agreements were already leaving the multilateral arena far 4 behind. 5 6 7 CASE STUDY 2 FTAS: GATS ON STEROIDS 8 9 Bilateral and regional trade agreements that involve even one WTO member 20111 must follow WTO, and hence GATS, rules. As the record confirms, GATS- 1 compatible agreements produce GATS-plus commitments and GATS-minus 2 flexibilities (Roy et al., 2006). The result is ‘GATS on steroids’. 3 The South Centre’s Director Yash Tandon identifies three types of 4 contemporary Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) (the term used by the 5 WTO): (1) ‘integrative partnerships’ where partners have compatible interests 6 and work on the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity to benefit the weakest 7 members; (2) ‘enforced partnerships’ where one side dictates the terms and 8 the other side either has to ‘take it or leave it’; and (3) ‘structured regionalism’ 9 30111 where the partnership is enforced and located in structures that are linked to 1 historical relationships (Shashikant and Tayob, 2007). 2 WTO researchers reported that by 2005 every member except Mongolia 3 was party to at least one of the 200-plus RTAs. Almost all followed Tandon’s 4 second or third typology. Aggressive services liberalisers, such as the US, the 5 EU, Singapore and Chile, routinely sought to push the boundaries beyond 6 what could be achieved in the WTO. At the same time, the major powers 7 avoided new openings of their own services markets to each other – only one 8 agreement since 2000, the Australia US Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), 9 was between developed countries. The rest were North/South or less com- 40111 monly, South/South (Roy et al., 2006, pp 6–8). 1 These agreements have emerged in several waves, each at a critical juncture 2 for multilateral trade negotiations. Each wave also coincided with the US 3 President’s ‘fast track’ negotiating authority, whereby the US Congress agrees 44111 to vote a trade treaty up or down without picking the deal apart. Reading the GATS as ideology 51

1111 As Chapter 2 explains, the inclusion of services in bilateral trade treaties 2 began in 1987 with the Canada US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and 3 the services annex to the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations 4 Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA). All these governments were champions 5 of the GATS and used the bilateral negotiations to develop proposals for 6 the Uruguay round. Both the CUSFTA and ANZCERTA went further in 7 content and architecture than the compromise that finally emerged as the 8 GATS 1994. 9 The second wave coincided with the paralysis in the Uruguay round in 1011 the late 1980s and predictions that the international trading system could 1 divide on three axes: the Americas, Europe and Asia (Africa was considered 2 irrelevant). 3111 The US and Canada launched negotiations with Mexico in 1991 to extend 4 the CUSFTA to create the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 5 That agreement was concluded in 1993, as President Clinton’s fast track 6 authority was about to expire. The US hailed NAFTA as a state-of-the-art 7 alternative to the emergent GATS: it used a negative list approach; specialist 8 chapters dealt with finance, telecommunications and energy; services and 9 investment were both contained in Part 5; and the investment chapter covered 20111 goods and services, with rights for investors to initiate disputes for ‘takings’ 1 – measures that were considered tantamount to expropriation. 2 Across the Atlantic, the member states of the European Community 3 approved the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. When it came into force in 1993, 4 the new European Union constituted a massive internal market with free 5 movement of goods, persons, services and capital and with the potential to 6 expand its membership and deepen its integration. 7 Australia, New Zealand and Japan feared being left behind. In 1989 8 Australia initiated meetings of trade ministers that included those from Japan 9 and ASEAN and (after pressure) the US and Canada. In 1994 the Asia 30111 Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum of trade ministers adopted 1 the voluntary and non-binding ‘Bogor goal’ of free trade and investment 2 in goods and services among the richer ‘economies’ of the region by 2010 3 and the remainder by 2020. 4 These developments were followed by a lull in the mid-1990s as the WTO 5 became established and the US and the EC focused on the continuing GATS 6 negotiations on telecommunications and financial services. The US Congress 7 refused to renew President Clinton’s fast track authority after it expired in 8 1993. Latin American governments, under growing pressure from their social 9 movements, blocked progress on a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 40111 The Europeans signed many bilaterals, but these were mainly preconditioning 1 Eastern European countries for accession to the EU. APEC expanded to 2 include the three Chinas, Russia and parts of Latin America before adopting 3 a moratorium on new members, and was mockingly dubbed ‘Aging 44111 Politicians Enjoying Cocktails’. 52 Serving whose interests?

1111 The real tidal wave of bilateral negotiations began in the later 1990s, 2 spurred on by the East Asian financial crisis and pessimism following the 3 collapse of the WTO ministerial in Seattle. Back in 1990, there had been 4 just 16 FTAs operating internationally; most were concentrated in Europe. 5 By 1997 there were 72, spread more widely across Europe, the Americas, 6 Asia Pacific and parts of Africa. By 2003, as the Doha round floundered, 7 a staggering 162 had been signed, with a huge increase in the number that 8 crossed geographical regions. Many more were being negotiated or proposed 9 (Dent, 2006, p 3). 1011 The diversity of these FTAs reveals the complex range of economic and 1 strategic interests and stark power dynamics that increasingly paralysed the 2 multilateral level and shifted attention to the bilateral and regional arenas. 3 Some of these FTAs are standard liberalisation instruments, driven by widely 4 varying motives. For states that dominate at a regional level, such as 5 Singapore, South Africa and Chile, bilaterals offer a means to establish their 6 credentials as a regional hub and the entry point for foreign investors. 7 Ideologically driven free traders, such as New Zealand, initially embraced 8 bilaterals for their ‘demonstration effect’ in bolstering trade liberalisation. 9 As the number of FTAs grew they, along with developing countries such 20111 as Indonesia and Thailand, have courted agreements with their main export 1 partners from fear that their competitors were securing privileged access to 2 important markets (Gibbs and Wagle, 2005). 3 A growing number of developing countries have embraced South/South 4 agreements, viewing regional integration as a stepping-stone towards, or 5 bulwark against, globalisation. These agreements notionally fall within 6 Tandon’s category of ‘integrative partnerships’. But they nevertheless remain 7 vehicles for liberalisation that must comply with GATT and GATS rules, 8 albeit on less onerous terms. South/South arrangements are often neoliberal 9 adaptations of groupings that were created in a different era. ASEAN is a 30111 classic example. It was created in 1967 primarily as a sub-regional security 1 alliance. An ASEAN Free Trade Area was adopted in 1992 and the ASEAN 2 Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) in 1995.30 A decade later, an 3 assessment prepared for ASEAN reported poor progress towards GATS- 4 plus levels of bound liberalisation and regional integration (Thanh and 5 Bartlett, 2006, p 6). 6 South/South agreements are often promoted as an antidote to the 7 asymmetrical bilateralism of North/South FTAs. But they also have their own 8 internal power dynamics and are subject to external influence. The New 9 Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), for example, is dominated 40111 by South Africa and widely viewed as a vehicle designed by the international 1 financial institutions to impose their post-Washington Consensus on Africa 2 (Bond, 2006b, pp 107–31). 3 The most potent of the contemporary FTAs are the products of competitive 44111 bilateralism, currently dominated by the US and the EU. As Tandon observes, Reading the GATS as ideology 53

1111 the Americans and Europeans treat bilaterals as instruments of geopolitical 2 power (Shashikant and Tayob, 2007). In 2007 Raj Bhala described an 3 emerging ‘paradigm of competitive imperialism’ in which ‘free trade is 4 subservient to the goal of projecting influence to another country or 5 throughout a region, and checking actual or perceived reciprocal efforts by 6 another power’ (Bhala, 2007, p 104). 7 Poorer countries are treated as pawns in this global chess game, as the 8 major powers compete to reshape the world in their interests and image. 9 The EC’s Global Europe strategy adopted in 2007 takes a two-track 1011 approach to advancing the interests of its capital through a neoliberal regime 1 of integration that is internally and externally coherent. The Commission 2 insists that increasing the EU’s external competitiveness requires domestic 3111 reform and greater competition, deregulation and flexibility within Europe. 4 The Seattle to Brussels Network of NGOs describes the EC’s strategy 5 as ‘more competition, more flexibilisation, more deregulation. Good-bye 6 European model, here is globalisation for all’.31 7 At the same time, the European model of regional economic and political 8 integration is exported through ‘development partnerships’ that expand 9 the ‘trade’ agenda to encompass a broad menu of economic policies and 20111 prescriptions for ‘good governance’. The alignment of trade with aid through 1 ‘technical assistance’ and ‘capacity building’ creates favourable policies and 2 opportunities for European transnationals (Chapter 4). 3 In classic ‘development’ double-speak, the EU has insisted on replacing 4 the historic trade preferences for former colonies in Africa and the ACP 5 with broad-reaching, reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 6 (EC, 1996). In a blatant exercise of divide and rule it dictated a regional 7 approach that split the ACP into sub-regions, ignoring criticism that this 8 would destabilise existing South/South regional initiatives. By ‘consent’, 9 the Cotonou Agreement 2000 included provisions on ‘new issues’, notably 30111 competition and investment, which the ACP states had successfully fought 1 to keep out of the WTO (South Centre, 2006). 2 The EC insisted that these EPAs must provide for liberalisation of services, 3 even though Article 41 of the Cotonou Agreement said this should occur 4 only ‘after they have acquired some experience in applying MFN treatment 5 under the GATS’. Most ACP countries have minimal GATS commitments. 6 Many are least developed countries. Some are not even WTO members. Yet 7 draft services chapters that the EC presented to the Pacific and Caribbean 8 negotiators sought aggressive GATS-plus commitments and were described 9 as a ‘not-to-be-missed opportunity’ for ACP states ‘to foster the development 40111 of their own services’ (quoted at Kelsey, 2005a: 31). 1 The Commission took a uniformly ruthless approach to all the EPA 2 negotiations. It initially insisted that comprehensive agreements must be 3 concluded by the deadline of 31 December 2007, when a WTO waiver for 44111 the ACP preferences on trade in goods expired. Extensive documentation 54 Serving whose interests?

1111 prepared by NGO researchers, which showed that reciprocal free trade 2 agreements were likely to cripple most ACP economies, was swept aside 3 (for example, GAWU et al., 2004; ActionAid, 2004). In late 2007 the EC 4 reluctantly accepted to a two-stage outcome: initial agreements on goods 5 would be concluded by December 2007, and negotiations on services, 6 investment and other issues would continue into 2008. 7 The exception was the negotiations with CARIFORUM Caribbean Forum 8 of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States, comprising the Caribbean 9 Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic. A comprehensive 1011 agreement was initialled on 16 December 2007 that included virtually every 1 negotiating proposal on services and investment that the EC had argued 2 for unsuccessfully in the WTO. The resulting EPA contains WTO-plus 3 obligations and WTO-minus flexibilities that exceed even the usurious terms 4 that are demanded in the WTO accession process. This radical new text 5 will become the template for future FTA and EPA negotiations. 6 The US took a different approach to achieve its strategic goals. The USTR 7 became more active on bilaterals around 2000, out of concern that new trade 8 and investment regimes were being created over which it had no control. 9 The first free trade agreement after NAFTA was a politically motivated deal 20111 with Jordan in 2000. When USTR Robert Zoellick supported renewal of ‘fast 1 track’ authority for President George W. Bush in 2002 he warned Congress 2 that ‘each [bilateral] agreement made without us may set new rules for . . . 3 countless . . . areas of the modern, integrated global economy – rules that will 4 be made without taking account of American interests’ (quoted Dent, 2006, 5 p 233). Zoellick responded to the EU’s rapprochement with Africa by 6 threatening that the US ‘will seek to level the playing field in areas where US 7 exporters are disadvantaged’ by such agreements.32 One African commentator 8 drew parallels with ‘the 1884 Berlin conference, where developed nations 9 scrambled for African resources and markets’ (Kamidza, 2004, p 16). 30111 Backed by fast track between 2002 and 2007, the USTR pushed the 1 boundaries with sufficient success that FTAs overtook the GATS as the 2 preferred negotiating avenue for the US. This blended seamlessly with 3 the growing preoccupation with security. Bilaterals became important 4 vehicles for strategic alliances through which the US could reward its 5 allies and entrench its geopolitical supremacy in diverse parts of the world. 6 From 1993, when NAFTA was signed, to the start of negotiations with South 7 Korea in June 2006, US negotiating partners collectively accounted for less 8 than 10 per cent of total US trade. 9 After ‘9/11’ the use of ‘security alliance diplomacy’ intensified. Zoellick 40111 described an FTA as a privilege, not a right, for which the US seeks 1 ‘cooperation – or better – on foreign policy and security’.33 US allies seemed 2 eager to prove their fidelity by matching military sacrifice with economic 3 surrender. This trend, and the new wave of US imperialism in Latin America 44111 and the Gulf, is discussed in Chapter 9. Closer to home, a ‘deep integration’ Reading the GATS as ideology 55

1111 project across the US, Canada and Mexico (euphemistically called the 2 Security and Prosperity Partnership) was launched in 2005, with the aim 3 of creating a common internal regulatory regime and a common security 4 border to the outside.34 5 While the motivations of the major powers are increasingly geopolitical, 6 the bilateral process also allows their negotiations to tailor the legal texts 7 in ways that are impossible in the GATS. The only legal constraint on the 8 trade in services aspects of these agreements is Article V of the GATS. RTAs 9 that involve a WTO member must have (undefined) ‘substantial’ sectoral 1011 coverage; eliminate, phase out or prevent the introduction of ‘substantially 1 all discrimination’ (also undefined) in those sectors; and be implemented 2 immediately or within an (undefined) ‘reasonable time-frame’. Barriers to 3111 non-parties cannot be raised ‘overall’. Developing countries enjoy greater, 4 but again undefined, ‘flexibility’, principally in the degree of liberalisation 5 and in implementation. 6 Parties are required to notify the Council for Trade in Services so it can 7 investigate and report on compliance and to provide periodic reports on 8 implementation. This requirement is largely academic. As of 2006 only 36 9 services agreements had been notified. Not one report had been forwarded 20111 from the Council to the WTO, reflecting the inability or reluctance of 1 members to agree on an interpretation. The Doha work programme 2 mandated a review to clarify and improve disciplines and procedures relating 3 to RTAs. This resulted in provisional rules for notification and review of 4 goods and services agreements, but not on interpretation.35 As of March 5 2007, the interpretation of GATS Article V had apparently never been 6 discussed (Shashikant and Tayob, 2007). 7 The GATS sets minima, not maxima, for RTAs. Although the rules are 8 vague they ensure that agreements are neoliberal and contain GATS-plus 9 elements. Because they relate only to goods and services, more powerful 30111 parties are free to demand that agreements follow their preferred structure 1 and include a range of non-WTO issues, notably investment and government 2 procurement, as well as foreign policy and good governance conditionalities. 3 Occasionally, governments also use the bilaterals to claw back previous 4 commitments on politically sensitive issues, such as audio-visuals and culture, 5 or indigenous rights, or attach side agreements or exchanges of letters to 6 placate domestic pressure on labour and environmental standards. 7 A WTO study of the services content of bilaterals published in 2006 8 identified three different types of architecture: the standard GATS model; the 9 NAFTA approach; and a hybrid that seeks to apply the same rules to all 40111 investments and all modes of services supply (Roy et al., 2006). The new 1 frameworks cut across different WTO agreements. Sector specific chapters 2 and disciplines were becoming more common, variously covering air 3 transport, movement of persons, financial services and telecommunications, 44111 energy, e-commerce and government procurement. 56 Serving whose interests?

1111 The review examined the mode 1 and 3 commitments of 29 WTO 2 members in 28 RTAs signed since 2000. It reported that the number of 3 commitments in bilaterals for all sectors, except for health, was higher 4 than even in the GATS 2000 offers. First time and ‘improved’ commitments 5 were made in key infrastructure areas, such as financial services and 6 telecommunications, and in the traditionally sensitive areas of education 7 and audio-visual. Those commitments often matched or exceeded the GATS 8 2000 plurilateral requests made in 2006. There was some evidence of ‘new 9 liberalisations’, most of which involved phasing out of laws and regulations 1011 by specified dates. 1 The US agreements contain the broadest and deepest commitments: 2 ‘the US, a key services demandeur and also signatory to many [RTAs], has 3 gotten very significant access in various services where its industry sees 4 particular interest, e.g., financial services, express delivery, distribution, 5 audiovisual’ (Roy et al., 2006, p 54). Agreements that use negative lists – 6 primarily those involving the US – are more likely to lock in the parties’ 7 existing levels of liberalisation. They also pre-empt new, more restrictive 8 regulation, including of currently unregulated service activities such as digital 9 technologies. Smaller, especially developing, countries tend to make the 20111 deepest commitments. Developed countries make fewer new commitments 1 and their sensitive areas remain protected. 2 Almost every item on the corporate shopping list for a GATS-plus 3 agreement has been included in at least one bilateral: WTO-plus coverage 4 of investment, government procurement, competition and e-commerce; 5 negative list commitments to a standstill of existing measures and rollback 6 of reservations; commitments to new liberalisation; a ratchet to lock in 7 further liberalisation automatically; blending of services and investment 8 chapters, including protections for investors against expropriation; adoption 9 of comprehensive, uniform model schedules and clusters of ‘high quality’ 30111 comprehensive commitments; updated reclassifications of services; ‘necessity’ 1 tests for domestic regulation and requirements to consult foreign firms 2 about proposed regulations; and inbuilt rounds of negotiations to achieve 3 further liberalisation. 4 The technical and political complexity of the FTAs militates against their 5 subsequent consolidation or reincorporation into the GATS. Many pro- 6 liberalisation commentators have fretted about the implications of this for 7 multilateralism (for example, Panagariya, 1999; Mattoo and Fink, 2002). 8 The 10-year review of the WTO echoed a growing concern that the 9 negotiation of a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of inconsistent, overlapping and partial 40111 agreements would be inefficient and undermine multilateralism (WTO, 1 2005). Other WTO commentators have offered a more positive spin, 2 suggesting that bilaterals can act ‘as laboratories for change and innovation 3 and may provide guidance for the adoption of new trade disciplines at the 44111 multilateral level’ (Crawford and Fiorentino, 2005, p 16). Reading the GATS as ideology 57

1111 The WTO’s 2006 study on services was ambivalent. The GATS-plus 2 outcomes suggested that services exporters were more easily convinced 3 about the gains from FTAs than from the GATS. Their endorsement could 4 give political impetus to bilateral negotiations and help governments to 5 overcome domestic and institutional resistance. However, governments might 6 also be holding back from making GATS 2000 offers so they could maximise 7 their bargaining coin in the bilaterals. Given the absence of North/North 8 agreements, the researchers concluded that the GATS was likely to remain 9 an important arena for liberalisation commitments between the major 1011 powers. At the same time, if the US got what it wanted through bilaterals, 1 its diminishing appetite for the GATS could reduce the scope for trade offs 2 in the broader Doha round. 3111 These commentaries address only one dimension of the challenge posed 4 by the FTAs. Bilateral and regional trade agreements are not simply technical 5 instruments of liberalisation; they reflect the competing hegemonic 6 aspirations of the larger powers to advance divergent models of capitalist 7 expansion. Moreover, this new form of competitive imperialism is playing 8 out in an increasingly crowded arena. The new economic powerhouses of 9 China and India have begun strategically exploring their options through 20111 bilaterals. Japan has negotiated EPAs within Asia and beyond that contain 1 concessions that would never be made to the US. It remains to be seen how 2 a US president of whatever political party, and the Congress, will respond 3 if competing powers secure deals that leave the US behind. An equally critical 4 question is whether the counter-hegemonic alternatives being sponsored by 5 Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia, discussed in the conclusion, can provide an 6 antidote to competitive imperialism, and how the existing and emerging 7 hegemons will respond if they do. All these factors make the future direction 8 of trade in services agreements impossible to predict, except that it appears 9 to lie primarily outside the multilateral domain. 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 Chapter 2

1111 2 How the GATS was won 3 (and lost?) 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3 The story of ‘how the GATS was won’ in 1994 is, at one level, about a contest 4 between the US, as the superpower of the global North, and India and Brazil 5 as the lead advocates for the global South. At a more profound level it 6 documents the transition from one hegemonic regime to another. The US, 7 at the apex of a bloc of leading industrialised countries, used its structural 8 power to rewrite the rules for the domestic regulation of services. The project 9 was supported by corporate and intellectual élites whose role was to develop 20111 strategies and propose the mechanisms to achieve that goal. The process 1 of constructing the new regime under the conditions that prevailed at that 2 time was much easier than sustaining it in the new millennium. 3 4 A matter of perspective 5 6 There are two versions of the genesis of the GATS, which reflect the 7 perspectives of the victor (the US) and of the purportedly vanquished (India 8 and Brazil). 9 The standard US version depicts the GATS as a child of America’s 30111 corporate/political intimacy that matured under their joint custody. Between 1 the mid-1970s and 1993 the Office of the USTR, in collaboration with large 2 and powerful services corporations, evolved a vision and strategy to create 3 a binding and enforceable treaty that could restore the country’s economic 4 supremacy. The US administration used its dominant presence in the OECD 5 to build a critical mass of support among wealthy countries for the inclusion 6 of trade in services in a new round of GATT negotiations. Potentially obstructive forums, especially UNCTAD, were marginalised. 7 US trade strategists then set out to ‘divide and rule’ the increasingly fragile 8 Third World bloc. The US’s adversaries, led by India and Brazil, tried to 9 resist by fighting from within the GATT and were progressively sucked into 40111 the vortex. Every concession became an advance that consolidated the US 1 position. Their final capitulation was secured in 1989 after the US employed 2 its ultimate trade-negotiating weapon of unilateral sanctions against Brazil 3 and then India. Opposition to the creation of a services agreement had been 44111 reduced to a lopsided contest over its legal content. How the GATS was won (and lost?) 59

1111 Success was achieved using threats and incentives. In the approving words 2 of US commentator Jon Aronson: ‘The world ultimately acquiesced to US 3 persistence and a skilful US campaign to alter nations’ perceptions of the 4 stakes involved.’ Part of the campaign ‘was to convince developing countries 5 that the United States was willing to “pay” for a new GATT round but 6 would punish other countries if there were no round’. The ‘carrots’ included 7 re-engineering of debt arrangements, and reducing US interest rates and the 8 value of the dollar. The ‘threats’ were to engage in bilateral negotiations 9 or plurilateral arrangements that limited MFN treatment to those who 1011 co-operated. ‘The final task was to divide the developing countries on 1 services’ (Aronson, 1988, p 21). 2 The inevitable political compromises meant the GATS 1994 text and 3111 commitments fell short of the ambitious objectives of the USTR and corporate 4 lobby. The critical infrastructure of telecommunications and financial services 5 was held back for ongoing negotiations that produced more state-of-the-art 6 outcomes. A pre-commitment to ‘progressive liberalisation’ of market access 7 to countries’ services was built into the text, with a further round of negotiations 8 set for 2000. Negotiations to tighten the disciplines on domestic regulations 9 and other rules would start before then. The parallel tracks of regional, sub- 20111 regional and bilateral agreements, combined with unilateral sanctions, meant 1 the US could choose how to pursue its strategic offensives with, or against, 2 countries of geopolitical and economic significance. 3 The alternative version starts with the same understanding of US 4 objectives. In the words of India’s then Ambassador to the GATT, SP Shukla: 5 6 The services issue was at the core of the American trade agenda, not 7 only because the US occupied the dominating position in this area, 8 but also because this issue was the key to the transformation of the 9 GATT. The issue of services, transcending the narrow confines of cross- 30111 border transactions, . . . had the potential of rendering [the GATT] into 1 an effective instrument to support and promote the activities of the 2 transnational corporations. 3 (Shukla, 2000, p 14) 4 5 Shukla vigorously rejects any suggestion that Southern governments were 6 unaware of the stakes: 7 There is a misconception that developing countries did not understand 8 what was being suggested and that’s why many things happened. That 9 is farthest from the truth. They were totally aware of the game. They 40111 did their best. It is a different matter the political choices [their national] 1 governments made. . . . The point is that no other round in the GATT 2 was preceded by such a long gestation period and such acute labour 3 pains. That is precisely because the developing countries saw through 44111 the game.1 60 Serving whose interests?

1111 Both versions agree that India and Brazil were pivotal. But the received 2 wisdom is that the ‘gang of 5’ (including Egypt, Argentina and Yugoslavia) 3 overplayed their hands. Their intransigence created the space for a moderate 4 proposal that allowed services negotiations to proceed. Shukla recounts a 5 different story of much greater intrigue. During 1985 and 1986 India and 6 Brazil held secret meetings with the European ambassador to develop a 7 fallback position, unbeknown to either the other rejectionists or the US. 8 The three ambassadors agreed on a ‘common platform’ that would keep 9 services negotiations on a separate track from the GATT, with clearly 1011 specified development parameters. Their proposal was tabled – in a final 1 twist, by Canada – after the ministerial conference at Punta del Este had 2 already run over time. That platform set the basis for negotiating the GATS 3 parallel to the GATT. In the early years of the Uruguay round, India and 4 Brazil led a unified Southern bloc in restraining the scope of the services 5 negotiations. The situation changed in 1989, when both governments 6 capitulated under a combination of US unilateral sanctions and domestic 7 political changes. The Brazilian and Indian ambassadors who had fronted 8 the hard line approach were replaced by more acquiescent representatives. 9 From Shukla’s perspective, the battles of the 1980s left an indelible mark 20111 on the GATS 1994 text. A positive list structure specified which sectors 1 would be governed by key rules. That allowed the developing countries to 2 limit their exposure and bought more time for education, research and 3 building of alliances that would strengthen their position. Promises to 4 promote development, and the requirement for an impact assessment before 5 any future negotiations, provided hooks on which to hang their future 6 resistance. Even though the Indian government later changed sides, other 7 Southern governments relied on these hard-won flexibilities in their own 8 passive subversion of the GATS 2000 negotiations. This time, their (in)action 9 was complemented by national, regional and sectoral social movements, 30111 activists and think tanks whose campaigns largely neutralised the 1 corporate lobby that had dominated the services agenda in the 1970s 2 and 1980s, and paralysed the multilateral negotiations. Similar campaigns 3 against the new generation of bilateral and regional agreements in some 4 cases mitigated their impact and in others brought those negotiations to a 5 standstill. 6 These two versions are flip sides of the same coin. This chapter analyses 7 how the dynamics of the Uruguay round shaped the rise, stalemate and 8 increasing marginalisation of the GATS. It draws on primary documents of 9 the OECD and GATT/WTO and personal accounts from the key players, 40111 Geza Feketekuty, the assistant USTR responsible for services during the 1 Uruguay round, and SP Shukla, India’s ambassador to the GATT from March 2 1984 to February 1989. Case study 3 examines the successful strategy of the 3 trade policy activists that gave birth to the GATS. The counter-hegemonic 44111 campaign that featured from the later 1990s is the subject of Case study 4. How the GATS was won (and lost?) 61

1111 Creating a constituency 2 The seeds of the GATS were sown between 1972 and 1979 during a turbulent 3 decade of oil shocks, recession and restructuring. What in retrospect looks 4 like a systematic strategy began in an ad hoc fashion. The first tentative 5 step was the handiwork of policy entrepreneurs connected to a newly 6 established Trade Policy Research Centre in London. In 1972 the Secretary 7 General of the OECD appointed a High Level Group on Trade and Related 8 Problems to stimulate longer-term thinking by member governments ahead 9 of the Tokyo round of the GATT. The resulting Rey report contained a 1011 short Chapter IV on ‘international trade in services’ (OECD, 1972). It 1 focused mainly on ‘invisibles’ in tourism and on remittances and transfers 2 of investment income. The committee recommended that ‘action should be 3111 taken by the developed countries to ensure liberalization and non- 4 discrimination in the services sector’ (Feketekuty, 1988, p 298). Although 5 there was no explicit proposal that this action should take place through 6 the GATT, it was interpreted as supporting future negotiations outside the 7 OECD. This one-off, top down approach fell into a void. The OECD did 8 9 not revisit ‘trade in services’ for another six years. 20111 The US services corporations, organised by Pan American Airlines and 1 AIG, took up the cudgels in 1974 as the Congress (belatedly) debated the US 2 2 President’s negotiating mandate for the Tokyo round. As a result, the US 3 Trade Act 1974 contained three innovations. First, the President was required 4 to negotiate for the removal of non-tariff barriers to international trade in 5 goods and services. This set in train a dynamic process: the USTR had to 6 report annually to Congress on progress in the Tokyo round and beyond, 7 which meant US trade officials had to give meaning to the concept of ‘non- 8 tariff barriers to trade in services’ and deliver something concrete. Second, a 9 new section 301 authorised unilateral trade sanctions against countries whose 30111 ‘unfair trade practices’ burdened US commerce, which was defined to include 1 services associated with international trade. The US capacity to alternate 2 between unilateralism and multilateralism gave it extraordinary power and 3 was later used to break India and Brazil’s resistance to the GATS. Third, a 4 new Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations included services industry 5 representatives. 6 The success of the lobbyists prompted a more ambitious corporate strategy 7 led by AIG and AMEX from within the US Chamber of Commerce. A 8 seamless relationship developed with the trade bureaucracy. The Department 9 of Commerce commissioned and published a report in 1976 on offshore 40111 ‘barriers’ faced by US services companies.3 The Trade and Tariff Act 1979 1 created a new Industry Sector Advisory Committee for Services and a Services 2 Policy Advisory Committee to the USTR. The campaign gained momentum 3 when Geza Feketekuty was appointed Assistant USTR in 1978 and assumed 44111 full responsibility for policy on services in 1979. At this time, Feketekuty 62 Serving whose interests?

1111 says they were still working out what ‘trade in services’ meant. Most of 2 their initiatives were ad hoc and designed to get the ‘pushy’ chair of AIG, 3 Hank Greenberg, off the USTR’s back.4 4 One option was to utilise the OECD Trade Committee, where Feketekuty 5 represented the USTR. In retrospect, the pre-cooking of a trade in services 6 agreement in the OECD seems an obvious strategy. The US could build a 7 political consensus among the major capital exporting countries and use 8 the OECD’s resources and expertise to do the basic conceptual and technical 9 work, prior to a push in the GATT. This would exclude the South-dominated 1011 UN bodies such as UNCTAD and bypass the specialist international 1 sectoral agencies, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 2 which took an interventionist approach to services regulation. 3 Feketekuty says the original proposal to conduct a study on trade in 4 services that built on the earlier US industry study was impromptu. Over 5 time, however, a sophisticated game plan emerged. Each incremental 6 concession by other OECD members consolidated the US position. 7 Feketekuty tabled a short paper entitled ‘World Trade in Services: The Need 8 for Analysis’ at the OECD Trade Committee in October 1978.5 This recast 9 services within a trade liberalisation discourse and treated the establishment 20111 of foreign investments related to services as ‘trade’. It pointed to a dearth 1 of research and analysis on the barriers that were impeding the rapidly 2 growing international services economy. The paper’s indicative list of barriers 3 reached into the heart of domestic policy: ownership requirements, personnel 4 and employment restrictions, taxes, intellectual property, government 5 controls and regulations including licensing, the absence of international 6 standards and procedures, imposition of duties and quotas, the restrictive 7 rules on government procurement of services, and more. 8 The paper proposed a programme of sectoral studies that coincided with 9 the active membership of the US Chamber of Commerce’s new committee 30111 on services. 1 According to Feketekuty, other governments initially responded with 2 incredulity. As trade representatives, they viewed services as invisibles that 3 were covered by the OECD’s Code of Liberalisation of Current Invisible 4 Operations and were the responsibility of the OECD Committee on Financial 5 and Fiscal Affairs. Nevertheless, the (then) European Economic Community 6 (EEC) and Finland persuaded the committee to agree to a discussion. 7 Feketekuty speculates that they were trying to humour the US and help 8 the administration to secure support for the Tokyo round package from 9 its services industries, as a counter to the increasingly protectionist US 40111 manufacturing sector. 1 The OECD Secretariat prepared a lengthy note for discussion that 2 highlighted three conceptual concerns.6 First, there was no a priori definition 3 of trade in services, especially whether it was limited to cross-border 44111 transactions or extended to the hugely contentious issue of foreign How the GATS was won (and lost?) 63

1111 investment. Second, the US goal to develop generic rules simply assumed 2 that services such as maritime transport, insurance and construction had 3 features in common, aside from being intangible. A third dilemma was the 4 lack of national and comparative data or any agreed system for classification. 5 In addition, the secretariat pointed out that numerous international entities, 6 such as the ITU, the Universal Postal Union, the International Aviation 7 Travel Association and the UNCTAD (through the Shipping Liners Code), 8 were charged with addressing the international regulation of these sectors. 9 The next incremental success for the US was the decision to establish an 1011 OECD working party on trade in services. This was the catalyst for a more 1 concerted campaign. Feketekuty describes working ‘in co-operation with a 2 loose international coalition of about a dozen key business executives and 3111 government officials’ to develop a comprehensive strategy (Feketekuty, 1988, 4 p 306). Working through the OECD Trade Committee had the advantage 5 that trade officials and diplomats would get up to speed in preparation for 6 eventual GATT negotiations on services. In late 1980 Feketekuty tabled a 7 US ‘inventory’ on barriers to trade in services.7 This was based on a survey 8 of US firms that, according to Jon Aronson, was commissioned from the 9 US Chamber of Commerce behind the backs of other government agencies 20111 (Aronson, 1988, p 16). The categories of ‘barriers’ were aligned as far as 1 possible to trade in goods. The inventory did not, by definition, include US 2 barriers. That gave other services exporting governments a greater incentive 3 to conduct their own surveys. 4 By this time, Feketekuty had secured almost unanimous agreement to 5 progress the issue, but not on how to do so. The US, supported by Japan, 6 Australia and Norway, wanted a generic analysis of the problems that 7 services industries faced and mechanisms to eliminate them. This cross- 8 sectoral approach would avoid the risk of becoming bogged down in lengthy 9 discussions of specific sectors and micro-management through regulations. 30111 Other governments were sceptical and preferred a sectoral approach with 1 pilot studies. Only the United Kingdom (UK) actively opposed the idea, 2 saying it ‘did not want the Committee to do anything at all in the services 3 area as it would be a waste of resources and would come to nothing’.8 4 (Once Thatcherism penetrated the UK trade ministry in 1980, it became 5 the most enthusiastic European advocate, especially on behalf of its financial 6 services industry.9) As a compromise, the trade committee adopted a parallel 7 process, without prejudice to what happened next. Governments who wished 8 to prepare US-style studies could do so. The committee itself would conduct 9 two pilot studies. 40111 A combination of political determination, negotiating savvy, corporate 1 pressure and positive noise was slowly bearing fruit. The ‘trade in services’ 2 discourse had become normalised among OECD trade officials. They began 3 developing more sophisticated analogies to GATT rules on unfair trade 44111 practices, non-tariff barriers and protectionism. The intention to use ‘trade 64 Serving whose interests?

1111 in services’ disciplines to curb national services policies and regulatory 2 autonomy was spelt out in a lengthy secretariat paper in early 1981: 3 4 While some barriers are deliberate measures designed to shield existing 5 firms from external competition, many are the result of a variety of 6 measures designed to achieve social, economic, cultural and national 7 security objectives. . . . Any liberalisation effort in the service sector 8 would have to take due account of the legitimate objectives of many 9 of the measures seen as obstacles to trade or competition in the service 1011 industries. Our goal should not be to remove all barriers, i.e. complete 1 de-regulation and elimination of all subsidies; but, rather, as is the case 2 currently in the GATT with respect to trade in goods, there should be 3 an assumption of free trade but with recognised exceptions for accepted 4 reasons. Regulations designed to achieve legitimate social goals should 5 be adopted and implemented in a manner which is least distortive of 6 trade and least costly in terms of efficiency. This suggests the need for 7 the development of international rules and procedures [that] could focus 8 on the extra territorial effects of domestic actions . . .10 9 20111 Conceptual frameworks and legal rules for international trade were seen 1 as a ‘natural complement’ to the OECD’s work on ‘positive adjustment’ 2 policies, code for its emerging neoliberal policy agenda.11 The officials 3 speculated that the OECD might address these issues in parallel. Another 4 document suggested that trade ministries could be encouraged to work with 5 services firms to bypass obstructive parts of their bureaucracy: 6 7 Tactically, US and, more recently, UK, service sector firms are seeing that 8 progress on liberalisation requires them to get the attention and support 9 of governmental trade policy-makers as they are getting nowhere through 30111 the industry specific approach. . . . The trade policy approach requires 1 government trade policy makers to be willing to work in the services 2 area against the resistance of industry-specific regulatory bodies.12 3 4 Moving to the GATT 5 6 In two short years the artifice of ‘trade in services’ had become part of the 7 OECD’s policy platform. The time had come for the US to increase pressure 8 for a new GATT round on services. In April 1981 Feketekuty prepared a 9 statement on US objectives for trade in services negotiations and announced 40111 plans to seek the political endorsement of OECD ministers.13 1 The support of the EEC was crucial. Officials were familiar with the 2 general concept – the Treaty of Rome 1957 envisaged ‘an internal market 3 characterized by the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the 44111 free movement of goods, persons, services and capital’. But, as noted in How the GATS was won (and lost?) 65

1111 the Introduction, the emerging ‘services economy’ in Europe centred on the 2 integration of services and industry. It was also embedded in a very different 3 policy environment. The federal nature of European governance, the multi- 4 layered structure for decisions on trade negotiations and the (thor consensus 5 on the Commission’s trade mandate meant it was impossible to promote 6 an overly ambitious agenda. 7 Moreover, the national bureaucracy of each member state was responsible 8 for regulating services. Those officials were also represented on, and 9 committed to, the sectoral committees of the OECD and unlikely to support 1011 initiatives that undermined those programmes or their own regulatory 1 authority. The Commission’s officials lacked the resources, corporate 2 pressure and mandate to push services within the OECD Trade Committee, 3111 where its member states were also represented. They therefore preferred a 4 gradual building of consensus through existing legal and institutional 5 mechanisms, with the possibility of eventual negotiations in the GATT. 6 Their continued ambivalence towards GATT negotiations was influenced 7 largely by the implications of a new round for agriculture and sensitivities 8 about domestic regulation of services, especially affecting culture. 9 The OECD ministers adopted a muted position on services at their June 20111 1981 meeting. Likewise, a tense meeting of GATT parties in November 1 1981 agreed only to reconvene a year later to prepare a draft work 2 programme for a new round. By the time they met again in November 1982 3 Feketekuty enjoyed the full support of the recently elected President 4 Ronald Reagan and his appointee as USTR, William Brock. On the eve of 5 the ministerial an article in Brock’s name entitled ‘A Simple Plan for 6 Negotiating Trade in Services’ was published in The World Economy (Brock, 7 1982). The meeting was held in tense circumstances, barely three months 8 after Mexico had defaulted on its debt repayments, signalling a Third World 9 debt crisis. The developing countries, led by India, insisted that they would 30111 not consider any new negotiations before the commitments on development 1 that had been made in both the Tokyo round and the GATT Work 2 Programme for the 1980s were implemented. Moreover, the GATT’s legal 3 mandate related only to trade in goods, not services. Brock claims to have 4 threatened India that ‘hell would be dappled with little icebergs before 5 India got anything out of the United States if they continued to act that 6 way’ and ‘relations between the American and Indian delegations were “less 7 contentious the next day”’(quoted in Dryden, 1991). 8 The US secured a concession at the 1982 meeting that Shukla describes 9 as a ‘turning point in the history of the GATT’ (Shukla, 2000, p 15). The 40111 ministerial declaration set out a two-year programme. Contracting Parties 1 who had an interest in services should conduct national examinations of 2 the issues and exchange information, using a standard format where 3 possible. The results, along with information and comments from relevant 44111 international organisations, would be reviewed at the next GATT ministerial 66 Serving whose interests?

1111 ‘to consider whether any multilateral action in these matters is appropriate 2 and desirable’.14 3 Trade in services was still a low priority for most OECD governments. 4 In 1982 Canada, Norway and the UK had small bureaucracies working 5 on the area. The EEC had just appointed one person to work full time on 6 services. Even the USTR had only six staff and one computer for the services 7 work.15 The proponents remained dependent on the OECD’s small trade 8 bureaucracy to co-ordinate the programme and undertake the complex and 9 difficult conceptual work. That was not without its tensions. OECD officials 1011 engaged in preferential dialogue with Feketekuty. But the domineering 1 approach of the US aggravated the international bureaucrats and other 2 governments. Minor turf wars erupted within the OECD as the proposed 3 trade rules were seen to usurp the OECD’s own codes. One internal memo 4 reveals jealousies over potential competition from the GATT, and predicted 5 the potential for subversion by certain (unnamed) governments: 6 7 It is useful to underline that among those who tend to privilege the 8 GATT rather than the OECD as a proper forum for discussions on 9 trade in services, some do it on the basis of high ambitions and hopes 20111 as to the scope and timing of future GATT activities, while others do 1 it for the opposite reasons, expecting that discussions would draw out 2 much longer in GATT before conducing to concrete results, thus 3 allowing them to delay such results without having to appear opposing 4 the exercise.16 5 6 The US was impatient. In May 1983 it proposed a new GATT round including 7 services, investment and trade in counterfeit and high-tech goods. If 8 developing countries wanted to see their concerns over industrials, textiles 9 and agriculture addressed they would have to offer compensatory liberalisation 30111 on the ‘new issues’ (Shukla, 2000, p 15). In November, the US signalled 1 through the media that it was about to deliver a national study on trade in 2 services to the GATT Secretariat, which listed over 900 restrictions in 102 3 countries covering 16 services sectors.17 The US study was submitted in 4 December 1983.18 Eventually, 16 developed countries followed suit. 5 6 Crossing swords with the South 7 8 The 1982 GATT ministerial had alerted the Southern governments to what 9 the US was doing in the OECD. Those who were advancing an alternative 40111 post-colonial economic agenda saw the inclusion of services in the GATT 1 as a make or break issue. Their opposition, according to Shukla, ‘was, at 2 one level, rooted in their collective memory of the colonial period’ (Shukla, 3 2000, p 15). Egypt drew parallels between an agreement on trade in services 44111 and denationalising the Suez Canal. How the GATS was won (and lost?) 67

1111 Shukla arrived in Geneva as India’s ambassador in March 1984. India, 2 Brazil, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Nigeria, Tanzania and Argentina began working 3 to build a GATT equivalent of the Group of 77 developing country bloc in 4 the UN. The sixth UNCTAD in 1983 asked the Secretariat to study the role 5 of services in development. This turned into a general study on services (Drake 6 and Nicolaidis, 1992, p 58). A comprehensive report, including case 7 studies, was released in August 1984.19 Its inter-disciplinary approach was 8 in stark contrast to the OECD’s. So was UNCTAD’s assertion that regulating 9 services to advance cultural, strategic and social objectives, and to address 1011 economic and social externalities, was necessary and in the public interest. 1 The report challenged the validity of transposing concepts of deregulation 2 and liberalisation from trade in goods to services. Consistent with 3111 UNCTAD’s work on a Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations, it 4 advocated the active regulation of corporations whose centralised service 5 operations were compounding the dependency of the South. 6 The UNCTAD report also made a veiled attack on a small number of 7 rich countries for conducting discussions on services within a narrow policy 8 framework at the OECD.20 OECD members had shown little compunction 9 about designing an agreement that advanced their own economic and 20111 corporate agendas, with the intention of binding poorer countries that were, 1 by definition, excluded from its preparatory activities.21 In August 1984 an 2 UNCTAD official asked the OECD secretariat to brief developing countries 3 on their work. A file note described this as a ‘highly political matter . . . at 4 a time when some OECD countries are hesitant to discuss it even at GATT 5 and also when practically all OECD members are reluctant to take it up at 6 UNCTAD’.22 Given ‘the rivalry between UNCTAD and GATT on this issue’ 7 there could be a ‘risk that informing developing countries on our work, in 8 the UNCTAD, could be seen as a lack of neutrality especially as our work 9 is closer to what the GATT role may be than to that of the UNCTAD’.23 30111 The officials preferred to offer an informal session jointly sponsored by 1 UNCTAD and the GATT. This attitude echoed earlier advice from within 2 the secretariat that OECD governments should ensure no further ground 3 was lost in UNCTAD while they developed a common position and 4 objectives for services negotiations in ‘other global fora’.24 5 By the time of the GATT General Council meeting in November 1984, 6 this informal group of developing countries unanimously rejected ‘trade 7 in services’ as a fiction that was designed to liberalise foreign investment 8 and open their countries to transnational corporations. Deeper dependence 9 on US transnationals would squeeze their nascent domestic services and 40111 regulatory regimes. If a new round did proceed, they predicted the US 1 would demand commitments on services as the price for complying with 2 its existing obligations on goods and textiles. All the agreements would 3 then be linked to justify cross-retaliation under the GATT and the US’s 44111 section 301 powers. Their technical opposition was that the mandate of 68 Serving whose interests?

1111 the GATT covered only trade in goods; negotiations on services would 2 require a formal amendment. This lack of mandate also meant the GATT 3 Secretariat could not organise any formal discussions on services. 4 The 1984 meeting ended in an impasse. But it was agreed that governments 5 could organise an exchange of information on services. Whether a multilateral 6 framework on services was desirable and appropriate could be considered 7 in 1985. This posed a dilemma for those opponents who insisted that the 8 GATT lacked jurisdiction. By requiring these meetings to remain informal 9 and without minutes they deprived themselves of information, and by 1011 absenting themselves they were unable to influence the discussions. By June 1 1985 the rejectionist core was down to 24. Shukla considered it was only 2 possible to stall a new GATT round for so long.25 In November 1985 a 3 formal preparatory committee was established to make recommendations 4 inter alia on the subject matter of the new round in mid-1986. GATT 5 Secretary-General Arthur Dunkel chaired it. Services were neither explicitly 6 included or excluded. 7 The battle entered a new phase. India, Brazil and their allies were 8 determined to prevent the Preparatory Committee from making any 9 recommendation on the ‘new issues’.26 But the US was playing hardball, 20111 using threats, incentives and disinformation to leverage its influence 1 bilaterally in Latin America and South East Asia. In November 1985 it 2 announced a section 301 investigation of Brazil’s law on informatics 3 products, including in relation to investment and services.27 Shukla quotes 4 USTR Clayton Yeutter as declaring that: 5 6 We simply cannot afford to have a handful of nations with less than 7 5 per cent of world trade dictating the international trading destiny of 8 nations which conduct 95 per cent or more of international commerce 9 in this world. . . . Services in particular must be in the round, or we 30111 are just not going to have a new GATT round . . . and we will have to 1 confront those issues in a different way – plurilaterally or multilaterally. 2 (Shukla, 2000, p 16, fn 14) 3 4 Rumours of a US walkout (a familiar strategy used by the US repeatedly 5 in GATS negotiations) prompted OECD officials to speculate: 6 7 If Washington ends up being disappointed by the discussions in GATT, 8 they may choose to have recourse to a new initiative e.g. launching a 9 series of bilateral discussions with major partners (as is presently being 40111 done with Japan, Canada and incidentally Israel, but without major 1 damage to multilateralism until now as the results are not discriminatory) 2 or promoting a new ad hoc international forum for services (we 3 have already heard of ideas in this direction and the name GATS was 44111 mentioned).28 How the GATS was won (and lost?) 69

1111 Colombian Ambassador Jaramillo convened a senior officials’ group in 2 late 1985 to clear the way for a preparatory committee mandate. India 3 formally withheld its consent to the inclusion of services. By now, solidarity 4 among the South was faltering in the face of the ongoing debt crisis in 5 Latin America, the onset of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment 6 programmes and the marginalisation of UNCTAD. Governments who were 7 desperate for relief from oppressive US trade practices feared that 8 unilateralism would intensify and that the US would disengage from 9 negotiations. Raghavan reported in March 1986 how 1011 1 under intense political and other pressures, mounted by the US at 2 capitals, some of the US allies have either remained silent or have been 3111 giving support of sorts to the US. But a number of Third World countries 4 – including Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Kuwait, Nicaragua, 5 Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Yugoslavia – have 6 continued to voice their opposition, with varying nuances.29 7 8 Fears that a services agreement would bring structural adjustment policies 9 under the GATT umbrella sharpened in April 1986 when Secretary-General 20111 Dunkel suggested a basic objective of the new round should be ‘to promote 1 worldwide the structural adjustment needed for growth’. The US concurred. 2 The EC argued that services and investment were vital to structural 3 adjustment and stressed the potential for shifting resources into services as 4 a source of new jobs to replace those lost in traditional industries. Brazil 5 vigorously objected that 6 7 after being discriminated against for decades in certain sectors where they 8 enjoyed comparative advantage, developing countries were now being 9 asked to put at risk the fundamental development goal of diversifying 30111 their economies and providing remunerative employment for their rapidly 1 growing populations in order to help improve the overall adjustment 2 process in developed economies entering a post-industrial phase.30 3 4 The recalcitrants from the South were not the US’s only problem. In 5 January 1986, OECD officials considered there was still only tentative 6 consensus within its own members about what a services agreement might 7 cover.31 The US, with likely support from the UK, seemed to favour a quick, 8 generic agreement for all service activities that left sectoral details to be 9 filled in later. France and Switzerland preferred a more sectoral approach. 40111 The EEC was likely to insist on reciprocity. Not all sectors would be on 1 the table, either. Most OECD governments, especially their treasuries, were 2 reluctant to include financial and banking services. Priority sectors for the 3 US, such as computer and information services and telecommunications, 44111 were precisely those that the Europeans had reservations about. The US 70 Serving whose interests?

1111 itself would want to keep out maritime services. Developing countries were 2 expected to seek access for migrant workers, which OECD countries would 3 oppose. 4 By June 1986, with the GATT ministerial conference looming in December, 5 a hard core of ten Southern governments was still holding out. The USTR 6 proposed a draft text for the ministerial declaration that set priorities 7 on agriculture, services, informatics and investment.32 A services agreement 8 should be based on GATT principles of market access, national treatment 9 and transparency. It would take into account the ‘legitimate objectives’ of 1011 regulation, such as national security, cultural sovereignty and consumer 1 protection. Transparency obligations would require governments to notify 2 all their proposed regulations on services and justify their reasonableness if 3 required, with an exception for consular affairs, such as immigration. 4 According to the semi-official history of the Uruguay round, the stand-off 5 ended when the Group of 10 over-played their hand by refusing to budge on 6 services (Croome, 1995, pp 29–30; also Singh, 2003). A group of nine smaller 7 OECD members, led by Switzerland, tabled a draft negotiating mandate. 8 Twenty Southern countries, led by Colombia and Jamaica, joined them 9 as ‘friends of the negotiations’. In discussions with the US, Japan and the 20111 EEC, they produced the ‘café au lait’ proposal (denoting Colombia plus 1 Switzerland) that called for multilateral liberalisation of services ‘with due 2 regard for development concerns’ (Drake and Nicolaidis, 1992, pp 66–7). 3 The proposal purportedly acknowledged many of the South’s issues: 4 development, technology transfer, the legitimacy of government regulation, 5 phasing in of commitments, the risks of cross-linkages in negotiations and 6 cross-retaliation in enforcement, and even the possibility of free labour 7 movements. The EEC did not endorse the proposed declaration formally; 8 John Croome suggests this was because of the implications for agriculture 9 (Croome, 1995, p 30). Three competing texts were forwarded to the Uruguay 30111 chair of the ministerial meeting in Punta del Este – the text rejecting the ‘new 1 issues’, the café au lait proposal, and a modification on the latter from 2 Argentina.33 After prolonged discussions using many channels, India was 3 successfully isolated and forced to capitulate (Winham, 1989, p 300). The 4 meeting ended with a detailed procedural agreement that ensured coverage 5 of all areas, but compartmentalised the negotiations. 6 Shukla tells a different story. The Europeans were always lukewarm 7 about a new round that could see services traded off for agriculture and herald 8 a US cultural invasion. From late 1984 or early 1985, Shukla and Brazil’s 9 Ambassador Paulo Bautista had begun meeting secretly with the EEC 40111 Ambassador to the GATT Tran Van-Thinh to develop a fall back option in 1 the expectation that there would have to be some negotiations. They settled 2 on five key elements for a ‘common working platform’: legal separation 3 of negotiations on goods and services; a mandate based on development 44111 and growth, and not liberalisation per se; respect for national laws and How the GATS was won (and lost?) 71

1111 regulations; no guaranteed trade offs between goods and services; and 2 inclusion of work underway in relevant international organisations. 3 These secret discussions ran parallel to the official talks. Even the others 4 in the ‘tight five’ did not know. Nor did the US. Indeed, the Europeans also 5 participated in the café au lait discussions. In the lead up to Punta del Este, 6 the USTR apparently became concerned about Ambassador Tran’s position. 7 Yeutter wrote to the European Commissioner for External Relations Willy 8 de Clerq asking him to join in isolating India and Brazil; de Clerq replied that 9 a new round should start with consensus. US pressure continued at the 1011 ministerial itself. Yeutter told the plenary: ‘We cannot envision – nor agree 1 to – comprehensive new trade negotiations that do not include these four 2 issues’, being agriculture, services, investment and intellectual property.34 3111 India’s finance minister VP Singh countered with a strident rejection of 4 services negotiations within the GATT, saying he could not return home with 5 shackles on his hands: 6 7 When I say so I express the will of 700 million people of my country who 8 constitute one of the largest potential markets in the world economy. 9 They rightfully ask that after their long struggle against colonial rule 20111 towards freedom, after having built bit-by-bit a strong and sound 1 economy on the strength of their own toil and talent, whether their 2 national aspirations are now to be condemned as ‘obstacles’ to trade?35 3 4 The US denounced this speech as a ‘door slammer’ and threatened to leave. 5 An informal meeting of all delegates began as the ministerial meeting passed 6 its deadline. Shukla, Bautista and Tran had previously decided that their 7 proposal should not be tabled until midnight or it would not survive.36 8 When the time came, a typed and unattributed version of the common 9 platform was distributed selectively. The Canadian foreign minister took it 30111 up. The US could only suggest minor changes to the wording. At the press 1 conference at around 5.30 a.m. all the developing countries, including 2 Uruguay and Colombia, applauded the Indian and Brazilian delegations. 3 4 The Uruguay round 5 6 The final Ministerial Declaration that launched the Uruguay round in 7 September 1986 contained a short part on services that was separate from 8 trade in goods. It read: 9 40111 Ministers also decide, as part of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 1 to launch negotiations on trade in services. 2 Negotiations in this area shall aim to establish a multilateral framework 3 of principles and rules for trade in services, including elaboration 44111 of possible disciplines for individual sectors, with a view to expansion of 72 Serving whose interests?

1111 such trade under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization 2 and as a means of promoting economic growth of all trading partners 3 and the development of developing countries. Such framework shall 4 respect the policy objectives of national laws and regulations applying to 5 services and shall take into account the work of relevant international 6 organizations.37 7 8 Operationally, the same ministers would conduct both streams of negotiations 9 through the GATT Secretariat. Legally, however, services were on a separate 1011 track. The formal separation of services frustrated US ambitions to use 1 trade-offs with goods to leverage a comprehensive multilateral investment 2 agreement. References to development, respect for national policy objectives, 3 and recognition of other organisations (such as UNCTAD) would provide 4 the foundations for subsequent contests over the content and architecture 5 of the GATS. 6 India and Brazil’s ambassadors spent the next two years slowing the 7 negotiations. They insisted on a sequenced approach. First, an adequate 8 statistical basis for assessing the potential implications and identifying 9 negotiating positions had to be developed. While the US argued that the 20111 definition should form part of the negotiations, India and Brazil insisted it 1 was not possible to negotiate something that was not defined. The critical 2 definitional questions involved foreign investment and labour. Once the 3 definitions were settled a generic framework could be discussed, with its 4 application to sectors left for subsequent negotiations. A five-point work 5 programme was eventually agreed, addressing definitional and statistical 6 issues, concepts and principles, sectoral coverage, existing international 7 8 instruments, and policies for expanding or limiting trade in services. 9 By the Montreal ‘mid-round’ ministerial meeting in December 1988 the 30111 South was again being sidelined, with claims that there was not enough 1 time to address most of their suggestions. The argument over services was 2 both strengthened and eclipsed by a confrontation between the US and 3 Brazil and India over the proposed Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 4 of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Stand-offs over intellectual property 5 and agriculture dominated the Montreal ministerial. But just five months 6 later, both the Indian and Brazilian governments had backed down. The 7 US imposed unilateral section 301 sanctions on Brazil in October 1988 over 8 its intellectual property law. India was threatened with similar sanctions 9 over insurance and financial services and was formally listed on the section 40111 301 watchlist in May 1989. These coercive measures by the US coincided 1 with major domestic changes: India’s national politics were in turmoil and 2 Brazil was in transition from a military junta to a democracy. 3 Once the TRIPS battle was lost, the vanguard on services lacked the 44111 willpower, trust and co-ordination that had made it so effective. This marked How the GATS was won (and lost?) 73

1111 what Shukla describes as ‘the end of developing countries’ resistance that 2 had been voiced since the 1982 ministerial meeting’ (Shukla, 2000, p 21). 3 Ambassadors Bautista and Shukla were both recalled in 1989; the former 4 was posted to New York, the latter returned to New Delhi to work on 5 family welfare policies. North/South divisions continued throughout the 6 services negotiations, but they were now about ‘levels of ambition’ and 7 increasingly overshadowed by division among OECD countries (Croome, 8 1995, pp 312–15, 355–8). 9 The technical discussions moved slowly. In March 1987 the OECD 1011 circulated among its members a conceptual framework for a services 1 agreement,38 which it continued revising into 1989. New Zealand and 2 Australia circulated the services annex to ANZCERTA, signed in August 3111 1988, among the negotiating parties. By June 1989 there was still no 4 agreement on key issues. One issue was the inclusion of investment. A second 5 was the use of a negative or a positive list.39 Most Southern governments 6 wanted a positive list and lengthy time frames for implementation. They 7 also wanted active support for development of their infant services capacity. 8 Canada and the EEC also favoured a positive list approach, largely because 9 they wanted developing countries to sign the agreement and a negative list 20111 would be too onerous for them. At that time, there was no proposal for a 1 world trade organisation whose members would automatically become 2 parties to a raft of agreements; it was assumed that individual states would 3 choose whether to sign and ratify a trade in services treaty. 4 Some governments were especially aggressive. In September 1989, New 5 6 Zealand tabled a detailed proposal for the structure and mechanisms 40 7 of an agreement. ‘Trade’ was defined as the cross-border movement of 8 payments, consumers, providers and knowledge, plus commercial presence. 9 A framework of general rules should include MFN, transparency, market 30111 access, national treatment, safeguards and subsidies. Countries would have 1 two schedules: a negative list of reservations that identified (temporary) 2 exclusions, and a schedule of positive bindings that would be multilateralised. 3 Intending signatories would pay an ‘entry fee’, meaning the quality of their 4 of commitments was subject to acceptance. Different levels of development 5 would be recognised. The treaty would include an inbuilt mechanism for 6 progressive liberalisation through regular multilateral rounds. 7 The US tabled its first comprehensive draft in October 1989.41 ‘Trade’ 8 would include rights of commercial establishment and temporary entry for 9 senior management. The parties would assume obligations in relation to a 40111 universe of services that were listed in an annex, unless specifically excluded 1 in a negative list. Governments could take reservations on market access, 2 national treatment or government aid with respect to existing legislation 3 or service sectors. The removal of these reservations would be subject to 44111 negotiation. There would be free movement of payments and transfers 74 Serving whose interests?

1111 relating to services, unless countries maintained restrictions that conformed 2 to IMF obligations. ‘Transparency’ would require prior notification of 3 proposed new measures, with an opportunity for comment. Significantly, 4 any party could withhold MFN status from any other at the time of 5 signing the agreement. Countries could negotiate annexes to clarify matters 6 of interpretation (the US used the example of access to telecommunications 7 networks). Protocols for expanded sectoral liberalisation (such as mutual 8 recognition of professional qualifications) and special agreements for services 9 not otherwise covered would not be subject to MFN. 1011 A number of Latin American countries responded in February 1990 with 1 their own framework text. They emphasised MFN obligations, with a 2 principle of ‘relative reciprocity’ that benefitted the South and imposed strong 3 development obligations on the North. National policies and laws would 4 be respected and the application of rules to foreign direct investment would 5 be limited.42 6 The enthusiasm of the US was waning in the lead-up to the Brussels 7 ministerial meeting in 1990. Its corporations looked unlikely to gain any 8 new access and the government would have to guarantee entry to its largest 9 foreign competitors on an MFN basis. Domestic regulators, especially the 20111 Treasury and Federal Reserve, became concerned about the economic 1 implications at home and abroad. Smaller US firms felt vulnerable, as did 2 larger transnationals who were becoming less competitive in the face of 3 international competition. The USTR announced the US would not agree 4 to the coverage of shipping, civil aviation and basic telecommunications 5 unless it could derogate from MFN. The US Coalition of Services Industries 6 denounced the text, saying the US could wield more direct influence 7 unilaterally or through regional measures, such as CUSFTA (Singh, 2003, 8 pp 22–3). 9 The chair of the negotiations produced a draft framework for discussion 30111 in July 1990.43 By November, the text that was forwarded to the ministerial, 1 on his own initiative, was full of square brackets. It combined a positive list 2 for the binding of sectors and sub-sectors on market access and national 3 treatment, and a negative list of limitations on those bindings. The critical 4 points of dispute were the refusal of the US to commit to MFN, and the status 5 of sectoral annexes that were proposed for telecommunications, maritime and 6 road transport, audio-visual, financial services and labour mobility.44 7 The Brussels ministerial collapsed over agriculture. New deadlines were 8 set for services, and missed. Gradually, a framework agreement took shape. 9 Once the discussions moved to a sectoral level, disagreements between the 40111 US and EEC, as the dominant services exporters, intensified. Two issues 1 dominated. The reluctance of the US and its industries to accord MFN 2 status in telecommunications and financial services was resolved by allowing 3 a schedule for MFN exceptions. The problem of sensitive sectors, notably 44111 maritime and direct taxation for the US and audio-visual for the Europeans, How the GATS was won (and lost?) 75

1111 was addressed by a two-tiered structure. Generic principles and rules 2 would apply across the board. Market access and national treatment would 3 only apply to a positive list of country-specific sectoral commitments, 4 which would be negotiated through a bilateral ‘request and offer’ process 5 and multilateralised. The mechanisms for this were established in negotiating 6 guidelines that were adopted in 1991.45 7 In December 1991, the GATT Secretary-General unilaterally produced a 8 draft final text that included a proposed WTO. Any departure from this 9 non-consensual ‘Dunkel’ text was said to require consensus. Only the major 1011 players had enough leverage to secure changes after that. In their final 1 power plays, the Europeans made a further unsuccessful push for an annex 2 on audio-visual services. The US opposition to ‘free riding’ through the 3111 multilateralisation of financial services commitments created a risk that other 4 countries would unwind their schedules. It was agreed that MFN on financial 5 services would be retained, subject to the right of governments to withdraw 6 those offers within six months. Meanwhile, negotiations on financial 7 services would continue. 8 The Final Act of the Uruguay round was adopted on 15 April 1994 and 9 came into effect on 1 January 1995. All members of the new WTO were 20111 automatically parties to the GATS. Article XIX mandated a new round of 1 negotiations to begin within five years to advance the goal of progressive 2 liberalisation. 3 A number of obstacles stood in the way of that vision. The first was 4 structural. As Chapter 1 explained, the GATS fell well short of the original 5 ambition of a generic set of rules that would open services markets and 6 7 dismantle domestic regulatory barriers. The positive list had been 8 institutionalised and it would be almost impossible to secure the consensus 9 needed to make comprehensive architectural changes. 30111 Second, the ideological climate had shifted. In the early 1980s a nascent 1 neoliberalism was being championed by Reagan, Thatcher and Pinochet 2 and the World Bank was launching its structural adjustment programmes. 3 By 2000 neoliberal globalisation was being blamed for financial instability, 4 economic collapse, social misery and deepening inequality. 5 Third, the shifting geopolitics of trade negotiations, already discussed in 6 Case studies 1 and 2, created new alliances, fractures and sources of active 7 and passive resistance. A letter from newly elected Bolivian President Evo 8 Morales to the WTO in March 2006 withdrawing his government’s initial 9 and revised GATS 2000 offers signalled how far the tide had turned.46 40111 Fourth, the corporate lobby struggled to maintain its dominance, despite 1 massive resources and privileged political relationships. Its critics successfully 2 pilloried the GATS as a supranational bill of rights for transnational 3 corporations that disabled sovereign governments and disenfranchised 44111 ordinary citizens. 76 Serving whose interests?

1111 Finally, the WTO was facing its own crisis of legitimacy. The second 2 ministerial meeting in Geneva in 1998 was besieged by demonstrations. 3 The Seattle summit in 1999 collapsed in the face of internal dissent and 4 external protest; with it went plans for a new Millennium round. The 2003 5 ministerial conference in Cancún also failed. A veneer of consensus rescued 6 the Hong Kong ministerial in 2005. In between, a new round of WTO 7 negotiations had been launched at the Doha ministerial meeting in 2001. 8 As former USTR Charlene Barshefsky concedes, this outcome was only 9 possible because of the leverage provided by ‘9/11’.47 The ‘Doha Develop- 1011 ment Agenda’ was quickly subsumed by conflicts over content and process, 1 largely on North/South lines. Once GATS 2000 was incorporated into the 2 Doha round, services became hostage to the fraught negotiations on 3 agriculture and industrials and a long period of paralysis set in. 4 5 6 CASE STUDY 3 THE ‘SERVICES MAFIA’ 7 8 New multilateral trade agreements do not just happen because the most 9 powerful government in the world thinks it is a good idea. Laying the 20111 foundations takes time and a focused and effective strategy. 1 The GATS is a textbook example of trade policy activism. Sometimes its 2 achievement is attributed to just one man, Geza Feketekuty, the Assistant 3 USTR responsible for services. One admirer asks: ‘How can a single 4 individual working almost without allies generate support and momentum 5 to make trade in services a US policy and to get trade in services onto the 6 7 GATT agenda?’ (Aronson, 1988, p 1). Feketekuty casts the net slightly wider 8 in his own ‘History of a Campaign’: 9 30111 How do you sell a new concept such as trade negotiations on services 1 to the world community? . . . Undoubtedly the time was ripe for a new 2 approach to services. . . . At the same time if it had not been for the 3 foresight and determined leadership of a small group of individuals, it 4 would not have happened in 1986 and it might not have emerged in a 5 trade framework. 6 (Feketekuty, 1988, p 295) 7 8 David Hartridge, the top WTO official responsible for the agreement in its 9 early days, attributes the birth of the GATS to the corporate beneficiaries: 40111 1 Without the enormous pressure generated by the American financial 2 services sector, particularly companies like American Express and 3 Citicorp, there would have been no services agreement and therefore 44111 perhaps no Uruguay Round and no WTO.48 How the GATS was won (and lost?) 77

1111 Numerous other commentaries celebrate the success of a small cadre of 2 policy entrepreneurs, corporate executives, academics, politicians, journalists, 3 business lobby groups and think tanks in developing an orchestrated game 4 plan to seed the GATS and see it to fruition. This is rather ironic, 5 given the fashion for public choice theory among neoliberal intellectuals 6 who vehemently denounce the capture of the policy machinery by vested 7 interests (Buchanan, 1978). That apparent contradiction is explained away 8 by the notion of an ‘epistemic community’. Members of this community 9 are said to be bound together by ‘normative and causal beliefs’ and a 1011 common policy enterprise. Their uniquely ‘principled’ approach makes 1 them a qualitatively different breed of policy maker, purportedly immune 2 from the failings of their self-serving counterparts. When members of these 3111 communities become influential at the national and international levels, they 4 increase the likelihood of convergent state behaviour and international policy 5 co-ordination. ‘To the extent to which an epistemic community consolidates 6 bureaucratic power within national administrations and international 7 secretariats, it stands to institutionalise its influence and insinuate its views 8 into broader international politics’ (Haas, 1992, p 4). 9 William Drake and Kalypso Nicolaidis have applied this notion to the 20111 genesis of the GATS. Writing as the Uruguay round neared completion, 1 they identified a two-tiered epistemic community (Drake and Nicolaidis, 2 1992, p 39). The first tier comprised the hands-on players from governments, 3 corporations and international institutions. It was their collective role to think 4 ahead, establish alliances of influence and steer a path through the obstacles. 5 The second tier of academics, researchers, journalists, lawyers and other 6 ‘experts’ worked behind the scenes. Their role was to construct a new 7 legitimising discourse that depoliticised the services issue and translated it into 8 an abstract conceptual framework and technicist language that was capable 9 of becoming law. 30111 The campaign was led by executives of transnational corporations with 1 the resources, influence and connections to create a groundswell of noise 2 and maintain pressure on politicians and governments. In 1974 Ronald K 3 Shelp, the newly appointed government relations executive for insurance group 4 AIG, believed the services industries deserved more support than they were 5 getting. Drawing on connections he made when working on international trade 6 issues for the US Chamber of Commerce, Shelp rallied executives from the 7 air transport, marine insurers, merchant shipping and construction sectors 8 to give evidence to the Senate Finance Committee on the Trade Act 1974. 9 AIG’s politically powerful chief executive ‘Hank’ Greenberg was appointed 40111 as the services industry representative on the Presidential Advisory Committee 1 for Trade Negotiations that was established by the 1974 Act. 2 Shelp from AIG joined forces with Harry Freeman of AMEX, formerly 3 of Bechtel. Theirs was hardly a disinterested normative project. Both 44111 recognised there were huge potential profits from new technologies, 78 Serving whose interests?

1111 deregulation and the globalisation of markets through the cross-border 2 transfer of information and money. The AIG parent company had listed 3 publicly in 1969 and just established the AIG Data Center to service its 4 offshore affiliates and subsidiaries. It was eager to secure an early foothold 5 and pre-empt the application of new regulations to its activities. AMEX 6 planned an aggressive diversification through offshore acquisitions. 7 The hard core of activists expanded through multiple, mutually reinforcing 8 corporate lobbies. In 1976 the US Chamber of Commerce established an 9 International Service Industries Committee, chaired by Shelp. A White House 1011 Inter-Agency Task Force on services and the multilateral trade negotiations 1 was established. The US Department of Commerce commissioned a study 2 from private consultants. The Trade and Tariff Act of 1979 expanded the 3 influence of the ‘services mafia’ (Aronson, 1988, p 6). Shelp was appointed 4 to chair a new Industry Sector Advisory Committee for Services. The 5 Chairman of AMEX James Robinson became the chair of a Services Policy 6 Advisory Committee to the USTR and was succeeded by John S Reed, 7 the Chairman of Citicorp (Aronson, 1988, p 12). According to Freeman, 8 they had an unlimited budget that funded lobbyists in Brussels, Tokyo and 9 numerous US cities (Freeman, 2000, p 456). The ‘services mafia’ attended 20111 every biennial GATT meeting of ministers from 1980 and worked the media 1 and their political connections relentlessly. 2 The US Coalition of Service Industries (CSI) was formed in 1982 at the 3 instigation of AMEX ‘to ensure that US trade in services . . . would become 4 a central goal of future trade liberalization initiatives’.49 Key players 5 included Citicorp, AT&T and Merrill Lynch. Freeman was the chair. The 6 Coalition distributed a monthly newsletter that outlined developments 7 during the lead-up to the Uruguay round. It remained the major lobbying 8 force for the GATS throughout the 1980s and beyond, advocating on behalf 9 of US transnational corporations in insurance, banking, construction, 30111 transport, telecommunications and data processing, audio-visual, tourism 1 and professional services. Influential US bodies also came on board, 2 including the US Council for International Business, the National Foreign 3 Trade Council, US Council for Foreign Relations, the Committee for 4 Economic Development, the Center for Strategic and International Studies 5 and the American Enterprise Institute. 6 The corporations’ influence reached beyond the border. In May 1981 7 Freeman told the OECD Secretary General he was ‘extremely pleased’ the 8 organisation had taken up the issue. Freeman reported growing interest in 9 Europe, especially from ‘more modern’ companies. In Germany, there was 40111 greater interest from the banks, insurance and reinsurance. In France, it 1 came from the airlines and travel sector. Both the UK government and 2 private sources were now on board. In the professions, there was support 3 from accountancy, law and hospital management. Global consulting and 44111 construction companies Fluour and Bechtel were also interested.50 How the GATS was won (and lost?) 79

1111 The most important non-US player was the Trade Policy Research Centre 2 in London. Australian expatriate economist Hugh Corbet established the 3 Centre in 1968. Its backroom influence accounts for the reference to trade 4 in services in the OECD’s Rey report in 1972. By 1979 Corbet was a 5 consultant on trade policy to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 6 in Paris and special trade adviser to the Tory parliamentary opposition in 7 Britain. In the mid-1970s he commissioned and published a book entitled 8 Invisible Barriers to Invisibles Trade. The Centre also began publishing The 9 World Economy, which provided an academic outlet for articles that seeded 1011 the concept of ‘trade in services’ (Feketekuty, 1988, p 296). It published 1 Jagdish Bhagwati’s pivotal article on ‘splintering’ in 1984 (Bhagwati, 1984). 2 Sympathetic media in the US and UK reported on conferences, published 3111 opinion pieces by key players and signalled US intentions at strategic times. 4 Some blurred the line between media and lobbyists. The Trade Policy 5 Research Centre and the Financial Times co-hosted a two-day conference 6 in March 1979 to focus attention on the need for a multilateral services 7 framework. Martin Wolf, a former World Bank economist, became the 8 Centre’s Director of Studies in 1981. Wolf joined the Financial Times in 9 1987. He served as adviser and rapporteur to the Eminent Persons Group 20111 on World Trade in 1990 and was principal author of its report, Meeting 1 the World Trade Deadline: Path to a Successful Uruguay Round. 2 The Centre hosted seminars, colloquiums, conferences and private 3 meetings to boost the profile of trade in services. It also facilitated unofficial 4 discussions between staff from the OECD, officials from sympathetic 5 governments, business executives and academics. As the US push intensified, 6 the Centre established a High-Level Group on Services, holding its first 7 meeting at Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire in April 1983 around the time the 8 USTR announced the goal of full-blown multilateral negotiations on services 9 under the GATT. It organised eight annual ‘informal’ round tables of 30111 ministers, diplomats, trade officials, business leaders and non-government 1 experts during the Uruguay round, hosted successively by the Australian, 2 British, Korean, German, Spanish, Japanese and Indonesian governments. 3 Other international players joined the campaign. The ICC created a 4 (US-driven) services working group in 1981 and began preparing reports. As 5 Thatcherism took root, British corporate lobby groups emerged. Lloyd’s of 6 London (alone among the British insurers) was instrumental in establishing 7 a London-based Liberalisation of Trade in Services Committee (LOTIS) in 8 1982 to work alongside the US CSI to secure the inclusion of services in the 9 GATT round.51 In 1986 LOTIS became a working committee of the newly 40111 created British Invisibles (later the International Financial Services, London), 1 holding regular informal meetings with key British officials. The International 2 Association for the Study of Insurance Economics set up a Programme for 3 Research on the Service Economy (PROGRES) in 1983 to facilitate informal 44111 debate on regulation, trade and services in Geneva. The programme initiated 80 Serving whose interests?

1111 an annual forum for some 60 inter-disciplinary specialists from the private 2 sector, experts from representative organisations, academics and officials 3 from government and intergovernmental organisations. 4 Other significant corporate lobbies emerged alongside the Uruguay round. 5 A Services World Forum was established in Geneva in 1986 to facilitate 6 interaction among governments, private sector and international institutions. 7 A Financial Leaders Group from US and Europe played a pivotal role in 8 the financial services negotiations after the Uruguay round. Significantly, 9 the European Services Forum was not launched until 1999, at the instigation 1011 of European Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan. 1 The US activists viewed these various international lobbies as support 2 players. Freeman boasted in 2000 that US corporations had almost single- 3 handedly conceived of and driven the GATS project: 4 5 The US private sector on trade in services is probably the most powerful 6 trade lobby, not only in the United States but also in the world. . . . At 7 the close of the Uruguay Round, we lobbied and lobbied. We had about 8 400 people from the US private sector. There were perhaps four 9 Canadians and nobody from any other private sector. The private sector 20111 advocacy operations in the US government are radically different from 1 those in every other government in the world. 2 (Freeman, 2000, p 458) 3 4 Freeman voiced his concern that there was no similar momentum to drive 5 the GATS 2000 negotiations. 6 The corporate cheerleaders could orchestrate and fund the campaign, 7 but they could not make the negotiations happen. That depended on a 8 strategically placed policy entrepreneur with the intellect, strategic skills, 9 drive, charisma, connections and authority to seed the idea, co-ordinate the 30111 strategy, dominate the debate, generate momentum and reach a successful 1 conclusion. They found an ideal champion in Geza Feketekuty. His career 2 before joining the USTR in 1974 included work as a finance and trade 3 economist at Citicorp and for the Council of Economic Advisers. He became 4 Assistant USTR in 1978, Senior Assistant USTR in 1982 and Counsellor 5 to the USTR from 1985 to 1990. In the early 1980s Feketekuty had full 6 responsibility for policy on trade in services. He was the US representative 7 on the OECD Trade Committee, which he chaired from 1992 to 1995. His 8 office produced a steady stream of papers and initiated a regular newsletter 9 designed to build an external constituency. 40111 Feketekuty relied, in turn, on political patronage from the highest levels 1 of the President and successive US Trade Representatives. That backing was 2 implicitly understood in all international institutions and trade negotiations. 3 Where necessary it was explicit, expressed through demands, inducements 44111 and threats. The USTR in the crucial early 1980s, William Brock, became How the GATS was won (and lost?) 81

1111 a trade in services enthusiast. While in office he oversaw the negotiation of 2 a symbolic agreement with Israel and began talks on the substantive free 3 trade agreement with Canada. Brock relied heavily on Feketekuty who, in 4 turn, praised Brock ‘as a kind of quiet “revolutionary” who wanted to 5 “shake up” people’s conventional ideas about what trade policy was’ (quoted 6 in Dryden, 1991). 7 These insights reveal how a cadre of beneficiaries, theorists and trade 8 policy practitioners were able to capture national governments and 9 international organisations to secure a legal instrument that conformed to 1011 their world view. Drake and Nicolaidis make the extraordinary assertion 1 that this ‘epistemic community’ these agents derived their authority from 2 ‘their articulation of causal beliefs that appear to external policymakers to 3111 be “scientifically objective” and susceptible to truth tests and also appear 4 to benefit the international community as a whole’ (Drake and Nicolaidis, 5 2000, p 39). They conclude that ‘these ideas would not have enjoyed 6 legitimacy or served as the basis of consensual interest redefinition if they 7 were recognizably biased and intended only to benefit one set of players 8 over another’ (Drake and Nicolaidis, 2000, p 40). 9 These rather astonishing claims ignore the fact that there was no 20111 opportunity for contest. Participation was by invitation. Most of the 1 background studies were unpublished and most publications were in 2 advocacy journals that targeted a narrow constituency. The pre-negotiations 3 phase of the GATS was conducted in the rich countries’ club of the OECD, 4 while the South’s counterpart UNCTAD was marginalised. The Uruguay 5 round negotiations were an equally private arena from which most non- trade officials and international institutions were excluded. Only a privileged 6 few sympathetic academics and commentators had access – the dissident 7 voice of Indian journalist Chakravarthi Raghavan being a rare exception. 8 This dynamic is not unique to the GATS. In Information Feudalism Peter 9 Drahos and John Braithwaite relate an almost identical story about the 30111 genesis of TRIPS in the Uruguay round, an achievement that effectively 1 globalised US intellectual property laws: 2 3 Put starkly, the intellectual property rights regime we have today largely 4 represents the failure of democratic processes, both nationally and 5 internationally. A small number of US companies, which were established 6 players in the knowledge game . . . captured the US trade-agenda-setting 7 process and then, in partnership with European and Japanese 8 multinationals, drafted intellectual property principles that became the 9 blueprint for TRIPS. . . . The resistance of developing countries was 40111 crushed through trade power. 1 (Drahos and Braithwaite, 2003, p 12) 2 3 The anodyne explanatory tool of ‘epistemic communities’ screens out the 44111 power relations that were central to these strategies. It seems more 82 Serving whose interests?

1111 appropriate to describe their architects as ‘organic intellectuals of capital’, 2 a term coined by Gramsci to describe those who act as ‘constructor, 3 organiser, “permanent persuader”’ as they seek to establish a new hegemony 4 around a particular form of capital and accompanying set of ideas (Hoare 5 and Smith, 1971, p 195). Their intellectual discourse seeks to replace, 6 re-articulate and reorder existing concepts in ways that privilege the new 7 forms of capital that they champion. 8 The concept of organic intellectuals also helps to explain why those 9 agents and ideas emerged at that particular economic, social and political 1011 conjuncture. Treating trade in services as part of a hegemonic project 1 recognises there are other intellectuals who will resist being displaced and 2 seek to defend their alternative ideas and values, and that factional internal 3 contests will also occur. Significantly, this more dialectical understanding 4 also recognises the potential for a crisis of hegemony if they fail to win 5 over and sustain a sufficient constituency for their ideas. 6 7 8 CASE STUDY 4 UNDERSTANDING THE ‘GATS 9 ATTACK’ 20111 1 While the transnational corporate lobby dominated the genesis of the 2 GATS, their adversaries have heavily influenced the fate of the GATS 2000 3 negotiations. The intensity and success of the ‘GATS attack’52 stunned the 4 WTO leadership, who responded with considerable vitriol. In February 2001, 5 the Guardian published a column from an incensed WTO Director-General 6 Mike Moore, who was never one to pull his punches: 7 8 WTO critics have always taken liberties with the truth. But the lies and 9 distortions they are peddling about the WTO’s services agreement, Gats, 30111 are astounding. . . . Those talks, and the WTO’s existing services 1 agreement, do not threaten governments’ ability to provide public 2 services, their right to regulate, or their scope to impose restrictions on 3 public investment.53 4 5 Moore went on to recite a catalogue of virtues that are commonly claimed 6 for the GATS: boosting global economic growth; access for poor countries 7 to new technology and capital investment; flexibility for governments to 8 choose what commitments to make; and protection of their right to regulate. 9 That same month the WTO Secretariat took the extraordinary step of 40111 publishing a booklet on its website entitled ‘GATS – Fact and Fiction’, 1 in response to a short critique entitled ‘GATS – How the World Trade 2 Organization’s New “Services” Negotiations Threaten Democracy’ (Sinclair 3 2000). The WTO’s opening paragraphs protested that ‘the negotiations 44111 and the GATS itself have become the subject of ill-informed and hostile How the GATS was won (and lost?) 83

1111 criticism. Scare stories are invented and unquestioningly repeated, however 2 implausible.’54 The booklet went on to create numerous straw men that it 3 then cut down. That approach added fuel to the fire by inciting a tit-for- 4 tat response from various critical commentators (e.g. World Development 5 Movement (WDM), 2001; Gould, 2001). The tendency of the Secretariat’s 6 rebuttal to tell only half the story did not help its cause.55 7 As resistance to the GATS intensified, Reuters offered to help out with 8 ‘Anti-GATS Counter-measures’. Its representative at one LOTIS meeting in 9 2001 asked how the business case for the GATS could best be communicated 1011 to the media and ‘[i]n this respect, his company would be most willing to 1 give them publicity’ (Wesselius, 2001). 2 In May 2002, the US and OECD convened a forum to counter a sustained 3111 critique of the GATS from the educational sector (Chapter 7). Leading GATS 4 advocate Pierre Sauvé, from the OECD Trade Secretariat, presented a paper 5 ‘What’s In, What’s Out, What’s All the Fuss About?’. In it he attacked 6 ‘a number of key misunderstandings and fallacies that have tended to cloud 7 a rational discussion of the possible effects of the GATS’ (Sauvé, 2002, p 51). 8 Sauvé portrayed the critics as confused, as much as mischievous: ‘Novelty, 9 complexity and variable geometry all too easily lead to misrepresentation 20111 and/or over-interpretation’ (Sauvé, 2002, p 48). He acknowledged the impact 1 that the opposition was having on the GATS 2000 negotiations, noting these 2 were taking place 3 4 not only against the backdrop of a weak initial harvest of liberalisation 5 commitments in the sector. They are also proceeding with significant 6 7 regulatory and political precaution, and in the midst of a growing anti- 8 GATS campaign, of which public sector unions in the educational field 9 are active players, especially in OECD countries, together with students 30111 sensitive to the anti-globalisation movement. 1 (Sauvé, 2002, p 49) 2 3 The substantive arguments made in these and other counter-offensives are 4 addressed elsewhere in this book. The point of this case study is that the 5 champions of the GATS and their adversaries occupy irreconcilable positions 6 that reflect the contradictions of the trade in services paradigm. The trade 7 discourse closes off the intellectual space to conceive of, let alone engage with, 8 a critique that is premised on services as social phenomena that should be 9 regulated for social objectives within a vibrant democratic polity. Those are 40111 the very factors that the agreement seeks to expel. The champions and the 1 critics appeal to rival constituencies with conflicting objectives: one prioritises 2 the needs of capital, especially transnational companies; the other espouses 3 economic redistribution, social justice and self-determination. The two ‘sides’ 44111 are therefore destined to talk past each other. 84 Serving whose interests?

1111 The previous case study described the architects of the GATS as ‘organic 2 intellectuals of capital’, organising the political, economic and intellectual 3 élites of the major powers, and later in some Southern countries, to construct 4 a novel legal artifice. Opponents of trade in services agreements play a 5 classic counter-hegemonic role as organic intellectuals of resistance. In 6 Gramscian terms, they aim to connect the ‘elementary passions of the people’ 7 dialectically with knowledge – in concrete terms, to make the connection 8 between the struggles of real people in their daily lives and the arcane world 9 of trade in services. ‘One cannot make politics-history without this passion, 1011 without this sentimental connection between intellectuals and people- 1 nation’ (Hoare and Nowell Smith, 1971, p 418). To continue the Gramscian 2 theme, the activism that results from this engagement is part of a ‘war of 3 movement’ that seeks to shift the power dynamics of international trade in 4 services negotiations back in favour of the national, the local and the social. 5 The critics are not a monolithic, NGO equivalent of the Global Services 6 Network,56 or a bunch of ‘network guerrillas’ as Financial Times journalist 7 Guy de Jonquières famously described the campaigners against the OECD 8 MAI.57 The resistance to trade in services agreements involves a disparate, 9 fluid, geographically dispersed, often disconnected, and sometimes conflicted, 20111 coalescence of activists and activities. Most of this opposition is organic 1 and arises out of national, local or sectoral campaigns that have their own 2 unique histories and contemporary concerns. The GATS and bilateral 3 agreements are just one of many focal points. 4 Opposition in the global South has often emerged from grass-roots 5 campaigns to defend people’s livelihoods as indigenous peoples, peasants 6 and workers, and basic rights that are threatened by collaboration between 7 national élites and foreign corporations. Their politics is sourced in historical 8 struggles for political independence, long-standing resistance to US and 9 European imperialism and more recent rejection of neoliberal structural 30111 adjustment programmes. Aspirations are expressed in terms of social justice, 1 constitutional rights and people’s sovereignty. 2 In the Philippines, opposition to trade in services agreements finds its 3 touchstone in defence of the 1986 ‘people power’ Constitution. Popular 4 mobilisations against privatisation, corruption and US imperialism treat 5 the GATS and bilateral agreements, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 6 and the World Bank, and the Arroyo administration as manifestations of 7 the same repressive elements (Case study 8). In South Africa, the GATS 8 symbolises the enduring greed of transnational corporations and national 9 élites that deny people the constitutionally guaranteed right to basic services, 40111 such as water or electricity, and obstruct the redistribution of social, 1 economic and political power. The rejection of the GATS in India began 2 with a small group of activists and academics that supported Shukla in the 3 battle over the Uruguay round mandate. Today, that opposition is part of 44111 a broad-based movement against a neoliberal vision of India Shining that How the GATS was won (and lost?) 85

1111 privileges an aspirant middle class over the impoverished rural and urban 2 masses. In Thailand, a proposed FTA with the US was one of the catalysts 3 for a popular mobilisation that saw the military remove Prime Minister 4 Thaksin Shinawatra from power and later generated amendments to the 5 Constitution that aimed to fetter the executive treaty-making authority of 6 future governments. 7 Resistance from indigenous peoples to trade in services agreements is integral 8 to their enduring struggle for self-determination over land, food, biodiversity, 9 water, culture and livelihoods. The Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas, Mexico 1011 was launched symbolically on 1 January 1994, the day that NAFTA came into 1 force. Indigenous-led movements in Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador have mobilised 2 against the US Andean free trade agreement as the latest vehicle for the legalised 3111 rape of their natural resources by foreign corporations and corrupt elites, and 4 their endemic poverty and disempowerment. 5 Regional alliances of mass-based social movements in Brazil, Argentina, 6 Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America have rallied against US plans 7 for hemispheric domination through the FTAA. The pressure brought by 8 the hemispheric alliance of social movements on their governments has been 9 pivotal to maintaining a stalemate in those negotiations. Likewise, regional 20111 networks of activists in Asia and the Pacific Rim have targeted APEC and 1 ASEAN, worked together against the MAI, and developed strategies to 2 oppose the GATS and other free trade agreements. Sometimes these alliances 3 span continents – African networks working together with European 4 development advocates ran a sustained campaign against the EU’s attempt 5 to impose EPAs on the ACP countries. 6 While social movements favour mass mobilisations and political 7 campaigns, NGOs rely more on lobbying, technical analysis and education 8 to pressure their governments. The social movements are mainly located in 9 the global South, and the NGOs are largely Northern, but that is not always 30111 so. Often there are fertile collaborations between them. But there are also 1 tensions over what is perceived as ‘NGO imperialism’, especially from 2 transnational corporate NGOs that seem intent on growing their brand and 3 international influence. 4 Some of the most aggressive Northern governments have been forced 5 to take defensive positions on services at home, while maintaining their 6 offensive offshore. The Canadian trade in services campaigns began in the 7 1980s when trade unions, feminists and democracy activists opposed the 8 CUSFTA, then NAFTA and the MAI. Their Australian counterparts have 9 mounted vigorous campaigns against the GATS, MAI, AUSFTA and APEC, 40111 highlighting the links between the embrace of economic rationalism by 1 successive governments and their hard-line services export agenda. Likewise, 2 New Zealand activists condemn trade in services agreements as devices that 3 lock in the socially destructive neoliberal experiment that began in 1984. 44111 The Hong Kong ministerial conference in 2005 provided a rare platform 86 Serving whose interests?

1111 for the Hong Kong People’s Alliance to learn about and then challenge 2 GATS offers that would reinforce the privatisation and deregulation agenda 3 of mainland China’s Administration. 4 Those living in the ‘belly of the beast’ play a different role again. US 5 activists have relentlessly lobbied the Congress in campaigns against the 6 renewal of the President’s fast track authority and the ratification of bilateral 7 agreements. They have successfully mobilised state legislators to challenge 8 the administration’s actions that erode their constitutional authority. 9 Constant exposés of bullying tactics of US politicians and officials, and of 1011 corporate intimacy with political power, fuel the politics of embarrassment 1 and provide campaign tools in the US and abroad. European groups engage 2 in multi-level regional, national and local campaigns against the corporate- 3 led integration agenda for Europe and the anti-development strategy of the 4 EU towards the South. 5 In a sometimes uncomfortable accommodation, Geneva-based specialists 6 maintain networks across government delegations, the WTO Secretariat, 7 UNCTAD and other international organisations, the media, NGO networks 8 and social movements. Their constant flow of information on the GATS 9 negotiations provides outsiders, including many delegations from the South, 20111 with analysis and interpretation from an otherwise secret world. These 1 specialists are complemented by academics, research-based NGOs and 2 specialist advocacy groups that are located in each continent, who have 3 created a library of resources that range from the populist to the academically 4 arcane. 5 Sectoral organisations that focus on environment, labour, women, water, 6 public services and culture mainly work with their own constituencies. Some 7 are active participants in broader cross-sectoral networks. The exemplar 8 is the coalition of South Korean farmers, students, workers and cultural 9 activists who waged a militant struggle for years against the WTO and a 30111 proposed US bilateral investment treaty, and more recently against the US 1 and EU Korea FTAs. Other sectors take an isolationist approach. The 2 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (now the International 3 Trade Union Congress) has been notable for its reluctance to join cross- 4 sectoral alliances that take an oppositional position on the trade in services 5 agreements. Despite this, international federations of trade unions in 6 education, public services and food, and numerous national union bodies, 7 have played a leading role in anti-GATS campaigns. 8 While GATS advocates reach out to a commercial constituency, the 9 critics have found their own influential allies. International organisations, 40111 including within the UN system, have produced powerful reports. Ministers 1 of culture and education publicly denounced trade agreements that 2 intrude on their responsibilities; state and provincial governments likewise 3 challenge the encroachment of services agreements on their jurisdiction. 44111 Local bodies in several countries have declared their neighbourhoods How the GATS was won (and lost?) 87

1111 ‘GATS-free zones’. Professional bodies, such as doctors, librarians and 2 university vice-chancellors, have challenged the marketisation of public goods 3 through trade in services treaties. 4 The development of the internet and the World Wide Web has enabled 5 information, documents and analysis about these agreements to flow more 6 widely and rapidly than the gestetnered newsletters that Raghavan and others 7 produced during the Uruguay round. Virtual archives and list-serves provide 8 invaluable resources that are not otherwise available, although access is 9 selective: technologies require reliable and affordable telecommunications 1011 and these are often only in English. Detailed legal, technical and political 1 analyses of multilateral, regional and bilateral negotiations are widely 2 available and shared, especially ahead of ministerial meetings and negotiating 3111 deadlines. This knowledge exchange builds on skills that were developed 4 following the leaks of the MAI text in 1997 and the EC GATS requests in 5 April 2002. With the growth of bilateralism, local experiences in one country 6 or region have become invaluable for campaigns in another. Relationships 7 among campaigners are strengthened by face-to-face strategy meetings – 8 gatherings in Geneva in late 2001 and March 2004 were pivotal to building 9 and strengthening opposition at critical moments. Side meetings are 20111 organised at key events, such as the WTO ministerials, regional ministers’ 1 meetings, and the world or regional social forums, although these too have 2 problems of exclusivity (de Sousa Santos, 2006, Chapter 5). 3 The process of analysis, networking and coalition building takes place 4 behind the scenes. The public face of opposition to the GATS is the protests 5 on the streets at the ministerial meetings. These moments are important, as 6 they send an international message through the media and act as a moral 7 boost and reminder to delegations inside the meetings – although those 8 meetings are so securely quarantined that delegates are often unaware of 9 the demonstrations except for the media reports. But protests do not bring 30111 about the collapse of international institutions and treaties. The governments 1 determine what decisions, if any, are taken in negotiations. The main lesson 2 from the MAI campaign was that negotiations collapse for a combination 3 of political and technical reasons: political pressure on individual 4 governments induces caution that undermines confidence, slows the process 5 and generates a technical quagmire. Some governments are more important 6 strategic targets than others. Equally, some services sectors or issues are 7 more ripe for ‘monkey wrenching’ to jam up the works – hence the focus 8 on public and social services rather than telecommunications and financial 9 services, in campaigns against the GATS. 40111 This brief survey conveys a sense of the diversity of participants, strategies, 1 motives and geographies of those who oppose the trade in services 2 agreements. It describes a dynamic that is genuinely organic, evolving and 3 self-determining, and is intrinsically local. It can be facilitated, but not 44111 centrally co-ordinated, orchestrated or manipulated. Collapsing the trade 88 Serving whose interests?

1111 in services negotiations is not an end in itself for those who oppose the 2 agreements. They are driven by a shared commitment to core values of 3 deliberative democracy, distributive social justice and self-determination 4 that are sourced in local realities. In the battle for hearts and minds, those 5 who are committed to expanding capital accumulation will always struggle 6 to understand, let alone win over, those who are motivated by social 7 transformation. 8 9 1011 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 Chapter 3

1111 2 Trade-related development 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 With remarkable prescience, Upendra Baxi observed in 1994 the 4 ‘emergence of a market-friendly (or specifically trade-related) human 5 rights paradigm’ (Baxi, 1994). In an embryonic ‘post-Dunkel’ world, states 6 were becoming more the enablers of capital than the representatives of 7 their citizens. Transnational corporations were the new recipients of 8 internationally guaranteed and enforceable rights, with no corresponding 9 legal obligations. 20111 The paradigm shift from a social to a market conception of human 1 rights and development confronted the Western-derived norms and moral 2 language that had dominated the twentieth century. Perhaps the starkest 3 collision involves the Declaration on the Right to Development,1 agreed 4 to by UN member states in 1986 just as the Uruguay round began. The 5 Declaration confers the right and duty on states to formulate appropriate 6 national development policies that will continuously improve the wellbeing 7 of their general population and all individuals. The people have the 8 corresponding right to participate actively, freely and meaningfully in their 9 own development and to a fair distribution of the resulting benefits. The 30111 Declaration requires states to formulate policies in the international 1 arena that facilitate the full realisation of this right and to ensure that new 2 treaty obligations do not disproportionately reduce their capacity to set 3 and implement national development policy. Such priorities, processes and 4 outcomes are antithetical to the primacy that trade in services agreements 5 require states to accord to the economic interests of foreign corporations. 6 When norms, instruments and institutional mandates conflict like this, 7 they must be left to co-exist in an uncomfortable disjuncture or be reconciled 8 by subordinating one to another. From the mid-1990s, the ‘human’ rights 9 and development discourse was progressively co-opted and displaced by 40111 the ‘trade-related’ rights and development paradigm. The former has not 1 disappeared. It has been reinvented through the medium of the Millennium 2 Development Goals (MDGs) and the ‘pro-poor’ policies prescribed by the 3 IMF and World Bank as Poverty Reduction Strategies, within a WTO- 44111 compatible model of development. 90 Serving whose interests?

1111 The triumvirate of the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO effectively 2 trumps any international organisation that champions the old paradigm. 3 Their hegemonic project of ‘global economic policymaking’ is advanced 4 under the rubric of ‘coherence’. This chapter interrogates the ideological, 5 institutional, policy and operational layers of ‘coherence’ to reveal their 6 distinct, yet synergistic, functions. Although the institutions rarely collaborate 7 actively across these levels, the cumulative effect is a seemingly impregnable 8 edifice. Despite this appearance, they have failed to drown out the dissident 9 voices of the disempowered and dispossessed who demand alternatives to 1011 neoliberalism or to subdue those international organisations that continue 1 to insist that services are inescapably social. 2 The analysis in Case study 5 of the World Bank’s World Development 3 Report Making Services Work for Poor People reveals how the World Bank 4 and the GATS complement each other organically, without the need for 5 active collaboration. Case study 6 traces how this hegemony was advanced 6 through an integrated circuit of UN-sponsored summits on trade, finance 7 and sustainable development that began in 1995 and intensified between 8 2001 and 2003. 9 20111 Ideological coherence 1 2 The GATS assumed a successful ‘socio-regulatory adjustment’ from old 3 discourses of human rights and development to new norms that celebrate 4 the market as the vehicle for development. Beginning in 1995, and especially 5 after the collapse of the Seattle ministerial meeting in 1999, the major powers 6 set out to capture every significant international summit as an ideological 7 platform – from the early iterations of the market model at the Copenhagen 8 Summit on Social Development in 1995 to the UN Millennium Summit 9 in 2000, through a rapid succession of further summits on trade (Doha in 30111 November 2001), finance for development (Monterrey in July 2002) and 1 sustainable development (Johannesburg in August 2002). This strategy is 2 analysed in depth in Case study 6. 3 These summits served four important functions. First, a decade-worth of 4 cross-referenced, mutually reinforcing international declarations from (almost) 5 all the world’s leaders amounted to a consensus endorsement of neoliberalism. 6 Each summit was the site of diplomatic contest by some participating 7 governments and more trenchant opposition from external critics. Yet the 8 final declarations invariably reflected the agendas of the major powers and 9 recited the new mantra of trade-driven development in an integrated global 40111 economy. Southern governments were promised rewards of debt cancellation 1 and new loans for adopting these policies. Deviant states that displayed ‘bad 2 governance’ were marginalised or denied debt relief and trade preferences. 3 The seriously recalcitrant were demonised as a threat to the integrity of the 44111 global economy and freedom loving people everywhere. Trade-related development 91

1111 Second, these summits were hosted by the UN – the institutional home 2 of the old human rights and development paradigm. Each declaration 3 reinforced the need for coherence: horizontally across the UN agencies, the 4 Bretton Woods institutions and WTO; and vertically by ‘mainstreaming’ 5 neoliberalism, especially trade liberalisation, within countries’ national 6 development plans and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and in 7 their trade agreements. 8 Third, the declarations deployed a depoliticised discourse. Neutral terms 9 such as ‘coherence’, ‘partnership’, ‘stakeholders’, ‘safety nets’ and ‘sound’ 1011 economic policies implemented within an ‘enabling’ environment disguised 1 the structural disparities of power. Likewise, the epithets of ‘civil society’ 2 and ‘non-state actors’ portrayed the corporate lobbies, transnational NGOs, 3111 more activist NGOs and transformative social movements as one harmonious 4 and depoliticised entity. Their contrasting social locations were exposed at 5 the summits themselves. Transnational corporate NGOs who wanted a seat 6 at the table alongside the Fortune 500 companies were given recognition 7 and sometimes funding. The ‘uncivil society’, whose popular struggles 8 challenged neoliberalism and the geopolitical ambitions of the major 9 powers, was excluded or boycotted the events. 20111 Fourth, the summits consolidated the MDGs, endorsed by the UN 1 Millennium Summit in 2000, as the normative reference point for trade- 2 driven development – and its source of virtue. Sweeping commitments were 3 made to halve the number of people living in poverty, reduce child and 4 maternal mortality and the incidence of HIV/Aids, and dramatically improve 5 the provision of education and safe drinking water by 2015. These goals 6 were bound together by MDG8, which made government/corporate 7 partnerships and trade liberalisation the primary means for achieving them. 8 Situating trade-driven development amidst goals on poverty and pandemics 9 conferred an unearned legitimacy on free markets and free trade. It also 30111 made the IMF, World Bank and WTO the primary institutions through 1 which the goals should be achieved (WDM, 2005). Even though there was 2 no explicit reference to the GATS, trade in services agreements were one 3 legal vehicle for ‘enabling’ public–private partnerships and private firms to 4 deliver health care, education, water and other essentials of life. 5 6 Institutional (in)coherence 7 8 The legal mandates of the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO provide 9 the platform for their role as hegemonic vehicles of neoliberal globalisation. 40111 Article III:5 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 1 reads: 2 3 With a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic 44111 policymaking, the WTO shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the 92 Serving whose interests?

1111 International Monetary Fund and with the International Bank for 2 Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated agencies.2 3 4 Article I of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement lists as one of its purposes: ‘to 5 facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade’. 6 Likewise, the purposes set out in Article 1(iii) of the Articles of Agreement 7 of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World 8 Bank) include ‘to promote the long-range balanced growth of international 9 trade . . . by encouraging international investment for the development of 1011 the productive resources of members’. 1 The three institutions formally agreed in 1996 to hold regular high-level 2 consultations and to grant reciprocal observer status at key meetings and 3 communicate on matters of mutual interest. They would also establish 4 protocols for co-operation and communications between staff.3 Giving effect 5 to these commitments has not been easy (Sampson, 1998, p 258).4 The 6 World Bank and IMF occupy adjacent complexes in downtown Washington. 7 They maintain a minimal presence in Geneva to service the WTO and other 8 international agencies. While they have vastly greater resources than the 9 WTO Secretariat, their specialist trade departments are relatively small. The 20111 Bank’s trade directorate was strengthened after 2000 by employing several 1 former WTO economists, including GATS specialist Aaditya Mattoo (Case 2 study 5). 3 Their divergent governance structures also affect how the institutions 4 interrelate. Finance ministers govern the Bank and Fund, trade ministers the 5 WTO. Finance ministers have more power and view trade liberalisation as 6 one consideration among many. The Bretton Woods institutions hold joint 7 executive meetings where the major powers, as the majority shareholders, 8 control the decisions. While the IMF has a centralised and rigidly hierarchical 9 bureaucracy and the World Bank is more amorphous, the staff of both 30111 institutions produce only documents that they know the board will approve. 1 By contrast, the formal governance arrangements of the WTO involve 2 one-country-one-vote, which means the major powers have to rely on the 3 less predictable methods of back-room deals, persuasion and coercion. The 4 WTO Secretariat is authorised only to perform the will of the members, 5 although it is frequently accused of actively promoting the North’s agenda 6 (Hilary, 2004). 7 The objectives and priorities of each organisation necessarily reflect their 8 distinctive mandate. Trade policies espoused by the World Bank have to 9 be consistent with the IMF’s macro-economic framework, while the Fund’s 40111 trade liberalisation conditionalities have traditionally depended on aspects 1 of the Bank’s structural adjustment programmes (Sampson, 1998, p 260). 2 The WTO’s activities are defined solely with reference to its legal texts. At 3 times the mandates of the institutions compete. The WTO texts defer to 44111 the IMF’s assessment of a member’s balance of payments situation when Trade-related development 93

1111 considering measures under Article XV of GATT and XII of GATS, but a 2 senior legal adviser at the IMF has noted the potential for jurisdictional, 3 substantive and institutional tensions in the IMF/WTO relationship (Siegel, 4 2002). 5 These practical difficulties and institutional differences are overcome 6 by their underlying ideological convergence. The World Bank’s World 7 Development Report 2004 shows it is not necessary for the institutions to 8 collaborate actively to achieve a synergy of both ideology and policy (Case 9 study 5). Conversely, the circuit of international summitry shows how all 1011 three institutions and the major powers can and do join forces to suppress 1 a challenge to their hegemony (Case study 6). 2 This common cause is also apparent in their relationships with UN agencies 3111 that continue to espouse a ‘human’ human rights and development paradigm. 4 Back in 1995 the Programme of Action from the Copenhagen Summit 5 on Social Development had proposed strengthening inter-institutional 6 co-ordination in economic and social development programmes, including 7 joint meetings at the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The first 8 ECOSOC session for that year included a ‘high level economic policy 9 dialogue’. The newly appointed World Bank President James Wolfensohn 20111 bluntly distinguished between (acceptable) co-operation and (unacceptable) 1 guidance and co-ordination: ‘I have a job to do and I don’t want . . . to carry 2 out my business according to some resolution made at the UN’. At the same 3 meeting the Director General of the newly established WTO, Renato 4 Ruggiero, pointed to his organisation’s mandate to improve policy coherence 5 with the Bretton Woods institutions, and stressed the WTO’s reliance on their 6 policy analysis and research. He did not mention the UN. Ruggiero also 7 insisted that the WTO’s contractual nature meant it could only discuss what 8 the members had agreed was its mandate. That was confined to trade, 9 including the promotion of development through progressive liberalisation. 30111 Other dimensions of development were beyond its purview (Khor, 1995). 1 All the UN agencies came under intense pressure to conform. The primary 2 target was UNCTAD, whose role as a partisan for the South before and 3 during the Uruguay round had seen it marginalised and starved of resources. 4 Trade ministers of larger Southern governments are said to have pressured 5 UNCTAD’s research staff in recent years to abandon any leftist positions. 6 The appointment of former WTO Director General Supachai Panitchpakdi 7 as Secretary-General of UNCTAD in 2005 was expected to bring any 8 dissident elements to heel. 9 It was partly to gill the gap left by UNCTAD that the South Centre was 40111 established in 1990 as a think tank to provide research support and promote 1 South/South co-operation in Geneva. In 2006, the South Centre submitted 2 a report entitled ‘Reinventing UNCTAD’ to the Panel of Eminent Persons 3 on Enhancing UNCTAD’s Impact. It pulled no punches, asserting that a 44111 ‘concerted effort by major economic powers to deprive the United Nations 94 Serving whose interests?

1111 of its Charter functions in the economic field and whittling down its role 2 and authority’ had reduced inter-governmental deliberations in UNCTAD 3 4 to a charade and its research and policy analysis work had lost its 5 earlier élan, punch and distinctiveness. . . . In the name of coherence, 6 [UNCTAD] is being required to conform to the mainstream views 7 espoused by developed countries and their preferred international 8 organizations . . . and is not being allowed to question the existing world 9 order or to bring out its inequalities and imbalances. 1011 (South Centre, 2006, p 5) 1 2 The South Centre blamed the ‘Partnership for Development’ (endorsed at 3 UNCTAD IX in 1994, at the end of the Uruguay round) for de-emphasising 4 the organisation’s focus on the role of governments and policy measures, 5 and converting it into a more pragmatic and action-oriented institution that 6 primarily delivered donor-driven technical assistance. Some ground had been 7 recovered at the UNCTAD X and UNCTAD XI, which followed the collapse 8 of the Seattle and Cancún WTO ministerials respectively, when Southern 9 governments had used UNCTAD to voice their critiques of the WTO. The 20111 promotion of the concept of ‘policy space’ had opened the possibilities for 1 a more pluralist approach, even though ‘certain powerful countries refuse 2 any reference to the concept in UNCTAD’ (South Centre, 2006, p 10). 3 The hostility of the major powers to UNCTAD was readily apparent in 4 discussions on ‘coherence’ in the WTO Working Party on Trade, Debt and 5 Finance. The committee had been established under paragraph 36 of the 6 Doha Work Programme. It was empowered to explore broader trade and 7 development debates and produce recommendations ‘within the mandate and 8 competence of the WTO’ that would contribute to a durable solution to the 9 external indebtedness of developing countries and ‘safeguard the multilateral 30111 trading system from the effects of financial and monetary instability’. The 1 committee was perpetually split on North/South lines (ICTSD [International 2 Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development], 2004). The US and its allies 3 blocked a proposal to ask the Hong Kong ministerial meeting in 2005 to 4 establish a permanent committee with an explicit mandate that would have 5 authorised UNCTAD to play a more active role (ICTSD, 2005, p 36). 6 The organisation still publishes several flagship reports. Their orientations 7 vary according to which division produces them. The annual World 8 Investment Report is the work of the Division on Investment, Technology 9 and Enterprise Development. Its 2004 report The Shift Towards Services 40111 documented the uneven distribution of trade in services, noting that most 1 poor countries had fallen further behind as the major powers had 2 accumulated greater control through their transnational corporations 3 (UNCTAD, 2004). In what has become UNCTAD’s standard line, the report 44111 promoted foreign direct investment in services in countries that had effective Trade-related development 95

1111 regulatory regimes, provided they could preserve the flexibility to pursue 2 their national objectives. 3 Other divisions of UNCTAD pushed the boundaries of what the 4 major powers would tolerate. The 2006 Trade and Development Report 5 produced by the Division on Globalization and Development Strategies 6 was, paradoxically, published under Supachai’s signature. It was replete 7 with references to ‘pragmatic’ policy approaches, ‘strategic trade integration’, 8 ‘flexibility’ that requires an ‘appropriate balance between national policy 9 space and international disciplines and commitments’ (UNCTAD, 2006, 1011 pp XI–XX). It criticised the prevailing macro-economic orthodoxy of 1 the international financial institutions, and the attempt to establish a 2 homogenous regulatory framework under the WTO, as being unlikely to 3111 take adequate account of asymmetries between rich and poor countries. 4 Moreover, the proliferation of free trade agreements had widened the gap 5 between legal equality and equality of economic constraints. The report 6 floated the possibility that an individual party might opt out of commitments 7 for a limited time under agreement-specific criteria. Taking a swipe at the 8 anti-democratic practices of the WTO, it remarked that a fully inclusive 9 process, and flexibility to reflect the needs of all members, would be necessary 20111 to avoid a deadlock in the Doha negotiations. 1 The US expressed ‘regret’ at recommendations that ran counter to the 2 ‘foundations of sound economic and trade policy’ and the research of other 3 international organisations, and ‘disappointment’ that trade issues were 4 presented as a North/South dichotomy ‘at odds with the economic reality of 5 modern global trade’. An aggregated concept of ‘policy space’ fostered the 6 harmful perception that all developing countries wanted to opt out of their 7 international commitments. Too little had been said about the importance 8 of liberalising infrastructure services, while the multilateral setting of a trade 9 negotiation ‘is simply not the place to try to solve the complicated issues 30111 related to international migration and labor’.5 1 Regional offices of UNCTAD play a pro-South, but pro-liberalisation 2 role. For example, UNCTAD India embarked on joint venture with the 3 UK’s Department for International Development and the WTO to strengthen 4 the capacity and commitment of India’s Ministry of Commerce to participate 5 positively in the Doha round. From June to August 2005 they conducted 6 a series of ‘stakeholder consultations’, including on services (UNCTAD India, 7 2005). One of the two NGOs invited to speak observed that the published 8 account had been massaged to endorse India’s pro-liberalisation position 9 on modes 1, 2 and 4 and to downplay their criticisms.6 40111 The UN’s other main economic development agency, the UN Development 1 Programme (UNDP), periodically questioned the trade-driven agenda for 2 services. Its Human Development Report for 2003 promoted a human rights 3 approach to policies on the private provision of health, education and water 44111 (UNDP, 2003). The same year the UNDP’s Socio-economic Development 96 Serving whose interests?

1111 Group published a review that was critical of MDG8. The authors said the 2 assumption that trade increased economic growth, which in turn reduced 3 poverty, had mostly failed the poor. Their position on the GATS was 4 carefully worded: ‘From a human development perspective, it is vital that 5 countries preserve adequate policy space for sequencing the progressive 6 liberalisation of basic public services such as water, health, education and 7 social protection.’ Liberalisation of those services should not be imposed 8 as ‘a blank prescription’. The potential application of the dispute settlement 9 and cross-retaliation mechanisms of the GATS were inappropriate for the 1011 liberalisation of such basic services. Concerns about the private management 1 of utilities, especially water in Latin America, showed the need for caution 2 (Vandemoortele et al., 2003, p 8). 3 The UN’s human rights institutions that adhered to the social paradigm 4 of services were also marginalised. A preliminary report on trade and human 5 rights from the UN Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of 6 Human Rights in June 2000 referred to the WTO as a ‘nightmare’ for 7 human rights, provoking a furious response from the WTO (quoted in 8 Picciotto, 2007, fn 3). In 2002 the Sub-commission produced another, more 9 diplomatically phrased report on ‘Liberalisation of Trade in Services and 20111 Human Rights’. The authors argued for a human rights approach to trade 1 through which ‘these two processes – progressive realization of human rights 2 and progressive trade liberalization – can be implemented simultaneously 3 and coherently’.7 They would have been well aware that affording human 4 rights equal status to, let alone primacy over, trade liberalisation would 5 negate the core principles and objectives of the GATS. 6 The report reiterated the state’s role as the primary duty bearer for the 7 implementation of human rights. Moreover: ‘The adoption of any deliberately 8 retrogressive measure in the liberalization process that reduces the extent 9 to which any human rights is protected constitutes a violation of human 30111 rights.’8 While not opposing liberalisation, they argued for evidence-based 1 assessments to determine its right form and pace. States should ‘undertake 2 public, independent and transparent human rights assessments of the impact 3 of liberalization policies – both past policies and future options – on the 4 enjoyment of human rights, through a participatory and consultative process 5 with concerned individuals and groups’. If assessments were not available, 6 governments should take a cautious approach to new commitments. 7 ‘Where assessments indicate negative effects of past liberalization policies 8 on the enjoyment of human rights’ other WTO members should allow 9 those governments the maximum flexibility to withdraw their liberalisation 40111 commitments.9 This report passed comparatively unremarked in the 1 WTO. 2 By contrast, a contemporaneous study that was co-authored by the World 3 Health Organisation (WHO) and WTO was profiled on the WTO website. 44111 The report spent relatively little time on the GATS, stressing the voluntary Trade-related development 97

1111 nature of commitments and potential gains for developing countries from 2 exporting health services. It concluded that WTO agreements are sensitive 3 to health issues, which can take precedence where necessary. The primary 4 recommendation was for closer national and international co-operation so 5 that ‘health and trade policy-makers can . . . ensure coherence between their 6 different areas of responsibilities’ (WHO, 2002, p 22). 7 8 Policy coherence 9 1011 A coherent ideology and institutional synergies have to be translated into 1 concrete policies. The neoliberal literature talks of a two-phase process for 2 securing a new paradigm: initiation of radical policy change followed by 3111 a period of consolidation that normalises and embeds the new regime 4 (Haggard and Kaufman, 1992). The initiation phase in the South rested 5 primarily with the Bretton Woods institutions. Initially, this was pursued 6 through the crude Washington Consensus template of fiscal austerity, anti- 7 inflationary monetary policy, capital account liberalisation, light-handed 8 regulation, trade and foreign investment liberalisation, privatisation, labour 9 market deregulation and consumption-based taxation. 20111 By the 1990s there was abundant evidence that the Washington Consensus 1 prescription had failed poor countries; so had the radical laissez-faire 2 approach foisted on Eastern Europe in the early 1990s (Hellinger, 2001; 3 Stiglitz, 2002; Henisz et al., 2005). That dismal record had been compounded 4 by major financial crises in East Asia and elsewhere. What Robert Wade 5 calls the ‘High Command’ of world finance then shifted the consensus ‘from 6 “liberalize the market” to “standardize the market” on a global scale’. 7 The ‘Post-Washington Consensus Consensus’ entailed ‘a big increase in 8 government and supranational “intervention”’ in order to homogenise 9 market institutions (Wade, 2007, p 2). This regulatory focus was especially 30111 evident in the post-Uruguay round GATS negotiations on financial services, 1 telecommunications and the accountancy profession. 2 At the same time, both the IMF and World Bank began rebranding their 3 structural adjustment programmes. They announced a joint decision in late 4 1999 that lending would be re-aligned to centre on poverty reduction, 5 including the effective provision of social services. The centrepiece would 6 be national development strategies that were designed and owned by the 7 debtor nations themselves and set out in PRSPs. Each institution established 8 new programmes: the IMF created a Poverty Growth Reduction Facility 9 and a Finance Programming Framework; the World Bank introduced 40111 Country Policy and Institutional Assessments that fed into its Country 1 Assistance Strategies. 2 Their major shareholders endorsed an ‘enhanced’ version of the discredited 3 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative for debt cancellation in 44111 least developed countries, which they had created in 1996. To qualify, 98 Serving whose interests?

1111 governments had to demonstrate a ‘good reform performance’ and prove 2 they would use the freed resources to reduce poverty. This would be 3 evidenced by their PRSPs, effectively making them new conditionalities. 4 In theory, these PRSPs were going to be generated and ‘owned’ locally 5 through the widespread participation of civil society – in contrast to the 6 top-down structural adjustment programmes and onerous conditionalities 7 of the original HIPC scheme. Each Poverty Reduction Strategy would reflect 8 the key principles of being country-driven with broad based participation; 9 comprehensive and results-oriented; take a medium- to long-term perspective; 1011 and be partnership-oriented (IMF/World Bank, 2003). 1 Between 2000 and 2005 a number of independent reviews showed the 2 PRSPs were still being designed to meet the imperatives of the institutions 3 and the donors (Abugre, 2000; Marshall and Woodroffe, 2001; Chavez 4 Malaluan and Guttal, 2002; de Barra, 2004; Hermele, 2005). They followed 5 a pre-prepared format with instructions set out in a 1,000-page source book. 6 Mandatory policy matrices that were annexed to the Interim PRSP were 7 almost identical to past structural adjustment agreements. The annexes, not 8 the cover document, were what really counted. Because the papers had to 9 be approved by the IMF and Word Bank boards as a pre-requisite to securing 20111 debt relief and other funding, senior officials would not submit advice to 1 the board that might be rejected. Their ‘advice’ to governments became 2 tantamount to directives and overrode any more informed insights from 3 staff on the ground (Chavez Malaluan and Guttal, 2002, pp 2–5). There 4 was no space to analyse the causes of poverty that fell outside the authorised 5 diagnosis and remedies. Problems in providing education, health care, clean 6 drinking water, sanitation, and energy were attributed, in market-speak, to 7 scarcity, inefficiency, poor quality political decisions and lack of market 8 disciplines. An IMF/World Bank document entitled ‘Poverty Reduction 9 Strategy Paper – Operational Issues’ in December 1999 maintained: 30111 1 The impediments to faster sustainable growth should be identified and 2 policies agreed to promote more rapid growth: such as structural reforms 3 to create free and more open markets, including trade liberalisation, 4 privatisation and tax reform and policies that create a stable and 5 predictable environment for private sector activity. 6 (quoted in Chavez Malaluan and Guttal, 2002, p 10) 7 8 An evaluation by Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et 9 la Solidarité (CIDSE)/Caritas International described the Poverty Reduction 40111 Strategy as preoccupied with process, providing a theatre in which actors 1 fulfil their roles to get the funding or meet ‘best donor practice’ while the 2 real policy discussions happen offstage (de Barra, 2004, p 7). Even where 3 citizens placed priority on improved access to high quality services during 44111 their country’s PRSP consultations, the formal documents almost always Trade-related development 99

1111 proposed the same recipe: competitive markets, reduced subsidies and 2 social entitlements, user charges at market rates with targeted exemptions, 3 privatisation through long-term concessions or Build Operate and Transfer 4 ‘partnerships’, and private property rights over natural resources, including 5 water. 6 Another study, this time of Vietnam’s PRSP in 2002, records the World 7 Bank’s own estimate that 400,000 workers would become unemployed 8 following the corporatisation of state enterprises. More job losses were 9 expected from trade liberalisation under the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. 1011 Yet the Bank made no meaningful recommendations to protect social services 1 for the unemployed, or even to provide safety nets, because (applying 2 neoclassical theory) these changes were predicted to create more jobs and 3111 have little net impact on employment (Chavez Malaluan and Guttal, 2002, 4 p 11). 5 When PRSPs did have a poverty focus their content rarely flowed through 6 to national budgets and policies, which were more likely to be driven by 7 competitive export strategies. Paradoxically, the PRSPs were also of marginal 8 relevance to the lenders. The main determinant for IMF loans was its Poverty 9 Reduction Growth Facility, which relied on briefing papers that were drafted 20111 secretly in Washington and subject to minimal negotiation. Similarly, the 1 World Bank’s own secret scorecard, the Country Policy and Institutional 2 Assessments, triggered lending under the Country Assistance Strategy and 3 Poverty Reduction Support Credits (de Barra, 2004, pp 9–10). Those facilities 4 were complemented by the Bank’s private sector lending agency, the 5 International Finance Corporation, whose promotion of private education 6 provision is discussed in Chapter 7. 7 Even the institutions’ own independent evaluation agencies found the 8 PRSPs wanting. The IMF review concluded that actual achievements fell 9 ‘considerably short of the potential’, essentially because there was little 30111 change in how the IMF was operating. Donors, including the Bank and 1 Fund, were often unwilling to treat country strategies and domestic processes 2 as the basis for ‘partnership’ and to increase the scope for treating countries 3 differently (IMF, 2004; see also World Bank, 2004). Perhaps predictably, 4 the joint internal review by the World Bank and IMF in 2005 was largely 5 uncritical, except of debtor governments. There were, it concluded, no magic 6 bullets, so the institutions should build on ‘best practice’ and continue to 7 tailor the process towards the needs of individual countries (IMF/World 8 Bank, 2005). 9 The institutions perceive ‘success’ as the introduction of the neoliberal 40111 prescription, not its positive outcomes. This ideological closure excludes 1 the authentic voices of people whose aspirations are still framed by the 2 language and concepts of human rights, social justice and self-determination. 3 The persistence of those voices and the risk of further policy failures require 44111 a more coercive mechanism to secure the new orthodoxy. This is where the 100 Serving whose interests?

1111 trade in services agreements come in. Their role is to lock in and expand 2 the liberalisation process and consolidate the markets that the Bretton Woods 3 institutions have initiated. 4 To date, the GATS has failed to fulfil its potential as a tool of consolidation. 5 The current GATS schedules were signed off in 1994. The level of services 6 liberalisation in the mid-2000s far exceeds those commitments, so Southern 7 governments face intense pressure to commit their new ‘status quo’ in the 8 GATS 2000 negotiations. Some have been encouraged by the seductive, but 9 legally meaningless, possibility in the GATS Article XIX:3 to seek ‘credit’ for 1011 making their liberalisation policies irreversible. Others remain very reticent, 1 insisting that the GATS guarantees them flexibility about what commitments 2 they make, if any. 3 There is one major instance in which the GATS has been effective – the 4 pernicious process of accession by some of the world’s poorest states to 5 the WTO (Adhikari and Dahal, undated; Charveriat and Kirkbride, 6 2003; Oxfam, 2005). To accede, an applicant must secure the consensus 7 endorsement of a self-appointed working party of existing WTO members. 8 Each participating member has an effective power of veto. Virtually every 9 accession package sets a progressively higher threshold for countries that 20111 follow. The major powers consistently seek to establish ‘high quality’ 1 precedents and avoid low-level commitments, so they can bolster their 2 demands in the WTO negotiations and the accession of significant countries, 3 such as Russia (or previously China). The US is notorious for demanding 4 an extensive list of services commitments (Grynberg et al., 2002). Such 5 practices continue, despite a decision of the WTO General Council in 6 December 2002 in which members pledged their sensitivity to development 7 10 8 objectives and mutual self-restraint towards least developing countries. 9 The World Bank Institute (WBI) confirms that the commitments made 30111 by countries that acceded to the WTO since 1995 are wider and deeper 1 than those made by existing WTO members during the Uruguay round. 2 Many acceding countries have also committed to new liberalisation, unlike 3 most existing members (WBI/WTO, 2006, p v). A comparative analysis of 4 the services schedules of WTO members and acceding countries published 5 in 2006 exposes the shocking extent of these disparities (Grynberg et al., 6 2006). Six of the twenty new members were least developed countries. While 7 GATS 1994 commitments are generally higher for higher income WTO 8 members, the acceding members’ commitments were higher still: 9 40111 At the most aggregate level, while WTO members have on average 1 taken up some kind of commitment in six sectors out of a maximum 2 of 12, the comparable figure for acceding countries is 11. At the 2-digit 3 level, acceding countries took commitments in 36 sectors, compared 44111 to only 14 for WTO members. Finally, at the most disaggregated level, Trade-related development 101

1111 acceding countries have made commitments in more than twice as many 2 sectors as WTO members: 100 as against only 42. 3 (Grynberg et al., 2006, p ix) 4 5 The lower the national income, the greater the disparity is between original 6 members and acceding countries. Acceding least developed countries took, 7 on average, 183 commitments at the most disaggregated level, compared 8 to 20 by original least developed country members. 9 Accessions also routinely include GATS-plus obligations. For example, 1011 OECD countries commonly insist on commitments to privatise utilities and 1 services, and require periodic reports on the progress of privatisation 2 (Grynberg et al., 2006, p 5). The legal justification for this is that Article 3111 30 of the Treaty of Vienna provides that a subsequent treaty, such as a 4 bilateral agreement reached during accession negotiations, supersedes its 5 predecessor (Grynberg et al., 2006, p 4). 6 The World Bank promotes universal WTO membership and provides 7 research, advice and advocacy to countries undergoing accession. The main 8 rationale for accession is that developing countries gain improved market 9 access, protection against discriminatory practices and access to dispute 20111 resolution (Evenett and Primo Braga, 2005). Accession is also said to attract 1 foreign investment by providing evidence of a government’s commitment 2 to maintaining pro-market economic policies. These claims are highly 3 contestable (Gay and Joy, undated; Kelsey, 2005b). Because the accession 4 process is conducted in secret, and commitments are not revealed until the 5 working party report is signed off, it is impossible to provide strong empirical 6 counter-arguments (unless the working party report is leaked). 7 The standard riposte is that states choose to join the WTO. Yet there is 8 suspicion that the international financial institutions may impose accession 9 as debt conditionality. That is hard to prove, given the confidentiality of 30111 the loan contracts. However, there some evidence to support the suspicion. 1 Vanuatu, a small South Pacific island and a least developed country, signed 2 a Comprehensive Reform Programme with the Asian Development Bank 3 in 1998. A key element required the government to encourage private sector- 4 led growth through a more open economy, in part by forming regional 5 trade blocs and acceding to the WTO. Vanuatu signed off its working party 6 report in November 2001. After unconscionable pressure from the US, 7 supported by the WTO Secretariat, it had made fifty specific commitments 8 in ten services, far higher than neighbouring Pacific Island WTO members. 9 Vanuatu was to have been the first least developed country to accede to 40111 the WTO at Doha in 2001. Days before, the government realised the 1 implications of its GATS schedule and suspended its accession ‘for technical 2 reasons’ (Gay and Joy, undated). In 2004 Vanuatu’s trade minister wrote 3 to the USTR seeking to reopen the accession package and withdraw 44111 commitments to foreign investment in health, education, environment, 102 Serving whose interests?

1111 audio-visual, wholesale and retail services. The US eventually replied that it 2 was prepared to revisit the schedule – on the terms of Article XXI that required 3 Vanuatu to negotiate compensatory concessions for any adjustments.11 4 While the GATS has had a limited impact at a multilateral level, Case 5 study 2 revealed a much greater level of commitments and GATS-plus rules 6 in bilateral agreements where political pressure can be applied more directly 7 and less publicly on weaker governments. The use of negative lists increases 8 the potential for governments to make extensive ‘standstill’ and ‘rollback’ 9 commitments, with a corresponding risk where negotiators have a poor 1011 understanding of the implications or simply make an error. 1 Some of these agreements, notably those involving the EU, also subordinate 2 aid to trade. This is a central platform of the Cotonou Agreement 2000, which 3 commits ACP states to negotiate EPAs with the EU by December 2007. The 4 EU Water Facility that has provided €500 million to help ACP countries 5 achieve MDG7 (Ensure Environmental Sustainability), and the EU’s insistence 6 that ACP states include services and investment liberalisation in their EPAs, 7 is a classic example of ‘coherence’.12 8 9 Operational coherence 20111 1 Ultimately, it is national governments that decide whether or not to sign 2 up to and implement neoliberal policies and trade in services commitments. 3 However, the institutions and donor states provide them with every 4 encouragement in the name of ‘capacity building’ and ‘technical assistance’, 5 and this is often linked directly or indirectly to a loan. Because the WTO- 6 compliant parameters have been so firmly established, there is a much more 7 catholic approach to inter-agency co-operation at the operational level. 8 The most prominent initiative is the Integrated Framework for Trade- 9 related Technical Assistance to Least-developed Countries.13 The Integrated 30111 Framework was created at the Singapore WTO ministerial meeting in 1996 1 and involves the IMF, World Bank, International Trade Centre (a WTO– 2 UNCTAD entity), WTO, UNDP and UNCTAD. The framework has two 3 objectives: to ‘mainstream’ trade into national development plans and/or 4 Poverty Reduction Strategies; and to deliver trade-related technical assistance. 5 A least developed country must be committed to trade integration, be starting 6 its PSRP process and have a ‘conducive operational country environment’. 7 The government asks for a ‘diagnostic trade integration study’ to assess the 8 economy and identify sectors that have actual or potential for trade. The 9 outcomes are then incorporated into an action matrix.14 40111 This programme has been repeatedly ‘enhanced’ in response to criticisms. 1 A 2003 review found anecdotal evidence that the institutions had improved 2 their coherence and consistency in promoting ‘mainstreaming’, but the goal 3 had ‘yet to be fully embraced at the national level’ (Capra, 2003, p 10). A 44111 further internal review concluded in 2006 that ‘trade is inadequately seen, Trade-related development 103

1111 by both donors and recipients, as an integral aspect of economic development 2 and poverty reduction, so does not feature high enough on their priorities’.15 3 Yet another ‘enhancement’ was made to complement the ‘aid for trade’ 4 package brokered at the Hong Kong ministerial in 2005. By the mid-2007, 5 43 countries were involved in the framework, 25 of which had completed 6 ‘diagnostic studies’. Many were least developed countries engaged in 7 accession. 8 The Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme (JITAP) is designed 9 to speed up the integration of African countries into the multilateral trading 1011 system. Established in 1998, JITAP’s second phase ran from 2003 into 1 2007.16 It is described as a multi-stakeholder ‘partnership’ involving the 2 International Trade Centre, WTO and UNCTAD and is funded by the major 3111 powers. The Centre developed generic tool kits for six developing countries 4 and 10 least developed countries from Africa who had demonstrated their 5 commitment to ‘mainstreaming of trade as an engine for poverty reduction’. 6 The African Union asked for the continuation and extension of JITAP past 7 2007, but also wanted the current and potential participants to be involved 8 in conceptualising JITAP III.17 9 Most international organisations also have their own initiatives. The WTO 20111 runs an Institute for Training and Technical Cooperation, which was subject 1 to a relatively critical independent strategic review in 2006.18 The Secretariat 2 replied to the suggestion that their ‘neutrality’ approach to assistance and 3 training might appear to some participants as ‘pro-liberalisation’ by saying 4 that advocating liberalisation was the WTO’s core function and was 5 supported by economic and empirical evidence.19 6 The World Bank sponsors its own forums to catalyse country or regional 7 discussions. The WBI provides training courses and seminars on trade policy, 8 sometimes with the WTO. Countries in accession receive special attention. 9 More academic-oriented programmes are run jointly with high-profile 30111 university centres. The regional development banks in Africa, Latin America, 1 Asia and Eastern Europe undertake similar activities. The World Bank 2 Trade Research Group produces regular Trade Notes and working papers 3 on particular trade issues. The Bank’s country economists also produce 4 country specific reports, often on request. 5 All these institutions have taken a special interest in mode 4. Institutional 6 collaboration enables the WTO to be involved in exploring an otherwise 7 partisan issue. The World Bank and WTO organised a seminar on mode 8 4 in October 2002. The International Organization for Migration (a non- 9 UN intergovernmental body), the World Bank and OECD co-sponsored a 40111 seminar on trade and migration in late 2003. The WTO replaced the OECD 1 as co-sponsor of a follow-up session on regulation of temporary worker 2 schemes in 2004. UNCTAD has also actively promoted mode 4. 3 Some view UNCTAD’s role in technical assistance and capacity building, 44111 especially on WTO accession, as an important counter-balance to the rest. 104 Serving whose interests?

1111 An independent review in 2006 praised its ‘objective, evidence-based and 2 development focused support’, despite its overstretched resources.20 In 3 the view of the South Centre, however, ‘UNCTAD’s foray into technical 4 assistance has been a negative development . . . at the cost of its negotiating 5 role and research and analysis work [and] has given the donors the leverage 6 to drastically remould UNCTAD’s other functions in the direction of their 7 interest’ (South Centre, 2006, p 19). 8 This observation highlights the lack of an institutional counter-weight to 9 the ‘triumphal triumvirate’ of the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. 1011 At one level, the mutually reinforcing layers of ideological, institutional, 1 policy and operational coherence represent a totalising hegemony. The 2 essential social function of services that was expressed during the twentieth 3 century through human rights and development discourse has been formally 4 subordinated to a neoliberal paradigm that redefines ‘services’ as ‘tradeable 5 commodities’, ‘rights’ as ‘goals’, and state ‘obligations’ as ‘aspirations’ to 6 be achieved through globalised markets. 7 Yet there are also signs of fragility. Rhetorical appeals to MDGs, 8 development partnerships, ‘pro-poor’ PRSPs and trade-driven development, 9 combined with legal artifices such as the GATS or bilateral ‘trade’ 20111 agreements, have not been able to purge services of their social essence or 1 conceal the deep disparities that are perpetuated through globalised services 2 markets. Strategies of exclusion have failed to silence dissenting voices, 3 whether they are expressed as the aspirations of people during cosmetic 4 consultations over PRSPs, the continued assertion of ‘human’ human rights 5 by marginalised UN agencies, or the resistance of mass movements on the 6 streets during the steady stream of international summits. 7 8 9 CASE STUDY 5 THE WDR 2004: MAKING SERVICES 30111 WORK FOR RICH COMPANIES 1 2 The World Bank’s flagship, the annual World Development Report (WDR), 3 provides an unofficial exposition of its thinking on current issues. 4 Starting with the 1991 report The Challenge of Development, which was 5 produced during a long period of paralysis in the Uruguay round, the reports 6 have consistently promoted an open trade regime as a key strategy for 7 development (World Bank, 1999/2000, p 22). As with most economic and 8 policy discussions, the reports’ notion of ‘trade’ has been limited to the 9 traditional categories of goods and agriculture. Although the reports also 40111 continually advance the commercialisation and market delivery of services, 1 there has been almost no reference to ‘trade in services’. 2 In 1993, Investing in Health urged governments to adopt ‘cost-effective’ 3 approaches to health care, especially through targeted provision and 44111 decentralised public private partnerships. In 1994, Infrastructure for Trade-related development 105

1111 Development focused on improving infrastructure efficiency through 2 commercial management, by which it meant privatisation and public private 3 partnerships. (In contrast to the later neocorporatist version, these reports 4 treated public private partnerships as purely commercial arrangements within 5 a laissez faire economy.) The 1995 report Workers in an Integrating World 6 stressed the creation of institutional support for the private sector through 7 private property rights, contracts, foreign investment and privatisation. 8 In 1996 the Bank’s internal culture and external public relations image 9 shifted under the presidency of James Wolfensohn. The Bank responded 1011 to the ‘50 years is enough’ campaign (Danaher, 1994), the manifest 1 failure of Bank and IMF policies in Africa and Eastern Europe (Chatterjee, 2 1994) and the embarrassing exposure of internal dissent (Wade, 1996) by 3111 re-inventing itself. The 1997 report The State in a Changing World 4 promoted a post-Washington Consensus: a benign self-limiting state should 5 use ‘sound’ economic policies to create an enabling environment for the 6 private sector, build social capital and demonstrate good governance. This 7 revisionist agenda permeated subsequent reports on Knowledge for 8 Development (1998/9), Entering the 21st Century (1999/2000), Attacking 9 Poverty (2000/1), Building Institutions for Markets (2001/2) and Sustainable 20111 Development in a Dynamic World (2002/3). 1 The most significant WDR from the perspective of services was the 2 2004 report entitled Making Services Work for Poor People (World Bank, 3 2003). The report focused on health, education, water and sanitation 4 services, with peripheral references to energy and transport. The consistent 5 refrain was that governments need to rely on the private sector, or at least 6 a private sector model, to deliver their development goals. A consultation 7 draft of the report asserted that governments had ‘failed poor people’ by 8 not meeting their basic needs, and public service workers were inefficient 9 and ill-disciplined. Specifically: 30111 1 Public funds are often spent on the wrong services and people; are 2 sucked away by corruption; and, when they are not, reach teachers and 3 health workers mired in a system where they have little incentive to do 4 their jobs.21 5 6 The preferred private sector model required the creation of services 7 markets, which in turn required payments to providers that were channelled 8 through government contracts and/or user charges. The very title of the 9 report – making services work for poor people – heralded the replacement 40111 of universal services with a two-tiered system based on targeted subsidies 1 or full cost recovery. Consumer choice displaced human rights as the 2 founding principle. Competition became the driver of quality. A ‘partnership’ 3 approach was said to place the client (consumers and their advocates) at 44111 the centre of services provision. Competitive markets would ensure they 106 Serving whose interests?

1111 had choice and voice to secure the services that satisfied their diverse needs 2 and to hold providers accountable. Governments would have further 3 choices over financing, regulation, production and monitoring arrangements, 4 as well as provision. They had a wide range of delivery options, including 5 public provision, contracting out, decentralisation, community-based and 6 private delivery, with or without subsidies. Governments could select from 7 this menu of providers to suit particular contexts and circumstances. 8 For this model to work, traditional state provision of services had to be 9 ‘unbundled’ in several ways. First, the previously integrated elements of 1011 each service had to be separated and sourced independently. Second, the 1 different actors or ‘stakeholders’ within the services chain – clients, providers 2 (public or private) and policy makers – had to be disaggregated so each 3 could respond to specific incentives. Because many poorer countries could 4 not afford to fund these services themselves, they had to engage with a 5 further set of stakeholders, the donors, who had their own incentives. 6 The abstract concept of ‘services markets’ that were inhabited by neutral 7 stakeholders ignored the realities of power. Markets that offered significant 8 rates of return would be dominated by the likes of (then) Vivendi, Nestlé 9 and Enron, whose practices, and in some cases proven corruption, were 20111 quarantined from World Bank scrutiny. The report made great play of the 1 potential for local community co-operatives and empowerment projects to 2 become service providers. It failed to explain that community co-operatives 3 often only survive where the new services market is not profitable enough to 4 attract the corporations. Some co-operatives and non-profit providers might 5 then thrive. But others would struggle to repay their set-up loans while 6 meeting the expectations of their communities and the requirements of 7 their contracts to provide quality, access and affordable services. 8 Making Services Work for Poor People came three years into the GATS 9 2000 negotiations. The World Bank and the GATS share the same basic 30111 premise: private firms operating in competitive markets are the best means 1 to guarantee access to efficient, affordable and accessible services in (rich 2 and) poor countries. For critics of the GATS, the link to the WDR seemed 3 obvious. They vigorously attacked the draft during the Bank’s consultation 4 process (initiated following claims of undue pressure on the authors of 5 previous reports (Wade, 2001)). A flood of responses condemned the report 6 for promoting the privatisation of essential social and public services for 7 the benefit of transnational corporations, who could then secure enforceable 8 rights of market access, national treatment and business-friendly regulation 9 under the GATS (for example, Bretton Woods Project, 2002). Some 40111 developing countries reportedly raised their concerns in the Special Session 1 of the Council for Trade in Services. They suggested the Bank was 2 undermining their negotiating positions in the GATS 2000 by arguing for 3 competition in service sectors, which would remove the protection for ‘public 44111 services’ under Article I:3 (Bretton Woods Project, 2002). Trade-related development 107

1111 The report’s authors say this reaction took them by surprise.22 In their 2 view, the GATS is ill defined, has a limited impact and is basically about 3 foreign investment and temporary migration. Moreover, the WTO is not 4 concerned with the question of whether the poor have access to services. 5 They originally did not intend mentioning the GATS; there was no reference 6 to it in either the October 2002 outline released for comment or the March 7 2003 draft. 8 Because of the fuss made by the NGOs, the final report included a one- 9 page box headed ‘Is the GATS a help or a hindrance?’. According to reports’ 1011 authors, this was prepared on the advice of a WHO/WTO liaison officer, 1 and with limited input from the WTO. Although the text was reportedly 2 drafted in January 2003, it was not released until late April (Bretton Woods 3111 Project, 2003). This is the only reference to the GATS in the 288-page 4 document. 5 The World Bank’s trade economist and GATS specialist Aaditya Mattoo 6 wrote the text. Mattoo had been one of the early advocates of the GATS, and 7 published a number of papers recommending ways to make the agreement 8 more far reaching. He has argued in favour of imposing a ‘necessity’ test on 9 all services regulations, which would make them violations of the GATS if 20111 they were deemed ‘unnecessarily’ trade restrictive; ‘technological neutrality’, 1 so that existing commitments apply to technologies that did not exist when 2 the commitments were made; and negotiating approaches that are intended 3 to increase the pressure to liberalise, such as model schedules and standardised 4 sets of commitments (Low and Mattoo, 2000). 5 In the text box, Mattoo notes a sharp polarisation of views about the 6 GATS: it is either a source of pro-poor reform or a threat to regulatory 7 sovereignty and pro-poor policies (World Bank, 2003, p 105, Box 6.9). 8 He implicitly discards the latter by endorsing the efficiency-driven market 9 ideology that is the primary target of the critique. Mattoo then posits three 30111 questions that provide straw men for him to strike down, without attempting 1 to address the widely published counter-arguments. The questions, the 2 report’s response, and the critique are set out below: 3 4 Q1: How much market opening has happened so far under the GATS? 5 6 WDR: The GATS coverage is broad reaching, but the rules are flexible 7 and most only apply to sectors that governments have committed. Most 8 existing commitments have entailed little liberalisation beyond prevailing 9 government practice. Relatively few governments, especially of developing 40111 countries, made commitments on primary education or hospital services, 1 and none on water distribution. 2 3 Critique: Some of the world’s poorest countries have been required to 44111 make commitments that involve extensive new liberalisation, including in 108 Serving whose interests?

1111 health and education, during their WTO accessions. GATS commitments 2 by other developing countries commonly lock in the liberalisation of services 3 that the IMF and World Bank have previously required through loan 4 conditionalities. While this reflects the status quo, such commitments are 5 almost impossible to reverse when markets fail or a new government is 6 elected with a democratic mandate to restore a modicum of social regulation 7 to the provision of services. Governments of developing countries face intense 8 political pressure to liberalise further in the GATS 2000 negotiations and 9 in FTAs. 1011 1 Q2: Does the agreement prevent recourse to the complementary policies 2 needed to ensure that the poor have access to essential services in liberalized 3 markets? 4 5 WDR: Arguments that the GATS threatens public services, outlaws 6 universal service obligations and subsidies, and undermines effective 7 regulation are ‘not well founded’ because: 8 9 a ‘services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority’ are excluded, 20111 although the meaning of services that are offered neither on a commercial 1 basis nor competitively ‘offers scope for clarification’; 2 b governments can still pursue domestic policy objectives, including 3 subsidies and universal services obligations, even where sectors are open 4 to full competition, so long as they do not discriminate against foreign 5 suppliers; 6 c the GATS recognises the right to regulate to meet national policy 7 objectives, and the rules on domestic regulation ‘are hardly intrusive’. 8 9 Concerns about what the GATS might become can be addressed by 30111 ‘informed debate [that] would undoubtedly help ensure that future GATS 1 rules and commitments reflect broader development concerns and not just 2 the dictates of domestic political economy or external negotiating pressure’. 3 4 Critique: These explanations of the GATS text are simplistic and 5 misleading: 6 7 a The Bank’s own commercialisation agenda increasingly takes services 8 outside the scope of the exception for ‘services supplied in the exercise 9 of governmental authority’. 40111 b The report, like the Bank’s own policy, ignores the sound reasons that 1 governments may have to discriminate against foreign investors, such 2 as: denying taxpayer subsidies to foreign firms that are more likely to 3 repatriate than reinvest them; requiring joint ventures that can facilitate 44111 the transfer of technology and skills and retain some domestic capacity; Trade-related development 109

1111 or setting foreign equity thresholds that restrict foreign control and 2 asset stripping of key infrastructure. 3 c The GATS does limit the ways in which governments are allowed to 4 regulate by denying the sovereign right to choose the measures they 5 believe can best achieve their national objectives. The accountancy 6 disciplines take this further by specifying a narrow indicative category 7 of ‘legitimate’ policy objectives and applying a ‘necessity’ (least trade 8 restrictive) test to regulating the accountancy profession. Some 9 governments in the Article VI:4 negotiations on domestic regulation 1011 want this to apply to all domestic regulation of all services, a proposal 1 Mattoo himself has made. 2 3111 Even if one believed that the market paradigm of services could ever be 4 ‘pro-poor’, the suggestion that informed debate can advance those priorities 5 in the GATS ignores the effective veto that major powers exercise over any 6 meaningful new initiatives. 7 8 Q3: Could the GATS process lead to premature liberalisation before 9 necessary reforms are implemented, and how can this be prevented? 20111 1 WDR: There is a legitimate concern that the GATS ‘does not – indeed 2 cannot – ensure the complementary action that is needed to deliver pro- 3 poor liberalization’. This is a problem of partial or inappropriate sequencing, 4 for example, not introducing competition policies to restrain private 5 monopolies or developing regulatory frameworks before markets are 6 opened. Binding legal commitments in the GATS make ‘inappropriate policy 7 choices’ difficult to reverse. Developing countries therefore need better 8 research into ‘the elements of successful reforms’ and ‘enhanced technical 9 and financial assistance to improve the regulatory environment and pro- 30111 poor policies’. 1 2 Critique: The very concept of ‘pro-poor liberalisation’ is an oxymoron, 3 as shown by the experience in many countries where liberalisation has been 4 imposed. The liberalisation model consolidates transnational corporate 5 power and erects new barriers to poor people gaining access to appropriate, 6 affordable, quality services. If it is impossible to reverse commitments that 7 reflect ‘inappropriate policy choices’, it is better for governments never to 8 make those commitments and for the institutions to stop imposing the 9 conditionalities that result in such policy ‘choices’. 40111 1 In summary, the text box demonstrates how the World Bank and GATS 2 complement each other organically: the Bank makes services ‘free trade 3 ready’, while the GATS and other trade in services agreements lock them 44111 in and create pressure for further liberalisation. The claim that the authors 110 Serving whose interests?

1111 did not think this connection was relevant seems rather extraordinary. 2 Mattoo was a former WTO official and in regular contact with the WTO 3 Secretariat, and has authored many papers on the GATS. Indeed, he 4 published a more detailed version of the text box as a World Bank Trade 5 Note on services in the Doha round in September 2003 (Mattoo, 2003). 6 Yet, that lacuna also shows that active collaboration is not necessary to 7 deliver a high degree of coherence when the institutions of the World Bank 8 and WTO operate within a common neoliberal paradigm. 9 1011 1 CASE STUDY 6 THE CLOSED CIRCUIT OF 2 SUMMITRY 3 4 Three months after the WTO, and hence the GATS, came into being on 5 1 January 1995 a UN Summit on Social Development was convened in 6 Copenhagen. In the opening paragraph of the Copenhagen Declaration the 7 assembled heads of state and ministers promised to ‘promote dynamic, open, 8 free markets, while recognizing the need to intervene in markets’,23 and 9 committed their governments to full implementation of the Uruguay round 20111 agreements. While the governments resolved in paragraph 9(q) to ‘monitor 1 the impact of trade liberalization on the progress made in developing 2 countries to meet basic human needs’, they would pay ‘particular attention 3 to new initiatives to expand their access to international markets’. 4 Social development was being turned on its head. The future of even the 5 world’s poorest people in Africa and other continents would now be tied 6 to free trade and free markets, including for social development, and the 7 fostering of international co-operation on macro-economic policies. This 8 pro-market approach to social development was still embedded in the 9 comforting, but increasingly empty, rhetoric of human rights, social 30111 solidarity and people-centred development. Human rights advocates were 1 outraged.24 What they were witnessing was the first step in a mutually 2 reinforcing circuit of summitry that within seven years would have realigned 3 ‘the social’ within the primacy of ‘the market’ (Bond, 2006a).25 4 The groundswell of so-called ‘anti-globalisation’ protests gave added 5 urgency to the neoliberal project. Trade ministers attending the WTO’s 6 second ministerial meeting in Geneva in May 1998 celebrated the GATT’s 7 fiftieth birthday protected by barbed wire and water cannons. The UN 8 Secretary General (via his emissary) warned the ministers that: ‘No-one 9 should be fooled by the festive atmosphere of these celebrations. Outside there 40111 is anguish and fear, insecurity about jobs and what Thoreau described as a 1 “life of quiet desperation”.’26 Protests engulfed meetings of the World Bank 2 and the IMF in Washington and Prague, the ADB in Chiang Mai, the Group 3 of Seven/Eight major powers in Birmingham and Okinawa, and the World 44111 Economic Forum gatherings in Melbourne and Davos. The humiliating Trade-related development 111

1111 collapse of the WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle in November 1999 made 2 the major powers even more determined to close ranks behind the 3 organisation and counteract the mounting critique from the WTO’s dissident 4 Southern members, and less well-behaved elements of civil society. 5 6 United Nations Millennium Development Summit, 7 September 2000 8 9 The preparatory process for the UN Millennium Summit in September 1011 2000 was carefully managed. Most of the accredited ‘NGO Partners’ invited 1 to the Millennium Forum obligingly concentrated on special pleadings 2 or reforms that stopped short of questioning the WTO’s legitimacy 3111 (Chossudovsky, 1999). The final Summit Declaration recited the customary 4 commitments to development and poverty eradication, noting in paragraph 5 13 that success in achieving this ‘depends, inter alia, on good governance. 6 . . . We are committed to an open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and 7 non-discriminatory multilateral trading and financial system’.27 8 The centrepiece of the Summit was the adoption of eight Millennium 9 Development Goals. The first seven goals aim to deliver the most basic 20111 services to some of the world’s poorest people by 2015. They are motherhood 1 statements that no one can easily object to, except to say they are not 2 ambitious enough. Goal 7 is to halve by 2015 the proportion of people 3 without sustainable access to safe drinking water. Goals 2 and 3 aim to 4 ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling 5 and to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education. Goals 6 4, 5 and 6 target child and maternal mortality and the incidence of HIV/Aids. 7 The headline Goal 1 is to halve the proportion of the world’s people living 8 in poverty by 2015. In a devastating critique, ethicist Thomas Pogge exposes 9 the manipulation of criteria for achieving MDG1. The actual reduction 30111 1 of people living in extreme poverty in 2015 is likely to be less than 20 2 per cent, from 1,094 million to 883.5 million (Pogge, 2004, p 329). This 3 deception allows 4 5 most citizens of the affluent countries [to] take comfort in the asserted 6 decline of global poverty, thinking of themselves as benefactors of the 7 global poor in the belief that the global institutional order they impose 8 kills and scars fewer people each year. They should instead take intense 9 discomfort in the fact that a feasible alternative global order could have 40111 avoided most life-threatening poverty and its associated evils. 1 (Pogge, 2004, pp 334–5) 2 3 All seven substantive MDGs are couched in aspirational language that 44111 Amin describes as ‘a litany of pious hopes [that] commits no-one’. Those 112 Serving whose interests?

1111 aspirations are accompanied by conditions that essentially eliminate the 2 possibility of their becoming reality’ and have the potential to produce 3 ‘apartheid on a world scale, reproducing and deepening global polarization’ 4 (Amin, 2006). The conditions he refers to are contained in MDG8: 5 6 Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development 7 Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non- 8 discriminatory trading and financial system. Includes a commitment to 9 good governance, development, and poverty reduction – both nationally 1011 and internationally. 1 Target 13: Address the special needs of the least developed countries. 2 Includes tariff- and quota-free access for exports . . . 28 3 4 This is the only goal that sets out the mechanisms for achieving the other 5 seven. 6 A social justice paradigm might have focused on cancellation of unpayable 7 and unconscionable debts, thus liberating money that nations could apply 8 towards achieving these goals. Beyond that, affluent countries could have 9 assumed moral responsibility for redressing the legacy of colonialism and 20111 helping to recover the stolen fortunes of corrupt rulers whom the major powers 1 maintained in office. Instead, as Pogge records, ‘the growing reluctance to 2 spend money on reducing world hunger is associated with the increasingly 3 popular idea that this goal is best achieved through investment rather than 4 aid. Hunger will be erased through globalization and free markets’ (Pogge, 5 2000, p 39). Thanks to the MDGs, donor governments could now insist on 6 coherence across aid, finance, trade and governance. 7 8 The MDGs were successfully marketed as the response of enlightened 9 world leaders to calls from the South and the development community for 30111 ‘pro-poor’, ‘pro-development’ initiatives. According to Amin’s account of 1 the preparatory process, they were actively promoted by the European, US 2 and Japanese governments, co-sponsored by the IMF, the World Bank and 3 the OECD, and drafted by a former consultant to the US Central Intelligence 4 Agency (Amin, 2006). One critic describes them as a ‘Major Distraction 5 Gimmick’ that has co-opted the corporate NGOs, who have adopted the 6 MDGs as their central platform, and undermined the campaigns of genuine 7 anti-poverty activists (quoted in Bond, 2006a). By abstracting the goals 8 from their social, political and economic context, the major powers also 9 sidelined the question of how governments that were weakened by the 40111 combination of neoliberalism and trade liberalisation could possibly achieve 1 those objectives. 2 The stage was set for the ensuing circuit of summits by the promise in 3 paragraph 14 to ensure the success of the UN Summit on Financing for 44111 Development in 2002. Trade-related development 113

1111 The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, 2 October 2001 3 Rescuing the WTO from the debacle of Seattle depended on a successful 4 launch of a comprehensive new round of negotiations at the fourth WTO 5 Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar. It took place in October 2001, less 6 than a month after the September 11 attacks in the US. A ‘consensus’ 7 outcome was required, at any price. The major powers bullied, bribed and 8 threatened Southern governments, even implying that those who opposed 9 a new round would be siding with terrorists (Kwa, 2003, pp 30–2). The 1011 Doha round was indeed launched. But it proved a fragile foundation on 1 which to expand an already dysfunctional organisation. 2 Developing countries were promised that their needs and interests would 3111 be ‘at the heart’ of the Doha Work Programme. Paragraph 2 of the 4 Ministerial Declaration affirmed that: ‘International trade can play a major 5 role in the promotion of economic development and the alleviation of 6 poverty.’29 Southern governments rejected attempts by the EC to officially 7 name an agenda that had been written by, and for, the major powers 8 the ‘Doha Development Round’.30 That did not stop European Trade 9 Commissioner Pascal Lamy and successive WTO Directors General from 20111 constantly referring to the Doha ‘development agenda’. The term was later 1 explicitly incorporated into the General Council Decision of 1 August 2004 2 (generally referred to as the ‘July package’).31 Southern governments 3 increasingly owned that description as a basis for pressing the major powers 4 to deliver on their rhetoric. In 2007 Charlene Barshefsky, the USTR at the 5 time of Doha, conceded that: 6 7 The round was launched on essentially false pretenses, in two respects. 8 First, it was launched almost immediately in the aftermath of 9/11. 9 I believe that but for 9/11, it almost certainly would not have been 30111 launched. As the six-year delay since then shows, but for 9/11 there 1 was almost no enthusiasm for the round. 9/11 changed that. Countries 2 believed that they needed to show solidarity with the United States and 3 make a statement about the global economy and the importance of 4 economic growth. So the round was launched. 5 Second, the round was called a development round. Again, as the 6 six-year delay shows, there may have been the broad intention on the 7 part of the wealthy nations to make this a development round, but 8 their ability to execute has always, in important respects, been absent, 9 something clear from the outset, rhetoric aside. At the end of this process, 40111 what will undoubtedly be portrayed as an important victory will, I 1 believe, be far less than what it should have been had the wealthy nations 2 genuinely pursued a development round. 3 While development issues have been addressed in a number of ways 44111 in the negotiations, naming the round the ‘Doha Development Agenda’ 114 Serving whose interests?

1111 does seem to overstate the case a bit. For the most part this round has 2 been like any other, with the focus being on the market access concerns 3 of the major trading powers. While large developing countries like Brazil, 4 China and India now play a greater role in trade talks, the interests of 5 the poorest countries still seem to be an afterthought in many ways.32 6 7 The focus at Doha was primarily on liberalisation of industrial and agricultural 8 trade. The GATS 2000 negotiations were folded into the ‘single undertaking’ 9 that authorised trade-offs across agriculture, NAMA, services, intellectual 1011 property and implementation issues. 1 2 UN Conference on Financing for Development, 3 Monterrey, Mexico, March 2002 4 5 Five months after the Doha ministerial came the UN Conference on Financing 6 for Development, held in Monterrey, Mexico. The idea of the summit began 7 as an initiative of the Group of 77 poorer countries to address global economic 8 governance and democratise the international financial institutions. The 9 US threatened to boycott the conference if the Declaration sought to 20111 tinker with the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO (Haffajee, 2002) 1 (and if Fidel Castro attended).33 Proposals for creative financing initiatives 2 and institutional reforms were accordingly purged from the text, which was 3 reduced to a list of platitudes on development.34 Paragraph 11 on ‘good 4 governance for sustainable development’ blended respect for human rights, 5 including the right to development, with implementation of market-oriented 6 policies. 7 The MDGs provided the formal reference point, to be achieved through 8 ‘policy and programme coordination of international institutions and 9 coherence at international and operational levels’ (paragraph 52). Trade- 30111 led economic growth, supported by aid and foreign direct investment, were 1 confirmed as the drivers of development. Southern governments made 2 multiple commitments to implement ‘sound’ pro-market economic policies, 3 demonstrate ‘good governance’ and apply the rule of law. Not one specific 4 obligation, target or deadline was imposed on Northern governments. 5 The US ruled out cancellation of unpayable and unconscionable debt and 6 insisted that private sector provision of services was essential to achieve the 7 MDGs. There would be no new or additional funding to address the critical 8 issues of disaster relief, aid and debt cancellation beyond the much-criticised 9 HIPC initiative. 40111 The two key themes of the so-called Monterrey Consensus legitimised 1 the market model of services, without referring to the GATS. The first 2 theme endorsed multiple layers of ‘development partnerships’: between 3 developed and developing countries; donors and recipients; private sector 44111 and governments; local and foreign businesses; and different agencies within Trade-related development 115

1111 national governments. These partnerships were premised upon the illusion 2 of apolitical stakeholders who co-operate to produce a fully inclusive and 3 equitable global economic system. The inequality that pervades the main 4 avenues of development financing, being aid, debt and trade, was effectively 5 submerged. 6 The second theme, ‘coherence for development’, aimed to ensure consistent 7 policies and co-operation within and across national and international 8 domains and agencies (in paragraphs 4, 52 and 69). Governments (in this 9 context, of the South) promised in paragraph 10 to create an enabling 1011 environment for markets and regulatory frameworks to promote and protect 1 investment. The section on trade focused almost exclusively on agriculture 2 and industrial tariffs and reiterated the development rhetoric of the Doha 3111 round. The solutions to problems of social infrastructure, identified in 4 paragraph 16, centred on ‘effective partnerships’ between donors and 5 recipients through ‘nationally owned paths of reform’, including PRSPs 6 (paragraphs 40, 43 and 56).35 7 Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez was spokesperson for the Group of 8 77 plus China; but his call for ‘actions, not words’ and for governments 9 from the South to take control of their destinies fell on deaf ears. Most Southern 20111 governments conformed to the North’s agenda and focused on increasing the 1 available funding and loosening the strings of conditionality. Only Cuba’s Fidel 2 Castro refused to sign the final Declaration, which he condemned as ‘a project 3 of consensus that has been imposed upon us by the masters of the world . . . 4 in which we resign ourselves to humiliating, conditional and interventionist 5 handouts’ (Cevallos, 2002, p 13). By contrast, Germany’s Third Way 6 government hailed the summit for replacing ‘market rule’ with ‘partnerships 7 for development’. Social activists denounced the outcome as the ‘Washington 8 Consensus in a sombrero’ (Haffajee, 2002, p 12). 9 30111 1 World Summit for Sustainable Development, 2 Johannesburg, August 2002 3 4 Hot on the heels of Monterrey came the UN-sponsored World Summit on 5 Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg. Those who recalled the 6 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro some 10 years before might have expected 7 another talkfest on traditional ‘green’ issues of deforestation, biodiversity, 8 animal conservation and fisheries, and ‘brown’ issues such as rights of access 9 to health, water and sanitation. Instead, the preparatory phases and the 40111 Summit itself became a further contest over which institutional regime would 1 shape the world’s social, environment and development agenda. 2 Once again, the Summit was dominated by the major powers. What 3 became known as the Juscanz group (led by the US with Japan, US, Canada, 44111 Australia and New Zealand), supported by numerous corporate lobbies, 116 Serving whose interests?

1111 insisted that the Johannesburg Declaration echoed the assertion in the 2 WTO’s founding document that trade liberalisation enhances sustainable 3 development. Their attempt to insert wording that explicitly subordinated 4 development and environment measures to the requirement of WTO 5 consistency was defeated after a pitched battle on the plenary floor. One 6 critic noted the irony that the UN was being asked to ‘commit suicide by 7 adopting a declaration that depletes itself of its own power and willingly 8 hands it over to the WTO’ (quoted in Khor, 2002). 9 The Summit’s Political Declaration and the Plan for Implementation 1011 promised to deliver on ‘Agenda 21’of the Rio Summit and on the MDGs. 1 But paragraph 9 of the declaration left no doubt about the parameters: 2 3 Between Rio and Johannesburg, the world’s nations have met in several 4 major conferences under the auspices of the United Nations, including 5 the International Conference on Financing for Development, as well as 6 the Doha Ministerial Conference. These conferences defined for the 7 world a comprehensive vision for the future of humanity.36 (Emphasis 8 added.) 9 20111 That ‘comprehensive vision’ pervaded the Implementation Plan. Referring 1 back to the Monterrey Consensus, paragraph 3 asserted that what became 2 known as ‘Type II Public Private Partnerships’ between governments of the 3 global North and South and (cryptically) between ‘governments and major 4 groups’ were ‘key to pursuing sustainable development in a globalizing 5 world’. The text was replete with the familiar catch cries of ‘sound 6 environmental, social and economic policies’ and a ‘dynamic and enabling 7 international economic environment’, particularly in the areas of finance, 8 technology transfer, debt and trade. WTO compatibility was a defining 9 feature of the three ‘interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars’ of 30111 sustainable development identified in paragraph 2, being economic 1 development, social development and environmental protection. 2 The pivotal, and most controversial, part of the Plan was ‘Section V: 3 Sustainable Development in a Globalizing World’ (Khor, 2002). The final 4 text committed governments to complement their pursuit of the Doha Work 5 Programme by undertaking further action at the national, regional and 6 international levels ‘to enhance the benefits for developing countries, as well 7 as for countries with economies in transition, from trade liberalisation, 8 including through public/private partnerships’ (paragraph 96). The trade in 9 services agreements, although never mentioned, would be a primary vehicle 40111 for achieving the synergy between trade liberalisation and a new contractual 1 form of ‘stakeholder partnerships’ between the private sector, governments 2 and selected (corporate-friendly) NGOs. 3 The transnational corporations had invested heavily in achieving this 44111 outcome. The Summit Star news-sheet recorded the presence of more than Trade-related development 117

1111 700 business executives, 200 companies and more than 100 chief executives. 2 And ‘why would corporations not come out in full force’, asked the Thai- 3 based Focus on the Global South, ‘when the UN’s priorities have shifted 4 from poverty eradication and environmental preservation to achieving 5 sustainable development via “public-private partnerships” or as Kofi Annan 6 calls it, The Global Compact’ (Malig, 2002)? 7 The corporate lobbyists had rebranded themselves as the World Business 8 Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), Business Action for 9 Sustainable Development, and the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable 1011 Development project, among others. The prime movers in the WBCSD, the 1 chairmen of DuPont, Shell and Anova Holdings, launched a report Walking 2 the Talk: The Business Case for Sustainable Development (Holliday, 2002) 3111 to showcase their ‘social responsibility’. The case studies profiled some of 4 the most notorious corporate perpetrators of economic and social harm: 5 Rio Tinto, Cargill Dow, Nestlé, Du Pont and Suez. The book’s promotional 6 material argued that 7 8 not only is sustainable development good for business, the solving of 9 environmental and social problems is essential for future growth. . . [A] 20111 global partnership – between governments, business and civil society – 1 is essential, if accelerating moves towards globalization are to maximize 2 opportunities for all – especially the world’s poor. The solution provided 3 by Walking the Talk is to mobilize markets in favour of sustainability, 4 leveraging the power of innovation and global markets for the benefits 5 of everyone – not just the developed world. This means a further 6 liberalization of the market – a move that would be condemned by 7 anti-globalization protestors.37 8 9 The location of the Summit in post-apartheid Johannesburg underscored 30111 precisely that paradox (Shiva, 2006). Days before the official opening, 1 South African police arrested more than 70 peaceful protestors from the 2 National Land Council and the Landless People’s Movement. Later in the 3 Summit some 20,000 people who marched from the depressed township of 4 Alexandra to the summit venue at élite Sandton were met by 8,000 police 5 officers, plus tanks, helicopters and barricades. This march was not simply a 6 showpiece for the international media. Local community groups were fighting 7 a life and death battle with the post-apartheid government over policies of 8 corporatisation and privatisation that had seen water and electricity services 9 to poor households terminated for non-payment and associated outbreaks of 40111 lethal disease, such as cholera. 1 The Johannesburg Summit effectively privatised the Rio agenda, transforming 2 ‘Rio + 10’ into ‘Doha + 10’ (Shiva, 2006). Government representatives from 3 the South and critics outside the summit demanded enforceable international 44111 rules to regulate the activities of transnational corporations. Their challenges 118 Serving whose interests?

1111 were swept aside. Instead, corporate responsibility became a code word for 2 greater corporate control over resources and services through the privatised 3 financing, delivery and regulation of environmental and social services. The 4 new pathways to sustainable development of energy, housing and food, and 5 for meeting MDG targets for clean drinking water and sanitation, would be 6 market-driven and WTO-compatible – dovetailing neatly with the GATS 2000 7 negotiations and emergence of more extensive regional and bilateral 8 agreements. 9 1011 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 Chapter 4

1111 2 The illusion of public services 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 When capitalism is under stress it needs to find unexploited markets and 4 prise them open. The public services that dominated welfare states and state 5 socialism for much of the twentieth century were an enticing expanse of 6 virgin territory. Since the early 1980s, these services have been progressively 7 transformed into market commodities that abstract them from their social 8 nature and function, often taking novel and complex legal forms. 9 ‘Orthodox’ public policy – or more specifically the international 20111 institutions, academics and consultancy industry that propagate theories of 1 new public management, public choice and new institutional economics – 2 insisted that markets could deliver higher quality services and greater choice 3 more efficiently than the state. The crude asset sales programmes of the 4 1980s and early 1990s gave way to more subtle ‘partnerships’ where the 5 state was encouraged to construct markets and align itself with corporations. 6 Since 2000, the MDGs have conferred a powerful legitimacy on this model. 7 The main policy instruments for privatisation now include corporatisation, 8 asset sales, outsourcing, unbundling, deregulation, competition, PPPs and 9 PFIs. This menu continues to expand, despite evidence from all over the 30111 world that marketised public services often fail, sometimes with tragic human 1 consequences. 2 How this transformation of public services relates to trade in services 3 agreements is hotly contested. Aside from public utilities and financial and 4 audio-visual services, ‘public services’ were largely off the radar during the 5 Uruguay round. Its early architects say they never envisaged the wide-ranging 6 application of the GATS to more explicitly social services such as sanitation, 7 schools or hospitals, which were considered the domain of national 8 governments.1 Since then, however, almost every conceivable state activity, 9 from airports, sewage systems and water supply to schools, prisons and 40111 even public policy advice itself, has been opened to the market. Their complex 1 commercial operations and legal forms bring them squarely within the 2 domain of trade in services agreements. 3 Critics fear that these agreements will lock in the control of transnational 44111 corporations over these services at the expense of social priorities and 120 Serving whose interests?

1111 democratic accountability, and override the responsibility of governments 2 to regulate for social objectives. The WTO’s booklet GATS – Fact and 3 Fiction vehemently refuted claims: 4 5 that the right to maintain public services and the power to enforce 6 health and safety standards are under threat, though both are explicitly 7 safeguarded under the GATS. How have serious people come to believe 8 what is, on the face of it, out of the question? Why should any 9 Government, let alone over 140 Governments, agree to allow themselves 1011 to be forced, or force each other, to surrender or compromise powers 1 which are important to them, and to all of us?2 2 3 This chapter addresses precisely that question. What the WTO claims is 4 obvious, on the face of things, is much more complex and threatening 5 when analysed through a political economy lens. Case study 7 shows how 6 the provision of public hospitals through multi-faceted PFI consortia and 7 complex chains of sub-contracts can become subject to commitments in a 8 range of CPCs that are unrelated to hospitals as popularly conceived. Case 9 study 8 on privatisation in the Philippines reveals how ‘constitutionalism’ 20111 competes at the national and supranational levels, and the political and 1 social ramifications of that conflict. 2 3 Creating public services markets 4 5 The battle between the defenders and critics of the GATS over public services 6 is driven by a contest of world views. The stand-off is complicated by the 7 difficulty of reducing ‘public services’ to a precise analytical category. It 8 was hard enough to define ‘public services’ before neoliberalism. The terms 9 ‘public’, ‘social’ and ‘community-based non-profit’ services were often 30111 used interchangeably. Sometimes people meant the basic rights to services 1 that are recognised in their national constitutions or under international 2 human rights instruments. Economists applied the term ‘public goods’ to 3 ‘non-rivalrous’ and ‘non-excludable’ services that the market cannot be relied 4 on to deliver. In many cases, public services were simply those services that 5 people regard as essential to their daily lives or that governments have 6 traditionally provided on a universal basis. 7 The neoliberal restructuring of the state assailed ‘public services’ in all 8 these senses. Colin Leys identifies four pre-requisites for the successful 9 creation of markets in public services: ‘the reconfiguration of services into 40111 commodities, the creation of a demand for the commodities, the conversion 1 of the public servants concerned into profit-oriented workforces, and the 2 underwriting of risk’ (Leys, 2003, p 214). 3 The commodification of services and creation of markets were discussed 44111 earlier. The policy of ‘corporatisation’ made state businesses, such as banks The illusion of public services 121

1111 and airlines, and state assets such as forests and mines, ready for sale at 2 taxpayers’ expense, usually with mass layoffs. Public monopolies in areas 3 such as telecommunications or railways were broken up or became private 4 monopolies. 5 Privatisation provided lucrative investment opportunities for transnational 6 companies, backed by a new breed of private consultants and investment 7 bankers. Foreign investment rules were liberalised, currency controls lifted 8 and pro-business competition policies introduced to ease the foreign 9 acquisition of state assets. Labour market deregulation promoted flexibility 1011 and competition, which in turn de-unionised the workforce and eroded 1 employment protections. The initial wave of corporatisation and privatisation 2 of state-owned commercial operations coincided with the Uruguay round, 3111 making the public infrastructure of electricity, telecommunications, finance 4 and transport key targets for the GATS demandeurs. 5 A less visible and more systemic form of privatisation affected 6 governments’ non-commercial activities. Advocates of public choice and 7 new public management theories urged governments to separate their policy, 8 regulation and delivery functions. The unbundling of government services 9 was commonly accompanied by a ‘funder-provider split’ that created a 20111 contractualised commercial relationship between ministers and their 1 departments, and required government agencies to substitute the social value 2 of specific activities with a market price. Public finance regimes required 3 these contracts to specify measurable performance outcomes. Those 4 outcomes were often further disaggregated into commodified ‘outputs’. Once 5 they were monetised, services could be opened to competitive tender. 6 An overlay of ‘fiscal responsibility’ encouraged governments to give 7 priority to budgetary targets over their social, cultural or environmental 8 responsibilities. The drive to achieve short-term efficiencies encouraged 9 outsourcing or abandoning of activities to the private sector. Imposing a 30111 capital charge on the assets owned by public agencies made off-budget 1 financing increasingly attractive and created a constituency for deferred 2 expenditure, such as PFIs. Citizens were differentiated into classes of 3 consumers, as taxpayer funded universal services gave way to user charges 4 and euphemistically termed ‘co-payments’, and to targeted subsidies or 5 vouchers that could be redeemed by the deserving poor for services that 6 were supplied competitively by public or private providers. 7 Public sector labour markets were deregulated to increase productivity 8 and maintain the competitiveness between state and private providers. The 9 special legal status of state employees as public servants was removed and 40111 they were integrated into the private sector workforce. Deprofessionalised 1 and de-unionised, they became the equivalent of waged workers in a 2 multiplicity of services industries. 3 Privatisation of non-commercial services assumed a ‘socio-regulatory 44111 adjustment’ of attitudes and values (Drake and Nicolaidis, 1992, p 63). 122 Serving whose interests?

1111 As the quality and accessibility of state-provided services deteriorated, and 2 they were constantly denigrated as inefficient, people were encouraged 3 to lower their expectations and to devalue the social and collective 4 characteristics of publicly provided services. Commercially marketed services 5 emerged as the desirable substitute. 6 Over time, states, communities and workers have become more 7 dependent on the market. Its scale and products expanded, creating ever 8 more commercial opportunities. Secondary service industries, from small 9 businesses to transnational consultancies, added new voices and vested 1011 interests that crowded out those who sought to defend a decaying public 1 sector. The wealthier retreated to the higher quality, more tailored private 2 market – a development praised by privatisers as necessary to relieve the 3 burden on struggling state services and budgets. New technologies further 4 blurred the boundaries of public and private, national and transnational. 5 This process was vigorously contested almost everywhere it occurred. Indeed, 6 the raw impact and failures of the crude privatisation approach of the 1980s 7 and early 1990s seriously undermined the legitimacy of neoliberalism. The 8 backlash against it revealed the depth of popular attachment to socially imbued 9 public services. The neoliberal project was rescued and consolidated by more 20111 sophisticated variants – the Third Way espoused by a new wave of social 1 democratic governments (Giddens, 2000) and the post-Washington Consensus 2 of the international financial institutions. 3 Bob Jessop distinguishes between ‘neocorporatist’ and ‘neostatist’ strands 4 of latter-day neoliberalism (Jessop, 2002, pp 261–3). Neocorporatism 5 promises to balance competition and co-operation through ‘stakeholder 6 partnerships’. The state’s role is to implement these ‘negotiated’ outcomes. 7 8 The stakeholders are defined as ‘civil society’ or ‘non-state actors’ in an 9 apolitical agglomeration of contradictory interests. In practice, business 30111 ‘partnerships’ take precedence over those with unions, local government or 1 other organised voices. The uncivil elements of civil society that raise 2 questions of politics, power, exploitation and imperialism are excluded. 3 Neostatism promotes a more active role for central and local government 4 in guiding the development of market forces, promoting innovation and 5 providing a business-friendly environment. Declining manufacturing 6 industries are restructured and new services industries fostered. Governments 7 retain the responsibility for infrastructure such as roads, schools, hospitals 8 and water, but provide these through PPPs and PFIs. Wherever possible, 9 the responsibility for delivering social services is contracted out to private 40111 business. The ‘enabling state’ demonstrates its ‘good governance’ by 1 implementing ‘sound’ (neoliberal) economic policies, private property rights 2 and the (Western) rule of law, and eliminating corruption. 3 These overlapping notions of partnership and the enabling state are found 44111 equally in Tony Blair’s Britain and Thabo Mbeke’s post-apartheid South The illusion of public services 123

1111 Africa (Bond, 2006b), pervade the contemporary of the international financial 2 institutions and are the designated means for achieving the MDGs. 3 Echoing Leys, Jessop argues that the success of this strategy depends on a 4 new social compromise where people identify their fate with the success of 5 global capitalism and accommodate themselves to rising inequality, 6 exploitation of the environment and dominance by a few corporations and 7 capitalist powers. Buy-in becomes more likely when workers’ pension plans 8 are invested in the international share market; producers and small businesses 9 depend on favourable global commodity markets, exchange rates and foreign 1011 investments; professionals look overseas for better-paid jobs to support their 1 families or pay off student loans; or people just accommodate themselves to 2 inferior conditions of paid work to supplement their dwindling social wage. 3111 The strategy also assumes the structural inequality of an internationalised 4 labour market can be managed through competition and self-interest. 5 The notion of ‘socio-regulatory adjustment’ assumes that this accommodation 6 will be linear and inevitable. But competitive markets are incapable of 7 delivering the ‘positive externalities’ of social coherence and equitable 8 participation that are the defining objective of ‘public goods’. These services, 9 and the markets in which they now operate, remain rooted in social and 20111 material reality. Deteriorating infrastructure, widening inequality and unmet 1 needs, and the resilience of the social conception of ‘public services’, have 2 fuelled demands that governments resume their previous responsibilities or 3 at least restore the primacy of social objectives to domestic regulation. 4 Managing that fallout is problematic enough when governments can inject 5 some pragmatism and flexibility into how they regulate socio-economic 6 relations under neoliberal globalisation. The dilemma posed by meta- 7 regulation through trade in services agreements is its singular imperative: 8 to promote capital accumulation by expanding the reach of private markets 9 and profitability of corporations. This impedes the capacity of governments 30111 to respond – hence, the backlash against the trade in services agreements. 1 The stand-off between advocates of the social and market paradigms is 2 further complicated by the fetishisation of public services: disaggregated 3 commercial activities and complex legal forms are inscribed in schedules of 4 services commitments, and subjected to the norms and disciplines of trade 5 in services agreements, in ways that render ‘public services’ unrecognisable. 6 7 Defining public services, GATS-style 8 9 The defenders of the GATS deny such linkages. Leading pro-GATS 40111 commentator Pierre Sauvé, for example, insists that the GATS does not 1 require governments to privatise or deregulate a service. Indeed, it has played 2 little, if any, role in the transformation of public services and ‘is not likely 3 to be a driving force or even a major consideration behind such changes’ 44111 (Sauvé, 2002, p 49). That claim is largely true of the GATS 1994. Its main 124 Serving whose interests?

1111 effect was to normalise and lock in the domestic neoliberal agenda. As 2 Sauvé himself observed, ‘the GATS can play a useful complementary role 3 in accompanying and imparting greater credibility and permanency to 4 ongoing policy changes . . . (but only to the extent that WTO Members 5 choose to assign it such a role)’ (Sauvé, 2002, p 49). 6 Since 1994, however, privatisation and deregulation have become routine 7 requirements in countries’ accession packages, and governments’ public 8 sector policies are commonly examined during Trade Policy Reviews. 9 Trade in services commitments have also entrenched the new modes of 1011 privatisation, such as PPPs, and competitive markets in unbundled public 1 services that are delivered through complex services supply chains across 2 seemingly unrelated CPC categories. Sauvé’s assurances are further 3 undermined by the offensives that the major powers have launched on many 4 ‘public services’ during the GATS 2000 and bilateral negotiations. 5 A second line of defence used by Sauvé and others is that public services 6 are carved out through Article I:3 of the GATS. However, this does not 7 refer to ‘public services’ – the very concept would be alien to an instrument 8 that conceives of the world in terms of private services markets. Article 9 I:3(b) refers to ‘services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority’, 20111 defined in paragraph (c) as ‘any service which is supplied neither on a 1 commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers’. 2 The same wording is routinely imported into bilateral agreements. The 3 defining features of the exclusion are the government as authorising agent 4 and the market nature of the activity; the social function of the service is 5 irrelevant. 6 The initial phrasing that was proposed in the 1990 draft GATS text read: 7 ‘except services supplied in the exercise of governmental functions’ (quoted 8 in Krajewski, 2001, p 16). That phrase appeared in square brackets, 9 indicating no consensus. Austria apparently suggested the term ‘public 30111 functions’; but ‘government functions’ was used in the Dunkel Draft text in 1 1991, along with a footnote that the terms of exclusion for such services 2 would be subject to review. It is not clear why ‘functions’ was later replaced 3 with ‘authority’, although the shift makes sense ideologically, as the latter 4 implies the separation of authorisation from performance. The Corporate 5 Europe Observatory (CEO) suggests that term was drawn from Article 45 6 of the EU Treaty, which reads: ‘The provisions of this chapter shall not apply, 7 so far as any given Member State is concerned, to activities which in that State 8 are connected, even occasionally, with the exercise of official authority’.3 The 9 CEO also noted that, as of 2001, eight cases had been taken to the European 40111 Court of Justice challenging attempts by member states to rely on that article, 1 and every challenge had succeeded (CEO, 2001). 2 Whether ‘commercial basis’ and ‘competition’ are to be given a broad 3 or narrow meaning is critical to determining what services are carved out 44111 under Article I:3. However, there is no WTO jurisprudence to guide the The illusion of public services 125

1111 interpretation. The only clear-cut exclusion is for non-commercial state 2 monopoly activities. In a highly liberalised and deregulated environment, 3 very few services fit within that narrow window. 4 A close legal reading of the GATS text by Markus Krajewski, based on 5 the Vienna Convention’s interpretative rules and the publicly available 6 material, concludes that both ‘commercial’ and ‘competition’ can be read 7 broadly (Krajewski, 2001, p 17). That would result in a narrow reading of 8 the exception and allow the GATS rules to intrude into highly sensitivity 9 areas of public policy. Krajewski points out that ‘supplied on a commercial 1011 basis’ refers to the modality of supply, irrespective of whether the supplier 1 is a public or private entity. Assuming that ‘commercial’ requires a monetary 2 price, it is unclear whether that is a full market price or includes not-for- 3111 profit cost recovery or a partial user charge. Likewise, whether ‘competition’ 4 requires suppliers to be targeting the same customers or market segments 5 may depend on the context, such as market size and the extent of 6 government provision, including a universal supply obligation (Krajewski, 7 2001, pp 7–12). 8 The background notes prepared by the WTO Secretariat on various 9 services sectors in 1998 identified possible limitations on the scope of the 20111 exception, but provided no systematic analysis of the provision. The note 1 on postal services assumes they are usually commercial and covered by the 2 agreement. This would subject them to the Article VIII:2 restriction on 3 cross-subsidisation by monopolies. The note on legal services treats services 4 that involve the administration of justice as excluded, except where they 5 are provided by non-civil servants, such as notaries. The Secretariat was 6 ambivalent about when environmental services would have a ‘commercial 7 basis’, but implied this basis would apply to public and private suppliers. 8 The background paper on health and social services noted: 9 30111 The hospital sector in many countries, however, is made up of 1 government- and privately-owned entities which both operate on a 2 commercial basis, charging the patient or his insurance for the treatment 3 provided. Supplementary subsidies may be granted for social, regional 4 and similar policy purposes. It seems unrealistic in such cases to argue 5 for continued application of Article I:3 and/or maintain that no 6 competitive relationship exists between the two groups of suppliers or 7 services. In scheduled sectors, this suggests that subsidies and any similar 8 economic benefits conferred on one group would be subject to the national 9 treatment obligation under Article XVII.4 40111 1 Krajewski quotes a later contradictory statement in a Secretariat study in 2 2001: ‘It seems clear that the existence of private health services, for example, 3 in parallel with public services could not be held to invalidate the status of 44111 the latter as “governmental services”’ (Krajewski, 2001, p 8, fn 14). 126 Serving whose interests?

1111 Sauvé advocates an alternative reading of Article I:3 that would see 2 ‘economic activities carried out on a not for profit basis’ covered by the carve- 3 out. In other words, cost-recovery services would be protected (although what 4 that means is also difficult to define). Yet he chooses his language carefully 5 when he discusses the application of Article I:3 to compulsory education: 6 7 GATS negotiators understand this to cover ‘public services’ broadly (if 8 somewhat loosely) defined, including public health and education services. 9 But public/private frontiers are inherently murky, vary significantly across 1011 countries and sectors, and are subject to change as markets, political 1 dynamics and technology evolve. Governments have, to date, chosen 2 not to clarify the scope of the GATS’ public services carve-out. But if one 3 were to ask any services negotiator in Geneva, the latter would be prone 4 to regard primary and secondary schooling as lying outside the scope of 5 the GATS. 6 (Sauvé, 2002, p 48) 7 8 On Sauvé’s narrow reading, state and private not-for-profit primary and 9 secondary education would be exempted. Only private for-profit schools 20111 would be subject to GATS rules. But even this would have implications for 1 public provision of education. The instructions to negotiators on scheduling 2 make it clear that national treatment obligations apply to subsidies unless 3 limitations are listed. It is increasingly common for state subsidies to be 4 applied on a neutral basis across public and private, profit and non-profit 5 providers. If a government made market access commitments that prevent 6 it from limiting the number of private schools, and national treatment 7 commitments that require it to extend subsidies to them all, its public 8 education system could become fiscally unsustainable. It would then have 9 to seek to withdraw its GATS commitment or terminate its subsidies. 30111 Where services are not covered by Article I:3 but involve direct government 1 funding through contracts or tenders, they could fall within the more limited 2 category of exceptions under Article XIII: Government procurement. This 3 carve-out purports to protect the common and highly sensitive use of central 4 and local government purchasing power to support domestic firms, workers, 5 economies and local communities. Again, the exclusion is only partial. The 6 wording is based on GATT Article III:8(a) and requires services to be 7 ‘purchased for governmental purposes’ and ‘not with a view to commercial 8 resale or with a view to use in the supply of services for commercial sale’. 9 Paragraph 2 of Article XIII authorised further multilateral negotiations on 40111 government procurement, during which the EU proposed a comprehensive 1 Annex on Government Procurement. However, these negotiations never 2 progressed far, despite attempts by the EU to keep them moving after its 3 proposals for negotiations on transparency in government procurement were 44111 rebuffed at the Cancún ministerial in 2003.5 The illusion of public services 127

1111 There is no formal definition of what constitutes ‘government procurement’ 2 for the purposes of the GATS. An UNCTAD paper in 2006 discusses whether 3 concession contracts, build-operate-transfer arrangements or management 4 contracts should be considered government procurement.6 It suggests 5 there is some convergence of opinion that concession contracts should not 6 be covered, but treats the other two categories as more complex. Again, the 7 term ‘commercial sale’ or ‘resale’ in Article XIII is determinative and unclear. 8 A contract for public transport or rubbish dumps awarded by a central or 9 local government through competitive tenders is clearly procurement. 1011 Those contracts would seem to constitute a commercial resale where they 1 permit cost-plus charges for use of the services, but whether that extends to 2 full cost recovery and user part-charges is uncertain. Case study 7 discusses 3111 the implications for PFIs, where the bulk of spending involves layers of 4 sub-contracting by the consortium that has the primary contract with the 5 government. Many bilateral agreements avoid these issues by combining 6 government procurement of goods and services in a separate chapter, with a 7 minimum qualifying threshold and a negative list of exclusions.7 Their 8 definitions are agreement specific. 9 The GATS government procurement exclusion applies only to the MFN, 20111 market access and national treatment rules. The Article VI rules on domestic 1 regulation for licensing, qualifications and standards still apply where the 2 relevant sectors have been committed, which is critical in areas such as 3 environmental services. There is also still an obligation on members under 4 Article VIII to ensure that monopolies and exclusive service suppliers do 5 not undermine a member’s commitments through cross-subsidisation of 6 activities outside the monopoly, although this is only subject to requests 7 for information. (As Chapter 5 shows, the Annex and Reference Paper on 8 Basic Telecommunications provide a more potent means for preventing cross- 9 subsidisation.) Again, stricter disciplines on monopolies are often found in 30111 the bilaterals. 1 Where services fall outside the limited exemptions provided by Articles 2 I:3 and XIII, governments need to rely on the much more limited Article 3 XIV: General Exceptions. These relate, for example, to public order or 4 human and plant life or health. Article XIV requires the particular measure 5 to meet restrictive criteria that it is ‘necessary’ to achieve the permitted 6 objective and does not constitute unjustifiable or arbitrary discrimination 7 or a disguised restriction on trade (Chapter 1). 8 Krajewski canvasses a range of options for clarifying the meaning of Article 9 1:3: an amendment to the GATS, an interpretative understanding that does 40111 not reopen the language itself, and a non-binding statement (Krajewski, 1 2001, pp 19–20). But the major powers would have to support such a 2 move. Any tightening of the rules would fetter their corporations, and any 3 weakening of the exception would fuel the anti-GATS campaign. Submitting 44111 the provision to interpretation through a dispute would be equally 128 Serving whose interests?

1111 inflammatory, especially given the pro-liberalisation approach of adjudicators 2 in the Mexico-Telecommunications and US-Gambling cases. As none of 3 these options appears likely, the controversy over the exception will 4 continue. 5 6 Trading in midwife services 7 8 International trade in services applies equally to ‘public services’ that are 9 provided by independent professionals. The commodification of those services 1011 – and of the professionals themselves – and the replacement of social regulation 1 with pro-market disciplines encompasses a further radical transformation of 2 social relations, identities and roles. Take, for instance, the iconic midwife: 3 life giver, holistic carer, trusted friend, renegade, threat to the male 4 medicalised monopoly. Under the GATS W/120 services classification she is 5 Business Service 1.A.j, designated by CPC 9312 sub-sector 93191 Medical, 6 Dentistry and Midwifery Services. The WTO Secretariat’s note on Health and 7 Social Services in 1998 complained that too few members had made 8 commitments in this category: 9 20111 While 49 Members have undertaken commitments on Medical and 1 Dental Services, only 39 Members have committed on Hospital Services 2 . . . Medical and Dental Services, as well as Hospital Services have drawn 3 significantly more commitments than, for example, Services Provided 4 by Midwives, Nurses etc. (CPC 93191) or Social Services (CPC 933).8 5 6 It seems surprising that any governments decided to include midwives 7 in their GATS 1994 schedules. Making a GATS commitment would have 8 meant redefining the deeply personal and cultural relationship between 9 midwife, mother, family and community as a disaggregated, disembodied 30111 contractual arrangement that operates exclusively as a market transaction. 1 That transaction would be regulated from the perspective of the commercial 2 midwife – and not just any commercial midwife, but the foreign provider 3 who sought non-discriminatory entry into the local ‘market’. Any exception 4 under Article XIV to protect human life or health would have to satisfy a 5 ‘necessity’ (least trade restrictive) test, and constitute neither arbitrary or 6 unjustifiable discrimination nor a disguised restriction on trade in midwife 7 services. It would have been equally difficult in 1994 to envisage this 8 transnational midwife operating through all four modes of delivery: cross- 9 border supply, consumption abroad, foreign investment or temporary 40111 presence of services personnel. 1 By scheduling full commitments on CPC 93191 a state would have 2 agreed not to deny foreign suppliers access to its midwifery ‘market’. The 3 government could not maintain discriminatory measures that favoured local 44111 midwives, for example paying taxpayer subsidies only to community-based The illusion of public services 129

1111 practitioners. Nor could the local health authority require foreign suppliers 2 of midwifery services to operate through joint ventures with their local 3 counterparts or limit the total number of outlets or practitioners that were 4 licensed to supply midwife services in their region to ensure effective 5 oversight. 6 Further, any professional qualifications, licensing or standards would 7 have to be ‘objective, transparent and the least burdensome necessary to 8 achieve quality’. Hypothetically, a WTO panel of trade experts could strike 9 down a regulation that required a midwife to understand obligations to 1011 indigenous peoples under a historic treaty or live in the local community 1 or country for a minimum number of years, if it considered that those 2 requirements exceeded what was strictly necessary to ensure quality. The 3111 central government would be required to ‘take such reasonable measures 4 available’ to ensure that the responsible professional body or local health 5 authority brought its domestic regulations into line with the GATS rules. 6 If it failed to do so the country’s exports in professional or other services, 7 or even in industrial goods or agriculture, could face retaliatory sanctions 8 for so long as the breach continued. Whether a WTO member would ever 9 bring such a dispute is immaterial. The state would be legally bound to 20111 comply with its GATS obligations. Under the principle of ‘technological 1 neutrality’ these commitments would automatically extend to new 2 technological means for delivering the midwifery service. 3 By the time of the GATS 2000 round, the notion of ‘midwife services’ 4 had broadened and the potential range of activities had expanded 5 dramatically. New information technologies created exciting opportunities 6 for those practicing and using midwife services. The International Alliance 7 of Midwives, for example, used its website to promote activities ‘designed 8 to revitalize your midwifery soul’ and strengthen the social identity and 9 international community of traditional midwives.9 ‘Midwives online’ was a 30111 more commercialised venture that promised ‘a world-class web-based 1 portal’ for midwives in the UK and internationally, and an around-the-clock 2 service for new parents. At the same time, it was an advertising outlet for 3 transnational corporations such as Procter & Gamble, offering them 4 ‘instant access to a worldwide audience of health professionals, parents and 5 parents-to-be where click-through capability brings these highly targeted 6 prospects directly to the point of purchase – your site!’10 Indeed, the 7 IT-enabled global midwifery market was open to any telemedicine or 8 marketing company that wanted to establish a purely profit driven web-based 9 advisory service – or a fly-by-night operator touting dangerous advice and 40111 unsafe products. 1 This expansion of midwife services posed new and immensely difficult 2 regulatory challenges for governments, professional bodies and communities 3 that wanted to maximise the opportunities and minimise the dangers. Trade 44111 in services commitments in CPC 93191 would add to those constraints and 130 Serving whose interests?

1111 subject the social practices of midwives to ‘trade’ rules whose scope and 2 implications are literally unknowable. 3 4 A clash of legal obligations 5 6 The collision between the GATS and public services has been engaged at 7 many levels. One of the most significant, in terms of international law, 8 has involved those UN institutions whose mandate, philosophy and legal 9 instruments require the state to play a primary and active role in providing 1011 public services, as either human rights or public goods. 1 In a forthright report on the liberalisation of trade in services in 2002, the 2 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights insisted that human rights cannot 3 be left to the whim of markets. While states are not the sole provider, they 4 ‘must guarantee the availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability 5 of essential services including their supply, especially to the poor, vulnerable 6 and marginalized’.11 It was not enough to say, as the World Bank and WTO 7 did, that governments have a right to regulate. States have an obligation under 8 international human rights law to promote and protect human rights. This 9 includes making sure that private entities or individuals, including 20111 transnational corporations, do not deprive people of their economic, social 1 and cultural rights. Moreover, the duty of states to adopt measures to protect 2 the right to life and the right to health should be central objectives of the GATS, 3 not merely permissible exceptions. 4 The right to public services, such as health (including the right to drinking 5 water) and education, were considered especially important. The report 6 made particular reference to the special UN rapporteur on education who, 7 having noted the influence of exporters of education on the tone of education 8 policy, had questioned ‘whether education is heading toward progressive 9 liberalization of trade in education services or progressive realization of the 30111 right to education’.12 1 The High Commissioner’s report dissected the implications of each GATS 2 mode for rights to health services. While cross-border supply (mode 1) can 3 promote better access and lower costs, lack of infrastructure can also 4 exacerbate existing inequalities and remote delivery makes it difficult to 5 regulate for quality and content. Travelling overseas to study or for medical 6 treatment (mode 2) can provide benefits to individuals; but it can also create 7 dual market structures and aggravate existing inequalities of service supply 8 in both the source and destination countries. Foreign direct investment 9 (mode 3) can upgrade a nation’s infrastructure, introduce new technologies, 40111 provide employment and reduce the burden on the government; but user 1 fees and internal brain drain across to the private sector also risk creating 2 ‘a two-tiered service supply with a corporate segment focused on the healthy 3 and wealthy and an underfinanced public sector focusing on the poor and 44111 sick’. Ensuring universal access can become problematic, especially when The illusion of public services 131

1111 ‘an increasingly large and powerful private sector can also threaten the 2 Government’s role as primary duty bearer for human rights, [and] subvert 3 health systems through political pressure and “regulatory capture”’.13 Mode 4 4 offers significant opportunities for migrants; but the poorest countries 5 bear the greatest burden of brain drain, and their governments find it hard 6 to protect the rights of their workers offshore. 7 The generic GATS rules raised further concerns. A government that faced 8 an immediate shortage of health workers and entered a bilateral agreement 9 to recruit from a preferred country could be held in breach of its MFN 1011 obligations. Domestic regimes for cross-subsidisation to provide access to 1 essential services for the poor and marginalised could also be challenged. 2 A government that was required to spread its subsidies across all ‘like’ 3111 service providers might withdraw them instead. 4 The report’s powerful underlying message posed a direct challenge to the 5 trade in services regime: the state’s human rights obligations must not be 6 subordinated to trade rules;14 nor should states be subject to sanctions for 7 taking action to protect human rights.15 8 As a practical strategy, the High Commissioner called for open and 9 participatory assessments of the human rights impacts of trade in services 20111 agreements. The National Human Rights Commission of Thailand responded 1 to this call by conducting an assessment of the implications of the proposed 2 US Thailand FTA for socio-economic, community and public health rights 3 that were guaranteed in the 1997 Constitution.16 The Commission’s report 4 in January 2007 (post-coup) warned that the intellectual property chapter 5 and the negative list approach to services and investment could undermine 6 the management of Thailand’s public health system. As neither the legislative 7 assembly nor the public had been given the opportunity to participate in the 8 9 process, ‘accepting the terms and conditions imposed by the United States 30111 would amount to recognizing the US sovereignty over our own’. 1 The UNCTAD Secretariat also intervened in the public services debate, 2 producing a note on universal access to services in September 2006. It 3 approached health care, education, water, telecommunications, energy 4 supply and financial services as public or merit goods that are essential to life 5 and have positive impacts on competitiveness and efficiency. The Secretariat 6 noted that all these services face problems of unequal and inequitable 7 provision, and it is difficult to develop strategies for accurate targeting and 8 adequate pricing. Because of this, the public sector plays an important role 9 as a regulator, as a provider of universal access to these services, or both. 40111 Some governments prefer to provide universal access through monopolies. 1 Others set minimum social policy obligations, or rely on competition that 2 is subject to government intervention through supply-side initiatives or 3 demand-side stimulus. Complex trade-offs are involved. Because these 44111 decisions need to be both country- and sector-specific, governments must 132 Serving whose interests?

1111 retain the policy space to develop an integrated, holistic and adaptable 2 approach that is appropriate to their national conditions. 3 The Secretariat agreed that privatisation of services could be a viable 4 option and that it had succeeded in some countries. Whether it did so 5 depended largely on political feasibility, regulatory considerations and social 6 issues. At the same time, there were many questions about how effectively, 7 for example, the public-good nature of water services had been addressed 8 by private operators who were not publicly accountable. The note concluded 9 that: ‘Evidence of the impacts of various universal access policies remains 1011 limited and – where available – results have been mixed.’17 More research 1 was needed; meanwhile governments should be cautious about trade in 2 services commitments. 3 As Chapter 3 explained, neither the views of the High Commissioner on 4 Human Rights nor of the UNCTAD Secretariat was likely to have any direct 5 impact inside the WTO. But their interventions provided important advocacy 6 tools for GATS critics and defensive governments, and were uncomfortable 7 reminders to services demandeurs of the state’s conflicting obligations under 8 international law. 9 20111 1 GATS and the water war 2 International campaigns often rally around an iconic cause that is threatened 3 by a powerful foe. For the GATS, this was the EU’s assault on people’s 4 right to water. 5 Europe is headquarters for nine of the ten largest transnational water 6 companies. The biggest, Suez, describes its mission as ‘delivering the essentials 7 18 8 of life’ (Public Citizen, 2005). According to an EC document in 2003: 9 ‘European companies are, in most areas (water-related services, waste 30111 management, air pollution control, etc.) internationally leading. . . . The case 1 for encouraging private sector participation in the provision of water related, 2 and in particular water distribution services, is a strong one’ (quoted in 3 Deckwirth, 2006). The EC trade directorate sought input from the leading 4 water corporations to develop a negotiating position that would deliver them 19 5 ‘real and meaningful’ market access through the GATS. 6 Given these commercial interests, it is also not surprising that the EU is 7 the largest water donor in the world, including support for private sector 8 water management. The EU launched a €1.4 billion European Union Water 9 Initiative at the Johannesburg Summit for Sustainable Development in 2002. 40111 The initiative has given priority to attracting new private finance rather 1 than supporting public water and sanitation projects. The Water Initiative 2 was closely linked to a controversial report presented by former IMF 3 Executive Director Michael Camdessus to the Kyoto World Water Forum 44111 in 2003, which supported the use of aid money to subsidise the expansion The illusion of public services 133

1111 of private water corporations in poor countries. Suez, Thames Water and 2 Vivendi (later Veolia) were active in designing both documents (CEO, 2003). 3 In 2007 the EC launched a new Private Sector Enabling Environmental 4 Facility with a €20 ($27) million budget to provide technical assistance to 5 ACP governments to promote PPPs and privatisation in the environmental 6 sector (CEO, 2007). 7 It seems ironic, in retrospect, that the WTO’s pamphlet ‘GATS – Fact and 8 Fiction’ stated so emphatically in early 2001: ‘It is of course inconceivable 9 that any Government would agree to surrender the right to regulate water 1011 supplies, and WTO members have not done so.’20 There were zero GATS 1 commitments on water distribution in GATS 1994. Even if commitments had 2 been made, it insisted they would not affect the rights of member governments 3111 to set quality, price, safety or other policy objectives. 4 It is true that water services were not an issue in the Uruguay round. 5 Indeed, the W/120 classification makes no reference to water. It is not 6 explicitly excluded, either. Category 6: Environmental Services in W/120 7 has four subheadings: sewage services (sewage removal, treatment and 8 disposal); refuse disposal services (collection, transport and disposal); 9 sanitation and similar services; other (pollution, landscape protection, natural 20111 disaster assessment). The WTO Secretariat reported in 1998 that some 38 1 WTO members had made commitments on at least one of these sub-sectors 2 (counting the EU as one): 29 of these were on sewage, refuse disposal and 3 other environmental services, 30 on sanitation and similar services, and 4 slightly fewer on individual segments of other environmental services.21 5 The EU was not happy with that outcome. In 1999 the Commission 6 tabled a paper that proposed a reclassification for ‘purely’ environmental 7 services.22 It suggested reorganising the environmental services sub-groups 8 around environmental mediums: protection of ambient air and climate; 9 water for human use and wastewater management; solid/hazardous waste 30111 management; remediation and cleanup of soil and water; noise and vibration 1 abatement; protection of biodiversity and landscape; and other environmental 2 and ancillary services. The water sub-sector would be divided between 3 wastewater services and water distribution involving ‘potable water 4 treatment, purification and distribution including monitoring’. Commitments 5 under this new classification could be complemented by other sectors from 6 W/120 during negotiations on a broader services cluster. 7 At the Doha ministerial in 2001, the EC insisted that a specific mandate 8 for negotiations on environmental goods and services was included in the 9 Doha Work Programme.23 This potentially provided a parallel forum 40111 through which the EU could push its interests in water services, but it made 1 little headway. 2 Social activists defending the right to water were alarmed by these 3 developments. Then, in April 2002, the EC’s GATS 2000 requests were 44111 leaked. The Europeans had asked 72 countries to open up environmental 134 Serving whose interests?

1111 services, including ‘water for human use and wastewater management’.24 2 Requests for water distribution for human consumption were made to 63 3 developing countries. The targets included seven least developed countries 4 and 14 low-income countries, among them the hotspots of failed water 5 privatisations, Bolivia and South Africa. The requests were reportedly based 6 on input from the major water companies, including Suez, Vivendi, Aqua 7 Mundo and Thames Water. Their main interest was in urban mains supplies, 8 which implied the reduction of cross-subsidisation that could fund rural 9 distribution. Information obtained by the International Union of Food- 1011 workers (IUF) showed the Commission had identified public water 1 corporations in Brazil, Bolivia, Botswana, Bangladesh, Tunisia and Honduras 2 as barriers to be removed.25 3 The leak ignited an already vigorous international campaign. Members 4 of the European Parliament, municipal and local governments, unions and 5 development agencies condemned the EU’s attempt to exploit the water crisis 6 that was engulfing developing countries. The World Water Forum in Kyoto 7 in 2003 became a focal point for exposing failed water privatisations in 8 Manila and Argentina, and deaths that were attributed to terminations 9 of household supply for non-payment under South Africa’s corporatised 20111 water regime (Stoppard, 2002). One EC official dismissed the critics as 1 ‘emotional’ and ‘muddled’ in their linking of privatisation to the GATS. This 2 description paled against the reported remark of Pascal Kerneis, the 3 managing director of the European Services Forum: ‘I would say they are 4 criminals . . . They have not counted the people who are dying because they 5 don’t have any clean water because there are no companies coming into their 6 countries to invest and give them clean water’ (quoted in Deckwirth, 2006). 7 The Commission worked assiduously with the water companies to 8 progress their demands. Revised requests on water services in January 2005 9 added advisory and consulting services through mode 1, reflecting the 30111 massive sums being paid to transnational consultancy firms for policy advice, 1 including on privatisation (Deckwirth, 2006). In some other respects the 2 request appeared to have narrowed. It recognised that governments could 3 retain ‘exclusive rights’, although the EU would enjoy full market access 4 where this was not listed as a limitation. Where governments awarded 5 exclusive rights through tenders, the Europeans expected rights of national 6 treatment to apply. This request was essentially a back door into government 7 procurement, and would have allowed large European firms that had an 8 intrinsic competitive advantage to squeeze local public and private bidders 9 out of the contract market. 40111 Following the adoption of Annex C at the Hong Kong ministerial the 1 ‘friends of environment services’ (Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, Norway, 2 Switzerland, Taiwan, the US and led by the EC) developed a plurilateral 3 request on environmental services. This largely followed the W/120 44111 classifications, rather than the EC’s proposal, and was explicit that ‘water The illusion of public services 135

1111 for human use is not included’. The non-European demandeurs had no 2 desire to lay themselves open to an attack over water. Indeed, the Norwegian 3 government had withdrawn its own request on water just before the 2005 4 ministerial (Deckwirth, 2006). The EC itself announced it would not 5 participate in any plurilateral request on audio-visual and cultural, education 6 or health services ‘or water for human use, or in any request that could 7 more generally impact on the operation of public services’.26 8 But any claim to victory was premature. The EC did not withdraw its 9 earlier bilateral requests on water. Further, GATS commitments on 1011 construction, distribution, consultancy, management consulting, technical 1 testing, pipeline transport, logistics, energy, integrated engineering, financing 2 and billing systems could still give its transnational companies effective 3111 control of a country’s water infrastructure. The EU would also pursue its 4 objectives outside the GATS through the ‘coherence’ of water-focused aid 5 and Economic Partnership Agreements. 6 Viewed from within the logic of the GATS, the EC was simply doing its 7 job on behalf of its companies. Suez and Veolia (formerly Vivendi) formed 8 a privatisation lobby in 2006 called the International Federation of Private 9 Water Operators (AquaFed), which set up offices directly opposite the EC’s 20111 Brussels headquarters.27 But the political ramifications of a strategy that 1 was patently anti-development began intruding on the ‘trade’ agenda. Several 2 EU members, including the UK and Belgium, tried to distance themselves 3 from the water requests. Even the German conglomerate RWE Thames 4 Water expressed discomfort and declined to join AquaFed. 5 The EU’s strategies, and the associated privatised water contracts, drew 6 7 on the MDGs for legitimacy: MDG7 proposed halving the number of 8 people without potable water or sanitation by 2015 (which still left 500 9 million and 1 billion people without), and MDG8 endorsed public private 30111 partnerships and trade liberalisation. At the same time their strategy was 1 delegitimised by a stream of reports that documented the monumental 2 failures of private water concessions and PPPs in the US, Indonesia, the 3 Philippines, Argentina, Bolivia, South Africa and many other countries (see 4 for example IBON, 2003, Public Citizen, 2005; Cann and Jones, 2006; 5 Bond, 2006b). While the negative social impacts identified in these studies 6 are common to other privatisations, they are life threatening when they 7 involve water. Poor households frequently face massive increases in their 8 water bills; those who cannot pay are often disconnected, with associated 9 risks of waterborne diseases such as cholera and typhoid. 40111 The corporations responsible for these tragedies are shielded for 1 accountability. They commonly skim off the most lucrative client base, 2 leaving poor areas under-serviced. ‘Efficiency gains’ through job cuts affect 3 the quality of services and erode local expertise. More profits are exported 44111 that reinvested. As foreign investors, these concessionaries commonly seek 136 Serving whose interests?

1111 sovereign guarantees to reduce the cost of private sector borrowing, backed 2 by bilateral investment treaties that provide supranational legal recourse if 3 the contracts are cancelled. The state therefore retains most of the risk. When 4 the contracts fail, or companies find them less profitable or more troublesome 5 than expected and walk away, governments have to resume control. 6 Reversing failed water privatisations is difficult enough without those 7 policies being locked in through international treaties. Bolivia became the 8 exemplar of that dilemma; but it also showed how social movements could 9 reclaim control by facing down the companies that tried to invoke the 1011 agreements. Mass mobilisations of the people of Cochabamba in 2000 forced 1 the cancellation of the water privatisation contract with a consortium that 2 was led by US utilities giant Bechtel. Similar mobilisations in El Alto led 3 to the termination of the water contract with Suez – ironically one of the 4 ‘partnerships’ that was profiled as a success story in the Business Council 5 for Sustainable Development’s showcase publication Walking the Talk 6 (Holliday et al., 2002, pp 164–5). 7 Bechtel’s pursuit of a $50 million claim to recover damages through a 8 Bolivia/Netherlands bilateral investment treaty created such a furore that 9 the consortium finally settled for a symbolic payment of thirty cents.28 If 20111 Bolivia had made GATS commitments on water services, as the EU has 1 requested, the Cochabamba and El Alto privatisations could also have 2 become a GATS issue. There is no safeguard mechanism in the GATS that 3 would have allowed the government to respond to what became an acute 4 social and political crisis. Equally, the general exceptions provision for 5 measures to protect ‘public life or health’ or ‘public order’ were subject to 6 ‘necessity’ and non-discrimination tests. While lodging a dispute at the WTO 7 would have compounded the legitimacy crisis facing the GATS, the EU 8 must have intended such commitments to be enforceable when it made its 9 requests on water in 2002. 30111 As of 2007, no WTO member, including the EU, has offered water services 1 in the GATS. The election of Evo Morales as President of Bolivia has come 2 to symbolise the moral victory of the water campaign. In a communication 3 dated 17 March 2006, the Bolivian representative to the WTO drew the 4 attention of the Director General 5 6 to one of the key issues for the new Government . . . which is to reaffirm 7 the sovereign right of each country to regulate their water resources, 8 in all their uses and services, as part of an integrated and sustainable 9 policy, in order to guarantee the human right of access to water to all 40111 the population.29 1 2 The letter asked Lamy to ‘suspend any negotiations that involve drinking 3 water in the GATS and withdraw the sector of drinking water from the 44111 155 services that have been categorized by the WTO’.30 The illusion of public services 137

1111 Bolivia’s Minister of Water Abel Mamani, who helped lead the fight 2 against Suez, called for an alternative vision: 3 4 With a resource that is essential for life, it is unacceptable to talk about 5 profit. In Bolivia, we were promised that privatization would resolve 6 problems of water access but it has failed and caused great harm. We 7 hope our public, participative, social and ecological vision will be shared 8 by all those who want clear drinking water to be delivered to all.31 9 1011 The ‘water wars’ exposed the deep contradictions that infuse the trade 1 in services agreements. Despite several decades of neoliberalism, the old 2 paradigm of ‘public services’ has proved remarkably durable. Those services 3111 lie at the heart of social and human existence. National governments 4 remain ultimately responsible for their delivery, especially when policies 5 and markets fail. The inability of trade in services agreements to recognise 6 that reality ensures that public services will remain a focal point for 7 opposition. 8 9 20111 CASE STUDY 7 ACCOUNTING FOR PFIS 1 2 By the late 1990s most viable state trading enterprises in most countries 3 had been sold. A more politically discreet and commercially attractive option 4 was needed to privatise other public services. One favoured mechanism was 5 to break down the distinction between public and private through public- 6 private partnerships (PPPs) and private finance initiatives (PFIs). Although 7 these terms are often used interchangeably they take different forms: PFIs 8 involve a contract for private firms to design, finance, construct, and operate 9 facilities for public use; PPPs describe joint state and private ownership of 30111 facilities. In addition, free-standing concessions or franchises grant private 1 sector rights to operate facilities for fixed periods, supported by user charges. 2 These second phase privatisations have been applied to almost every 3 conceivable government activity, from hospitals, schools and roads to waste 4 facilities, courts and even the UK Government Communication Headquarters 5 (GCHQ). Within a decade, such schemes enjoyed broad international 6 currency across the global North and South. International policy transfer 7 through the OECD and the World Bank was reinforced by the ‘partnership’ 8 rhetoric of the Monterrey and Johannesburg summits and the MDGs 9 (Case study 6). 40111 This hybridised approach to privatisation makes it difficult to predict when 1 services are covered by public and administrative law, which assets are on 2 public or private balance sheets (who owns what), who the beneficiaries 3 are and what underpins their entitlement. The complex web of private 44111 parties also exposes public facilities to GATS obligations in unanticipated 138 Serving whose interests?

1111 ways. The commercial structure of PFIs means the relevant services 2 classifications are not health, education or transport, but construction, 3 finance and facilities management, plus a plethora of ancillary services. A PFI 4 hospital, for example, would involve a minimum of 60 of the W/120 sub- 5 sectors within the categories of Professional; Computer and related; Real 6 Estate; Rental leasing without operators; Other Business; Communications: 7 Construction related; Distribution; Environmental; Tourism related; Health- 8 related and social; and Financial Services. Many of these classifications attract 9 little attention in negotiations, and very few governments making 1011 commitments would connect them to their core public services or even to 1 PFIs. This case study uses the experience of the UK to tease out the 2 complexities and implications of the PFIs. 3 The British government was an early evangelist for PFIs and eager to 4 secure international opportunities to exploit the ‘comparative advantage’ 5 of its maturing industry. The Conservative government launched the concept 6 in 1992. Since then, it has been periodically reinvented with new rationale 7 to replace those that public policy analysts have discredited. The original 8 justification was that PFIs could give the government access to much 9 needed new finance that was off the public sector balance sheet for national 20111 accounts purposes and could thereby evade the EU’s new Maastricht rules 1 on public debt. The PFIs would also generate large contracts for construction 2 companies and new investment opportunities for finance capital. It became 3 British government policy from 1994 that no capital project would be 4 approved unless private financing had been explored. However, the uptake 5 of PFIs was slow and mainly for transport infrastructure. 6 The policy gained momentum under Tony Blair’s New Labour government 7 in 1997. The PFIs were misleadingly rebranded as public private partnerships, 8 symbolising Blair’s Third Way strategy of government/business collaboration. 9 The government made it clear that ‘partnerships’ would be the only source 30111 of funding for health and education infrastructure (Whitfield, 2001, pp 91–4). 1 The policy was supported by a new rationale: the higher costs for private 2 finance were outweighed by procurement efficiencies not available in the 3 public sector. Approval would be based on ‘value for money’. The formula 4 assumed that the cost over the lifetime of the contract was less than that for 5 traditional procurement of the service, largely because the private sector would 6 carry some of the risks and costs and their much-vaunted greater efficiency. 7 Public health analysts produced a powerful critique of both the ‘public service 8 benchmark’ that was used to assess ‘value for money’ and the contractors’ 9 performance (Gaffney and Pollock, 1997). 40111 In 2003 the rationale shifted once again, to the private sector’s superior 1 performance on time and budget. The UK Treasury claimed to have research 2 that showed 88 per cent of PFIs came in on time or early, with no cost 3 overruns on construction being borne by the public sector. This compared 44111 to over 70 per cent of public projects that were delivered late or over budget The illusion of public services 139

1111 (UK Treasury, 2003). The Treasury issued a revised Green Book for the 2 appraisal and evaluation of government expenditure based on a report 3 commissioned from Mott MacDonald, a major PFI contractor. The new 4 rules introduced an ‘optimism bias’ on the costs and duration of construction 5 that were projected by the public sector. Public health academics once more 6 discredited the research on which the Treasury relied as irrelevant or, in 7 the case of Mott MacDonald, lacking in methodological integrity (Pollock 8 et al., 2007). 9 The UK’s PFI industry became huge in less than a decade. In 2001 it created 1011 its own PPP Forum as a public advocacy and political lobby group. By 1 2007 the forum boasted 118 members: 35 corporate, 47 financial and 36 2 professional, including all the big players.32 Even the government agency 3111 established to accelerate uptake of the schemes, Partnerships UK (PUK), was 4 a joint venture private company between ‘the very corporations that are closely 5 involved as owners, financiers and subcontractors in such projects’ and the 6 government, which was a minority shareholder (Shaoul et al., 2007, p 485). 7 A Channel 4 television documentary in 2006 cited estimates from the 8 UK Treasury that the industry received 10 to 15 per cent of total government 9 investment;33 academic analysts suggest the figures are much higher (Pollock 20111 et al., 2004, p 4, fn 3). According to the British PFI industry, over 700 1 contracts to deliver infrastructure investment had been signed between 1992 2 and 2006, with a capital value over £49 ($98) billion. These covered more 3 than 20 sectors of activity and involved over 100 procuring authorities. 4 More than 500 PFIs were fully operational, including 185 new or refurbished 5 health facilities, 230 new or refurbished schools and 43 transport projects.34 6 That was before a new policy push was launched in 2006. One little-known 7 company, Innisfree, alone had shares in 280 schools and 26 hospitals in 8 2007, covering over 140,000 pupils and 12,000 hospital beds – more than 9 anyone but the British state. Innisfree’s other PFI projects spanned transport, 30111 waste to energy, the Ministry of Defence, courts and water treatment. More 1 than one third of Innisfree’s shareholders were outside the UK.35 2 The standard PFI involves a contract for provision of specified infrastructure 3 and services. Contractors and financiers are commonly ‘comforted’ by implicit 4 guarantees and letters of support for recovery of their costs. They also typically 5 get to own and manage the facilities, generate income from third party use, 6 and benefit from a 25 to 35 year repairs and maintenance contract. Beyond 7 that, they can negotiate which other support services they would like to 8 provide. Often, but not always, the assets will be transferred to the state at 9 the end of the contract term.36 Lower labour costs are achieved through staff 40111 cuts, deskilling and casualisation of the core workforce, while the ‘flexible 1 workers’ (e.g. orderlies), catering and transport staff are transferred from the 2 public sector to private sub-contractors (Lister, 2003). 3 Most PFI consortia create special purpose vehicles (SPVs) for individual 44111 projects that limit their liability. SPVs are usually shell companies that consist 140 Serving whose interests?

1111 of finance, construction and facilities-management arms that have no recourse 2 to their parent companies when things go wrong. The SPV is supported by 3 established banks, equity and pension funds, and insurance companies. The 4 construction and management arms have their own retinue of architects, 5 legal, financial and other advisers, either in-house or on retainers. Most 6 construction work is contracted to subsidiaries. Service level agreements set 7 the standards for facilities management, estates, maintenance, ‘flexible 8 support’ (cleaning, etc.), catering, laundry, waste management, supplies, car 9 parking and security. These, too, are sub-contracted. In the past, contracts 1011 have required even minor repairs to be organised through the SPV and its 1 chain of subcontractors. 2 The contracts are a civil arrangement between purchasing agencies 3 and the consortium, and remain commercially confidential. This makes 4 it impossible to assess the real costs over the life of the contract or the 5 profits taken by the consortium. It also prevents effective accountability. 6 As a private company PUK is not subject to the United Kingdom’s Freedom 7 of Information Act, and PFI contracts are commonly withheld by the 8 purchasing public agencies on the grounds of commercial confidentiality 9 (Shaoul et al., 2006, p 260). 20111 The PFI is a deceptive piece of creative accounting. The justification for 1 keeping the transaction off the public sector balance sheet is that PFIs transfer 2 the risk from government to the private consortium. In theory, the contractor 3 absorbs some of the costs of construction overruns, adaptation to new 4 technologies, repairs and maintenance. In practice, it is the government who 5 retains the political or reputational risk as provider of last resort. If contracts 6 collapse, or if companies go bankrupt or abandon an unprofitable project, 7 the state is expected to step back in. Because the contracts also guarantee 8 payments for their entire term, or require compensation for early termination, 9 the private provider is protected against the risk that hospitals or schools 30111 become redundant if people move or policies change. Varying the contracts 1 is difficult and expensive. 2 The claim that private infrastructure providers are cheaper than the state 3 is also misleading. The rent paid over the life of PFI contracts in Britain is 4 estimated at four or five times the cost of construction. This reflects higher 5 interest rates for private sector borrowing, even when backed by guaranteed 6 income, and the payment of dividends.37 Contracts that commit public 7 bodies to payments from government revenue for 25 to 35 years create new 8 inter-generational burdens that do not appear in the public accounts. In 9 most cases, these payments have first call on the public purse, irrespective 40111 of other priorities. An article in the Financial Times on 17 July 1997 spelt 1 out the longer-term implications: 2 3 The future cash outflows under PFI/PPP contracts are analogous to future 44111 debt service requirements under the national debt, and, potentially, more The illusion of public services 141

1111 onerous since they commit the public sector to procuring a specified 2 service and over a long period of time when it may well have changed 3 its views on how or whether to provide certain core services of the 4 welfare state.38 5 6 As of 2006, the UK government’s aggregate forward commitments for 2006 7 to 2032 was £155 ($310) billion.39 8 The scope for profiteering from PFIs is staggering. Contracts routinely 9 include rights to profit from third party use of the facilities and from 1011 the sale of surplus assets that are usually controlled by a separate legal 1 vehicle. Companies claim tax losses by generating massive income against 2 which they offset equally massive operating expenditure, described as a 3111 ‘management fee’ paid to the parent company. In a study of PFI roads Jean 4 Shaoul et al. report a claim from the Major Contractors Group that its 5 members expected to make between three and ten times as much on their 6 PFI stakes as on their traditional contracts (Shaoul et al., 2006, p 269). 7 When the profits of subsidiaries, intra-firm financing, third-party income 8 from user charges for car parking, canteens and TV/telephones, and the 9 gains from refinancing, land sales, disposal of equity stakes investments 20111 and unrealised increases in investment value are added, the real return to 1 shareholders is vastly greater. 2 The risky part of the contract is construction, which is usually completed 3 after 18 months. It is common then to refinance, with cheaper borrowing 4 that reflects the very low post-construction risk. Larger loans spread over 5 a longer period allow the initial loan to be repaid, with windfall sums that 6 can be used by the parent companies at no cost to themselves. Contract 7 lengths for some PFIs have been extended to 60-plus years to accommodate 8 this, extending the cost to the hospitals and the risk to the public sector if 9 the contact is terminated. This refinancing windfall was initially governed 30111 by a voluntary code, which was ignored. Eventually the Treasury required 1 some of the gain to be shared. The UK National Audit Office reported in 2 2006 that the taxpayer received only £137 ($274) million of a total £264 3 ($528) million made from refinancing.40 The Parliamentary Public Accounts 4 committee described a windfall of some £80 ($160) million from refinancing 5 the Norfolk and Norwich University, when the local National Health Service 6 (NHS) trust faced a £15 ($30) million deficit, as the ‘unacceptable face of 7 capitalism’.41 8 Beyond the projects themselves, PFIs offer a lucrative new commodity 9 for the financial services industry. For example, HSBC Infrastructure 40111 Company, incorporated in the Guernsey tax haven, trades shares in PFIs. 1 This increases the incentives to reduce costs and maximise returns. There 2 is also a thriving secondary market in the contracts themselves. In 2006 the 3 City of London predicted that the sale of equity stakes in PFI contracts 44111 could reach £1.5 ($3) billion by the end of 2007. These attract a 30 per 142 Serving whose interests?

1111 cent capital gains tax, but not if they are sold offshore. The purchasers 2 profit from the regular fixed income from government at no risk, but also 3 have incentives to ‘sweat the assets and labour’ to cut expenditure. The 4 Secondary Market Infrastructure Fund is the largest asset management firm 5 in the UK PPP/PFI market. Its assets include the GCHQ, several prisons, 6 schools, hospitals and the M40 motorway.42 Two of the three core investors 7 are the Bank of Scotland and AMP Capital Investments. There is no 8 regulation of those secondary market sales and profits. 9 The PFIs are a classic instance of public policies designed by the 1011 transnational accountancy-cum-consultancy industry for its own benefit. 1 For a single PFI contract the University College London NHS trust retained 2 separate professional advisers on capital finance, accounting, legal, property, 3 healthcare strategy and planning, quantity surveying, survey engineering, 4 architecture and facilities management.43 Shaoul et al also point to the 5 huge potential for conflicts of interest. The roles played by the Big Four 6 (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Ernst & Young, and Deloitte & Touche) 7 include: 8 9 providing advice on policy and projects via staff, whom they second 20111 or loan to the government; writing reports on financial methodologies 1 and policy evaluation; advising the private sector that tender for PFI 2 contracts; acting as advisors on public bodies; and sponsoring research 3 on PFI/PPP. . . . Furthermore, in some cases, the firms or their sister 4 companies are equity stakeholders or major subcontractors in PFI 5 contracts. 6 (Shaoul et al., 2007, p 481; see also Newberry, 2003) 7 8 Despite the obvious conflict, the UK government routinely contracts the Big 9 Four to conduct the initial evaluation of whether public dollars would be 30111 better spent on PFIs or projects delivered through the public sector. 1 With ‘partnership’ now in vogue across the world, the potential export 2 market for PFIs, franchises and concessions, and other ‘partnerships’ is 3 enormous. It is part of PUK’s mandate to promote PFIs in the world market. 4 The UK and Japanese governments sponsored a World Bank Public 5 Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) to ‘help developing countries 6 improve the quality of their infrastructure through private sector 7 involvement’.44 The technical assistance facility operates through generously 8 paid consultants and supports only privatisation options (CEO, 2007). 9 Their activities include policy and legislative reforms that make countries 40111 PFI-ready, and propaganda campaigns of ‘consensus building’ to overcome 1 domestic resistance. The focal sectors are energy, telecommunications, 2 transport and water. The main regional focus has been sub-Saharan Africa, 3 44111 commonly building on PRSPs and debt conditionalities. Cambodia and China are other target markets. The management of the EC’s own Private The illusion of public services 143

1111 Sector Enabling Environment Programme (BizClim) is contracted to a 2 London-based consultancy firm that, in turn, contracts its projects to third 3 party consultants from a preferred provider list (CEO, 2007). 4 While the corporations, their patron states and international institutions 5 aggressively promote the PFIs, governments are beginning to re-regulate. 6 Sustained union criticism in the UK has resulted in new regulations to protect 7 workers affected by transfers of undertakings.45 Regular monitoring by the 8 UK Select Committee on Public Accounts has generated greater transparency 9 and more active regulation. There are similar pressures in Australia and 1011 Canada. Elsewhere, local authorities and communities have embraced 1 alternatives, such as public-public partnerships (PUPs) between several public 2 sector agencies, or a municipality and a non-profit organisation, with the aim 3111 of more efficient and effective service delivery but without a financial profit. 4 Under PUPs, the public agency remains the service authority, responsible for 5 regulation, setting tariffs, planning and monitoring.46 Trade in services 6 commitments have the potential to prevent governments from adopting either 7 stronger regulation or PUPs, even when PFI privatisations go wrong. 8 The commercial and competitive nature of PFIs takes them outside the 9 Article I:3 exemption and its bilateral equivalents. The primary contract 20111 might be categorised as government procurement under Article XIII, but 1 only for those services that do not involve commercial re-sale. The exemption 2 does not apply for those governments that made government procurement 3 commitments in their accession packages or in bilateral agreements. It is 4 also unclear how far down the PFI chain the definition of government 5 procurement would apply, because the GATS does not define procurement. 6 The international PFI market is dominated by a core of transnational 7 construction, finance and management firms that can squeeze out local 8 public and private competitors. Market access commitments prevent a 9 government from imposing economic needs tests, restricting the legal 30111 form of consortia, limiting foreign shareholdings or requiring joint 1 ventures, including with public enterprises. National treatment would 2 exclude nationality requirements for directors or the ability to give favourable 3 treatment to local firms, again including public agencies. Depending on how 4 ‘like’ services are defined, foreign consortia could demand the same subsidies 5 as ‘competing’ local community facilities and equivalent underwriting of risks. 6 Technical standards for a wide range of services, including laboratory testing 7 or nutritional content of school meals, could be subject to the existing or 8 proposed domestic regulation disciplines. 9 The major accountancy firms have their own interests in securing 40111 GATS commitments for professional services in modes 1, 3 and 4. If the 1 accountancy disciplines eventually come into effect, governments would be 2 unable to regulate the profession’s PFI activities in ways that serve legitimate 3 social objectives. The Big Four will also profit from any mutual recognition 44111 agreements (MRAs), and uniform standards, licensing and qualification requirements that would enhance their PFI activities. 144 Serving whose interests?

1111 Perhaps the most ominous risk is in those bilateral agreements that have 2 integrated mode 3 on services with investment rules, which potentially expose 3 governments to multi-million dollar expropriation claims through investor- 4 initiated arbitration if they resume control of failed PFIs contracts. Bolivia’s 5 experience with its water concessions is a warning to all. 6 7 8 CASE STUDY 8 PRIVATISING POWER IN THE 9 PHILIPPINES 1011 1 The ‘people power’ revolution that overthrew Philippine dictator Ferdinand 2 Marcos in February 1986 proclaimed an end to crony capitalism, US 3 imperialism and the plunder of the nation’s patrimony by corrupt élites and 4 foreign corporations. Twenty years later, local commentators suggest that 5 little has changed: ‘The basic problems of the country are foreign domination, 6 factionalism of élite politics, bad governance and feudal bondage’ (Yu, 2005, 7 p 8). In 2006, the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 8 gave the Philippines a score of 2.5 out of 10, where ‘5’ marks the borderline 9 for countries with a serious corruption problem. Former presidents Marcos 20111 and Joseph Estrada (impeached in 2000 and ousted in January 2001) were 1 judged the second and tenth most corrupt leaders of the past two decades.47 2 The short history of privatisation in the Philippines reflects this state of 3 affairs. Policies prescribed by the international financial institutions were 4 implemented by corrupt administrations. This created lucrative financial 5 opportunities that were exploited by national élites and transnational 6 corporations who urged the government to remove any remaining fetters 7 on their profit taking. Periodic waves of ‘people power’ have sought to 8 unseat successive presidents who were accused of betraying the nation. They, 9 in turn, resorted to emergency powers and suppression of human rights 30111 that fuelled instability and further popular resistance. 1 One rallying point for these mobilisations is the 1987 post-Marcos 2 Constitution, which enshrines the principles of patriotism, nationalism, social 3 justice and participatory democracy.48 Economic nationalism and people’s 4 sovereignty are deeply intertwined. Section 19 of Article II: Declaration of 5 Principles and State Policies requires the state to ‘develop a self-reliant and 6 independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos’. Section 7 10 of Article XII: National Economy and Patrimony mandates measures 8 that encourage locally owned enterprises and give preference to Filipinos 9 in grants of rights, privileges and concessions. Section 12 requires the state 40111 to promote the preferential use of Filipino labour, domestic materials and 1 locally produced goods. No private person can own public land or rights 2 over geothermal, hydroelectric or other natural resources. Only Filipino 3 citizens, or corporations with at least 60 per cent national ownership, can 44111 own land other than public lands or lease public lands. Foreign investors The illusion of public services 145

1111 can only lease private-owned lands for a maximum of 75 years. Under 2 Section 1 of Article XIII: Social Justice the state must 3 4 give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and 5 enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, 6 economic and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by 7 equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. 8 To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, 9 and disposition of property and its increments. 1011 1 These nationalist protections have been eroded to the point of impotence 2 in the wake of neoliberalism, privatisation and free trade commitments. Yet 3111 the Constitution remains the legal touchstone for Filipino opposition to 4 neoliberal globalisation. 5 In December 1994, 20 politicians and civil leaders asked the Supreme 6 Court of the Philippines to declare unconstitutional the Senate’s motion to 7 ratify the accession to the WTO. By the time the court finally delivered its 8 judgement in May 1997, the WTO had been operating for two years with 9 the Philippines as a member; President Fidel Ramos had internalised the 20111 IMF/World Bank-mandated privatisation strategy through his Medium-Term 1 Philippine Development Plan, known as Philippines 2000; and the country 2 had been hailed as an emerging new regional tiger at the APEC leaders’ 3 meeting in Manila in 1996. 4 The Supreme Court upheld the ratification. Despite an opening flourish 5 that quoted Peter Drucker on the virtues of globalisation, Justice 6 Panganiban insisted that the court’s role was simply to decide whether there 7 had been a gross abuse of discretion, not to ‘wade into the unchartered 8 ocean of social and economic policy making’.49 The nationalist goals of the 9 Constitution had to be understood in the context of Section 13 of Part XII 30111 that requires the state to ‘pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare 1 and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality 2 and reciprocity’, and of section 1 to promote industries that are competitive 3 in both domestic and foreign markets. The WTO agreements espoused those 4 principles, with built in protection for weak and developing countries. 5 Therefore: 6 7 Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on national 8 sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral 9 trading and the veritable forum for the development of international 40111 trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not economic 1 self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership, keenly aware 2 of the advantages and disadvantages of globalisation with its on-line 3 experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the Philippines 44111 now straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic 146 Serving whose interests?

1111 prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through 2 their duly authorized elected officers, make their free choice.50 3 4 This judicial rhetoric that extolled the democratic choice of the Filipino 5 people seemed particularly poignant 10 years later as the administration 6 of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo sought undemocratically, and 7 unsuccessfully, to remove the formal barriers to foreign investment in 8 privatisations, and to free trade agreements, from the Constitution. By that 9 time, a succession of failed privatisations had reinforced the stark disparity 1011 between the privileged and the masses. 1 The vast bulk of the post-Marcos privatisations, worth over $4 billion, 2 involved public utilities, primarily banking, petroleum, airline, electricity 3 and water.51 The sector examined here is electricity. The framework for 4 privatisation was laid, under IMF instruction, in the terminal days of the 5 Marcos regime and centred initially on the traditional form of asset sales. 6 The key themes of the IMF/World Bank economic rescue package for 7 President Cory Aquino were fiscal austerity and trade and investment 8 liberalisation. The Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization 9 Trust were established. 20111 The policy proceeded by fits and starts. Four factors contributed to this 1 uneven implementation. First, privatisation was a conditionality for loans 2 from the IMF and World Bank made to finance the odious debts incurred 3 by Marcos and subsequent bailouts of the economy. That produced hasty 4 and ill-considered policies. Second, competing interests within the domestic 5 political, bureaucratic and business hierarchies variously hastened, delayed 6 and derailed the programme. Third, the Philippines lacked the necessary 7 capital markets to fund privatisation from within; yet constitutional 8 restrictions on foreign investments in land and utilities constrained the sale 9 of assets to foreigners. The focus for natural resource privatisations, such 30111 as water and power, therefore took the form of build-operate-transfer 1 (BOT) contracts involving ‘partnerships’ between foreign corporations and 2 domestic élites. The tendering process for BOTs invited corruption. Fourth, 3 the failure of privatised services and repeated exposés of corrupt practices 4 fuelled the anti-privatisation campaigns of opposition parties and popular 5 movements. 6 The National Power Company (NPC or Napocor) had been established in 7 1936 to generate and transmit energy; distribution was left to the private 8 sector. Instead of developing an energy plan to address the country’s 9 long-term needs, Aquino adopted a deregulated market model of power 40111 generation. The first contract was let in 1988. In 1990 a law on BOTs allowed 1 the private sector to finance, construct, operate and maintain infrastructure 2 projects. Ramos, elected in 1992, picked up the pace, spurred on by the 3 international financial institutions and daily electricity outages across most 44111 of the country. Again, there was no long-term plan. The Power Crisis Act The illusion of public services 147

1111 1993 allowed the President to fast track the authorisation of independent 2 power producers (IPP). When that Act expired in 1994, an updated BOT law 3 allowed approval of unsolicited bids for a range of projects, including 4 IPPs (IBON Databank and Research Center, 2003, pp 82–3). 5 Most of the private power projects were financed by foreign players, 6 including the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation. The legal 7 form of BOTs was especially attractive because the element of ‘transfer’ 8 made them eligible for sovereign guarantees. The concessions operated 9 through power supply contracts for between 10 and 25 years. They were 1011 effectively risk-free investments, aside from the costs of construction and 1 operation. The government, through Napocor, assumed the market risk 2 through ‘take or pay’ obligations to buy between 70 and 100 per cent of 3111 total capacity, whether or not the power was consumed or even produced, 4 plus a fuel-cost guarantee. It also bore the foreign exchange risk (Rimban 5 and Samonte-Pesayco, 2002). 6 In just four years foreign direct investment in the Philippines multiplied 7 eightfold, mainly by the fast tracking of IPPs. Ramos approved at least 8 28 contracts valued at $7.4 billion. Over 90 per cent of new power 9 capacity in the 1990s came from foreign-owned IPPs, led by El Paso, Enron, 20111 Mirant, Intergen, CalEnergy, Covanta, Chevron, and some Asian utilities, 1 in conjunction with national capital. This ad hoc, untransparent environment 2 was linked to insider deals, bribes and other kickbacks (Andaquig, 2003). 3 The result was a private electricity system that even the World Bank warned 4 was overcapacity, overpriced and unaccountable (cited in Woodhouse, 5 2005, p 10). 6 The IPPs provided almost half of the Philippines’ power. Although their 7 contracts became unsustainable when the Asian financial crisis hit, the 8 corrupt Estrada administration chose to honour them. The debt-ridden state 9 company Napocor was crippled by its ‘take or pay’ obligations. These and 30111 other costs were passed on to consumers, adding 30 to 50 per cent to the 1 average power bill. 2 Following Estrada’s removal, former Vice-President Arroyo responded to 3 the crisis with a more-market response, restructuring the state owned 4 monopoly into ‘an unbundled, privatized merchant system (in which 5 electricity is sold and traded in a wholesale market at fluctuating spot market 6 prices)’ (Woodhouse, 2005, p 1). The Electricity Power Industry Reform 7 Act (EPIRA) was rushed through in 2001 to secure the release of Asian 8 Development Bank funding for power sector restructuring and an IMF 9 rehabilitation loan. All Napocor’s 31 generating plants would be transferred 40111 to a management corporation and sold. So would a 25-year concession to 1 run the National Transmission Company Transco, renewable for a further 2 25 years, although the state company would remain Transco’s owner and 3 default provider. Power would be sold through bilateral contracts or into 44111 a new spot market. While Transco was subject to restrictions on foreign 148 Serving whose interests?

1111 and cross-ownership, and Congress had to approve the franchise, the power 2 generators would be largely unregulated (IBON Databank and Research 3 Center, 2003, pp 88–9). 4 The asset sale process was a debacle. The only sale in 2005 was to a Filipino- 5 Australian SPV with no relevant documented experience. The company 6 contracted to pay $561 million; yet its paid up capital was just $11,938 7 and its maximum capitalisation was $191,021. The payment was never 8 made.52 The government’s target date for selling the assets was extended 9 to 2007; again the process limped along. 1011 The EPIRA had mandated an independent review of the IPPs. That was 1 completed in July 2002, but never released publicly. Informed reports reveal 2 that only six of the 35 contracts were considered ‘clean’ (IBON Databank 3 and Research Center, 2003, p 84). Most had legal and financial defects. 4 Five were deemed onerous, contributing to Napocor’s P500 ($10) billion 5 in outstanding debt and P1.5 trillion ($30 billion) in stranded liabilities.53 6 Three of these five contracts were supported by the export credit agencies 7 of the US, the UK and Japan. Faced with warnings from the IMF and others 8 that terminating the onerous contracts would risk a crisis of investor 9 confidence, the Arroyo government asked the firms to accept voluntary 20111 adjustments. 1 One of the most notorious of those contracts involved American electricity 2 giant Mirant Corporation. Mirant declared bankruptcy in the US in 2003, 3 but continued to earn huge profits from its Philippine subsidiaries that 4 supplied 30 per cent of the national grid requirements. In 2006, following 5 new allegations of tax avoidance using offshore financing, the company 6 decided to cash up and quit the country (IBON Databank and Research 7 Center, 2003, pp 86–7). Given the privileges enjoyed by companies such 8 as Mirant, it is not surprising that most IPP investors were reported to be 9 ‘quietly satisfied with their experience’ (Woodhouse, 2005, p 25). 30111 The generation, transmission and distribution of electricity in the 1 Philippines has progressively passed from the public sector to national élites 2 and foreign corporations that operate as unaccountable, and often corrupt, 3 oligopolies with no effective regulation. Even pro-privatisation analysts are 4 highly critical: 5 6 With more than a decade of experience with private power generation, 7 the Philippines should be in a position to reap the benefits of extremely 8 competitive contracting. However, the combination of the Asian 9 financial crisis, re-politicization of electricity prices shortly thereafter, 40111 and the headlong leap into an ambitious reform program, has once 1 again put the Philippines into a delicate position. Uncertainty in the 2 new market structure has induced a gridlock for new investment, and 3 investors’ perception of risk is high. 44111 (Woodhouse, 2005, p 26) The illusion of public services 149

1111 For the Filipino masses, power privatisation has been a disaster, leaving 2 them with an overpriced, unreliable service and no guarantee of affordable 3 long-term supply. The Asian People’s Tribunal on Poverty and Debt 4 reported in 2006 that electricity rates were the second highest in Asia. Power 5 bills for residential consumers in metro Manila rose 211 per cent from 1993 6 to 2006, with households paying about 20 per cent of their monthly income 7 for electricity.54 Government debt obligations multiplied with every failed 8 new experiment. Debt servicing, in turn, depressed social spending on health, 9 education and poverty-focused programmes. 1011 Trade in services agreements are blind to such precarious situations. 1 The privatised electricity regime would fall outside the GATS Article 2 I:3 exemption for government services. Although W/120 has no formal 3111 classification for energy services, electricity generation, transmission, 4 distribution and supply are covered by a vast number of relevant CPCs (see 5 Chapter 9). Extensive commitments by the Philippines government in those 6 sectors would make the failed privatisations very difficult to wind back, 7 especially in bilateral agreements that also protected foreign investments. 8 Like most developing countries, the Philippines made very few 9 commitments under GATS 1994. These related to transport, communications 20111 (courier and telecommunications), tourism and financial services. All are 1 subject to horizontal limitations that reflect the constitutional constraints 2 on foreign ownership of land and natural resources, the nationality of board 3 members and executives, and economic needs tests. 4 The Philippine government remained reluctant to make commitments 5 during the GATS 2000 negotiations. Its negotiators strongly resisted 6 proposed disciplines on domestic regulation and took a long time to table 7 an initial offer, despite enormous pressure.55 The EC’s leaked request to 8 the Philippines contained the standard disclaimer that it was ‘not seeking 9 the dismantling of public services or the privatization of state owned 30111 companies’.56 Yet the request targeted the two major areas of Philippines’ 1 privatisation: environmental services, including water collection, purification, 2 distribution, treatment and remediation; and energy services, ranging across 3 construction, transport, transmission and distribution, wholesale trade, 4 brokering of network energy products, and production management 5 consulting. The EC’s horizontal request for the Philippines to eliminate 6 restrictions on foreign direct investment, nationality of management and 7 executives, and foreign ownership of land would have required major 8 amendments to the Constitution. 9 The government finally tabled its offer in May 2004. Its proposed new 40111 commitments reportedly included aspects of services relating to electricity 1 privatization, notably the construction of power plants. The Philippines was 2 the target of every plurilateral request in 2006, and a watchful participant 3 in the ‘Enchilada’ talks in 2007. Some Manila-based officials apparently 44111 supported the binding of BOTs within a revised offer.57 150 Serving whose interests?

1111 The government was also more cautious at the regional level than 2 many of its ASEAN neighbours. Its ‘voluntary and non-binding’ Individual 3 Action Plans under APEC were minimalist.58 The Philippines was a party 4 to the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) 1995,59 but that 5 progressed very slowly (Thanh and Bartlett, 2006, p 6). The Philippines 6 government came under more pressure as established and emerging powers 7 courted ASEAN. In 2002 and 2003 ASEAN members signed a succession 8 of framework agreements that committed them to negotiate bilateral trade 9 agreements on goods, services and investment with China60 and Japan,61 1011 both to be established by 2012, and with India,62 to be concluded by 2007. 1 Despite comfort words on flexibility, reciprocity and sensitivity (mainly 2 directed to the newer ASEAN members) all three agreements required 3 GATS-plus liberalisation of services with substantial sectoral coverage, and 4 progressive liberalisation of investment regimes that included investor 5 protection. The US launched its own Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative in 6 2002, as it concluded bilaterals with Singapore and Australia. By 2005 this 7 had become the US–ASEAN Enhanced Partnership. One year later, the US 8 goal of a common vision across a full range of economic, political and 9 security issues had been realised and an initial five-year Plan of Action had 20111 given birth to a US–ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.63 1 In addition to these regional negotiations, many of its ASEAN partners 2 had jumped on the bilateral bandwagon. Again, the Philippines was initially 3 reserved. A report by analysts from the Philippine Institute for Development 4 Studies in 2004 concluded that the government had not identified its priorities 5 and sensitivities and had no clear strategy, set of objectives or preferences 6 about the form and scope of FTAs. They urged the administration to map 7 out a trade negotiations strategy that complemented its neoliberal domestic 8 industry and competitiveness objectives, and develop clear criteria for 9 choosing bilateral partners. It identified Japan and the US as prime candidates, 30111 within stronger frameworks for regional cooperation and integration 1 (Medalla and Lazaro, 2004). The Philippines Chamber of Commerce and 2 Industry also warned that the country was being left behind, as the US was 3 already negotiating with South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia. The 4 government appeared to heed that advice and commissioned a study on the 5 prospects for an FTA with the US (Medalla and Balboa, 2006). The expiry 6 of the US President’s fast track authority put that initiative on hold. 7 The Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA), signed 8 in September 2006, was seen as a practice run by the Philippines and 9 an early step in Japan’s bilateral programme.64 The agreement was cautious. 40111 But it nevertheless contained commitments on energy services, disciplines 1 on domestic regulation and investor protections that all conflicted with the 2 Philippines Constitution. In particular, Article 4 required each party to 3 examine the possibility of amending or repealing laws that pertain to the 44111 implementation and operation of the agreement, where the circumstances The illusion of public services 151

1111 or objectives that gave rise to them no longer existed or could be addressed 2 in a less trade-restrictive manner. The JPEPA was condemned by the political 3 and popular opposition as ‘destructive and unequal’, and its ratification 4 became stalled in the Senate.65 5 Negotiations for a Philippines US FTA were expected to provoke a much 6 more militant response. The Philippines has long been a client state of the 7 US, militarily and economically. US transnationals have major interests in 8 privatised electricity, gas and water, as well as agribusiness, mining and 9 finance. In 2003 their corporate lobby established a Philippines Energy Ad 1011 Hoc Working Group.66 The USTR’s annual survey of trade barriers has 1 routinely targeted the Philippines’ threshold for foreign investment in 2 exploration and utilisation of natural resources, the ban on foreign ownership 3111 of land, limits on foreign ownership of utilities and preferences for 4 government procurement.67 A bilateral that satisfied the US would, therefore, 5 require substantial amendment to the 1987 Constitution. 6 Proposals for amending the Constitution date back to the Ramos 7 administration in the 1990s, and were revisited by Estrada and Arroyo. 8 A Committee of the House of Representatives produced a draft in 2006 9 that aimed to consolidate the political power of the Arroyo administration 20111 and make the Constitution free-trade friendly. The draft left most of the 1 existing provisions untouched, but added a catch-all caveat that potentially 2 negated all the nationalist protections: 3 4 Section 12: Notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. 2 and 11 hereof, 5 citizenship restrictions are hereby lifted relative to the ownership and 6 lease of alienable lands of the public domain which include agricultural, 7 residential, commercial and reclaimed lands, development of natural 8 resources, ownership of franchises and advertising unless otherwise 9 provided by law. Parliament shall provide for limited foreign ownership 30111 in regard to franchises granted to corporations involving public utilities 1 of large scale.68 2 3 A backlash forced the Arroyo government to abandon undemocratic 4 moves to secure these and other changes in December 2006. But this was 5 a temporary setback. The prospects for a showdown over constitutional 6 change and an FTA with the US loom large in a country where mass 7 mobilisations have unseated two presidents and ‘Down with US Imperialism’ 8 is an everyday part of the political lexicon. 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 Chapter 5

1111 2 Ruling the services 3 infrastructure 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3 Behind the hyperbole of a borderless global economy and the liberating 4 potential of the internet are the stark realities of power. Those who control 5 the infrastructure of finance capital and information flows wield determinative 6 power over the evolving international services/knowledge economy. 7 The financial system can be likened to the ‘brain’ of the international 8 economy, because it is the allocator of capital resources. Hardt and Negri 9 observe how the denationalisation of financial markets has been accompanied 20111 by a monetary re-territorialisation, which is concentrated at the political 1 and financial centres of Empire, the global cities, from whence the globalised 2 networks of finance and production are managed (Hardt and Negri, 3 2000, p 297). In similar vein, they quote an adviser to the US Federal 4 Communications Commission (FCC) who depicted the new IT highway as 5 establishing ‘the conditions and terms of global production and government 6 just as road construction did for the Roman Empire’ (quoted in Hardt and 7 Negri, 2000, p 298). 8 The role of trade in services agreements is to construct a normative and 9 disciplinary regime of meta-regulation for this rapidly evolving infrastructure, 30111 in the image and interests of ‘empire’. Paradoxically, the artifice of a ‘trade’ 1 treaty, with its sclerotic classifications and architecture, has frustrated 2 those ambitions. The mega-corporations demand the right to extend their 3 operations in ways that the new technologies make possible, but the GATS 4 text cannot deliver. The new generation of bilateral treaties provides an 5 opportunity to rewrite the script and compounds the legal complexities. 6 As with other sectors, the techniques of commodification and fettishisation 7 erase the social relations and normalise the structural inequalities that are 8 intrinsic to contemporary financial and telecommunications markets. 9 Equally, the combination of liberalisation and pro-market regulation that 40111 is demanded by trade in services agreements is de-linked from the systemic 1 instabilities in the global financial system that re-surfaced so vividly in the 2 wake of the subprime mortgage crisis in late 2007. Case study 9 uses 3 Antigua’s challenge to the US ban on internet gambling to challenge the 44111 claim that trade in services agreements empower small and poor countries Ruling the services infrastructure 153

1111 to harness new technologies and compete as equals in the international 2 services economy. Case study 10 examines the social implications when 3 pension policy falls captive to the pension industry supply chain and trade 4 in services rules, especially in such a turbulent environment. 5 This chapter also sets the platform for the subsequent examination of 6 downstream services that rely on the financial and IT infrastructure, such 7 as globally integrated food chains (Chapter 8), e-education (Case study 13), 8 cultural exchanges (Chapter 7) and call centres (Case study 11). The potential 9 for a foreign company to turn of the economic lifeblood of an entire economy 1011 at the flick of a switch and foment political chaos, as occurred in Venezuela 1 in 2002, is the subject of Case study 17. 2 3111 Infrastructure as a social phenomenon 4 5 It seems perverse that trade in services agreements aim to provide long- 6 term political stability to corporations, not to societies or even economies. 7 It seems perverse that trade in services agreements aim to provide long- 8 term political stability to corporations, not to societies or even economies. 9 The domino effects of the subprime mortgage crisis confirmed the fragility 20111 of an integrated global financial system whose regulation is designed largely 1 by and for the financial services industry. The latest turmoil was utterly 2 predictable. The East Asian financial crisis showed the systemic risks of the neoliberal ‘orthodoxy’ that was advanced by the IMF, World Bank and 3 OECD in the 1980s and 1990s (see Kapstein, 1994; Krugman, 1994; Wade, 4 2007) and how rapidly contagion can spread from country to region and 5 beyond, leaving devastation in its wake (Bullard et al., 1998; Stiglitz, 2002). 6 Malaysia’s ‘unorthodox’ imposition of currency controls in 1997 reinforced 7 the importance of governments retaining their full regulatory autonomy 8 and exercising it prudently, despite the condemnation of the institutionalized 9 ‘voices of capital’. A study of Thailand’s experience of the financial crisis, 30111 conducted in 2002 as one of the few assessments of the GATS pursuant to 1 Article XIX, described how 2 3 the rapidly growing banking system and the influx of short-term foreign 4 capital proved to be too much and too fast for the authorities to catch- 5 up on [the] regulatory front. The problems were further aggravated by 6 new technologies that enabled transfer of capital to be as easy as ‘a click 7 away’. New financial and debt instruments were created that made 8 surveillance and devising appropriate regulation almost impossible. The 9 result was that a lot of short-term capitals [sic] that came to Thailand 40111 ended up in sectors like construction and real estate developments, 1 contributing very little in real term[s]. And in the end, they became the 2 major source of non-performing loans that are currently besetting the 3 whole banking system. Perhaps the regulatory, supervisory and prudential 44111 regimes were somewhat lax but they were never intended to be so.1 154 Serving whose interests?

1111 The authors concluded that ‘the global economic environment coupled with 2 new technological development has greater tendency to unravel many 3 economies than before’. Developing countries face particular difficulties in 4 devising a regulatory framework that can ‘catch up with globalisation’. 5 While the study endorsed liberalisation, it advised caution: ‘If [devising a 6 regulatory framework] is too difficult to achieve, then perhaps the pace of 7 liberalization that a country plans to implement may have to be adjusted 8 so that its supervisory and regulatory capability will not be compromised’.2 9 However, once a government has made commitments on financial services 1011 through the trade in services agreements they may have no ‘policy space’ 1 to address these challenges, and no GATS-compliant alternatives. Further, 2 members who take a mode 1 commitment automatically guarantee a free 3 inflow and outflow of capital that is an ‘essential part’ of that service, while 4 a mode 3 commitment prevents them from restricting incoming capital flows 5 related to the investment. Parties to US free trade agreements, such as Chile 6 and Singapore, have even abandoned their right to suspend commitments 7 temporarily in balance of payments emergencies. 8 The systemic implications of the GATS for telecommunications are seen 9 more in the concentration of corporate power. There are valid arguments 20111 that many old state-owned telecommunications monopolies failed to provide 1 adequate quality and access, and that they lacked the capital and incentives 2 to meet the challenges of the IT revolution. Privatisation and unbundling 3 were promoted as solutions that would generate competition, improve 4 efficiency, lower prices and broaden coverage. However, privatisation has 5 6 often simply transformed old state monopolies into dominant price gouging 7 private monopolies and oligopolies. 8 Corporate power over telecommunications is concentrated overwhelmingly 9 in US and European ‘telcos’, who have established this dominance through 30111 a century of monopoly control over the telecommunications networks of the 1 world’s largest industrialised economies. Those traditional public monopolies, 2 or in the case of the US a private oligopoly, were formally dismantled during 3 the 1980s and 1990s, but their power remains intact. The US government 4 broke up the Bell Telephone System in 1984. The Telecommunications Act 5 1996 further promoted competition by unbundling the local networks. Despite 6 these measures, AT&T has re-established its dominance through a series of 7 mergers and acquisitions (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000, pp 322–6). In 8 Europe a more neoliberal model of privatisation and competition slowly 9 spread from the UK in the 1980s. A pro-competitive regime was harmonised 40111 through the EU directive on competition in 1990 and other regulations. Instead 1 of enhanced competition, a continuous cycle of acquisitions and mergers across 2 Europe has generated oligopolies that dominate the integrated networks of 3 telephone, radio, television, computing and information services that are 44111 enabled by satellite and cable. Ruling the services infrastructure 155

1111 The GATS expands the international dominance of these telcos as governments 2 privatise, deregulate and liberalise their domestic telecommunications systems. 3 A report for the World Bank observed, approvingly, in 2005 that: 4 5 The GATS can be viewed as a multilateral investment agreement, 6 granting rights to the service suppliers of other WTO members, and 7 allowing foreign ownership and control in telecommunications, a sector 8 of the economy often seen as having particular political and strategic 9 importance. For developing countries, this investment agreement often 1011 results in foreign ownership and/or the transfer of control of the 1 incumbent carrier due to lack of domestic capital. 2 (Bressie et al., 2005, p 5) 3111 4 The authors of that report hailed the potential for binding commitments 5 by developing countries to anchor their far-reaching telecommunications 6 reforms and to reassure investors by providing safeguards against policy 7 reversal (Bressie et al., 2005). They applauded 11 countries that they said 8 had ‘voluntarily’ made telecommunications commitments during their 9 accession process and sent a signal to investors by locking in their domestic 20111 reforms. 1 The global reach of foreign telcos feeds the risk of a growing digital 2 apartheid. The commercialisation and mass expansion of the internet from 3 1991 transformed the IT environment. C Edwin Baker rightly warns against 4 overstating the potential for the internet and worldwide web to displace other 5 forms of social communication (Baker, 2002, p 298). However, access to the 6 telecommunications infrastructure does determine which countries, and 7 which segments of their economies and societies, can choose to interact 8 through this form of communications. It also determines which of them can 9 participate in IT-enabled services and electronic commerce (the production, 30111 advertising, sale and distribution of products via electronic networks), such 1 as financial transactions, tourism, e-education or call centres. 2 These globally integrated financial and telecommunications markets have 3 direct social impacts. The report for the World Bank cited above implied 4 a positive relationship between the GATS commitments of selected low- 5 income countries and regions and the penetration of fixed-lines and mobile 6 phones. However, it chose not to examine other, more socially relevant, 7 statistics, such as levels of reinvestment by foreign firms or the social 8 distribution of the services in terms of access and affordability. Nor did it 9 address the fate of universal service obligations. 40111 By contrast, Hardt and Negri argue that: ‘The new communications 1 technologies, which hold out the promise of a new democracy and a new 2 social equality, have in fact created new lines of inequality and exclusion, 3 both within the dominant countries and especially outside them’ (Hardt 44111 and Negri, 2000, p 300). Even in richer countries, cost remains the most 156 Serving whose interests?

1111 significant barrier to access for lower-income, older and minority households 2 (Cooper, 2000; Reddick et al., 2000; EKOS Research Associates Inc, 2001). 3 A growing digital divide within and between countries would have ‘profound 4 impacts not just on economies, but on politics, societies and cultures’ with 5 potential for political backlash (Taylor and Jussawalla 1998, p 2). Yet, as 6 explained below, social regulation to mitigate that risk is treated as a trade 7 barrier in the GATS. 8 Financial services liberalisation has comparable impacts on local communities 9 and small businesses. Transnational banks generally enter countries through 1011 mergers and acquisitions (under mode 3) that concentrate market power in 1 fewer, foreign hands. Recent history shows a high level of foreign ownership 2 once state banks are privatised and foreign investment in financial markets 3 is liberalised: 90 per cent of banks in Mexico in 2002 were foreign controlled, 4 up from 19 per cent in 1999; Eastern Europe is similar, with 97 per cent foreign 5 ownership in Estonia in 2004; in Tanzania foreign banks had about 70 per 6 cent of market share (vander Stichele, 2006). 7 The ability of transnational banks to offer higher quality services and 8 technology allows them to skim off the profitable commercial operations and 9 shed the custom of higher cost, low-value rural communities, small businesses 20111 and the poor. As a result, local businesses, small farmers and households face 1 a credit squeeze that can disable the local economy and employment (Chapter 2 8). The wealthy frequently respond to domestic instability by shifting money 3 into offshore accounts, which further depletes the national investment base. 4 Second-tier, third-tier and underground markets in high-risk lending may 5 emerge, within minimal protections for borrowers or investors. Banks that 6 remain locally owned are often expected to maintain universal services, and 7 may take unwise risks simply to survive. When they close or are taken over 8 the market becomes even more concentrated. There is nothing to stop foreign 9 firms from maximising their returns and moving on to greener pastures, 30111 leaving the local financial services sector depleted and destabilised. These 1 risks are greatest where domestic regulations are weak and governments 2 have fully lifted their capital controls (as required under mode 1). 3 These dimensions of trade in services agreements often go unremarked. 4 Few people, including politicians, know if their governments have signed 5 away the autonomy to regulate the infrastructure that drives their economies. 6 Fewer still know that this might extend to their right to exercise capital 7 controls. The areas of financial services, telecommunications and e-commerce 8 have attracted equally little attention from the GATS critics (vander Stichele, 9 2005). The services themselves and the related trade rules are complex, 40111 specialised and technology-centred. For campaigners, the real world impacts 1 often seem less obvious than in education, health or water and are harder 2 to mobilise around. Yet it is small businesses, workers and communities in 3 the real economy that ultimately bear the consequences of financial market 44111 failure and technological exclusion. Ruling the services infrastructure 157

1111 Uruguay round negotiations 2 These systemic and social considerations were far from the minds of US 3 negotiators when they demanded the inclusion of services in the Uruguay 4 round. They had two primary targets. The first was to secure guaranteed 5 rights to access and consolidate control over the world’s emerging financial 6 and telecommunications markets. The less obvious long-term objective 7 was to pre-empt the regulation of new technologies through which capital 8 and data would flow. As Case study 3 recounts, the corporate activists 9 who pushed for the GATS came from AMEX, AIG, Citicorp and later 1011 AT&T, with support from the British financial services lobby LOTIS. Geza 1 Feketekuty explains their motivation: 2 3111 More than anything what drove [the GATS] was telecom, both telecom 4 deregulation and the shift in the market structure in telecom. The two 5 are so inter-related, the regulatory stuff and the technology on the 6 other side. . . . The key people from the industry came to me and said: 7 8 ‘look, what we really want out of this, bottom line, is to stop any 9 pressure within governments to establish restrictive regulations on the 20111 information transfer side. Yes, we’re interested in liberalised access in 1 some of the traditional regulated areas, but we know that’s going to 2 take a long time.’ None of the people who were really driving the 3 liberalization of services were really that gung ho on deregulation 4 globally, with the partial exception of telecom. What they were really 5 interested in was what they called the ‘new services’, from consulting 6 to data processing to information services. That’s what they were 7 wanting, and they were keen to make sure that governments didn’t 8 look at this and say ‘gee, here’s a new service, this new thing called 9 international data processing, international value-added telecom services. 30111 It needs to be regulated just like all the other services that we regulate’ 1 . . . out of gut reaction without thinking why it needs to be regulated. 2 [They said . . .] ‘That’s what we want you to do. We want you to come 3 up with a regime that stops governments from just willy-nilly coming 4 in and regulating things and building up new restrictions in what is 5 potentially a tremendous growth area’.3 6 7 The financial services corporations recognised a clear synergy between 8 their interests and the regime governing of telecommunications. AMEX 9 and Bank of America orchestrated the creation of a powerful International 40111 Telecommunications Users Group in Europe in 1974 as the voice of 1 corporate consumers (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000, p 342). The group’s 2 membership expanded internationally by sponsorship of national bodies 3 and the recruitment of major corporations and influential individuals. 44111 Feketekuty says the financial services firms were primarily concerned to 158 Serving whose interests?

1111 secure cheap and reliable access to basic telecommunications networks, 2 especially the use of leased lines for intra-firm communications: 3 4 Even the insurance people said ‘what we’re openly interested in is the 5 insurance transactions that could easily take place over the net’. The 6 financial services people were [also] more interested in the information 7 transfers and data. They had their banks abroad and, yes, it would be 8 nice to get some more branches, but that wasn’t what they really wanted. 9 They wanted to be able to do business globally. . . . As they said ‘when 1011 we provide cash management services for some of the big companies 1 we’ve got to be able to move cash around’. That’s what was driving 2 it. Or the insurance companies saying the same thing, ‘we’ve got to 3 be able to manage our cash flow so we’ve got to be able to move 4 information, we’ve got to be able to move the money’.4 5 6 The power of the US services lobby explains the inclusion of trade in 7 telecommunications as a US negotiating priority in the Omnibus Trade Act 8 1988, Part 4 of which was the Telecommunications Trade Act 1988. 9 Indeed, the US refused to sign off on either the financial services or 20111 telecommunications negotiations until it had pushed the boundaries as far 1 as possible, several years beyond the end of the Uruguay round. Both 2 negotiations ran in parallel, with similar specific goals: to maximise 3 commitments to binding liberalisation in members’ schedules; to achieve 4 international adherence to a common pro-corporate regulatory regime; and 5 to recover some of the procedural ground conceded to the South during the 6 Uruguay round. The demandeurs attacked a similar raft of ‘barriers’ – 7 8 restrictions on foreign investment, economic needs tests, limits on the range 9 of services provided, restrictions on foreign exchange movements, local 30111 monopolies, tax concessions and licensing processes. However, the outcome 1 in each sector reflected its unique characteristics and regulatory history. 2 3 Meta-regulation of financial services 4 5 The GATS 1994 contains several special provisions on financial services. 6 The first is an Annex on Financial Services, which drew heavily on the 7 landmark chapter on financial services in the CUSFTA (Raworth, 2005, 8 pp 196–216). This Annex contains defensive and offensive elements. The 9 defensive provisions were crucial to securing the support of sceptical financial 40111 regulators. A broad prudential carve-out allows governments to use non- 1 conforming measures to safeguard the integrity of their financial system or 2 protect consumers. Such measures must not be used to avoid commitments 3 or obligations – a matter that can be subject to a dispute, although the 44111 panel hearing the complaint must include relevant financial expertise. Ruling the services infrastructure 159

1111 The Annex also contains a special definition of ‘services supplied in the 2 exercise of governmental authority’ that parallels Article I:3. Activities 3 conducted in pursuit of monetary and exchange rate policies are totally 4 exempt, whether they are carried out by a central bank, monetary authority 5 or public entity authorised to do so. The exclusion also covers a country’s 6 statutory system of social security or public retirement plans, and the 7 activities of a public entity that is backed by a government guarantee or 8 uses public finance. However, these activities are subject to full GATS 9 disciplines if they are conducted in competition with a public entity or a 1011 private financial service supplier (Case study 9). 1 The Annex has a second, offensive aspect. It expands the definition of 2 financial services beyond W/120 to cover ‘any service of a financial nature 3111 offered by a financial service supplier’ (paragraph 5:1). This opens the way 4 for market access, national treatment and additional commitments across 5 a vast spectrum of insurance and banking activities, trade in foreign exchange 6 and derivatives, trade in all kinds of securities, securities underwriting, money 7 broking, asset management, settlement and clearing services, provision and 8 transfer of financial information, and advisory and other auxiliary financial 9 services. Sauvé and Gillespie suggest this breadth was partly a strategy to 20111 avoid capture of the negotiations by any part of the financial services industry 1 that was opposed to foreign competition (Sauvé and Gillespie, 2000, p 432). 2 The Annex was accompanied by a model schedule entitled the Understanding on 3 Commitments in Financial Services. Governments adopting the 4 Understanding must specify, and later endeavour to reduce or eliminate, 5 6 existing monopoly rights; this includes monopoly financial services that are 7 supplied in the exercise of governmental authority, except those relating to 8 monetary and exchange rate policy or statutory systems of social security and 9 public pensions. Foreign financial services suppliers have a right to establish 30111 and expand their commercial presence, including by acquiring existing 1 enterprises, and entry for their senior management and specialists, subject 2 to specified terms and conditions. National treatment and MFN apply to the 3 procurement of financial services. Governments must not prevent data 4 transfer and processing that is necessary for the conduct of ordinary business, 5 except to protect privacy and confidentiality. Any new financial service that 6 is not already supplied in the member’s territory would automatically be 7 allowed, whatever the means of delivery. The Understanding only has legal 8 force when it is incorporated within a member’s schedule. A government that 9 adopts the Understanding binds itself to a standstill of its existing non- 40111 conforming measures. It can qualify any other commitments. 1 The aim of the Understanding was to secure a critical mass of commitments 2 (a forerunner to the plurilaterals of the GATS 2000 negotiations). It is a wish 3 list of commitments designed by a select group of OECD governments to 44111 achieve deep liberalization of financial services. The fact that it became a 160 Serving whose interests?

1111 formal addendum to the GATS is remarkable, given the lack of any input 2 into its drafting from non-OECD governments. Its origins pre-date the 3 proposal to establish a WTO and reflected the legally separate nature of the 4 proposed services treaty. An OECD note in 1990 reports that US and Japanese 5 treasury officials favoured a financial services agreement that was separate 6 from the GATS, whereas the EEC wanted them linked and hoped that 10 to 7 15 developing countries would sign, in addition to OECD members.5 8 The Understanding was adopted in 1994 by mainly OECD states that 9 have advanced financial systems. The Europeans and North Americans had 1011 already integrated their financial markets through the EU Single Market 1 and NAFTA, respectively. Most other OECD members were committed to 2 these policies through the OECD codes on capital movements. As at 1994 3 those industrialised countries accounted for some 80 per cent of the world 4 banking assets, 76 per cent of international bond issues and most of the 5 world stock market capitalisation (Sorsa, 1997, p 13). 6 The GATS 1994 text also introduced enforceable rules on capital account 7 liberalisation. The logic was simple: cross-border transactions (mode 1) 8 require an unrestricted inflow and outflow of capital where that is an 9 ‘essential part’ of the service itself, and foreign investment (mode 3) requires 20111 at least a free inflow of capital. Footnote 8 to Article XVI on Market Access 1 attaches those requirements to mode 1 and 3 commitments, respectively. 2 However, ‘essential part’ is not defined, making it unclear if and how far 3 the mode 1 obligation extends beyond financial services. Article XI also 4 precludes members from imposing restrictions on international transfers 5 6 and payments that are inconsistent with their sectoral commitments, subject 7 to the exception for balance of payments emergencies. 8 The sum of the Annex, Understanding and capital account rules confirmed 9 the extraordinary influence of the financial services industry over the Uruguay 30111 round. However, the US was not satisfied with the commitments originally 1 proposed by the larger developing countries in the emerging markets in 2 Asia and Latin America, whose high savings rates and demand for investment 3 made them potential honey pots after further privatisation and liberalisation. 4 Late in the round, the US announced it would withhold MFN treatment 5 from countries that did not give reciprocal rights to its financial 6 services firms. To prevent the request and offer process unravelling at the last 7 minute a Ministerial Decision and a Second Annex on Financial Services 8 extended the negotiations. This allowed WTO members six months after the 9 GATS came into force to improve, modify or withdraw their scheduled 40111 commitments and list additional MFN exemptions. The USTR again rejected 1 the package that was proposed in July 1995. The negotiations were finally 2 signed off in December 1997 – and only then, according to some 3 commentators, because of the damaging effect of another missed deadline 44111 (Sauvé and Gillespie, 2000, p 430). Difficulties in implementation meant the Ruling the services infrastructure 161

1111 Fifth Protocol to the GATS containing the new schedules only entered into 2 force on March 1999 – nine months before the GATS 2000 negotiations were 3 due to begin. 4 The finance industry maintained a shadowy presence throughout the 5 extended negotiations. In mid-1996 a Financial Leaders Group comprised 6 exclusively of chief executives and chairs of the major finance corporations 7 was formed to advise the US and EC on principles, barriers and target 8 countries. A lower level Financial Leaders Working Group did the legwork. 9 The senior group played a leading role in the final hours of the negotiations 1011 in Geneva in December 1997 (Wesselius, 2003). 1 The timing of the Agreement on Financial Services could hardly have 2 been less auspicious. The fallout from the East Asian financial crisis showed 3111 the systemic risks of rapid financial liberalisation and footloose speculative 4 capital. Ironically, IMF analyst Piritta Sorsa remarked, in an assessment of 5 the interim offers tabled prior to the crisis, that ‘hasty opening of unsound 6 banking sectors to foreign competition can lead to costly systemic failures 7 or hamper macroeconomic management’ (Sorsa, 1997, p 5). She noted the 8 rule of thumb that ‘financial sector reforms tend to succeed better if they 9 are preceded by macroeconomic stabilization and supported by evolving 20111 prudential measures’ (Sorsa, 1997, p 20). The Malaysian government, which 1 had bucked IMF strictures and introduced capital controls to stabilise its 2 economy, was the last to sign the agreement and did so under enormous 3 US pressure. According to Raghavan, WTO Director General Ruggiero 4 thanked the IMF and World Bank for bringing the financial services talks 5 and agreement to a conclusion through pressure on the South, both in Geneva 6 and the capitals (Raghavan, 2002, p 84). 7 In the end, more commitments were made in financial services than in any 8 sector except tourism. A total of 56 schedules for 70 countries were annexed 9 to the Fifth Protocol of the GATS. Most covered the three core areas of 30111 insurance, banking and securities. However, few governments went beyond 1 their existing levels of liberalisation and many stopped short of that. There 2 were also numerous limitations; 80 per cent of those were on banking and 3 other non-insurance sectors, especially retail banking. The majority of 4 commitments were in mode 3, and contained limitations on foreign equity 5 participation and discretionary licensing that protected domestic institutions. 6 Governments, including those from the OECD, seemed especially nervous 7 about mode 1 – presumably because this would remove their capacity to 8 employ capital controls. 9 A detailed assessment of the outcome by Mattoo argues that financial 40111 services commitments still compared unfavourably with basic 1 telecommunications (Mattoo, 2000, p 376). He speculates that governments 2 might have held back during the sector-specific negotiations to maintain more 3 bargaining chips in future multi-sectoral negotiations, although it is unclear 44111 why the same reasoning would not apply to telecommunications. 162 Serving whose interests?

1111 Regulating telecommunications 2 The focus of the telecommunications negotiations was not so much on 3 liberalisation as on the regulatory regime that would govern the networks. 4 Telecommunication services are supplied through an infrastructure that 5 consists of ‘equipment, sites, lines, circuits, software and other transmission 6 apparatus that permits these services to be delivered between and among 7 defined network termination points’ (Raworth, 2005, p 299). They cater to 8 the public, non-public user groups, and private intra-corporate communications. 9 Basic telecommunications involve end-to-end transmission of customer- 1011 supplied information between two or more points where the information is 1 not altered. Value-added telecommunications enhance the information or 2 provide for its storage, but generally still require access to the networks. 3 As with financial services, the GATS 1994 included specific provisions on 4 telecommunications. The Annex on Telecommunications Services imposed 5 new obligations on every WTO member, whether or not they made sectoral 6 commitments on telecommunications. These obligations relate to all public 7 and private telecommunications services across the border and through 8 foreign investment, except measures affecting cable and broadcast distribution 9 of radio or television programmes. Every government is required to provide 20111 access to, and use of, its public telecommunications transport network and 1 services on a ‘reasonable and non-discriminatory’ basis to enable the 2 electronic supply of any service it has committed in its schedule. For example, 3 a government that has made cross-border and national treatment 4 commitments on financial services must provide access to its public telephone 5 network for a foreign firm that wants to provide those services through an 6 ATM (automated teller machine) (Bressie et al., 2005, p 6). All governments 7 must also provide foreign firms with access to any available services to move 8 information within corporations and access stored data; these services include 9 private leased circuits that connect two or more customer premises for their 30111 exclusive use. Developing countries were allowed to ‘place reasonable 1 conditions on access to and use of public telecommunications transport 2 networks and services’ in their schedules for the purpose of strengthening 3 their domestic and international trade capacity (paragraph 5(g)). 4 Even though it secured this exceptional annex, the US was not prepared 5 to accept the level of commitments that some larger developing countries 6 had proposed on basic telecommunications. A Declaration of Ministers, 7 supported by an Annex on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, 8 authorised voluntary (and hence plurilateral) negotiations on basic 9 telecommunications to continue until April 1996. Governments that 40111 participated were committed to a standstill from April 1994, which prevented 1 them from adopting measures that would improve their negotiating position. 2 By the cut-off date, 47 countries had submitted offers on basic 3 telecommunications, but only eleven promised full commitments. Under US 44111 pressure, the deadline was extended again to February 1997. Finally, new Ruling the services infrastructure 163

1111 schedules of commitments from 69 governments (in 55 schedules) were 2 annexed to the Fourth Protocol to the GATS. This was dated 15 April 1997 3 and entered into force on 5 February 1998. By that time, a total of 86 WTO 4 members had taken commitments, 80 on basic and 69 on value-added 5 telecommunications.6 This accounted for 95 per cent of an estimated $600 6 billion in global telecommunications revenues (Rohlfs and Sidak, 2002, p 317). 7 The Fourth Protocol was accompanied by a Reference Paper on Regulatory 8 Principles for Basic Telecommunications. Its obligations extend far beyond 9 the Article VI: Domestic Regulation disciplines by positively requiring 1011 governments to adopt pro-market telecommunications regulations. Members 1 were invited to incorporate the Reference Paper in whole or part through 2 the ‘additional commitments’ column of their schedules. The relatively brief 3111 instrument addresses six areas. Three of them are procedural: governments 4 must maintain an impartial and independent regulatory body; the criteria 5 and reasons for licensing decisions must be made available; and the 6 allocation of scarce resources, such as numbers or frequencies, must be 7 objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory. 8 The other three areas are substantive. First, the right of governments to 9 define the kind of universal service obligations they want to maintain is 20111 circumscribed by the requirement that these measures are non-discriminatory 1 and not more burdensome than necessary to achieve that kind of service. 2 Second, governments have an obligation to prevent the major supplier(s) from 3 engaging in ‘anti-competitive practices’, especially through cross-subsidisation 4 or by manipulating the supply and use of information (paragraph 1.1). Third, 5 a government must ensure interconnection for foreign carriers at ‘cost-oriented 6 rates that are transparent, reasonable, having regard to economic feasibility, 7 and sufficiently unbundled so that the supplier need not pay for network 8 components or facilities that it does not require for the service to be provided’ 9 (paragraph 2.2). A process for independent dispute resolution must be 30111 provided. 1 The key substantive provisions mirror the US Telecommunications Act 2 1996. Not surprisingly, the chair of the FCC greeted the Reference Paper 3 as the ‘gold standard for pro-competitive deregulation’ (quoted in Rohlfs 4 and Sidak, 2002, p 327), while USTR Barshefsky boasted that ‘United States 5 companies are the most competitive telecommunications providers in the 6 world; they are in the best position to compete and win under this agreement’ 7 (quoted in Taylor and Jussawalla 1998, p 6). By contrast, academic critics 8 of the US telecommunications policy objected that the FCC was now setting 9 the domestic telecommunications policy of other countries (Sidak and Singer, 40111 2004, p 4). Indeed, the US routinely requires the full adoption of the 1 Reference Paper by acceding states, including least developed countries. 2 Following the conclusion of the telecommunications negotiations the US 3 split its efforts between enforcement, the emerging topic of e-commerce, 44111 and the GATS 2000 round. 164 Serving whose interests?

1111 The first dispute that dealt exclusively with the GATS was brought by 2 the US against Mexico on telecommunications. The Mexican government 3 had deregulated the monopoly of Teléfonos de México (Telmex) over long- 4 distance and international telecommunications services in 1997 to allow 5 multiple Mexican carriers. Telmex maintained a monopoly on local services 6 until 2025, which carried with it specific service obligations, and remained 7 the carrier of last resort. 8 By 2003 there were 27 long-distance carriers, including eleven international 9 gateway operators. Two of the biggest, Alestra and Avantel, were part owned 1011 by US giants AT&T and WorldCom, respectively. Telmex remained the 1 largest, although its share of revenue had declined from over 98 per cent 2 to 64.6 per cent by 2002 (Sidak and Singer, 2004, p 35). Mexico’s regulations 3 applied a uniform settlement rate to each long-distance call. The rate had 4 to be negotiated for each country by the operator that had the greatest 5 market share. Incoming calls were distributed among the operators in 6 proportion to their share of outgoing calls to that country. 7 The Mexican government had made full national treatment commitments 8 on basic telecommunications, and market access commitments for all but 9 non-facilities-based services.7 The US complained in April 2002 that 20111 Mexico had breached its obligations under paragraphs 1.1 and 2.2 of the 1 Reference Paper to provide cost-oriented rates and to prevent anti- 2 competitive practices by a major supplier. Further, the US said Mexico had 3 denied ‘reasonable and non-discriminatory’ access for US-owned Mexican 4 companies to the public telecommunications networks and services, as 5 6 required under the Annex. 7 Two years later a panel upheld almost all aspects of the US complaint. 8 It adopted a narrow interpretation of ‘cost-oriented rates’ that excluded 9 recovery of the costs to Telmex of meeting its universal service obligations. 30111 The decision opened the door for US corporations to cream skim Mexico’s 1 profitable operations without having to contribute to the infrastructure from 2 which they benefitted (Gould, 2004b). Applied more broadly, the ruling 3 means that governments who sign on to the Reference Paper without making 4 reservations cannot cross-subsidise from their more profitable activities to 5 meet their social goals, including affordable access to poor neighbourhoods 6 or expansion into remote regions. With no apparent sense of the irony, the 7 USTR effectively argued that if Mexico had wanted to protect its universal 8 service regime it should have entered a reservation when it adopted the 9 reference paper – as the US had done (Gould, 2004b)! 40111 The Mexican government expressed strong concern over some of the 1 findings, but did not appeal.8 The legislature amended the law in August, 2 2005. Foreign companies were now allowed to establish wholly owned 3 telecommunications providers. The legislation also repealed the provisions 44111 relating to proportional return, uniform tariff and settlement of the outgoing Ruling the services infrastructure 165

1111 rate by the carrier with the greatest share of traffic.9 The US agreed that 2 Mexico could retain restrictions on International Simple Resale – the use 3 of leased lines to carry calls across the border – for security reasons. The 4 US had secured a market worth over $2 billion for its corporations. 5 Telecommunications economists Gregory Sidak and Hal Singer have slated 6 the panel’s approach, accusing the WTO of assuming ‘a new role as a highly 7 specialized, global regulator of domestic telecommunications policy’ that 8 usurps the domain of domestic regulatory authorities and is beyond its 9 competency (Sidak and Singer, 2004, p 3). The panel’s lengthy report ‘reveals 1011 a startlingly low level of economic sophistication’ that fails to ‘cite – much 1 less rely upon – any scholarly work on telecommunications regulation, 2 industrial organization, antitrust policy, international trade, or any other 3111 branch of economics’. Instead, the ‘overwhelmingly lexical’ reasoning 4 accepted, uncritically, the US argument and made nonsense of the right of 5 governments to regulate (Sidak and Singer, 2004, p 7). 6 According to Sidak and Singer, the Mexican government had legitimate 7 social policy objectives to ensure universal access, minimum quality standards 8 of service and regional pricing. Telmex was their ‘carrier of last resort’. The 9 government made a deliberate policy decision not to create a universal 20111 services fund, but to allow Telmex to use the international settlement rate 1 to recover the costs of maintaining a reserve capacity and fixed domestic 2 prices. Nothing in the Annex or the Reference Paper prevents this approach. 3 The panel rejected the Mexican government’s argument that the ‘economic 4 feasibility’ of rates should be interpreted with reference to the need for 5 6 developing countries to develop their infrastructure and achieve universal 7 service. It adopted a literal reading of the recognition in both the Reference 8 Paper and Annex of the right of countries to define their own universal service 9 obligation. The GATS ‘development’ rhetoric received short shrift from the 30111 panel. It said any conditions imposed by developing countries on access to 1 and use of their public telecommunications networks, pursuant to paragraph 2 5(g) of the Annex, must be inscribed in the member’s schedule (Mexico- 3 Telecommunications, 2004, para 7.388). Moreover, the development 4 sensitivities espoused in the GATS preamble and Article IV merely ‘describe 5 the types of commitments that Members should make with respect to 6 developing country Members; they do not provide an interpretation of 7 commitments already made by those developing country Members’ (Mexico- 8 Telecommunications, 2004, para 7.214). 9 A further feature of the dispute was the use of the GATS to subordinate 40111 the ITU. Section 7 of the Annex explicitly recognises the role of the ITU 1 and requires appropriate arrangements for consulting it on matters that 2 involve implementation. Mexico had complied with the target rates set by 3 the ITU for the relevant category of teledensity; indeed, the prices set for 44111 interconnection to Mexico’s telecommunications infrastructure were within 166 Serving whose interests?

1111 the lowest 20 per cent of that grouping. Instead, the panel effectively required 2 Mexico to implement US regulatory principles and do so immediately (Sidak 3 and Singer, 2004, p 21). Sidak points out that 19 years after the divestiture 4 of AT&T those principles remained contested and incomplete in the US 5 itself, and had given rise to the largest ever fraud in the telecommunications 6 industry (Sidak, 2003). 7 Sidak and Singer reject the claim that the US litigation was in the interests 8 of US consumers, saying the real objective was to advance the interests of US 9 telcos. From 1990 to 2002 the international settlement rate that Mexican 1011 operators charged to US long distance carriers had fallen by 91 per cent in 1 real terms, from $1.04 to $0.09 per minute. Over much the same period, the 2 US companies increased their margins for carrying the calls from 16 per cent 3 to 163 per cent. The equivalent Canadian margin was around 40 per cent 4 (Sidak and Singer, 2004, p 24). During 1999 and 2000, some 90 per cent of 5 calls from the US to Mexico had been controlled by two US companies, 6 AT&T and WorldCom (Sidak and Singer, 2004, p 45). Sidak and Singer 7 interpret these figures as evidence of imperfect markets, if not tacit or explicit 8 collusion (Sidak and Singer, 2004, p 33). They conclude that: 9 20111 The policies advocated by the U.S. government before the WTO 1 advanced the private interests of AT&T, Sprint and WorldCom while 2 depriving U.S. consumers of a more ubiquitous telecommunications 3 network in North America. Those policies successfully overturned the 4 informed judgements of an independent regulatory authority in Mexico 5 that, consistent with principles of the WTO agreement and its associated 6 7 Reference Paper, had based its decisions on expertise and detailed 8 knowledge concerning the industry that it regulates. 9 (Sidak and Singer, 2004, p 48) 30111 1 The consequences for the politically influential and still-dominant Telmex, which 2 is owned by Mexico’s richest man, might evoke little sympathy. However, 3 the case has far reaching social and regulatory implications. The Mexican 4 government was left with a dilemma over its universal service obligations. If 5 Telmex lost further market share, either the company would have to offset that 6 loss through revenue gained elsewhere and slow the expansion in more remote 7 parts of Mexico, or the government would have to find another means of 8 ensuring universal service or abandon its social objectives. 9 This dispute is only one example of US pressure on telecommunications. 40111 Other developing countries have fallen into line to avoid prolonged WTO 1 litigation. In 2003 the USTR complained to the government of Antigua that 2 the delay in granting a mobile telecommunications licence to AT&T 3 breached its GATS obligations. The Antigua government then fast-tracked 44111 the licence. It later complained in its submission to the WTO panel on Ruling the services infrastructure 167

1111 internet gambling that AT&T operates largely from the US and contributes 2 little to Antigua’s employment or government revenue. The indigenous 3 operators cannot match its prices, and AT&T’s largest competitor, which 4 does employ local people, was being driven out of business.10 The government 5 predicted that prices would then rise, compounding the existing outflow of 6 foreign exchange to settle subscribers’ accounts. In 2002, the USTR also 7 reportedly used the implied threat of trade sanctions to influence Japanese 8 policy on the price of access to the unbundled parts of its local network 9 (Rohlfs and Sidak, 2002, pp 330–2). 1011 According to the academic critics, these developments reflect a trend where 1 the US seeks ‘to wrest decision making power from foreign regulators and 2 give it to the USTR itself . . . to satisfy American political purposes’ (Rohlfs 3111 and Sidak, 2002, p 356). They question whether the USTR has ‘the detailed 4 knowledge, the expertise and the proper incentives to negotiate trade 5 agreements on interconnection pricing’, and the propriety of attempting to 6 influence the domestic regulatory policy of another country on such complex 7 issues (Rohlfs and Sidak, 2002, p 318). 8 9 20111 Challenges of the digital age 1 The US developed a second limb to its telecommunications strategy as 2 technological innovation liberated the potential for cross-border delivery of 3 services. By the mid-1990s the Group of 7 (richest) countries had embraced 4 a US-led initiative on the ‘information economy’ that was premised on the 5 liberalisation of telecommunications, increased market access, strong 6 intellectual property laws and privacy protection. The second WTO 7 8 ministerial conference in Geneva in May 1998 agreed to a moratorium on 9 customs duties on e-commerce transactions in goods (rumoured to be the 11 30111 price set for President Clinton to attend the meeting). An accompanying 1 Work Programme on E-commerce was established to examine issues relating 2 to the ‘production, distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of goods and 12 3 services by electronic means’. The work programme soon became 4 moribund; it was not formally extended at either the Doha or Cancún 5 ministerial conferences in 2001 and 2003 respectively, although it was 6 endorsed again at Hong Kong in 2005 (Wunsch-Vincent, 2005, p 8–9). 7 E-commerce did not fit the existing ‘trade’ categories. Governments could 8 not even agree on whether e-products were goods covered by the GATT 9 or services under the GATS (Barker et al., 2001, p 7–8). This makes a 40111 difference: the GATT provides corporations with stronger generic protections 1 through MFN, quantitative restraints, subsidies and antidumping rules, 2 whereas the GATS has exceptions and limitations. The US argued, with 3 some support from Japan, that e-products should be classified as goods 44111 and subject to GATT disciplines.13 The EC contended that all products 168 Serving whose interests?

1111 that are delivered electronically, not physically, are services. This approach 2 would preserve the regulatory space for EU content restrictions, such as 3 Television without Frontiers (Chapter 7), and constrain the dominance of 4 US e-commerce firms.14 5 The WTO Secretariat struggled to find a legal resolution.15 The principles 6 of ‘technological neutrality’ and ‘progressive liberalisation’ suggested a 7 preference for the stronger GATT rules; yet some e-commerce commitments 8 were already contained within the GATS. The Secretariat distinguished three 9 kinds of cross-border electronic provision that needed to be considered: 1011 commercial access to the internet itself; electronic delivery of digitised 1 products; and electronic distribution of non-electronic products. The first 2 two were considered clearly to be services. 3 By 1999 it was ‘generally agreed’ that at least electronic delivery of 4 services was covered by the GATS.16 But that raised its own complications. 5 First, should the internet be classified under basic or value-added 6 telecommunications? If the former, the Annex and Reference Paper on Basic 7 Telecommunications would apply, including provisions on anti-competitive 8 behaviour. That outcome would be unacceptable to the US, because it would 9 impose an obligation on the government to regulate and the US is opposed 20111 to regulation of e-commerce, even of a market-friendly kind. The US therefore 1 insisted that the internet was a value-added service, while Australia and the 2 EC argued that it was covered by basic telecommunications. 3 A second complication is that 3C: Telecommunications in the W/120 4 classifications does not distinguish between basic and value-added 5 6 telecommunications. A note on the WTO website says ‘basic 7 telecommunications’ includes ‘all telecommunications services, both public and 8 private that involve end-to-end transmission of customer supplier information’ 9 (equated to categories 3C: a to g); ‘value added’ are ‘telecommunications for 30111 which suppliers “add value” to the customer’s information by enhancing its 1 form or content or by providing for its storage or retrieval’ (equated to 3C: 17 2 h to o). However, the Secretariat’s note has no legal standing. 3 The rapid expansion of e-commerce posed a third, unresolved set of 4 questions about classifications. Should bundles of services that are delivered 5 by the internet be classified in just one primary telecommunications 6 sub-sector or also by reference to their associated content? Does a product 7 such as on-line video games come under value-added telecommunications, 8 computer based services or audio-visual services (Wunsch-Vincent, 2005, 9 p 8)? Where are ‘new’ services, such as application service providers, data 40111 warehousing, on-line shopping, website hosting, on-line chatrooms and 1 multimedia services, to be covered (Wunsch-Vincent, 2004, p 103)? 2 A fourth uncertainty relates to modes of supply (Wunsch-Vincent, 2005, 3 p 14). E-services could be considered mode 1, based on the seller’s location, 44111 in which case the barriers are those that restrict supply from abroad, or Ruling the services infrastructure 169

1111 mode 2, reflecting the location of the buyer, where barriers limit their ability 2 to purchase services offshore. Again, this matters because countries have 3 made far more extensive mode 2 commitments. The US initially argued that 4 the consumer ‘visits’ the website, hence mode 2 applies. However, the parties 5 and adjudicators in US-Gambling applied mode 1. 6 Finally, e-commerce poses unique regulatory dilemmas. How can abuses 7 of market power by major private internet providers be addressed effectively 8 when the US has refused to designate internet access as a telecommunications 9 service that is subject to legislative and regulatory obligations on common 1011 carriers, and is intent on exporting that position? How might consumers 1 be protected when they are not mentioned as a ground for a general exception 2 under Article XIV? What might be considered a ‘reasonable’ and ‘not more 3111 burdensome than necessary’ approach to domestic regulation when applied 4 to the complex and fluid sphere of e-commerce? 5 Drake and Nicolaidis have canvassed four ways to resolve the dilemmas 6 posed by global e-commerce (Drake and Nicolaidis, 2000). The first 7 would rely on the current GATS disciplines, using clearer scheduling of 8 commitments and supplemented by clarification through dispute settlement. 9 Second, there could be a selective revision of the General Obligations and 20111 Disciplines (GODs) to provide greater clarity, although detailed language 1 could introduce new rigidities. A third option was a new annex or a reference 2 paper on electronic commerce that provided more relevant principles and 3 rules. The most ambitious path was to devise new disciplines that 4 ‘horizontally revamped’ the instruments on goods, services, investment and 5 6 intellectual property into a coherent set of disciplines. The authors conceded 7 that each approach had its problems. The fallback position was the 8 undesirable prospect of leaving the dispute settlement system to effectively 9 legislate on highly sensitive issues – an approach that could threaten the 30111 legitimacy of, and support for, the WTO. 1 The obvious target for such a dispute was China’s internet firewall. Search 2 engines that are operated from within China are only licensed to operate 3 through the state provider. The firewall was used, for example, in 2002 to 4 block access from within China to Google’s search engine, which was 5 operated from outside the country. China’s accession package included full 6 market access and national treatment commitments on 1.B. Computer 7 and Related Services: CPC 843 data processing, which is arguably the 8 classification most applicable to a search engine.18 9 The firewall could fall foul of various GATS provisions. First, the refusal 40111 to disclose the criteria for censoring a foreign internet site could breach 1 Article III: Transparency. Second, a de facto ban could be considered a 2 zero quota in breach of market access commitments, although that stretches 3 the bow even further than the US-Gambling decision (Case study 9). Third, 44111 assuming the firewall is considered a domestic regulation, Article VI:1 170 Serving whose interests?

1111 requires it to be administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial 2 manner. If application of the regulation is considered an administrative 3 decision, China must provide a mechanism for impartial review. If the 4 regulation were deemed to involve the application of a technical standard, 5 it would have to be transparent and not more burdensome than necessary 6 to achieve quality. In any such dispute, China could be expected to invoke 7 Article XI: General Exceptions for measures to protect ‘public morals and 8 public order’. But that would be subject to a ‘necessity’ test and the 9 requirement not to be a disguised barrier to trade that in part protects its 1011 local service providers. 1 The economic incentives for challenging the firewall are enormous: China 2 has the world’s fastest internet growth rate, rising from 17 million in 2000 3 to 87 million in 2004 (Kluver, 2005, p 84). The geopolitical fall out from 4 pursuing such a dispute could be equally huge. 5 6 GATS 2000 7 8 The GATS 2000 negotiations were seen as a unique opportunity to bring 9 telecommunications, e-commerce and financial services into the internet age 20111 (Sauvé and Gillespie, 2000, p 438). An agenda that was genuinely infused with 1 concerns for development would have actively addressed the digital divide 2 and the proven instability of liberalised financial flows. That was literally 3 inconceivable for the GATS. Instead, academic commentators and major 4 power demandeurs contended that rich and poor countries would benefit by 5 further liberalisation of services and pro-business revisions of the rules. 6 The negotiations followed several overlapping tracks. On e-commerce, the 7 US and EC both proposed clusters of internet-enabled services that reflected 8 their priorities and sensitivities (Wunsch-Vincent, 2004, p 80). The US looked 9 beyond basic and value-added telecommunications to complementary 30111 services (distribution, express delivery, computer, advertising and 1 certain financial services).19 The Europeans had a different package – 2 telecommunications, computer, some distribution, advertising and some 3 banking services.20 However, the e-commerce track went nowhere, 4 especially as India had begun advancing the objectives of its own IT 5 industry (Chapter 6). 6 On the telecommunications front, the USTR stressed the convergence of 7 carriage and content, supported by the principle of ‘technological neutrality’. 8 The US tabled a brief paper in 1998, and a detailed version in 2000, which 9 argued for new classifications to provide clearer and more predictable 40111 international rules. Some technologies were not currently covered by any CPC; 1 these included satellite or digital networks, wireless cable systems, and 2 ‘converged’ transmission services that transmit data, voice or communications 3 services.21 Revised classifications should be accompanied by more extensive 44111 sectoral commitments. Ruling the services infrastructure 171

1111 The Europeans proposed an alternative classification that advanced their 2 own offensive interests in carriage, while defending the cultural exception 3 (Chapter 7). In February 2005 the EC suggested using the carrier-based 4 classification in the Annex on Telecommunications, being ‘transmission and 5 reception of signals by any electro-magnetic means’ to resolve the uncertainty 6 about existing and potential commitments. Value-added telecommunications 7 could be dealt with under ‘computer and related services’. Services whose 8 content required telecommunications for delivery would be better covered by 9 content-specific sectors. Regulatory issues should be addressed by adopting 1011 the Reference Paper.22 This position was reflected in the EC’s revised offer, 1 which adapted the W/120 ‘Telecommunications’ classifications (excluding 2 broadcasting) with a textual annotation that read: ‘Telecommunications 3111 services do not cover the economic activity consisting of the provision of 4 content services which require telecommunications services for their 5 transport.’23 Meanwhile, the EC asked all members to make commitments in 6 modes 1, 2 and 3 without restrictions, and on the movement of élite personnel, 7 as well as adopting the Reference Paper. It was prepared to consider ‘flexibility’ 8 for the least developed countries.24 9 The US responded to the EC proposal by insisting that ‘value-added’ was 20111 an essential part of telecommunications and already recognised in the W/120 1 classification. The Europeans’ approach would limit the scope of the sector, 2 increase uncertainty and diminish existing telecommunications commitments 3 on value-added services. The US produced a model schedule that proposed 4 an alternative, explicit classification that was premised on technological 5 6 neutrality: ‘All services consisting of the transmission and reception of signals 7 by any electromagnetic means, alone or in combination with enhancing, 8 storing, forwarding, retrieving, or processing functions added to the transmission 25 9 and reception of signals’ (original emphasis). If there was no consensus on 30111 the adoption of this classification, the US said members should still choose it 1 for the purposes of their schedules. If not, they should stick with W/120. 2 Southern governments were relative bystanders in this exchange. Mexico, 3 already subject to the US complaint, stressed the right of governments to 4 address their national policy needs and determine their accounting rates.26 5 Cuba again called for an assessment of the impacts of the GATS and sought 6 to protect telecommunications accounting rates from challenge.27 7 The sectoral negotiations on financial services also struggled, as 8 governments remained cautious about rapid financial market liberalisation. 9 A paper by GATS advocates Sauvé and Gillespie sought to dispel that reticence. 40111 They predicted that the new round of negotiations would be highly 1 differentiated, with the focus on commitments in modes 1 and 2 from OECD 2 countries and in mode 3 from the South (Sauvé and Gillespie, 2000, Table 3 3). They urged developing countries whose financial markets had collapsed 44111 to use the round to lend credibility to their liberalisation programmes (Sauvé 172 Serving whose interests?

1111 and Gillespie, 2000, p 445). While governments might be wary of allowing 2 in new foreign competitors until they had strengthened their domestic industry, 3 they should at least make pre-commitments to a credible deadline, which 4 would contribute to greater stability. This would also give their regulators a 5 timetable for developing prudential regulation and supervision. There were, 6 they argued, ample protections available to governments through the 7 prudential carve-out, flexibility, balance of payments safeguard, and right to 8 exercise governmental authority over monetary policy and exchange rates. 9 They suggested that offering developing countries an emergency safeguard 1011 mechanism might make them more inclined to buy in, as had worked with 1 Mexico for NAFTA. 2 Writing in 2000, Sauvé and Gillespie were already proposing the use of 3 clusters to maximise liberalisation and economise on negotiating resources. 4 They also suggested enshrining the right to supply services without having 5 to establish a commercial presence (‘non-establishment’), as in NAFTA. 6 Remarkably, given recent history, they even proposed that measures adopted 7 by governments for prudential concerns should be governed by a least trade 8 restrictive test. 9 Switzerland took the lead in the GATS 2000 negotiations on financial 20111 services, promoting the harmonisation of mode 1 and 2 commitments and 1 a free flow of financial information, data processing and auxiliary services 2 across the border.28 The EC asked all members to adopt the Understanding, 3 and made specific requests to 75 developing countries, including 24 least 4 developed countries, relating to mode 3 and cross-border transfer of 5 29 6 financial information and advisory services. US demands are not publicly 7 available. 8 The shift to plurilateral modalities after the Hong Kong ministerial 9 produced revised requests in both telecommunications and financial services. 30111 The telecommunications request was a compromise, led by Singapore along 30 1 with the US, EC and others. It was directed mainly at large Southern 2 markets. The demandeurs sought ‘commercially meaningful’ commitments, 3 especially for voice and data transmission and leased circuits, based on the 4 principle of technological neutrality. Their main goal was to remove 5 restrictions on foreign investment and limitations in modes 1 to 3 for all 6 value-added services. Target countries were urged to commit to all provisions 7 of the Reference Paper and remove all MFN exemptions. 8 The plurilateral request on financial services came from 10 mainly 9 Northern governments to at least 21 developing countries.31 It was short 40111 and comprehensive, and applied to the broad spectrum of financial services 1 activities. The principal market access demand sought very broad 2 commitments in mode 3 for non-insurance and some insurance services, 3 including the right to establish and acquire investments as wholly owned 44111 subsidiaries, joint ventures and branches. This reflected the preference of Ruling the services infrastructure 173

1111 foreign banks to use investment vehicles that can be supervised from their 2 home states, most of which take a light-handed approach to regulation. 3 They also wanted the removal of economic needs tests, quotas and 4 monopolies across all modes. In mode 1, they sought commitments in some 5 insurance, financial advisory and data management services. The request 6 relating to national treatment covered modes 1, 2 and 3. Transparency 7 obligations would apply to both developing and applying new regulations. 8 A government that agreed to this request in its entirety would effectively 9 sign away control over its country’s domestic financial services industry. 1011 By 2007, the GATS route had been overtaken by the bilateral agreements, 1 except as between the major powers. The US Congress made the removal 2 of barriers to the digital trading environment a central tenet of the 3111 President’s Trade Promotion Authority in 2002 and required the USTR to 4 report on progress. The integrated package was tailored to the delivery of 5 digital products through ‘elimination of tariffs on physical media carrier, 6 the liberalisation of trade in telecommunication, computer, entertainment 7 and other electronically deliverable services, free trade chapters on 8 ecommerce, and a strong protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) – 9 especially copyrights – in an online environment’ (Wunsch-Vincent, 2003, 20111 p 9). Consistent with this requirement, US FTAs routinely reclassify 1 telecommunications as including digital content, a fraught issue that is 2 revisited in Chapter 7. 3 The EU’s agenda was framed by the Framework Directive on 4 Telecommunications adopted in 2002. The Directive sets a number of core 5 6 principles, being ‘proportionality to objectives’, technological neutrality, 7 promoting competition, development of the internal market, and protection 8 of end-user interests. Social cohesion and consumer protection are 9 subordinate concerns (Raworth, 2005, p 327). This domestic regime informs 30111 the EU’s negotiating template. The standard architecture of European EPAs 1 blends services, investment and e-commerce into a single chapter, while 2 maintaining a proviso that keeps audio-visual content quarantined. 3 By 2007, the original US goal to re-regulate the infrastructure for 4 international services transactions to secure the long-term dominance of the 5 trans-Atlantic finance industry and telecommunications had largely been 6 achieved. Yet the sclerotic nature of the GATS left the rising tide of e-commerce 7 and e-services dependent on bilateral and regional treaties that were both 8 complementary and divergent. It remains to be seen whether governments will 9 consider themselves bound to maintain the liberalisation of financial services 40111 and capital flows during a sustained financial meltdown, and whether 1 transnational telcos will face moves to re-regulate them for social objectives 2 to address a deepening digital divide. 3 44111 174 Serving whose interests?

1111 CASE STUDY 9 GAMBLING ON THE GATS 2 3 When a WTO panel upheld the challenge by Antigua and Barbuda (Antigua) 4 to a US ban on internet gambling in 2004 it sent shock waves through the 5 trade policy community. The panel defined the ban as a ‘zero quota’, held 6 it was subject to market access commitments that the US insisted it never 7 made, and concluded that the US had not satisfied the requirements for the 8 ban to be treated as an exception to the GATS. Warnings that the GATS 9 could strip governments of their sovereign right to regulate could no longer 1011 be dismissed as the scaremongering of anti-GATS activists (Gould, 2004a, 1 p 1). In the words of the WTO panel itself: 2 3 4 Members’ regulatory sovereignty is an essential pillar of the progressive 5 liberalization of trade in services, but this sovereignty ends whenever 6 rights of other Members under the GATS are impaired. 7 (US-Gambling, 2004, para 6.316) 8 9 USTR Robert Zoellick denounced the panel report as ‘absolutely outrageous’ 20111 (quoted in Gould, 2004a). In April 2005 the Appellate Body upheld the 1 panel’s interpretation of the US commitments. In doing so, it also confirmed 2 the potential for unaccountable trade adjudicators to interpret the GATS 3 creatively in ways that WTO members can only reject by a unanimous 4 veto. The Appellate Body partly defused the anticipated furore by allowing 5 the US to invoke the general exception for public morals, aside from a 6 horseracing law that discriminated between US and foreign internet 7 providers. The US decided it was unable to make the required changes. 8 In mid-2007 the USTR announced the extraordinary step of withdrawing 9 the gambling commitment – further undermining a treaty that it had 30111 originally sponsored so that foreign investors would gain market access and 1 legal certainty. 2 3 In a legal sense, the case set far-reaching precedents. First, the reasoning 4 of both the panel and the Appellate Body not only breached the exclusive 5 right of members to interpret the WTO texts; these bodies actively filled in 6 the gaps to make the GATS a more effective vehicle for liberalisation. 7 Second, the US was bound to commitments on gambling that it insists 8 were never intended. The W/120 list of classifications refers to the 1991 9 UN CPCprov classification ((UN) provisional Central Product Classification). 40111 However, its use was not mandatory. The US had followed the CPC 1 categories closely when compiling its schedule for GATS 1994, but did 2 not refer to them explicitly (Gould, 2004a, p 4). The schedule listed a 3 commitment on ‘other recreational services (except sporting)’ as follows: 44111 Ruling the services infrastructure 175

1111 2 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA – SCHEDULE OF SPECIFIC 3 COMMITMENTS32 4 5 Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border 2) Consumption Abroad 6 3) Commercial Presence 4) Presence of Natural Persons 7 8 Sector or Limitations on Limitations on Additional 9 sub-sector market access national commitments treatment 1011 1 II. SECTOR-SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS 2 ... 3111 10. 4 RECREATIONAL, 5 CULTURAL, & 6 SPORTING 7 SERVICES 8 ... 9 D. OTHER 1) None 1) None 20111 RECREATIONAL 2) None 2) None 1 SERVICES (except 3) The number of 3) None sporting) concessions available 4) None 2 for commercial 3 operations in federal, 4 state and local 5 facilities is limited. 6 4) Unbound, except as indicated in the 7 horizontal section 8 9 30111 1 2 Antigua pointed to CPCprov Group 964,33 where ‘9641: sporting services’ 3 is separate from ‘9649: other recreational services’. The breakdown of the 4 latter includes ‘96492: gambling and betting services’: 5 6 CPCprov code 964 7 Section 9 – Community, social and personal services 8 Division: 96 – Recreational, cultural and sporting services 9 Group: 964 – Sporting and other recreational services 40111 1 Breakdown: 2 This Group is divided into the following Classes: 3 * 9641 – Sporting services 44111 * 9649 – Other recreational services 176 Serving whose interests?

1111 Breakdown: 2 This Class is divided into the following Subclasses: 3 96491 – Recreation park and beach services 4 96492 – Gambling and betting services 5 96499 – Other recreational services n.e.c. 6 7 The US rejected the application of the CPCs definition and argued that an 8 ordinary dictionary meaning of ‘sporting’ includes gambling. The Appellate 9 Body found for Antigua, using W/120 and the CPCs as aids to interpreting 1011 the ambiguous language of the schedule (based on Article 32 of the Vienna 1 Convention) (Trachtman, 2005, p 862). It laid the onus on any member 2 that does not use the CPCs to be explicit about the meaning of its commit- 3 ments. The panel accepted that the US probably did not intend to schedule 4 a commitment on gambling services, but said that was irrelevant (US- 5 Gambling, 2004, para 6.136). Antigua rejected the US claim as disingenuous, 6 pointing to 10 other members who had explicitly excluded cross-border 7 gambling services. While that is true, it is still difficult to explain why the 8 US would have consciously made such a commitment. 9 The implications of this outcome are alarming. If the US with all its vast 20111 resources could be caught out, the risk of poorly resourced countries making 1 unintended commitments is so much greater. It is higher still with the negative 2 listing of services used in many bilateral negotiations and the clusters and 3 model schedules that they are being pressured to adopt in the GATS 2000 4 negotiations. 5 Even if the US had intended to commit mode 1 in gambling, it adopted 6 that schedule in 1994. The first internet gambling site was not launched 7 until 1996 (although Antigua argues there was a longstanding practice of 8 telephone gambling in the US and across borders). The panel and Appellate 9 Body both applied a principle of ‘technological neutrality’ that ties the 30111 commitment to the attributes of the service, not the technology used to deliver 1 it. So all means of delivering services across the border are treated alike. 2 Hence, a mode 1 commitment covers the existing means of cross-border 3 supply and all means as yet unknown (US-Gambling, 2004, paras 6.285–7). 4 Further, when there are a number of means for delivering gambling services 5 across the border, a restriction on any one of those would breach a full mode 6 1 commitment, even if all other means within that mode were unrestricted. 7 At the least, a full mode 1 commitment deprives governments of the 8 right to assess the risks, and then limit the impacts, of technologies that 9 they could not foresee when it was made. One way to avoid that situation 40111 is not to make any commitments, especially in mode 1. But it is too late 1 for the GATS 1994 schedules and difficult in bilateral negotiations, especially 2 when the major powers insist on an e-commerce chapter or define 3 telecommunications to include digital content. In theory, governments can 44111 amend their schedules later if problems arise. This has been considered Ruling the services infrastructure 177

1111 hypothetical for most countries, because of the requirement to compensate 2 other states for lost markets. The US proposal to do so in this case seems 3 unlikely to make it any easier for them. 4 Next, the panel and Appellate Body considered whether certain US laws 5 that prohibited cross-border internet gambling breached Article XVI: 6 Market Access, paragraph 2 of which reads: 7 8 In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, the 9 measures which a Member shall not maintain or adopt either on the 1011 basis of a regional subdivision or on the basis of its entire territory, 1 unless otherwise specified in its Schedule, are defined as: 2 (a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form 3111 of numerical quotas . . . ; 4 (b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in 5 the form of numerical quotas . . . ; 6 (c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total 7 quantity of service output expressed in terms of designated numerical 8 units in the form of quotas . . . . 9 20111 The US described their prohibitions as a restriction on the character, not 1 quantity, of the activity. However, both the panel and Appellate Body 2 conceptualised the ban as a ‘zero quota’. That seems inconsistent with the 3 words ‘in the form of numerical’, although the explanatory note for 4 scheduling of GATS commitments in 1993 did give as one example of market 5 access: ‘nationality requirements for suppliers of services (equivalent to zero 6 quota)’.34 7 Most commentators have treated this reasoning as an exercise of judicial 8 activism. Joel Trachtman attributes the interpretation to a concern about 9 possible gaps in the coverage of the GATS, which adjudicators ‘sought to 30111 fill . . . despite the limits of the text itself’ (Trachtman, 2005, p 865).35 As 1 discussed in Chapter 1, prominent academic commentator and former WTO 2 official Joost Pauwelyn argues that the reasoning has dangerously blurred 3 the distinction between prohibited market access measures and less onerous 4 disciplines on domestic regulation, and warns that it ‘risked WTO intrusion 5 into the regulatory freedom of WTO Members far beyond what was 6 originally agreed to in the WTO treaty’ (Pauwelyn, 2005, p 133). 7 US-Gambling was also the first case to apply GATS Article XIV: General 8 Exceptions. The Appellate Body adopted the two-tier approach developed 9 in GATT jurisprudence (US-Gambling, 2005, para 292). First, the US had 40111 to satisfy one of the closed list of permitted policy objectives. In this case 1 it cited concerns over organised crime, money laundering, fraud and 2 underage gambling to bring the ban under Article XIV(a) ‘to protect public 3 morals’. The US also had to show a ban was ‘necessary’ to provide that 44111 protection. The panel held that the US should have consulted Antigua about 178 Serving whose interests?

1111 less restrictive alternatives. The Appellate Body disagreed, putting the 2 onus on the US to show that a ban was the least trade restrictive of the 3 alternatives that were reasonably available, including any identified by 4 Antigua. However, it did not have to identify all possible alternatives or hold 5 consultations with Antigua. Having brought the ban within the paragraph, 6 the US then had to show it was ‘not applied in a manner which would 7 constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 8 countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade 9 in services’. The application of the Interstate Horseracing Act, which allowed 1011 internet gambling only within the US, was held to be discriminatory. 1 Defenders of the beleaguered WTO have portrayed this case as a David 2 and Goliath victory for Antigua over the US (Trachtman, 2005, p 862). 3 Many small and impoverished countries such as Antigua have embraced 4 the opportunity to diversify their economies by developing niche markets 5 in IT-enabled services. One of these opportunities was the burgeoning 6 multibillion-dollar on-line gambling business. The number of gaming 7 websites had exploded from 250 in 1998 to around 2,300 in 2004; the 8 industry estimated international turnover at $90 billion and anticipated that 9 revenue would reach $200 billion by 2008. The US was the largest national 20111 market, despite the ban, although the Asian market was rapidly expanding 1 (Ranade et al., 2006, p 10). Because executives of internet gambling 2 companies faced arrest on racketeering charges within the US, these sites 3 had to operate offshore. 4 By 2005, some 85 jurisdictions regulated remote gambling. Almost four- 5 fifths of the sites were licensed by just four states: Antigua, Costa Rica, 6 Kahnawake Mohawk (Canada) and Curacao. Britain and Gibraltar were 7 also major players (Ranade et al., 2006, p 9), giving the EC an economic 8 and political interest in the GATS litigation. 9 Antigua became one of the first countries to legalise and license on-line 30111 gambling in 1996. The industry provided a vital, if unsavoury, economic 1 lifeline. By 1999 there were 119 licensed operators on the islands and 3,000 2 of the 68,000 locals were employed in the industry. Economically, it 3 generated one-tenth of the country’s GDP and $7.4 million in licence fees. 4 Finance and trust companies had also developed, until pressure from the 5 US and Britain for stronger money laundering laws forced many of them 6 to close, costing Antigua jobs and revenue. By 2003, the number of licensed 7 operators had fallen to 28 with just 500 employees. Licensing revenue was 8 down to $1.8 million. Part of the reason, according to the Antiguan 9 government’s submission to the WTO panel, was ‘an increasingly aggressive 40111 strategy’ that included the arrest of executives of companies that operated 1 out of Antigua when they passed through the US (Pauwelyn, 2005, p 132).36 2 The GATS challenge in March 2003 was a matter of economic life and 3 death for Antigua. But it was not acting alone. The high-powered and very 44111 expensive legal team came from American and European firms with strong Ruling the services infrastructure 179

1111 links to the gaming industry (Gould, 2004a, p 1). The British government 2 reportedly ‘sponsored’ the original WTO challenge in the interests of its 3 high-value gambling companies.37 The litigation offered a way for non-US 4 companies to break down barriers to the US market and create a precedent, 5 and for giant US gambling companies to deregulate their domestic market 6 so they could operate from within the US and stem the flow of gaming 7 money out of the country. After the panel report a spokesperson for MGM 8 Mirage remarked that he was ‘going to send Antigua a thank you note’.38 9 Although the dispute itself was quite limited in scope it had much broader 1011 ramifications. The Appellate Body restricted the case to three federal laws 1 on technical grounds;39 but the reasoning applies equally to state and local 2 government measures, such as state monopolies over lottery services, or 3111 exclusive licences to certain groups, such as first nations or charities (Gould, 4 2004a, p 5). The US gambling commitments also guaranteed full national 5 treatment in all four modes. Antigua’s challenge involved only internet 6 services (mode 1). A similar ruling on mode 3 would be potentially far- 7 reaching, although it would require expensive new litigation. 8 Under WTO rules the US had until April 2006 to amend the horseracing 9 law. The Bush administration remained as belligerent as it was when the case 20111 began. This reflected a convergence of pressures from different constituencies. 1 The domestic gambling industry, especially for horseracing, is enormously 2 powerful and state governments depend on lottery revenues. The ban was 3 a talisman for neoconservative ‘family values’ – gambling is even 4 unconstitutional in the deeply religious state of Utah. In addition, the chief 5 legal officers from 29 states urged the USTR to withdraw the GATS 6 commitment and defend the flexibility and sovereign authority of states 7 to determine their gambling laws ‘without second-guessing by WTO 8 tribunals’.40 9 Far from being penitent, the US ‘upped the ante’. In July and September 30111 2006, executives of two large British companies, Sportingbet and Party- 1 Gaming, which operated sites out of Antigua, were arrested on warrants 2 issued by the Louisiana state, where it is illegal to bet through the internet. 3 In October, one month before the mid-term congressional elections, the 4 Republicans attached an Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act onto 5 a new law dealing with port security. The law basically prohibited credit 6 card and financial institutions from sending payment to gambling sites. The 7 Internet Gambling Council objected that anyone who opposed the measure 8 risked being labelled soft on national security. The new ban affected players 9 on sites that were run from Antigua, who could only bet from money they 40111 deposited in an account. The law immediately wiped £4 ($8) billion off the 1 sector’s stock market value.41 2 Antigua’s allies attacked the US move. Britain’s culture secretary (who 3 was responsible for the gambling industry) suggested it would make 44111 unregulated offshore sites the ‘modern equivalent of speakeasies’.42 However, 180 Serving whose interests?

1111 Britain could only act in the WTO through the EC. Although the EU Internal 2 Market Commissioner labelled the US Act ‘protectionist’, the Commission 3 would not directly challenge the US laws because its own member states 4 were not agreed about the issue. Antigua’s lawyer anticipated the Europeans 5 would instead ‘add support’ to their case.43 The gaming firms also talked 6 of ‘joining forces’ with Antigua.44 But unless a major power was a formal 7 party to the dispute, the US could continue to treat Antigua with contempt, 8 knowing that it had little economic capacity to retaliate. Each phase of 9 enforcement and any new GATS challenge could be strung out interminably. 1011 When Antigua sought a ruling on compliance the USTR simply tabled several 1 paragraphs from an anonymous Justice Department official claiming the 2 law was, and always had been, GATS compatible. In March 2007 Antigua 3 ‘won’ that phase of the litigation. But it was not much further forward. 4 Antigua then sought authority to impose $3.4 billion in commercial 5 sanctions against the US for losses incurred. This was partly in communication 6 services, but primarily through cross-retaliation by non-compliance with parts 7 of the TRIPS agreement – previously uncharted territory for the GATS and 8 rare within the WTO (ICTSD, 2007).45 The USTR rejected the sum as ‘patently 9 excessive’, and unnecessary because it had announced it intended to ‘clarify’ 20111 its commitment on recreational services.46 Her deputy argued that no member 1 could have reasonably believed that the US would make commitments 2 that directly conflicted with its laws, so there was no basis to require 3 compensation. 4 At the arbitration hearing the US pushed for compensation of only 5 $500,000. The lengthy judgment awarded Antigua a claim of only $21 6 million, although it was authorised to recover this largely by suspension of 7 recognition of US copyright and trademark laws to an equivalent value. The 8 amount reflected the arbiter’s assessment of the ‘counterfactual’ case, 9 concluding that even in an amicable agreement the US would never have 30111 allowed Antigua unrestricted access to all on-line gambling markets, but only 1 to markets related to horseracing that were subject to the adverse finding. 2 Eight members (understood to be Antigua, Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, 3 India, Macao, Japan and the EC) served notice that they would seek billions 4 of dollars of compensation from the US for lost potential revenues from 5 withdrawal of its gambling commitment.47 Under GATS Article XXI, the US 6 could agree to provide compensatory liberalisation on an MFN basis, which 7 would have little benefit for Antigua or the international gambling industry. 8 If the US refused compensation or the level of loss was disputed, any of those 9 objectors could take the matter to arbitration. The US would be required to 40111 implement the outcome before it could withdraw (or ‘clarify’) its 1 commitment. Failure to do so would allow those members who sought 2 arbitration to withdraw an equivalent value of GATS concessions to the US. 3 In December 2007, the US and EC agreed on compensatory access to US 44111 postal and courier, research and development, and storage and warehouse Ruling the services infrastructure 181

1111 sectors, to the dismay of its gambling firms and the delight of Dutch mail 2 carrier TNT.48 Canada, Japan and Australia also reportedly settled. Within 3 days the USTR had clarified that it was simply binding existing liberalisation 4 and sensitive sectors would remain closed.49 Moreover, the US President 5 could not unilaterally change the US GATS commitments and would require 6 the approval of Congress. Discussions with India, Costa Rica and Macao 7 continued as the sectors being offered by the US had no commercial value 8 to them. Costa Rica and Antigua subsequently filed for another round of 9 arbitration. 1011 Antigua won a pyrrhic victory, at best. An industry that had earned 1 Antigua close to $1 billion seven years earlier was now generating revenue 2 of around $130 million as a result of systematic attacks from the US. Its 3111 future was far from assured. The internet gambling industry is dispersed, 4 fluid, opaque and parasitic. With low barriers to entry and exit, Antigua’s 5 industry is a prime target for deregulatory arbitrage, including from Britain 6 and Australia (Ranade et al., 2006, p 9, 22–3). Europe is the second largest 7 internet gambling market, and the Asia-Pacific market is growing rapidly. 8 Unlike Antigua, the big gambling companies could survive a long-term US 9 ban. Neither they, nor the USTR, had any interest in the fate of Antigua’s 20111 industry, economy or people. 1 2 3 CASE STUDY 10 PUBLIC PENSIONS OR 4 CORPORATE WELFARE? 5 6 One hallmark of a civilised society is the way it supports its elderly – not 7 just supplying the individual’s need for a basic income, but also as a collective 8 commitment to human dignity, social cohesion and inter-generational 9 obligation. 30111 That ideal was encapsulated for most of the twentieth century by 1 universal public pensions. For neoliberals, this epitomised the dead hand 2 of the state on economic growth and the denial of individual choice and 3 responsibility. Their critique intersected with the phenomenon of aging 4 populations in much of the world and a mobile workforce in irregular 5 employment. Public pension schemes were considered to be unaffordable 6 by governments that faced pressure to cut government spending and taxes. 7 A burgeoning financial sector was eager for a lucrative new commercial 8 opportunity. 9 The solution was to deliver retirement income through the market. 40111 Governments were urged to delegate or divest their responsibility for the 1 financial wellbeing of the elderly to private financial institutions, which 2 would invest the contributions from individuals and the state in ways that 3 fuelled economic growth and enhanced income security. The subtext was 44111 that states would now subsidise private schemes through contributions, tax 182 Serving whose interests?

1111 write-offs and deductions, while remaining morally, if not legally, responsible 2 for bailouts or safety nets if pension funds failed. 3 The classic exposition of this policy was the World Bank’s report in 1994 4 Averting the Old Age Crisis. The Bank advocated three pillars: first, a tax- 5 financed, publicly managed system that would redistribute public revenue 6 to alleviate poverty among the aged through means-tested benefits, a 7 guaranteed minimum pension or a modest universal entitlement; second, 8 individualised occupational pension plans or personal savings accounts that 9 were mandatory and transportable, to be operated competitively by the 1011 private sector; and third, voluntary savings (World Bank, 1994, pp 17–19). 1 The first pillar was considered a safety net and the third depended on surplus 2 personal income. The second pillar of compulsory private schemes, if 3 successful, would reduce the demands on the safety net. 4 The Bank argued that the changing nature of employment justified a 5 shift away from ‘defined benefit’ schemes where guaranteed sums were paid 6 out to long-term employees on their retirement to ‘defined contribution’ 7 schemes that were portable and where workers bore the risk of investment 8 and their own longevity. Allowing individuals to choose between different 9 providers and schemes was expected to promote competition and efficiency, 20111 although the problem of information asymmetry would require governments 1 to regulate carefully. Privately managed funds were assumed to be superior 2 to their public counterparts. Workers would ‘rarely’ be required to accept 3 below-market returns and could fall back on the safety net (World Bank, 4 1994, pp 21–2). The pre-funding (as opposed to pay-as-you-go) approach to 5 pensions was also supposed to boost capital accumulation and financial 6 market development. Enhanced economic growth would make it easier for 7 governments to finance the public pillar. 8 The shift from state to private pensions would require many countries 9 to develop a more sophisticated financial services infrastructure. The Bank 30111 suggested that young low-income countries in Africa and South Asia 1 should begin by creating an ‘enabling environment’. Young, but rapidly 2 aging economies in East Asia should start developing regulatory regimes 3 and markets. Older countries with large public pillars, found across the 4 OECD, Eastern Europe and parts of Latin America, were urged to raise 5 their retirement age, eliminate rewards for early retirement, cut benefit levels 6 and tax rates; in addition, they should reallocate state contributions to the 7 second mandatory private pillar. 8 The same three pillars – public retirement benefits, private pensions and 9 household savings – formed the basis of a report from the Bank of International 40111 Settlements (BIS), IMF and OECD that was endorsed by the ‘Group of 10’ 1 finance ministers from Europe, North America and Japan in 1998 (BIS, 1998). 2 They stressed the need for ‘strengthening the financial infrastructure, 3 encouraging financial transparency, enhancing financial supervision and 44111 eliminating barriers to international capital flows’ BIS, 1998, p 1). Rules that Ruling the services infrastructure 183

1111 ‘unnecessarily’ inhibit broader, deeper and more diversified financial markets 2 and risk management should be eliminated (BIS, 1998, p 3). 3 As reliance on pre-funded pensions has grown in the global North and 4 South, staggeringly large pools of investment capital have been generated. 5 Institutional pension funds in the 11 major pension markets doubled in a 6 decade to total $23 trillion by 2006, and grew from 58 to 81 per cent of 7 the GDP in those countries (Watson Wyatt, 2007). Retirement plan assets 8 in the US alone in 2005 were over $14 trillion (EBRI (Employee Benefit 9 Research Institute), 2007, p 8). In the US and UK, private pension funds 1011 became the largest institutional holders of company shares, and owned over 1 30 per cent of their respective share markets. About 12 per cent of investment 2 was made outside the country of origin (Minns and Sexton, 2006, p 5). 3111 The BIS report shows how the private pension funds depend on, and 4 create demand for, liberalised international financial markets and diverse 5 financial products that can be traded across borders. The industry makes 6 its money from giving investment advice, managing funds, trading assets 7 and charging fees. The main assets are equities traded on the international 8 stock exchanges, supplemented by a wide variety of investments. An OECD 9 report on pensions in 2005 revealed a self-perpetuating dynamic: the 20111 promotion and expansion of pension funds creates risks that require further 1 products, such as pensions insurance and very long-dated index-linked 2 government bonds, that spread the risk and minimise the potential for 3 disruption to international financial markets (OECD, 2005). The specialised 4 ‘pension fund food chain’ (Watson Wyatt, 2006) comprises consultants, 5 investment advisers, brokers, credit rating agencies, management firms, 6 performance assessors and share markets. Many fund operators are also 7 part of the pension privatisation industry; sometimes the firm’s consultancy 8 and underwriting divisions receive astronomical fees from pension and assets 9 privatisations, while their funds managers invest in the commercial 30111 opportunities the consultants create. The nature of the industry has led 1 some critics conclude that pension markets are ‘not really about pensions 2 at all, but about extending capital markets and the free movement of capital 3 and changing the role of the state’ (Minns and Sexton, 2006, p 35). 4 The pension fund supply chain is a prime beneficiary of the GATS. The 5 definition of financial services in Article 5(a) of the Annex applies asset 6 management, including pension funds, and the various ancillary services. 7 The exemption for services supplied in the exercise of government authority 8 applies to ‘activities forming part of a statutory system of social security 9 or public retirement plans’. However, this only applies where those services 40111 are not conducted by the government’s financial services suppliers in 1 competition with a public entity or private financial services supplier. A 2 government that made a commitment on financial services when it operated 3 a universal state pension may well find that privatising the management of 44111 its pensions brings the new scheme under the GATS disciplines. A choice 184 Serving whose interests?

1111 between the state pension and a subsidised contributory scheme run by 2 private firms, or competition between a state-run and private schemes, would 3 clearly fall outside the exception. 4 Once the GATS rules apply, the entire pension industry chain, from the 5 fund managers, advisers and derivatives traders to the credit rating agencies 6 and auditors, benefit from its regime of light-handed regulation. The sheer 7 size of these foreign operators is likely to crowd out most domestic providers 8 in conditions of open competition. Market access rules aim to prohibit 9 governments from requiring joint ventures or limiting foreign shareholding 1011 or the number of operators. Full national treatment commitments prevent 1 governments from reserving part of the subsidised market for local firms. 2 Governments that adopt the Understanding must maintain a standstill to 3 existing non-confirming measure. In a defined contribution scheme without 4 a government guarantee, people’s pensions become fully exposed to the 5 risks of mega-fraud or systemic meltdown in a highly interconnected global 6 financial market place. The subprime crisis shows how billions of dollars 7 can be wiped off pension funds in a matter of months. Unwinding this 8 exposure through re-regulation is problematic and even fiduciary measures 9 are potentially subject to challenge as an attempt to avoid commitments or 20111 obligations under the GATS. 1 The EC’s GATS 2000 requests targeted pension fund management as 2 part of its wish list of financial services based on the Understanding. These 3 services spanned the entire pension supply chain. One ‘essential prerequisite’ 4 was an ‘appropriate regulatory structure’ that was ‘proportionate and 5 necessary’50 – code words for severe restrictions on the government’s choice 6 of (re-)regulatory instruments. The plurilateral request on financial services 7 built on a June 2005 paper from 12 members and reiterated that the 8 definition included asset management, pension funds, financial advisory and 9 information, and other financial services.51 Their preferred transparency 30111 obligation would require governments to consult the global pension fund 1 industry before introducing regulations that were designed to discipline their 2 activities, such as highly leveraged buyouts, require a greater proportion of 3 investments in government securities, or increase protections for the rights 4 of retirees. Even basic measures, such as capital controls to restrict cross- 5 border trading in currency, requirements that pension funds hold greater 6 reserves, or stricter accountancy standards, could be considered ‘more 7 burdensome than necessary’ (vander Stichele, 2005, Chapter 6). 8 There is enough evidence of the social harm caused by ideologically driven 9 or poorly conceived pension reforms to show why governments need to 40111 retain their capacity to re-regulate or partly renationalise private pensions 1 markets. The OECD acknowledged in 2005 that changes in pensions policies, 2 especially the move from defined benefit to defined contribution schemes, 3 ‘have resulted in a shift of risk bearing from the government and corporate 44111 sectors to individuals’ (OECD, 2005, p 11). Ruling the services infrastructure 185

1111 That risk is not shared equally. It is still generally assumed that husbands 2 will provide for the needs of elderly women, despite social trends, women’s 3 greater longevity and the human right to equality. Contribution based 4 pensions are especially gender biased. Women commonly live longer, but 5 they are typically low waged workers in insecure employment, informal 6 work or households. For example, over half the women in Chile, Bolivia, 7 Colombia, El Salvador, Argentina and Brazil will never receive a pension 8 because they have never been in paid employment. One estimate suggests 9 that paid women workers in Chile who are employed only during the harvest 1011 season would need to work 80 years to accumulate a minimum pension 1 (Minns and Sexton, 2006, p 26). 2 Increased state support for private pension schemes is also regressive and, 3111 consequently, racialised. According to a Financial Times report in 2006 4 around 45 per cent of pension-related tax relief in the United Kingdom 5 went to 2.5 million higher rate taxpayers (predominantly white and male), 6 and 55 per cent went to 13 million lower rate taxpayers. Some 9 million 7 people received nothing because they were not saving into a pension scheme. 8 The lowest paid, women and minorities lost out (Minns and Sexton, 2006, 9 p 18, fn 38). In addition, there are risks of pension failure. Where schemes 20111 are not backed by a government guarantee, workers may find the company 1 or private fund manager cannot deliver when the pension falls due. In 2005 2 pension funds worldwide were estimated to be 20 per cent underfunded, 3 amounting to some $1.5 to $2 trillion (Minns and Sexton, 2006, p 25). 4 This improved significantly in 2006, but the risk of failure remains and falls 5 most heavily on the poor.52 6 The experiences of pension privatisation in Chile and Britain illustrate 7 the social and government risks from the combination of poorly thought 8 out pension schemes and a highly liberalised pension fund industry. 9 The Pinochet dictatorship (largely) privatised Chile’s pay-as-you-go state 30111 pension in 1981. Existing workers were induced to shift to a contribution- 1 based scheme where their individual accounts would be managed by the 2 private sector. Workers employed after 1981 had no choice (Riesco, 2005). 3 The state’s contribution, through a ‘recognition bond’, was set during a 4 recessionary period. That low level was compounded by high unemployment 5 and low wages for much of the next decade. Labour market deregulation 6 encouraged churning between paid work, unemployment and subsistence 7 self-employment. As a result, 70 per cent of the workforce contributed into 8 the pension accounts for less than half of each year, with women and the 9 poorest most vulnerable. Despite an economic recovery in the 1990s, the 40111 gap remained. According to government studies in 2000, between half and 1 two-thirds of the contributors could never save enough in their pension 2 accounts by retirement to fund even the minimum pension (Riesco, 2005, 3 p 1). They were not entitled to the state’s non-contributory safety net pension 44111 because that was only available to the very poor. Workers who had stayed 186 Serving whose interests?

1111 with the pre-1981 state scheme were twice as well off as those who transferred; 2 the latter became known as the victims of ‘pension damage’. 3 The winners in Chile were the fund managers and commissioned agents. 4 Some firms that administered the private pension scheme failed. Those who 5 succeeded became consolidated into a handful of companies, whose boards 6 were stacked with ex-Cabinet ministers from the Pinochet era. They became 7 the most profitable industry in Chile, with an average return on assets from 8 1999 to 2003 of over 50 per cent. In 1990 operating costs had accounted 9 for 15.4 per cent of annual contributions and represented 2.3 per cent of 1011 assets. By 2000, half the contributions made by Chilean workers who retired 1 that year went to (government determined) management fees (Minns 2 and Sexton, 2006, p 18). In addition, the companies received the state 3 contributions. Manuel Riesco points out that public expenditure on pensions 4 had remained around 6 per cent of GDP since 1981, absorbing over one 5 third of the government budget and over 42 per cent of public social 6 expenditures – enough to fund a decent universal base pension for retirees, 7 with a reformed private system that provided a solid, complementary second 8 tier (Riesco, 2005, p 3). 9 A World Bank report in 2004 conceded that Chile’s scheme, emulated 20111 by eleven other Latin American countries, had failed to extend formal 1 financial protection for old age to a broader segment of society (Gill et al., 2 2004). In 2007 the government of Argentina responded to its pension crisis 3 by introducing a five-yearly option to contract back from individual 4 accounts into the state’s pay-as-you-go defined benefit pension.53 5 Britain introduced a two-tier system of a flat rate basic pension and a 6 top-up State Earnings-related Pension Scheme (SERPS) in 1978.54 Both were 7 funded by National Insurance contributions. Workers could opt out of the 8 SERPS scheme and invest part of their own and the employer’s contribution 9 in an employer-sponsored private pension. That option was initially limited 30111 to defined benefit schemes that guaranteed a pension at least as good as 1 SERPS. In 1986 the Thatcher government sought to cut the government’s 2 pension spending and encouraged workers, through propaganda and 3 generous tax breaks, to apply part of their contributions to buy defined 4 contribution ‘Appropriate Personal Pensions’ from a private insurer. This 5 triggered the ‘mis-selling scandal’: commission-based financial advisers used 6 high-pressure tactics to convince many members of defined benefit plans to 7 transfer to unsuitable pensions that had high exit fees. Even market 8 cheerleader Martin Wolf condemned the scheme in the Financial Times as 9 a ‘shameful confidence trick’ (quoted in Minns and Sexton, 2006, p 38). 40111 In 1991, the discovery that the late Robert Maxwell had stolen £450 1 ($908) million from his company’s pension fund turned the spotlight on 2 the problem of under-funding of private pension schemes. The Pensions Act 3 1995 introduced new requirements for minimum pension funding and asset 44111 levels. Stronger accounting requirements for companies to disclose their Ruling the services infrastructure 187

1111 under-funding of pensions had the unintended consequence of prompting 2 many to abandon defined benefit schemes in favour of defined contributions. 3 While this facilitated portability, it was effectively a pay cut for those workers 4 who remained with their employers until retirement. Many defined benefit 5 schemes closed because of insolvency, although some did so to reduce the 6 company’s pension liability. By 2001 major firms such as BT, Lloyds TSB 7 and Unilever were still running huge pension fund deficits, compounded by 8 accounting requirements to incorporate the collapse of international share 9 prices into their company accounts. A new Pensions Act 2004 introduced 1011 a Pension Protection Fund paid for by an industry levy and a Financial 1 Assistance Scheme for those affected by earlier fund failures (but not for 2 schemes wound up by a solvent employer). The regulator also required 3111 companies to shore up the deficit in their pension funds before making new 4 investments or distributing dividends to shareholders. 5 The defined benefit schemes took years to wind up, leaving both old 6 and new retirees without recourse. In March 2006, the Parliamentary 7 Ombudsman tabled a damning report on the process from 1997 to 2004 8 (UK House of Commons, 2006a). She invoked the exceptional power to 9 report in cases where complainants had suffered from maladministration 20111 leading to injustice ‘and the injustice has not been, or will not be, remedied’. 1 A bipartisan parliamentary select committee agreed that the publicity 2 material produced by the government to promote private pension schemes 3 had failed to alert people to the risks. An estimated 125,000 people had 4 been affected; some lost 85 to 90 per cent of their entitlements (UK House 5 of Commons, 2006b, p 21). The government rejected the findings and said the £15 ($30) billion cost of restoring the lost benefits would be prohibitive 6 (UK House of Commons, 2006b, p 24). The select committee objected that 7 the government could not simply abandon people: ‘we want a response 8 which is not about defensiveness and denial, it is about constructive 9 engagement and putting things right’ (UK House of Commons, 2006b, 30111 p 33). The committee concurred with the Ombudsman that the government’s 1 refusal to accept and act on the findings raised serious constitutional issues 2 (UK House of Commons, 2006b, pp 25–32). 3 In both Chile and Britain ideologically driven policies failed to provide 4 a workable balance between public and private pensions that met people’s 5 basic social needs. In a comprehensive review of pension policy in 2005 a 6 World Bank report conceded that lessons had been learned; they expanded 7 the three pillars to five, incorporating ‘informal intrafamily’ support and 8 a basic non-contributory (so-called ‘zero’) pillar to protect the lifelong 9 poor (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005, pp 2–3). Yet Southern governments that 40111 experienced policy failure after implementing the Bank’s 1994 version were 1 caught between social and political imperatives to step back in, and 2 countervailing pressures from the pension fund industry, financial markets, 3 the international institutions and GATS signatories to promote investor- 44111 friendly regulation and maintain ‘investor confidence’. 188 Serving whose interests?

1111 As commentators stress, the economic and social implications of pension 2 policy choices play out over very long time periods (Myles and Pierson, 3 2000). Given recent history, it seems reckless to encourage governments to 4 lock in the ‘autonomous liberalisation’ of their pension schemes, immediately 5 and permanently. The proposal in the GATS 2000 plurilateral request that 6 new regulation should be subject to privileged consultation with the 7 international industry is already being transposed into FTAs. The resulting 8 pressure from the international financial services industry could seriously 9 undermine the kind of rational policy debate that is needed to achieve an 1011 appropriate balance between state and private provision of pensions for the 1 social, fiscal and economic realities of each country. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 Chapter 6

1111 2 Trade in people 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 Colonisation is an economic enterprise built largely on the exploitation of 4 people. Its most repugnant genocidal practice was human slavery, the trade 5 in human beings. Today, the GATS has revived talk of trade in people. Again 6 human beings are reduced to commodities that are traded across borders in 7 international markets, but the politics and language are considerably more 8 nuanced. 9 The introduction discussed the relationship between the new international 20111 division of labour and the globalising services-driven economy in terms 1 of Hardt and Negri’s three categories of immaterial labour: labour for 2 informationalised industrial production; labour that performs analytical and 3 symbolic tasks, which is subdivided between creative and intelligent 4 manipulation and routine work; and affective labour. These categories are 5 infused with class relations. At one level, transnational corporations require 6 international mobility for their executives, managers and specialists, and 7 for associated professionals. At the same time, they seek to minimise the 8 cost of the mundane labour component of services, whatever the mode of 9 delivery – remotely across the border (call centre operators); to visiting 30111 foreign consumers (hotel workers); by contractors for foreign-owned 1 enterprises (cleaners); or through temporary migrants (construction labourers 2 or domestic servants). While these practices are variations on a historic 3 theme, the capacity of new technologies ‘to link together different groups 4 of labour power in real time across the world has led to furious and 5 unrestrained competition among workers’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000, p 337). 6 It is common to equate ‘GATS and labour’ with modes 1 and 4. These 7 are ideologically constructed legal spaces, devoid of people, workers or 8 citizens. The physical ‘space’ between places of origin and places of 9 consumption is reconstituted as a de-territorialised and dehumanised global 40111 services market. Neither the economic forces that impel participants into 1 these markets nor how people experience them is considered relevant. This 2 narrow focus on ‘modes’ also begs the prior question of how trade in services, 3 and trade liberalisation more generally, redefine people’s life opportunities. 44111 The push and pull factors that shape today’s international division of labour, 190 Serving whose interests?

1111 including the trend to migration for remittances, have been socially and 2 politically constructed within the paradigm of neoliberalism. As Mariama 3 Williams consistently points out, the stylised assumptions and beliefs about 4 societies and economies that underpin structural adjustment and trade 5 liberalisation are careless of the real consequences for national economies, 6 let alone for mesa-levels of local markets and the micro-level of households 7 (Williams, 2003). 8 This chapter locates the labour dimension of trade in services within that 9 structural context. As an old class struggle takes new forms, the objectives 1011 and strategies defined by traditional Western-dominated international labour 1 organisations are also found wanting. Social movements of workers from 2 the global South and North struggle to protect their rights and livelihoods 3 within the new international division of labour, while maintaining national 4 and international solidarity. 5 Case study 11 puts a human face to call centres in Bangalore, dubbed 6 the assembly lines of the twenty-first century, and the complexities of ‘virtual’ 7 migration. Case study 12 examines the social implications of defining 8 migration-for-remittances as a trade issue – in the case of Fiji through the 9 export of women nurses to developed countries and male security workers 20111 to the Iraqi war zone. 1 2 Services workers as tradeable commodities 3 4 Services are by definition labour intensive. Corporations that seek to 5 maximise their profitability and competitiveness in a globalising economy 6 require a workforce that is mobile, flexible and compliant. From a class 7 perspective, that means a further redistribution of wealth from labour to 8 capital. For millions of individual workers it means gaining or losing an 9 often-precarious livelihood. The term ‘labour flexibilisation’ serves as code 30111 for the erosion of hard fought laws on job security, minimum working 1 hours, collective bargaining, rights to unionise, minimum wages and penalty 2 rates, pension and health insurance schemes, work and safety regulations, 3 and much more. Those protections were among the earliest targets of 4 neoliberals, who condemned them as relics of the bygone era of social 5 regulation and corporatism. The trinity of deregulation, liberalisation and 6 privatisation produced a dual labour market for services whose inequalities 7 are segmented by class, gender and race: typically, a white male-dominated 8 professional and managerial élite engages in high skilled, well paid, 9 sometimes insecure, but usually substitutable work; and a largely feminised, 40111 often non-white proletariat undertake low paid, temporary, part-time or 1 casual work, with minimal job security or associated entitlements. 2 As services markets became more transnational, the labour market 3 reflected the political geographies of neo-colonialism. Ankie Hoogvelt notes 44111 how widening income inequalities across the global North and South both Trade in people 191

1111 transcend and replicate historical boundaries (Hoogvelt, 2001). This is 2 symbolised by the call centres, which bridge the ‘old divide between core 3 and periphery in new ways, linking marginal workers and localities with 4 global networks of capital while at the same time reinscribing hierarchies 5 of place and identity’ (Buchanan, 2002, p 49). 6 The growth of migration-for-remittances and offshore outsourcing is 7 deeply embedded in the international labour hierarchy and the broader 8 political economy of trade liberalisation. As Saskia Sassen observes: 9 ‘Migrations do not just happen: they are one outcome or one systemic 1011 tendency in a more general dynamic of change’ (Sassen, 1998, p 116). People 1 who migrate for remittances are impelled by local economic conditions to 2 leave their families and communities to work abroad. Eman Villaneuva, 3111 the secretary general of United Filipinos in Hong Kong, observed at the 4 time of the sixth WTO ministerial conference in 2005 that ‘even without 5 GATS we are already affected by the WTO because other agreements are 6 actually destroying the livelihood and the economy and the environment 7 of the countries we come from.’1 Their households increasingly depend on 8 their new livelihoods. So do their countries. 9 The very concept of mode 4 takes the fetishisation of contract labour 20111 to a new, depersonalised level ‘as if the migrant service workers are devoid 1 of feelings and emotions and that they are not geographically transported 2 away from their homes’ (Lindio-McGovern, 2004, p 222). The majority of 3 temporary migrants are women. The label ‘unskilled’ is a misnomer; many 4 are highly qualified professionals who, tragically, can earn more as low 5 status service workers in a foreign country. Most women are engaged in a 6 services supply chain that involves a ‘two-tiered transfer of reproductive 7 labor – women in developed countries pass the work on to women migrants 8 from developing countries, who in turn, pass it on to other women in their 9 countries of origin – women migrants form the crucial link’ (Asis, 2003, 30111 p 3). This signifies what Sassen calls a return of the ‘serving classes’, 1 composed largely of immigrant and migrant women within a racialised 2 political geography (Sassen, 2000, p 510). 3 The mass of male migrant workers are clustered in construction, 4 manufacturing and manual labour. Human Rights Watch estimates that 5 over half a million construction workers are employed in Dubai alone, mostly 6 semi-literate men from South Asia (Human Rights Watch, 2006, pp 6–7). 7 They are paid (or not paid) pitiful wages and are often deeply indebted to 8 unscrupulous recruiters. Their sometimes deadly high-rise work sites are 9 the glitzy showpieces of Dubai’s construction boom. Labour laws are not 40111 enforced. Employers frequently withhold workers’ passports to keep them 1 captive as modern day slaves. 2 The treatment of male and female migrant workers is itself gendered. The 3 highest proportion of foreign workers in Asia is in Singapore, where 44111 they comprise around 30 per cent of total employment. There are at least 192 Serving whose interests?

1111 180,000 male construction workers, mainly from Bangladesh, Thailand 2 and China, and many thousands of female domestic servants. Most are 3 considered ‘unskilled’. Temporary migrants are kept on short-term permits 4 that allow easy repatriation, are forbidden to bring their families or marry 5 locals, and are subject to constant surveillance. Yet Shirlena Huang and 6 Brenda Yeoh have documented the differential as between women and men, 7 in terms of ‘the differential access to legal protection; the differential effects 8 of state medical surveillance of their bodies; the different ways in which their 9 ‘skills’ are valorised; as well as differences in the efforts invested into the social 1011 control of these workers in public space’ (Huang and Yeoh, 2003, p 83). 1 Southern governments bought into the ‘trade’ paradigm for services 2 workers during the Uruguay round when they demanded that factors of 3 production received equivalent treatment: if trade in services was to cover 4 free movement of capital and ideas, it also had to include labour. Eventually 5 it did, just not most developing countries’ labour. Nevertheless, the ‘trade 6 in services’ discourse has gained such currency that many Southern 7 governments’ negotiations treat services workers as dehumanised input 8 factors in the quest to exploit their comparative advantage and as a potential 9 trade-off for concessions in other services, agriculture and industrials. 20111 This ‘trade’ abstraction applies equally to ‘virtual’ and actual migrant 1 labour. Outsourcing is presented as a win-win for North and South, although 2 the hierarchy between them remains intact. Jagdish Bhagwati et al. argued 3 in 2004 that ‘outsourcing is just fundamentally a trade phenomenon’ to 4 which standard neoclassical assumptions apply. As the US loses jobs 5 in low wage services, which it then imports, it can expand in high-wage 6 services that it exports. ‘On balance, therefore, . . . the expansion of trade 7 in Mode 1 services seems likely to offer America a transition to higher- 8 value jobs’ (Bhagwati et al., 2004, p 110). The US Department of Commerce 9 proffered the more politically sensitive opinion that offshoring is likely to 30111 affect relatively few workers, and raise living standards for the average 1 American, although ‘all of us must be troubled when American workers 2 lose their jobs, whatever the reason’ (US Government Accountability Office, 3 2005, p 69). 4 In a paper for the South Centre in 2004, Indian economist Rupa Chanda 5 applied the same comparative advantage rationale to mode 4. She argued that 6 high cost, delays and restrictions that apply to visas and work permits 7 constitute barriers to trade. The requirement that temporary migrants must 8 pay social security taxes while they are denied access to benefits is a form of 9 double taxation ‘akin to a trade tax or disguised tariff that erodes his [sic] 40111 earnings’ (Chanda, 2004, p 14). The regulations that govern the recognition 1 of professional and technical qualifications are legitimate when they are 2 designed to satisfy public policy purposes, quality and consumer protection; 3 but when combined with delays, costs and untransparent discretions, they 44111 become protectionist trade restrictions. Trade in people 193

1111 These aspects of Chanda’s trade-based argument can be transposed 2 without much difficulty into a rights-based advocacy for migrant workers. 3 But the next step in her reasoning cannot. Chanda points to rules on 4 temporary migration in the US that require employers to obtain information 5 from authorities or other sources on the prevailing wage, and pay at least 6 95 per cent of that rate to foreign candidates. Similar parity requirements 7 apply when wages in the European Economic Area are covered by collective 8 agreements. Those requirements are justified from a traditional labour 9 relations paradigm as protecting the jobs and working conditions of both 1011 nationals and migrants (ironically, the US and EU object to such ‘economic 1 needs’ and ‘labour market’ tests in other contexts). However, they are 2 incompatible with Chanda’s trade paradigm: 3111 4 the principle underlying the wage parity requirement is that overseas 5 nationals are to be hired to address the shortage of suitably qualified 6 service providers in the host country and not to save money by hiring 7 cheap labour from abroad. However, the wage parity requirement also 8 acts to negate the cost-based advantage of many developing countries 9 in exporting labour-intensive services and works against the very concept 20111 of comparative advantage based on cost differentials. 1 (Chanda, 2004, pp 9–10) 2 As Chanda’s argument starkly reveals, reconceptualising labour in terms of 3 comparative advantage can strip away hard-won historic compromises and 4 allow the state to disengage from the role of mediating between capital and 5 labour. 6 7 8 Mode 4: temporary movement of services 9 personnel 30111 When it comes to international mobility, there is nothing new about privileges 1 for managerial over proletarian labour, the former usually being European 2 and the latter being ‘other’. Those privileges were previously advanced through 3 idiosyncratic and discretionary national immigration laws; they are now 4 legitimised through ‘market access’ commitments on trade in services. This 5 transition relies on several sleights of hand. First, to substitute a ‘trade’ for a 6 ‘labour’ paradigm, the ‘market’ that is being accessed must be reclassified as 7 the services market of the purchaser, instead of the employment market of 8 the host state (at least for those professionals, executives and skilled workers 9 that inhabit the privileged tier in the international labour market). Second, 40111 the argument that mode 4 ‘conceptually does not fall under the administrative 1 machinery applicable to permanent migration’ (Chanda, 2004, p 1) rests on 2 a sharp, objective and illusory distinction between foreign workers engaged 3 in services and non-service activities, and between short-term and longer-term 44111 foreign services workers. 194 Serving whose interests?

1111 Many Southern governments have embraced the artifice of mode 4 2 because it potentially offers them a vehicle through which to pursue a 3 previously unattainable goal. Temporary emigration can help to soak up 4 unemployment, provide income to struggling communities and alleviate 5 the balance of payments deficit. Most Southern governments therefore 6 prefer to export their lower skilled and unemployed, rather than their 7 professionals. The idea that governments of rich industrialised countries 8 would grant legally enforceable rights of access for such workers on a 9 multilateral basis was unthinkable so long as it was framed in terms of 1011 labour and immigration policy. Hence the attraction of the ‘trade’ discourse. 1 The prospect of a cheap, docile and dispensable workforce is also attractive 2 for wealthier destination states that face shortages in both the skilled and 3 professional workforce and in less appealing services jobs. However, they 4 prefer to cherry pick the executive, professional and educated migrants, often 5 allowing entry on a semi-permanent basis. The ‘trade’ discourse absolves them 6 of any moral responsibility if that results in brain drain, loss of educational 7 investment or stunted economic and social development in the ‘exporting’ 8 countries. Services workers with fewer skills are kept on a short leash or out 9 altogether. By insisting that the latter are treated as temporary migrants, 20111 destination governments retain the discretion and flexibility to respond to their 1 domestic labour needs, manage anti-immigration sentiments and limit their 2 exposure to social security obligations. Downward pressure on the labour 3 market from an underclass of migrants also strengthens their policies of labour 4 flexibility and de-unionisation. Conversely, by maintaining the distinctive 5 categories of ‘trade’ and migration, Northern governments can seek greater 6 mobility for executives, managers, specialists and professionals that are linked 7 to their transnational companies. 8 India is a special case. Its human exports are professionals, IT specialists 9 and skilled contractors who are not necessarily associated with corporations 30111 and are eager to work temporarily in the US or Europe. The Indian government 1 bargains hard for guaranteed access on their behalf. The primary beneficiaries 2 are not the workers themselves, but the employing firms who are able to 3 minimise their costs and maximise their profits and competitive positioning. 4 Yet there is enough of a win-win for both the educated élites and the 5 government of India for mode 4 to play a central role in the vision of India 6 Shining, and drive India’s negotiating position in the Doha round and 7 emerging bilaterals. Indian negotiators reject criticism that their focus on 8 white-collar educated workers ignores the priorities of poorer countries to 9 gain access for their lower skilled workers, as a matter of political realism. 40111 Both source and destination states rely on, and facilitate, a secondary 1 industry that has grown up around the ‘trade’ in services labour. Sometimes 2 state agencies oversee the temporary export of their citizens. The Philippines 3 government has done so since 1982 through the Philippine Overseas 44111 Employment Administration. Increasingly, private sector operators are linked Trade in people 195

1111 in transnational supply chains of immigration consultants, personnel 2 agencies, training providers, lenders and money brokers. During the 2005 3 WTO ministerial conference in Hong Kong the Indonesian, Thai and Filipino 4 domestic workers described the payment of agency fees as ‘debt bondage’. 5 Others have condemned the recruitment of private security workers for Iraq 6 by similar agencies as a twenty-first-century form of ‘blackbirding’.2 These 7 supply chains are embedded within ‘recruitment geographies’, where they 8 ‘sculpt the labor force and shuttle workers into different employment 9 niches that reflect ideologies of gender, race, class, and civilisation’ (Mahler 1011 and Pessar, 2006, p 49). Even when their activities are formally regulated, 1 governments that depend on remittance revenue often turn a blind eye to 2 the exploitative practices of public agencies and private recruitment firms. 3111 The GATS and the bilaterals operate to stabilise, expand and globalise 4 these sectoral and geographical markets through commitments across 5 multiple CPCs. The worker is integral to each stage in the migration-for- 6 remittance chain, at the same time as the ‘trade in services’ discourse renders 7 her invisible (Kurian, 2004). 8 9 Mode 1: cross-border supply of services 20111 1 Services offshoring was a logical step in the continuum of restructuring that 2 saw the outsourcing of industrial production in the 1960s and 1970s. The 3 splintering of services from manufacturing (Bhagwati, 1984), and the 4 subsequent privatisation and unbundling of public services, prepared the way 5 for contracting out to local firms. New information technologies and market 6 regulation of telecommunications expanded the possibilities for remote 7 delivery of services, especially across the border. Companies such as EDS, IBM 8 and Accenture (formerly Arthur Andersen Consulting) developed their 9 outsourcing operations domestically, then expanded offshore. 30111 Offshore outsourcing meant large, and subsequently medium sized, 1 businesses could concentrate on their core strengths and outsource non- 2 core activities. This offered the services equivalent of just-in-time offshore 3 industrial production with benefits of lower costs, higher profits and quicker 4 delivery. Firms enjoyed access to compliant services workers and reduced 5 liability and social security costs, without the responsibilities of employers. 6 New possibilities constantly emerged. IT advice desks could provide different 7 levels of in-house and customer support around the clock. Staggered time 8 zones meant back office operations could process airline tickets and 9 insurance claims, read X-rays, and prepare medical transcriptions or legal 40111 documents overnight, ready for business the next day. Call centres could 1 deliver customer support for banks, credit card or finance companies ‘24/7’. 2 As with temporary migration, this attracted a secondary industry of training 3 providers, recruitment agencies, real estate developers, business consultancies, 44111 market analysts and more (Case study 12). 196 Serving whose interests?

1111 This form of labour is described as ‘virtual migration’ because the 2 disembodied production of services is divided between two or more 3 geographically distant sites and received without the physical presence 4 of the worker (Upadhya and Vasavi, 2006, p 7). That degree of spatial 5 dispersion is possible because control is primarily exercised over mental, 6 not physical, labour. 7 By the late 1990s offshore outsourcing had become a multi-billion dollar 8 business. Despite some market differentiation on quality and function, most 9 outsourcing was driven by price. Governments in the North and South 1011 competed to attract the industry and associated jobs. Most governments 1 adopted an ‘enabling’ role by offering high quality infrastructure, tax breaks 2 and other privileges. ‘Public private partnerships’ were common. A ‘pro- 3 business environment’ also required ‘competitive labour costs’ through 4 labour market flexibility and low unionisation. 5 Ireland and India were the first governments to market themselves as 6 outsourcing destinations. Contrary to popular mythology, India’s IT 7 revolution was not a triumph of free enterprise. Sociologists Carol Upadhya 8 and AR Vasavi recount how it was systematically constructed through federal 9 and state intervention (Upadhya and Vasavi, 2006, pp 7–15). Rajiv Ghandi 20111 began the liberalisation project and push to technological modernisation in 1 the 1980s, capitalising on India’s legacy of state-sponsored scientific and 2 industrial experience and English language proficiency. This fostered an 3 indigenous middle class of entrepreneurs, who complemented the growing 4 wealth and influence of a generation of non-resident Indian engineers who 5 had emigrated to the US in the 1970s. The National Association of Software 6 and Service Companies (NASSCOM) was formed in 1988 and worked in 7 partnership with transnational IT pioneers, notably Texas Instruments. 8 The Indian government embraced the IT sector as a source of foreign 9 exchange during the balance of payments crisis of the late 1980s. By the early 30111 1990s, IT offered the government a sink for India’s educated unemployed 1 after the liberalisation programme had failed to produce the anticipated 2 economic expansion. A decade later, the services sector contributed over half 3 of India’s GDP. In 2003, revenue from Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) 4 alone was $3.6 billion. The fastest growing sectors of customer care and 5 finance increased by 100 per cent and 70 per cent, respectively, in 2002/3 6 (Jha, 2006, p 154). 7 South Africa and countries in Eastern Europe and Asia generated a second 8 wave of IT-enabled outsourcing of services in the early 2000s. They marketed 9 themselves in terms of investment incentives, technological infrastructure, 40111 geography, sectoral clustering and a compliant and available labour force. 1 But they essentially competed on price in a crowded, peripatetic and 2 increasingly politicised market. In supply terms, China had the potential to 3 displace them all before long. Demand was also heavily dependent on US 44111 firms. The US had welcomed onshore outsourcing when it generated local Trade in people 197

1111 jobs to replace those lost in manufacturing and boosted corporate profits. 2 Government and business initially applauded offshore outsourcing as a 3 means to improve labour efficiency, without the immigration and security 4 downsides associated with mode 4. But once onshore jobs began moving 5 offshore, outsourcing became a politically volatile issue. 6 The employment impacts of offshoring in the US are hotly contested. 7 There are no reliable figures. Economists have claimed the numbers are 8 small relative to job losses in total, and specifically in manufacturing, and 9 argue that offshoring would boost the economy and net job growth. Trade 1011 unions countered that gross job losses have been significant and are likely 1 to grow, and disproportionately affected workers and communities that 2 were already marginalised. The US Congress is sensitive to growing to fears 3111 about declining domestic competitiveness, job losses, privacy and security: 4 in 2003 four bills sought to restrict offshoring; a further 40 federal and 5 200 state bills were introduced in 2004. Effective bans were initially limited 6 to the offshoring of government procurement, but there was nothing to 7 stop them being extended to other areas (Jha, 2006, p 155). 8 India faces its own internal dilemmas. The government heralded the rapid 9 growth of IT-enabled services as a payoff for its investment in education 20111 and high-tech infrastructure and a platform for long-term economic 1 development. The primary objectives were to increase export revenue and 2 employment for its educated, but largely unemployed middle class. By 2004/5 3 remittances through mode 4 financed most of India’s trade deficit, while 4 over half of the country’s trade in services involved IT-enabled services and 5 BPO (Jha, 2006, p 160). But even enthusiasts for the GATS strategy conceded 6 that the IT revolution had not produced the expected employment benefits. 7 During the decade of the 1990s, the share of services in India’s employment 8 statistics actually decreased around 1 per cent (Jha, 2006, p 150). Upadhya 9 and Vasavi warn of a false dawn: ‘While the IT industry is widely regarded 30111 as a model for India’s development, due to its concentration on the export 1 of software and IT-enabled services, it is largely an enclave economy that 2 is closely linked to the global economy, but has few substantial linkages to 3 local, regional and national economies’ (Upadhya and Vasavi, 2006, p i). 4 5 GATS 1994 6 7 The transformation of services labour was at an early stage during the 8 Uruguay round. Mode 1 had the most unbound commitments, many for 9 lack of technical feasibility. (Its coverage in the GATS 1994 text was therefore 40111 experimental and problematic.) That situation had changed by GATS 2000, 1 as new technologies and the principle of ‘technological neutrality’ opened 2 almost limitless possibilities for cross-border trade in services. 3 The primary focus in the Uruguay round was on mode 4, defined in 44111 Article 1:2(d) as the supply of a service ‘by a service supplier of one Member, 198 Serving whose interests?

1111 through presence of natural persons of a [not that] Member in the territory 2 of any other Member’. The Annex on Movement of Natural Persons 3 Supplying Services sought to differentiate entry and temporary presence 4 from employment and permanent migration: ‘The Agreement shall not apply 5 to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to the employment 6 market of a Member, nor shall it apply to measures regarding citizenship, 7 residence or employment on a permanent basis.’ 8 The definition envisages several situations: an independent service provider 9 from one country who sells their services directly to a company or individual 1011 in the host country; a national who is employed by their home company 1 or by a third country company that is established in the host country; or 2 a national who is contracted out by a company of their home or a third 3 country to provide services to a company in the host country. Technically, 4 nationals of one country who are imported as employees of a company of 5 the host country seem to fall outside the definition – yet that is the nature 6 of the US H-1B visas for which India and other governments are requesting 7 guaranteed quotas under mode 4. As a further complication, Chanda points 8 out that host countries often require contractors to be employees for the 9 purpose of their local labour laws (Chanda, 2004, pp 15–16). 20111 Paragraph 1 of the Annex refers to ‘entry and temporary stay’, while 1 paragraph 2 is negatively worded to exclude permanent migration. 2 ‘Temporary’ is not defined. Only one-third of the 1994 schedules specified 3 time frames. These ranged from three months maximum for most business 4 visitors to between two and five years for intra-corporate transferees. This 5 inconsistency underscores the fuzzy boundary between mode 4 and medium- 6 term migration and makes it impossible to determine objectively when a 7 foreign national enters the local labour market and falls outside the legal 8 scope of mode 4. To compound the confusion, both the US and Australia 9 took commitments that apply to short-term employees. 30111 The relationship to immigration rules is also unclear. The Annex reserves 1 the right of countries to regulate entry and stay in their territory, provided 2 these measures do not nullify or impair the benefits expected from their 3 commitments. Interpretive Note 14 says ‘the sole fact’ of requiring a visa 4 for only some natural persons does not constitute discrimination that nullifies 5 or impairs specific commitments. This wording implies that, in some 6 unspecified circumstances, visa requirements combined with other factors 7 might be discriminatory. Some governments believe this could apply to 8 limitations that are susceptible to discriminatory or arbitrary interpretation, 9 such as vague references to economic needs tests (Chanda, 2004, p 19). 40111 Sensitivity to the competing demands of the Northern and Southern 1 governments meant that neither the text nor the Annex referred to a level of 2 skill. This militated against the formal adoption of occupational specifications, 3 such as the ILO (International Labour Organization) International Standard 44111 Classification of Occupation, known as ISCO-88. Consequently, the Trade in people 199

1111 categories used in schedules are vague and inconsistent. There are also familiar 2 problems with the static, obsolete and ambiguous nature of W/120 3 classifications. It is uncertain, for example, whether a hospital call centre that 4 provides medical transcriptions should come under a ‘health service’, a 5 ‘business service’ or ‘telephone answering services’. A mode 4 commitment 6 on ‘services incidental to’ agriculture, mining, forestry or fishing (CPCs 881 7 and 882) could cover seasonal workers or contract labourers, while the 8 combination of mode 1 and the broad definition of ‘supply’ of a service could 9 apply to a spectrum of cross-border activities. 1011 In addition to the muddled state of the GATS 1994 schedules, some 1 of the horizontal rules have largely been ignored. Article VII: Mutual 2 Recognition provides that ‘a member may recognize education, experience, 3111 licensing and certification of a foreign provider’ through harmonisation, 4 mutual recognition or autonomously. This allows governments to deviate 5 from MFN provided the standards or criteria are not discriminatory or 6 disguised restrictions against other members. Non-parties must have the 7 opportunity to negotiate to accede to those agreements or reach similar 8 agreements. As of 2004, there had been only 39 notifications by 19 WTO 9 members, far fewer than the total number of mutual recognition agreements 20111 signed. No notifications involved pending negotiations (Chanda, 2004, 1 p 35). Comprehensive Guidelines on Mutual Recognition Agreements 2 developed in relation to the accountancy sector have not been replicated 3 for other disciplines. 4 Other rules are ambiguous. Article VI:1 Domestic Regulation requires 5 that measures of general application that affect trade in services in 6 sectors that a government has committed are administered in a ‘reasonable, 7 objective and impartial manner’. This applies to visas and work permits, 8 which are notoriously discretionary. Members who have made sectoral 9 commitments must have adequate procedures to verify the competence of 30111 the relevant professionals of any other member to deliver those services, 1 and must ensure that their licensing procedures, professional certification 2 and technical standards are not more burdensome than necessary to achieve 3 quality. However, this only applies where the measures are not covered by 4 national treatment or market access. Some licensing systems have elements, 5 such as residency requirements, that fall into each category. 6 A review of the initial GATS 1994 schedules by the WTO Secretariat 7 reported few meaningful commitments under Mode 4.3 At the end of the 8 Uruguay round, members were given until July 1996 to improve their initial 9 mode 4 commitments (this appears to have been a concession to the 40111 South to balance the extension of negotiations in financial services and 1 telecommunications). That extension produced ‘modest results’,4 which were 2 attached as the Third Protocol to the GATS. Most sectoral entries remained 3 ‘unbound’ for mode 4 except as provided in the horizontal commitments. 44111 One hundred members made horizontal commitments, commonly using the 200 Serving whose interests?

1111 phrase ‘unbound, except for’ specified categories of personnel or purposes 2 for the visit. Most commitments were limited to higher-skill categories, 3 such as executives or intra-corporate transferees. These were organically or 4 explicitly linked to mode 3, reflecting the requirements of transnational 5 firms for their executives, managers and specialists to work internationally. 6 Only 17 per cent of horizontal entries potentially covered low-skilled 7 personnel; this included 15 per cent that referred to Contractual Service 8 Suppliers, most of whom would be contractual employees of a foreign firm. 9 These commitments carried a wide range of limitations and restrictions 1011 that variously applied to: categories of personnel; duration of stay; pre- 1 employment requirements; economic needs tests; quantitative restrictions; 2 requirements for technology and skill transfer; discriminatory tax treatment; 3 government approval; work permits, residency and citizenship; and 4 recognition of professional qualifications. Almost 50 members reserved the 5 application of domestic minimum wage legislation, often coupled with 6 limitations on conditions of work, work hours and social security – even 7 though such requirements fell outside the market access and national 8 treatment rules. Twenty-two countries reserved the right to suspend 9 commitments in labour/management disputes. 20111 1 GATS 2000 2 3 By the time of GATS 2000, almost all Southern governments had identified 4 labour as their major, and often only, source of ‘comparative advantage’. 5 But India’s new role in the international division of labour, and subsequently 6 in the WTO, saw it focus on IT professionals and skilled contractors to the 7 exclusion of less skilled labour. The conflict between India’s offensive 8 interests under modes 1 and 4, and the desire of the US and EU to secure 9 greater market access in modes 3 and 4 while defending their own labour 30111 markets, became a major undercurrent of the negotiations. 1 Early proposals were tabled by two developing (India and Colombia) and 2 four developed countries (the US, EC, Japan and Canada). They covered 3 the same issues, but with contrasting emphases. All wanted greater clarity 4 and predictability in mode 4 by using common definitions, more information 5 about restrictions on movement, improved administrative procedures for 6 entry and greater transparency. As negotiations moved into the request and 7 offer phase a number of other developing countries and least developed 8 countries submitted proposals, individually and collectively. They wanted 9 fewer horizontal restrictions on access and mode 4 de-linked from mode 40111 3. Specifically, they asked for longer permitted periods of stay, expanded 1 categories of services workers and new sectoral commitments. 2 India led the charge. On mode 1 it sought horizontal commitments 3 covering all services supplied across the border, supported by specific 44111 commitments on IT and IT-enabled services/BPO. India’s paper on mode Trade in people 201

1111 4 proposed horizontal commitments for a new category of independent 2 professionals, including middle and lower levels, de-linked from mode 3. 3 National immigration frameworks should either recognise a ‘GATS visa’ 4 for scheduled categories of services workers or adopt special administrative 5 rules and procedures. It also suggested super-imposing ILO occupational 6 classifications on existing categories in members’ schedules.5 7 India is widely understood to have demanded from the US a guaranteed 8 quota of 100,000 H-1B visas. The US Congress created that visa category 9 for ‘guest workers’ in 1990 to alleviate labour shortages by allowing entry 1011 to a modest number of professionals and technicians. The level of the quota 1 fluctuated from 65,000, which the US committed in its GATS 1994 2 schedule, to 115,000 for 1999/2000 and 195,000 for 2001/3. The total was 3111 cut back to 65,000 for fiscal year 2004 in response to a US economic 4 downturn. In April 2005, USTR Peter Allegeir named mode 4 as a ‘critical 5 pillar’ to successful Doha negotiations (Anderson, 2005). However, under 6 the US Constitution the Congress has plenary power over immigration policy, 7 including the level of H-1B visas (Wallach and Tucker, 2006). The USTR 8 created a furore when maximum quotas of 1,400 and 5,400 H-1B visas 9 were reserved in the US/Chile and US/Singapore free trade agreements, 20111 respectively. These agreements had been subject to the fast track approval 1 process. Congress warned successive USTRs not to negotiate any further 2 immigration provisions in trade agreements that would restrict its plenary 3 power and prevent Congress from making future adjustments in response 4 to changing national circumstances.6 5 India was prepared to lock in its autonomous liberalisation in sectors 6 such as telecommunications to achieve its goals in modes 1 and 4. It also 7 sought to leverage its position as part of the ‘new Quad’ by making 8 concessions on industrials and agriculture conditional on commitments in 9 services. After a detailed examination of India’s negotiating options in 2005, 30111 UNCTAD India urged a careful assessment of the implications of this strategy 1 for future regulation and a ‘degree of caution in making binding commitments 2 where significant regulatory experimentation is still underway’ (Jha, 2006, 3 pp 218–19). Obviously adverting to IT, the report noted there were risks 4 when liberalisation was concentrated in a few sectors that were highly 5 vulnerable to competition and had produced largely jobless growth. While 6 it concluded that liberalisation would have positive effects, the authors 7 warned: ‘There is a greater need to ensure that liberalisation does not lead 8 to market failures and other socio-economic problems’ (Jha, 2006, p 219). 9 This caveat had no visible impact on India’s negotiating position. 40111 A chorus of international agencies (primarily the World Bank, UNCTAD, 1 and the South Centre) theorised, constructed and reinforced India’s mode 2 1 and 4 proposals, which they depicted as central to a Doha ‘development’ 3 round (e.g. Chanda, 2004; Mattoo and Wunsch, 2004). They generated 44111 two creative, and impossibly ambitious, ideas. 202 Serving whose interests?

1111 The first was a Service Provider Visa (originally called a GATS visa). The 2 working paper produced by Rupa Chanda for the South Centre in May 3 2004, discussed earlier, proposed a special arrangement that was distinct 4 from usual immigration visas and ‘would cover natural persons with 5 professional skills and a specified minimum level of educational and other 6 qualifications, including intra-company transferees, establishment based and 7 independent CSS [contractual services suppliers], but excluding employment- 8 based movement’ (Chanda, 2004, p x). Multiple entry visas would run for 9 three years, with any one visit limited to one year. Penalties would apply 1011 to their abuse. The requirement for wage parity would not apply (Chanda, 1 2004, p 26). 2 Chanda also considered how to extend the proposal further down the skill 3 chain. She suggested the CSS category could be expanded or split to provide 4 for temporary contract workers whose demonstrated experience was certified 5 through a government-designated recruitment or manpower agency. That 6 agency (not the worker) would be the party to the cross-border contract with 7 the foreign employer. This category of CSS workers would face more restrictive 8 conditions of entry and stay than their professional counterparts, possibly 9 including an economic needs test. Quantitative restrictions and minimum 20111 wages might apply, both for the workers’ own protection and to reduce 1 objections about labour displacement (Chanda, 2004, pp 30–2, 42). WTO 2 members would be asked to complement the visa by adopting model 3 horizontal schedules for mode 1 and 4, plus sectoral commitments. Various 4 versions of the model schedule were already circulating, based on a 2003 5 version that had been endorsed by the US Coalition of Services Industries and 6 the European Services Forum (Chaudhuri et al., 2004, p 48). Chanda argued 7 8 that linkages across modes 4, 1 and 3 were critical. 9 The second proposal addressed the problem that comprehensive GATS 30111 coverage for mode 1 was not achievable using positive list schedules. No 1 classification scheme could keep up with changes in technology, business 2 practices and skills, or anticipate new services that would be traded. Further, 3 the request and offer process was costly, with unequal bargaining power 4 and free riders. 5 World Bank economists Aaditya Mattoo and Sacha Wunsch first examined 6 the possibility of a model schedule of full market access and national 7 treatment commitments based on a positive list of IT and BPO related 8 services at 2–3-digit level, using the updated CPC 1.1 classification. They 9 concluded that this would still produce a static schedule and only cover 40111 standard IT and BPO. Their preferred option was a plurilateral approach 1 where a critical mass of members made commitments to remove restrictions 2 on cross border trade, except for a narrow and closed list of services (Mattoo 3 and Wunsch, 2004, pp 24–5). Governments would also sign away the right 44111 to introduce new restrictions. Trade in people 203

1111 Mattoo and Wunsch were frank that the purpose of a model schedule was 2 to lock in the current state of openness and pre-empt a backlash against 3 offshoring, and pressures for trade barriers, in the US. They argued that a lock- 4 in would put the responsibility for adjustment costs onto US domestic policy, 5 instead of creating barriers to trade. While this departed from the GATS 6 tradition of flexibility, they said it was justified by the ‘obvious protectionist 7 danger from countries retaining the freedom to impose restrictions on cross- 8 border trade’. Developing countries would also need to shed their ‘aversion 9 to giving up policy discretion and overcome domestic opposition’ to opening 1011 their domestic markets to international competition (Mattoo and Wunsch, 1 2004, pp 30–1). The authors suggested the US and EU might be persuaded 2 to agree because it would guarantee market access for their companies and 3111 affirm the ‘development’ dimension of the Doha round. 4 Chanda proposed a complementary raft of stricter rules on regulatory 5 transparency, domestic regulation and mutual recognition (Chanda, 2004, 6 pp 35–41). The guidelines on mutual recognition agreements for accountancy 7 could be adapted to other professions and provide the basis for a legally 8 binding multilateral agreement on recognition. Obligations to ensure 9 transparency, objectivity and least burdensome requirements for recognition 20111 could be scheduled as ‘other commitments’ under Article XVIII, although 1 this would still leave problems for occupations such as construction that 2 had no paper qualifications, and for countries without advanced accreditation 3 systems. Removal of the limitations on domestic regulation disciplines 4 contained in Article VI:4 could be included in the proposed schedule of 5 horizontal mode 4 commitments. 6 All these proposals were totally unrealistic. The 40-odd initial offers on 7 mode 4 (EC as 1) showed very limited movement, most of which reflected 8 members’ own offensive interests.7 The US made no improvements on GATS 9 1994. Chanda complained that: ‘There is still no clear separation of mode 30111 4 from immigration rules and procedures and the distinction between 1 permanent and temporary movement is still not evident from the commitments’ 2 (Chanda, 2004, p 23). In other words, destination governments were not 3 buying into the legal artifice and remained protective of their immigration 4 policies. 5 Annex C of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, which was brokered 6 between India, Brazil and the developed countries, offered nothing to 7 Southern governments in lower skilled services categories. It identified specific 8 objectives for ‘new and improved’ commitments in mode 1, primarily to 9 lock in existing levels of market access, and in mode 4 that aimed to remove 40111 or reduce economic needs tests for contractual service suppliers, independent 1 professionals, intra-corporate transferees and business visitors. Both should 2 be de-linked from commercial presence. 3 The model schedule on mode 4 re-emerged in a diluted form in the 2006 44111 plurilateral request, led by India on behalf of larger developing countries and 204 Serving whose interests?

1111 made to nine other members.8 The request apparently attracted little 2 response. The plurilateral request on cross-border services was also led by 3 India.9 Despite their interest in e-commerce, neither the US nor the EC were 4 parties. The request combined modes 1 and 2, seeking parallel commitments 5 in both modes to avoid uncertainties over the classification of electronic 6 delivery. The demandeurs sought the removal of limitations on mode 1 for 7 ‘technical infeasibility’ and requirements of associated commercial presence. 8 They also requested full national treatment on a long list of sub-sectors across 9 business, telecommunications, distribution, financial, tourism, recreation and 1011 culture, and transport services. Commitments on computer related services 1 at the two-digit classification level would accommodate rapid technological 2 changes, and other commitments should use the new (but uncertain) category 3 of CPC Rev. 1.1 Other Business Services: Other Support Services. 4 5 The bilateral challenge 6 7 As with most other sectors, the stalemate on modes 1 and 4 in GATS 2000 8 shifted attention to the regional and bilateral levels. This built on existing 9 arrangements to produce a complex spectrum of approaches to temporary 20111 migration (Chanda, 2004, p 7). The EU, the European Economic Area, and 1 the ANZCERTA provide for full mobility of labour and all service suppliers. 2 NAFTA and CARICOM guarantee mobility for certain categories and 3 occupations. The US/Jordan FTA and ASEAN FTA contain GATS-plus 4 liberalisation using the GATS architecture. An APEC Business Travel Card 5 facilitates entry for temporary business visitors among APEC members. The 6 US/Chile and US/Singapore FTAs reserve visa quotas for entry to the US. 7 The NZ/Thailand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement has no services 8 chapter, but includes limited and specific provisions on labour mobility. 9 ACP governments demanded mode 4 commitments at lower skills levels in 30111 their EPA negotiations with the EC; the EC responded that immigration 1 was a matter for its member states. The CARIFORUM-EC EPA contained 2 a chapter that applied only to key managerial and specialist personnel, 3 graduate trainees, business services sellers, contractual services suppliers 4 and independent professionals. 5 The shift of focus to the bilateral level also increased the opportunities 6 for trade unions to exert direct political pressure. Conceptually and politically, 7 trade in services agreements strike at the heart of the corporatist compromises 8 that were reached between labour, capital and the state during the twentieth 9 century. In place of tripartism, these agreements only recognise commercial 40111 service suppliers and states and are negotiated in arenas to which capital 1 has privileged access and labour is excluded. The growing importance of 2 this form of meta-regulation compounds the narrowing of the political space 3 for organised labour to influence national policy and regulation under 44111 neoliberalism. Trade in people 205

1111 The driving ambition of the International Confederation of Free Trade 2 Unions (ICFTU) (now the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)), 3 which the European and American unions have traditionally dominated, 4 has been to gain a seat alongside capital at the WTO table. There is no 5 remote prospect of that ever being agreed to. At the first WTO ministerial 6 meeting in Singapore in 1996, reiterated at every subsequent ministerial, 7 Southern governments have insisted that trade and labour is a matter for 8 the ILO. The dogged commitment of the ICFTU/ITUC to their engagement 9 strategy has precluded a more critical stance that confronts the political 1011 economy of trade liberalisation. Even if trade unions were at the WTO 1 table, they would be impotent to protect the basic rights and needs of their 2 members because there is no legal or ideological space for their issues to 3111 be heard. The raison d’être of the WTO, including the GATS, is progressive 4 liberalisation that removes barriers to the profitability of international 5 capital; trade unions are intrinsically one such barrier. 6 A second, enduring goal of the ICFTU/ITUC is to inscribe the core ILO 7 labour standards relating to the right to organise and bargain collectively, 8 non-discrimination and child labour in all trade treaties. That would require 9 a consensus of WTO members that will never be achieved. There is a greater 20111 prospect for success at the bilateral and regional level, where the inclusion 1 of labour side-agreements or social chapters depends largely on political 2 disposition, union strength and the balance of power between the negotiating 3 parties. In 2007, for example, the Democratic Party majority in the US 4 Congress insisted there must be stronger labour provisions in the US free 5 trade agreements with Panama and Peru before it would ratify them.10 Peru 6 complied: the US–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement approved by Congress 7 in November 2007 contains a number of labour-related obligations, 8 including a requirement for each party to ‘adopt and maintain’ core labour 9 rights in its laws and practices. President of the American Federation of Labor 30111 and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) John Sweeney reflected 1 on the turbulent history of labour provisions, noting that the Peru agreement: 2 3 represents major progress over the Jordan FTA, which required only 4 that countries ‘strive to ensure’ that their laws recognise and protect 5 the core labour standards. It is an enormous improvement over all the 6 agreements previously negotiated by the Bush administration (Chile, 7 Singapore, Morocco, Australia, Bahrain, DR-CAFTA, and Oman), 8 which required only that countries enforce their own domestic labor 9 laws. . . . [But] we are justifiably skeptical about whether the Bush 40111 Administration will faithfully enforce the newly negotiated labor and 1 environment protections . . .11 2 3 As with their engagement strategy, the preoccupation of peak union bodies 44111 with the social clause diverts their attention from more systemic issues. 206 Serving whose interests?

1111 Trade in services agreements threaten the livelihoods of workers through 2 competitive deregulation, foreign investment liberalisation, removal of 3 domestic preferences, elimination of labour market tests and other core 4 demands. Trade liberalisation in agriculture, industry and natural resources 5 contributes to the push and pull factors that impel workers to migrate 6 internally and offshore, often into highly exploitative services industries. 7 These threats to workers are not matters of core labour standards; they are 8 endemic to a free trade paradigm that perpetuates a grossly unequal 9 international division of labour that is still delineated on traditional social 1011 class and North/South lines and denies human beings the fundamental rights 1 to livelihoods, security, voice and dignity. 2 3 4 CASE STUDY 11 CALL CENTRES – THE ASSEMBLY 5 LINE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 6 7 When the international call centre phenomenon took off in the late 1990s, 8 it spawned a new pejorative: to be ‘Bangalored’. This colonial-infused 9 imagery refers to ‘people who have been laid off from a multinational 20111 because their job has been moved to India’.12 American academics Kate 1 Bronfenbrenner and Stephanie Luce urge a more sophisticated understanding 2 that offshore outsourcing ‘is not a story of good jobs being stolen by 3 low-wage workers in Latin America and Asia’, but rather a search by the 4 world’s largest multinationals ‘for ever-cheaper production costs . . . and 5 the flexibility that comes from diverse supply chains in a volatile global 6 economic and political climate’ (Bronfenbrenner and Luce, 2004, pp 78–9). 7 The call centre story reveals what the abstract ‘mode 1: cross-border 8 trade in services’ obscures: that outsourcing redistributes power and wealth 9 from labour to capital, whether in the US, Canada, Shanghai or Bangalore. 30111 The influential outsourcing industry lobbies hard for this outcome. 1 Accenture, a reincarnation of Arthur Andersen Consulting, employed over 2 158,000 people in 49 countries in 2007 with net revenues of $16.65 billion.13 3 An active promoter of privatisation, it led the expansion of call centres into 4 public utilities in the US and Canada, and specialises in providing outsourced 5 social services for governments. Although it is registered in Bermuda, 6 Accenture has been active in both the European Services Forum and the US 7 Coalition of Service Industries. Another major player in the call centre 8 business is Convergys, which grew out of Cincinnati Bell. Convergys reported 9 total revenue in 2006 of ‘just’ $2.8 billion. It claims more than 74,000 40111 employees servicing customers in over 70 countries using 35 languages.14 1 Both firms have a major presence in India. But they do not wield the 2 political clout of India’s home-grown transnationals. Wipro and Infosys are 3 India’s oldest, and most influential, IT firms respectively. Wipro began as 44111 a factory making cooking oil and laundry soap in 1945 and entered the IT Trade in people 207

1111 industry when IBM quit India in 1977. By 2007 the company had 30 offices 2 and 50,000 employees worldwide, including a ‘nearshoring’ facility in 3 Romania.15 Infosys set up in India in 1981 and the US in 1987. In 2006 it 4 crossed the $2 billion revenue threshold. With 66,000 employees in 44 5 countries, Infosys has become the icon of the Indian IT industry and arguably 6 its most powerful player.16 7 The industry’s promoters promise massive gains for buyers and sellers 8 from offshoring their IT-enabled services (ITES), especially BPO, and flow- 9 on benefits to local and national economies. The global consultancy firms 1011 that provide these ‘independent’ reports, often jointly with the local industry 1 association, are themselves key players in the outsourcing game. They are 2 also major advocates and beneficiaries of the GATS. 3111 Their projections are seductive and treated as factual, even though their 4 assumptions and methodology are questionable. The most consistently 5 influential analyst is the McKinsey Global Institute, an ‘independent think 6 tank’ within McKinsey & Company. Its staff are primarily consultants 7 seconded from the parent firm’s outsourcing/BPO division. One of the most 8 quoted McKinsey reports, produced in 2004, claimed that every dollar US 9 companies transfer to India through outsourcing creates as much as $1.46 20111 in new wealth. Of that $1.46, India receives 33 cents. The US economy 1 captures the remaining $1.13 through cost savings, increased exports, 2 repatriated earnings and $0.45–$0.47 in ‘additional economic output 3 created when US workers are reemployed in other jobs’ (Agrawal and Farrell, 4 2003). Offshoring clearly does produce substantial cost savings and 5 improved profits for some US firms. However, critics object that the benefits 6 for individual firms cannot simply be projected onto the US economy as a 7 8 whole. Further, aggregated gains to firms, or the wider economy, hide the 9 redistribution of wealth from workers to capital, and not all displaced 30111 workers find new jobs (Bivens, 2005). 1 McKinsey is everywhere. In a 2004 report they argued that Germany was 2 missing out on similar gains to the US because hiring and firing was too 3 difficult, and the wage floor provided by collective bargaining and social 4 protections inhibited those workers who lost their jobs from taking lower 5 paid re-employment: 6 7 Germany’s labor laws and product market regulations were designed 8 to achieve important social objectives, such as protecting workers’ 9 incomes and preserving employment. But over the past two decades, 40111 one lesson has become clear: mixing social and economic policy reduces 1 employment and slows growth. By decoupling these policies, Germany 2 could boost economic growth and employ more people and thus be 3 better able to finance its social agenda. 44111 (Farrell, 2004, p 13) 208 Serving whose interests?

1111 In 2005, the South African government received a Business Process 2 Outsourcing and Offshoring strategy prepared by McKinsey. The government 3 had created a public private partnership with its Business Trust and the 4 newly created South Africa Contact Centre Community (Sacccom), a 5 business lobby for the call centre and BPO industry. The McKinsey strategy 6 aimed to attract R1.4 billion ($200 million) in foreign investment by 2008 7 and create 100,000 jobs. Achieving that would require 40,000 to 60,000 8 personnel to be trained each year, mainly at managerial level. But to be 9 competitive South Africa would have to cut operating (mainly labour) costs 1011 by around 25 per cent. Business sources said the departments of Labour 1 and Trade and Industry were committed to the strategy, including new 2 flexible labour laws (Robinson, 2005). 3 Such grand projections are premised on, but gloss over, the fact that 4 offshore outsourcing is highly competitive, differentiated and itinerant. One 5 industry survey in 2006 suggested ‘[t]he IT Outsourcing boom appears to 6 be over, onshore providers are facing new pressures, and companies are 7 outsourcing more selectively’ (DiamondCluster International Inc., 2006). 8 While 75 per cent of respondents currently outsourced to India, China had 9 rapidly appeared on their horizon and a majority of Indian providers planned 20111 to invest there. Canada was relatively effective at marketing the benefits of 1 language, culture and time zone to the US, but Eastern Europe, Ireland and 2 Latin America were finding it hard to generate demand. 3 When governments gamble on outsourcing and fail, it is their workers 4 and communities who pay the price. A public relations drive in the US and 5 Canada promoted call centres as an opportunity to fill the unemployment 6 vacuum faced by small towns. These onshore call centres are the most 7 vulnerable. For example, the Sykes Corporation, which runs call centres 8 for Microsoft and SBC, began operating in economically depressed American 9 communities in the late 1990s, lured by tax incentives. In 2004 the company 30111 began closing these operations to move offshore. Some 1,800 workers were 1 laid off. Their devastated communities were left with the fiscal deficit from 2 the incentives, and no alternative income to keep the local economy afloat. 3 The same pattern was evident in the UK. Official sources reported in 2001 4 that one-third of new jobs created were in call centres. By 2004, communities 5 devastated once by outsourcing of their major manufacturing plant were 6 facing a second wave of offshoring of their replacement jobs (Bronfenbrenner 7 and Luce, 2004, p 74). 8 The unparalleled success story appears to be India. Bangalore, Mumbai, 9 Delhi and several other cities cashed in early on the outsourcing boom. By 40111 2004/5 India had captured 65 per cent of the global market for offshore 1 IT services and 46 per cent of global BPO. The software and services industry 2 generated $13.5 billion in earnings that year, including $10 billion in exports. 3 The ITES-BPO sector grew by 37 per cent in 2006, faster than the software 44111 sector, with exports reaching $4.6 billion. The two largest activities were Trade in people 209

1111 customer interaction services and finance and accounting (Upadhya and 2 Vasavi, 2006, p 8). The Indian government celebrated the IT revolution as 3 the pathway to a resurgent India Shining. A NASSCOM McKinsey report 4 in 2005 projected a massive $60 billion in export revenues from IT and 5 ITES in the next five years, with 2.3 million people in direct employment 6 and ‘indirect and induced employment’ for another 6.5 million workers 7 (NASSCOM, 2005, p 19). 8 Karnataka (whose capital is Bangalore) was the first state to develop an 9 IT policy, in 1997. Within two years, the state had vested planning authority 1011 in a new Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF), headed by the managing 1 director of Infosys. In 2002, the government adopted a Millennium BPO 2 Policy, developed with McKinsey, which aimed to create one million jobs 3111 by 2010.17 Firms were promised an ‘investor-friendly’ environment, with 4 fiscal incentives such as exemptions from import tax on computer hardware 5 and capital goods, other tax holidays, free or subsidised infrastructure and 6 land, priority power connections and exemptions from power cuts. A Single 7 Window clearance mechanism provided fast-tracked approvals that bypassed 8 other departments and local bodies. The Karnataka Industries (Facilitation) 9 Bill 2002 simplified the regulatory framework. Bangalore was run by and 20111 for the IT industry. A World Bank senior adviser remarked approvingly in 1 2004: ‘The story of growth in Bangalore is unique because it is being led 2 by private entrepreneurs from the IT industry. The BATF model of civil 3 society being involved in all aspects of city planning can be a model to 4 other cities in other countries.’18 The controversial BATF office was 5 eventually closed down, but the IT sector continued to drive the Bangalore 6 Development Authority’s decisions. 7 Bangalore became known as the Silicon Valley of India. The city’s website 8 celebrates its (undated) UNDP ranking as the fourth best technology hub 9 in the world. By 2004, the IT sector accounted for 50 per cent of total 30111 transactions in the central business district and 97 per cent in the suburbs. 1 The number of registered IT companies more than doubled over six years, 2 although the majority were very small. The largest were ‘captive units’ of 3 transnational companies or niche third party providers. 4 A secondary industry of property developers has emerged, promoting 5 new office complexes, gated residential colonies, shopping malls, gyms, 6 colleges, a railway station, helipads and more. Demand boosted land prices 7 from Rs2,203 ($50) per hectare in 1982 to Rs8,747,501 ($206,000) in 8 2004. The potential profits are staggering: a 10-year Royal Garden City 9 project into which the Vancouver-based Royal Indian Raj International 40111 Corporation invested $2.9 billion had an estimated ultimate retail value of 1 $8.9 billion.19 2 As the IT industry increasingly colonises the neighbouring semi-urban 3 and rural areas, local farmers are forced to sell their lands to the government, 44111 or at a slight premium to speculators. Village panchayats have no control. 210 Serving whose interests?

1111 Arkavarthi, the Bangalore Development Authority’s biggest residential 2 layout with 20,000 proposed sites, extends over 16 villages. Local villagers 3 successfully challenged the plan in court, but lost on appeal and could not 4 afford a prolonged Supreme Court hearing in New Delhi. A large police 5 presence was deployed to quell their continued protests. One villager 6 describes the impact on local people and livelihoods: 7 8 Our entire land was rich in agriculture and we used to grow mangoes, 9 coconut, grapes, flowers, brinjal and many other vegetables. Everything 1011 has been destroyed. I had 20,000 flower bushes on which 300 labourers 1 used to work. I will get some compensation but what about these 300 2 workers? They never figure in any compensation proposals and are the 3 worst affected.20 4 5 Some of those displaced had already taken up jobs as cleaners, drivers and 6 servants in nearby plush apartment complexes. 7 Everything in Bangalore is now designed to service the IT sector. The 8 state government has poured money into IT parks, an outer ring road and 9 flyovers, a metro system, an international airport and an 8,000-hectare IT 20111 corridor. All this feeds into a jammed city that faces a deepening crisis in 1 roads, water, sanitation, sewerage and public transport. Poor maintenance 2 and broken pipes leave local people dependent on public fountains with 3 contaminated water. In 2005, the 75,000 residents in Dodallpuru town 4 received 10 minutes of water every five days. Short cuts and poor planning 5 have caused unprecedented floods. French consultants prepared a 6 Comprehensive Development Plan in 2005 that redefined Bangalore’s slums 7 as ‘shadow areas’ – they encompass 48 per cent of the population. Despite 8 its privileges, the industry constantly complains about poor infrastructure 9 and threatens to leave.21 30111 The state’s rationale for the IT strategy was to create employment. A 1 Board for IT Education Standards (BITES) was given the job of removing 2 bottlenecks in Karanataka’s ‘Human Resource Bank’ through programmes 3 across schools, colleges and professional training. To ‘create an optimal 4 environment for growth’ in the sector, Karnataka ‘simplified’ its labour 5 laws by removing ‘barriers’ to employing women at night, flexi-working 6 hours and mandatory weekly days off. 22 Direct IT employment in Bangalore 7 exploded from 20,000 in 1999 to an estimated 200,000 to 250,000 of the 8 city’s nearly 7 million in 2005 (Upadhya and Vasavi, 2006, p 15). About 9 two-thirds of those workers came from outside Bangalore. Some 35 per 40111 cent of the BPO jobs in Bangalore in 2005 involved low-end customer care 1 such as ticketing, payroll, telemarketing by phone and internet. 2 Ruth Buchanan describes call centres as a new kind of work for a new 3 class of ‘faceless and placeless’ workers who animate the scripts of the post- 44111 industrial economy (Buchanan, 2002, p 47). The production process is both Trade in people 211

1111 highly Fordist – tasks are geographically and conceptually segmented from 2 the centre of the enterprise – and Taylorist with ‘very exact, rigid, and 3 “panoptical” systems of monitoring, measurement, and management, 4 using sophisticated computer and telecommunication systems that bind the 5 human worker tightly to the machine’ (Upadhya and Vasavi, 2006, p 139). 6 Buchanan quotes the self-perception of Rosa, a call centre worker in New 7 Brunswick: ‘you are standing waiting until that call comes in to use you to 8 make money. And you are simply another part of that machine’ (Buchanan, 9 2002, p 62). 1011 Comparative studies of call centre workers in the US and India document 1 many similar experiences (CEC (Centre for Education and Communication) 2 et al., 2006; Upadhya and Vasavi, 2006). The centres have their own 3111 gendered hierarchies, with men predominating in technical and financial 4 sectors, and women at the monotonous, low-skilled bottom end. The 5 employer has absolute power over the working relationship through 6 performance metrics, electronic monitoring, scripted texts and productivity 7 targets. The work is allocated by Automatic Call Distributors and Predictive 8 Dialling. Workers face contradictory obligations to maximise efficiency while 9 maintaining customer orientation, including deference to abusive customers. 20111 High levels of job-related stress contribute to significant health problems, 1 with Indian workers in one survey reporting high levels of stomach disorders 2 (CEC et al., 2006, p 80). 3 Cost-cutting drives the call centre industry, which means it is intrinsically 4 anti-union. Significantly, two-thirds of 249 call centre workers surveyed in 5 three Indian cities agreed that a union was required; when asked their 6 preferred kind of employee association, 38 per cent again said a union (CEC 7 et al., 2006, p 88). Fledgling attempts to unionise have been stifled and 8 workers who persist are terminated. When unions announced plans to 9 organise the call centres following the rape and murder of a young woman 30111 worker in Bangalore in December 2005, the reaction of NASSCOM and 1 employers was hostile.23 Unionised call centres in the US appear to be 2 particular targets for offshore outsourcing, even though in-house unionised 3 call centres generally have the best-trained and most stable workforce, with 4 the best reputation and customer satisfaction ratings (Bronfenbrenner and 5 Luce, 2004, pp 36–8). Indian labour organisers and US unions have 6 responded to these common challenges by developing collaborative research, 7 exchanges and strategies (CEC et al., 2006). 8 However, there are also significant cross-national differences. Bangalore’s 9 call centre workers are better qualified than their US counterparts: 92 per 40111 cent in one study were graduates and 18 per cent had postgraduate degrees. 1 Yet their main recruitment criteria are ‘soft skills’ of fluency in English, 2 language skills and ‘cultural capital’. The Indian workers are paid around 3 six times less than their US counterparts; adjustments for purchasing power 44111 parity reduce the wage gap to around 25 per cent (CEC et al., 2006, p 89). 212 Serving whose interests?

1111 Actual salaries in India are highly discretionary and confidential. They are 2 based on quantitative and qualitative performance metrics that include 3 subjective parameters such as tone of voice, language (grammar), accent, 4 problem solving and customer satisfaction. Firms balance the benefits of 5 retaining and churning the workforce: one firm calculated it needed 270 6 days to cover costs of recruitment, induction and training; after two years 7 workers became too expensive and ‘anti-retention’ strategies kicked in. 8 Around a quarter are contract workers, which give the employer added 9 flexibility (Upadhya and Vasavi, 2006, pp 133–5). 1011 Indian workers also face higher levels of work intensity than their US 1 counterparts. One study reported that an employer required workers to be 2 engaged in calls for 94 per cent of work time, demanding near-impossible levels 3 of concentration. Efficiencies and self-discipline are achieved through 4 individual monitoring, team-based competitions and peer pressure. Night shifts 5 that coincide with US time zones and six-day working weeks create social 6 isolation and family tensions. Caller hostility and racism are emotionally 7 demanding. So is maintaining a cultural pretence. While most clients are content 8 with ‘accent neutralisation’, some specify assumed accents and identities in their 9 Service Level Agreements (Upadhya and Vasavi, 2006, p 130). 20111 Call centre workers everywhere complain that the work is monotonous 1 and high stress. Celebrated author Arundhati Roy has described the centres 2 as glorified sweatshops producing ‘cybercoolies’.24 Despite the stressful 3 conditions, three-quarters of workers in one Indian study described the work 4 as challenging or satisfying and nearly 60 per cent saw it as a career option 5 (CEC et al., 2006, pp 58–9). This paradox can be attributed to the success 6 of ‘soft management’ techniques. The socialisation process begins at the 7 initial training: ‘army-style “boot camp” techniques are aimed at producing 8 fully socialised and indoctrinated service workers, incorporating them into 9 the company’s culture and its philosophy of customer service, and retaining 30111 them through social bonding’ (Upadhya and Vasavi, 2006, p 131). 1 An illusion of status is created through designations as customer relations 2 executives or customer service associates. Whereas US call centres usually 3 have four levels of hierarchy, in India there are 10. Most centres have 4 specialist departments for rewards and recognition, and invest in creating 5 a ‘fun’ workplace for their young, largely unmarried workforce (Upadhya 6 and Vasavi, 2006, p 147). Competition and high stress are mitigated by 7 the ‘hip’ work environment, loud rock music and hedonistic intra-firm 8 socialising that many outsiders view as being not quite respectable. Dubbed 9 ‘Zippies’ and ‘Liberalisation’s Children’, call centre workers represent the 40111 new post-colonial youth culture of conspicuous consumption that is 1 emerging in large Indian cities.25 India Shining is symbolised by shopping 2 malls, chic bar-cafés and designer brand clothes. While some critics see the 3 phenomenon as cultural imperialism, sociologists Upadhya and Vasavi urge 44111 a more nuanced interpretation: Trade in people 213

1111 Rather than understanding the BPO phenomenon as representing a 2 straightforward ‘cultural invasion’ by the West, it must be situated within 3 the political economy of outsourcing, which has produced a new kind 4 of labour force that is managed (like the IT workforce) through culture 5 as much as through computerised surveillance systems. . . . Like any 6 system of cultural control or domination, there is always scope for 7 agency, resistance, and critique by workers. 8 (Upadhya and Vasavi, 2006, pp 154–5) 9 1011 Their subversion takes passive as well as active forms, including embryonic 1 moves to organise workers within individual companies on a transnational 2 basis. 3111 The more pressing question for Upadhya and Vasavi, among others, is 4 whether the IT-driven strategy for India Shining, which in turn drives its 5 GATS strategy, is economically, socially and culturally sustainable. The old 6 compromise between the state and middle class under the Nehruvian disposition 7 is being replaced by a new relationship between the political élite 8 and the IT industry. As the state becomes embedded within private and 9 global capital, those interests divert the formation of policy across education, 20111 infrastructure, investment and social development from addressing the 1 endemic poverty of the rural and urban masses. Existing class and caste 2 divisions intensify. Upadhya and Vasavi describe the IT sector as ‘an outpost 3 of global capital within a largely agrarian and still industrialising economy’ 4 5 (Upadhya and Vasavi, 2006, p 8). Call centres offer a high wage, but low 6 quality option to a small section of young, educated unemployed within 7 the politically powerful middle class. Even 1 million IT workers would 8 amount to just one quarter of 1 per cent of all India’s workers. 9 India’s preoccupation with IT also ignores the vulnerability of an 30111 export-oriented industry that is skewed towards low-value, low-cost services 1 that are outsourced from the US. The industry could be plunged into 2 a steep decline by declining competitiveness, especially relative to China, a 3 recession in the global economy, and a deepening political backlash in 4 the US. 5 6 7 CASE STUDY 12 TAKING NURSES AND SOLDIERS 8 TO MARKET 9 40111 On 11 December 2005, Hong Kong’s Victoria Park was filled with Filipina, 1 Thai and Indonesian maids on their day off. That was nothing unusual; 2 thousands gather there every Sunday. What marked this occasion was their 3 leading role in the opening mobilisation to oppose the sixth WTO ministerial 44111 conference being hosted by the Hong Kong government. This action was 214 Serving whose interests?

1111 the culmination of workshops, education forums and demonstrations held 2 throughout 2005, which built on their (relatively) successful protests over 3 proposed cuts to their wages and contract conditions from 2001 to 2003.26 4 Many of these domestic workers are college-educated nurses or teachers 5 who have not seen their children for several years, having left them at home 6 in the care of family members or paid caregivers. Some are now ‘illegals’, 7 trapped in a foreign land where they have no status and are exploited and 8 often abused but that they cannot afford to leave. Their stories, as portrayed 9 in speeches, placards and street theatre, brought to life the social realities 1011 of mode 4. Two kilometres away, their governments were seeking to 1 expand guaranteed access for temporary migrants, as a trade-off for deeper 2 liberalisation of their agriculture, industry, natural resources and services – 3 the very policies the women blame for forcing them to leave their homes 4 and families. 5 The Hong Kong mobilisations were the public and politicised face of 6 a rapidly growing and highly gendered global industry built around 7 remittances. For 30 years the Philippines has dominated this ‘trade’ (Lindio- 8 McGovern, 2004; Choy, 2003). In the past decade, the export of women’s 9 and men’s labour from the global South has intensified. The World Bank 20111 estimates that over $250 billion was remitted from overseas workers to 1 developing countries in 2005 through official and informal channels, up 2 60 per cent in four years (Ratha and Shaw, 2006). Faced with deepening 3 poverty, and the prospect of earning over 20 times more than at home, 4 temporary migration-for-remittances has become a worldwide strategy for 5 household survival. A complex institutional and commercial infrastructure 6 has emerged to facilitate and profit from this cross-border trade in people 7 and associated capital flows. 8 What rational choice theorists portray as personal choice is embedded in 9 the structural inequality of global capitalism. The Pacific island of Fiji is 30111 a classic example. The Fijian government has dutifully pursued the goal 1 of a competitive export-driven economy through a disabling combination of 2 structural adjustment and trade liberalisation (Slatter, 2006b). Fiji’s fragile 3 export economy depends on eroding trade preferences for sugar and 4 garments. The former are now WTO-illegal, and drove the grossly inequitable 5 EPA negotiations on goods that were concluded with the EC in November 6 2007; the latter are subject to periodic short-term renegotiation with 7 Australia. Public sector restructuring failed to deliver an end of corruption 8 and left Fiji’s physical and social infrastructure in disarray. Even subsistence lifestyles at village level are severely stressed in an increasingly cash-based 9 consumer economy. 40111 Fiji’s economy took a further hit in December 2006 when the country 1 suffered its third military-led coup in 20 years. Each coup has impacted 2 heavily on tourism, Fiji’s other major foreign exchange earner, and on the 3 broader economy. The coups have also prompted the exodus of a range of 44111 skilled professional and trades people, who can gain entry into countries Trade in people 215

1111 such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Reflecting the ethnically 2 charged nature of the coups, the majority of these migrants are Fiji islanders 3 of Indian descent.27 4 There has also been an upsurge in temporary migration. For years, Fijian 5 women have sought better paid work in Australia and New Zealand, the 6 US and the Gulf states, mainly as nurses, caregivers and teachers. Men 7 from the regular army and the reserves have signed up for well-paid UN 8 peacekeeping duties or, along with civilians, joined the British Army. 9 New ‘market opportunities’ have emerged since 2000 with the chronic 1011 international shortage of nurses and care givers, and the wars in Afghanistan 1 and Iraq. By 2006 official remittances comprised the country’s second largest 2 foreign exchange earner after tourism; informal remittances would make 3111 the figure much higher. 4 Faced with a cumulative crisis in unemployment, poverty and balance of 5 payments, and encouraged by both the World Bank and Asian Development 6 Bank (Connell and Brown, 2005; World Bank, 2006), the Fiji government 7 embraced remittances as a positive development strategy. By redefining 8 migration-for-remittances as mode 4 of trade in services, the government 9 hoped to circumvent the racism that historically attaches to migration from 20111 the Pacific. Using the ‘trade’ discourse, the government argued that mode 1 4 market access in categories such as teaching, nursing, tourism and security 2 would allow the island to capitalise on its comparative advantage and 3 encourage temporary, rather than permanent, migration.28 4 This rationale informed Fiji’s requests in the GATS 2000 and the EPA 5 negotiations with the EC. In return for a guaranteed entry quota, Fiji was 6 willing to consider further liberalisation of agriculture, goods, services and 7 investment – a trade-off that would deepen the economy’s remittance 8 dependency. The prospect of concessions in mode 4 was also a stated 9 prerequisite for negotiations with Australia and New Zealand for regional 30111 economic integration agreement under the Pacific Agreement on Closer 1 Economic Relations (PACER). 2 By mid-2007 there was no prospect that Fiji would achieve significant 29 3 new access under mode 4 from anywhere. Yet migration for remittances 4 continued to grow as a socio-economic response to push and pull factors. 5 Australia and New Zealand were happy to continue sucking out nurses and 6 teachers, trained at Fijian taxpayer expense or with aid funding, to 7 compensate for their own loss of skilled workers, failed health policies and 8 under-investment in training and social services. The demand for security 9 workers in Iraq and other conflict zones also seemed, tragically, insatiable. 40111 The Fijian government rationalised this organic outflow as part of its trade 1 strategy, a fiction that absolved it from examining the broader economic, 2 social, cultural and development implications. The combination of remittance 3 dependency, Fiji’s weak regulatory capacity and the trade rubric allowed 44111 foreign and local commercial interests to exploit this ‘twenty-first century form of blackbirding’ without effective constraints.30 216 Serving whose interests?

1111 In economic terms, the outflow of ‘human capital’ from Fiji each year 2 has been estimated to cost the economy, directly and indirectly, some F$44.5 3 ($28) million a year, with nursing migration being a significant factor (Reddy 4 et al., 2004; Storey, 2005, pp 11–12). Between 1999 and 2001, the net 5 outflow of Fijian nurses exceeded the number trained. Political instability 6 was a factor in this, with a reported exodus of Indo-Fijian nurses following 7 the 2000 coup. There was little incentive for expatriate nurses to bring 8 their skills home. One survey showed Fijian nurses were paid an average 9 A$9,322 ($7,866) as migrants and A$3,080 ($2,600) on their return, just 1011 A$560 ($472) more than non-migrant nurses (Brown and Connell, 2006, 1 p 159). The same authors predicted in 2004 that the ‘skill drain is likely 2 to continue, where there have been structural reforms that reduce public 3 sector employment, wages and salaries remain unequal, working conditions 4 are difficult and hierarchical, international recruitment intensifies and many 5 kin are overseas’ (Brown and Connell, 2004, p 208). 6 The exodus of nurses had slowed in 2003 and 2004, but began rising 7 again in 2005.31 The government was under pressure to increase the numbers 8 of nurses trained, both to fill the gap created by those who leave and to 9 capitalise on opportunities for work offshore. Around 2,000 Fijians, mainly 20111 women, had been applying for public nurse training each year but as of 1 2006 only 120 to 140 places were available. The course used to be fully 2 subsidised, with a three-year bond. While this helped retain newly trained 3 nurses, it meant the more experienced nurses went offshore, depleting the 4 small pool of nursing expertise and undermining the public health service. 5 A ‘cost-sharing’ alternative allowed nurses to pay a fee to avoid the bond. 6 Most students funded this by advances on their (parents’) Fiji National 7 Provident Fund (FNPF) pension. 8 Limited access to training in the public system created a market for private 9 health and caregiver courses, primarily geared for export. These full fee 30111 courses were also eligible for advances on the provident fund. Other students 1 borrowed from relatives, village trusts or church funds, raised loans, or 2 relied on remittances from their parents or relatives. The nature and quality 3 of private health care educators varied enormously. A respected local 4 charitable trust (Sangam) opened a government-licensed private nursing 5 college in 2004 and charged $F5,000 ($3,137) a year. The government 6 denied similar accreditation to a private tertiary education company that 7 mainly offered franchised Australian business studies qualifications, for 8 which ‘graduates’ received 40 of the 100 immigration points they required 9 to migrate to Australia. That private provider then established a two-year 40111 childcare training course that cost $F9,000 ($5,647), the bulk of which 1 went to the Australian franchiser. Again, fees could be paid from the 2 FNPF. Despite a high drop-out rate, there were no refunds. Several former 3 migrant nurses also established basic, small-scale, lower cost courses for 44111 care givers; these attracted no foreign recognition or immigration points, Trade in people 217

1111 but were used by recruitment agencies as evidence of skills training for 2 immigration purposes. 3 Private recruitment agencies, often acting as brokers for further layers 4 of personnel agencies and sub-contractors, have descended like parasites 5 on the remittance industry. Some are shysters. A World Bank report on 6 remittances in 2006 cites the example of a US recruiter who collected $1,200 7 payments from Fijian nurses without providing jobs (World Bank, 2006, 8 p 131). Women with unrecognised caregiver qualifications, and who have 9 no possibility of migrating permanently, are the most vulnerable. 1011 The Fijian Ministry of Labour conceded in 2006 that its process for vetting 1 the contracts of its offshore workers was ineffectual.32 One New Zealand 2 temping agency became renowned for short, unannounced recruitment 3111 blitzes. It ignored the ministry’s complaints about such tactics. The agency 4 targeted women with any health-based training that did not require 5 occupational registration. According to Fijian sources, it charged F$8,000 6 ($5,000) for married women and F$6,000 ($3,700) for unmarried women 7 to join its register. The contractual relationship was with the agency, and 8 each work assignment was separate.33 The hourly rate it paid for a ‘clinical 9 assistant’ in the private or public sector was marginally above New 20111 Zealand’s minimum wage, with some provision for penal rates. However, 1 the ‘assistant’ had to be available to work any hour of the day, any day 2 of the week. There was no guarantee of work, only ‘the opportunity to 3 undertake assignments for a client’. Cost, time and uncertain work hours 4 limited the opportunities to upgrade existing qualifications, meaning that 5 de-skilling, rather than up-skilling, could well occur. If a worker signed the 6 contract after leaving Fiji, the Ministry of Labour said it had no authority 7 to monitor or enforce its conditions. 8 The international literature on remittance migrants who work as nurses 9 and caregivers confirms their vulnerability to abuse and exploitation. 30111 Recruitment agencies commonly keep the women isolated and de-unionised 1 (Manchester, 2005, p 12). The more private the workplace, the greater the 2 risk. This applies even where governments, such as the Philippines, operate 3 the programme. As ‘guest workers’ these women have no direct access to 4 the labour market, no prospect of permanent employment, no job security, 5 and no guarantee of a living weekly income. As migrants, they have no 6 entitlement to social security benefits and are liable to sudden changes in 7 regulations. As women, they face intrusion on their privacy and even their 8 bodies. Constitutionally, they have no access to permanent residence or 9 citizenship in the destination country, and can become disenfranchised 40111 citizens at home. If they overstay, they become criminals; children born to 1 them can fall into a stateless void. The ‘trade’ discourse makes these human 2 costs invisible. 3 The Fiji government’s national export design strategy group on labour 44111 mobility concluded in 2006 that a strategy to train nurses for export was 218 Serving whose interests?

1111 premature. It would be feasible in the medium term (five years), provided 2 an appropriate regulatory regime, mutual recognition arrangements and 3 incentives for retention were in place.34 4 Fiji’s more dominant human export is security workers to conflict zones. 5 By 2006, an estimated 3000 Fijian men were working in Iraq as private 6 contractors or soldiers with the British Army. Fiji’s politics, economy and 7 culture are highly militarised. The army offers attractive job options, primarily 8 for indigenous Fijian men. Teresia Teaiwa cites unofficial estimates of the 9 standing army of regular and territorial forces in 2005 as 10,000 ‘making 1011 Fiji the most militarized independent nation in the Pacific’ (Teaiwa, 2005, 1 p 202). The men can earn double their Fijian wages as UN peacekeepers. 2 Other soldiers and civilians sell their skills to offshore armies, even straight 3 from school. One former Fijian officer working with the British said: ‘In 4 these modern days, our warriors cannot find the resources to look after 5 their families. If there is a greener pasture there, they will automatically 6 resign and try for it.’ In similar vein, the local spokesman for transnational 7 recruitment agency Global Risk observed: ‘My pool can never run dry.’35 8 The ‘reconstruction and relief contracts’ in post-invasion Iraq have 9 generated a massive demand for foreign security workers to guard bases, 20111 energy infrastructure and commercial premises, or to drive and escort 1 conveys. These are privatised military operations that depend on well- 2 disciplined workers who are willing to risk their lives for high returns. In 3 2006, a ‘quartermaster’ conducting guard and escort duties was paid $2,000 4 a month;36 the estimated poverty wage in Fiji was $115 a month. 5 The lead contracts are awarded to companies of US coalition partners 6 or ‘contributing nations’ and operate through a complex chain of 7 subcontractors across many countries. In Fiji, most recruitment firms are 8 subsidiaries of major British and US contractors, such as Homeland Security, 9 ArmorGroup, Global Risk Security and Control Risk. All are headed by 30111 former Fijian military or police officers who can exploit the deep bonds 1 among the powerful élite of politicians, bureaucrats and military. 2 By February 2005, Global Risk had reportedly sent 1,000 men to Iraq.37 3 These foreign-owned firms have standard contracts that are formally 4 checked by Fiji’s Ministry of Labour. A typical contract employs each man 5 as an independent security consultant.38 He is encouraged to adopt ‘efficient 6 working methods’, including longer working hours and sub-contracting. 7 There is no employment relationship. The contract states in three separate 8 places that the men are assuming personal risk and liability. The minimum 9 payment for accidental death is £85,000 ($172,000), but there is no 40111 compensation for death or injury not caused on the job. The men must pay 1 for their own private sickness insurance. This does not cover long-term 2 health problems and trauma when they return home. Those who stay for 3 a further term may spend several months before receiving new contracts, 44111 during which time they are presumably not insured. Trade in people 219

1111 The locally owned recruitment firm Meridian achieved particular notoriety. 2 It provided workers for Kuwait-based Public Warehousing Company 3 (PWC),39 a privatised state enterprise that specialises in warehousing and 4 supply chain services. By May 2005 Meridian had recruited an estimated 5 20,000 mainly non-military indigenous Fijians directly from their villages. 6 Administration fees to Meridian reportedly totalled F$3.5 ($2.15) million 7 in three months. Some were paid by village trust funds and the Methodist 8 church. Months later most recruits still had no contracts. Only 400 men 9 initially went offshore. Many of those later complained of not being paid 1011 (Maclellan, 2007, p 52). 1 Meridian’s boss left Fiji to avoid a police inquiry and set up a new head 2 office in Kuwait. Recruits who left for Iraq signed ‘invitations to contract’ 3111 with Meridian’s Suva agency, which bypassed vetting by the local Ministry 4 of Labour. Their formal contracts were governed by Kuwaiti law and 5 payments were in Kuwaiti dinars. There is no accurate record of how many 6 men Meridian sent to Iraq via Kuwait, but many of the 18 Fijian contractors 7 killed in Iraq by mid-2007 were initially with Meridian. In addition, 11 8 Fijian soldiers with the British Army were killed.40 9 The government initially welcomed the economic opportunity to capitalise 20111 on the country’s military capacity. The acting head of the Ministry of Labour 1 said: 2 3 We are very happy, because it helps to solve our unemployment problem 4 and brings in remittances . . . We are adopting an open market policy. 5 But we are advising people, instead of sending money home every week, 6 to invest it wisely so they will have a more long-term future.41 7 8 The Great Council of Chiefs also rejected concerns, saying only a small 9 percentage of Fiji’s 216,000 men were affected. The foreign exchange they 30111 earned was equivalent to 45 per cent of the national budget, almost double 1 the earnings from sugar.42 After the Meridian scandal, the Cabinet approved 2 an overseas recruitment policy for the licensing of local agents, which 3 required bonds to be lodged as security for wages and various employment 4 protections.43 It seems that this was not enforced. By mid-2006, the 5 unregulated remittance market was becoming a political liability. Local Fijian 6 media reported that ‘[f]amilies of dead guards can be and have been left 7 with little or nothing in the way of compensation for the simple reason that 8 their employers cannot be traced’.44 In one case, the wrong body was sent 9 back to Fiji (Maclellan, 2006). The government said it had no legal 40111 responsibilities for the casualties.45 1 In June 2006, then Prime Minister Qarase called on Fijian ex-servicemen 2 to return to farm their land; a spokesperson for the Iraqi workers blamed 3 the government for failing to provide the funds so they could do so.46 The 44111 UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries expressed concern at the 220 Serving whose interests?

1111 end of their visit to Fiji in May 2007 about the absence of national legislation 2 and measures to protect security workers from exploitive treatment and 3 human rights violations, and to reintegrate them safely into their communities 4 on their return.47 5 The spectre of more deaths hangs over a remittance economy that has 6 become dependent on war and a society that becomes ever more militarised. 7 Fijian women and men will continue to seek temporary work offshore to 8 sustain their families and communities, whether or not Fiji secures mode 4 9 commitments for nurses, caregivers and security workers. The trade discourse 1011 has allowed the government to eschew a whole-of-government approach 1 that addresses the long-term economic, social or cultural impacts on 2 villages, urban communities and the country, and to divest its responsibility 3 to explore alternative development strategies. 4 Avelina Rokoduru describes ‘almost a conspiracy of silence about 5 workers’ rights, in the rush to establish worker mobility in the interests of 6 the ‘market’ and the ‘big players’ (Rokoduru, 2004, p 225). As the ultimate 7 manifestation of the new international division of labour it also allows 8 destinations – and their occupying powers – to ignore the deep structural 9 divide that impels people to risk their lives in someone else’s war. 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 Chapter 7

1111 2 Minds and markets 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 The fractious battle for ‘minds over markets’ reflects profoundly different 4 perceptions of knowledge and culture: one, as a dynamic process of ‘discourse 5 and dialogue’, the other as a static and commodified form of ‘content and 6 artefact’ (Baker, 2002, pp 249–51). Trade in services agreements recognise 7 only the latter. International market exchange requires products that are 8 asocial, ubiquitous and substitutable; government measures that defend and 9 promote the social, particular and unique are condemned as ‘protectionist’. 20111 Defenders of the dialogical ideal insist that it is progressive and dynamic, 1 the antithesis of backward looking protectionism. They perceive public 2 domains of knowledge and culture as unique and contestable arenas for 3 social communication in which people affirm, critique and transform their 4 individual and collective identities and visions for the future. The media’s 5 role as the fourth estate of democratic government is mirrored by the quasi- 6 constitutional role of universities to expand the horizons of knowledge, 7 excite the intellect, and engage critically and independently with the pressing 8 questions of the time. 9 As these paradigms collide, they expose a contradiction that reaches far 30111 beyond either trade in services agreements or culture and education in their 1 specific sense. The ‘regime of accumulation’, to recall Gill’s term, reduces 2 citizens to consumers who are governed by a spectator democracy that is, 3 in turn, subject to supranational disciplines. Yet attempts to embed this 4 redefinition through meta-regulation have failed to dislodge people’s 5 understanding of themselves as social beings, or their commitment to 6 sovereignty and self-determination through complex, participatory and 7 contested polities. 8 This chapter challenges the application of neoclassical trade theory to 9 exchanges of culture and knowledge and the consequences for a vibrant, 40111 complex democracy. A review of OECD and World Bank sponsored 1 neoliberal policies across both domains reveals an awkward hybrid of public 2 goods and dynamic international markets. Pressure from the formidable US 3 entertainment industry to secure control over those markets through trade 44111 in services commitments initially focused on audio-visual services. Those 222 Serving whose interests?

1111 ambitions were largely unfulfilled in the Uruguay round. Renewed attempts 2 in the GATS 2000 negotiations, coupled with increasingly assertive public 3 and private sector ‘edupreneurs’,1 have (so far) been stymied by intense 4 national and international campaigns in defence of the dialogical paradigm 5 of knowledge and cultural exchange. 6 As with public services, however, claims to ‘victory’ would be misleading. 7 The global markets in these services are multifaceted. The production and 8 exchange of knowledge and cultural ‘products’ increasingly depends on the 9 infrastructure of telecommunications and finance and is conducted through 1011 digital platforms and e-commerce. The new generation of bilateral agreements 1 provides the opportunity to secure deeper and more diverse commitments that 2 reflect the complex entertainment and higher education industries. Case study 3 13 shows how commitments on trade in services can strengthen the 4 international education supply chain and entrench the hybridised public/ 5 private form of contemporary higher education. Case study 14 recounts how 6 the US successfully subverted moves to develop an antidote to trade in services 7 agreements through a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 8 Organization (UNESCO) convention on cultural diversity – an outcome that 9 also served the interests of those developed countries that championed the 20111 convention. 1 2 A theoretical misfit 3 4 In Media, Markets and Democracy, C Edwin Baker argues that the basic 5 premises of neoclassical trade theory are deeply flawed, at least in relation 6 to culture (Baker, 2002, Chapter 10). The producers of cultural products 7 in larger and wealthier countries, especially the US, have very large budgets. 8 The ‘first copy’ costs of production for a Hollywood film, CNN news item 9 or Warner music product are very high. The costs of adding a marginal 30111 consumer are negligible. So the export costs for producers with large 1 domestic markets are low. They also have the resources to diversify by 2 using different windows to access multiple markets at differential prices. It 3 is this massive potential for export earnings that tilts American cultural 4 content towards factors of universal appeal – action, violence, sex and slick 5 production qualities. That content is discursively simplistic and lacks 6 cultural complexity. 7 By contrast, local producers who cater for unique local interests have far 8 smaller audiences and limited potential demand. Their viability is threatened 9 by the low cost, high production quality and universality of US products. 40111 Claims that this is an expression of consumer sovereignty ignore the 1 likelihood that these imports squeeze out local productions that have 2 culturally and socially relevant content and are highly valued, but 3 unprofitable. Markets only register consumer preferences that are expressed 44111 through commercial transactions. People’s political choices may favour Minds and markets 223

1111 content that the market does not produce, such as political salience, local 2 languages or indigenous culture. Local cultural discourses are not simply 3 substitutable by a foreign product – showing Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s 4 Stone does not engage a young Mapuche woman in Chile on the place of 5 the shaman in her cultural world. Individual consumers may not even know 6 what they are missing when the market is dominated by homogenous 7 imports. 8 Baker further argues that cultural markets have significant negative and 9 positive externalities, beyond the individual consumer (Baker, 2002, Chapter 1011 11). The national structures and legal frameworks within which individuals 1 exercise their preferences are decided collectively and are often robustly 2 contested. The entire populace benefits from a well-functioning democracy; 3111 it is harmed by ignorance or the social consequences of exclusion or illiteracy. 4 Hence: 5 6 a country’s own domestic media products potentially better provide (or 7 provide in ways not duplicated by imports) domestic content that people 8 need for a democratic political process to function well and, more 9 generally, for their cultural discourses of identity, meaning, and value. 20111 In this regard, domestic media can have tremendous positive externalities 1 not supplied by the imports that threaten to replace them. 2 (Baker, 2002, p 237) 3 4 Baker argues that governments should not negotiate away the prerogative 5 to regulate in ways that ensure that their people can hear their own voices 6 and engage in the development of their communities. 7 This does not imply a closed door and suffocating introspection. Exposure 8 to cultural diversity and potentially transformative values and perspectives 9 are, using economic terminology, ‘positive externalities’. Speaking in 30111 opposition to the US South Korea Free Trade Agreement, the Director of 1 South Korea’s Coalition for Diversity in Moving Images Gi Hwan Yang 2 described losing one’s culture as ‘tantamount to losing one’s language and 3 soul. . . . No culture should disappear from the face of this earth because 4 it lacked market competitiveness’.2 The struggle, he said, is to open borders, 5 not to close them. Achieving that requires an end to market-led cultural 6 invasion and a truly balanced exchange among cultures so that diversity 7 and self-determination are able to thrive. Genuine diversity militates against 8 narrow nationalist protections. But to achieve diversity, balance and welfare- 9 maximising results, both locally and internationally, requires the potential 40111 for ‘governmental interventions, including local subsidies and possibly well- 1 designed trade restraints’ (Baker, 2002, p 238). Such strategic interventions 2 are not permissible under free trade. 3 Baker’s critique of neoclassical economics applies equally to international 44111 trade in education, where universalised curriculum and digitised materials 224 Serving whose interests?

1111 are marketed through franchises or e-education. Knowledge is reduced to 2 information that, by necessity, is ubiquitous, sanitised and monolingual. 3 Access is governed by price and technology, while ownership is locked up 4 through intellectual property laws. Corporations that have the scale and 5 technological platforms to dominate the education export market assume 6 asymmetrical power over knowledge exchange. Universities in many 7 Southern countries struggle to compete with slickly packaged international 8 qualifications that bear famous academic brand names, especially when 9 those qualifications also facilitate migration. The premium on IT, English 1011 language and businesses courses can crowd out the study of physical and 1 social sciences and humanities that are infused with local knowledge and 2 culture. The anodyne content of mix-and-match modules stifles the critical 3 thought and scholarship that is integral to genuine education. National 4 universities in poor countries or regions become ghettoised. Scholars who 5 remain in them are generally excluded from the ‘knowledge-driven’ global 6 economy, and their potential to catalyse a vibrant polity is undermined. As 7 with cultural practitioners, educationalists who seek to sustain the viability 8 of their national universities are the opposite of protectionists or isolationists 9 – they believe their intellectual mission is enriched through the ‘deep 20111 internationalisation’ of people and ideas that sustain a ‘global knowledge 1 commons’ (Duke, 2002, p 97). 2 Information technologies heighten the potential for positive and negative 3 externalities, in both cultural and knowledge exchange. On one hand, they 4 can enhance access and provide opportunities for interaction that overcome 5 distance and isolation. They can also foster creative new pedagogies, research 6 strategies and interactive communications. Visual and audio technologies 7 can break down barriers between languages, cultures, geographies and social 8 class. Yet the dominance of transnational corporations over both carriage 9 and content risks a new form of information imperialism that erodes local 30111 control, capacity and substance, especially in poorer countries, and deepens 1 the existing technological divide. 2 3 Shifting paradigms 4 5 The power to shape minds and culture is at the heart of any hegemonic 6 project. For much of the twentieth century, the governments of richer 7 countries shaped their knowledge creation and cultural policies to serve 8 multiple objectives: to enhance capital accumulation and social reproduction, 9 manage social stability and maintain their own political legitimacy. How they 40111 did so varied with time, place and context. The democratic and egalitarian 1 ideals that were used to justify state ownership and/or social regulation of 2 media, culture and higher education were often not present in practice. State 3 directed approaches could be stultifying and repressive. But they were 44111 constantly challenged for that, confirming their essential function as ‘both a Minds and markets 225

1111 primary means and central result of democratic participation’ (Baker, 2002, 2 p 252). 3 Control over culture and knowledge was equally pivotal to the colonial 4 project and created an enduring legacy. The policies and practices of colonialism 5 towards indigenous peoples were overtly malign. Cultural imperialism was 6 often genocidal. Universities were a rarity and colonial powers used higher 7 education as a means to socialise and reward élites, often by sending them 8 to the metropole. Independence posed challenges for people and governments 9 in the South to reconcile their desire for authentic decolonisation within 1011 post-colonial realities. 1 These complex dynamics were profoundly ruptured with the onset of 2 neoliberalism. 3111 4 Marketising knowledge 5 6 The dialogical vision of knowledge creation and exchange is encapsulated 7 in the UNESCO World Declaration on Higher Education for the Twenty- 8 First Century: Vision and Action, adopted by UNESCO members as recently 9 as 1998. The Declaration affirmed the ‘core mission and values of higher 20111 education [that] should be preserved, reinforced and further expanded’. The 1 long list included educating highly qualified graduates to meet the needs of 2 all sectors of human activity; advancing, creating and disseminating 3 knowledge through research; interpreting, preserving and promoting cultures 4 in the context of cultural pluralism and diversity; providing opportunities 5 for higher learning throughout life; contributing to the development and 6 improvement of education at all levels; and protecting and enhancing civil 7 society by training young people in the values that form the basis of 8 democratic citizenship, and by providing critical and detached perspectives 9 in the discussion of strategic choices facing society.3 30111 This mission had a particular poignancy in the post-independence South, 1 as people and governments espoused a nationalist development agenda. Their 2 higher education systems were heavily dependent on Western knowledge 3 and intellectuals, and the patronage that was bestowed by one or other 4 superpower as coinage in the battle for Cold War ascendancy. At the same 5 time, higher education offered the prospect of genuine development – even 6 though it was often (but not always) still the domain of the élite. The 7 experiences of countries varied. Under-resourced and isolated universities 8 battled to survive in many, but not all, parts of Africa (Mihyo, 2004). Long- 9 established and new universities in the Indian subcontinent flourished, 40111 but remained captive of what Dinesh Abrol calls the ‘eternal triangle of 1 quantity, quality and equity’ (Abrol, 2006, p 123). In Latin America the 2 Córdoba reform movement, begun by students in Argentina in 1918, 3 espoused a ‘commitment to accessibility, social justice, academic freedom 44111 and institutional autonomy’ (Schugurensky and Davidson-Harden, 2003, 226 Serving whose interests?

1111 p 324). Soviet investment in the intellectual infrastructure of Eastern 2 European countries laid the platform for vibrant post-communist revivals 3 in some former satellites; that same dependency devastated higher education 4 and research in others, which collapsed when the economic resources and 5 political patronage were abruptly terminated (Ginsberg et al., 2003). 6 By the 1990s the public system of higher education and research was under 7 pressure across the global North and South. The radical re-organisation of 8 capital and the associated growth in services and intellectual property had 9 created new imperatives. ‘Massification’ and ‘flexible lifelong-learning’ were 1011 pre-requisites for an internationally integrated labour market. The dynamic 1 redundancy of products, skill sets and jobs meant that workers had to be 2 continually retrained. Just-in-time (or just-for-me) education created a new 3 demand for disaggregated units and fragmented courses that could be easily 4 marketed, sold and delivered by instructors (rather than educators) to 5 disembodied consumers anywhere in the world. Education to think was 6 replaced by training that shed the pretence of ‘meaning making’ and was 7 designed and delivered solely with end-users in mind. 8 Transnational firms pressured wealthier states to reinvent their higher 9 education systems to serve the new economy. The European voice of big 20111 business, the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe 1 (UNICE), complained that the social and cultural values that influenced 2 government policies and regulatory frameworks were major obstacles to 3 corporate competitiveness, and that collaboration between industry and 4 universities was ineffective (CEO, 2000). Yet those market approaches to 5 higher education and research had to be superimposed on the existing 6 structures, operations and personnel. 7 8 The OECD’s Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (CERI) 9 championed an education reform strategy for its members that required 30111 higher education institutions to refocus on efficiency, accountability, 1 competition and cost recovery. Competitive pressures intensified as 2 governments cut real per capita subsidies, mandated private tuition fees and 3 authorised public or private loan schemes. University income increasingly 4 depended on effective marketing and performance rankings. Polytechnics 5 sought to emulate the universities, and both diversified their offerings in 6 response to common consumer demand. The outreach programmes of public 7 institutions competed with private education companies for local and foreign 8 students who sought training in English language and IT. As students 9 assumed the identity of customers, their approach to learning also became 40111 more instrumentalist. The student body was increasingly depoliticised and 1 the curriculum gradually sanitised. University governance became 2 managerialist. Academic labour was explicitly proletarianised and preferably 3 de-unionised, with tenure giving way to more flexible employment that 44111 enabled quicker adjustment to shifting demand. Minds and markets 227

1111 This transformation involved a ‘systematic reduction of the historically 2 hard-won social institution of education to a commodity for private 3 purchase and sale’ (McMurtry 1991, p 216). Yet attempting to graft the 4 new onto the old generated complexity and resistance. Determined 5 governments forced the pace by reorienting their policies and resources 6 towards the private providers that were rapidly expanding to meet, and 7 stimulate, a seemingly infinite demand for credentials. The tertiary education 8 market spawned a new industry of para-education services including student 9 recruitment, franchises, surveys and rankings, education databases, loan 1011 schemes and education investment analysts (Case study 13). 1 While higher education was devalued, postgraduate research degrees and 2 university research enjoyed an elevated status. The corporations required 3111 constant innovation, but were not willing to pay the huge costs of research. 4 Basic research conducted by mainly US-based academics, and funded by 5 the state, had laid the foundations for the dynamic IT revolution in the 6 1970s and 1980s. By the 1990s, OECD governments were under intense 7 pressure to harness the research capacity of their universities to advance 8 the competitiveness of their country and its firms (Castells, 2000, p 126). 9 Governments became more strategic, providing incentives for universities 20111 to focus on high-end, high-quality postgraduate education to produce the 1 next generation of innovators. Publicly funded research was tied to science, 2 technology and industry, often through private sector partnerships. 3 Universities became preoccupied with patenting their intellectual property, 4 creating in-house commercial ventures and spin-off businesses to capitalise 5 on their competitive advantage. As with teaching, the reorientation of 6 research marginalised the social sciences, humanities and cultural disciplines, 7 and threatened the fundamental tenets of academic freedom and critical 8 and independent scholarly inquiry. 9 The responses of Northern governments varied in ways that reflected 30111 their academic traditions, social values and the grip of neoliberalism: 1 in 2007 Norway was still not charging fees to foreign students, whereas 2 New Zealand, which treated foreign students as ‘cheques on legs’ (Duke, 3 2002, p 100), struggled to rein in a dysfunctional competitive market that 4 depended on volatile ‘export education’ earnings. In the research arena, 5 states and universities with the biggest budgets began a bidding war that 6 undermined the research base of others. 7 In a parallel transition, private education markets were superimposed on 8 public higher education in the South. In the 1980s structural adjustment 9 programmes cut the budgets of many universities that were already 40111 struggling. The loss of funding and post-graduate opportunities after the 1 demise of the Soviet Union deepened the crisis. During the 1990s, the World 2 Bank came to dominate the higher education policies of Southern countries, 3 even though it funded only a miniscule proportion of their spending. This 44111 disproportionate influence was felt through policy advice, consultants, 228 Serving whose interests?

1111 offshore training of officials and partisan reports, as well as debt 2 conditionalities.4 3 The Bank’s initial strategy was to redirect resources to primary and 4 secondary education, and to commercialise tertiary education. By 2002, the 5 Bank decided that higher education was important after all, and advocated 6 ‘lifelong learning’ as the means to integrate poor countries and people into 7 the knowledge-driven global economy. Governments were now urged to 8 create an enabling framework that used market mechanisms to encourage 9 innovation and responsiveness by public and private providers (World Bank, 1011 2002, p vi). By 2006, Bank officials were stressing the need to harness 1 information technologies for ‘asynchronous’ distance learning and digital 2 resources, such as textbooks (Salmi, 2006, p 7). Potential partners for these 3 ‘enabling’ governments included franchise and corporate universities, media 4 companies, electronic libraries and education brokers.5 5 The Bank’s policies were financed with assistance from its private sector 6 lending agency, the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IFC began 7 targeting private tertiary education and vocational training intensively in 8 2000. It professed a balanced commitment to business, development and 9 poverty alleviation. But all investments had to meet the required rate of 20111 return, and be made in a policy environment that reduced or eliminated 1 restrictive regulations on the education market (IFC, 2001, p 11 and Annex 2 4). Investment priorities identified by the IFC focused on creating markets 3 for para-education services, such as technology based education companies 4 and projects, financing of student loans, and ancillary services such as cross- 5 border accreditation and IT development. 6 This strategy promoted a higher education system for most of the 7 South that was neocolonial and grossly asymmetrical. Quality programmes 8 from credible Northern education institutions could and did contribute 9 positively to filling some of the voids in poorer countries. However, societies 30111 that desperately needed external support to develop their higher-end science 1 and technology capacity often experienced a super-saturation of basic courses 2 they could already supply. Modules, courses and degrees that were mass- 3 produced on a commercial scale crowded out indigenous norms, values, 4 culture, language, pedagogy and knowledge. Paschal Mihyo describes the 5 impact in Africa as ‘intellectual dumping’ (Mihyo, 2004, p 15). Foreign 6 competitors created ‘wage havens’ for the best local academics and 7 encouraged internal migration that depleted the public university sector, 8 with long-term consequences. National governments had no representation 9 on the governing boards of these companies, making it impossible to regulate 40111 content in ways that promoted local development and objectives. Nor were 1 the companies subject to national audit and accountability mechanisms. 2 As with the North, this scenario played out in different ways. The people 3 of Argentina staunchly defended the centuries old University of Buenos Aires 44111 against the World Bank prescription. By contrast, the Romanian government Minds and markets 229

1111 unofficially began to transform its university system during the socialist era 2 under IMF tutelage. This was formalised through a World Bank higher 3 education reform package from 1996 to 2002 (Ginsberg et al., 2003, 4 pp 424–7). Governments in Chile during and after the Pinochet regime, 5 and the Cardoso administration in Brazil, embraced the neoliberal model 6 voluntarily (Ginsberg et al., 2003, pp 416–18). Some Southern governments 7 marketed themselves as regional education hubs, usually in collaboration 8 with private foreign companies – Chile into Latin America, Romania into 9 Eastern Europe, Egypt into the Arabic speaking world (Altbach, 2004, 1011 p 8). In India, the commercialisation and privatisation of higher education 1 to cater for the massive demand for technical education from the middle 2 classes ‘damaged the agenda of equity as well as quality of education and 3111 aggravated the crisis in higher education in India’ (Abrol, 2006, p 121). 4 The story was just as diverse for research. Late industrialising states, such 5 as Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, had been strategically building their 6 technological research capacity for some years. India invested belatedly, but 7 heavily, in IT research and expertise and secured a niche market for its 8 firms and professionals (Case study 11). China’s rapid catch-up strategy 9 threatened to eclipse the rest. Other countries that lacked capital, basic 20111 infrastructure, research facilities and expertise faced exclusion. 1 2 Marketising culture 3 4 The transformation of cultural policy followed a similar path. The twentieth 5 century Western ideal of national culture is encapsulated in Northrop 6 Frye’s famous typology of popular lifestyle, traditional ideology and 7 creative powers (Kertzer, 2004/5, p 570). However, the heavy hand of the 8 state was a mixed blessing. National policies were designed to serve diverse 9 commercial, aesthetic, advocacy, propaganda and ‘nation building’ 30111 functions. Laws mandated state ownership of radio and television, 1 libraries, galleries, museums and archives as public services that delivered 2 public goods. Tax-payer subsidies represented a collective investment in 3 orchestras, ballet and writing, and limited the intrusion of advertising and 4 commercialism in public broadcasting. Regulation of the media promoted 5 local content and ‘balanced’ (often conservative) reporting and censorship 6 during ‘national emergencies’. Private, foreign and cross-media ownership 7 were strictly limited. Telecommunications were state owned, regulated and 8 subsidised to provide a balance of investment, access and affordability. 9 Intellectual property laws recognised both the moral rights of authors and 40111 common access to creative works, while they guaranteed commercial 1 returns. Material support for musicians, poets, artists, dancers, filmmakers, 2 writers and actors was provided through direct employment in public 3 services and protected local industries; others benefited from state subsidies, 44111 local community grants and government procurement. 230 Serving whose interests?

1111 Once the global South was liberated from colonial rule, the indigenous 2 cultures that re-emerged were hybrids of the traditional, occidental and 3 national (Sreberny, 2000). Governments often displayed a nationalist 4 fervour that was itself culturally and politically intolerant. Yet culture 5 provided a vital organising tool for political resistance against both colonial 6 and authoritarian regimes (Comfort, 2002; Santiago, 2002). 7 Neoliberalism had a dramatic impact on this cultural landscape. Policies 8 and laws that privileged or protected local culture and practitioners 9 gave way to light-handed regulation that fostered liberalised markets and 1011 international competition (Street, 2001, Chapter 8). Privatisation of many 1 aspects of broadcasting and the easing of restrictions on movements of capital 2 and foreign investment generated a rush of mergers and acquisitions in the 3 news media. Mega-corporations became vertically and horizontally integrated. 4 Corporate empires spanned an ever-widening range of activities: newspaper 5 production, magazine and book publishing, music, film and television 6 production, pay television, information technology, software development, 7 satellite transmission, e-commerce, retail, advertising, public relations, sports 8 promotion, events management, star management, leisure facilities, museum 9 franchising, intellectual property, brand marketing, financing and much more. 20111 Privatisation, outsourcing and cuts to state support made the livelihoods of 1 creative artists more precarious. Professionals, such as journalists, teachers, 2 librarians, archivists, technicians, actors, musicians and visual artists faced 3 the added pressure of labour market deregulation and foreign ownership. 4 These changes generated new market dynamics across the global North 5 and South. Countries such as India, Brazil, China and some Arabic states 6 had the scale and investment capacity to dominate their regional markets 7 and create (limited) reverse flows of cultural products into the US and Europe 8 (Sreberny, 2000, p 113). Some mega-entertainment companies exploited 9 what David Harvey calls the ‘collective symbolic capital’ of such locations 30111 as Rwanda or Vietnam whose name, places or events make them exotic 1 and potentially profitable. This investment in the local created new sources 2 of revenue, employment and skills for some Southern countries in ways 3 that appear antagonistic to globalisation (Harvey, 2002, p 101). But the 4 international division of labour still operated through the Eurocentric bias 5 of corporate ownership, customer base, language, cultural norms, and race 6 and gender stereotypes. 7 Information technologies also opened new doors. Creators, professionals 8 and countries benefited from economies of scope and scale, lower-cost 9 technologies and real-time co-production. Niche markets emerged in 40111 outsourcing, and in cultural products that targeted the young and affluent. 1 However, initiatives that succeeded were often taken over once they became 2 lucrative or too competitive. Again, all these initiatives were located in 3 an economic architecture and infrastructural terrain that was laid by, and 44111 for, the mega-transnationals. Minds and markets 231

1111 The battle of the GATS 2 The dialogical traditions in both the universities and the culture sector 3 sustained a stubborn resistance, which slowed the neoliberal advance and 4 generated complex and contradictory hybrids of the public and private. At 5 the same time, the commercial industries were demanding greater control of 6 the regulatory agenda. Media and entertainment giant Time Warner objected 7 that: ‘The cultural issue is appearing with alarming frequency in the 8 international marketplace, and must be roundly rejected’ (quoted in Sreberny, 9 2000, p 102). The European Roundtable of Industrialists complained that: 1011 ‘All too often the education process is entrusted to people who appear to have 1 no understanding of industry and the path of progress. . . . The provision of 2 education is a market opportunity and should be treated as such’ (quoted in 3111 Monbiot, 2001, p 334). These polarised positions translated into prolonged 4 battles over the GATS. 5 6 7 Trade and culture: phase 1 8 Conflicts over trade and culture have a long pedigree (Bernier, 2005, 9 p 748). The US has always been the demandeur on behalf of its powerful 20111 entertainment industry. Canada and France have usually led the resistance. 1 The early arguments focused on cross-border trade in tangible goods, 2 primarily books, movies, records, artefacts and art works. An uneasy 3 accommodation was reached in the GATT 1947, where it was accepted 4 that films were sufficiently threatened by international competition to justify 5 a unique carve-out in Article IV. The American motion picture industry 6 never stopped objecting to such ‘protectionism’. These tensions carried over 7 to the CUSFTA, signed in 1988. The Canadian government secured a limited 8 exemption from the obligations of the agreement for national cultural 9 industries (Article 2005). This nevertheless allowed the US to retaliate to 30111 an equal commercial value if the Canadian measures were otherwise 1 inconsistent with the Agreement. 2 Canada’s exception was imported into NAFTA in 1993. Mexico’s pro- 3 US, pro-liberalisation government led by President Carlos Salinas did not 4 seek a similar provision (Acheson and Maule, 1998, p 4). His government 5 had already begun privatising the network of state cinemas that had 6 guaranteed the exhibition of Mexican films. Over the next few years, many 7 local theatres closed and were replaced by Canadian and US multiplexes. 8 US firms came to dominate both film distribution and exhibition. The two 9 state-supported distribution chains went into bankruptcy. US productions 40111 in Mexico ceased. The US entertainment industry had the support of 1 NAFTA’s investment and services chapters as they pushed for further 2 liberalisation of Mexico’s cultural regulation. As of 1992, half of the movies 3 shown in Mexican theatres had to be local, with a ceiling on ticket prices 44111 of three pesos; by 1997 the quota was down to 10 per cent and the price 232 Serving whose interests?

1111 cap raised (Sánchez-Ruiz, 2001, p 93). US studios had captured 80 per cent 2 of the film market when in 2003 the Mexican government announced plans 3 to sell the national news agency, the National Cinematographic Institute 4 and various studios and workshops.6 The proposal provoked a massive 5 outcry and was abandoned. Although local film production continued, US 6 control over distribution meant very few of them were shown in Mexico.7 7 The CUSFTA and NAFTA negotiations coincided with the Uruguay 8 round. The ‘friends of culture’ led by the EU, France and Canada argued 9 unsuccessfully for an annex on audio-visual services in the GATS. The EC 1011 then sought a cultural exception along the lines of CUSFTA. The US 1 resolutely refused (Bernier, 2005, p 749). Despite the broad scope of the 2 cultural industries by the 1990s, their sights remained narrowly focused on 3 film and television, as in the GATT. 4 At the end of the Uruguay round, very few commitments were made on 5 audio-visual services (covering production, distribution, exhibition and 6 broadcasting). By 1998, only 19 members had made market access 7 commitments. Four were developed countries (the US, Japan, New Zealand 8 and Israel). Fifteen were developing countries, six of which had made 9 commitments under pressure from the US during their accessions. Most 20111 commitments were subject to limitations. Some 33 members (the EC as one) 1 had lodged exceptions to MFN treatment, mostly for co-production 2 agreements.8 3 New Zealand’s commitments became something of a cause célèbre for the 4 GATS critics (Kelsey, 2006). The government had signed off its schedule in 1993 5 6 in the midst of a radical neoliberal programme that included the deregulation, 7 corporatisation and partial privatisation of public broadcasting (Kelsey, 1997, 8 pp 112–13; Murdock, 1998). Trade officials warned the Cabinet that the 9 proposed market access and national treatment commitments on audio-visual 30111 services would prevent New Zealand from reinstating specific restrictions on 1 foreign investment in broadcasting or introducing local content quotas, unless 2 it negotiated adequate compensatory adjustments. Cabinet confirmed the 3 negotiating instructions. New Zealand’s offer was hailed by the US as exemplary. 4 Both Australia and New Zealand made similar commitments using a 5 negative list on services in the ANZCERTA in 1988. In 1996, a New Zealand 6 industry coalition successfully took the Australian Broadcasting Authority 7 to court in Australia to force them to treat New Zealand productions as 8 local content.9 9 By 1999, the level of New Zealand content on television was the lowest 40111 in the OECD. A Labour government was elected with a mandate to introduce 1 compulsory local content quotas for radio and free-to-air television, as part 2 of its Third Way ‘nation building’ strategy. The Prime Minister, who was 3 also the Minister of Culture, responded to official advice that quotas would 44111 breach New Zealand’s GATS commitments by saying: Minds and markets 233

1111 We have unilaterally disarmed ourselves on trade but very few others 2 have been so foolish. We’re now left with perfectly legitimate calls for 3 local content and people saying ‘You can’t do that because of Gats’. 4 This seems a bit ridiculous so we’re just working out the best way to 5 handle it.10 6 7 Ultimately, New Zealand’s commitment to being an exemplary WTO citizen 8 in the interests its agricultural sector held sway. The government set 9 voluntary targets for free-to-air television networks, backed by a threat to 1011 legislate if necessary.11 The USTR objected even to that.12 1 Cultural policies could be caught by WTO rules even without services 2 commitments, as the prolonged dispute between the US and Canada over 3111 split-run magazines showed. Canadian editions of US titles, such as Time 4 Warner’s Sports Illustrated Canada, contained mostly US content, but with 5 Canadian advertising. The Canadian culture industry objected that split- 6 run magazines were capturing the advertising dollar and reducing the 7 viability of local publications. The Canadian federal government imposed 8 an excise tax on advertising in magazines that originated abroad. Canada 9 had not made any commitments on advertising services under the GATS, 20111 and the government apparently assumed the tax was covered by protections 1 for cultural industries that were grandfathered under NAFTA (Canada- 2 Periodicals, 1996, p 6). 3 The US complained to the WTO that the measure was unlawful 4 discrimination under the GATT, arguing that the US and Canadian 5 magazines were directly competing or substitutable products. The Appellate 6 7 Body agreed, saying that neither the GATT nor the GATS took precedence: 8 ‘a periodical is a good comprised of two components: editorial content and 9 advertising content. Both components can be viewed as having services 30111 attributes, but they combine to form a physical product – the periodical 1 itself’ (Canada-Periodicals, 1996, p 17). Specific aspects of each transaction 2 could be assessed under different rules. Hence, activities that were permitted 13 3 by one WTO agreement could be struck down through another. Even if 4 Canada had won the WTO dispute, it could still have faced a challenge 5 under its commitment on advertising services in NAFTA. 6 The Canadian government repealed the offending law. It also removed 7 other support measures, notably the tariff on imported split-run magazines 8 and a postal subsidy that reduced the distribution costs for Canadian 9 periodicals. These were replaced by the Foreign Publishers Advertising 40111 Services Act 1999 that prohibited Canadian advertisers from placing 1 advertisements in foreign magazines. A foreign publisher who breached the 2 law could be fined. After sustained US objections, the Act was limited to 3 publications that contained a level of Canadian advertising that would almost 44111 never be reached.14 234 Serving whose interests?

1111 Trade and education 2 Unlike cultural services, education remained below the radar during the 3 Uruguay round. For most governments education was a public good. ‘Export 4 education’ was still a novelty: what later became the biggest education 5 company in the US, Apollo Group, was only established in 1993 and publicly 6 listed in 1994. Some 30 members made initial commitments across the five 7 W/120 categories in 5: Education Services (primary, secondary, higher, adult 8 and other), the fewest after energy services. The largest proportion related 9 to mode 2, which related to restrictions on nationals studying abroad. By 1011 2002, accessions had boosted the number of members with education 1 commitments to 42 out of 144; 34 were from the South (Mundy and Iga, 2 2003, p 290). 3 By the time of GATS 2000, neoliberal policies had cut deeply into national 4 education systems. The export education industry had grown exponentially, 5 thanks to both massive demand from China and the internet and World 6 Wide Web. The US was the largest exporter. Other leading players were 7 Australia and New Zealand, whose industry was largely comprised of state 8 tertiary institutions that had become hybridised under neoliberalism. 9 The WTO Secretariat’s background note in 1998 documented the 20111 economic importance of the education sector, the changing structure of the 1 market and emerging ‘trade’ issues. It listed ‘barriers’ that ranged from 2 immigration and currency restrictions to limits on licensing, nationality 3 requirements and economic needs tests.15 4 The prospect of embedding the education export industry through the 5 GATS was highly controversial. The European Regional Ministers for 6 Culture and Education, speaking as the ‘democratically accountable 7 providers of public services’, issued the Brixen Declaration in 2002 in which 8 they demanded the exclusion of ‘democratically supported services in 9 education, culture and media . . . from further GATS involvement’.16 30111 Academics and their unions in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the UK, 1 India, Argentina, South Africa and elsewhere rallied to defend the public 2 domain. Their campaigns gained momentum when the global trade union 3 federations of Education International (EI) and Public Services International 4 (PSI) published a joint critique of the GATS in 1999 (EI/PSI, 1999). High- 5 profile institutions also voiced their concerns, individually and collectively. 6 The peak bodies of some 5,000 degree-granting universities and colleges 7 across Canada, Europe and the US issued a joint statement in 2001 that 8 said: 9 40111 Higher education exists to serve the public interest and is not a 1 ‘commodity’, a fact which WTO Member States have recognised 2 through UNESCO and other international or multilateral bodies, 3 conventions and declarations. . . . Given this public mandate, authority 44111 to regulate higher education must remain in the hands of competent Minds and markets 235

1111 bodies as designated by any given country. Nothing in international 2 trade agreements should restrict or limit this authority in any way.17 3 4 Academics applied their tools of trade to produce a deluge of critical 5 commentary. Scholars from the political economy tradition pointed out that 6 reducing the capacity of the state to use higher education to manage the 7 conditions that are necessary for the expansion of capital, and to absorb its 8 contradictions, was potentially counter-productive for capitalism (Robertson 9 et al., 2002, p 493). Others condemned the GATS ‘as a neo-colonial 1011 instrument which has the potential to continue the cycles of imperialism 1 which have subdued Latin American countries’ development since the time 2 of colonisation’ (Schugurensky and Davidson-Harden, 2003, p 333). 3111 Speaking for the Association of African Universities, Mihyo highlighted the 4 risks for poor or small African countries of opening their education systems 5 on an MFN basis, instead of selectively. A proliferation of shorter, lower cost 6 courses could force national universities to close or dilute their public 7 offerings. Because the GATS has no emergency safeguard mechanism, a 8 government could not suspend its commitments, even temporarily, if the 9 survival of its only national university was threatened. The GATS rules on 20111 monopolies would operate in the interests of foreign edupreneurs and 1 compound the dominance of transnational companies over the infrastructure 2 of education, especially information technologies and finance (Mihyo, 2004). 3 Trade officials and ministers had little interest in the substance of such 4 arguments. But they could not ignore the mounting fallout. Claims and 5 counter-claims by academics, unions, NGOs, the industry, governments, 6 the OECD and WTO catapulted education services into the forefront of 7 the GATS debate (for example: Barblan, 2002; Knight, 2002a; Knight, 8 2002b; Larsen et al., 2002). Aside from the disingenuous argument that 9 Article I:3 protected public services (Chapter 4), the standard defence was 30111 that all governments recognised the importance of public education, so none 1 would bring a dispute that challenged another’s national education policies. 2 This ignored the effect of the GATS in normalising market-driven higher 3 education and the chilling effect of commitments, especially when 4 governments came under pressure from an aggressive education export 5 industry. Such arguments also assumed that WTO members who were 6 making and responding to requests on education services in GATS 2000 7 did not intend to enforce them. 8 The three leading demandeurs were the US, Australia and New Zealand. 9 Each tabled an early negotiating paper. All were defensive in tone, 40111 acknowledging the public and social role of education and the right to 1 regulate – protestations that were largely addressed to their critics at home. 2 Japan,18 and much later Switzerland,19 also tabled papers; the former took 3 an ambivalent position, while the latter tried (unconvincingly) to distinguish 44111 public from private education, again probably for domestic reasons. 236 Serving whose interests?

1111 The US was first to present its paper, in December 2000.20 Education 2 services were then the fifth largest US services export. It was still the world’s 3 largest education exporter, although its market dominance had declined. 4 Early policy had aimed to attract bright foreign students, mainly from Asia, 5 to study in the US. With growing security concerns and tighter immigration 6 laws, the export focus had shifted to distance education (mode 1) and foreign 7 investment (mode 3). The paper drew on a 1998 US industry survey to 8 identify a long list of ‘obstacles’. These included restrictions on foreign 9 investments and accreditation to grant degrees; delays in licensing and 1011 authorisations; economic needs tests; discriminatory treatment of joint- 1 ventures and franchises; untransparent subsidies; ‘inappropriate’ restrictions 2 on electronic transmission of course materials; limits on entry and 3 employment of foreign specialist personnel; ‘excessive’ taxes on licensing 4 or royalty payments; and ‘excessive’ costs in repatriating earnings. 5 The US’s own offer was confined to adult and other education. The 6 imbalance partly reflected the complexities of federal/state jurisdiction over 7 education and the growing US preference for bilaterals. But the main 8 influence on the offer was the National Committee for International Trade 9 in Education (NCITE), an affiliate to the US Coalition of Services Industries. 20111 The industry lobby enjoyed a direct line to the USTR’s office and played a 1 crucial role in the Forum on Trade in Education Services that the USTR 2 convened with the OECD and World Bank in 2002 to defuse growing 3 agitation over the GATS and education.21 While NCITE wanted market 4 openings in other countries, the industry was concerned that US 5 commitments could jeopardise its share of public subsidies (Mundy and 6 Iga, 2003, pp 301–2). 7 Karen Mundy and Mika Iga describe the US position as that of a 8 ‘hegemonic free rider’ (Mundy and Iga, 2003, p 311). But the real issue, 9 as Philip Altbach observes, is the underlying asymmetry of the global market. 30111 The US would never be a major export destination even if it did make 1 extensive commitments, for a combination of reasons: the size, quality and 2 diversification of the domestic sector, US dominance of technology and 3 ancillary services, and cultural introspection (Altbach, 2003). Even foreign 4 niche operators would struggle to succeed in the US. 5 Mundy and Iga note that Japan also requested the liberalisation of 6 education services, while offering very little itself. As of 2003 no foreign 7 affiliated higher education institution was officially recognised in Japan, 8 although the Koizumi government had made proposals to liberalise. The 9 authors speculated that Japan’s reticence might dissolve if the government 40111 saw services commitments on education as a way to justify domestic reforms, 1 and to keep the US and EU interested in the WTO (Mundy and Iga, 2003, 2 p 308). But, as with the US, the actual impact of higher education 3 commitments on Japan’s national education system would be limited by 44111 culture, language, customer preference and commercial practices. Minds and markets 237

1111 By contrast New Zealand and Australia were consistent in taking an 2 aggressive approach to domestic liberalisation, GATS demands and their 3 own commitments (Kelsey, 1998; McBurnie and Ziguras, 2003). New 4 Zealand made the most far-reaching education commitments in the Uruguay 5 round, including (possibly by error) national treatment for public subsidies 6 (Kelsey, 2003, pp 20–1). Australia’s commitments were almost as extensive. 7 These were the only two OECD members to reduce their per capita spending 8 on tertiary education in the 1990s. Both governments promoted ‘education 9 exports’ as a foreign exchange earner and a substitute for public education 1011 funding. Encouraging ambitious outcomes on services was also intended to 1 advance their overriding objectives in agriculture.22 2 Both governments tabled strong negotiating positions in 2001, insisting 3111 they were only targeting private education.23 New Zealand was especially 4 active, reflecting the dependence of its education system on foreign student 5 fees and its limited range of services export opportunities. Trade officials 6 in Geneva participated energetically in the discussions on ‘complementary 7 strategies’ in 2005 to break the impasse in negotiations. But they expressed 8 concern back in the capital that quantitative benchmarks or the pre-selection 9 of sectors for plurilateral negotiations would encourage ‘cherry-picking’ that 20111 was likely to preclude the sensitive ‘niche’ market of education services.24 1 Because the plurilateral requests were expected to emanate from sector- 2 based ‘friends’ groups of WTO members, and there was only an ‘education 3 contact group’, New Zealand initiated the ‘friends of private education’.25 4 The plurilateral request for ‘a meaningful commitment’ in private higher 5 and/or other education services was submitted by New Zealand in April 6 2006.26 Only four other members participated: Australia, Chinese Taipei, 7 Malaysia and the US. The EC declined to join, as did others, such as Canada, 8 which had initially made requests on education. The 22 target countries 9 remain secret, but are understood to focus on Latin America, the Arab 30111 states and Asia. 1 Both the content and tone of the request were strikingly defensive. The 2 scope was restricted to private higher education and ‘other education’. It 3 eschewed the need to differentiate between public and private education by 4 suggesting that education should be treated like other services that have 5 public and private elements, such as postal, telecommunications, medical 6 and environmental services; members could describe only that part of 7 education services that they wished to commit. Governments were also free 8 to limit the coverage of government funding to students or institutions. 9 The request was couched in an educational rationale. If ‘properly 40111 regulated, increased trade in education opens the door to great economic, 1 social, cultural and political benefits’. Cross-border education can boost 2 students’ understanding of their subjects and ‘helps to level the playing field 3 in a knowledge-driven economy’ by providing students with access to 44111 subjects or world leaders that would otherwise not be available. There was 238 Serving whose interests?

1111 even an attachment of questions and answers, which reassured recipients 2 that ‘[t]he requesting members recognise that education does, and should, 3 enjoy a special status in society’ and that definitions of public and private 4 education differ between countries. 5 The minuscule number of demandeurs and the equally minimalist response 6 suggest that the twentieth-century paradigm still prevails. The symbolic 7 equivalent of Bolivia’s intervention on the GATS and water was the 8 condemnation by South Africa’s Education Minister Kader Asmal of the 9 inclusion of education in the GATS. Breaking the secrecy surrounding 1011 the GATS requests in 2003, he attacked Norway, the US, Kenya and New 1 Zealand for making education requests (although South Africa’s trade 2 minister was simultaneously trying to market the sector). Treating education 3 as a tradeable service would compromise quality at South Africa’s public 4 universities and derail the complex transformation of universities that were 5 products of apartheid. The internationalisation of higher education was 6 more appropriately addressed using conventions and agreements outside a 7 trade policy regime.27 The Norwegian development community expressed 8 dismay at the request and apologised. Initially, Norway’s trade negotiators 9 stood by their position, arguing that trade rules provided protection for 20111 weaker countries (Sørenson, 2005). In 2005, a new government withdrew 1 all Norway’s education requests. Not so the US or New Zealand. 2 3 4 Trade and culture revisited 5 ‘Audio-visual services’ suffered a similar fate to education in GATS 2000. The 6 US had shifted its focus to digital media and the convergence of technology 7 8 and content through cross-border transmission and extraterrestrial 9 technologies. Papers tabled in 1998, and again at the start of GATS 2000, 30111 argued that new technologies were providing worldwide access for cultural 1 consumers and stimulating new and cheaper distribution options for locally 28 2 based content producers. It rejected an ‘all-or-nothing’ approach to audio- 3 visual services, arguing that other services also had unique social policy 4 objectives and that GATS rules and schedules provided adequate flexibility. 5 While the principle of technological neutrality was essential to ensure that 6 commitments remained relevant, there was also a need for clearer sectoral 7 classifications that recognised the blending of content and carriage. In an 8 attempt to find allies, the US paper in 2000 attached a list of firms from other 9 countries ‘whose converging functions and technologies transport a wide range 40111 of content, including films, music, news, games, and other forms of 1 entertainment and information to customers’.29 Switzerland also tabled a paper 2 advocating liberalisation.30 The plurilateral request on audio-visual services 3 was submitted by Taiwan on behalf of five other governments to 27 44111 members.31 There was apparently a negligible response. Minds and markets 239

1111 However, the audio-visual CPC was no longer the primary target. The 2 declared objective of the US movie industry was ‘to keep digital networks free 3 of cultural protectionism’ through trade commitments on the new 4 technologies (quoted in Bernier, 2004, p 235). In 1994, embryonic digital 5 technologies had been covered by CPC 8790: ‘other telecommunications 6 services’. The Annex on Telecommunications guaranteed foreign firms would 7 have ‘reasonable and non-discriminatory’ access to, and use of, public 8 telecommunications networks that are necessary to provide the services that 9 a host government has committed in its schedule. However, the Annex 1011 excludes measures affecting cable or broadcast distribution of radio or 1 television programmes. As noted in Chapter 5, the US proposed a 2 reclassification that would include content within telecommunications. The 3111 EC agreed there was a need to rethink the telecommunications classification; 4 but it was determined to protect its regionally integrated market under 5 ‘Television Without Frontiers’,32 and avoid a confrontation with France over 6 the EU’s policy of ‘cultural exception’. 7 The USTR also targeted services whose connection to culture is less 8 obvious. The production and supply chain for cultural services falls within 9 a range of generic services CPCs, such as retail, franchising, distribution, 20111 information technology, consultancy, business and financial services, 1 telecommunications and e-commerce. The market power of Wal-Mart, for 2 example, means it can dictate which music, books, magazines and videos 3 it will sell, and hence how an artist will fare. It also censors the content of 4 those products: major music companies supply Wal-Mart with sanitised 5 6 versions of the raunchy CDs they provide to radio stations, while magazines 33 7 and book titles are vetted to meet the corporation’s self-defined ethical code. 8 Wal-Mart’s international reach, including into China, makes it a central 9 player in the culture industry. The company’s submission to the USTR on 30111 GATS 2000 did not mention audio-visual; it sought commitments in 1 ‘information technology services, consolidation and deconsolidation of 2 merchandise, marketing, advertising, telecommunications, financial services 34 3 and insurance’. 4 The GATS 2000 negotiations were always going to be sub-optimal for 5 the entertainment industry. Regional and bilateral agreements offered more 6 creative opportunities. The US agreement with Chile in 2003 grandfathered 7 the latter’s existing protections for cultural sectors (a ‘standstill’). But it 8 gave the US full guarantees of access, non-discrimination and market-driven 9 regulation in the digital sphere, despite protests from the Chilean Coalition 40111 for Cultural Diversity. The e-commerce chapter was drafted so broadly that 1 all products traded or delivered digitally, including cultural services, were 2 covered. The US hailed that as ‘a breakthrough in achieving certainty and 3 predictability for market access of products such as computer programs, 44111 video images, sound recordings and other digitally encoded products’.35 240 Serving whose interests?

1111 The Australian Coalition for Cultural Diversity strenuously resisted similar 2 proposals during the negotiation of the AUSFTA in 2004. They objected, 3 unsuccessfully, that a Chilean-style standstill would tie the hands of 4 Australian governments in adopting any innovative new policies, including 5 strategies to promote digital cultural industries, and effective outsource the 6 creation of Australian cultural policies to Hollywood (Duffy, 2003).36 The 7 agreement imposed onerous standstill requirements. It made no exception 8 for public broadcasting, aside from a general exclusion for grants and 9 subsidies. The USTR summarised the obligations on new media as calling 1011 ‘for each government to adopt state-of-the-art protection for digital products 1 such as software, music, text, and videos, and encourages adoption of 2 measures to promote trade through electronic commerce’.37 3 The US refused to accept an equivalent of the Annex that Australia had 4 attached to its bilateral agreement with Singapore.38 That had reserved 5 Australia’s right in relation to broadcasting, audio-visual, entertainment, 6 and cultural services to 7 8 adopt or maintain any measure with respect to the creative arts, cultural 9 heritage and other cultural industries, including audiovisual services, 20111 entertainment services and libraries, archives, museums and other 1 cultural services; broadcasting and audiovisual services, including 2 measures with respect to planning, licensing and spectrum management, 3 and including services offered in Australia [and] international services 4 originating from Australia. 5 6 ‘Creative arts’ and ‘culture heritage’ were extensively defined in Annex 4II(A), 7 8 with the former including ‘digital interactive media and hybrid arts work 9 which uses new technologies to transcend artform divisions’. The Annex 30111 was largely symbolic, and was effectively superseded by the AUSFTA. 1 The biggest showdown over culture in the US bilaterals centred on South 2 Korea’s movie screen quotas. The US had been challenging the quotas since 3 1998 in its negotiations with South Korea for a bilateral investment 4 agreement. The quotas were legal under the GATT, which allows 5 governments to reserve screen time for films of national origin. South Korean 6 theatres were required to screen local movies at least 146 days a year. The 7 quota was introduced in 1966, but only enforced from 1993. Between then 8 and 2005 the market share in South Korea for local films grew from 16 to 9 47 per cent, attendance rose from 48 million to 105 million and export 40111 earnings dramatically increased. The US insisted on abolition of the quotas 1 as a precondition for any bilateral agreement. The South Korean film industry 2 mounted a successful campaign of lobbying, public education and street 3 protests, including a 63-day sit-down strike. Negotiations stalled and 44111 domestic legislation to open the culture sector was defeated in 2001.39 Minds and markets 241

1111 The US (and other countries) maintained intense pressure on the South 2 Korean government during GATS 2000, including a request for liberalisation 3 of audio-visual services.40 Frustrated South Korean trade officials claimed 4 the industry was now robust, so the quotas should be sacrificed for the 5 benefit of the country and consumer choice. The filmmakers maintained 6 their opposition, with militant support from students, farmers, educationists 7 and trade unions. In January 2006 the government announced the screen 8 quotas would be cut by 50 per cent. Within days the USTR announced 9 negotiations for a US–Korea FTA. Despite ongoing protests, the agreement 1011 was finalised as the guillotine fell on the US President’s fast track authority. 1 The Democratic majority then stalled the agreement in the US Congress, 2 but for very different reasons. 3111 The controversy that has surrounded attempts to subject higher education 4 and audio-visual services to the disciplines of trade in services reflects a 5 contradiction that is intrinsic to the broader project: the technocratic strategy 6 of ‘socio-regulatory adjustment’ (Drake and Nicolaidis, 1992, p 63) has 7 failed to displace the deep-seated commitment of people and governments 8 around the world to the dialogical paradigm of knowledge and cultural 9 exchange. Their resistance is not intellectual or abstract, but is socially and 20111 politically grounded. At the same time, however, the forms, practices 1 and institutions through which that paradigm traditionally operated have 2 been significantly transformed, if not superseded, by neoliberal policies, 3 internationalised markets and new technologies. Those changes are 4 embedded in successive layers of trade in services agreements. Two conflicting 5 paradigms now co-exist within an uneasy dialectic. 6 7 8 CASE STUDY 13 THE HIGHER EDUCATION 9 SUPPLY CHAIN 30111 1 Most critics of the incursion of the GATS into higher education focus on 2 W/120 category 5: Education Services, especially 5.C: Higher Education. 3 This seems obvious. But it overlooks the structural changes that have 4 overtaken the public education system since the early 1990s with the growth 5 of hybrid public/private universities and the blurred borderline between 6 genuine education and commercial enterprise. This case study provides a 7 snapshot of selected aspects of the global supply chain, and confirms Chris 8 Duke’s prediction that: 9 40111 The higher education ‘system’ may soon also come to mean virtual 1 consortia, including broadcasters and carriers, software producers, 2 publishing houses, and speculative investors as well as established public 3 and private universities and new private and for-profit universities. 44111 (Duke, 2002, p 109) 242 Serving whose interests?

1111 As of 2007, ‘mode 2: consumption abroad’ by foreign fee-paying students 2 is the predominant form of ‘education exports’. The mass market for foreign 3 students began in most education exporting countries in the private sector. 4 Public institutions gradually accepted small numbers of fee-paying 5 international students to top up their government subsidies. As the fees 6 regime spread to domestic students, and with it a customer-centred ethos, 7 international students became an integral part of the higher education system. 8 Private providers were often licensed to compete with the state institutions 9 for domestic and international student fee income, sometimes receiving equal 1011 subsidies. 1 An OECD paper conservatively estimated the market value of income 2 from international students in its member countries in 1999 at $30 billion 3 (Larsen et al., 2002, p 858). The initial customer base was the expanding 4 middle class of the global South, who sought English language, IT skills 5 and business courses and internationally portable qualifications that assist 6 immigration. The market exploded once demand within China outstripped 7 local supply and the Chinese government relaxed its restrictions on the 8 movement of people and capital. 9 Today, public and private ‘edupreneurs’ compete aggressively for 20111 international and domestic customers by appealing to brand name, brand 1 loyalty, culture, location, scale, price, end-use and/or immigration 2 opportunities for students and their families. The ‘services suppliers’ occupy 3 different levels of a highly stratified international market. Entry to the quality 4 end of the industry carries high costs in investment, infrastructure and 5 expertise. Prestigious universities, usually from rich countries, enjoy a strong 6 competitive position and can spread the risk by diversifying their catchments. 7 Most are solicitous about the control of quality, content and delivery to protect 8 their investment and reputation. Less attractive countries and providers largely 9 compete on cost and face significant risks from volatile markets, competition 30111 and crises in their primary source country or region. Exploiting foreign 1 students as ‘cash cows’ also carries the potential for reputational fallout in 2 international markets, disgruntled customers, and an often-racist backlash 3 from domestic students and inundated local communities. 4 As the market has matured it has spread across all four GATS modes of 5 delivery. The providers themselves cover a broad spectrum of ownership 6 structures, legal forms and market niches. The top tier universities prefer 7 to establish offshore satellites or joint ventures, run their own e-education 8 programmes or deliver courses through visiting academics/instructors. Most 9 are state-owned education enterprises that struggle to accommodate 40111 traditional governance structures, public good responsibilities, obligations 1 to deliver research-informed teaching and protection of academic freedom. 2 Less prestigious state institutions increasingly supplement their income from 3 domestic and international fee-paying students through subsidiaries, joint 44111 ventures and franchises. Their incentives for self-regulation are weaker and Minds and markets 243

1111 quality control is generally less rigorous. The borderline with private 2 education providers often blurs, as offshore firms deliver their pre-packaged 3 and franchised courses, sometimes as overpriced qualifications to students 4 who are desperate to emigrate. 5 Many private providers operate as companies that are accountable 6 primarily to their shareholders and subject to the requirements of company 7 law rather than educational regulation. A prominent example is US-based 8 Apollo Group, which claims to be the world’s largest educator. Apollo began 9 as a company that provided training and ‘life-long learning’ for students in 1011 the US and Latin America, but has expanded through joint ventures into 1 China and India. 2 Other private companies service a lucrative market in internet-based 3111 corporate training that makes little claim to genuine education. Mega-firms 4 such as IBM and franchise operations such as Dale Carnegie respond to 5 mass demand for credentials by tailoring courses for particular occupations 6 or packaging training modules for firms. At the far end of the spectrum, a 7 transnational such as McDonald’s delivers standardised in-house corporate 8 programmes to its branches throughout the world. 9 Maintaining the idealised bright line between public and private education 20111 services becomes even more difficult because public universities from the 1 North are among the most active ‘edupreneurs’. The University of Melbourne 2 is a prime example. In 1998 it established a fully owned limited liability 3 company called Melbourne University Private.41 The subsidiary offered 4 ‘client-focused corporate education programs and advanced professional 5 English language training’, while still proclaiming a commitment to academic 6 freedom and the highest possible standards of teaching and research. All 7 8 programmes were developed to meet the specific needs of a corporate or 9 government client or industry sector. They included a Master of Public 30111 Private Partnerships, later renamed a Master of Public Infrastructure, 1 delivered through the School of Enterprise. The School of International 2 Development offered Masters and PhD degrees and ran development 3 projects in various parts of Asia. Melbourne University Private also owned 4 a network of franchised Hawthorn English language centres in Melbourne, 5 Vancouver, Edinburgh, Muscat, Singapore and Auckland – the latter being 6 owned by the Lion Nathan School of Business Ltd, a subsidiary of an 7 Australasian wine and beer conglomerate. 8 These ventures were fully commercial, which means they carried financial 9 risks. By 2005 Melbourne University Private was only one-quarter of the 40111 way to achieving its target of 2,500 students by 2008 and had lost A$20 1 ($18) million over eight years. It was ‘merged’ back into the parent University 2 of Melbourne. The University’s Vice-Chancellor nevertheless proclaimed 3 it a success for ideological reasons: the enterprise had fostered competition 44111 and introduced domestic fee-paying students at Australia’s public universities. 244 Serving whose interests?

1111 Critics described it as a fiasco that diverted public university money to prop 2 up an inappropriate business model of education.42 3 Melbourne University (public) also championed the idea of the ‘virtual 4 university’ that could sell educational products on-line to under-serviced 5 locations, mainly into richer developing countries and China. The experiment 6 bears out the warnings of an OECD review of e-learning in 2001 about 7 the exaggerated potential of virtual universities and the risk that ‘cyperbole 8 and market ambition’ will drown out questions as to what really works 9 (Duke, 2002, p 110). 1011 Universitas 21 Global was the brainchild of former University of 1 Melbourne Vice-Chancellor Alan Gilbert. The original proposal involved a 2 joint venture between the Universitas 21 (U21) consortium of 18 second- 3 tier universities from 10 countries and Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation. 4 An outcry from academics in many U21 universities saw Murdoch replaced 5 by Thomson Learning, the education and training services arm of Canadian 6 media conglomerate Thomson Corporation. 7 U21Global was eventually established as a subsidiary of U21 in 2001. Two 8 universities, Toronto and Michigan, declined to participate in the venture. 9 Its qualifications carry the brand names of the shareholding universities who 20111 receive a licensing fee in return. However, the students have no guarantee 1 that their qualification will be recognised internationally. Courseware design 2 is contracted out, not necessarily to academics from the share-holding 3 universities. A quasi-independent body Universitas 21 Pedagogica 4 (U21Pedagogica), comprising one academic from each participating 5 6 university, was established to oversee quality control. That body initially 43 7 rejected all five of the first courses referred to it. 8 As of 2007, U21Global’s secretariat is based in Singapore and headed 9 by the former president of IBM India. It offers an on-line Master of Business 30111 Administration (MBA) degree and joint masters degrees in information 1 systems management and tourism and travel management with the University 2 of Nottingham. A postgraduate certificate in Entrepreneurship and Family 3 Enterprise was launched in 2006 conjunction with the Indian Institute of 4 Management in Bangalore.44 5 The original U21Global Business Plan said the shareholding universities 6 would recoup the total initial investment of $50 million in six to nine years.45 7 However, the projected 5,000 students by 2004 did not materialise. As 8 of mid-2005 some 600 students from India, Singapore and the Middle East 9 were enrolled; each paid fees of up to $12,000.46 The Chinese government 40111 had not yet granted permission to operate there. U21 shareholders were asked 1 for a further multi-million dollar injection, knowing that if they refused, a 2 high-profile venture that bears their brand names might fail. By 2007, the 3 U21Global website still claimed only 3,000 students in 60 countries, well 44111 short of the 10,000 it reportedly needed to break even (Walker, 2005, p 30). Minds and markets 245

1111 A tentative valuation of the company by KPMG in 2005 at between $41 2 million and $144 million seems remarkable given this background.47 3 In addition to exporting their courses, public universities have created 4 new market opportunities in education-related services by unbundling and 5 outsourcing other parts of their operations (Roberts, 2001). Outsourcing 6 began with ancillary services, such as cleaning, printing or the internal post. 7 It subsequently extended to core activities, such as management, cataloguing 8 and referencing of library collections and management of library services 9 (Carter, 1997, p 3). A review of these developments in North America 1011 found there was some negative impact on staff and some on service quality, 1 but that out-sourcing also provided financial relief. A deeper concern was 2 the displacement of qualified professionals, whose ethical obligation is to 3111 maintain the responsibility of libraries as one of the ‘building blocks of 4 democracy’ (Spires and Hill, 2005). 5 Media and publishing interests, such as Thomson Learning or Pearson 6 plc, and IT firms, such as Microsoft, have become integral contributors to 7 the supply chain by providing access to information through e-publishing 8 of courseware, materials and journals. Their technological and market 9 dominance, mass purchasing power, and global reach increasingly allows 20111 them to decide what knowledge is made available and to whom. The World 1 Bank and IFC urge universities in developing countries to embrace this 2 option. Those who do, and find the pre-packaged deals are unsuitable or 3 unaffordable, are left with a void in one of their most critical educational 4 resources. The Bank gives no equivalent support to progressive alternatives, 5 such as the 10-year commitment of Massachusetts Institute of Technology 6 (MIT) to provide open courseware, which reflects MIT’s belief that ‘the 7 syllabus and lecture notes are not an education, the education is what you 8 do with the materials’ (Steven Lerman quoted in Noble, 2002, p 38). 9 Both providers and consumers in these complex international markets 30111 need credible accreditation and quality assurance agencies. Most 1 commentators concede that it would be impossible for one global agency 2 to operate across diverse countries and providers. Even the negotiation of 3 MRAs, which is explicitly encouraged in GATS Article VII, has been very 4 slow (Jung, 2005). 5 Attempts to develop commercial accreditation agencies have highlighted 6 the obvious pitfalls. The most infamous is the Global Alliance for 7 Transnational Education (GATE), which was an active participant in 8 meetings of the US Coalition of Services Industries on the GATS. The 9 enterprise was established in 1995 by Glenn R Jones, the owner of US 40111 software and education company Jones International, which also owned 1 the first fully on-line, regionally accredited US university. GATE was profiled 2 as ‘a new international alliance of business, higher education and government 3 dedicated to principled advocacy for transnational educational programs’ 44111 (Lenn, 1997). For several years it enjoyed considerable credibility and was 246 Serving whose interests?

1111 promoted by the World Bank (Observatory on Borderless Higher Education, 2 2003, pp 2–3). Jones provoked allegations of conflicts of interest when he 3 sought to advance his commercial interests by asserting greater control over 4 GATE and most of its credible affiliates withdrew. In August 2003, Jones 5 International Ltd announced it was ‘donating’ GATE to the United States 6 Distance Learning Association, a private non-profit US entity.48 7 As the higher education supply chain expanded, it generated a commercial 8 demand for diverse para-education services, such as education and 9 information brokers, consultancies, public relations firms, hard copy and 1011 on-line publishers, rating and ranking agencies, franchising operations, book 1 rental companies, education stock brokers and analysts. The IFC operates 2 its own EdInvest facility to promote private investment and public/private 3 partnerships around the world through its consultancy, research, training, 4 conferences and information services.49 5 One of the largest para-education enterprises is the Observatory on 6 Borderless Higher Education, which describes itself as ‘an environmental 7 scanning facility on higher education issues’.50 Its international advisory 8 group comprises mainly senior managers from leading public UK universities. 9 The Observatory began in 2001 as an initiative of the Association of 20111 Commonwealth Universities and Universities UK, with seed funding from 1 the Higher Education Funding Council for England. It later became fully 2 funded through subscriptions and consultancies. In 2007, the Observatory 3 claimed over 130 institutional subscribers from more than 20 countries. Its 4 subscriber service provides access to surveys and benchmarking, while its 5 consultancy services specialise in e-learning, market research, institutional 6 strategic planning, and inquiries into particular institutions, countries or 7 initiatives. 8 The privatised higher education market has become a profitable niche 9 for financial services firms. Robert W Baird & Co describes itself as an 30111 80-year-old ‘employee-owned, international wealth management, capital 1 markets, private equity and asset management firm’.51 It produces a weekly 2 e-newsletter entitled ‘Class Notes: Weekly Insights on the Education 3 Industry’, which canvasses business, market and investment developments 4 in education.52 The firm maintains an education composite of listed stocks. 5 In addition to the latest movements in share prices, the newsletter gives 6 detailed accounts of changes in US policy and regulations, firm-specific 7 investment and personnel decisions, granting or withdrawal of accreditation, 8 international market developments and general scuttlebutt. 9 Perhaps the most lucrative, but least remarked on, link in the supply 40111 chain involves higher education financing. Again, these firms are strongest 1 in the US, but many of them process on-line student loan applications in 2 association with international loan guarantee agencies and lenders.53 Among 3 the largest and most prominent are Citigroup and SLM corporation (known 44111 as Sallie Mae). The latter was set up in 1972 as a US government-sponsored Minds and markets 247

1111 enterprise. ‘Privatised’ in 2005 with a virtual government guarantee, it runs 2 a secondary market in student loans. In April 2007 a private equity 3 consortium including JP Morgan Chase and Bank of America announced 4 it would acquire Sallie Mae for $25 billion – double the price at which the 5 shares were being traded. Six months later they backed off, following ethical 6 scandals and proposals from the US Congress to cut subsidies for student 7 loans.54 8 Mapping the tertiary education supply chain onto the GATS and W/120 9 classifications reveals coverage in every mode of supply – mode 1: cross- 1011 border e-education and para-education services; mode 2: foreign fee paying 1 students; mode 3: offshore campuses and education-related enterprises; mode 2 4: short-term presence of foreign teachers, administrators, accreditors or 3111 consultants. It also spans multiple CPCs: 4 5 1.B Computer and Related Services: 1.B.c data processing, 1.B.d data base, 6 1.B.e other; 7 1.C Research and Development Services: 1.C.a R&D (Research and 8 Development) services on natural sciences, 1.C.b R&D services on social 9 sciences and humanities, 1.C.c interdisciplinary R&D services; 20111 1.F Other Business Services: 1.F.a advertising, 1.F.b market research, 1.F.c 1 management consulting and related, 1.F.k placement and supply of 2 personnel, 1.F.m related science and technical consulting, 1.F.r printing/ 3 publishing, 1.F.s convention, 1.F.t other; 4 2.C Telecommunications Services: 2.C.j e-mail, on-line information and data 5 base retrieval, 2.C.n on-line information and data base processing, 2.C.o 6 other; 7 2.D Audio-visual Services: 2.D.a video tape production and distribution, 8 2.D.c radio and television services, 2.D.d transmission, 2.D.e sound 9 recording, 2.D.f other; 30111 4. Distribution Services: 4.A commission agents, 4.B wholesale, 4.C retail, 1 4.D. franchising, 4.E other; 2 5. Educational Services: 5.C higher, 5.D adult, 5.E other; 3 7.B Financial Services: 7.B.b lending of all types, 7.B.e guarantees and 4 commitments, 7.B.k advisory or other auxiliary services, 7.C other; 5 8.C Health Related and Social Services: 8.C social services; and 6 10. Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services: 10.B news agency services, 7 10.C libraries, archives, museums and other cultural services, 10.D 8 sporting and other recreational services. 9 40111 This list reveals how the GATS and other trade in services agreements have 1 the potential to consolidate this booming international higher education 2 market, despite the relatively few commitments in education services per se 3 – and deepen the contradiction that confronts the hybrid public/private 44111 education system. 248 Serving whose interests?

1111 CASE STUDY 14 A COUNTER-CONVENTION ON 2 CULTURAL DIVERSITY 3 4 Growing pressure from the US for agreements in which ‘trade trumps culture’ 5 led a number of mainly non-Anglophone governments to join forces with 6 international organisations of creative artists and cultural professionals to 7 sponsor a counter-convention on cultural diversity. 8 The catalyst for the convention was not so much the GATS as the proposed 9 MAI in the OECD. Both the French and Canadian governments refused to 1011 sign that agreement unless ‘cultural sovereignty’ was fully insulated from 1 its standstill, rollback and review provisions. The refusal of the US to accept 2 a cultural carve-out was pivotal to the decision of the French government 3 to pull the rug from the MAI negotiations in October 1998 – although 4 Prime Minister Jospin maintained that investment issues should be addressed 5 in the WTO.55 6 The Canadian Minister of Heritage called her contemporaries from 47 7 countries together for a conference on cultural diversity and globalisation 8 in June 1998. The ministers founded an International Network on Cultural 9 Policy (INCP) and agreed to meet annually. In February 1999 the Canadian 20111 Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade floated 1 the idea of an international instrument that recognised the legitimate role 2 of domestic cultural policies in ensuring cultural diversity. In a classic display 3 of cultural exceptionalism, the group supported the WTO and free trade 4 so long as it did not constrain cultural policy.56 Their proposal was formally 5 endorsed by the INCP in 2000.57 6 Two lobby groups for the convention emerged. Both were Canadian-led 7 and supported by the Canadian government. They had overlapping 8 memberships, but divergent strategic perspectives. The International Network 9 for Cultural Diversity (INCD) had its origins in a meeting of cultural activists 30111 and NGOs that ran parallel to the culture ministers’ meeting in 1998 and 1 was formalised at the time of the mobilisations against the WTO Seattle 2 ministerial in 1999. The network’s broad-based membership was loosely 3 co-ordinated on a regional and international level through an elected steering 4 committee. The Canadian Coalition for Cultural Diversity began in Quebec 5 in 1998. An International Liaison Committee of Coalitions for Cultural 6 Diversity was later formed in 2003 to provide a common voice and promote 7 the establishment of new national chapters. Most coalitions consisted of 8 cultural professionals and had a narrower industry focus than the INCD. 9 Some had close relationships with their governments. Both organisations 40111 had members from the global North and South, who had their own political 1 dispositions, perceptions of the challenges facing the culture sector, and 2 strategies for enhancing cultural diversity. 3 The idea of an alternative legal instrument was endorsed by the 44111 Francophone summit, Europe’s ministers for culture and education and Minds and markets 249

1111 the Organisation of American States. The Convention would broadly 2 promote local culture, international diversity and development. But the 3 relationship to trade agreements was pivotal. The INCP and INCD 4 each developed draft texts that were discussed jointly in Johannesburg in 5 late 2002. Under the ministers’ version, parties who were asked to make 6 commitments in other agreements that might jeopardise the preservation 7 of cultural diversity should consult each other with a view to developing a 8 common approach. They would also refrain from making commitments in 9 other international forums that were contrary to the objectives of the 1011 Convention.58 The Network’s equivalent provision went further: 1 2 nothing in this Convention, or any other International Agreement to which 3111 it may be a Party, shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, 4 maintaining or enforcing measures that accord special, preferential or 5 more favourable treatment to indigenous or national goods and services 6 for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the Convention.59 7 8 An international convention requires an institutional sponsor. UNESCO 9 was the obvious choice. It had hosted the Stockholm Conference on Cultural 20111 Policies for Development in 1998. UNESCO’s General Council had adopted 1 a Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity in 2001, accompanied by an 2 Action Plan, and resolved to consider ‘the advisability of an international 3 legal instrument’.60 4 The decision to ask UNESCO formally to sponsor the initiative was 5 taken at consecutive meetings of the two cultural organisations and the 6 ministers in Paris in February 2003. The proposal was advanced through 7 UNESCO’s Executive Board by the representatives of Canada, France, 8 Germany, Greece, Mexico, Morocco and Senegal. Eight months later, the 9 ministerial meeting of UNESCO adopted a mandate to develop a binding 30111 standard-setting convention on the protection of cultural contents and artistic 1 expressions.61 2 The US had quit UNESCO almost 20 years earlier, accusing it inter 3 alia of threatening free speech in its policy proposals on communications 4 (Baker, 2002, pp 271–2). The re-affiliation of the US in October 2003 5 guaranteed that the Convention would be highly contested. The US 6 delegation made constant and vigorous interventions throughout the drafting 7 process that were designed to subvert the promoters’ objectives, even though 8 the US was unlikely ever to ratify the instrument – a tactic it applied with 9 considerable success in negotiations on numerous environmental and human 40111 rights treaties (Stairs, undated). 1 The preliminary draft prepared by an independent expert group reflected 2 these polarised positions.62 Article 19: Relationship to Other Instruments 3 offered two options. Under Option A, the Convention would not affect the 44111 rights and obligations of any state party deriving from any other existing 250 Serving whose interests?

1111 international instrument (such as trade in services agreements), ‘except where 2 the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause serious damage or 3 threat to the diversity of cultural expressions’. Option B was a blanket 4 statement that the Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of 5 parties under other existing international instruments. 6 Political tensions increased as a group of intergovernmental experts, 7 assisted by a drafting sub-committee, set about refining the draft. They were 8 instructed to take into account the submissions from governments and 9 international organisations, including the WTO. The WTO Director General 1011 advised his UNESCO counterpart in October 2004 that members would 1 hold formal discussions at the relevant councils (on services, goods and 2 intellectual property), followed by the General Council. By this time, 3 however, the GATS negotiations were in serious trouble. A major factor 4 was the groundswell of popular opposition, including from cultural activists. 5 Holding a full-blown formal discussion on the Convention in the WTO 6 would provide a platform for the very criticisms that the trade negotiators 7 were seeking to deflate. 8 At the WTO General Council meeting in October 2004, Australia 9 suggested the Director General might instead hold an informal seminar and 20111 invite a representative from UNESCO.63 This discussion would help WTO 1 delegations to inform their capitals of the issues and encourage a ‘whole- 2 of-government’ approach that ensured coherence and complementarity 3 between the Convention and the WTO agreements. That approach could 4 prevent the kind of inconsistencies that had arisen between the multilateral 5 trade and environmental agreements. 6 The WTO delegations from the US, Chile, India, Hong Kong China, 7 Taiwan, Japan and Mexico – as self-styled ‘friends of cultural diversity’ – 8 had previously convened a seminar to discuss the issue (Voon, 2006). They 9 supported the Australian proposal. Canada also agreed, seeming to distance 30111 itself from the draft Convention then in circulation, and stressed the need 1 for coherence and complementarity. The EC did not oppose Australia’s 2 suggestion. Cuba and Morocco emphasised their commitment to the 3 Convention and their concern that the WTO should not interfere with its 4 drafting or content. All these and other governments wanted to quarantine 5 the Convention from the WTO, but for quite divergent reasons. The WTO 6 held its informal seminar in November 2004 and member states were left 7 to make their interventions at UNESCO. 8 The original mandate from the UNESCO ministers was to present a 9 preliminary draft Convention to the next biennial General Conference in 40111 October 2005. Knowing the US could drag out the negotiations interminably, 1 the INCP governments were determined to present a final text to the 2005 2 conference. But the stand-off over Article 19 continued. A third approach 3 was floated, whereby no treaty would take precedence and ways would be 44111 sought to ensure complementarity.64 That compromise informed the final Minds and markets 251

1111 text of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity 2 of Cultural Expressions, the pivotal article of which read: 3 4 Article 20: Relationship to other treaties: mutual supportiveness, 5 complementarity and non-subordination 6 1. Parties recognise that they shall perform in good faith their obliga- 7 tions under this Convention and all other treaties to which they 8 are parties. Accordingly, without subordinating this Convention to 9 any other treaty: 1011 (a) They shall foster mutual supportiveness between this Convention 1 and the other treaties to which they are parties; and 2 (b) when interpreting and applying the other treaties to which they 3111 are parties or when entering into other international obligations, 4 Parties shall take into account the relevant provisions of this 5 Convention. 6 2. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying the 7 rights and obligations of the Parties under any other treaties to 8 which they are parties.65 (Emphasis added.) 9 20111 Article 21 obliged parties to ‘promote the principles and objectives of this 1 Convention in other international forums’, but stopped short of requiring 2 active co-operation or solidarity. 3 The rapporteur’s account of the final negotiating session recorded a stream 4 of formal objections from the US, and its unsuccessful demand that 5 two texts be forwarded to the General Conference.66 The final statement 6 from the US delegation described the document as ‘deeply flawed and 7 fundamentally incompatible with UNESCO’s Constitutional obligation to 8 promote the free flow of ideas by word and image’.67 The US protested that 9 the process, including decisions by voting, had undermined ‘the spirit of 30111 consensus’ that normally characterised UNESCO and ‘would weaken its 1 reputation as a responsible, thoughtful international organisation’ (which 2 is ironic, given the travesty of ‘consensus’ that pervades decision making 3 at the WTO). The US also objected that the Convention was not about 4 culture, but about trade, citing as evidence the provision for the participation 5 of the European Commission, which has competency for trade, not culture. 6 ‘Because it is about trade, this convention clearly exceeds the mandate of 7 UNESCO.’ Yet the US had made cultural policy a ‘trade’ issue by its demands 8 for trade commitments that intrude deeply into areas of cultural policy and 9 regulation. The US was now using that re-designation to disqualify the 40111 international organisation that had constitutional responsibility to ‘preserve 1 the fruitful diversity of cultures’ from performing its mandate. 2 The UNESCO Convention was adopted by 148 members in favour, and 3 only the US and Israel opposed. It came into effect on 18 March 2007, 44111 three months after the thirtieth instrument of ratification was deposited. 252 Serving whose interests?

1111 Despite its posturing, the US had largely achieved its objectives. Two 2 years of obstruction had emaciated an already compromised text. Article 3 20(2) makes it clear that the Convention does not modify rights and 4 obligations under other treaties. It does not even provide a moral justification 5 for withdrawing or amending a trade in services commitment. Moreover, 6 Article 20:1(b) only requires parties to ‘take into account’ the obligations 7 and ‘relevant’ provisions in the Convention when they interpret, apply or 8 negotiate other international obligations. The obligations and provisions 9 this refers to are merely aspirational. Moreover, the Convention only applies 1011 to its parties. The US is unlikely ever to ratify and would face no effective 1 restraints even if it did. The Convention is therefore impotent to affect US 2 behaviour or as a basis for resisting US demands, as the indomitable Korean 3 Coalition found when seeking to repel the US assault on Korea’s film quotas 4 in the US Korea FTA. 5 Other powerful parties might well invoke the Convention in negotiations 6 and disputes between themselves. Articles 20 and 21 might, for example, 7 inhibit one state from lodging a trade dispute against another, such as the 8 EC’s challenge to Canada over film distribution in 1998 (see note 13 of 9 this chapter).68 Or it could generate moral pressure to settle a dispute through 20111 conciliation. But both sides would have to be willing to use the Convention. 1 That is not assured. The EU cannot agree internally on whether its cultural 2 exception should extend to music, let alone to the broad range of culture- 3 related services in which Europe’s corporations have offensive interests and 4 to which the Convention potentially applies. In most situations, these states 5 can already look after themselves, and pick and choose what aspects of 6 culture they protect without needing the Convention. 7 The critical question was whether the major powers that ratified the 8 Convention would be prepared to invest it with real meaning if it was invoked 9 by developing country signatories. The first test came in the CARIFORUM- 30111 EC EPA, initialled in December 2007. Protocol III on Cultural Co-operation 1 draws explicitly on the UNESCO Convention. It contains soft commitments 2 to strengthening cultural industries and diversity that are couched in the 3 aspirational language of ‘aim’, ‘endeavour’, ‘facilitate’ and ‘co-operate’, and 4 ‘without prejudice to the other provisions of this Agreement’. The substance 5 of the services, investment and e-commerce chapters reflect almost verbatim 6 the EC’s negotiating stance on cultural goods and services in the WTO. 7 The story of the Convention offers broader lessons for those seeking a 8 legal antidote to trade in services agreements. Its so-called ‘mirror’ solution, 9 whereby neither treaty takes precedence, is a mirage. The UNESCO 40111 Convention will always occupy a subordinate legal position vis-à-vis the 1 trade treaties. The trade agreements gain their potency from the prevailing 2 hegemony of the market paradigm, their closed text and binding enforcement 3 mechanisms. Complaints that a WTO member’s policy or regulations have 44111 breached the trade in services rules are judged by a panel of trade law Minds and markets 253

1111 experts, and solely with reference to those rules. There is no legal space 2 to recognise the UNESCO Convention, even if it was an effective legal 3 instrument. It could hardly qualify as customary international law. Given 4 that hierarchy, the obligation to ‘foster mutual supportiveness’ will, in 5 practice, require conformity of the Convention to the ideology and rules of 6 the WTO in cases where a dispute occurs. 7 This outcome reflects the contemporary state of international treaties and 8 international institutions. UNESCO is a post-Second World War creation 9 of a superseded paradigm. It survives, tenuously, in a hostile international 1011 regulatory arena and is marginalised by governments at the national level. 1 The soft subjects of culture and education give it much less weight than 2 even UNCTAD or the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 3111 The UNESCO Convention was primarily championed by culture ministers 4 and ministries. Responsibility for the GATS and related agreements rests 5 with the more powerful trade ministers, ministries and Geneva-based 6 negotiators. Cultural services are one small part of a multifaceted negotiating 7 programme where trade-offs are made not only with other services but also 8 with agriculture, industrial products and intellectual property. At a whole- 9 of-government level, even governments that strongly supported the 20111 Convention would not privilege their cultural concerns over their strategic 1 trade objectives. 2 As the discussions at the WTO General Council confirm, the weak out- 3 come on ‘trade trumps culture’ was not just the work of the US and ‘friends’; 4 it also reflected the interests of the Convention’s powerful patrons, notably 5 France, Canada/Quebec and Spain. They have their own offensive interests 6 in the WTO. The last thing they wanted was to inflame accusations that 7 the trade agreements subordinate culture, human rights, social regulation 8 and democracy. It was important for them to contain the issue within 9 UNESCO. The final result delivered them a pragmatic balance of cultural 30111 and economic self-interest, within neoliberal parameters. 1 Where does this leave the two cultural sector lobby groups that fought 2 so hard for a Convention that would neutralise the trade agreements? 3 Again, their assessments reflect their different perspectives and goals. The 4 Coalitions appeared to approach the Convention largely as an end it itself. 5 They pragmatically hailed the text as a success and urged its adoption. In 6 September 2007 the 42 national coalitions established a more formal 7 International Federation of Coalitions for Cultural Diversity whose purposes 8 were defined exclusively with reference to the Convention. 9 The INCD saw the Convention more broadly, as one step within a political 40111 strategy to expose, weaken and paralyse trade in services agreements. That 1 was not always clear to its members, many of whom struggled to understand 2 the arcane mindset and technicalities of trade law. But it was consistently 3 reflected in their more critical discourse, the involvement of their members, 44111 alongside other activists, at various WTO protests, and their broader 254 Serving whose interests?

1111 platform of cultural diversity initiatives. While INCD actively campaigned 2 for the Convention’s ratification, they were realistic about its failings: 3 4 If the objective of the new Treaty is to declare the right of States to 5 implement cultural policies and to establish a new foundation for future 6 cooperation, the Treaty has succeeded. If the objective is to carve out 7 cultural goods and services from the trade agreements, the Treaty is 8 inadequate, at least in the short term.69 9 1011 It is no coincidence that the Canadian government informed the INCD in 1 2006 that it would fund only one organisation in the future, and that was 2 the Coalition. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 Chapter 8

1111 2 Dominion over the earth 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 Among the largest economic sectors of ‘trade in services’ are those that 4 profit from the exploitation of nature: tourism, food production and 5 distribution, and processing of natural resources such as timber, fisheries 6 and minerals. These industries operate internationally through integrated 7 production and supply chains. Those chains are controlled by oligopolies 8 that are increasingly ‘transnational in their corporate constitution, 9 multinational in their sourcing, international in their labor allocation, and 20111 global in their consumer marketing strategies’ (Konefal et al., 2005, p 294). 1 Natural resources rarely feature in the critique of trade in services. Yet 2 corporate exploitation and often outright plunder pose a grave threat to 3 sustainability in the fully social sense of the term: people’s material needs 4 for food, water, shelter, clothing, transport and energy; the survival of 5 communities that have unique identities, cultures and spiritualities; and the 6 fragile ecosystem in which land, water, plants, forests, fish, animals and 7 humans co-exist. These corporate and social worlds collide in a form of 8 ‘accumulation by dispossession’ that is fragmented and localised (Harvey, 9 2005, p 178), and has provoked a swath of oppositional movements that 30111 are often described as ‘globalisation from below’. 1 This chapter looks at two dimensions of the threat that trade in services 2 agreements pose to genuine sustainability. It begins by examining three cases 3 where the WTO agreements on agriculture, intellectual property, investment 4 measures and services have intersected in ways that undermine the viability 5 of national and local communities. The first is the landmark dispute over 6 preferential imports of bananas from the ACP countries into the EU (EU- 7 Bananas). The second case, Japan-Distribution Services, involves ‘agreement 8 shopping’ by the US between the GATT and the GATS. What began as a 9 dispute between Kodak and Fuji over photographic paper ended up opening 40111 doors for supermarket chains such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour at the expense 1 of Japan’s small shopkeepers, local neighbourhoods and cultural traditions. 2 The third example reveals how the web of obligations under the WTO, 3 including the GATS, traps a resource-rich country, the Solomon Islands, 44111 in poverty. 256 Serving whose interests?

1111 The remainder of the chapter analyses how globally integrated food 2 production and supply chains are disaggregated into W/120 classifications 3 that seem unrelated to the natural resources they consume or the livelihoods 4 they determine. When those CPCs are reassembled and transposed to the 5 real world, they entrench the power of mega-retailers and transnational 6 agribusinesses to determine what food is produced, for both export and 7 domestic consumption, by whom, for what price, and using which technical 8 standards and production techniques. Once more, the corporations complain 9 that the myriad and scattered commitments in the GATS 1994 fail to meet 1011 their requirements. Pressure from the US and European services lobbies to 1 have the GATS restructured in ways that reflect the infrastructure of the 2 supply chains has gained little traction in GATS 2000, but may have greater 3 success through the bilaterals. 4 Two case studies document the social, political and ecological implications 5 of the ‘economy of exploitation’. Case study 15 examines the threat posed 6 by the major supermarket chains to the sustainability of local communities, 7 while Case study 16 reveals the human cost of unsustainable tourism for 8 indigenous peoples and for the local community of Cancún in Mexico. 9 20111 Reintegrating the trade treaties 1 2 Discussions about ‘trade and . . .’ natural resources, environment or 3 sustainability almost never include the trade in services agreements. Tourism, 4 the world’s largest services export industry, is treated as benign and largely 5 ignored. International food production is equated with the WTO Agreement 6 on Agriculture (AoA), with occasional references to non-tariff barriers under 7 the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, or the patenting of biodiversity 8 and protection of geographical indicators for alcohol and food under the 9 TRIPS agreement. Fisheries, forestry and mining are dealt with variously 30111 through the GATT, including the Agreement on Trade-related Investment 1 Measures (TRIMS), and the Doha round negotiations on NAMA and rules 2 on trade-distorting subsidies. 3 Technically, each of these legal texts is self-contained. When the AoA, 4 NAMA, TRIPS and GATS do appear in the same discussion, it is usually 5 as trade-offs in the ‘single undertaking’ of the Doha round. The reification 6 of legal rules conceals their function as complementary vehicles through 7 which major powers advance the interests of their corporations. 8 The classic example of complementarity is the case of EC-Bananas (Salas 9 and Jackson, 2000), where a functionally integrated transaction was 40111 subjected to the distinctive legal regimes of trade in services and trade in 1 goods.1 In the early 1990s, the EU harmonised its system of preferential 2 imports of bananas from ACP countries under the Lomé Conventions. The 3 banana growing countries of Latin America made a series of complaints 44111 that these preferences were illegal under the GATT. Although successive Dominion over the earth 257

1111 GATT panels upheld those complaints, the Europeans vetoed the adoption 2 of the reports. In 1994 the EC offered the Latin American litigants a more 3 generous framework agreement on tariff quotas and import licences for 4 bananas if they would not take action under the new WTO before 2002. 5 The complainants agreed. The world’s largest banana producer, Ecuador, 6 was not a GATT party at the time (Salas and Jackson, 2000, pp 147–50). 7 Bananas account for about 0.03 per cent of transatlantic trade (Alter and 8 Meunier, 2006, p 363). However, US companies Dole, Chiquita and Del 9 Monte (owned by Heinz since 2002) control two-thirds of the world’s trade 1011 in bananas. Most of these are grown in Latin America and marketed 1 internationally. Chiquita had anticipated that the Europeans would be forced 2 to open their banana market after the WTO was formed and invested heavily 3111 in banana plantations and shipping equipment. When the Latin American 4 governments made their deal with the EU, Chiquita was left with excess 5 capacity and a massive debt. In September 1994 Chiquita filed a section 6 301 petition with the USTR, claiming the European banana regime was 7 costing it millions of dollars. The company’s chairman at the time, Carl 8 Lindner, was a major contributor to both the Republican and Democratic 9 parties and an election was only a year away (Alter and Meunier, 2006, 20111 pp 369–70, 373–5). 1 The US administration chose to lodge a dispute with the new WTO rather 2 than act unilaterally. In 1995, the US alleged that the EC had breached its 3 GATS obligations under Article II (MFN), as it had not scheduled an MFN 4 reservation for distribution services in favour of the ACP countries. Further, 5 it said the EC had breached its national treatment commitments on distribution 6 services in modes 1 and 3. The EC schedule of sectoral commitments had 7 used the provisional Central Product Classification (CPCprov) CPC 622 8 Wholesale Trade Distribution, which has a sub-sector headed ‘wholesale 9 trade services of food, beverages and tobacco’, with a sub-category of that 30111 sub-sector for ‘wholesale trade services of fruit and vegetables’. The US was 1 able to invoke mode 3 because the importers and distributors of bananas 2 were European companies that were owned or controlled by Chiquita and 3 Dole. GATS Article XXVIII defines ‘owned’ as a 50 per cent or greater 4 equity ownership, and ‘controlled’ as the power to name a majority of its 5 directors or otherwise legally direct its action. 6 The WTO panel rejected the EC’s contention that the banana regime 7 involved only trade in goods, not services. The wording in GATS Article I 8 ‘applies to measures affecting trade in services’. That covered both the direct 9 and indirect impact of a measure (EU-Bananas 1997a, paras 7.279–81). 40111 The Appellate Body agreed that the same measure can be scrutinised under 1 both agreements: the GATT was concerned with how the measure affects 2 goods; the GATS with how it affects the supply of a service or the service 3 suppliers (EU-Bananas, 1997b). Despite the observation that this should 44111 be assessed on a case-by-case basis, it is difficult to see how cross-border 258 Serving whose interests?

1111 commodity trade would not involve distribution services. A potential dispute 2 would then depend on which companies were involved in what activities. 3 Latin American banana producing countries that were not subject to the 4 agreement with the EC successfully brought their own complaint only under 5 the GATT. They included Ecuador, which had rushed its WTO accession 6 to participate in the litigation. The Europeans dragged their feet in response. 7 Ecuador sought the right to retaliate against the EU by suspending 8 concessions under TRIPS, where it potentially had more leverage than in 9 goods (Alter and Meunier, 2006, p 376). Meanwhile, the US banana lobby 1011 had mobilised through the Congress to demand enforcement of the ruling. 1 In 1998, the USTR responded by announcing 100 per cent retaliatory tariffs 2 on a revolving list of goods imported from Europe (Salas and Jackson, 3 2000, pp 155–7). 4 The US gained much more from this case than the Latin American 5 countries that actually produce bananas, thanks to a (controversially) liberal 6 treatment of its standing in the dispute. The biggest losers were the small 7 family producers of bananas in the Caribbean for whom the Lomé 8 preferences were an economic lifeline and who were powerless in this dispute. 9 The ruling gave legitimacy to the plan already floated by the European 20111 Union to replace the Lomé preferences with reciprocal trade agreements. 1 The EC secured a temporary waiver for its non-compliance until 1 January 2 2008, which became the deadline in the Cotonou Agreement 2000 for 3 completion of new EPAs. 4 EU–Bananas had nothing to do with services in the US. The USTR used 5 the legal fiction that foreign investment is ‘trade’ to advance the interests 6 of US companies that produce bananas in Latin America and sell them in 7 Europe. So the GATS operated as a proxy investment agreement between 8 countries that do not have one. The case also created a precedent for the 9 major powers whose companies dominate the global distribution markets 30111 to use the GATS as a back door route to secure changes to other countries’ 1 goods regimes. 2 The second case illustrates the potential for ‘agreement shopping’ as the 3 US challenged the same law through parallel disputes under the GATT and 4 GATS. In May 1995 Kodak lodged a section 301 complaint with the USTR, 5 claiming Japan’s Large-Scale Retail Law was a barrier to imports of US- 6 made photographic film and paper. For diplomatic reasons, the USTR again 7 chose to pursue the issue under the GATT. The WTO panel rejected the 8 complaint, finding that nothing in Japan’s retail law prevented smaller shops 9 from stocking the imported goods (Japan-Photographic Paper, 1998). 40111 A GATS complaint was seen as a ‘backup option’ that could address 1 other concerns of US firms (Devereaux et al., 2006, p 165). Japan’s retail 2 law required local governments to conduct extensive public hearings and 3 economic, traffic, environmental and other impact assessments before a large 44111 retailer could open for business (Bottari and Gould, 2005, p 14). The USTR Dominion over the earth 259

1111 argued that these procedural requirements posed a barrier to foreign retailers 2 and distorted competition in favour of Japan’s small shopkeepers (Japan- 3 Distribution Services, 1996). As Japan had taken market access commitments 4 on distribution services in its GATS 1994 schedule, the law allegedly 5 breached its Article III (transparency) and Article XVI (market access) 6 obligations. Consultations with Japan on the GATS dispute continued after 7 the panel had rejected the GATT complaint. Japan agreed to introduce a 8 diluted Large-Scale Retail Store Location Law that required assessments 9 only of the environmental and traffic impacts of a big box department store 1011 (Bottari and Gould, 2005, p 15). This eased the entry into Japan’s trillion- 1 dollar retail market for the US’s Wal-Mart and European superstores such 2 as Carrefour, although informal barriers remained. 3111 The local councils, shopkeepers and communities who were directly 4 affected by the case were mere bystanders in a geopolitically motivated 5 settlement between the US and Japan. The absence of an emergency safeguard 6 mechanism in the GATS meant that Japanese central or local governments 7 could not legally reinstate the requirement for comprehensive impact 8 assessments or other constraints if local livelihoods and culture were 9 threatened as a result the new law. 20111 The US succeeded in having the law amended, despite losing one challenge 1 and without a panel ruling on the second. From the perspective of GATS 2 advocates, this is the best possible outcome as voluntary consensual 3 liberalisation is the primary objective of the dispute settlement system. For 4 critics, it illustrates the potential chilling effect of a trade dispute, even 5 between major players. The case also showed the broader liberalising effect 6 of the multilateral system. A complaint that was initiated by Kodak to 7 increase its goods exports had created foreign investment opportunities for 8 retailers from the US and other countries to establish superstores in Japan. 9 The third example highlights the embedded asymmetry of trade rules that 30111 disempower countries that are resource rich, but economically impoverished, 1 and benefit the companies of rich countries that exploit those resources and 2 capture the added value. The Solomon Islands is a least developed country 3 in the South Pacific. It joined the WTO in 1996 and was subject to a WTO 4 Trade Policy Review in 1998. At the time, the government faced major 5 arrears in public debt. Its revenue and export earnings depended largely on 6 log exports to South Korea and Japan. Those exports had been severely hit 7 by the Asian financial crisis and a fall in commodity prices. Unsustainable 8 logging practices had intensified the resulting glut. The world price for the 9 Solomon Islands’ copra exports was also depressed. Its other main export, 40111 canned tuna to the UK, depended on Lomé preferences that were threatened 1 in light of the ruling on bananas. 2 The Solomon Islands government faced a no-win situation. On the one 3 hand, it was being pressured by WTO members to manage its resources 44111 sustainably, diversify its export markets, and encourage foreign investment. 260 Serving whose interests?

1111 Yet it had to generate tax and export receipts to service its debt through 2 exploiting its ‘comparative advantage’ – which meant, in practice, the 3 unsustainable logging and export of timber by foreign companies, largely 4 in the form of unprocessed logs. The Solomon Islands government pointed 5 out during the Trade Policy Review 6 7 that the export of unprocessed logs and fish had been the source of 8 nefarious rent-seeking behaviour by private sector participants which 9 weakened governance and subverted the proper functioning of the public 1011 sector. Trade malpractice was rampant in the logging industry . . . via 1 transfer pricing, species misidentification by log exporting firms and 2 mismanagement.2 3 4 The obvious solution, from the government’s perspective, was to prohibit 5 round log exports and encourage downstream processing. Other WTO 6 members objected that such measures encouraged inefficient domestic 7 industries and were prohibited TRIMS. In a remarkably blasé observation, 8 the chairman of the review body remarked that ‘this was a particularly 9 interesting review’ that raised key questions of 20111 1 how to reconcile policies of environmental sustainability and the steps 2 necessary to generate foreign earnings (especially in circumstances where 3 a government is coping with significant debt servicing burdens), and 4 also the question of how small economies heavily reliant on a very 5 limited number of products can maximize returns on production.3 6 7 Such observations did nothing to reduce the vulnerability of the Solomon 8 Islands economy. Its plight was compounded by a highly volatile domestic 9 political situation and the competition influences of Australia, China and 30111 Taiwan. In 1999 a civil war broke out between ethnic groups over land 1 and jobs, leaving almost 100 people dead. In 2000, the government was 2 overthrown in a coup. The new government invited Australia to dispatch 3 what became a highly controversial Regional Assistance Mission to the 4 Solomon Islands. Riots razed the capital’s Chinatown in 2006 after the 5 election of a new pro-China government. Further liberalisation was likely 6 to reignite this tinderbox. 7 The Solomon Islands had taken a cautious approach to its original GATS 8 schedule. The horizontal limitations included an economic needs test for 9 foreign investment that required consideration of: (a) provision of new 40111 services; (b) improvement of the productive structure of the economy; (c) 1 viability of the new project, especially with respect to foreign exchange 2 earnings or savings; and (d) the implications for employment in the Solomon 3 Islands. A further limitation prohibited foreign ownership of land. The EC’s 44111 GATS 2000 request to the Solomon Islands on tourism asked for the foreign Dominion over the earth 261

1111 investment restriction to be removed. Whether this was a pro forma request, 2 or based on a country-specific assessment, it reveals a contemptuous 3 disregard for the economic and political stability of such a fragile country.4 4 If the EC were to secure commitments on distribution services from the 5 Solomon Islands in its EPA negotiations, the latter would also face the 6 prospect of a ‘bananas’-style link between the GATT and GATS. 7 It is not clear what requests were made of the Solomon Islands in GATS 8 2000 by other countries, or what it has offered. One of the most significant 9 risks would be a mode 3 commitment in the seemingly benign CPC 86140 1011 ‘services incidental to forestry and logging’, which would guarantee foreign 1 firms the rights to establish a commercial presence and non-discrimination 2 over services such as felling, cutting, debarking and transport of logs within 3111 the forest. 4 The combined effect of significant services commitments under the GATS 5 or an EPA, and the prohibited investment measures under TRIMS, would 6 be a virtual carte blanche for foreign logging companies. Proposals in the 7 NAMA negotiations to accelerate tariff elimination in forestry would further 8 intensify the commercial pressures that were driving the unsustainable and 9 illegal logging practices in the Solomon Islands.5 20111 Similar stories can be told for mining, fisheries and other natural resources 1 in most parts of the world. 2 3 Global food supply chains 4 5 As explained earlier in this book, trade in services agreements rely on a 6 web of illusions: that all state parties are equal; that the technical rules are 7 applied to isolated commercial transactions that take place between equally 8 endowed buyers and sellers; that massive transnational corporations 9 and small local businesses are equivalent legal persons; and that social and 30111 environmental ‘externalities’ should and will be addressed as matters of 1 domestic policy by national governments. 2 This legal veil facilitates the expansion of transnational corporate control 3 through vertically integrated and multinational production and supply chains, 4 and masks their implications for social and ecological sustainability. The 5 GATS Article XXVIII implicitly recognises the chains of services transactions 6 in each sector when it defines ‘supply’ of a service to include ‘production, 7 distribution, marketing, sale and delivery’. When applied to a full commitment 8 in mode 3, this authorises foreign investors to produce, distribute, market, 9 sell and deliver the scheduled sub-sector without discrimination or restrictions 40111 on market access.6 Full commitments across numerous sectors and countries 1 therefore have the effect of consolidating corporate power over 2 transnationalised production and related supply chains. 3 The example used in this chapter is food. Following the Second World 44111 War, agriculture became increasingly industrialised, especially in the global 262 Serving whose interests?

1111 North. Both agribusiness input-manufacturers (covering equipment, 2 fertilisers, pesticides, seeds, etc.) and output-processing firms (covering uplift 3 and storage of farm products, packaging, sale, etc.) consolidated to achieve 4 efficiencies through scale and volume. In the 1970s, major food processors 5 and retailers began responding to the same impulses that drove industrial 6 producers, and disaggregated their operations internationally. 7 Several decades later, these supply chains take two main forms. Traditional 8 bulk commodity chains rely on spot markets. The resulting price uncertainties 9 have spawned a huge speculative futures market – Bill Vorley from the UK 1011 Food Group reports that one bushel of soybeans was produced for every 1 31 traded in 2000 (Vorley, 2003, p 20). Corporate concentration means 2 an ever-decreasing number of firms control the key elements of production, 3 trade, processing and marketing for each commodity. In 2002, three 4 companies controlled 45 per cent of coffee roasting activities; four controlled 5 40 per cent of cocoa grinding; three dominated crushing and feed production 6 in soy and livestock food (Vorley, 2003, p 10). Their transnational 7 operations allow them to take advantage of economies of scale in transport, 8 storage and finance. As preferred (and dependent) buyers have become more 9 common, local trading houses and brokers are squeezed out. The producers 20111 carry the risk, whether they sell through spot markets or contracts. 1 The second form, buyer-driven agri-food chains, tends to be highly 2 integrated across producers, suppliers, processors and retailers. The 3 transnational supermarkets dominate these chains so completely that they 4 ‘are largely determining the type and quality of food that most people 5 consume [especially], its cost, and how it is produced’ (Konefal et al., 2005, 6 p 294). The UNDP Human Development Report for 2005 made the same 7 point from the producer’s perspective: ‘To sell in world markets, especially 8 markets for higher value-added crops, is increasingly to sell to a handful 9 of large supermarket chains’ (UNDP, 2005, p 142). To give these statements 30111 a social context, some 2.5 billion people depend on agriculture for their 1 livelihoods, including an estimated 1.3 billion people who work in agriculture 2 (Vorley, 2003, p 14). 3 These buyer-driven chains rely on sources and outlets all over the world. 4 However, their dynamics are driven by consumer trends in rich countries. 5 Supermarkets have differentiated on price and quality, promoted niche 6 products and constantly innovated in response to intense competition and 7 market saturation. Non-food products are an increasing part of their core 8 business. Loyalty schemes have expanded into rewards for petrol, while 9 many chains provide financing through credit cards and banking. Ethical 40111 concerns among more affluent consumers have spawned new commercial 1 opportunities that avoid having to address the underlying asymmetries of 2 power in the agri-system. ‘Fairtrade’ attracts premium prices and bigger 3 retail margins; as demand has expanded, the fair trade production chain 44111 has increasingly replicated the old trading structures (Vorley, 2003, p 36). Dominion over the earth 263

1111 Similarly, organics are no longer the domain of smaller scale producers. 2 Major suppliers operate parallel conventional and organic production 3 systems within a single supply chain that deals with logistics, quality control 4 and traceability. 5 Constant innovation has increased the pressure for flexible, short-run 6 production and supply. That process generates pressure for greater cost 7 efficiencies from labour and suppliers. Wal-Mart’s ruthless approach to both 8 allows it to undersell its US competitors by an estimated 14 per cent (Head, 9 2004, p 3).7 The massive expansion of ‘own brands’ prompted Unilever, 1011 the world’s third largest food group, to adopt a ‘Path to Growth’ strategy 1 in 1999 that reduced the number of brands on offer from 1,600 to a core 2 400, resulting in 8,000 lost jobs and 30 factory closures worldwide (Burch 3111 and Lawrence, 2005, p 10, fn 6). As ‘operational inefficiencies’ are 4 eliminated, suppliers come under more severe pressures. Some supermarkets 5 demand payment for preferred supplier status as well as rebates and 6 retrospective discounts, and charge for promotions, shelf placement and 7 listing of new products. Suppliers’ invoices are routinely paid late (Burch 8 and Lawrence, 2005, p 4–5). 9 Mega-retailers now largely determine what products enter the agri-food 20111 chain. They create, and then respond to, the preoccupation of consumers 1 with appearance by demanding and advertising uniform standards for 2 products, especially perishables such as fruit, vegetables and flowers. The 3 supermarkets argue that standardisation is necessary because supply is so 4 diffused. When consumers respond negatively to the resulting influx of ‘food 5 from nowhere’ with demands for labelling of country origins or genetic 6 engineering (GE) content, the producers face new requirements of traceability. 7 Those demands increase with the growth of niche markets for organics, 8 free range and fairtrade products. 9 The official reference used at the WTO for standard setting by governments 30111 on food is the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which is dominated by 1 Northern governments and the agri-food industry (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2 2000, pp 400–4). But the retail industry’s private standards have become 3 the de facto regulations. In 2001 a consortium of European retailers 4 established EurepGAP, a private standard for food safety and quality that 5 applies from seed to farm gate (and includes some references to labour and 6 environmental impacts). It is operated through third party certification 7 agencies. Within two years, over 10,000 suppliers in 32 countries had been 8 certified. By 2007, EurepGAP had become GlobalGAP and claimed to be 9 working with 100 certification bodies in 70 countries.8 It euphemistically 40111 describes itself as an ‘equal partnership of agricultural producers and retailers’. 1 In practice, many major retailers will only buy from producers who comply. 2 As a result, ‘[p]roducers in developing countries have become standard 3 takers while retailers in industrialised nations have become standard setters’ 44111 (Konefal et al., 2005, p 298). 264 Serving whose interests?

1111 Again, the cost falls on the producers. Small-scale and poor growers who 2 cannot invest in the necessary equipment and upgrades are unable to export 3 or supply domestically to those stores. Support services, such as technical 4 testing or agronomists’ advice, may enhance the capacity of a country and 5 its producers to participate. But these services, too, are being privatised. 6 When foreign firms provide them, especially through mode 1, there is 7 minimal transfer of technology and knowledge, and high risks of supplier 8 capture and depleted national capacity. 9 The greatest concentration in the agri-food supply chain is at the buying 1011 desks, where large alliances pool their purchasing power (Vorley, 2003, 1 p 28). Some producers are forced to sell below their costs of production – 2 a process of producing more to earn less that Vorley describes as 3 ‘immiserising growth’ (Vorley, 2003, p 15). In a further twist, Lisa Michaels 4 claims that supermarkets have become the main beneficiaries of rich 5 countries’ agricultural subsidies: 50 years ago, farmers in Europe and North 6 America received 45 to 60 per cent of the money consumers spent on food; 7 by 2002 that was 7 per cent in Britain and 3.5 per cent in the US (but still 8 18 per cent in France) (Michaels, 2002, p 13). 9 The asymmetries in the supply chain produce ‘insiders’ who can afford 20111 the investment, scale and technology to supply the buying desks or establish 1 direct contracts with the retailers, and ‘outsiders’ who cannot (Vorley, 2003, 2 p 9). The impacts of exclusion are most severe for small producers and 3 growers in the global South. In Kenya, for example, small farmers’ share 4 of horticulture exports fell from 70 per cent to under 20 per cent by late 5 1990s (Reichart and Lines, 2005, p 3). 6 In addition, the rapid growth in foreign supermarkets that service the 7 expanding middle classes in large developing countries has undermined local 8 farms, small family owned shops, informal markets and street vendors (Case 9 study 15). Domestic markets have started to reflect the characteristics of 30111 export markets. Two decades ago, most meat produced from the Amazon 1 was by small-scale ranchers for local slaughterhouses. They have been 2 displaced by massive commercial ranchers that are linked to the supermarkets 3 who supply Brazil and beyond; those ranchers are pushing ever deeper into 4 the Amazon (McMichael, 2004, p 12). Vorley describes this asymmetry as 5 a multi-level process: value is transferred within countries from producers 6 and rural areas to consumers and urban areas; and from commodity 7 producing countries in the global South to consuming countries in the North, 8 which in turn puts pressure on small farmers in those countries. 9 The just-in-time system of transnational food production requires 40111 sophisticated inventories, computer-assisted logistics and state-of-the-art 1 satellite tracking that connects producers, distributors, wholesalers and 2 retailers across many countries. This further increases the costs of participation 3 for poor countries and small producers. The movement of perishables for just- 44111 in-time delivery requires cheap and efficient international transport services Dominion over the earth 265

1111 that are integrated from farm to retail store. These integrated freight systems 2 span road and rail, inland waterways and airports at both ends. More durable 3 foodstuffs rely on mega- container ships that dock in a small number of deep 4 harbour trans-shipment hubs, from which products are distributed to spoke 5 ports. Both air and sea ports face constant pressures to cut costs, despite rising 6 fuel prices. A primary source of cost efficiencies is the de-unionisation, 7 contracting out and where possible offshoring of engineering, ground support, 8 cargo handling and customs services. Many ports that are still publicly owned 9 for strategic reasons are nevertheless fully commercialised. Increasing 1011 privatisation has allowed infrastructure firms and investment funds to 1 consolidate control over key international hubs and multiple modes of 2 transport. 3111 Steps in the buyer-driven food supply chain described up to this point 4 correspond to almost every W/120 classification group. The most obvious 5 is 4. Distribution services: A. commission agents; B. wholesale trade; C. 6 retailing; D. franchising. But a non-exhaustive list also includes: 1.A 7 Professional services: 1.A.i veterinary; 1.B. Computer and related: 1.B.c 8 data processing; 1.B.d data base; 1.E. Rental/Leasing [services relating to] 9 1.E.a ships; 1.E.b aircraft; 1.E.c other transport equipment; 1F Other 20111 Business Services: 1.F. a. advertising; 1.F.b market research; 1.F.e technical 1 testing and analysis; 1.F.f services incidental to agriculture; 1.F.i services 2 incidental to manufacturing; 1.F.m related scientific and technical consulting; 3 1.F.q packaging; 2.C Telecommunications: 2.C.j. on-line information and 4 data base retrieval; 2.C.k electronic data interchange; 2.C.n on-line 5 information and/or data processing; 2.C.o.01 and 02 terrestrial and satellite 6 based mobile telecommunications; 7.B Banking and Other Financial services: 7 7.B.f.03 derivative products; 7.B.f.04 exchange rate and interest rate 8 instruments; 7.B.k advisory and other auxiliary financial services; 9 11.Transport services: 11.A maritime; 11.B internal waterways; 11.C. air 30111 transport; 11.E rail transport; 11.F road transport; 11.H.a cargo handling; 1 11.H.b storage and warehouse; and 11.H.c freight transport agency services. 2 This is only part of the picture. All aspects of globalised food production 3 – including large production units, up-to-date technology, patented seeds, 4 approved herbicides, testing, storage, marketing and transport – are 5 expensive and require access to credit. Producers often face demands for 6 discounts and delays in payment. If their produce is rejected, their contract 7 is cancelled or product specifications are altered without warning, they have 8 no income and cannot service their debts. 9 In the past, state-owned producer boards, banks and rural credit facilities 40111 compensated for the lack of collateral, and smoothed out commodity price 1 volatility and uneven seasonal incomes. States also helped to cover the costs 2 of insurance, especially for disasters. Most of those state agencies have been 3 dismantled or privatised. Those that remain and seek to cross-subsidise 44111 credit from more profitable activities face complaints of anti-competitive 266 Serving whose interests?

1111 practices. Government guarantees, or subsidies to lenders, risk being 2 challenged during a member’s Trade Policy Review as trade distorting 3 subsidies, even though moves to develop Article XV disciplines on subsidies 4 are moribund. The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy notes the 5 precedent set by a European Commission ruling that public guarantees for 6 deposits in local savings banks in Germany constituted an unfair competitive 7 advantage by attracting a higher credit rating and lower borrowing rates 8 in capital markets (Reichert and Lines, 2005, p 7). 9 Several of the EC’s individual GATS 2000 requests on financial services 1011 explicitly affect agricultural financing: for South Korea to remove mandatory 1 lending to small and medium-sized enterprises; for Mexico to permit foreign 2 investment in credit unions, savings and loan companies, and development 3 banks; and for the Philippines to ‘clarify’ why its requirements on lending 4 to small-medium enterprises and agri-business were not in its schedule 5 (Reichert and Lines, 2005, p 7). 6 Trade in services ideology assumes that foreign financial institutions that 7 receive guaranteed market access and national treatment under W/120 8 category 9. Banking and Financial Services will fill the gaps created by 9 privatisations or the collapse of uncompetitive local lenders. But the 20111 transnational financial industry is not interested in scattered rural clients 1 with low volumes of loans and high transaction costs. They are more likely 2 to shut down operations in the countryside and small towns and focus on 3 higher end, more specialised finance sectors. The same applies to 7.A. 4 Insurance and Insurance-related services. 5 A further, equally potent threat to sustainable rural livelihoods involves 6 the commercialisation and privatisation of water supply and distribution. 7 The UN World Water Development Report 2003 estimated that 70 per 8 cent of all the fresh water consumed is used for agriculture, 22 per cent for 9 industrial use, and 8 per cent for domestic use (UNESCO, 2003, p 19). 30111 Water scarcity is already a problem. The Food and Agriculture Organisation 1 estimated in 2003 that future food production would require a 14 per cent 2 increase in agricultural water withdrawals over the next thirty years (quoted 3 4 in IUF, 2004, p 3). The agribusinesses saw this crisis as a lucrative new 5 market opportunity and began positioning themselves to profit from water 6 shortages. Vandana Shiva quotes Monsanto executive Robert Farley as 7 saying: 8 9 what you are seeing is not just a consolidation of seed companies, it’s 40111 really a consolidation of the entire food chain. Since water is as central 1 to food production as seed is, and without water life is not possible, 2 Monsanto is now trying to establish its control over water. During 3 1999, Monsanto plans to launch a new water business, starting with 44111 India and Mexico since both these countries are facing water shortages. Dominion over the earth 267

1111 Shiva cites a Monsanto strategy paper that outlined its plans to focus on 2 the 3 4 resource market for water and land. These are the markets that are 5 most relevant to us as a life sciences company committed to delivering 6 food, health and hope to the world, and these are markets in which 7 there are predictable sustainability challenges and therefore opportunities 8 to create business value.9 9 1011 The company anticipated receiving assistance from ‘non-conventional 1 financing’, such as the World Bank’s IFC. By operating through joint ventures 2 in India, it hoped to secure management control over local operations while 3111 avoiding direct liability. 4 As noted in Chapter 4, the World Bank actively promotes water 5 privatisation and tradeable water rights. Growing competition for water 6 between industry, aquaculture and agriculture is expected to see small 7 operations and poor areas miss out. The International Union of Foodworkers 8 fears that higher input costs will increase the pressure on food producers 9 to cut costs, especially labour, and prompt a shift of production to high 20111 return, low water use cash crops rather than staples. Higher user charges 1 will affect access to water for workers and communities, including to wash 2 off pesticides. Services to poor areas may be abandoned once waste water 3 treatment and recycling, and the recovery of polluted rivers, become 4 commercially driven. Similarly, those communities may become sites for 5 environmental dumping of contamination, pesticide stockpiles and tradeable 6 toxic wastes (IUF, 2004, pp 7–9). 7 The EC’s GATS 2000 requests on water focused on urban main supplies, 8 but such commitments could erode the ability of public utilities and private 9 franchisers to cross subsidise rural distribution, and of governments to insist 30111 on universal supply. Water distribution for irrigation is not included in 6. 1 Environmental Services or elsewhere in W/120 (although it is in the (UN) 2 revised Central Product Classification (CPC Rev) 1.1). GATS commitments 3 on urban domestic use could open the door to its inclusion. Other 4 classifications already apply to the water supply infrastructure, notably 1.F.e 5 technical testing and analysis, and 11.G pipeline transportation. 6 At the input end of the food supply chain, agricultural production is 7 dominated by equally powerful corporations that control knowledge, seed 8 technologies and farming inputs, such as fertilisers, pesticides and insecticides. 9 In 2004 just six agro-chemical transnationals (BASF, Bayer CropScience, 40111 Dow AgroSciences, DuPont Crop Protection, Monsanto and Syngenta) 1 controlled about 80 per cent of a world market that had sales of over $32 2 billion (Dinham, 2005, p 9). While Monsanto accounted for 90 per cent of 3 genetically engineered crops grown world wide, that technology is integral 44111 to all six. Their research budgets dwarf the money available for publicly 268 Serving whose interests?

1111 funded research, especially in developing countries (Dinham, 2005, p 11). 2 Hence, these self-described ‘plant science’, ‘crop science’ or ‘life science’ 3 companies can dictate the direction of agricultural research. Their top-down 4 biotechnology solutions displace the bottom-up participatory approaches that 5 build on farmers’ knowledge. By establishing a presence in different countries, 6 often in ‘partnerships’ with state funded public research bodies and 7 universities, the corporations gain access to local and indigenous knowledge 8 (Paul and Steinbrecher, 2003, pp 130–2). Indigenous genetic material and 9 processes are then patented courtesy of World Intellectual Property 1011 Organization’s Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants and the 1 WTO’s TRIPS. Full GATS commitments on W/120 category 1.C.a: research 2 and development services on natural sciences, and 5.C: higher education 3 would guarantee unrestricted rights for these corporations to establish a 4 commercial presence and to access public subsidies. 5 In conjunction with the agreements on agriculture and intellectual 6 property, the GATS has the potential to embed a market model of food 7 security that marginalises traditional farming methods and institutions, and 8 undermines rural livelihoods and food sovereignty. 9 Vorley concludes that today’s integrated agri-food supply chain is 20111 producing three rural worlds, which reflect traditional asymmetries. In the 1 first rural world, a minority of large farmers and entrepreneurs are well 2 connected into the global food economy and become a vital part of 3 agribusiness. The Second World comprises those family farmers and landed 4 peasants who were traditionally the mainstays of the rural economy and 5 are economically and politically subordinated within the agribusiness model. 6 They face declining returns, fluctuating output and lack of access to land 7 and credit, and search for local buyers and niche markets. ‘Rural World 3’ 8 is ‘a struggling underclass that includes almost four-fifths of the world’s 9 hungry’ who try to survive through off-farm work, itinerant farm labour, 30111 temporary migration and subsistence agriculture (Vorley, 2003, pp 14–15). 1 These communities are trapped in poverty. The GATS provides no escape 2 route for the second or third rural worlds: the general exceptions provision 3 allows no exceptions for agricultural crises, the loss of food sovereignty or 4 environmental catastrophe; nor is there any emergency safeguard mechanism. 5 This analysis has focused on food production. The exploitation of forestry, 6 fisheries or mineral resources can be mapped onto the trade in services 7 agreements in similar ways. As Case study 16 shows, tourism has its own 8 supply chain that falls under multiple GATS rules and potentially 144 CPCs. 9 40111 GATS 2000 1 2 The companies who control these industries are a major force in the 3 transatlantic services lobbies. They were disappointed by their harvest from 44111 GATS 1994. Commitments were partial, fragmented and unevenly spread Dominion over the earth 269

1111 across the supply chains. As GATS 2000 approached, the corporations took 2 advantage of their intimate relationship with the US and EC trade negotiators 3 to identify target countries, sectors and barriers. They were not interested 4 in additional piecemeal commitments to CPCs. They wanted comprehensive 5 and coherent commitments that covered the logistics infrastructure from 6 point of origin to point of consumption across multiple sectors and 7 countries. That could never be achieved through the meandering bilateral 8 request and offer process. In the lead-up to the Hong Kong ministerial in 9 2005, the retailers’ lobby Eurocommerce urged greater priority for services, 1011 arguing ‘[n]ow is the time for preparing cross-cutting trade-offs: services/ 1 agriculture, services/industrial, market access/industrial’ (Eurocommerce, 2 2005). 3111 The plurilateral process that was authorised at Hong Kong offered a 4 prime opportunity to push for clear, certain, comparable and coherent 5 coverage of the supply chains. Most of the major demandeurs were involved 6 in most of the relevant plurilateral requests, whose demands often 7 overlapped.10 However, national sensitivities prevented a unified approach. 8 The Mode 3 request focused on removing horizontal limitations on foreign 9 investment, while that on distribution services sought comprehensive 20111 coverage of that sector across modes 1, 2, and 3, with limited exclusions 1 for sensitive services. Air transport targeted ancillary services. Other 2 plurilaterals were more innovative. The logistics request appended a checklist 3 designed to provide a ‘comprehensive picture of all activities relating to the 4 supply chains for freight’. It only detailed four categories covering freight 5 transport and logistics, intending that these would complement other 6 requests. Maritime services built on the EC-promoted Maritime Model 7 Schedule for comprehensive liberalisation, which was designed to enable 8 multimodal transport operators ‘to undertake locally all activities which 9 are necessary for the supply to their customers of a partially or fully 30111 integrated transport service, within which the maritime transport constitutes 1 a substantial element’. Because the plurilaterals were also expected to bind 2 the demandeurs, the uptake of these requests would provide a significant 3 consolidation of supply chains across the major economies. 4 These far-reaching plurilateral proposals were designed to restrict the 5 flexibility that members were guaranteed in Article XIX of the GATS. 6 Ironically, that approach drew legitimacy from the proposal by the 7 Dominican Republic and other developing countries for a ‘coherent’ cluster 8 of commitments on tourism, discussed in Case study 16. 9 The contribution of the GATS and other trade in services agreements to 40111 the consolidation of the agri-food supply chains and control over natural 1 resources has gone largely unremarked by defensive governments and GATS 2 critics. So have the cumulative impacts of ‘trade’ agreements on services, 3 agriculture, NAMA, TRIPS, TRIMS, FTAs and bilateral investment treaties. 44111 Yet the impact of what David Harvey calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’ 270 Serving whose interests?

1111 determines the sustainability of physical, social and cultural life for over a 2 billion people (Harvey, 2005, p 178). That pressure will intensify as food 3 staples are diverted to produce agri-fuels. Peasant farmers and agricultural 4 workers, fisher folk, indigenous peoples, and local communities have 5 mobilised in defence of food sovereignty, land rights and self-determination. 6 These local struggles are often connected regionally and internationally. 7 Their actions have had a major influence on Southern governments in the 8 Doha negotiations on agriculture and NAMA and indirectly, therefore, on 9 the advance of the trade in services negotiations. 1011 1 2 CASE STUDY 15 WAL-MART RULES, OK? 3 4 Mega-supermarkets such as Wal-Mart, Carrefour and Tesco that ‘trade’ 5 through foreign investment (mode 3) are transforming the urban landscape, 6 local communities and traditional lifestyles of millions of people around 7 the world. 8 Modern supermarkets are creatures of North America and Europe. They 9 date back to the cooperative movement in Britain in the nineteenth century, 20111 when they were controlled by their members and sold basic foods at prices 1 that working people could afford. Once retail price maintenance was 2 abolished they expanded rapidly. Container ships and jumbo jets increased 3 their range of product sources and the scale of purchasing. The trend to 4 self-service cut labour costs. Widespread car ownership meant consumers 5 could shop at a distance and in bulk (Michaels, 2002, p 3). 6 As competition intensified, and profit margins tightened, supermarket 7 8 owners looked for economies of scale and built larger stores. Ownership 9 was consolidated into chains and became increasingly concentrated. The 30111 market differentiated on cost and quality, to the point that most chains began 1 operating stores at every level: hypermarkets, superstores, supermarkets, 2 convenience stores and cash-and-carry. As domestic markets in wealthy 3 countries became more competitive, the major players turned to large 4 Southern countries with a growing middle class of consumers. 5 The Spinex Resources Top 100 retailers (by sales) for 2005 ranked 42 6 US firms in the top 100; Britain had 12 and the rest of the EU another 26.11 7 Wal-Mart dwarfs all its competitors. Its sales for the 2006 financial year 8 were $315 billion, with profits of $11.2 billion from some 6,600 stores. 9 The company was founded in 1962 and only made the Fortune magazine 40111 top 500 US companies (ranked by revenue) in 1995 (Semmens, 2006). 1 However, by 2002 Wal-Mart’s revenue had exceeded Exxon Mobil, and it 2 became the first services company to top the Fortune ranking. In 2006, 3 Exxon recovered first place, only to be trumped again by Wal-Mart in 44111 2007.12 The company accounted for one-tenth of total US imports from Dominion over the earth 271

1111 China in 2002, and is so pivotal to the US economy that one retail industry 2 expert predicted a national security crisis if Wal-Mart went into a tailspin.13 3 France’s Carrefour (Crossroads) came a distant second in the Spinex ranking, 4 with sales in 2005 of ‘only’ $90 billion through 7,003 stores, excluding its 5 franchises. Two other grocery chains, Metro AG of Germany and Royal 6 Dutch Ahold, made the top five retailers on the Spinex list, while Tesco plc 7 came in sixth. 8 Where trade in services agreements do not open markets to these retailers, 9 they secure and consolidate them. In GATS 1994, 33 members made specific 1011 commitments for retail distribution; a majority were developing countries, 1 including the larger markets of Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, South Korea 2 and South Africa.14 By the mid-2000s, the major chains controlled 50 to 60 3111 per cent of the food retail sector in Latin America, compared to 10 to 20 per 4 cent in the early 1990s. Brazil fully opened its distribution services to foreign 5 investment in GATS 1994. In 2000, four of the five biggest Brazilian retail 6 companies were wholly or largely foreign owned. When foreign investment 7 was allowed in China in 1992, a huge migration of consumers to 8 supermarkets began. China’s WTO accession package contained extensive 9 distribution commitments, including the rapid phasing out of investment 20111 restrictions. Foreign chain stores soon accounted for 23 per cent of all big 1 new supermarkets (Reichert and Lines, 2005, p 4). Although China’s retail 2 market grew by a massive 13 per cent in 2006, the AT Kearney Retail 3 Development Index 2007 identified Brazil, Mexico and Russia as offering the 4 most attractive market opportunities; China rated only seventh.15 At a 5 bilateral level, Malaysia’s ban on new hypermarkets in certain areas until 6 2009 was threatened during its FTA negotiations with the US. 7 These supermarket chains have no commitment to the uniqueness of 8 ‘place’. Corporate headquarters in the US or Europe aim to remake local 9 communities to suit their operating requirements and design templates. In 30111 May 2002, for example, the (then) International Mass Retail Association 1 complained that ‘zoning and store size restrictions, and hours of operation 2 restrictions, although frequently imposed on a national basis, make 3 investment unattractive in some markets. European hours of operation 4 regulations are particularly troublesome’ (quoted in Bottari and Gould, 2005, 5 p 8). If the chains are prevented from reshaping the planning laws, labour 6 practices and consumer habits of one town in one country to meet their 7 profit targets, they can sell up and move on to more compliant locations. 8 Different firms have different strategies for influencing local government 9 decisions. Wal-Mart, for example, has attempted to mobilise and manipulate 40111 consumer activism. In 2003 it hired a specialist petition management 1 company to collect signatures for a petition to overturn an ordinance in 2 Contra Costa County (California) that barred super-size retail centres from 3 opening full-service grocery stores outside the city limits – even though Wal- 44111 Mart had no plans to open such a store. It had already secured the repeal 272 Serving whose interests?

1111 of a similar ordinance in Nevada’s Clark County.16 Other mega-retailers 2 rely on lobbying, and direct political influence over central and local 3 government regimes, as George Monbiot details in his passionate exposé 4 of supermarket power in Britain (Monbiot, 2000, pp 162–207). 5 Corporate leverage is most politically effective on home governments. It 6 rarely opens foreign doors. Trade in services agreements can assist, albeit 7 imperfectly. The kind of ‘measures’ that are subject to rules on market 8 access, national treatment, MFN and domestic regulation range from 9 national statutes and city by-laws to unwritten practices, or even exercises 1011 of discretion by planning councils. How deeply these obligations intrude 1 on the core civic responsibilities of local authorities is unclear. The ‘hit list’ 2 of barriers identified by WTO members and their services lobbies to inform 3 the GATS 2000 and domestic regulation negotiations includes many 4 measures that central governments and local bodies commonly use to contain 5 the impact of big box stores – limits on land use, hours of operation and 6 size; social and economic impact assessments on the local community; 7 requirements for buildings to harmonise with the urban landscape and local 8 architecture; bans on large stores in certain areas (which would constitute 9 a ‘zero quota’); limits on the number of formula stores in particular locations; 20111 requirements for indemnity bonds; ‘onerous’ documentation requirements; 1 and restrictions on marketing and advertising.17 2 Many GATS 1994 schedules show that governments were uncertain about 3 the kind and degree of constraints that national treatment and market access 4 commitments impose. Limitations scheduled by governments for mode 3 5 of retail distribution include many entries for economic needs tests and 6 some for restrictions on store size. A number of governments listed state 7 and local government zoning and land use limitations. Others, including 8 the US, apparently thought it was not necessary to do so (Bottari and 9 Gould, 2005, Appendix 1). This uncertainty sets the stage for a repeat of 30111 US-Gambling where a government is bound to commitments it says it never 1 intended. That case also shows how US or European retailers could bankroll 2 challenges by other states, or use offshore affiliates, to deregulate their own 3 markets. The case of Japan’s retail law, where a retail market was opened 4 on an MFN basis even without a formal ruling, illustrates the chilling effect 5 that the threat of a dispute can have on regulation. 6 Some of the proposals for disciplines on domestic regulation would provide 7 further ammunition to deregulate the retail sector. By definition, a ‘necessity’ 8 test or requirement for least trade restrictive regulation would tie the hands 9 of local authorities. In addition, a transparency obligation that required 40111 prior consultation with foreign firms over proposed new regulations would 1 stretch the capacity of even a large metropolitan council. These constraints 2 are already being written into bilaterals. 3 Once market access and national treatment commitments for retail 44111 distribution are made, local governments can no longer ensure the sustainability Dominion over the earth 273

1111 of their local retail sector. Trade in services agreements have no emergency 2 safeguard provisions that allow those commitments to be suspended when 3 the local communities are threatened, or allow time for local shops to become 4 re-established if the superstore that displaced them closes down. Nor, 5 scandalously, does Article XIV: General exceptions apply to measures that 6 are taken for sound environmental reasons. 7 Trade agreements can help to remove barriers to the global expansion 8 of superstores. However, they cannot dismantle the cultural barriers. To 9 export their particular brands of Western consumerism, the supermarket 1011 chains must succeed in colonising foreign cultures, or at least the minds of 1 target consumers. 2 Wal-Mart has found this difficult. Because it has been losing market share 3111 to competitors in the US, its thousands of overseas stores are increasingly 4 important. But the Wal-Mart formula of selling lowest cost products through 5 sterile big box stores is culturally specific. Wal-Mart found a cultural mesh 6 in Britain. But it could not break through Germany’s tight price regulation, 7 strong labour laws and loyalty to local firms and withdrew at a serious 8 loss. It failed to win over consumers in South Korea and quit there too. 9 Wal-Mart insisted it would stay in Japan, despite losing $465 million in 20111 the first six months of 2006, as it struggled to reconcile its standard template 1 with Japanese retail culture.18 2 China was the ultimate challenge. By late 2006, Wal-Mart had 36,000 3 workers in 68 stores in China. It paid $1 billion for Trust-Mart, a 4 downscale local chain, to gain access to 20 Chinese provinces. In an attempt 5 to ‘go native’ it swapped dead fish and meat in polystyrene trays for live 6 fish tanks and open meat counters.19 It also conceded a long battle over 7 unionisation with the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.20 Despite these 8 moves, commentators note that the aspirations of China’s middle class are 9 driven more by social standing than low cost, and Wal-Mart’s success is 30111 not assured. Some even suggest the Wal-Mart phenomenon may have 1 peaked.21 2 Carrefour has been equally itinerant, but arguably more adaptable. Over 3 half of its sales are outside France. As of September 2005, Carrefour operated 4 10,000 retail outlets in 31 countries, and employed more than 430,000 5 people. In 2006 it had 35 hypermarkets and hundreds of discounts stores 6 in Brazil. But it, too, sold 32 hypermarkets in South Korea, where it had 7 been the second largest retailer, and quit Japan and Spain to concentrate 8 on China. Carrefour first invested in China in 1995. By 2006 it had 9 established 67 outlets and a Chinese export base for its global operations.22 40111 The GATS guarantees these retailers the fluidity to invest and disinvest, 1 without regard to the consequences for local communities. The impacts in 2 wealthy countries have been dramatic enough. Researchers calculate that 3 two supermarkets will close in the US for each new Wal-Mart that opens, 44111 with a loss of jobs and local businesses in the surrounding area.23 Back in 274 Serving whose interests?

1111 1960, small independent retailers in Britain, who tend to source locally, 2 had a 60 per cent share of the food retail market. By 2000, their share was 3 down to 6 per cent. Food sales through supermarkets grew 30 per cent just 4 between 1995 and 2002 (Michaels, 2002, p 17). A 1998 study of 93 stores 5 in Britain found an average net loss of 276 local jobs each time a 6 supermarket opened (Simms et al., 2002, p 15). 7 This takeover by supermarkets in the North took several decades. The 8 transition in the South has been much more rapid and disruptive, and forms 9 part of a broader food export strategy that Philip McMichael argues has 1011 ‘Westernised social diets of newly urbanized customers in industrializing 1 regions of the Third World’ (McMichael, 2004, p 5). As a result the food 2 system has become polarised across class, generational and rural/urban divides. 3 The aspirations of newly affluent consumers, and desires of ‘children of the 4 market’ for Western retail therapy, are pitted against cultural traditions, close- 5 knit neighbourhoods and the livelihoods of small producers and shopkeepers. 6 Wet markets and small local shops tend to be frequented by older generations 7 who prepare traditional foods, while working professionals prefer the 8 efficiency and choice of one-stop superstores. Malls are promoted to 9 consumption-focused urbanites as centres for ‘retailtainment’. Traditional 20111 outlets and the informal sector are cannibalised. McMichael draws parallels 1 between the ‘managed construction of the Third World consumer’ and ‘the 2 decimation of peasant agriculture’ (McMichael, 2004, p 5). 3 These incursions do not go uncontested, as the resistance of local 4 shopkeepers, communities and trade unions in Thailand shows. The impact 5 assessment of the GATS for Thailand in 2002, discussed in Chapter 5 in 6 relation to financial services, included a case study on foreign superstores.24 7 The report stressed that Thailand remains an agrarian society, with 60 8 per cent of the people still engaged in agriculture. Wholesale and retail 9 trade was the second most important sector of the cash economy, after 30111 manufacturing, and employed 15 per cent of the total workforce. The sector 1 was split between the traditional wet markets and neighbourhood shops 2 that were locally owned and modern department stores and shopping malls 3 that were mostly owned by foreign chains. 4 During the 1990s, the government had used light-handed regulation to 5 enhance consumer choice and create forward and backward linkages with 6 the retail sector. But the fire sale of property that followed the 1997 Asian 7 financial crisis had attracted a large number of foreign retailers who offered 8 lower cost items to the now less-affluent Thais. Their sales and outlets rapidly 9 expanded. Several thousand small retailers had closed each year as consumer 40111 and lifestyle preferences shifted. According to the report, this created ‘a 1 very hot potato’ for the government.25 While the government did not plan 2 to halt retail liberalisation completely, it considered some ‘appropriate 3 regulations’ were called for to prevent further impacts on small, traditional 44111 retailers and encourage their competitiveness. Dominion over the earth 275

1111 Thailand had made no retail distribution services commitments in GATS 2 1994. The assessment concluded that these experiences 3 4 have given rise to serious thoughts on having appropriate and sound 5 regulatory framework set before liberalisation is unleashed in a fast 6 and uncontrolled manner. Since that may be hard to come by in realistic 7 terms, it is felt that liberalisation, while desirable, should take place at 8 a pace commensurate to the economic (and perhaps, social) readiness 9 of a country. This is completely congruent with the principles of 1011 progressive liberalisation and the right to regulate – the two cornerstones 26 1 of the GATS. 2 The Thai government drafted a new Retail Business Act in co-operation with 3111 the Chamber of Commerce. The law aimed to restrict the operations of 4 foreign retailers by regulating their pricing policies, including their advertising 5 budgets and supplier-entrance fees, and restricting capital registration and 6 the expansion of new chains. Tesco, Carrefour and others rushed to beat the 7 new law: more than 40 superstores were approved in 2002.27 8 In November 2002, the since-disgraced Prime Minister Thaksin suddenly 9 abandoned the proposed law. The Minister of Commerce hinted at foreign 20111 pressure: ‘Any enactment of rules of law that are not universally accepted 1 in the international community would affect our future negotiation power 2 over free-trade agreements.’ The spokesperson for a local Chamber of 3 Commerce responded: ‘The prime minister is afraid of upsetting the likes 4 of England, but we would like to ask which country he is the prime minister 5 of?’28 At the time, it was the European chains that dominated Thailand’s 6 markets and the EC’s GATS 2000 requests had sought full commitments 7 in wholesale and retail distribution. But Thaksin’s about-face was also a 8 precursor to the US announcement of free trade negotiations with Thailand 9 in October 2003. 30111 Thailand retained its existing planning rules for zoning and opening 1 hours. The Chamber of Commerce objected that these had never worked 2 and never would. The superstores continued to expand, even as Thailand 3 hit an economic downturn. By September 2005, Carrefour was operating 4 20 hypermarkets in Thailand, each serving an average 8,000 customers a 5 day, and planned to expand further through supermarkets and franchised 6 convenience stores. 7 Negotiations on the US–Thailand FTA stalled following the military coup 8 in August 2006. But the retail expansion continued. In October 2006, 9 Thailand’s small shop owners took to the streets in defiance of martial law 40111 to protest at Tesco’s plans to double its smaller outlets to 200, alongside 1 the 51 hypermarkets under construction in the provinces. They demanded 2 a five-year moratorium on expansion by foreign retail chains, likening the 3 process to ‘a fire that is burning down local markets across the nation’.29 44111 The saga of the Retail Act, and the use of zoning to contain the expansion 276 Serving whose interests?

1111 of foreign supermarkets, continued through 2007 as the cabinet, legislative 2 assembly and supreme Council of State disputed the appropriate balance 3 of interests between foreign investors and local shopkeepers. Meanwhile, 4 the legislature had adopted a new section 190 of the Thai Constitution that 5 required the National Assembly to approve the entry into negotiations for 6 any treaty that, inter alia, would have a widespread impact on the country’s 7 economic and social stability, and to the conduct of public hearings prior 8 to signing the treaty. 9 Several lessons can be drawn from the Thai experience. First, it is possible 1011 to attract foreign investment without GATS commitments. Second, it is easier 1 to change policies if you have no binding GATS commitments. Third, the 2 existence of the GATS combined with pressure for bilateral negotiations has 3 a chilling effect on domestic regulation, even without formal commitments. 4 The story also reveals a now familiar dynamic. On one hand, the appeal of 5 Western consumerism, the overwhelming dominance of the supermarket- 6 driven food supply chain, and the relentless quest of mega-retailers for new 7 markets and higher profits are features of global capitalism. On the other, 8 local people will struggle to defend their communities, livelihoods and 9 traditions, and the right to shape their own lives, when they are threatened 20111 by GATS obligations or FTA negotiations (Joy and Hardstaff, 2003, p 14). 1 2 3 CASE STUDY 16 THE REAL CANCÚN 4 5 Tourism is the fourth largest economic activity in the world, surpassed only 6 by armaments, petroleum and motor vehicles. The World Travel and Tourism 7 Council (WTTC) projected that the industry would generate $1,815 billion 8 in direct economic activity, amounting to 3.6 per cent of world GDP, in 2007 9 and directly employ 76 million people (WTTC, 2007). The tourism sector is 30111 treated in the trade policy arena as harmless and uncontroversial – a view 1 that also reflects its importance as the main source of foreign exchange 2 earnings for 83 per cent of developing countries. UNCTAD has urged those 3 countries to strengthen their tourism capacity and competitiveness. 4 Despite this benign image, the global market is as chronically skewed for 5 tourism as it is for other services. Indian-based NGO Equations has 6 developed a GATS-Tourism Impact Assessment Framework, which reveals 7 how tourist-source countries dominate the industry and retain the benefits 8 (EED/Equations, 2005). Between 40 and 50 per cent of gross tourism receipts 9 ‘leak’ out of smaller developing country destinations to pay for imported 40111 equipment, drink, food and other items. Further ‘export leakage’ occurs as 1 foreign investors in resorts, hotels and other infrastructure take their profits 2 back to their country of origin. The UN Environmental Programme has 3 estimated that only $5 of each $100 spent on a vacation tour by a visitor 44111 from a developed country stays in the developing country destination.30 Dominion over the earth 277

1111 Those figures are not surprising in an industry where just four internet- 2 based global distribution systems (including Amadeus and Pegasus) manage 3 80 per cent of bookings in the world tourism market. The sector is dominated 4 by household names such as American Express in finance and travel, 5 Intercontinental and Best Western branded hotels and, less obviously, 6 Accenture in IT and outsourcing for airlines, hotels and transportation. 7 E-tourism operators such as Expedia.com (established by Microsoft in 1996 8 and spun off in 1999) host other mega-players who sponsor placements 9 and links. Small local hotels, tour guides or rental car firms who cannot 1011 afford the listings miss out, and traditional landed travel agencies struggle 1 to compete. The world’s major cruise lines (covered under Maritime 2 Transport Services) sell pre-paid packages for sightseeing, culture, shopping 3111 and food that exclude smaller local tour guides and entrepreneurs (Slatter, 4 2006a). The Star Alliance and One World Alliance consortia link together 5 most of the world’s major airlines, marginalising other, often struggling 6 national carriers. 7 Local communities are left to bear the ‘negative externalities’ of mass 8 tourism. Resorts and tourism zones demand priority access to land, water, 9 energy and high quality infrastructure, which usually means land title 20111 registration, privatised services and price rationing. These luxury enclaves 1 displace indigenous peoples and local communities, and remain largely 2 disconnected from the local culture and economy. The impacts of 3 construction, landscaping, leisure facilities and pollution threaten the local 4 bio-diversity. Cruise ships likewise pollute the local fishing grounds and 5 harbours with sewage, fuel leakages and waste. Jobs for locals are clustered 6 in the untrained, low paid activities of construction, hotel work and 7 transport. Many tourism destinations are notorious for the formal and 8 informal exploitation of child and women’s labour, most perilously through 9 sex tourism, entertainment and the souvenir trade.31 30111 The international tourism industry has tried to overcome such criticisms 1 and reinvent itself for the twenty-first century under the banner of 2 ‘sustainable tourism’. But sustainability for them refers to the market, not 3 the lifestyles and livelihoods of those in whose back yards they operate. 4 The WTO secretariat paraphrases the World Tourism Organization’s 5 definition of ‘sustainable tourism’ as ‘meeting of the needs of present tourists 6 and host regions, while protecting and enhancing opportunities for the 7 future’.32 8 Indeed, the industry has capitalised on challenges to its destructive impacts 9 by creating lucrative niche markets in ‘concept-driven tourism’, including 40111 ecotourism, nature tourism, cultural tourism, ethno-tourism, health tourism, 1 cross-border religious tourism and even poverty tourism to visit slums or 2 watch scavenging. Eco-tourism, in particular, has given the industry access 3 to hitherto untouched areas around the world, without having to compromise 44111 on profit. The World Tourism Organization portrays ‘eco-tourism’ as 278 Serving whose interests?

1111 ‘responsible travel to natural areas which conserves the environment and 2 improves the welfare of local people’.33 The International Forum on 3 Indigenous Tourism held in Oaxaca, Mexico, in March 2002 described it 4 very differently: 5 6 We have been told that the International Year of Eco-tourism (IYE) is 7 testimony to the importance of ecotourism to conserve lands, protect 8 cultures, and encourage economic development. Yet the realities we are 9 experiencing of ecological degradation and cultural erosion associated 1011 with tourism development under the influence of globalisation suggest 1 that the IYE does not go far enough in its review of ecotourism. For 2 centuries, Indigenous Peoples have suffered from displacement and 3 dispossession, and we see the incursion of the profit-driven global 4 tourism industry as well as the rhetoric of ‘sustainable development’ in 5 the IYE as the latest threats to our lands and our communities. . . . 6 Tourism is beneficial for Indigenous communities only when it is based 7 on and enhances our self-determination. . . . An essential component 8 of this is the right to decline tourism development at any point in the 9 development process. So when we talk about ‘Indigenous Tourism’, it 20111 is not just another marketing gimmick, but a broad category of 1 distinctive ways in which Indigenous Peoples choose to implement 2 tourism on our own terms.34 3 4 Trade in services agreements are the antithesis of self-determination. In 5 1990 the OECD described tourism as ‘remarkably free’ from protectionist 6 and discriminatory practices.35 The GATS has largely locked in that 7 liberalisation. More governments (112) made commitments on tourism in 8 1994 than in any other sector. The W/120 Category 8: Trade and travel- 9 related services covers the obvious – hotels and restaurants; travel agencies 30111 and tour operators; tourist guides; and other. However, an illustrative list 1 prepared by the WTO in 1990 identified a further 70 tourism-dedicated 2 activities that ranged across real estate, hotel construction, souvenir sales, 3 tourism degree programmes, refuse disposal, travel insurance, nightclubs, 4 tour guides, amusement markets and museums, casinos, rail and bus services, 5 air passenger transport. Then there were another 70 more generic tourism- 6 related activities.36 7 These classifications were developed by the World Tourism Organization 8 into a ‘Standard International Classification of Tourism Activities’.37 An 9 UNCTAD-sponsored experts meeting on tourism in 2000 proposed 40111 incorporating these into a tourism cluster for the GATS 2000 negotiations.38 1 That formed the basis for a proposal from El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua 2 and Panama in 2000 for a ‘coherent’ cluster of commitments on tourism- 3 characteristic services, tourism-connected services and tourism non-specific 44111 services (almost everything else).39 A further paper from Brazil and others Dominion over the earth 279

1111 that reviewed progress in the tourism negotiations by September 2004 2 complained that most offers failed to provide commercially meaningful (new) 3 market access and national treatment commitments.40 4 The request is, of course, silent about the consequences. Trade in services 5 commitments restrain governments, in the interests of the global tourism 6 industry, from maintaining and adopting policies and regulations across a 7 vast array of activities. Measures that would be considered a breach of 8 market access obligations include limits on the numbers of hotels or resorts 9 in a region, tour groups licensed to operate in a culturally sensitive area, 1011 or cruise ships allowed to enter a port, and similarly with restrictions on 1 the number of tourists visiting a site or coaches permitted in a protected 2 area. Reserving jobs for indigenous people as tour guides would violate 3111 national treatment. Conditions on licences that require cultural impact 4 assessments or use of recycled building materials could be deemed under 5 Article VI to be ‘more burdensome than necessary’ to achieve ‘quality’. 6 The International Cancún Declaration of Indigenous Peoples, convened 7 in opposition to the fifth WTO ministerial conference in September 2003, 8 called for an end to the GATS-sponsored monopoly by the international 9 tourism industry over protected areas, parks, forests, waters and ecosystems, 20111 and asserted the right to exercise indigenous management practices and 41 1 control over natural resources. The following account was written by the 2 author at that time, and reflects the realities of tourism for the local residents 3 of Cancún. The names of the sources have been changed: 4 5 Puerto Juarez is the oldest settlement in Cancún. Past the local fishing 6 boats moored on the stunning white beach, you can see the profile 7 of the hotel zone where the WTO ministerial meeting is about to 8 begin. The contrast is breathtaking. 9 Cancún was created just 33 years ago. Fishers and their families 30111 have been in Puerto Juarez for generations. Many of the traditional 1 families are now being displaced. The locals say that people have no 2 rights, and some have no water, because powerful developers are intent 3 on expelling them from the beach so they can build new hotels in a 4 mirror image of the hotel zone. 5 Jose owns a small beachfront restaurant and fishing boat. His was 6 the first stop on the tour of ‘real’ Cancún organized for journalists 7 by a number of groups including Friends of the Earth International 8 9 and the Polaris Institute of Canada, alongside the local organisers of 40111 the Comité de Bienvenida de Cancún. 1 Snr Jose apologized that ‘there are few people around today, because 2 they are afraid’. A few days ago, he had a visit from the local council. 3 They told him that his restaurant licence would not be renewed. Plain 44111 clothed officials came to watch over the media tour. 280 Serving whose interests?

1111 He thought there were two likely reasons. First, the authorities 2 want to close his restaurant down because poor people gather there. 3 They will be unsightly in the proposed new luxury hotel zone. Second, 4 Jose was prepared to talk to the international media about the harsh 5 realities of life for local people in Cancún – a truth that would 6 contradict the claim that foreign investment in tourism is essential to 7 8 create development and jobs in poor countries. It would also tarnish 9 the image of golden sands, wealth and First World services being lapped 1011 up by the WTO delegates, journalists and lobbyists who now occupy 1 Cancún’s hotel zone. 2 Snr Jose’s message was simple: ‘They promised tourist development 3 that would help indigenous people, help the local people and help the 4 poor people. And we noticed at the beginning of the process that that 5 was lies, that wasn’t the way it was going to be.’ The cruise ships and 6 hotel chains are all foreign controlled. Tourists buy an all-inclusive 7 8 package, including arts, crafts, restaurants and fishing excursions. 9 Foreign investors now control all development in Cancún. Small 20111 businesses simply cannot survive. 1 ‘All the money stays in the hands of the same people. That’s what 2 creates the poverty, alcoholism, vandalism and lack of services. We 3 live day to day. Our livelihoods depend on the weather. If the weather 4 is good, we work. If not, we can’t. The permits we need to purchase 5 to run a business here are too expensive for us and they are turned 6 down for reasons we don’t understand and aren’t told to us. The 7 point seems to be to make sure we can’t continue to exist.’ 8 9 ‘When we can get permits to run the little restaurants and fishing 30111 boats it is impossible to compete with the transnational companies 1 that are all backed with foreign money.’ 2 He noted that ‘all this started with NAFTA. In 10 years, there has 3 been no widespread development for the people. Foreign investors 4 take all the money back home. Some 600 families live in this community. 5 Soon they will have no choice but to work for the foreign companies 6 for a pittance, putting on white suits, being people’s servants and taking 7 orders, or set up small tourist stands’. 8 ‘People used to be happy’, he said. ‘Here by the shore on the water 9 40111 there used to be thousands of lobsters, shrimps and clams. People 1 could live from the sea. Just recently a friend was arrested, had his 2 boat confiscated and was sent to jail because he took seven kilogrammes 3 of shrimp. The people of Cancún do not have any part of Cancún for 44111 themselves.’ Dominion over the earth 281

1111 Down the road at the port this perverse form of ‘development’ was 2 also making its mark. A new facility was under construction, designed 3 to cater for 200 to 300 boats. The small operators and co-operatives 4 that ran the old port would shortly be redundant. The new port 5 building had an OXXO convenience store and a McDonald’s that, based 6 on similar experience elsewhere, would soon displace the small shops 7 8 in the town. 9 What has this story got to do with this week’s WTO ministerial 1011 meeting? A great deal has been invested in the argument made by the 1 IMF, World Bank and WTO that poor countries need foreign direct 2 investment. Negotiation of a new agreement to promote and protect 3111 foreign investment tops the list of ‘new issues’ that ministers are 4 required to decide on. This would see the failed negotiations on a 5 Multilateral Agreement on Investment reborn. 6 Already, foreign investors in services such as tourism, fishing, 7 8 restaurants, food stores, hotels, leisure services and ports can secure 9 guaranteed rights to set up business and be treated at least as 20111 favourably as locals under the GATS. The right to regulate can also 1 be restricted if governments have committed those services to the 2 GATS rules. Under new negotiations launched in 2000, governments 3 are expected to make further services commitments. The European 4 Commission has asked Mexico for extensive new openings in tourism, 5 retail services and environment, including water. The Cancún 6 ministerial is expected to set new deadlines for governments to table 7 their offers in response to such requests. 8 9 The water issue is especially sensitive. Numerous World Bank loans 30111 to Mexico have contained conditions mandating water privatisation 1 and cost recovery. In 2003, the World Bank approved another loan 2 for Mexico to provide infrastructure services, including water, for 3 eligible states. Conditions for eligibility include economically efficient 4 pricing, self-sufficiency through cost recovery, appropriate competition 5 and regulatory frameworks, and enhancing the participation of the 6 private sector. 7 Ondeo, the local water company in Cancún, is 50 per cent owned 8 by Suez of France, the world’s largest water company. Suez is a 9 40111 cornerstone member of the European Services Forum that drives the 1 EC’s position in the GATS negotiations. In 2002, Suez secured the 2 contract for Cancún’s water supply from Azurix, a subsidiary of Enron. 3 Suez claimed that this and other Mexican water contracts would earn 44111 it $70 million in annual revenue. 282 Serving whose interests?

1111 The real meaning of water privatisation was evident down the road 2 from Snr Jose’s restaurant. A pumping station provides a relatively 3 clean and reliable water supply to local residents. But not to all of 4 them. A stone’s throw away from the pumping station lives the family 5 of Snra Maria and Snr Jorge. Their house has no water. To have it 6 connected they need papers that show they are legal tenants. They’ve 7 lived in their own house on this land for many years. But they don’t 8 have the paperwork. It got lost at the Council. Each time they try to 9 1011 secure new documentation, that gets lost too. Sometimes, they say, 1 the tanker drivers give them water, out of solidarity. 2 The landowner was billionaire Carlos Hank Gonzales, former 3 Minister of Agriculture and Minister of Tourism. One of Mexico’s most 4 influential businessmen, Gonzales was implicated in the corruption 5 scandals that surrounded former President Salinas. His local corporate 6 vehicle Trivasa has been linked to an Enron-style corruption scandal. 7 Another of his firms is a co-partner with French water company Suez. 8 Snr Hank flagged the land where the family lives as the site of a 9 new hotel zone. They were offered 6,000 pesos to move. When they 20111 refused, the local authority and landowner came with machines to 1 destroy the house. The municipal government documented their 2 complaint. But those papers were never served and disappeared too. 3 4 The couple observed that ‘developers have big pockets’. 5 Some of their neighbours have moved. Three years ago, 17 fishing 6 families were evicted to make way for a hotel development and 7 relocated to a remote but beautiful lagoon at Rio Manati. This was 8 presented as an opportunity to develop their own tourism venture. 9 Accepting the challenge, the families have been developing eco- 30111 tourism with a fresh fish restaurant, bird watching, fishing and exploring 1 the rich natural environment nourished by mangroves. They have 2 invested heavily in equipment for tourism and sustainable aquaculture. 3 Access is a problem – the dirt road would deter all but the most 4 determined tourist. So is the absence of electricity, although they are 5 working on innovative solar energy strategies. Two other threats may 6 spell the death knell for the project and force them to search for yet 7 another livelihood. 8 9 The first is a rubbish dump 2 kilometers up the road, right next to 40111 the mangroves. The dump receives all the refuse from Cancún, even 1 though it is in the separate municipality of Mujeres. The 24,000 hotel 2 rooms in Cancún generate as much rubbish as the 400,000 residents 3 of Cancún. The toxins from decomposing rubbish leach into the 44111 mangroves, polluting the lagoon. This, in turn, kills the fish larvae that Dominion over the earth 283

1111 spawn there. As guardians for the environment, the families explain 2 they have been trying to get environmental regulations and restrictions 3 on fishing to safeguard an irreplaceable heritage, to no avail. That is 4 not surprising – they said the dump is owned by connections of Carlos 5 Hank Gonzales. As vultures circle the rubbish tip, our guide quips 6 that ‘we would rather have these vultures than the ones at the WTO’. 7 Developers are now eyeing the site at Rio Manati as a 8 9 commercialised tourist venture, displacing the families yet again. In a 1011 familiar story, they don’t have the formal paperwork to support their 1 ownership of the land. It disappeared within the offices of the local 2 council. The families are trying to regularise the situation so they 3111 cannot be removed. Without those documents, developers can lay 4 claim to the site. Presumably, if they succeed Snr Hank’s associates 5 will be involved, and discover a profitable way to resolve the pollution 6 threat to a lucrative new tourist venture, as well as fixing the road 7 and laying on electricity. 8 To a large extent NAFTA, which covers both services and 9 investment, has already locked open the doors of Cancún and its 20111 surrounds to foreign capital from the US and Canada. Their 1 2 corporations are ‘free’ to operate in a largely unfettered regulatory 3 environment. The people whose communities they destroy, whose 4 environments they despoil, whose livelihoods they terminate, whose 5 self-determination they violate, and whose dignity they leave in tatters 6 have no legal right to keep them out. Nor, any longer, does the Mexican 7 government. 8 Extending this ‘free trade zone’ to the world through WTO 9 agreements on investment and the GATS would reduce Mexico, and 30111 places such as Cancún, to mere playgrounds for transnational 1 corporations and foreign investors that want to profit from this 2 stunning location. The contrast between a development model that is 3 designed to promote the profits of the world’s transnationals, and 4 5 one that protects the basic rights of people to safe drinking water, 6 fish from their oceans, a clean environment, a secure income and 7 protection from intimidation, eviction and repression, could hardly be 8 more stark. 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 Chapter 9

1111 2 Energy wars 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3 The GATS presents a utopian vision of ever-expanding global markets 4 that is blind to its self-destructive potential. A globally integrated services 5 economy cannot survive without cheap and plentiful energy; nor can the 6 lifestyles of Western consumers and aspirant middle classes in the South. 7 Global warming, the depletion of energy resources and projections of 8 peak oil (Deffeyes, 2005) herald an intensified rivalry among the major 9 powers. US ascendancy depends on maintaining its prosperity, which in 20111 turn depends on oil. The US ‘has 5 per cent of the world’s population, 1 consumes 26 per cent of the world’s oil, but only has 2 per cent of the 2 world’s oil reserves within its boundaries’ (Barnett, 2006, p 7). The US is 3 already competing with the EU and Japan to secure supplies of oil and gas 4 from the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe. China and India 5 have initiated their own economic and strategic alliances to meet their 6 growing demand. A belligerent Russia is sitting on massive energy reserves. 7 The quest for energy security has invested the trade/energy/security nexus 8 with a new urgency and prompted some GATS critics to predict that trade 9 in services agreements could become the site of ‘the other oil war’ (Menotti, 30111 2006, p 3). This chapter explores that proposition in three complementary 1 contexts. 2 The first is the push for commitments on energy-related services in the 3 GATS 2000 negotiations and, with that having stalled, through regional 4 and bilateral agreements with energy-rich and/or strategic countries. These 5 agreements provide extensive legal entitlements. Yet attempts to enforce 6 such agreements would, in many cases, risk fuelling an anti-Western or 7 anti-imperialist backlash. 8 The US is disadvantaged in the race for new treaties so long as the President 9 lacks fast track authority. It is therefore likely to push aggressively on a 40111 second track: to secure enforceable access to oil and gas reserves and energy 1 services through WTO accession, including of ‘post-conflict’ Iraq and the 2 former and current enemies of Empire, Libya and Iran. However, as Case 3 study 18 shows, the accession process takes time and carries similar risks 44111 of provoking or intensifying internal instability and external hostility. Energy wars 285

1111 The third context is the national security exception under GATS Article 2 XIV bis. Here the US plays a double game: it demands extensive services 3 commitments from energy-rich states, while asserting its own absolute 4 sovereignty and right to set aside its trade obligations in the name of national 5 security. The ubiquitous ‘war on terror’ seems to offer limitless potential 6 to do this. 7 Yet, the US’s adversaries could do the same, individually or collectively. 8 Energy services have an intrinsic foreign policy component. Belligerent OPEC 9 members could follow the example of Venezuela, which has reasserted its 1011 ‘full oil sovereignty’ by renationalising its oil and gas fields irrespective of 1 any GATS implications (Case study 17). Attempts to enforce trade in services 2 commitments in this context would provoke a legal, political and ideological 3111 confrontation that would become a proxy battle between the prevailing 4 hegemony of neoliberal globalisation and the counter-hegemonic vision of 5 a people’s trade agenda. 6 7 Trade in energy services 8 9 The use of international law by the major Western powers to secure control 20111 over energy resources has a long history. Tony Anghie documents a potent 1 combination of unconscionable agreements, duress and legal doctrine that 2 sustained the colonial project and imperial expansion (Anghie, 2005, p 163). 3 The Western liberal notion of the ‘commons’ was used to justify the legal rule 4 that other countries’ resources were accessible to all until private property 5 rights were granted by the ‘civilised’ occupying powers. During the colonial 6 and mandate periods these rights were vested in a small number of vertically 7 integrated, Anglo-American multinational companies, known as the Seven 8 Sisters: Esso, Royal Dutch Shell, British Petroleum, Mobil, Chevron, Gulf Oil 9 and Texaco. An UNCTAD review of ‘Oil, Trade Agreements and Developing 30111 Countries’ in 2000 explains the original exclusion of petroleum from the 1 GATT in 1947: 2 3 Since the beginning of the twentieth century, petroleum has been 4 recognized to be not just an economic commodity, but also a strategic 5 one. . . . At the time of the early GATT negotiations, most of the 6 petroleum fields, located in North America, the Middle East and South 7 East Asia, were under the control of transnational corporations owned 8 mostly by residents of the United States, the United Kingdom, the 9 Netherlands, and France. Because these countries wanted to avoid new 40111 tensions over the control of resources, it seems likely that they decided 1 to exclude from the GATT negotiations the most strategic international 2 commodity at that time. Their concern was that the political and strategic 3 aspect of petroleum would have introduced an undesirable degree 44111 of ‘politicisation’ into the otherwise ‘technical’ nature of the GATT. In 286 Serving whose interests?

1111 any case, the main petroleum-exporting countries were not contracting 2 parties to the GATT at the time. 3 (UNCTAD, 2000, pp 14–15)1 4 5 Newly independent Third World states reasserted their pre-colonial 6 sovereignty over those resources (Anghie, 2005, pp 211–16). Their proposal 7 to review existing claims with a view to nationalisation was a central plank 8 of the New International Economic Order. Western powers insisted there were 9 no remedies in international law for legitimate conquest and dispossession. 1011 The rules of international law and the doctrine of state accession (which they 1 had created) had to be respected. Nationalisation required the payment of 2 compensation through internationally determined standards and customary 3 international law (again, as established by themselves). Rights ‘legally’ granted 4 over natural resources by a predecessor state had to be respected by the 5 successor; there was no legal space to re-examine those grants through a post- 6 colonial lens. 7 Southern states used their numerical ascendancy in the UN to attempt 8 to make new international law. In 1958, against the backdrop of Egypt’s 9 nationalisation of the Suez Canal, the UN established a Commission on 20111 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. In 1962 the General 1 Assembly adopted a Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty of Natural 2 Resources. Paragraph 7 read: ‘Violation of the rights of peoples and nations 3 to sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources is contrary to the 4 spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and hinders the 5 development of international co-operation and the maintenance of peace.’ 6 Article 2 of the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 7 affirmed the full sovereignty of states over their natural resources. This 8 includes the right to exercise authority over foreign investment according 9 to national laws, and to nationalise, expropriate or transfer ownership from 30111 foreign owners, with compensation to be settled under domestic law. No 1 state could be compelled to give preferential treatment to foreign investments. 2 In a triumph for imperial law, the International Court of Justice ruled in 3 the Libya Texaco case that the 1962 resolution did not bind the capital 4 exporting states, because they had opposed the provision.2 In other words, 5 a majority of newly created states could not change Western international 6 law and it was not relevant that those new states rejected that law. Juridical 7 sovereignty for the Third World lacked substance; permanent sovereignty 8 over their natural resources remained with the imperial powers. 9 During this period, the conflict between resource-rich countries and the 40111 states whose corporations exploited those resources centred on petroleum. 1 Five oil-rich countries – Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela – 2 formed the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. 3 OPEC’s primary aim was to co-ordinate and unify their petroleum policies 44111 to safeguard their individual and collective interests. They resolved to ensure Energy wars 287

1111 stable prices, having regard to their need for a steady income, a fair return to 2 investors and an efficient, economic and regular system of supply to consumer 3 nations. In 1971 OPEC members moved towards the nationalisation of their 4 oil industries. 5 In response to the 1973/4 oil crisis the OECD countries set up their own 6 International Energy Agency, and an associated Energy Programme, to 7 co-ordinate their energy security strategies. The US led an unsuccessful 8 attempt to put petroleum export restrictions on the GATT Tokyo round 9 agenda. It tried again to tighten rules on trade in petroleum and related 1011 products during the Uruguay round. However, the US did not make the 1 same concerted push on energy services in the GATS as it did on financial 2 services and telecommunications. The technical explanation is that there 3111 was no separate comprehensive entry for energy services in the provisional 4 UN CPC, and hence W/120, presumably because most of those services 5 were still provided in-house by the corporations or through vertically 6 integrated state monopolies. The GATS 1994 commitments relating to energy 7 were therefore very thin: 33 in services incidental to mining, eight for services 8 incidental to energy distribution, and only three for pipeline transportation 9 of fuels. Another 46 countries signed up to general construction work for 20111 civil engineering services.3 1 2 GATS 2000 3 4 Preparations for the GATS 2000 negotiations on energy services began in 5 a very different context from the Uruguay round. The size, shape and 6 dynamics of the energy market had been transformed. Social regulation had 7 given way to market-driven competition policy and regulation of natural 8 monopolies. The privatisation of state-owned coalmines and electricity and 9 gas monopolies, and the unbundling of power generation, transmission, 30111 wholesale and retail distribution opened new opportunities, primarily for 1 foreign investors (Case study 8). Information technologies enhanced the 2 capacity of transnational energy companies to centralise their data storage 3 in one location from where they could exercise remote control over flows 4 and monitor production. The expansion of private energy markets spawned 5 a growing demand for energy-related services, such as consultancy, 6 engineering design, analysis and testing, and data management. ‘Splintering’ 7 occurred as the major energy corporations outsourced those and other non- 8 core service activities. New energy-related financial services included trading 9 on spot markets and in derivatives and, more recently, carbon credits. Most 40111 of these services were generic in nature, and they all could be delivered 1 across the border or by the temporary presence of specialist personnel. 2 An influential US Energy Services Coalition, founded by Enron and 3 Halliburton and bankrolled largely by Enron, set out to secure binding 44111 rights to dominate this broad platform of services. The Coalition’s budget 288 Serving whose interests?

1111 line for GATS lobbying in 2001 was half a million dollars. Part of this went 2 to retain former USTR Carla Hills as trade counsel. United States negotiators 3 created lobbying opportunities for the coalition, such as a Geneva workshop 4 for WTO delegates and staff at which Enron’s now-infamous president 5 Kenneth Lay pressed its cause.4 6 A second difference from the Uruguay round was the dramatic geopolitical 7 shift within the energy industry. The old Seven Sisters, reduced to four 8 through consolidations,5 had been displaced in their dominance of oil and 9 gas production by what the Financial Times dubbed the ‘new seven sisters’ 1011 from non-OECD countries.6 Saudi Aramco, Russia’s Gazprom, CNPC of 1 China, NIOC of Iran, Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima (PDVSA) 2 of Venezuela, Petrobras of Brazil and Malaysia’s Petronas controlled almost 3 one-third of the world’s oil and gas production and more than one-third 4 of its reserves. Most of these companies were state owned. Their governments 5 had stopped using production-sharing agreements, and some were taking 6 back control of their major energy fields. The Financial Times quoted a 7 prediction from the International Energy Agency that 90 per cent of new 8 supplies would come from developing countries over the next 40 years. 9 This prospect increased the stakes for the Anglo-European demandeurs in 20111 both core and non-core energy services. It also strengthened the incentives 1 for Southern oil-rich governments to retain their regulatory autonomy. 2 A third feature was the expansion of WTO membership since the start 3 of the Uruguay round to include a significant number of OPEC states, 4 including Mexico (1986) and Venezuela (1990). During the early stages of 5 the GATS 2000 negotiations Venezuela’s representatives in Geneva had 6 promoted the interests of the old guard of national capital that then 7 controlled the state oil company PDVSA. As a result, the initial demandeurs 8 on energy services came from the global North and South. All agreed that 9 fragmentation between goods and services was undesirable and the mass 30111 of services sub-sectors failed to reflect the corporate realities of integrated 1 production, transportation and distribution of energy resources. The W/120 2 classification list was considered inadequate and the resulting schedules were 3 unclear and incoherent. The WTO Secretariat noted that Annex 1 to the 4 CPCprov included a compendium of products related to energy, including 5 ‘services incidental to energy distribution’. The later CPC Rev. 1 included 6 ‘energy distribution services’ and ‘gas distribution through mains’. But W/120 7 had not been updated to include either.7 8 Beyond that common ground, the North/South positions diverged. The 9 US and EC wanted a comprehensive new cluster of classifications and 40111 regulatory disciplines. The US staked out its position in an advocacy paper 1 during the information exchange process in 1998. It argued for a transparent 2 and seamless approach that reflected the true nature of commercial activities 3 and covered a broad range of exploration, processing, production, delivery 44111 and related activities: ‘the US believes that, in the end, the marketplace Energy wars 289

1111 realities regarding energy supply services rather than artificial classification 2 categories should dictate the appropriate scope for future GATS work’.8 3 In a follow-up paper in 2000 the US developed a draft classification that 4 covered the entire chain of energy services activities and cut horizontally 5 across those in W/120.9 It proposed five categories – resource development 6 and redevelopment, operation of facilities, energy networks, wholesale 7 markets and retail supply – with 140 specific services. Reflecting the Energy 8 Coalition’s agenda, it even included financial services. Once a comprehensive 9 classification was settled, it said members should set about designing a 1011 model schedule and the energy equivalent of the Reference Paper on Basic 1 Telecommunications. 2 The Europeans endorsed the need for a revised classification list that was 3111 neutral as to energy sources, and a pro-competitive regulatory framework 4 that balanced trade, liberalisation and the public policy objectives of 5 regulation.10 The EC specifically targeted monopolies and exclusive rights, 6 restrictions on legal forms and on foreign direct investment, unclear 7 licensing and approval processes, vague economic needs tests, and residency 8 and nationality requirements. 9 The practical effect of the US and EC positions would be to limit the 20111 flexibility of governments to respond to new technologies, climate change 1 and energy crises. For example, the principle of neutrality across energy 2 sources, technologies, and onshore or offshore delivery would prevent energy- 3 importing countries from excluding environmentally unsound or costly fuels 4 in favour of renewable sources, and could potentially deepen their 5 dependency on traditional fuels. The disciplines in a telecommunications-style 6 reference paper would apply to all WTO members, whether or not they made 7 energy-related commitments. State enterprises or state-authorised monopolies 8 could be prevented from cross-subsidising social access and environmental 9 projects from their more profitable operations. Unbundling, outsourcing and 30111 the expansion of secondary markets already made it difficult for governments 1 to regulate. The added constraints of a ‘necessity’ test, or ‘transparency’ 2 requirements to consult with potentially affected transnationals before 3 introducing new regulations, would make it even harder to respond to social 4 need or re-regulate in cases of energy market failure. If governments were 5 obliged to take a non-discriminatory approach to energy-related services they 6 would be left to the mercy of powerful energy transnationals whose first 7 allegiance is to their shareholders and executive bonuses. Energy scarcity and 8 global warming would increase the significance of all these constraints. 9 Of the other OECD contributors to energy services discussions, Canada 40111 supported the existing W/120 classifications, with a possible cluster or 1 checklist as an aide-memoire.11 Japan urged sensitivity to the need of net 2 energy-importing countries for security and reliability of supply.12 3 Venezuela was the main Southern demandeur. Its negotiating proposal 44111 in March 2001 urged members to look beyond a trade-related perspective 290 Serving whose interests?

1111 to ensure that people, industries and businesses had access to energy and 2 so improve their standards of living.13 They proposed a ‘clear, precise and 3 unambiguous’ classification to bring W/120 more into line with the current 4 reality, but which was limited to energy services and did not alter the balance 5 of rights and obligations established in GATS 1994. Obviously with PDVSA 6 in mind, they noted that monopolies existed for economic and strategic 7 reasons. The paper stressed the right of developing countries under Article 8 IV to meet their national policy objectives and the need for commitments 9 that would strengthen their entrepreneurial and technological capacity. Other 1011 development dimensions should include an emergency safeguard mechanism 1 and guaranteed rights for governments to determine their national conditions 2 of access and public services obligations. 3 The Venezuelan position was designed to ensure that the national élites 4 could continue to leverage deals between PDVSA and preferred foreign 5 companies, at the same time as opening the energy services markets in 6 other countries. It seems that the US, at some point, indicated it would 7 support the Venezuelan classification, but only as a guide to clarify general 8 commitments and not as the basis for new commitments.14 This explains 9 an angry memorandum from the Venezuelan delegation in June 2003, which 20111 complained that careful and resource intensive deliberations had produced 1 a ‘List of Commercial Reality of Energy Services and Energy Related Services’ 2 that was framed around the continued use of W/120 and accommodated 3 development objectives. 4 This argument became redundant when loyalists to President Hugo Chávez 5 6 replaced the old guard of Venezuelan diplomats at the WTO in 2004. They 7 arrived against the backdrop of a failed coup against Chávez and a campaign 8 of oil sabotage led by the management of PDVSA, supported from the US. 9 During 2005 the GATS negotiations became increasingly adversarial as the 30111 EC pressed its proposal for benchmarks and plurilateral negotiations. This 1 culminated in the denunciation of Annex C by Venezuela and Cuba during 2 the Hong Kong ministerial (Case study 3). By that time Venezuela’s proposal 3 on energy services had been withdrawn and it played no further part in the 4 energy services negotiations. 5 The plurilateral request on energy services was presented by the EC and 6 supported by nine other OECD members, including the US and Japan. The 7 only non-OECD demandeur was the recently acceded Saudi Arabia (Case 8 study 18). The targets of the request were unnamed but are understood to 9 include Argentina, Brazil, Brunei, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, 40111 India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, 1 Peru, Philippines, Qatar, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and United Arab 2 Emirates. Although most, if not all, the recipients were developing countries 3 the request made no reference to development, aside from a peremptory 44111 nod to flexibility. Energy wars 291

1111 The request proposed a comprehensive, cross-cutting cluster along the lines 2 promoted by the US and EC. It had the potential to include nearly every 3 transaction, from development to delivery, such as upstream oil and gas 4 exploration, mapping, drilling, construction and operation, transportation 5 (through oil tankers at sea and trucks by road, and by pipeline), storage (in 6 tanks), building and maintaining power plants, distribution, marketing, 7 auditing, and metering (Bhala, 2004, p 802). All modes were covered. In mode 8 1, the demandeurs wanted a substantial reduction of market access limitations 9 and removal of requirements for commercial presence. For mode 3 they sought 1011 the removal, or substantial reduction, of foreign equity limits, requirements 1 for joint ventures and joint operations, economic needs tests and 2 discriminatory licensing. 3111 The old imperial powers had once again turned to international law to 4 secure control over resources that were slipping from their grasp. It seems 5 extraordinary to expect the handful of developing countries that now held 6 the balance of power in petroleum production to sign away their ability to 7 strengthen their state companies, set conditions on foreign investors and 8 service providers, require technology transfer and demand a larger share of 9 the profits. Assurances in the plurilateral request that states would retain 20111 ownership of their natural resources meant nothing if governments who 1 made energy services commitments could no longer control the chain of 2 activities that governed the exploitation of those resources. 3 4 The bilateral pathways 5 6 Pessimism that the GATS 2000 negotiations would deliver anything mean- 7 ingful dictated a multi-track strategy. The US had already begun to address 8 its energy objectives through bilateral negotiations during the Uruguay 9 round. UNCTAD attributes that preference for bilaterals to the sometimes 30111 complementary, sometimes competing, objectives that drive US trade 1 negotiations on energy (UNCTAD, 2000, p 104). In economic terms, the 2 US seeks to promote its exports in energy-related goods, services and capital 3 and to secure access to foreign raw materials. In 1998 the US exported 4 $64.3 billion worth of machinery that is commonly used for energy 5 production. Some $91 billion of US capital was invested in foreign petroleum 6 projects, across the world: oil accounted for two-thirds of US investment 7 in Africa, more than one-quarter of its investment in the Middle East, and 8 significant shares of US investment in Canada, Asia, and Europe. While it 9 is a net energy importer, the US also has the largest refinery capacity in the 40111 world; in 1998 it supplied 9.9 per cent of global exports of refined petroleum 1 (UNCTAD, 2000, p 125). 2 However, US security interests require a balance between maintaining 3 reliable supplies of energy and conflicts with some oil-rich states. When 44111 tensions arise between export interests and national security, the latter always 292 Serving whose interests?

1111 prevails. UNCTAD describes the US Department of Energy as driven by a 2 ‘culture of security’; its priorities are to maintain secure access, limit the 3 leverage that oil producers can use at times of crisis, and cut off oil wealth 4 to current or potentially hostile states (UNCTAD, 2000, p 106). 5 That priority on security explains a preference for regional agreements 6 that can be tailored to secure a supply of energy resources from friendly 7 countries. The precedent was established in the CUSFTA and reinforced 8 with its extension to Mexico under NAFTA. These agreements contain 9 separate chapters on energy, services and investment (including investor- 1011 initiated enforcement), and a narrow national security exception that is 1 specific to energy. There is an explicit national treatment discipline on energy 2 regulation. Both Canada and Mexico insisted on making some limitations. 3 Canada’s restrictions relate mainly to offshore petroleum development. 4 Mexico’s are more extensive: it reserved the right to perform a range of 5 energy-related activities and to refuse investment in basic petrochemicals. 6 This exception reflects Mexico’s national sensitivities and constitutional 7 protections, but it also limits how they might be interpreted. 8 Canada and Mexico provide over one-quarter of US crude oil imports. 9 NAFTA effectively secures that supply for the US, and severely constrains 20111 the regulatory and policy options of the federal and provincial governments 1 in Canada and Mexico to manage their resources. NAFTA also laid the 2 foundations for regulatory harmonisation of energy markets to the US model. 3 It is easy to see why USTR Clayton Yeutter described the energy chapter 4 of CUSFTA as ‘the jewel of the agreement’ (Gold and Leyton-Brown, 1988, 5 p 213). 6 President Clinton’s fast track authority expired in 1994. For the rest of 7 the 1990s the US trade strategy outside the WTO centred on Latin America 8 and the regional FTAA. When the US reacted to the rise of competitive 9 bilateralism in 2000, its strategy and objectives were driven by national 30111 security priorities, as UNCTAD predicted; ‘9/11’ reinforced that. The 1 primary targets were Latin America and the Middle East where foreign 2 policy and energy imperatives merge. Even when there were no direct energy 3 gains, national security still determined who the US negotiated with, on 4 what terms. 5 United States strategy followed several tracks. One sought to shore up 6 geopolitical alliances by offering selective rewards to long-term friends, 7 especially the ‘coalition of the willing’. Australian Prime Minister John 8 Howard, the self-styled deputy sheriff in the Asia Pacific, was rewarded for 9 his stalwart support for the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. When 40111 USTR Robert Zoellick proposed an FTA with Australia to the US Senate 1 he talked of ‘strengthening the foundation of our security alliance’. Howard’s 2 government told the Australian Parliament that the FTA ‘would put our 3 economic relationship on a parallel footing with our political relationship’ 44111 (quoted in Ranald, 2007, pp 6–7). The Australian negotiations attracted Energy wars 293

1111 concerted, but peaceful, opposition. Thai Prime Minister Thaksin fared 2 less well: his support for the war and promotion of a US Thailand 3 FTA contributed to his overthrow in 2006. The US Korea FTA, which 4 reinvigorated the US foothold on the Korean peninsula, was concluded 5 despite militant resistance – only to become stalled in the US Congress. 6 A second, more coercive, pathway made preferential trade access to the 7 US conditional on US approval of the beneficiary’s economic and security 8 policies. The US offered unilateral trade preferences to 38 impoverished 9 sub-Saharan African countries through the US African Growth and 1011 Opportunity Act 2000 (AGOA) (Bhala, 2006). These were conditional on 1 the US certifying that those governments adhered to US foreign policy, US 2 national security policies and US-dictated economic and social policies. These 3111 ‘sound’ economic policies would strengthen the hold of US (and other) 4 transnational corporations over Africa’s oil, gold, diamonds and other 5 minerals and metals. The very presence of these companies increased 6 the level of militarisation, as they commonly use US military or mercenaries 7 to guard their operations against civil and military disruption.15 Critics 8 re-branded AGOA the ‘American Growth and Opportunity Act’ and a 9 vehicle for the re-colonisation of Africa (Mushita, 2001, p 17). Africa’s 20111 dependence on preferential trade access to the US would create fertile ground 1 for FTAs that carried similar conditionalities. 2 A revitalised US regional strategy to secure natural resources in Latin 3 America was set out in the Santa Fe IV document in 2000. Brazilian 4 economist Marcus Arruda describes that project as combining a financial 5 tentacle (the debts), a military tentacle (the war-like policies and expansion 6 of US military bases and intelligence operations in Latin America and the 7 Caribbean), and the economic and commercial tentacles (NAFTA and 8 the FTAA).16 9 Brazil, and later Venezuela, led the successful resistance to the FTAA. 30111 The US responded by exploiting the dependency of Central American states 1 on their northern neighbour. The US–Dominican Republic-Central America 2 Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which binds Costa Rica, El Salvador, 3 Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua to the US, took only 12 months to 4 negotiate. It was signed in May 2004, with the Dominican Republic joining 5 in August 2004.17 One US commentator suggests that CAFTA was ‘the only 6 way the United States can synthesize or orchestrate its non-economic policy 7 objectives south of Mexico’, thereby limiting the expansion of Chinese 8 economic influence. It was also ‘a calculated play for the entrenchment of 9 American interests in a zone of political instability, on par with the invasion 40111 of Iraq as an expression of grand strategy’.18 1 By the time CAFTA reached the US Congress in mid-2005, the domestic 2 political climate had turned sour: the agreement was approved by the 3 Senate by 54 votes to 45 and with a majority of just one in the House of 44111 Representatives. The Costa Rica government faced massive domestic 294 Serving whose interests?

1111 opposition. The ‘no’ campaign won the right to hold a citizen-initiated 2 referendum on ratification. The government responded by taking over the 3 referendum and scheduled it for October 2007. A document attributed to the 4 President’s close advisers advocated a media campaign based explicitly on fear: 5 ‘it’s crucial that “yes” be associated with democracy and stability . . . and that 6 “no” be equivalent to violence and disloyalty to democracy. . . . We must rub 7 in all over the place the connection of the “no” campaign with Fidel, Chavez 8 and Ortega, in very strident terms’.19 The ‘yes’ vote of 51.6 to 48.4 per cent 9 was achieved amidst accusations of electoral fraud and promises of ongoing 1011 resistance to the implementation of the agreement. 1 The US strategy of divide and conquer was most explicit in the Andean 2 sub-region. The Andean Trade Preference Act 1991 provided market access 3 for Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru until 2001. Its benefits were subject 4 to yearly reviews against the Act’s political and economic eligibility criteria. 5 The successor, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, 6 was due to expire in December 2006. Negotiations began in May 2004 for 7 an US/Andean FTA involving Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, with plans to 8 include Bolivia. In September 2005, the US issued an ultimatum for the 9 governments to sign an agreement before the 2006 elections in all three 20111 Andean countries and the expiry of ‘fast track’ in July 2007. Peru signed 1 a deal four months later. Colombia followed in February 2006, despite 2 popular mobilisations, and created a residue of anger at ‘a deep capitulation 3 to US economic and geopolitical interests’.20 The US suspended talks with 4 the Ecuador government in mid-2006 after the latter cancelled a contract 5 with US company Occidental Petroleum and seized its assets. Bolivia stayed 6 outside the deal. Venezuela objected that the agreement undercut the Andean 7 Community of Nations initiative, from which it then withdrew. Neither the 8 Peru nor Colombia FTA had been endorsed by the US Congress when fast 9 track expired; the administration appealed to Congress not to require their 30111 renegotiation, reviving old Cold War rhetoric that portrayed trade ‘as a 1 weapon to block the influence of regimes that seek to promote socialist 2 ideas in Latin America’.21 Congress approved the Peru FPA in late 2007 3 but stalled on Colombia. 4 The Middle East was the biggest prize for US energy-cum-national security 5 objectives. The National Energy Policy generated in 2001 by US Vice 6 President, and former Halliburton chief executive, Dick Cheney identified 7 the Gulf as a primary focus of US international energy policy. Likewise, the 8 US–UK Energy Dialogue, established in 2002, stressed the need to increase 9 oil production capacity from the Gulf. The ‘9/11 Commission’ advised the 40111 Bush administration that economic growth through trade liberalisation 1 removes a breeding ground for terrorism. (Muttitt et al., 2005, p 8). 2 The centrepiece of this ‘trade’ strategy was an umbrella US Middle East 3 FTA (MEFTA) – a corporate-led assault on the region’s energy resources, 44111 which Zoellick insisted could help to fight terrorism.22 In May 2003 President Energy wars 295

1111 George W Bush announced the plan to create a MEFTA by 2013. A 2 US–Middle East Free Trade Coalition was established to promote the 3 agreement. Its steering committee in 2006 included AIG, Boeing, Booz Allen 4 Hamilton, ChevronTexaco, Coca-Cola, Dow Chemicals, ExxonMobil, 5 Intel, Motorola and Occidental Petroleum.23 The official aim of a MEFTA 6 was to support ‘peaceful’ countries joining the WTO. The tactical objective 7 was to expand the web of bilaterals in the region so the US could fragment 8 OPEC and undercut the planned implementation of the Greater Arab Free 9 Trade Area (or Pan-Arab Free Trade Area) by 2007 and the integration 1011 efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 1 The US advocated trade and investment framework agreements as 2 stepping-stones to comprehensive FTAs in the region. By 2007, nine 3111 framework agreements had been concluded. Full FTAs were signed with 4 US allies Jordan in 2001, Bahrain in 2004 (after the government assured 5 Washington it no longer supported the Arab League boycott of Israel), and 6 Morocco and Oman in 2006. Negotiations with Egypt and the United Arab 7 Emirates hit temporary obstacles, the latter after a ‘national security’ furore 8 forced Dubai Ports World to divest the US port operations it bought in 9 2006 (to AIG Investment Group). Neither agreement was concluded before 20111 fast track expired. 1 The EU took its own initiatives on behalf of its energy transnationals in 2 the spirit of what Bhala describes as ‘competitive imperialism’ (Bhala, 2007). 3 By the end of the Uruguay round just 10 companies owned 49 of the 95 4 refineries in the EU, accounting for 61 per cent of the EU’s crude oil distilling 5 capacity. The same companies also dominated extraction and distribution.24 6 Access to oil and gas reserves depended heavily on transportation by 7 pipelines. Three quarters of the world’s gas trade relied on pipelines between 8 Russia and Western Europe, and the US and Canada.25 The signing of the 9 European Energy Charter between EU member states and Russia and the 30111 Eastern European states in 1991 was a strategic move to secure the EU’s 1 interests on energy trade, transit and investment in the post-Soviet era. This 2 initiative formed the basis for the Energy Charter Treaty that was signed 3 in 1994 and came into effect in 1998.26 The treaty is effectively a multilateral 4 investment agreement on energy and would have guaranteed third-party 5 access to Russia’s pipelines. As of 2007, Russia had not ratified the treaty, 6 presumably because doing so would reduce its negotiating coin in its drawn- 7 out process of WTO accession. 8 The pursuit of a ‘coherent policy’ to secure Europe’s access to oil and 9 gas reserves is an integral part of the EU’s 2007 Global Europe strategy 40111 competitiveness strategy (discussed in Case study 4). Target countries include 1 the six petroleum-producing members of the Gulf Cooperation Council 2 (Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and 3 Qatar). The US plan for MEFTA was matched by an EU strategy to convert 44111 the Mediterranean basin into a giant free trade zone by 2017. In July 2004, 296 Serving whose interests?

1111 China and the Gulf Cooperation Council signed a framework of agreement 2 on economic, trade, investment, and technological cooperation and 3 began negotiations on an FTA (Pao-yu Ching, 2007). A commentary on 4 www.bilaterals.org concludes that: 5 6 Oil and geopolitics are key factors in all FTAs involving countries of the 7 Middle East. China, the EU and the US are all offering FTAs to Middle 8 East countries and blocs (such as the Gulf Cooperation Council) in order 9 to protect access to energy supplies – and to some extent, to secure access 1011 to mineral resources. At the same time, the US and the EU have important 1 geopolitical agendas in the region, revolving around the Israeli- 2 Palestinian conflict and tensions with various Islamist or at least 3 anti-Western governments and regimes. Meanwhile, governments in the 4 region are under subtle and not-so-subtle pressure to conform to US wish 5 lists in trade and investment negotiations (such as the removal of Israeli 6 boycotts in the case of several Gulf countries), reminded of the US’ 7 willingness to resort to military means as it occupies and restructures 8 the shattered Iraq, endorses Israel’s recent assault and occupation of 9 Lebanon, and threatens other nations such as Syria and Iran.27 20111 1 Ultimately, as Case study 18 shows, the US can invade and rewrite a 2 country’s constitution, appoint a new government, and design national laws 3 to serve its interests, and then attempt to lock in these measures through 4 bilateral agreements or accession to the WTO. 5 6 The national security exception 7 8 The US and its allies claim the right to behave in this way because they are 9 defending freedom and civilisation. The same rationale justifies them 30111 breaching their own trade obligations, by asserting their supreme authority 1 or invoking Article XIV bis. The latter was adapted from Article XXI of 2 the GATT, with some innovations in paragraph 2. 3 Article XIV bis: Security Exceptions 4 5 1. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: 6 (a) to require any Member to furnish any information, the disclo- 7 sure of which it considers contrary to its essential security 8 interests; or 9 (b) to prevent any Member from taking any action which it 40111 considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 1 interests: 2 (i) relating to the supply of services as carried out directly 3 or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military 44111 establishment; Energy wars 297

1111 (ii) relating to fissionable and fusionable materials or the 2 materials from which they are derived; 3 (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international 4 relations; or 5 (c) to prevent any Member from taking any action in pursuance 6 of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the 7 maintenance of international peace and security. 8 2. The Council for Trade in Services shall be informed to the fullest 9 extent possible of measures taken under paragraphs 1(b) and (c) 1011 and of their termination. 1 2 Legal scholars hold divergent views about the degree of sovereignty that 3111 states can exercise under this and the equivalent GATT Article XXI. On 4 one hand, Raj Bhala argues that the opening phrase ‘Nothing in this 5 Agreement’ means no GATT (or GATS) obligation shall be construed to 6 require or prevent the actions described, and comes close to authorising a 7 WTO member to be a ‘cowboy’ (Bhala, 1998, pp 268–9). Realpolitik requires 8 the sovereign prerogative to prevail; to encroach on that would damage the 9 WTO (Bhala, 1998, p 279). In an attempt to rescue some effect for the 20111 provision, he suggests that increased co-ordination between the WTO and 1 UN Security Council, perhaps by rendering a non-binding non-precedential 2 opinion, could encourage compliance with the criteria specified in the Article 3 (Bhala, 1998, p 276). 4 Other commentators seek to invest the provision with greater legal effect, 5 arguing that the drafters specified criteria and chose subtle variations 6 of language intending them to be meaningful. Moreover, a self-judging 7 obligation is no obligation at all (Akande and Williams, 2003, p 383). An 8 extensive academic literature canvasses many permutations of the possible 9 interpretations and applications: which, if any, elements should be justiciable 30111 and which should be self-defining; what the criteria in (i) to (iii) might mean; 1 what the word ‘essential’ adds to ‘security interests’; whether a subjective or 2 objective test should apply if a government’s actions are to be reviewed; and 3 the relevance of existing WTO and international law jurisprudence, including 4 the scope for applying international law obligations of good faith and 5 reasonableness (for example, Hahn, 1991; Zillman, 1994; Cann, 2001). 6 This academic debate assumes that governments seriously consider each 7 element of Article XIV bis in framing actions taken for security purposes, 8 and that it is at least partly justiciable. Even accepting these assumptions, 9 paragraph 1(b) provides extensive scope for breaching GATS rules and 40111 scheduled commitments. In paragraph 1(b)(i) the security interest that is 1 affected only has to ‘relate’ to the supply of a service, ‘supply’ being broadly 2 defined as ‘production, distribution, marketing, sale and delivery’. Using 3 the Iraq war as an example, this could allow the US to take retaliatory 44111 action if it perceived the policies or regulations of Kuwait were affecting 298 Serving whose interests?

1111 US bases in Iraq adversely by restricting the transport of people or arms 2 across the border. Because the supply can be ‘directly or indirectly’ for the 3 purpose of provisioning a ‘military establishment’, the exception extends 4 to a secondary or even tertiary supplier to the direct service contractor. A 5 Fijian subsidiary of a company run by a Kuwaiti national whose firm supplies 6 security workers to a sub-contractor of Halliburton to fulfil its contract to 7 guard US camps might act in ways the US considers contrary to US essential 8 security interests. The nature of a ‘military establishment’ is not defined. 9 The reference to ‘a’, not ‘its’, arguably means that the military establishment 1011 could belong to the US or its allies, or to Lebanon or Al-Qaeda. 1 Article XXI:1(b)(ii) would justify action against a country that asserts 2 the right to possess ‘fissionable materials . . . or the materials from which 3 they are derived’. Bhala notes there is no requirement for the actual 4 production or possession of nuclear weapons, arguing that would be too 5 late for sanctions to have any protective effect (Bhala, 1998, p 275). Nor 6 do the materials have to be for military purposes, which renders irrelevant 7 an Iran-style argument that such materials are intended for peaceful power 8 generation. While Iran may not join the WTO for many years, if at all, the 9 words ‘relating to’ and the silence over the relationship between the possessor 20111 of material and the target of the measures would justify secondary sanctions. 1 There is no requirement for consistency, so failure to take parallel action 2 against actual or potential nuclear powers, such as Israel or North Korea, 3 would be immaterial. 4 Perhaps the most expansive criterion is action taken under (b)(iii) ‘in time 5 of war or other emergency in international relations’. Defining war is 6 problematic enough: one side’s ‘troubles’ or terrorist insurgency is another’s 7 civil war. The phrase ‘other emergency in international relations’ suggests 8 a war-like situation, while ‘emergency’ implies a limited duration. Yet the 9 argument that old forms of warfare have been supplanted by unstructured 30111 state-sponsored or stateless terrorism could be used to justify actions taken 1 in the name of Operation Enduring Freedom (originally Operation Infinite 2 Justice). That includes pre-emptive strikes in self-defence – what Anghie 3 terms ‘defensive imperialism’ (Anghie, 2005, p 292). Further, the threat 4 posed in paragraph (iii) need not involve the supply of services. The US 5 could justify actions against services suppliers from OPEC, or individual 6 oil-exporting countries, such as Venezuela, to safeguard the security of its 7 oil supply during an ‘emergency in international relations’. 8 Paragraphs (b)(i) and (iii) could also justify discrimination, for example 9 by the US and allies in favour of their corporations, including for so-called 40111 post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction. The boundary between 1 military- and civilian-related contracts is becoming ever more blurred. Many 2 activities formerly conducted by the military, such as transport, provisioning, 3 detention facilities and interrogation, are contracted out and many civilian 44111 activities have an actual or potentially dual use for military purposes. The Energy wars 299

1111 government procurement exception in Article XIII would exclude services 2 not for resale. But those services are more vulnerable in bilateral agreements 3 that contain disciplines on government procurement of services. 4 Commentators generally treat Article XXI(c) as unproblematic. Bhala 5 optimistically wrote in 1998 that ‘Charter obligations concerning international 6 peace and security will be agreed to by the Security Council, and the problem 7 of unilateral action is unlikely to arise in this context’ (Bhala, 1998, p 278). 8 The invasion of Iraq revealed widely divergent interpretations of the 9 legitimacy of action that states claimed (however disingenuously) was 1011 authorised by the Security Council. Every US FTA since that signed with 1 Morocco in 2004 omits the reference to the Security Council. For example, 2 Article 22.2 Essential Security in the Australia US FTA provides an effective 3111 carte blanche to both parties: 4 5 Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: 6 (a) to require a Party to furnish or allow access to any information 7 the disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to its essential 8 security interests; or 9 (b) to preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers 20111 necessary for the fulfilment of its obligations with respect to the 1 maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or 2 the protection of its own essential security interests. 3 4 For six decades, the US, EC and allies have successfully avoided a formal 5 GATT or WTO panel investigation of the legitimacy of national security 6 measures that breach their trade obligations.28 During the pre-WTO era, 7 various avoidance strategies were employed: refusal to invoke the defence, 8 which deprived the panel of any basis for examining Article XXI; a veto 9 of the establishment of a panel; excluding the relevant questions from the 30111 panel’s terms of reference; refusal to submit the state’s substantive actions 1 to a panel review; and vetoing adoption of a panel report (Hahn, 1991; 2 Zillman, 1994). Only the first and fourth strategy are still possible under 3 the WTO. The DSB has compulsory jurisdiction over disputes arising from 4 all provisions in the WTO agreements. There are standard terms of reference 5 for panels and their reports can only be rejected by a consensus. 6 However, these changes are unlikely to make any difference to the pattern 7 that emerged between 1947 and 1994. Under GATT Article XIX bis 8 paragraph 1(a) a state can refuse to furnish information to justify its actions, 9 if it considers that disclosure conflicts with its essential security interests. 40111 If the USTR declined to participate by presenting relevant arguments or 1 information a panel might take the extraordinary step, given the context, 2 of seeking expert opinion or an advisory report from an expert review group 3 under the DSU. Even then, the ‘objective’ information that was available 44111 could, at most, constitute a prima facie case of a breach. Some scholars 300 Serving whose interests?

1111 suggest that the onus of proof should then shift to the US (Akande and 2 Williams, 2003, p 394). But the US is still legally entitled to withhold 3 information. It is politically implausible to think that a WTO panel of trade 4 experts would proceed on that basis to a substantive determination against 5 a major power on a matter of national security. 6 As of 2007, no WTO panel has heard a dispute involving GATS Article 7 XIV bis or GATT Article XXI. The closest situation involved sanctions 8 imposed by Nicaragua against Colombia and Honduras for a maritime 9 boundary dispute. The DSB agreed to establish a panel but it was never 1011 composed. Nicaragua later submitted the dispute to the International Court 1 of Justice. During the DSB discussion, third parties Japan, Canada, the US 2 and Honduras urged caution over resolving political disputes in the WTO 3 (Akande and Williams, 2003, p 377 fn 48). Uncharacteristically, the EC 4 supported Nicaragua’s right to a panel, probably because it had its own 5 dispute brewing with the US over the secondary boycott of Cuba. 6 The US sanctions against Cuba arise under what is colloquially called 7 the Helms-Burton Act. Formally known the Cuban Liberty and Democratic 8 Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, this codifies the extension of the US 9 embargo of Cuba to cover foreign companies and individuals. It effectively 20111 authorises secondary boycotts against any non-US person who has economic 1 dealings with Cuba, and targets corporations and executives (and their 2 families) that ‘traffic’ in expropriated property in Cuba (Cann, 2001, 3 p 461). This is a domestic US law that operates extra-territorially on the 29 4 basis of foreigners’ acts or decisions that occur entirely outside the US. 5 The Act potentially breaches US obligations under the NAFTA, GATT 6 and GATS. Mexico and Canada introduced domestic legislation to neutralise 7 its effect. In 1996 they also initiated a dispute under NAFTA, but the panel 8 was never established. President Clinton repeatedly deferred the most 9 contentious powers that authorised private legal action against foreign firms 30111 under Title III of the Act. 1 The EU enacted its own blocking and claw-back legislation, but faced 2 pressure from business and political quarters to do more. The Commission 3 lodged a dispute at the WTO claiming breaches of GATS Articles II, III, VI, 4 XVI, XVII and the Annex on Movement of Natural Persons, plus nullification 5 and impairment of anticipated benefits. The US refused to concede the WTO’s 6 mandate, and announced in February 1997 that it would boycott any panel 7 (Dunning, 1999, p 230). Had the US invoked Article XIV bis, the DSB would 8 have either had to deny it the right to determine its own national security 9 measures, and potentially provoke a US walkout from the WTO, or legitimise 40111 an exemption for all members from WTO rules for a potentially infinite range 1 of economically, politically, or ideologically motivated extra-territorial 2 measures. The Europeans chose not to push the US. By April 1997, the two super- 3 powers had signed a Memorandum of Understanding to suspend proceedings 44111 and resolve the matter without a panel. Clinton promised the US would Energy wars 301

1111 modify the boycott rules, and the EU said it would develop principles for 2 business dealings with Cuba. The panel’s authority lapsed in April 1998. 3 At the G8 summit in May 1998 Clinton agreed to try to persuade the US 4 Congress to waive legal action under Title III indefinitely for European 5 companies (Schloemann and Ohlhoff, 1999, p 430). He introduced a six- 6 month waiver in May 1999 citing ‘US national interest’; this was rolled 7 over several times. President George W Bush continued the waiver, under 8 threat of renewed WTO action. 9 The US operated parallel sanctions against Iran and Libya. The Iran- 1011 Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) 1996 was described as a measure to combat 1 state support for terrorism and the development of weapons of mass 2 destruction, and to enforce unilaterally the UN Security Council resolutions 3111 against Libya. The Act required the US President to impose two of six 4 possible sanctions against investors who made a ‘direct and significant’ 5 contribution to the development of Iranian or Libyan oil resources, or 6 provided Libya with items prohibited under UN resolutions. The targets of 7 sanctions included subsidiaries, parent companies, and affiliates where they 8 had actual knowledge of the activity. A threshold of $20 million annual 9 investment was set to screen out small players. The US determined that 20111 targeting investment was preferable to finance or trade sanctions that would 1 impact more directly on US businesses and jobs. The link between foreign 2 policy, oil and economic sanctions was spelt out in section 3 of the Act, 3 which stated US policy with respect to Iran: 4 5 The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to deny 6 Iran the ability to support acts of international terrorism and to fund 7 the development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and 8 the means to deliver them by limiting the development of Iran’s ability 9 to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum 30 30111 resources of Iran. 1 2 The legislative history of the Act is even more explicit: ‘Without foreign 3 investment, production in Iran’s oil and gas sector will fall, which will choke 4 off revenue to the government of Iran and thereby deny it resources it 5 employs to threaten the national security interests of the United States.’ 6 (quoted in Bhala, 1998, p 306) 7 The sanctions had a potentially wide sweep. The definition of investments 8 that might help to develop petroleum and natural gas resources ranged 9 across exploration, extraction, refining and transportation. The kinds of 40111 activities affected would include construction contracts for a pipeline, 1 provision of consultancy services, holding an equity interest in any of those 2 services activities, or receipt of associated royalties, earnings or profits. What might constitute a ‘direct and significant’ contribution to developing those 3 investments was unclear. Iran objected that the Act breached the Algiers 44111 Declarations of January 1982 in which the US pledged ‘not to intervene 302 Serving whose interests?

1111 directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs’. Iran 2 sought binding arbitration before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. 3 The claim has never come to a hearing. 4 Other states responded to ILSA as they did to Helms-Burton. The EU 5 requested consultations in the WTO and enacted a legislative antidote. 6 Mexico and Canada lodged a dispute under NAFTA but never pursued it. 7 NAFTA’s National Security exemption in Article 2102 allows a party to 8 take ‘any actions that it considers necessary for protection of its essential 9 security interests’. Presumably they reasoned that a NAFTA panel was 1011 unlikely to pass judgement on a US assessment of its essential security 1 interests. Even if they won, section 3312 of the US NAFTA Implementation 2 Act provides for US law to prevail in its domestic courts where there is a 3 conflict with NAFTA provisions. 4 Clinton agreed to another partial waiver, and the EU and Russia agreed 5 to tighten controls over the export of weapons technology to Iran (Cann, 6 2001, p 461). Congress renewed ILSA in 2001 for five years, despite pressure 7 from US energy firms who had watched their French, Russian and Malaysian 8 counterparts invest an estimated $30 billion in Iran’s petroleum sector. The 9 law was renamed the Iran Sanctions Act in 2006 following the political 20111 rehabilitation of Libya, and its term was extended to 2011. 1 This recent history confirms that geopolitical factors govern the ‘national 2 security’ exception to trade in services agreements, not law. The implications 3 are far-reaching. Harvey Oyer wrote in 1997, before the current wave of 4 security paranoia, that: 5 6 more than seventy-five countries are named [in US law] as subject to, 7 or under the threat of, one or more of twenty-one specific sanctions 8 based on twenty-seven target behaviors. Many of these sanctions lack 9 any visible rationale or guiding principle for their existence, and most 30111 of the sanctions lack a method for assessing whether the objectives are 1 being achieved and at what cost(s) to other national interests. 2 (Oyer, 1997, p 433) 3 4 While the major powers have been demanding enforceable commitments 5 on energy services through the GATS 2000, the accessions, bilateral negotiations 6 and security exemptions provide them with the political and legal space to 7 secure their own economic and foreign policy objectives. As Case study 17 8 shows, that space is increasingly contested. 9 40111 1 CASE STUDY 17 CONFRONTING ‘EL DIABLO’ 2 3 The official account of the closing session of the WTO’s sixth Ministerial 44111 Conference in Hong Kong records, without further explanation that: ‘Cuba Energy wars 303

1111 and Venezuela formally expressed their reservations on the texts on non- 2 agricultural market access and services and the meeting noted these.’ It took 3 extraordinary interventions at the final plenary to have even that level of 4 dissent recorded as the chair, Hong Kong’s Commerce Secretary John Tsang, 5 gavelled through the ‘consensual’ Declaration at breakneck speed (Khor, 6 2005). 7 The resolute opposition from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and 8 the Republic of Cuba to Annex C on services was noteworthy for three 9 reasons. First, their opposition was based on explicit rejection of the 1011 neoliberal paradigm. This continued the challenge that Venezuela had 1 articulated at Cancún in 2003 (and Cuba many times before): 2 3111 The Bolivarian Government of Venezuela maintains that countries 4 should liberalize their services in accordance with their national 5 development priorities and not because they are required to do so by 6 international treaties. They should keep public those services that are 7 indispensable for the population, as determined by their Constitution 8 and laws. . . . In this Fifth WTO Ministerial Meeting, the Venezuelan 9 delegation will firmly and categorically insist that international agreements 20111 cannot limit the authority and the sovereign right of states to regulate, 1 through laws and rules, the distinct service sectors that they consider 2 to be of strategic importance in satisfying the basic and essential 3 necessities of their populations.31 4 5 They said no new commitments should be made in the Doha round until 6 outstanding development issues were resolved. The ‘true obstacles to free 7 8 trade’ were massive disparities between the rich and poor under an unjust 9 international economic order. Requiring ‘free competition between non- 30111 equals can only lead to a strengthening of the strongest and a further 1 weakening of the weakest’. To overcome this imbalance required ‘[a]s much 2 market as possible, and as much state as necessary’. 3 The second factor was geopolitical. The US was waging, and losing, a hot 4 war in the Middle East and a cold war on its doorstep. The democratic 5 election of charismatic leftist leaders in Latin America, with more in the 6 wings, threatened the already fragile claims of US regional hegemony. 7 Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez had become the rallying point for 8 anti-imperialism and an alternative to the neoliberal trade paradigm. The 9 Chávez government was convinced that the US administration and corporate 40111 interests had backed a failed coup in 2002 and continued to foment economic, 1 social and political instability. Both Venezuela and Cuba believed from bitter 2 experience that extending the power of US (and European) transnational 3 corporations, as the GATS aims to do, would fuel the economic, military and 44111 ideological vendettas being waged against them. 304 Serving whose interests?

1111 The third, decisive factor was the power of energy. As the world’s fifth 2 largest oil producer, Venezuela supplied almost 10 per cent of US petroleum 3 imports in 2007.32 This made it the fourth largest external source of US 4 petroleum behind Canada, Mexico and Saudi Arabia, although that share 5 was declining. Almost 60 foreign companies, representing fourteen different 6 countries, participated in one or more aspects of Venezuela’s oil sector, 7 including Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips and Chevron Texaco. With one of 8 the world’s largest known oil reserves, Venezuela posed an obvious target 9 for services demands that would guarantee both oil supplies and corporate 1011 profits to the US and Europe. Equally, the potential for Venezuela to use 1 its oil wealth to create political leverage within and outside the WTO made 2 it a potential threat to a neoliberal trade in services regime and the hegemony 3 of the major powers. 4 The conflation of national security, oil and covert intervention has long 5 been a feature of US policy towards Venezuela.33 Historically, the US had 6 relied on the corrupt Venezuelan élite to defend its interests in OPEC. Foreign 7 oil companies battled the Venezuelan government whenever it tried to 8 reassert control over lucrative concessions, and renegotiate the minimal 9 royalties and huge tax breaks. Faced with the expiry of their concessions 20111 in 1983 and reversion of the assets, installations and equipment to the 1 state, the companies stopped reinvesting. This prompted the Venezuelan 2 government to speed up the nationalisation of Royal Dutch Shell and other 3 foreign companies’ operations in 1975, following the precedents of Mexico 4 (1938), Indonesia (1965), Algeria (1971), and Iraq and Libya (1973). 5 However, last-minute changes to the nationalisation law allowed the new 6 state-owned PDVSA to enter fixed-term association agreements with private 7 entities. In practice, the concessions being operated by foreign firms were 8 reinvented as 14 subsidiaries of PDVSA, and remained under the control 9 of their old boards, management and technical experts. By 1986 those 14 30111 companies had reduced to three and were consolidated as arms of PDVSA. 1 Significantly for the GATS story, PDVSA’s technological and administrative 2 expertise in automation was outsourced to a foreign controlled joint venture. 3 This depleted its expertise and created a new vulnerability. 4 The profligate and deeply indebted government of Carlos Andrés Pérez 5 adopted IMF austerity measures in the late 1980s that widened existing 6 inequalities. A populist mobilisation in 1989, known as the Caracazo, 7 was brutally repressed with hundreds of deaths. In the early 1990s, more 8 extensive IMF conditionalities resulted in the ‘great turn’ and ‘oil opening’, 9 including extensive privatisations. Two civil-military rebellions in 1992, in 40111 which Chávez played a key role, brought about the resignation of the corrupt 1 Pérez in 1993, and imposed some constraints on neoliberalism. But they 2 failed to overthrow the government. 3 These developments coincided with the Uruguay round. Venezuela 44111 acceded in 1990 under the relatively relaxed GATT procedures. Its GATS Energy wars 305

1111 1994 schedule contained extensive commitments on energy-related services. 2 These included seemingly benign full commitments on computer and related 3 services in modes 1 and 3. The government also guaranteed access under 4 mode 4 for foreign executives, managers and specialists. This was made 5 subject to prevailing labour laws, which at that time required 90 per 6 cent of the firm’s total personnel to be Venezuelan nationals and for them 7 to constitute 80 per cent of the firm’s wage and salary costs. However, 8 exceptions could be made for personnel under contract to the government, 9 which included PDVSA. Full mode 3 commitments were taken in services 1011 incidental to mining, in construction and engineering services, and in 1 contracting of works and supply of services for the national petroleum and 2 petrochemical industry. Shortly before Chávez came to power in 1998, the 3111 government proposed the privatisation of PDVSA. Had this proceeded, 4 mode 3 commitments would have enabled the international cartels to assert 5 effective control over Venezuela’s oil industry. 6 Chávez won the presidency in 1998 with the largest electoral majority 7 in the country’s history. His platform appealed to democratic constitutionalism 8 and invoked the name of legendary independence leader Simon Bolivar. A 9 new constitution was drafted and approved by over 71 per cent of the 20111 popular vote.34 The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela would become a 1 ‘democratic and social state of law and justice’, potentially alongside other 2 Bolivarian-inspired republics. The Constitution’s aspirational rhetoric 3 celebrated social, educational, cultural, economic, indigenous and women’s 4 rights. The state was obliged to promote national industry. Consultative 5 (non-binding) referenda would be required for questions of ‘transcendent 6 importance’, such as free trade agreements. 7 Ideologically, the Chávista regime sought to replace a neoliberal model of 8 representative government, a limited state and the primacy of the market 9 with a nationalist style of governance based on popular democracy, state 30111 ownership and intervention, and the redistribution of wealth, profits and 1 power. Its economic strategy aimed to bolster economic independence by 2 redirecting Venezuela’s oil revenues to restructure and strengthen the domestic 3 non-oil economy, and reduce import dependency. Politically, the new regime 4 pitted a charismatic populist, who claimed support from the impoverished 5 masses and an alliance with Cuba, against a wealthy élite that had plundered 6 the country’s bountiful resources under US patronage for decades. 7 The state-owned PDVSA held the key. It is the largest company in Latin 8 America with activities that span the exploration, production, refining and 9 exporting oil, and the exploration and production of natural gas. In 2004, 40111 the company’s annual revenue was nearly $65 billion and provided about 1 half the government’s income. The Chávez government argued that the old 2 PDVSA had become a ‘state within a state’ during ‘false nationalization’ 3 and designed energy policies to serve foreign interests.35 The new PDVSA 44111 would belong to the people (‘la nueva PDVSA es del pueblo’). The outflow 306 Serving whose interests?

1111 of oil profits offshore would be stemmed and the company would assume 2 a broader focus by funding social and economic development at home and 3 solidarity abroad. 4 In November 2001 the Chávez government radically overhauled PDVSA 5 and passed a raft of laws on liquid and gas hydrocarbons, land ownership, 6 the financial system, income taxation and cooperatives. Production royalties 7 were doubled. PDVSA was required to own a majority stake in all joint 8 ventures with foreign companies. Over the next 18 months, the combined 9 forces of the Federation of Chambers of Industry and Commerce 1011 (Fedecamaras), the (disputed) leadership of the Confederation of Venezuelan 1 Workers (CTV), the private media, the Democratic Action political party, 2 the top management and white collar workers of PDVSA, and, many believe, 3 the US administration conspired to overthrow Chávez.36 4 The first stage was a management-led strike-cum-lockout in December 5 2001. When Chávez subsequently appointed a new company president and 6 board, the officials and employees began a production slowdown. On 8 April 7 2002, after seven senior executives were sacked, this turned into another 8 strike. Three days later, senior military officers supported a short-lived coup 9 d’état. The head of Fedecom, Pedro Carmona Estanga, was installed as 20111 President of a ‘transition government’ that was immediately legitimised by 1 the US administration. Carmona’s first decree was to repeal the new laws, 2 raise oil quotas to their previous levels, and terminate an arrangement to 3 provide oil to Cuba. According to Mexico’s Proceso, the coup leaders acted 4 to privatise PDVSA: 5 6 turning it over to a U.S. company linked to President George Bush 7 and the Spanish company Repsol; plus the sale of CITGO, the US 8 subsidiary of PDVSA, to [mega-entrepreneur and long-time friend of 9 Bush] Gustavo Cisneros and his partners in the north; as well as an 30111 end to the Venezuelan government’s exclusive subsoil rights.37 1 2 Chávez was restored to office in a display of ‘people power’, helped by 3 international pressure, on 13 April 2002. But PDVSA remained a hotbed 4 of opposition. The state might have owned the oil resource and the company, 5 but it had little effective control over the infrastructure, pipelines, transport, 6 data processing and analysis, shipping, senior executives and specialists, 7 and other important energy-related services. The least obvious, and possibly 8 most potent, weapon in foreign hands was control over PDVSA’s information 9 technology system. 40111 Back in 1996, the old PDVSA had created a joint-venture information 1 services enterprise with the Bermuda subsidiary of Science Applications 2 International Corporation (SAIC), a US company whose board members 3 included former defence department and intelligence agency officials. This 44111 occurred under a chief executive who later worked for Shell and as an Energy wars 307

1111 energy adviser for the Bush administration. The joint venture company, 2 INTESA, was owned 40 per cent by PDVSA and 60 per cent by SAIC, and 3 it controlled the entire data processing system of PDVSA. The Chávez 4 government alleges that through INTESA information about its deposits, 5 production and capacity that was classified as confidential, and of paramount 6 importance to national security, found its way into the hands of the major 7 companies.38 8 Moves by the Chávez government to reclaim control over PDVSA and 9 its revenues prompted a prolonged period of ‘oil sabotage’ from late 2002. 1011 The management’s strategy was to shut down a large part of the industry 1 and force Chávez out of office by removing his access to oil revenue. INTESA 2 closed off its systems so that all data had to be processed manually. In one 3111 prominent case, an official was caught altering the readings of a well in 4 Zulia state: ‘With the change in the readings two things could have happened: 5 the plant’s production was turned off, or an explosion occurred’.39 Victor 6 Menotti observes: ‘Although oil still flowed, without the capacity to manage 7 the complex computer systems, PDVSA was unable to sell oil, resulting 8 in the loss of billions of dollars of revenue for the nation’ (Menotti, 2006, 9 p 10). The Attorney General of Venezuela initiated a criminal investigation 20111 of INTESA for sabotage, but no charges were laid.40 1 INTESA’s services agreement expired in June 2002. As a result of an 2 auditor’s report PDVSA sought to renegotiate the contract, through which 3 it claimed SAIC had earned more than $40 million in dividends on a $1200 4 investment, and an additional $53 million in subcontract fees. The US partner 5 refused. INTESA’s operations were discontinued in January 2003 and 6 PDVSA resumed the management of its automated information flows.41 7 Remote control of data has been used before to serve US foreign policy 8 interests. In the early 1980s, the head office of Texas energy giant Dresser 9 delivered design information, financial data, personnel files and inventory 30111 listings on-line to its offices and construction sites in 100 countries. In 1 March 1983, the Reagan administration moved to enforce sanctions against 2 companies involved in building the Soviet Union’s trans-Siberian pipeline 3 across Western Europe. Dressner’s Dallas office was ordered to terminate 4 engineering services and information flows to its Paris branch, which was 5 manufacturing compressors for the project. With a flick of the switch the 6 branch’s data lifeline was cut off (Bhagwati, 1984, pp 139–40). 7 The prolonged campaign of oil sabotage by PDVSA’s white-collar 8 employees and its contractors created economic, social and political chaos 9 across Venezuela. Local merchants shut their doors. Domestic manufacturing 40111 collapsed. The economy went into deep recession and official unemployment 1 peaked at over 20 per cent. Domestic petrol queues grew as oil was imported. 2 There was no money for social programmes. Chávez responded by dismissing 3 19,000 PDVSA employees, accusing them of mismanagement and 44111 corruption. 308 Serving whose interests?

1111 The political opposition set about collecting signatures to force a recall 2 referendum. In June 2004 they succeeded. Chávez won with 58 per cent of 3 the vote. The reinvigorated President declared a ‘true nationalization’ policy 4 of ‘full oil sovereignty . . . intended to bring about authentic oil nationalization’. 5 This strategy ‘calls for the reaffirmation of the nation’s property rights over 6 its subterranean deposits of hydrocarbons, as well as the recovery of control 7 of oil activities within its frontiers, from the legal and fiscal perspectives to 8 full control over of the national oil industry’.42 9 By 2005 Venezuela’s economy had recovered with a GDP growth rate 1011 of 9.3 per cent. Despite much higher oil prices, the main contribution was 1 a surge in non-oil domestic activity, notably construction, domestic trade, 2 transportation and manufacturing. Diversification meant oil was now only 3 14.9 per cent of GDP. Official unemployment was down to 8.9 per cent.43 4 Chávez won another landslide electoral victory in 2006. The nationalisation 5 of the oil fields was completed in June 2007 when the government reclaimed 6 a minimum 60 per cent shareholding in the lucrative Orinoco River basin 7 projects in El Tigre. All but two of the foreign corporations that ran the 8 projects conformed and received compensation; Exxon Mobil and 9 ConocoPhillips refused.44 20111 This story explains why Venezuela’s new representatives to the WTO in 1 2004 withdrew an energy services proposal that favoured the national élites. 2 It is also why Venezuela opposed the proposals for GATS benchmarks 3 and plurilaterals and led the resistance to Annex C at the Hong Kong 4 ministerial in 2005. Their stance was not just tactical. ‘True nationalization’ 5 and ‘full oil sovereignty’ constitute a bold challenge to the GATS and a 6 refusal to subordinate this to commitments that were made by a previous 7 corrupt government. 8 The decision not to renew INTESA’s services contract was not a GATS 9 issue per se. However, it is quite possible that the measures used to reassert 30111 control over those services could have breached Venezuela’s market access 1 or national treatment commitments on computer services in modes 1 and 2 3, and at least nullified and impaired the benefits expected by the US for 3 its company. The fully commercial nature of the service would take it outside 4 the exceptions for governmental services and government procurement. 5 Apparently the US negotiator raised the issue with Venezuela at the time, 6 but it was not pursued.45 7 The nationalisations also have GATS implications. Requiring all foreign 8 investments to operate through majority-owned joint ventures with the state 9 appears to clash with Venezuela’s mode 3 market access commitments in 40111 a number of energy-related services. Again, however, it seems unlikely that 1 the USTR would pursue a dispute that would become a cause célèbre, fuelling 2 anti-GATS sentiment and boosting Venezuela’s kudos. Venezuela could also 3 raise a national security justification that would put the US government’s 44111 actions under unwelcome scrutiny. Energy wars 309

1111 It is equally clear why Venezuela has resisted an FTAA that contains services 2 and investment guarantees, supported by investor-initiated enforcement. The 3 US joint venture partner in INTESA was apparently paid compensation for 4 expropriation by the US Overseas Protection Insurance Company.46 In 5 September 2007, Exxon Mobil sought international arbitration at the World 6 Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 7 regarding the 2007 nationalisations, while Conoco-Phillips pursued a 8 negotiated outcome. 9 When the US succeeded in dividing the Andean Community of Nations 1011 through bilateral trade deals, Venezuela cut its ties with the community and 1 sought to join Mercosur instead. As of December 2007, the legislatures 2 of Brazil and Paraguay had delayed Venezuela’s entry. Their domestic 3111 constituencies apparently feared that Chávez would oppose the Mercosur 4 FTA with the EU and turn the WTO-compatible regional arrangement into 5 a political vehicle to promote his Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America 6 and the Caribbean (ALBA).47 ALBA has been described as 7 8 a socially-oriented trade block [sic] rather than one strictly based on 9 the logic of deregulated profit maximisation [that] appeals to the 20111 egalitarian principles of justice and equality that are innate in human 1 beings, the well-being of the most dispossessed sectors of society, and 2 a reinvigorated sense of solidarity toward the underdeveloped countries 3 of the western hemisphere.48 4 5 Reflecting the principles of ALBA, Chávez also developed creative ways 6 to circumvent the OPEC prohibition on sales at below market value. 7 Venezuela eased the economic blockade of Cuba through a deal that allowed 8 deferred and in-kind payments, notably by health and literacy programmes. 9 Chávez provided oil to crisis-ridden Argentina in 2003/4, and delivered 30111 subsidised oil through Sandanista politicians during Nicaragua’s election 1 campaign in 2006. In a move calculated to humiliate George W Bush, he 2 even provided heavily discounted heating oil to flood victims, low-income 3 families and first nations in the US.49 In a further threat to US hegemony, 4 the government used its oil wealth to repay Venezuela’s IMF loans and 5 proposed a socially democratic regional alternative to the Bretton Woods 6 institutions. 7 Oil has provided the platform for Venezuela to build alternative alliances, 8 reduce the risk of political isolation and challenge neoliberal globalisation. 9 As the host of OPEC in 2002, Chávez pushed for production limits that 40111 increased world oil prices and returns to oil-producing countries. He visited 1 both Saddam Hussein and Gaddafi beforehand. Venezuela has sponsored 2 moves to consolidate petroleum organisations in Latin American and the 3 Caribbean. A strong diplomatic and oil relationship has been established 44111 with China, which is now a major investor in Venezuela’s oil industry. 310 Serving whose interests?

1111 The prospect that Chávez might succeed in creating a viable counter- 2 hegemonic alternative to neoliberal globalisation poses a dilemma for the 3 US. Invading Venezuela is not a political or economic option. As veteran 4 legislator Luis Tascon observed: ‘We could cause a lot of damage to the 5 US economy if our oil was cut off – more than any war.’50 Rumours of 6 another coup abound. Short of that, Noam Chomsky predicts the US might 7 support the secession of the rich, largely anti-Chávez, Zulia province that 8 is located on the border of Colombia and home to about 40 per cent of 9 the country’s oil.51 Privatisation, foreign ownership and long-term 1011 preferential or non-discriminatory contracts could then be cemented through 1 a bilateral FTA with the newly created state. 2 3 4 CASE STUDY 18 GULF ACCESSIONS: A LEGAL 5 INVASION 6 7 Accession is one of the WTO’s dirtiest little secrets. In the words of 8 experienced commentators: ‘The accession process has no rules, except 9 precedent and power, and is the very antithesis of what the members publicly 20111 state to be the intention and design of the WTO.’ Moreover, ‘only those 1 who are extraordinarily naïve would believe that the system of accession 2 will be reformed’. The acceding countries have no voice and few powerful 3 allies, while the major players have no incentive to change a process that 4 gives them free rein to pursue their economic and strategic objectives 5 (Grynberg and Joy, 2000, pp 172–3). 6 States who have embarked on WTO accession fall into four main 7 categories: small, marginal or least developed countries, such as Nepal or 8 Tonga; countries that are emerging from the Sino-Soviet shadow, such as 9 Vietnam and the Kyrgyz Republic; powerful outsiders, notably the former 30111 communist states of China and Russia; and states that are oil rich and 1 energy-strategic, mostly from Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Those 2 energy rich or strategic countries that have been or are still involved in 3 WTO accession in 2007 include Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Equatorial 4 Guinea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 5 Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Russia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Yemen. 6 The accession process is always tortuous. Because applicants are not yet 7 WTO members, they have no intrinsic rights. The process of entry does not 8 involve genuine negotiations, because there is no room for trading of 9 concessions. States who join must accept the rules already framed by, and 40111 for, the major powers. In theory, governments have some choice about the 1 extent of their country-specific commitments, including in services. But in 2 practice the bargaining is at the margins. The starting price increases with 3 every accession – China’s terms of entry in 2001 fuelled hyperinflation 44111 (Bhattasali et al., 2004, pp 117–39). Accession packages routinely contain Energy wars 311

1111 ‘WTO-plus’ commitments. These relate to policies, such as investment and 2 privatisation, which are not governed by WTO agreements, and schedules 3 of commitments on both goods and services that far exceed those of existing 4 members. The terms are also ‘WTO-minus’, with lower thresholds and 5 shorter implementation periods than provided for in the WTO texts (see 6 Chapter 3). 7 The accession package is decided by a working party on which any WTO 8 member can sit. The US and EC are routinely there. The applicant government 9 presents a memorandum of its trade policies and legal regime. That 1011 document is subject to multilateral discussions in the working group, who 1 ‘negotiate’ the rules, disciplines and time lines that will apply. A parallel 2 bilateral process allows each working party member to determine the specific 3111 commitments and concessions they require as the price of approving entry. 4 Those bilateral deals are then multilateralised. Once the accession package 5 has been adopted by the working party it is presented, along with the signed 6 Protocol of Accession, to the General Council or Ministerial Conference 7 for adoption. Until that happens, the entire process and proposals are 8 officially secret. The final step in accession is domestic ratification in 9 accordance with the state’s constitutional requirements. 20111 In the process of joining the WTO, acceding countries surrender 1 sovereignty over their economic development strategies. For Islamic states, 2 accession also means replacing economic principles that are deeply embedded 3 in the religious ethos of the people, the country and the constitution 4 with a neoliberal form of capitalism. Their compliance is not a foregone 5 conclusion. There is potential for economic and social upheaval even in 6 Arab states that have relatively liberal economies. 7 Fortunately for US allies Jordan and Oman, they concluded their 8 accessions in 2000, before the OPEC-induced price hikes began to impact 9 on the international economy and the reality of the oil peak hit home. It 30111 was also before the ‘9/11’-induced atmosphere of retribution against Arab 1 states. The next major accession was Saudi Arabia, a country with 25 per 2 cent of the world’s proven oil deposits, and that exports 40 per cent of the 3 world’s petroleum. Saudi Arabia applied to accede in June 1993, during 4 the Uruguay round. The working party was chaired by Pakistan. It included 5 Israel; in 2000, Saudi Arabia agreed to withdraw from the Arab League’s 6 secondary boycott of Israel. 7 Despite being a US ally, Saudi Arabia faced ever-higher demands from 8 the US, including a WTO-plus commitment on foreign direct investment. 9 The Saudis initially promised to lock in their newly liberalised foreign 40111 investment regime. However, they appended a long negative list of 1 exceptions. These included the sensitive areas for Islamic law of finance and 2 insurance and a spectrum of downstream to upstream energy services. Later 3 drafts offered electricity privatisation, natural gas development and services 44111 related to mining, but not oil exploration, drilling, extraction and production, 312 Serving whose interests?

1111 pipelines transportation, and services incidental to electrical energy distribution. 2 In an empathetic commentary, Bhala reports that the Saudi side had intended 3 to eliminate the negative list eventually, including the ‘previously 4 “unthinkable” opening to foreign investment of upstream petroleum 5 services’, such as oil exploration (Bhala, 2004, p 785). But the US was still 6 not satisfied. Bhala observes that US trade law seemed more intent on 7 constraining the Saudi’s comparative advantage in the oil and natural gas 8 sectors than on enhancing it (Bhala, 2004, p 747). 9 The working party had met 14 times by the time the package was signed 1011 off in October 2005. Saudi Arabia formally joined the WTO at the Hong Kong 1 ministerial in 2005. The chair of the US CSI described the final accession 2 package as a ‘high quality’ agreement.52 In the energy sector, foreign companies 3 had secured non-discriminatory access to energy services in oil and gas 4 exploration and development, pipeline transportation, management 5 consulting, technical testing and analysis, and repair and maintenance of 6 equipment. This would set the minimum threshold for the next energy-strategic 7 countries in the accession process. 8 The decision to join the WTO was controversial within Saudi Arabia. As 9 of 2004, oil still accounted for 34 per cent of GDP, three-quarters of government 20111 revenues and 85 per cent of its export earnings, although those shares were 1 declining. According to Bhala, the pro-accession constituency was supportive 2 of economic liberalisation, believing it could promote greater efficiencies and 3 diversification. But it had genuine concerns about social instability and the 4 adjustment costs of implementing the US demands. The US seemed deaf to 5 their dilemma. 6 Saudi Arabia also wanted to accede so it could influence the future 7 development of trade rules on the import and export of oil. The OPEC bloc 8 within the WTO was growing. In 2000 UNCTAD calculated that OPEC 9 members of the WTO produced 40 per cent of the world’s oil, possessed 30111 around three-quarters of the proven crude oil reserves and exported about 1 60 per cent of oil that was traded internationally. Eight countries, which 2 collectively represented another 26 per cent of global production, were 3 seeking accession. If all of them joined, net oil exporters that represent over 4 two-thirds of production would be WTO members. The entry of Iran, Iraq 5 and Libya would add another 10 per cent (UNCTAD, 2000, p 114). 6 However, it would be difficult for OPEC members to wield influence in the 7 WTO once they made extensive commitments during their accession 8 process. Their options within OPEC would be similarly constrained, unless 9 they became renegades like Venezuela. 40111 Saudi Arabia (like Russia and Iran) was justifiably concerned that it had 1 no say in the GATS 2000 negotiations that were attempting to write a new 2 road map for the liberalisation of energy services. The US’s proposals aimed 3 to give Bechtel, Exxon and Halliburton the broadest possible access to the 44111 widest array of energy services. In particular, the US proposal for a reference Energy wars 313

1111 paper on energy services would oblige Saudi Arabia to provide third-party 2 access to pipelines, storage facilities and terminals, and could undermine 3 the pre-eminence of Saudi Aramco. The alternative of Venezuela’s narrowly 4 defined, and later retracted, energy services classification preserved the 5 ‘sovereign right to grant limited market access to a select few foreign 6 industries and companies’ (Bhala, 2004, p 804). But Saudi Arabia signed 7 away that option in its accession. Indeed, in 2006 it joined the EC-led 8 plurilateral request on energy services. 9 Bhala notes the US claim that ‘trade with the Kingdom is about our security’ 1011 (Bhala, 2004, p 810). Reflecting on the paradox that the accession could 1 instead cause profound dislocations he asks: ‘Will resentment in the Kingdom 2 against the United States worsen, as the psychological (if not real) link between 3111 globalization and Americanization strengthens?’(Bhala, 2004, p 812). 4 Indeed, ‘in the post-9/11 world, would it have been more in the interests 5 of . . . the American Heartland for American negotiators not to press the Desert 6 Kingdom almost mercilessly for more market access, but rather to emphasize 7 the importance of long-term, trusting trade relationships?’(Bhala, 2004, 8 p 768). 9 The Saudi accession had wider implications for Islamic states. Bhala notes 20111 the unique significance of Saudi Arabia and its experience to all Moslems 1 (Bhala, 2004, p 750). The arrogance of the US, and to a slightly lesser 2 degree its allies, towards the fundamental tenets of Islam established a 3 precedent. As a Kingdom, Saudi Arabia has minimalist constitutional 4 requirements for treaty making and ratification, so there was little scope 5 for legal or political contest. The same or higher demands of Libya, Iraq 6 and Iran had the potential to provoke political mayhem. 7 Libya was next in line of the Arab states. As soon as Muammar Gaddafi 8 repudiated weapons of mass destruction the US announced it would no 9 longer oppose Libya’s WTO accession. Libya applied in June 2004. The 30111 working party, chaired by Spain, was established in July. The US formally 1 ended its trade embargo of Libya in September. That did not make them 2 best friends. Reuters reported in a rare interview in March 2007 that: 3 ‘Gaddafi has criticised the world financial system as a dictatorship based 4 on fear but said Libya’s only pragmatic choice after sanctions was to accept 5 the unfair reality of world trade.’53 Gaddafi complained that Britain and 6 the US had not delivered the promised compensation to Libya for renouncing 7 nuclear weapons, and predicted that countries such as Iran and North Korea 8 would not follow his lead. 9 Iran was already familiar with US power politics in the WTO. The Iranian 40111 government wanted to diversify the economy and escape the discriminatory 1 tariffs on its exports that came from being outside the GATT’s MFN regime. 2 It made its first request for accession to the WTO in July 1996. The US 3 vetoed that and 21 further requests. Talks brokered by the EU sought to 44111 trade off Iran’s agreement to discontinue its nuclear programme for security 314 Serving whose interests?

1111 and trade benefits, including WTO membership. On 25 May 2005 Iran’s 2 representative announced that the country would refrain from developing 3 nuclear weapons. The next day the WTO General Council finally accepted 4 the accession application. However, that was just the first step. The US 5 could still prolong the bilateral negotiations, demand crippling commitments 6 and ultimately veto Iran’s entry without having to give any reasons. If Iran 7 did join on the terms the US demanded, the US could then withhold Iran’s 8 entitlements, supported by GATS Article XIV bis and GATT Article XXI 9 that allow countries to suspend their WTO obligations on grounds of 1011 national security. 1 In Iran’s case a Saudi-plus package, and the core ideology and substantive 2 rules of the GATS, would be irreconcilable with the central tenets of its 3 Islamic Constitution:54 4 5 Article 3 [State Goals] 6 In order to obtain the objectives [of the Foundational Principles] the 7 government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of directing 8 all its resources to the following goals: . . . 9 5) the complete elimination of imperialism and the prevention of foreign 20111 influence; . . . 1 2 8) the participation of the entire people in determining their political, 3 economic, social, and cultural destiny; . . . 4 12) the planning of a correct and just economic system, in accordance 5 with Islamic criteria, in order to create welfare, eliminate poverty, and 6 abolish all forms of deprivation with respect to food, housing, work, 7 health care, and the provision of social insurance for all; . . . 8 9 Article 4 [Islamic Principle] 30111 All . . . economic . . . and other laws and regulations must be based on 1 Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and generally to all 2 articles of the Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations 3 ... 4 Article 44 [Sectors] 5 2) The state sector is to include all large-scale and mother industries, 6 foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, 7 dams, and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, post, 8 telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and 9 the like; all these will be publicly owned and administered by the State. 40111 1 Article 81 [Foreign Business] 2 The granting of concessions to foreigners or the formation of companies 3 or institutions dealing with commerce, industry, agriculture, service, or 44111 mineral extraction, is absolutely forbidden. Energy wars 315

1111 Article 82 [Foreign Experts] 2 The employment of foreign experts is forbidden, except in cases of 3 necessity and with the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. 4 5 Article 153 [No Foreign Control] 6 Any form of agreement resulting in foreign control over the natural 7 resources, economy, army, or culture of the country, as well as other 8 aspects of the national life, is forbidden. 9 1011 The Iranian President has authority to sign an international treaty, but the 1 Islamic Consultative Assembly must approve it. The Assembly cannot enact 2 laws that are contrary to the official religion of the country or to the 3111 Constitution, as determined by the Guardian Council of six religious men 4 and six jurists. While departures from these strictures are not unusual in 5 practice, WTO accession would require a comprehensive formal revision 6 of state policy and law. Rewriting the Constitution would involve, inter 7 alia, a national referendum that would catapult WTO accession onto the 8 centre stage of Iranian politics. Not surprisingly, two years after Iran’s WTO 9 accession working party was approved, no member had agreed to act as 20111 its chair. 1 The story of occupied Iraq is the mirror image of Iran’s. Order number 12 2 issued by Paul Bremer, the US Director of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 3 Assistance and head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, set February 4 2004 as the target date for Iraq to join the WTO. Right on schedule, Iraq was 5 granted WTO observer status on 12 February 2004, while still under the rule 6 7 of the provisional authority. The application progressed rapidly. Colombia 8 was appointed to chair the working party. Iraq’s memorandum of trade 9 legislation was submitted in late 2005, and questions and responses 30111 exchanged by November 2006. The bilateral phase was underway by mid- 1 2007, beginning with the EU and US, Brazil and several Arabic states. The 2 US had already signed a trade and investment framework agreement with Iraq 3 in 2005. That agreement laid the groundwork for negotiations on a WTO- 4 plus and WTO-minus bilateral agreement, which the US expected would 5 include investment guarantees, investor-initiated enforcement and foreign 6 policy conditionalities. 7 The US offered to help Iraq prepare for the accession. According to Herbert 8 Docena: 9 40111 The US ordered Bearing Point, the contractor tasked with the economic 1 reconstruction of Iraq, to ‘create a WTO-consistent trade and investment 2 legal framework which will . . . lay the groundwork for greater 3 integration into international financial and trading networks’. 44111 (quoted in Malig, 2006, p 39) 316 Serving whose interests?

1111 The new Iraqi Constitution produced under the interim administration 2 had been expected to ensure that Iraq was WTO-ready. Instead, a June 3 2005 draft of the constitution proclaimed that ‘social justice is the basis of 4 building society’. It envisaged a Scandinavian-style welfare system, with the 5 oil wealth spent on social entitlements to education, healthcare, housing 6 and other social services. It also required the state to safeguard Iraq’s oil 7 (Docena, 2005, p 1). That version was superseded by a version that emerged 8 from the backroom constitutional process and purported to combine Islam 9 and neoliberalism. The final Constitution says:55 1011 1 Article 2 2 First . . . A: No law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam 3 may be established. 4 5 Article 13 6 First: This constitution is the sublime and supreme law in Iraq and shall 7 be binding in all parts of Iraq without exception. 8 Second: No law shall be enacted that contradicts this constitution. Any 9 text in . . . any other legal text that contradicts it is deemed void. 20111 Article 25: 1 The State guarantees the reform of the Iraqi economy in accordance 2 with modern economic principles to insure the full investment of its 3 resources, diversification of its sources and the encouragement and the 4 development of the private sector. 5 6 Article 26: 7 The state guarantees the encouragement of investments in the various 8 sectors. This will be organised by law. 9 30111 Article 27: 1 First: Public property is sacrosanct, and its protection is the duty of 2 each citizen. 3 Second: The provisions related to the protection of State properties and 4 its management and the conditions for its disposal and the limits under 5 which none of these properties shall be relinquished shall all be 6 regulated by law. 7 8 Article 109: . . . 9 Second: The federal government with the producing regional and 40111 governorate governments shall together formulate the necessary strategic 1 policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the 2 highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques 3 of the market principles and encourages investment. 44111 [emphasis added] Energy wars 317

1111 In the case of oil, the laws and principles that are referred to in Articles 2 26, 27 and 109 ran roughshod over Article 2 and hence Article 13, but 3 embodied the ‘modern economic principles’ of Article 25. In February 2007, 4 the Iraqi Cabinet approved a draft oil law that would govern the world’s 5 third largest oil reserves. The resource would effectively be privatised through 6 long-term production sharing agreements – a mechanism for legalised extortion 7 that other oil producing countries were eliminating. The oil industry 8 administration and revenues would be split across three internal regions. 9 But the key decisions would be controlled by an ‘advisory’ Federal Oil and 1011 Gas Council, which comprised ‘oil experts’ from inside and outside Iraq. 1 Journalist Pepe Escobar reports that: 2 3111 The law was in essence drafted, behind locked doors, by a US consulting 4 firm hired by the Bush administration and then carefully retouched by 5 Big Oil, the International Monetary Fund, former US deputy defense 6 secretary Paul Wolfowitz’ World Bank, and the United States Agency 7 for International Development. It’s virtually a US law (its original 8 language is English, not Arabic).56 9 20111 The legislation was to be introduced to the Iraqi parliament in April 2007. 1 The government of Nouri al-Maliki said it would be passed in one or two 2 months. By December 2007 it remained stalled, despite pressure from the 3 US, where President Bush had wanted to use the law to show Congress that 4 his new Iraq strategy was succeeding. 5 Reflecting the arrogance of imperialism, the US administration assumed that 6 WTO membership, an FTA, a constitution and a foreign investment law could 7 confer legitimacy and security on US economic and foreign policy interests 8 in a country that it had literally torn apart. The trenchant opposition within 9 the parliament and oil industry workers suggests the passage and 30111 implementation of the proposed oil law, let alone the WTO accession, will 1 compound the chaos that is the US occupation of Iraq. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 1111 2 Conclusion 3 4 Serving whose interests? 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3 The previous chapters and case studies have prised open the arcane world 4 of trade in services agreements to shed light on their socio-economic and 5 geopolitical dimensions. Just as liberal legalism constructs an artificial world 6 that excludes such factors, political economy allows them to be brought 7 back in. The trade in services regime emerges as an ideological construction 8 that is both potent and fragile. There is a vast literature on its potency, 9 much of which is referred to throughout this book. Much less has been 20111 written about the factors that make it unsustainable. 1 Four contradictory forces emerge from this analysis. The future of the trade 2 in services regime will depend on how these contradictions play out within 3 both the broader international ‘trade’ arena and the contested domain of 4 neoliberal globalisation. These concluding reflections suggest that a tentative 5 transformation is already underway. 6 First, the intrinsically social nature of services remains resilient in the face 7 of agreements that seek to purge them of that very essence and de-link them 8 from the social relations of their production, consumption and exchange. 9 The Bangladeshi construction worker in Dubai who is enslaved by the 30111 recruitment agency, loan shark and construction company; the Chilean 1 grandmother with no pension or other income; the impoverished Bolivian 2 family whose water is cut off for non-payment of extortionate user charges 3 are human tragedies that trade in services agreements cannot see. The 4 champions of these agreements assume that reality can be redefined through 5 the legal artifice of a treaty. But the wilful blindness of free trade entrepreneurs, 6 and the closure of the texts they create, does not make this suffering and 7 alienation go away. As a commentary in the International Herald Tribune 8 put it on 5 February 1999: ‘A billion people living in dire poverty alongside 9 a billion in widening splendour on a planet growing ever smaller and more 40111 integrated is not a sustainable scenario.’1 1 The resilience of the social plays out through multiple levels of organic 2 and organised resistance. Some societies appear to conform to the prescription 3 of ‘socio-regulatory adjustment’, offering a grumbling acquiescence. 44111 Elsewhere, people remain determined to exercise sovereignty over their own Conclusion 319

1111 lives, even when their governments have formally abdicated the state’s 2 responsibility. Communities that have little or no consciousness of trade in 3 services agreements mobilise to defend their futures – whether they are small 4 shopkeepers in Thailand, displaced farmers in Bangalore, impoverished South 5 African communities resisting privatisation by the post-apartheid government, 6 or local residents of Cancún who refuse to make way for a new hotel zone. 7 In Australia, Canada or Europe, the internal inequalities and disempowerment 8 associated with neoliberalism have spurred a gentler, yet determined, 9 opposition. 1011 The ‘organic intellectuals of counter-hegemony’ help to articulate the links 1 between the local, the legal and the international. Many activists and social 2 movements focus on empowerment and mobilisation that spans the national, 3111 regional and international arenas. Others strategically target the most 4 influential governments and sensitive issues. Specialist NGOs channel their 5 analytical and technical resources to governments who are prepared to 6 engage critically with the process. International institutions that remain 7 wedded to a social paradigm add to the noise and confront member states 8 with their failure to meet their competing legal obligations. 9 Far from engaging with these challenges, the ‘regime of accumulation’ 20111 seeks to embed the neoliberal paradigm for time immemorial through 1 complementary layers of pro-market meta-regulation at the national and 2 supranational levels. It deliberately closes off the ideological and legal space 3 for governments to give priority to social needs and the common good 4 over ‘trade’ commitments, or even to respond to a disabling political crisis. 5 States are relegated to a self-limiting and ‘enabling’ role vis-à-vis capital. 6 That subordination is rationalised on the grounds that states can no longer 7 effectively steer their economies or control capital flows (for example, 8 Giddens, 2000). This, in turn, assumes a sterile spectator-style of democracy 9 where the responsibility to govern is entrusted to political leaders and ‘voices 30111 of the market’. Citizens are informed of decisions, often ex post facto, but 1 not actively involved in making them. The secrecy of international trade 2 negotiations and the executive nature of treaty making compound the 3 ‘democratic deficit’ of neoliberalism. 4 Meta-regulation faces a conundrum: state sovereignty and people’s 5 sovereignty (not always the same thing) are more powerful ideological constructs 6 than ‘trade’ agreements will ever be. States continue to bear the burdens of 7 democracy. SP Shukla observed when reflecting on the Uruguay round and 8 the collapse of the third WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle that the 9 40111 deeper the process of integration, the more glaring the basic contradiction 1 in the system. . . . Deeper integration carries the process of exclusion 2 much further by excluding people from the law-making process of their 3 own countries. And it transfers the process, in effect, to the invisible 44111 hands of the transnational corporations who have vested interests in 320 Serving whose interests?

1111 the creation of ‘internationally contestable markets’. In this sense, deeper 2 integration is anti-democratic. In terms of the system, the significance 3 of open defiance by a large number of ‘exclusion’ casualties . . . can 4 hardly be exaggerated. 5 (Shukla, 2000, pp 33–4) 6 7 These contradictory dynamics play out differently among national governments. 8 The Fijian government put off dealing with the economic, social and cultural 9 implications of a ‘development’ model that depends on migration-for- 1011 remittances by redefining the export of its skilled women and militarised 1 men as mode 4 of trade in services. The Japanese government opted to 2 comply with US demands by voluntarily amending its retail laws and relying 3 more on cultural preferences. India became an aggressive demandeur in the 4 interests of its politically powerful middle class at the expense of its 5 impoverished masses. Other governments have sided with their national 6 élites and superpower allies: the Arroyo governments failed in its attempt 7 to purge the Philippines Constitution of economic nationalism, but the 8 government of Costa Rica successfully subverted a citizen-initiated 9 referendum designed to oppose CAFTA. The South Korean government 20111 concluded a free trade agreement with the US despite militant protests from 1 farmers, students, workers and even film stars. 2 Yet Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin was overthrown, in part, because 3 he championed a US free trade agreement. Future Thai governments 4 now face constitutional constraints on their treaty making powers. Centre 5 left governments in Latin America have strengthened their own regional 6 integration, while blocking the US goal of an FTAA. Even the US 7 administration – the initial champion of the GATS – has chosen to withdraw 8 its commitment on gambling rather than amend its domestic laws. That 9 decision opens a Pandora’s box. Other governments will face pressure from 30111 their domestic constituencies to do the same – which the US and others will 1 vigorously oppose. 2 More radical governments have directly challenged the neoliberal 3 paradigm itself. The indigenous-led government of one of world’s poorest 4 countries, Bolivia, withdrew the GATS offers of its predecessor as part of 5 its quest for trade justice. In neighbouring Venezuela the government of 6 Hugo Chávez has prioritised ‘full oil sovereignty’ over the trade in services 7 commitments of a previous administration, and applied the country’s oil 8 wealth to building alliances through barter-style alternatives. In May 2006 9 Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba signed a People’s Trade Agreement ‘as a means 40111 toward development with social justice in the framework of genuine 1 fraternal Latin American and Caribbean integration’.2 This and Chávez-led 2 ALBA represents a conscious counter-hegemonic strategy to confront both 3 the FTAA and neoliberalism more generally. Whether they can be sustained 44111 if their political champions, especially Chávez, lose power is questionable. Conclusion 321

1111 Venezuela’s bold initiatives are made possible by another paradox – the 2 use of oil wealth as the basis for alternatives. Building on that foundation 3 is itself problematic. The divergent political loyalties of OPEC members 4 make concerted action by oil rich countries most unlikely. Moreover, 5 Venezuela’s leverage that depends on oil wealth sits uncomfortably with 6 the crisis of global warming, especially given its strategic alliance with one 7 of the world’s major energy consumers, China. 8 These diverse voices, values, tensions and alternatives are part of an 9 evolving dialectic that makes the trade in services regime contested and 1011 unstable. When governments cannot regulate in the interests of their people, 1 and dynamic participatory governance is suppressed, there is a risk that 2 social dis-ease will fuel social upheaval. National governments become 3111 pincered between the demands of their citizens for social regulation, often 4 reinforced by the state’s constitutional and other international obligations, 5 and the economic imperatives of contemporary capitalism, reflected in the 6 state’s commitments in ‘trade’ treaties to regulate for capital. 7 These tensions can undermine the political legitimacy of governments 8 and their capacity to govern. They also infect and de-legitimise the trade in 9 services regime itself. Governments of all dispositions become cautious and 20111 defensive. The negotiation, implementation and enforcement of the GATS, 1 regional and bilateral agreements, and pro-market regulation at a national 2 level all become technically complex and politically contentious. This suggests 3 that the legal regime of accumulation is potentially unsustainable. 4 The second fissure reflects the imperialist nature of international law: 5 what purports to be a normative rules-based ‘trade’ regime embeds the 6 historic asymmetries of economic and political power between the global 7 North and South. The GATS was a creation of the 1980s and early 1990s 8 when US hegemony and neoliberal globalisation seemed omnipotent. As 9 Anghie predicted, Southern governments responded to this new challenge 30111 by struggling from within. The legal structures and negotiating principles 1 they established have since been used to stall the GATS 2000 process. 2 As the WTO has become increasingly dysfunctional, both the US and EU 3 have shifted their focus from multilateral liberalisation to a complex of 4 economic and political arrangements at the bilateral and regional levels that 5 Bhala describes as ‘competitive imperialism’ (Bhala, 2007). These inter-state 6 rivalries will intensify as China and India, the previously passive Japan, and 7 a potentially resurgent Russia compete to secure new bilateral and regional 8 alliances. 9 These new generation agreements combine guaranteed rights over scarce 40111 natural resources with increasingly oppressive economic, aid and foreign 1 policy conditionalities. Subversion is both more possible and more difficult 2 for Southern governments in these highly politicised negotiations. The 3 ruthlessness with which the US, EU and others are ‘negotiating’ with some 44111 of the world’s poorest states, such as the Andean nations and the ACP 322 Serving whose interests?

1111 countries, increases the prospects for localised rebellion and international 2 instability. It is ominous that these public displays of raw power go hand in 3 hand with the language of ‘failed states’, the ‘axis of evil’, an ‘arc of instability’, 4 and ‘pre-emptive intervention’. Similar treatment of Arabic states during 5 WTO accession and bilateral negotiations, against the backdrop of actual 6 occupation and threatened invasion, seem destined to foment long-term anti- 7 Western sentiments and resistance among the already disaffected. As Anghie 8 observed, throughout the history of international law ‘these imperial projects 9 inevitably provoke rebellion and opposition’ (Anghie, 2005, p 312). 1011 It is not clear how the US will respond if the President’s fast track authority 1 remains in abeyance for some years and it is left behind by competing 2 hegemons. Already the post-‘9/11’ siege mentality has driven the US to shore 3 up its own neighbourhood through a deep integration process with Canada 4 and Mexico, dubbed the Security and Prosperity Partnership. A corresponding 5 internal consolidation has been promoted within Canada through the Trade, 6 Investment and Labour Mobility Agreement (TILMA) between British 7 Columbia, Alberta and potentially other Canadian provinces. While 8 regionalism is important to the US, the competition to secure ‘trade’ treaties 9 is a proxy battle for control of the world’s increasingly scarce natural, 20111 especially energy, resources, and between competing models of capitalism. 1 The US cannot retreat from that global arena – a fact that may foreshadow 2 more overt force and covert aggression. 3 Nascent counter-hegemonic ventures that aim to replace the neoliberal 4 paradigm with emancipatory alternatives are both promising and fragile. 5 The governments of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and President Evo Morales 6 in Bolivia symbolise the resistance to US-led imperialism. Morales articulated 7 an alternative vision sourced in indigenous values in his address to the UN 8 on 22 September 2007: 9 30111 I come here to express the suffering, the product of marginalisation, of 1 exclusion, I come to express above all else, this anti-colonial sentiment 2 of the peoples that struggle for equality and justice. . . . Many countries 3 have the same problems as my country, a country, a nation with so much 4 wealth but also with so much poverty, where the natural resources 5 have historically been stolen, looted, auctioned off by the neoliberal 6 government, handed over to the transnationals. . . . This new millennium, 7 the millennium that we find ourselves in, needs to be a millennium of life, 8 not of war, a millennium of people and not of empire, a millennium of 9 justice and equality and that any economic policy needs to be orientated 40111 towards ending, or at least lessening these so-called asymmetric differences 1 between one country and another country, those social inequalities.3 2 3 The vanguard role of Venezuela and Bolivia is also its vulnerability. If Chávez 44111 and allied leftist leaders are destabilised or removed, those countries that Conclusion 323

1111 have embraced their alternatives and become dependent on their resources 2 are at risk of being cut adrift, as occurred after the demise of the Soviet 3 Union. Sustainable alternatives require the use of the emerging economic 4 and political space to de-legitimise the notion of TINA that maintains the 5 bonds of neoliberalism and to create broader networks of local and regional 6 initiatives that allow people and societies to use and trade their own resources 7 to advance their own welfare. 8 The third contradiction is the intrinsic inability of the GATS and its 9 successors, as legal texts, to meet the needs of the transnational corporations 1011 they are intended to serve. As treaties they are expected to provide certainty 1 and security that pro-business laws and policies will be implemented, retained 2 and improved over time. Instead, the political compromises between the 3111 North and South, and among the major powers, that gave birth to the 4 GATS 1994 have left a legacy of vague and unfinished rules, and fragmented 5 and partly obsolete schedules of commitments. 6 The fate of the Doha round is, at the time of writing, unknown. If some 7 deal on agriculture and NAMA is pulled together, however cosmetic, there 8 would be enormous pressure on larger developing countries to adopt extensive 9 new services commitments. Whether they would comply, and whether a 20111 dissident such as Venezuela could catalyse others to block a consensus, is 1 pure conjecture. However, even if an ambitious outcome was achieved in 2 the GATS 2000 negotiations it could not remedy the structural deficiencies 3 in the agreement. The positive list and classifications system remain 4 unchanged. Attempts to develop rules and disciplines on government 5 procurement and subsidies have been at standstill virtually since they began. 6 The partial exception is the Article VI:4 disciplines on domestic regulation. 7 Although these have become embedded in the GATS 2000 round, their 8 proponents have argued for an ‘early harvest’. All WTO members would then 9 face additional constraints on their autonomy to regulate, and poor and small 30111 countries would face onerous costs to comply. Yet even these disciplines 1 seem unlikely to go as far as those already agreed for the accountancy 2 profession – which are themselves not effective until the conclusion of a GATS 3 2000 round. 4 Alternatively, the Doha round might remain moribund until a new US 5 President secures fast track authority. The relevance of the GATS would 6 depend largely on the dispute settlement process and creative applications 7 of the principle of ‘technological neutrality’ to extend existing commitments 8 to new activities. 9 By contrast to the faltering multilateral level, the new generation of GATS- 40111 plus agreements has succeeded in creating new architectures, classifications, 1 rules and constraints on regulation. The combination of negative list schedules 2 and the principle of technological neutrality make those commitments more 3 responsive to new commercial opportunities. The stand-alone structure of 44111 the GATS has given way to integrated legal texts as the boundaries between 324 Serving whose interests?

1111 agriculture, industry, energy, finance, intellectual property, services and 2 investment are reorganised. In particular, the blending of services and 3 investment chapters has opened the door to investor-initiated disputes. 4 Before long, the flood of new generation agreements may render the GATS 5 an historical anachronism. From a pro-liberalisation perspective, there would 6 still be two purposes to reviving the GATS 2000 negotiations. First, if the 7 main elements that are currently being resisted have been incorporated into 8 most bilaterals, continued opposition to them in the GATS may become 9 academic. Ideally, a GATS agreement could then smooth out some of the 1011 incoherencies across the new generation agreements and apply those 1 commitments on a MFN basis. Second, there is no realistic prospect of 2 bilateral agreements between the US, EU, Japan and China. The major 3 powers therefore need agreement in the GATS to secure access to each 4 other’s markets and provide seamless ‘trade in services’ among the major 5 importing and exporting economies. 6 Neither purpose appears likely to attract a passive consensus of WTO 7 members. These objectives may only be achieved through plurilateral side 8 agreements. That would fundamentally change the multilateral regime and 9 implicitly recognise the North/South fissure that pervades the ‘global’ services 20111 economy. 1 Over two decades have passed since the Uruguay round began. The original 2 vision of one global set of rules to govern the world’s services markets has 3 given way to a plethora of overlapping, often incoherent and sometimes 4 conflicting treaties. These new agreements contain their own illusions and 5 rigidities. They cannot simply be reintegrated within the WTO domain or 6 with each other. As their purpose and content become more politicised, 7 governments may pay less attention to the demands of the corporations, aside 8 from the crucial sectors of finance, energy and communications. 9 It is not clear what this bilateral and regional patchwork will actually 30111 achieve. Many governments, especially the poor, appear to lack the technical 1 as well as political capacity to comply with all the commitments they are 2 signing on to. Attempts to enforce the rules and extend them through judicial 3 lawmaking in either the WTO or international arbitral tribunals would be 4 fraught with danger. The more disputes that are taken, and the more activist 5 the trade ‘judiciary’ becomes, the greater the likelihood that the agreements 6 will be condemned by governments and people for usurping their sovereignty 7 in the interests of major powers and transnational companies. Treaties that 8 are not enforceable lack potency. 9 This points to the final, systemic contradiction. When the GATS 2000 40111 round became paralysed and the WTO confronted a crisis of legitimacy, 1 the organic intellectuals of capital reinvented the regime. Yet the new 2 configurations of bilateral and regional agreements perpetuate the same 3 ideological illusions, inequities, asymmetries and instabilities that destabilised 44111 the multilateral arena. The internal logic of the ‘regime of accumulation’ Conclusion 325

1111 becomes self-defeating because the closed ideology of trade in services 2 agreements sees the world only as a market. It cannot recognise, let alone 3 mediate, the structural inequalities and ecological exhaustion that destabilise 4 the globalising services economy. The ‘social structure of accumulation’ 5 faces its own crises as the conditions that are necessary for its survival 6 appear impossible to sustain. The very notion of international trade in 7 services belies the seismic potential of peak oil, climate change or a global 8 meltdown of speculative capital. Yet trade in services agreements contribute 9 in no small way to the potential for financial instability, energy depletion, 1011 social upheavals and war to plunge global capitalism into crisis. 1 As Robert Cox presciently remarked, hegemony represents a particular 2 configuration of ideas, institutions and material forces which people can 3111 move with or resist, but not ignore (Cox, 1981, p 135). A hegemonic project 4 requires a modicum of consent or at least acquiescence. It is vulnerable 5 when the conceptual foundations on which it is built are flawed, the 6 objectives are overtly partisan, the activities it mandates are not sustainable, 7 and people retain a strong allegiance to displaced or alternative values. 8 While those who champion the trade in services regime assume that it will 9 endure forever, it is neither irresistible nor eternal. 20111 These sites of contradiction are not presented as linear forces that are 1 driving the trade in services regime specifically, or neoliberal globalisation 2 generally, towards a spectacular meltdown. There is no prediction of 3 Armageddon or a mass revolutionary uprising against global capitalism. 4 What this book reveals is a dialectical struggle that, to answer the question 5 posed in the title, appears to serve the long-term interests of no one. 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111 1111 2 Notes 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 Introduction 4 1 EC, ‘Opening World Markets for Services – Towards GATS 2000’, 2003, online. 5 Available at http://gats-info.eu.int/gats-info/g2000.pl?NEWS=bbb (accessed 14 6 January 2004). 7 2 CTS, ‘Recent Developments in Services Trade – Background Note by the 8 Secretariat’, S/C/W/94, 9 February 1999, para 23. 3 WTO Secretariat, ‘Introduction to the GATS’,October 1999,online. Available at 9 www.union-network.org/unisite/regions/africa/pdf/labourissues/gatsintroduction. 20111 pdf (accessed 20 September 2007). 1 4 Ruggiero, R ‘Towards GATS 2000 – A European Strategy’, 2 June 1998, online. 2 Available at www.wto.org/english/news_e/sprr_e/bruss1_e.htm (accessed 20 3 September 2007). 5 WTO, ‘International Trade Statistics 2006’, Tables A.8, 1.7 and 1.8 and Chart 4 IV.2, online. Available at www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2006_e/its06_ 5 bysubject_e.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). These figures draw on 6 international service transactions recorded in balance of payments statistics for 7 the categories transport, travel and other commercial services. They do not 8 correspond to the GATS definition, where foreign direct investment is deemed a mode of ‘trade’. 9 6 OECD, ‘The Trade Committee of the OECD. Thirty Years and a Hundred 30111 Meetings’, TD(91)100, p 72. 1 7 Raghavan, C ‘A Rollback of the Third World?’, International Foundation for 2 Development Alternatives Dossier 52, March–April 1986, online. Available at 3 www.sunsonline.org/trade/other/rollback.htm (accessed 8 August 2007). 4 1 Reading the GATS as ideology 5 6 1 WTO, ‘Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)’, S/L/92, 23 March 2001. 7 2 WTO, ‘Structure of Commitments for Modes 1, 2, and 3’, S/C/W/99, 3 March 8 1999, p 4. 9 3 WTO, ‘Services Sectoral Classification List’, MTN/GNS/W/120, 1 July 1991. 40111 4 Sorsa notes that the role of the WTO committee is unclear and untested as the 1 IMF independently approves restrictions on current account payments (Sorsa, 1997, p 10). 2 5 WPGR (Working Party on GATS Rules), ‘Communication from Brunei 3 Darussalam (and seven others), (Draft) Annex on Article X Emergency Safeguard 44111 Measures’, room document, 6 March 2007. On file with author. 328 Notes

1111 6 WTO, ‘Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector’, online. 2 Available at www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres98_e/pr118_e.htm (accessed 20 3 September 2007). 7 Depalma, A ‘W.T.O. Pact Would Set Global Accounting Rules’, New York Times, 4 1 March 2002, online. Available at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/ 5 timestopics/organizations/w/world_trade_organization/index.html?offset=30&qu 6 ery=TREATIES&field=des&match=exact (accessed 14 September 2007). 7 8 WTO, ‘Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector’, online. 8 Available at www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres98_e/pr118_e.htm (accessed 20 9 September 2007). 9 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘International Trade in 1011 Services. Domestic Regulation. Necessity and Transparency’, online. Available 1 at www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/services/domreg_gats_nat.html (accessed 2 14 September 2007). 3 10 WPDR, ‘Communication from Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, the 4 Philippines. Elements for Draft Disciplines on Domestic Regulation’, room document. On file with author. 5 11 WPDR, ‘Disciplines on Domestic Regulation Pursuant to GATS Article VI: 4’, 6 room document, 18 April 2007. On file with author. 7 8 Case study 1 9 12 WTO General Council, ‘Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference. 20111 Further Negotiations as Mandated by the General Agreement on Trade in Services 1 (GATS). Communication from the United States’, WT/GC/W/295, 5 August 2 1999. 3 13 Ibid. 4 14 WTO General Council, ‘Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference. Proposals Regarding the GATS Agreement in terms of Paragraph 9(a)(i) of the 5 Geneva Ministerial Declaration. Communication from India’, WT/GC/W/224, 6 2 July 1999. 7 15 WTO, ‘Report of the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services to the 8 General Council’, S/CSS/3, 24 November 2000. 9 16 UNCTAD, ‘Trade in Services and Development Implications’, note by the 30111 Secretariat, TD/B/COM.1/71, 20 January 2005. 17 WTO General Council, ‘Preparations for the 1999 Ministerial Conference. 1 Further Negotiations as Mandated by the General Agreement on Trade in Services 2 (GATS). Communication from the United States’, WT/GC/W/295, 5 August 3 1999. 4 18 Ibid. 5 19 WTO, ‘Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations on Trade in Services’, S/L/93, 29 March 2001. 6 20 WTO, ‘Doha Work Programme. Decision Adopted by the General Council on 7 1 August 2004’, WT/L/579, 2 August 2004. 8 21 Council for Trade in Services, Special Section (CTS.SS), ‘Report by the Chairman 9 to the TNC’, TN/7/17, 8 October 2004. 40111 22 CTS.SS, ‘Report by the Chairman to the TNC’, Supplement, TN/S/19/Suppl.1, 1 9 May 2005. 23 ‘EC non-paper’, 27 October 2005. On file with author. 2 24 Khor, M ‘Developing Countries Jointly Object to “Targets” in Ministerial Draft 3 and Attack EU Paper’, 28 October 2005, online. Available at www.twnside.org. 44111 sg/title2/twninfo288.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). Notes 329

1111 25 WTO, ‘Ministerial Conference. Sixth Session. Hong Kong, 13–18 December 2 2005, Doha Work Programme. Ministerial Declaration’, Adopted on 18 3 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC. 26 Joint statement of Cuba and Venezuela to WTO General Council, ‘Irregularities 4 identified in the negotiation and decision making process at the Sixth WTO 5 ministerial conference’, 8 February 2006. On file with author. 6 27 WTO, ‘The New Negotiations’, online. Available at www.wto.org/english/ 7 tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_e.htm (accessed 1 August 2007). 8 28 WTO, ‘Elements for a Services Text’, WTO Room Document, online. Available 9 at www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=100722 (accessed 30 November 2007). 1011 29 WTO, ‘Possible Elements of a Services Text’, WTO Room Document, online. 1 Available at www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=100720 (accessed 30 2 November 2007). 3111 4 Case study 2 5 30 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services, online. Available at www.aseansec. 6 org/6628.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 7 31 Seattle to Brussels Network Briefing, The New Ambitions for the EU Trade 8 Policy: creating more space for corporations abroad and at home, 2006, online. 9 Available at www.s2bnetwork.org/download/s2bbriefing_newambitionsofeutra depolicy (accessed 9 August 2007). 20111 32 USTR, ‘USTR Zoellick to Discuss Regional Free Trade Agreement on Visit to 1 South Africa’, 1 October 2003, online. Available at www.ustr.gov/Document_ 2 Library/Press_Releases/2003/January/USTR_Zoellick_to_Discuss_Regional_Free 3 _Trade_Agreement_on_Visit_to_South_Africa.html (accessed 20 September 4 2007). 5 33 Speech to the International Institute of Economics, Washington DC, 8 May 2003, reported as: ‘Markets Must Open, U.S. Warns’, online. Available at www. 6 tradeobservatory.org/headlines.cfm?refID=18715 (accessed 20 September 2007). 7 34 ‘Security and Prosperity Partnership of America’, online. Available at 8 www.spp.gov (accessed 20 September 2007). 9 35 WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, ‘Transparency Mechanism for Regional 30111 Trade Agreements’, JOB(06)/59/Rev.5, 29 June 2006. 1 2 2 How the GATS was won (and lost?) 3 1 Interview with S Picciotto, 8 December 2005, New Delhi. 4 2 Feketekuty says its origins were serendipitous – a dinner date between the drafter 5 of the legislation and a lobbyist for Pan American Airlines, who complained that the Australian government would not allow Pan Am to deliver the 6 international mail. Interview with author, Washington DC, 3 May 2005. 7 3 US Department of Commerce, ‘US Service Industries in World Markets. Current 8 Problems and Future Policy Development’, 1976. 9 4 Interview with author, Washington DC, 3 May 2005. 40111 5 OECD, ‘World Trade in Services: The Need for Analysis’, discussion paper 1 submitted by US Delegation, TC/M(78)3(Prov.) Annex II. On file with author. 6 OECD, ‘Trade in Services. Note by the Secretariat’, undated. On file with author. 2 7 OECD, ‘Working Party of the Trade Committee. Analysis of Barriers to Trade 3 in Services. Note by the United States delegation’, TC/WP(80)44, 23 December 44111 1980. On file with author. 330 Notes

1111 8 OECD, ‘Trade in Services’, JW Hackett to WH Witherell, IME/70.207, 2 October 2 1979. On file with author. 3 9 OECD, ‘Council on Foreign Relations Conference on International Investment and Trade in Services’, J Myerson to WH Witherell, WHW/81, 17 June 1981. 4 On file with author. 5 10 OECD, ‘Liberalisation of Services (Discussion Paper by the Secretariat)’, 10 6 February 1981, pp 2, 9–10. On file with author. 7 11 Ibid., p 13. 8 12 OECD ‘Meeting on Restrictions on International Trade and Investment in Services’, WH Witherell to the Secretary-General, WHW/80.97, 6 June 1980. 9 On file with author. 1011 13 ‘Work Programme on Trade in Services’, press release 20 April 1981, OECD 1 files; ‘US Official Supports Trade Negotiations on Services’, US Mission to OECD, 2 18 April 1980. On file with author. 3 14 GATT, ‘Thirty-Eighth Session at Ministerial Level Ministerial Declaration’, 4 adopted on 29 November 1982, Geneva, online. Available at www.jus.uio.no/ lm/wto.gatt.thirty.eighth.session.ministerial.declaration.1982/doc#109 (accessed 5 28 August 2007). 6 15 LOTIS, ‘Liberalisation of Trade in Services. Visit to OECD on 9 July 1982’, 7 LOTIS 58/82. On file with author. 8 16 OECD, ‘Some issues on the OECD approach to liberalisation of services’, T 9 Bernes and A Farhi to Secretary General, 14 January 1984. On file with author. 17 ‘US set to propose freer trade in services to GATT’, Financial Times, 11 November 20111 1983. On file with author. 1 18 ‘US National Study on Trade in Services: A Submission by the United States 2 Government to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’, Washington, DC: 3 Government Printing Office. On file with author. 4 19 UNCTAD, ‘Services and the Development Process. Study by the UNCTAD 5 Secretariat’, TD/B/1008, August 1984. 20 This was also a major point of contention in negotiations for the MAI in the 6 OECD from 1995 to 1998 (Khor, 1998). 7 21 The OECD later engaged with ‘trade and development’ from a pro-liberalisation 8 perspective (OECD, 1989). 9 22 OECD, ‘UNCTAD and Trade in Services’, K Takahashi to S Devos and W 30111 Witherell, KT(84)69, 29 August 1984. On file with author. 23 OECD, ‘UNCTAD and Trade in Services’, S Devos to MK Takahashi, 31 August 1 1984. On file with author. 2 24 OECD, ‘Liberalisation of Services. Discussion paper by the Secretariat’, 10 3 February 1981, p 19. On file with author. 4 25 SP Shukla to author, email correspondence, 6 April 2008. On file with author. 5 26 Kanaga, R ‘North attempts to split developing-country alliances’, South-North 6 Development Monitor (SUNS), 27 July 2004, online. Available at www.twnside. org.sg/title2/twninfo151.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 7 27 GATT, ‘Summary Record of Meeting of Contracting Parties on 26 November 8 1985’, SR 41/3, 10 January 1986, p 7. 9 28 OECD, ‘Secretary General’s Visit to Capitals’, briefing note, 4 February 1986. 40111 On file with author. 1 29 Raghavan, C ‘A Rollback of the Third World?’, International Foundation for Development Alternatives Dossier 52, March–April 1986, online. Available at 2 www.sunsonline.org/trade/other/rollback.htm (accessed 8 August 2007). 3 30 GATT Preparatory Committee, ‘Record of Discussions of 17–20 March’, 44111 PREP.COM(86)SR/3, 11 April 1986, paras 1, 13 and 3. Notes 331

1111 31 OECD, JW Hackett to Secretary-General, JWH(86)10, 9 January 1986. On file 2 with author. 32 GATT Preparatory Committee ‘Trade in Services. Proposed Text for Ministerial 3 Declaration’ PREP.COM(86)W/34, 11 June 1986. 4 33 GATT Preparatory Committee, ‘Communication from the Chairman’, PREP. 5 COM(86)W/50, 8 August 1986. 6 34 GATT, ‘United States: Statement by Ambassador Clayton Yeutter, Trade 7 Representative, at the Meeting of the GATT Contracting Parties at Ministerial Level’, 15–19 September 1986, Punta Del Este, Uruguay, MIN(86)/ST/5, 3-4, 8 15 September 1986. 9 35 GATT, ‘India: Statement by the Minister of Finance of the Government of India, 1011 VP Singh, at the Meeting of the GATT Contracting Parties at Ministerial Level’, 1 Uruguay MIN(86)/ST/33, 3, online. Available at www.wto.int/gatt_docs/English/ 2 SULPDF/91240242.pdf (accessed 10 August 2007). 36 Drake and Nicolaidis state that the ‘common working platform’ for a two-track 3111 approach was suggested several days before the meeting (Drake and Nicolaidis, 4 1992, p 68). Singh also suggests the two-track proposal was promoted by the 5 EC before the meeting (Singh, 2003, p 15). 6 37 GATT, ‘Ministerial Declaration of 20 September 1986’, online. Available at www.sice.oas.org/trade/Punta_e.asp (accessed 23 September 2007). 7 38 OECD, ‘Elements of a Conceptual Framework for Trade in Services’, March 8 1987. On file with author. 9 39 OECD, ‘Working Party of the Trade Committee. Trade in Services. Review of 20111 issues relating to negotiating techniques’, TC/WP(89)43, 1 June 1989. 1 40 Group of Negotiation on Services (GNS), ‘Communication from New Zealand. Structure and Mechanism for a General Agreement on Services. Key Issues’, 2 MTN.GNS/W/72, 20 September 1989. 3 41 GNS, ‘Communication from the United States. Agreement on Trade in Services’, 4 MTN.GNS/W/75, 17 October 1989. 5 42 GNS, ‘Communication from Brazil [and 10 others]. Structure of a Multilateral Framework for Trade in Services’, MTN.GNS/W/95, 26 February 1990. 6 43 GNS, ‘Draft. Multilateral Framework for Trade in Services’, MTN.GNS/35, 7 23 July 1990. 8 44 GNS, ‘Note of the Meeting of 12 and 22 November 1990’, MTN/GNS/40, 9 28 November 1990. 30111 45 GNS, ‘Procedural Guidelines for Negotiations on Initial Commitments’, MTN.GNS/W/119, 2 July 1991. 1 46 Permanent Mission of the Republic of Bolivia to Hamid Mamdouh, Director, 2 Services Division, WTO, 17 March 2006. On file with author. 3 47 Altman, D ‘Charlene Barshefsky on Doha’, Managing Globalization, 31 January 4 2007, online. Available at http://blogs.iht.com/tribtalk/business/globalization/ 5 ?p=342 (accessed 4 August 2007). 6 Case study 3 7 48 Hartridge, D ‘What the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Can 8 Do’, speech to the Clifford Chance Conference on ‘Opening Markets for Banking 9 Worldwide: The WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services’, London, 40111 January 1997. 1 49 ‘Coalition of Services Industries’, online. Available at www.uscsi.org/about (accessed 20 September 2007). 2 50 ‘Record of a Discussion between the Secretary General and Mr Freeman, Senior 3 Vice President, American Express, on 8 May 1981’, File note TJA/111. On file 44111 with author. 332 Notes

1111 51 LOTIS, ‘Liberalisation of Trade in Services. Visit to OECD on 9 July 1982’, 2 LOTIS 58/82, 12 July 1982. On file with author. 3 4 Case study 4 5 52 ‘Stop the GATS Attack Now’ was the title of the strategy paper and first 6 international sign-on letter initiated by anti-GATS campaigners in 2001. 7 53 Moore, M ‘Liberalisation? Don’t Reject It Just Yet’, Special Report, The Guardian, 26 February 2001, online. Available at www.guardian.co.uk/ 8 globalisation/story/0,7369,443085,00.html (accessed 7 August 2007). 9 54 WTO, ‘GATS – Fact and Fiction’, p 2, online. Available at www.wto.org/english/ 1011 tratop_e/serv_e/gats_factfiction_e.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 1 55 Raghavan, C ‘“GATS – Fact and Fiction”, at Best a Partial Truth’, SUNS Bulletin 2 4859, online. Available at www.twnside.org.sg/title/fiction.htm (accessed 8 August 2007). 3 56 The Global Services Network was formed by the major services lobby groups 4 from the UK, US, Hong Kong, France, Ireland, Canada, Sweden and Argentina 5 in 1998. See www.globalservicesnetwork.com. 6 57 Financial Times, 20 April 1988, p 8. On file with author. 7 8 3 Trade-related development 9 1 UN, ‘Declaration on the Right to Development’, adopted by General Assembly 20111 Resolution 41/128, 4 December 1986. 1 2 ‘Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization’, online. Available at www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm (accessed 20 2 September 2007). The ministerial declarations from the Doha conference in 2001 3 and Hong Kong in 2005 reiterated this objective. 4 3 WTO, ‘WTO Agreements with the Fund and the Bank’, WT/GC/W/43, 4 5 November 1996. 6 4 For a critical commentary on Sampson’s views by the Bank’s representative during the Uruguay round see Baneth, 1998. 7 5 ‘UNCTAD: Trade and Development Report 2006: Remarks by Ann Low, First 8 Secretary, U.S. Mission to the United Nations’, online. Available at http:// 9 geneva.usmission.gov/Press2006/0928TDR2006.html (accessed 7 August 2007). 30111 6 Interview with Vidya Rangan, Equations, Bangalore, 10 December 2006. 1 7 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection Human Rights, ‘Liberalisation of Trade in Services and Human Rights. Report of the High 2 Commissioner’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002, p 11. 3 8 Ibid., pp 10–11. 4 9 Ibid., p 30. 5 10 WTO, ‘Accession of Least-Developed Countries’, Decision of 10 December 2002, 6 WT/L/508, 20 January 2003. 11 USTR, ‘Non Paper’, July 2005. On file with author. 7 12 The language on services is ambiguous. The EC originally insisted that it meant 8 the negotiations on services must begin, and preferably conclude, by the end of 9 2007. In late 2007 it was agreed that negotiations on services would continue 40111 into 2008. 1 13 ‘Integrated Framework for Trade-related Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries’, online. Available at www.integratedframework.org/ (accessed 20 2 September 2007). 3 14 ‘IF Process’, online. Available at www.integratedframework.org/process.htm 44111 (accessed 20 September 2007). Notes 333

1111 15 ‘An Enhanced Integrated Framework. Report of the Chairman of the Task Force 2 on an Enhanced Integrated Framework, including recommendations’, WT/IFSC/ 3 W/15, 29 June 2006. 16 JITAP, ‘Partnership for Trade Development in Africa’, online. Available at 4 www.jitap.org (accessed 20 September 2007). 5 17 African Union Conference of Trade Ministers, Third Extraordinary Session, 6 15–16 January 2007, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Ext/Min/Trade/Decl.1(III). 7 18 WTO, ‘Strategic Review of WTO-provided Training and Technical Assistance 8 (TRTA)’, WT/COMTD/W/152, July 2006. 19 WTO, ‘Strategic Review of WTO-provided TRTA’, WT/COMTD/W/153, 17 9 October 2006, para 16. 1011 20 UNCTAD, ‘Evaluation of UNCTAD’s Trade-related Technical Assistance and 1 Capacity Building on Accession to the WTO’, TD/B/WP/190, 21 July 2006. 2 3111 Case study 5 4 21 World Bank, ‘Introduction to the Outline of the World Development Report 5 2004, “Making Services Work for Poor People”.’ On file with author. 6 22 Interviews with Aaditya Mattoo, Will Martin and Shanta Devarajan, World 7 Bank, Washington, 1–2 November 2004. 8 9 Case study 6 20111 1 23 ‘Report of the World Summit for Social Development’, Copenhagen, 6–12 March 1995 A/CONF.166/9, 19 April 1995, para 1e, online. Available at www.un.org/ 2 esa/socdev/wssd/agreements/index.html (accessed 20 September 2007). 3 24 U Baxi, ‘Summit of Hope’ In the Depths of Despair? Social Development as 4 Realization of Human Rights’, 1995. On file with author. 5 25 For an official account of these summits see Chasek and Sherman 2004, 6 Chapter 3. 26 K Annan, ‘Speech of the United Nations Secretary General to the WTO 7 Conference’, Geneva, 19 May 1998. On file with author. 8 27 UN Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 55/2. ‘United Nations 9 Millennium Declaration’, 8 September 2000, online. Available at www.un.org/ 30111 millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 1 28 UN, ‘Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration. Report of the Secretary-General’, A/56/326, 6 September 2001, 2 online. Available at www.un.org/millenniumgoals/documents.html (accessed 20 3 September 2007). 4 29 WTO, ‘Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration’, WT/MIN(01)/ 5 DEC/1, 20 November 2001, adopted 14 November 2001, online. Available at 6 www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 7 30 Raghavan, C ‘Framework for Modalities or ‘Platform’ for Future Careers?’, 8 South-North Development Monitor (SUNS), 21 July 2004, online. Available at 9 www.twnside.org.sg/title2/twninfo141.htm (accessed 8 August 2007). 40111 31 WTO, ‘Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004’, WT/L/579, 1 2 August 2004: para 1d, online. Available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 2 32 Altman, D ‘Charlene Barshefsky on Doha’, Managing Globalization, 31 January 3 2007, online. Available at http://blogs.iht.com/tribtalk/business/globalization/ 44111 ?p=342 (accessed 4 August 2007). 334 Notes

1111 33 Landau, S ‘Lies, Truth and Transcendent Issues in Monterrey’, Radio Progreso 2 Weekly, 11 April 2002, online. Available at www.tni.org/archives/landau/lies.htm 3 (accessed 20 September 2007). 34 UN, ‘Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development’, 4 Monterrey, Mexico, 18–22 March 2002 A/CNF.198/11 (Monterrey Consensus), 5 paragraph 11, online. Available at www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/ 6 Monterrey_Consensus.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 7 35 One government pointed to 160 conditions it had to meet to obtain support 8 for its PRSP, Monterrey Consensus, Ch IV, Ministerial roundtable B.2, p 45, para 8. 9 36 ‘Declaration of the World Summit on Sustainable Development and Plan of 1011 Implementation’, 4 September 2002, A/CONF.199/L.6/Rev.2, online. Available 1 at www.unep.org/wssd/ (accessed 20 September 2007). The final text differed 2 significantly from an earlier more pro-development draft. 3 37 On file with author. 4 5 4 The illusion of public services 6 1 Interview with Mme Marie-Pierre Faudemay, former principal administrator, 7 Trade Directorate, OECD, at Paris, 6 March 2005. 8 2 WTO, ‘GATS – Fact and Fiction’, p 2, online. Available at www.wto.org/english/ 9 tratop_e/serv_e/gats_factfiction_e.htm (accessed on 20 September 2007). 3 ‘Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty 20111 Establishing the European Community’, 29 December 2006, online. Available 1 at http://eur-lex.europa.euen/treaties/index.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 2 4 CTS, ‘Health and Social Services. Background Note by the Secretariat’, S/C/W/50, 3 18 September 1998, p 11. 4 5 WPGR, ‘Communication from the European Communities. Government 5 Procurement in Services’, S/WPGR/W/54, 20 June 2006. 6 UNCTAD Trade and Development Board, ‘Expert Meeting on Universal Access 6 to Services’, TD/B/COM.1/EM.30/2, 18 September 2006, p 16. 7 7 WPGR, ‘Government Procurement-related Provisions in Economic Integration 8 Agreements’, Note by the Secretariat, S/WPGR/W/49, 31 August 2004. 9 8 WTO, ‘Health and Social Services. Background note by the Secretariat’, 30111 S/C/W/50 18 September 1998, p 16. 9 Online. Available at www.midwiferytoday.com/international/ (accessed 20 1 September 2007). 2 10 Online. Available at www.midwivesonline.com/internationallinks.htm (accessed 3 20 September 2007). In 2005 this website was freely browsable; in 2007 it 4 required a password to enter. 5 11 ECOSOC, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Liberalization of Trade in 6 Services and Human Rights. Report of the High Commissioner. Executive Summary’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002, p 4. 7 12 Ibid., pp 19–20. 8 13 Ibid., p 21. 9 14 Ibid., p 26. 40111 15 Ibid., p 28. 1 16 Smith, S ‘Thai Human Rights Commission attacks FTA with US’, TWN Info Service on WTO and Trade Issues, online. Available at www.twnside.org.sg/ 2 title2/twninfo492.htm (accessed 9 August 2007). 3 17 UNCTAD, ‘Universal Access to Services’, TD/B/COM.1/EM.30/2, 18 September 44111 2006, p 18. Notes 335

1111 18 Suez Environment, ‘Identity’, online. Available at www.suez-environnement.com/ 2 en/suez-environnement/who-we-are/identity/identity/ (accessed 20 September 3 2007). 19 CEO, ‘WTO and Water. The EU’s Crusade for Corporate Expansion’, 4 Infobrief#3, online. Available at www.corporateeurope.org/water/infobrief3.htm 5 (accessed 26 August 2007). 6 20 ‘GATS – Fact and Fiction’, WTO, p 9, online. Available at www.wto.org/ 7 english/tratop_e/serv_e/gats_factfiction_e.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 8 21 CTS, ‘Environmental Services. Background Note by the Secretariat’, S/C/W/46, 9 6 July 1998. 22 CTS, ‘Communication from the European Communities and their Member States: 1011 Classification Issues in the Environmental Sector’, S/CSC/W/25, 28 September 1 1999. 2 23 WTO, ‘Ministerial Declaration and Doha Work Programme’, WT/MIN01/ 3111 DEC/1, 20 November 2001: para 31, online. Available at www.wto.org/english/ 4 thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 24 EC, ‘GATS 2000: Environmental Services. Proposal from the EC and their 5 Member States to all WTO Members’, online. Available at www.gatswatch. 6 org/requests-offers.html#outgoing (accessed 20 September 2007). 7 25 IUF ‘The GATS Threat to Food and Agriculture’, 2004, p 5, online. Available 8 at www.iufdocuments.org/www/documents/wto/GATS-e.pdf (accessed 20 9 September 2007). 20111 26 EC, ‘Trade in Services. EU and Others Launch “Plurilateral” Process to Boost Doha Services Negotiations’, Brussels, 28 February 2006, online. Available at 1 http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/services/pr280206_en.htm 2 (accessed 20 September 2007). 3 27 Hall, D and Hoedman, O ‘Aquafed – Another Pressure Group for Private Water’, 4 Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU), August 2007, online. 5 Available at www.psiru.org/ (accessed 20 September 2007). 6 28 ‘Bechtel Surrenders in Bolivia Water Revolt Case’, Earthjustice, 19 January 2006, online. Available at www.earthjustice.org/news/press/006/page.jsp?itemID= 7 27533393 (accessed 20 September 2007). 8 29 Permanent Mission of the Republic of Bolivia to the Director General of the 9 WTO, 17 March 2006. Translation on file with author. 30111 30 Bolivian Representative to WTO to Pascal Lamy, WTO Director General, 17 1 March 2006. On file with author. 31 Abel Mamani, speech to Municipal Government of Mexico, 16 March 2006. 2 Translation on file with author. 3 4 5 Case study 7 6 32 Online. Available at www.pppforum.com (accessed 20 September 2007). 7 33 L Halligan, ‘Liam Halligan: The Truth about PFI’, Channel 4, 14 August 2006, 8 online. Available at www.channel4.com/news/articles/dispatches/liam+halligan+ 9 the+truth+about+pfi/158055 (accessed 20 September 2007). 40111 34 Online. Available at www.pppforum.com/projects/ (accessed 20 September 1 2007). 35 Innisfree, ‘Who Are We’, online. Available at www.innisfree.co.uk (accessed 20 2 September 2007). 3 36 Variants include ‘Design, Build and Finance’, where the state continues to operate 44111 the service; and ‘Design, Build and Operate’, where the state finances the project. 336 Notes

1111 37 Halligan, L ‘Liam Halligan: The Truth about PFI’, Channel 4, 14 August 2006, 2 online. Available at www.channel4.com/news/articles/dispatches/liam+halligan+ 3 the+truth+about+pfi/158055 (accessed 20 September 2007). 38 Pike, A and Timmins, N ‘New Scheme to Speed Up Projects’, Financial Times, 4 17 July 1997, p 1. 5 39 UK House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, ‘Update on PFI debt 6 refinancing and the PFI equity market’, HC 158, 15 May 2007, p 14, online. 7 Available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmpubacc.htm (accessed 20 8 September 2007). 40 UK National Audit Office, ‘Update on PFI Debt Refinancing and the PFI Equity 9 Market’, 21 March 2006, pp 3–6. 1011 41 UK Select Committee on Public Accounts, ‘The Refinancing of the Norfolk and 1 Norwich PFI Hospital: How the Deal can be Viewed in the Light of the 2 Refinancing’, HC 78, Session 2005–06, online. Available at www.publications. 3 parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmpubacc/694/69403.htm (accessed 10 4 September 2007). 42 ‘Single Market Infrastructure Fund. Case Studies’, online. Available at www.smif. 5 com/public/studies.html (accessed 20 September 2007). 6 43 ‘Full Business Case for Redevelopment of University College, Middlesex Hospital 7 and Associated Hospitals’, 14 August 2000 [University College London NHS 8 Trust], section 10. On file with author. 9 44 Online. Available at www.ppiaf.org (accessed 20 September 2007). 45 ‘Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006’ 20111 (commonly known as the TUPE Regulations), online. Available at www.dti.gov. 1 uk/employment/trade-union-rights/tupe/page16289.html (accessed 20 September 2 2007). 3 46 Kitchen, F, Xaba, M and others, ‘Public Public Partnerships’, Knowledge Sharing 4 Partnership (KSP) Newsletter 14 of 2003, online. Available at www.ksp.org.za/ 5 holonl15.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 6 7 Case study 8 8 47 Transparency International, ‘2006 Corruption Perceptions Index’, online. 9 Available at www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2006/cpi_2006__1 30111 (accessed 20 September 2007). 48 Republic of the Philippines, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines 1987. 1 49 Tanada et al. v Angara et al., GR No 118295, 2 May 1997, 272 SCRA 18, per 2 Panganiban J, p 34. 3 50 Ibid., pp 71–2. 4 51 An initial wave of privatisations involved assets sequestered from Marcos and 5 his cronies. 6 52 Padilla, A ‘Masinloc Fiasco Exposes Pitfalls of Privatization’, VI(22) Bulatlat , online. Available at www.bulatlat.com/news/6-22/6-22-fiasco.htm (accessed 20 7 September 2007). 8 53 See also Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Selda and Bayan v Gloria Macagapal-Arroyo, 9 et al, ‘Charge Two: General and specific allegations of gross and systematic 40111 violations of economic, social and cultural rights’, Indictment for the Permanent 1 People’s Tribunal Second Session on the Philippines, 21–25 March 2007. 54 Nemenzo, AM ‘IPPs in the Philippines: A Case of Public “Bailout” of Private 2 Power Corporations’, 17 September 2006, online. Available at www. 3 freedomfromdebtcoalition.org/fdc_old/main/pages/bailout23.php (accessed 20 44111 September 2007). Notes 337

1111 55 That position may have reflected the sensitivities of their Geneva based officials, 2 rather than the Manila government. 3 56 EC, ‘GATS 2000: Environmental Services. EC Request to the Philippines’; ‘GATS 2000: Energy Services. EC Request to the Philippines’, both online. Available 4 at www.gatswatch.org/docs/offreq/EUrequests/Philippines.pdf (accessed 20 5 September 2007). 6 57 Interview by author with official from the Delegation of the Republic of 7 Philippines, Geneva, 26 June 2007. 8 58 ‘Individual Action Plan Update for Philippines for 2006’, online. Available at www.apec-iap.org/document/RP_2006_IAP.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 9 59 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services, online. Available at www. 1011 aseansec.org/6628.htm (accessed 20 September 2007); ‘Philippines Schedule of 1 Specific Commitments’, Annexes to the Protocol to Implement the Fifth Package 2 of Commitments under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services, Cebu, 3111 Philippines, 8 December 2006, online. Available at www.aseansec.org/19353.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 4 60 Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between the 5 Association of South East Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China 6 2002, online. Available at www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=2488 7 (accessed 20 September 2007). 8 61 Framework for Comprehensive Economic Partnership Between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Japan 2003, online. Available at www.aseansec. 9 org/15275.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 20111 62 Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the 1 Republic of India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 2003, online. 2 Available at www.aseansec.org/15278.htm (accessed 20 September 2003). 3 63 Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement between the United States of America and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 2006, online. Available 4 at www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=5771 (accessed 20 September 5 2007). 6 64 ‘JPEPA – Joint Statement of the Leaders of Japan and the Philippines’, online. 7 Available at www.business.gov.ph/DTI_News.php?contentID=136 (accessed 20 8 September 2007). 65 ‘The Japan–Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA): Surrendering 9 Sovereignty and Development’, IBON Facts & Figures, 31 July 2007, online. 30111 Available at www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=9221 (accessed 20 1 September 2007). 2 66 Quintos, P ‘Analysis: The ABC Behind a US–Philippines FTA’, Bulatlat.com, 3 19–25 October 2003, online. Available at www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_ article=10 (accessed 20 September 2007). 4 67 USTR, ‘2007 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers: 5 Philippines’, online. Available at www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_ 6 Publications/2007/2007_NTE_Report/Section_Index.html (accessed 20 7 September 2007). 8 68 ‘Amendments to the 1987 Constitution as Proposed by the House Committee on Constitutional Amendments’, (undated). On file with author. 9 40111 5 Ruling the services infrastructure 1 1 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from Thailand. Assessment of Trade in Services’, 2 22 July 2002, TN/S/W/4, p 16. 3 2 Ibid., p 19. 44111 3 Interview with author, Washington DC, 3 May 2005. 338 Notes

1111 4 Ibid. 2 5 OECD, ‘GATT: Financial Services Discussions’, WH Witherell to R Ley, 12 3 June 1990. On file with author. 6 WTO, ‘Results of the Basic Telecommunication Negotiations’, online. Available 4 at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_results_e.htm 5 (accessed 20 September 2007). 6 7 Non-facilities-based services are where a service supplier does not own 7 transmission capacity but contracts for that capacity from a facilities-based supplier. 8 8 WTO, ‘Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services’, online. 9 Available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds204_e.htm 1011 (accessed 20 September 2007). 1 9 Washington Trade Daily 14(160), 15 August 2005. 2 10 United States, ‘Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda’, WT/DS285, 1 3 October 2003, para 11. 4 11 Personal observations of author. 5 12 WTO General Council, ‘Work Programme on Electronic Commerce’, WT/L/274, 6 30 September 1998. 7 13 Working Party on Electronic Commerce (WPEC), ‘Submission by United States’, WT/GC/16, 12 February 1999. 8 14 WPEC, ‘Communication from the European Communities and their Member 9 States’, WT/GC/W/306, 9 August 1999. 20111 15 WTO General Council, ‘WTO Agreements and Electronic Commerce’, 1 WT/GC/W/90, 14 July 1998; CTS, ‘The Work Programme on Electronic 2 Commerce. Note by the Secretariat’, S/C/W/68, 16 November 1998. 16 WPEC, ‘Progress Report to the General Council’, S/L/74, 27 July 1999. 3 17 WTO, ‘Coverage of Basic Telecommunications and Value-added Services’, online. 4 Available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/telecom_e/telecom_coverage_ 5 e.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 6 18 P Hall (2006) China and the Internet, LLM research paper, Faculty of Law: 7 University of Auckland, New Zealand. 19 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from United States, Market Access in Telecom- 8 munications and Complementary Services: the WTO’s Role in Accelerating the 9 Development of a Globally Networked Economy’, S/CSS/W/30, 18 December 30111 2000. 1 20 CTS, ‘Communication from the European Communities Electronic Commerce 2 Work Programme’, S/C/W/183, 30 November 2000. 21 CTS, ‘Communication from the United States. Telecommunications services’, 3 S/C/W/91, 16 December 1998; CTS.SS, ‘Communication from the United States. 4 Market access in telecommunications and complementary services: the WTO’s 5 role in accelerating the Development of a Globally Networked Economy’, 6 S/CSS/W/30, 18 December 2000. 7 22 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from the European Communities. Classification in the Telecom Sector under the WTO-GATS Framework’, S/CSC/W/44, 10 February 8 2005. 9 23 EC, ‘EC Revised GATS Offer’, undated. On file with author. 40111 24 GATS Council-Special Session, ‘Communication from the EC and their Member 1 States, GATS 2000: Telecommunications Services’, S/CSS/W/35, 22 December 2000. 2 25 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from the United States. Classification in the 3 Telecommunications Sector under the WTO-GATS Framework’, S/CSC/W/45, 44111 22 February 2005. Notes 339

1111 26 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from Mexico. Telecommunications Services’, S/CSS/ 2 W/101, 10 July 2001. 3 27 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from Cuba. Negotiating Proposal on Telecommunications Services’, TN/S/W/2, 30 May 2002. 4 28 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from Switzerland. E-banking in Switzerland’, S/CSS/ 5 W/71, 4 May 2001; Committee on Trade in Financial Services, ‘Communication 6 from Switzerland. E-banking in Switzerland’, S/FIN/W/26, 30 April 2003. 7 29 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from the EC and their Member States, GATS 2000: 8 Financial Services’, November 2000. 30 ‘Collective request for Telecommunications Services’, 17 February 2006. On file 9 with author. 1011 31 ‘Financial Services Collective Request’, undated. On file with author. Switzerland 1 apparently did not join because the request was not sufficiently ambitious. 2 3111 Case study 9 4 32 WTO, ‘United States of America. Schedule of Specific Commitments’, GATS/SC/ 5 90, 15 April 1994. 6 33 UN Statistics Division, ‘CPCprov’, online. Available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ 7 cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=9&hg=1 (accessed 20 September 2007). 8 34 GNS, ‘Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services: Explanatory 9 Note’, MTN.GNS/W/164, 3 September 1993, p 3. 35 Even without Article XVI, Antigua could have invoked Article XXIII to say the 20111 ban nullified and impaired a benefit it reasonably expected to accrue from the 1 US commitments. 2 36 WTO, ‘United States; Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling 3 and Betting Services, First Submission of Antigua and Barbuda’, WT/DS285, 1 4 October 2003, paras 11, 30–7. 5 37 ‘Online Gambling – Gaming Stocks Crash on AIM, PLCs to pursue the case with the WTO’, The Online Wire, 2 October 2006, online. Available at www. 6 theonlinewire.com/articleView.aspx?ID=1600 (accessed 20 September 2007). 7 38 ‘US Ban on Web Gambling Breaks Global Trade Pacts, Says WTO’, Wall Street 8 Journal, 25 March 2004, online. Available at www.antiguawto.com/WTO 9 ArticlesPg.html (accessed 20 September 2007). 30111 39 The Wire Act 18 USC §1084; the Travel Act 18 U.S.C. §1952; the Illegal Gambling Business Act18 U.S.C. §1955. 1 40 ‘Communication from the Chief Legal Officers of the States of Arizona and 28 2 Other States to Hon Rob Portman, Ambassador, United States Trade 3 Representative’, 31 May 2005. On file with author. 4 41 Interactive Gaming Council, ‘Congress Passes a Ban that Targets Payments, but 5 Fails to Protect the Players’, online. Available at www.igcouncil.org/press. 6 php?id=382 (accessed 27 October 2006). 42 ‘Britain Criticizes US Online Bet Ban’, CBS News, 27 October 2006, online. 7 Available at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/27/ap/world/mainD8L12R9O4. 8 shtml (accessed 31 October 2006). 9 43 ‘Antigua Seeks EU Support on WTO Case Against US Online Gambling Laws’, 40111 11 February 2007, PokerPages.com, online. Available at www.pokerpages.com/ 1 poker-news/news/antigua-seeks-eu-support-on-wto-case-against-us-online- gambling-laws—29524.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 2 44 ‘Online Gaming Firms Consider Legal Challenge to US Ban’, Guardian Unlimited, 3 6 October 2006, online. Available at http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/ 44111 0,,1888721,00.html (accessed 20 September 2007). 340 Notes

1111 45 Ecuador was granted the right to withdraw commitments to the EU on 2 intellectual property rights in its dispute over bananas, but never actually did 3 so (ICTSD, 2007). 46 ‘Statement of Deputy United States Trade Representative John K. Veroneau 4 Regarding US Actions under GATS Article XXI’, 4 May 2007, online. Available 5 at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2007/May/Statement_ 6 of_Deputy_United_States_Trade_Representative_John_K_Veroneau_Regarding_ 7 US_Actions_under_GATS_Article_XXI.html (accessed 20 September 2007). 8 47 ‘US faces Seven Compensation Claims in WTO Online Gambling Case’, RGT online, 25 June 2007, online. Available at www.rgtonline.com/Article.cfm? 9 ArticleId=73519&CategoryName=Headline&SubCategoryName=News 1011 (accessed 20 September 2007). 1 48 ‘Antigua Wins Modest Sanctions in US Gambling Case’, Reuters, 21 December 2 2007, online. Available at www.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUSL21601 3 57420071221?sp=true (accessed 23 December 2007). 49 ‘EU Raises Doubts over Trade Deal’, Financial Times, 24 December 2007, online. 4 Available at www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22381096 (accessed 27 December 2007). 5 6 Case study 10 7 50 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from the EC and their Member States, GATS 2000: 8 Financial Services’, November 2000. 9 51 WTO, ‘Communication from Australia [and 11 others]. Liberalization of 20111 Financial Services’, S/FIN/W/43, 8 June 2005; ‘Financial Services Collective 1 Request’ (undated). On file with author. 2 52 Erhardt, JW, LaBombarde, AR and Morgan, P ‘The Return to Full Funding – Almost’, Milliman Inc., 2007, online. Available at www.milliman.com/expertise/ 3 employee-benefits/products-tools/pension-funding-study/index.php (accessed 20 4 September 2007). 5 53 US Social Security, ‘International Update. Recent Developments in Foreign Public 6 and Private Pensions’, April 2007, pp 1–2, online. Available at http://www. 7 ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/intl_update/2007-04/2007-04.pdf (accessed 20 September 2007). 8 54 This was repackaged in 2002 as the State Second Pension. 9 30111 6 Trade in people 1 1 ‘Maids Plan WTO Show of Strength’, The Standard, 27 September 2005, online. 2 Available at www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail.asp?pp_cat=11&art_id= 3 2157&sid=4733918&con_type=1 (accessed 20 September 2007). 4 2 ‘Blackbirding’ is a term applied to the historical practice of enticing indigenous 5 labourers to work in Australia and Fiji sugar plantations, often by trickery or 6 as indentured labourers. 3 CTS, ‘Presence of Natural Persons (Mode 4)’, note by the WTO Secretariat, 7 S/C/W/75, 8 December 1998, pp 12–16. 8 4 WTO, ‘Movement of Natural Persons’, online. Available at www.wto.org/english/ 9 tratop_e/serv_e/mouvement_persons_e/mouvement_persons_e.htm (accessed 20 40111 September 2007). 1 5 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from India. Proposed Liberalisation of Movement of Professionals under General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)’, S/CSS/ 2 W/12, 24 November 2000. 3 6 James, F Sensenbrenner Jr to Hon Peter Allgeier, 3 March 2005. On file with 44111 author; Sen Dianne Feinstein to Hon Robert Portman, 5 December 2005, online. Notes 341

1111 Available at http://Feinstein.senate.gov/05releases/r-mode-portman.htm (accessed 2 20 September 2007). 3 7 ‘WTO Services Council. Members Find Services Offers Disappointing’, Bridges Trade Weekly 8:13, 8 April 2004, online. Available at www.ictsd.org/weekly/ 4 04-04-08/story3.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 5 8 ‘Collective Request. Mode 4 – Movement of Natural Persons’, undated. On file 6 with author. 7 9 ‘Collective Request. Cross-border Supply’, undated. On file with author. 8 10 ‘Pelosi, Hoyer, Rangel and Levin Statement on Trade’, 29 June 2007. On file with author. 9 11 Statement by AFL-CIO President John Sweeney on Passage of the Peru Free 1011 Trade Agreement, 8 November 2007. On file with author. 1 2 Case study 11 3111 4 12 World Wide Words online. Available at www.worldwidewords.org/ turnsofphrase/tp-ban1.htm (accessed 10 September 2007). 5 13 Online. Available at www.accenture.com (accessed 20 September 2007). 6 14 Online. Available at www.convergys.com (accessed 20 September 2007). 7 15 Online. Available at www.wipro.com (accessed 20 September 2007). 8 16 Online. Available at www.infosys.com (accessed 20 September 2007). 9 17 Karnataka Udyog Mitra, ‘The Millennium BPO Policy 2002’, online. Available at www.kumbangalore.com/Htmlpages/policy/161/index.htm (accessed 20 20111 September 2007). 1 18 Quoted in ‘Partnership Shibboleths’, Down To Earth, 15 February 2006, p 41. 2 19 ‘Real Trends: The Boom Continues’, India Times Real Estate, undated, online. 3 Available at http://realestate.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1482456.cms (accessed 4 20 September 2007). 20 Quoted in ‘Virtual Realty’, Down To Earth, 15 February 2006, p 44. 5 21 ‘A Blocked Circuit Called Bangalore’, Down to Earth, 15 February 2006, p 39. 6 22 Karnataka Udyog Mitra, ‘The Millennium BPO Policy 2002’, online. Available 7 at www.kumbangalore.com/Htmlpages/policy/161/index.htm (accessed 20 8 September 2007). 9 23 National Commission for Women, ‘Report on Interaction and Consultation on the Issue of Protection to the Women Employees of the Call Centres, held on 30111 17 January 2006 in Banglore’, online. Available at ncw.nic.in/Document%20in 1 %20BPO%20Guidelines.pdf (accessed 20 September 2007). 2 24 Quoted in ‘No one saves for a rainy day now’, TimesonLine, 4 February 2004, 3 online. Available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/article 4 1010410.ece (accessed 20 September 2007). 25 The term ‘Zippies’ denotes young people who walk with a ‘zip in their step’. 5 6 7 Case study 12 8 26 ‘HK Domestic Workers Score Partial Victory with HK$50 Wage Hike; Wage 9 Hike for OFWs Also Needed in Other Countries – Migrante’, press release, 19 40111 May 2005, online. Available at www.migrante.org/sttmt.html (accessed 20 June 1 2006). 27 Around 120,000 Fijian Indians are believed to have migrated from the country 2 since the first coup in 1987. The third coup was expected to exacerbate the 3 situation. 44111 28 Government of Fiji, ‘Services Negotiating Strategy’. On file with author. 342 Notes

1111 29 Following the 2006 coup Fiji was suspended from the New Zealand Seasonal 2 Workers Scheme that allowed temporary entry to 5,000 seasonal workers from 3 the Pacific Islands. 30 Pareti, S ‘Fiji Rakes in $m from Overseas Jobs’, Islands Business, undated, online. 4 Available at www.islandsbusiness.com (accessed 20 June 2006). 5 31 ‘National Export Design Strategy: Labour Mobility Sectoral Group, Nursing 6 Industry’ (undated). On file with author. 7 32 Interview by author with an official from the Fiji Ministry of Labour, May 8 2006. 33 AcornHealthLink, Individual Employment Agreement 2006. On file with author. 9 34 ‘National Export Design Strategy: Labour Mobility Sectoral Group, Nursing 1011 Industry’ (undated). On file with author. 1 35 Keenan, E ‘Idle Hands for Export’, Time South Pacific, 1 February 2005, online. 2 Available at www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1023453-1,00.html 3 (accessed 7 August 2007). 4 36 An British ex-SAS officer could reportedly command $1,000 a day in 2003. I Traynor, ‘The Privatisation of War’, The Guardian International, 10 December 5 2003, online. Available at www.endwar.net/theprivatisationofwar.htm (accessed 6 20 August 2006). 7 37 Keenan, E ‘Idle Hands for Export’, Time South Pacific, 1 February 2005, online. 8 Available at www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1023453-1,00.html 9 (accessed 7 August 2007). 38 Global Risk, ‘Supply of Services (Self-Employed/Independent Contractor) 20111 Agreement’, May 2006. On file with author. 1 39 ‘Who’s Who in the Kuwait Affair’, Islands Business, online. Available at 2 www.islandsbusiness.com/archives/islands_business/index_dynamic/container 3 NameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/focusModuleID=4699/overideSkinName=issue 4 Article-full.tpl (accessed 20 September 2007). 5 40 ‘Fijian Lad Dies in Iraq’, 11 July 2007, online. Available at www.fijitimes. com/story.aspx?id=66053 (accessed 20 September 2007). 6 41 Keenan, E ‘Idle Hands for Export’, Time South Pacific, 1 February 2005, online. 7 Available at www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1023453-1,00.html 8 (accessed 7 August 2007). 9 42 Pareti, S ‘Human Labour; Lucrative Export: Fiji rakes in $m from overseas jobs’, 30111 Islands Business (undated), online. Available at www.islandsbusiness.com/ islands_business/index_dynamic/containerNameToReplace=MiddleMiddle/focus 1 ModuleID=4977/overideSkinName=issueArticle-full.tpl (accessed 10 August 2 2007). 3 43 ‘Who’s Who in the Kuwait Affair’, Islands Business, online. Available at www. 4 islandsbusiness.com/archives/islands_business/index_dynamic/containerNameTo 5 Replace=MiddleMiddle/focusModuleID=4699/overideSkinName=issueArticle- 6 full.tpl (accessed 20 September 2007). 44 Fiji Sun editorial, 10 June 2006, quoted in Gaglioti, F ‘Fiji’s economic conscripts: 7 tragic victims of the war in Iraq’, Asian Tribune, 24 June 2006, online. Available 8 at www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/724/print (accessed 6 August 2007). 9 45 ‘Fiji Rules Out Compo to Families of Killed in Iraq’, Radio New Zealand 40111 International, 21 April 2006. On file with author. 1 46 ‘Four Fiji Nationals Killed in Iraq’, Fiji Times online, 21 April 2006; see also ‘Mother Laments Son’s Death in Iraq’, Fiji Times, 14 June 2006. On file with 2 author. 3 47 ‘UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries Concludes Visit to Fiji’, statement 44111 issued in Suva, Fiji on 18 May 2007. On file with author. Notes 343

1111 7 Minds and markets 2 1 The term was coined in a published by the conservative Washington-based Cato 3 Institute (Lips, 2000). 4 2 GH Yang, ‘Why UNESCO Should Adopt a Convention on Cultural Diversity’, International Liaison Committee of Coalitions for Cultural Diversity, online. 5 Available at www.coalitionfrancaise.org/actus/doc/yang.pdf (accessed 10 August 6 2007). 7 3 UNESCO World Declaration on Higher Education for the Twenty-First Century: 8 Vision and Action, online. Available at www.unesco.org/education/educprog/ 9 wche/declaration_eng.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 4 J Nicholls ‘Multilateral Financial Agencies, Globalisation and Education Policy: 1011 Potential and Limitations’, paper prepared for Conference on Academic Freedom 1 in the Asia Pacific Region, Melbourne, November 2003. On file with author. 2 5 ‘Tertiary Education and Economic Growth: The Bank Strategy’, Brazil HD Team 3111 Seminar, 7 February 2006, online. Available at siteresources.worldbank. org/../547664-1099079956815/547670-1128086743752/brazil_strategy_feb06. 4 ppt (accessed 20 September 2007). 5 6 Tuckman, J ‘Mexico: Film Studio Sell Off’, Guardian (London), 14 November 6 2003. online. Available at www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=9072&printsafe=1 7 (accessed 20 September 2007). 8 7 Hecht, J ‘Mexican Film Production’, Hollywood Reporter, 19 September 2006, online. Available at www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/content_display/ 9 international/features/e3iCAGp1f%2FrC6q3HUNUzcEORQ%3D%3D 20111 (accessed 20 September 2007). 1 8 WTO, ‘Audiovisual Services. Background note by the Secretariat’, S/C/W/40, 2 15 June 1998, pp 7–8. 3 9 Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] 194 CLR 355. For the Australian response see Dalton, K ‘Speech to SPADA New Zealand 4 Conference’, 23 November 2003, online. Available at www.afc.gov.au/ 5 downloads/speeches/spada_nz_speech.pdf (accessed 20 September 2007). 6 10 New Zealand Herald, 10 April 2000. On file with author. 7 11 New Zealand Labour Party, Broadcasting Policy 2002. On file with author. 12 USTR, ‘Trade Summary on New Zealand’, online. Available at www.ustr.gov/ 8 assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/ 2005/2005_NTE_Report/asset_ 9 upload_file435_7485.pdf (accessed 20 September 2007). 30111 13 Bernier notes that the US complaint against Turkey on taxation of foreign film 1 revenues in 1996 was based on Article III of the GATT (Turkey – Taxation of 2 Foreign Film Revenues) Doc. WT/DS43 (1996)), but the EC complaint against Canada on Measures affecting film distribution services in 1998 was based on 3 Articles II and III of the GATS: Canada – Measures Affecting Film Distribution 4 Services, WT/DS117/1 (1998). The complaint was dropped a few months later 5 when the company at the origin of the case, Polygram, was bought by a Canadian 6 company (Bernier, 2005, p 768, fn 99). 7 14 ‘Canada and United States Sign Agreement on Periodicals’, 4 June 1999, online. Available at http://w01.international.gc.ca/MinPub/PublicationContentOnly.asp? 8 publication_id=375611&Language=E&MODE=CONTENTONLY&Local= 9 False (accessed 20 September 2007). 40111 15 WTO, ‘Education Services. Background note by the Secretariat’, S/C/W/49, 23 1 September 1998, pp 8–9. 16 European Regional Ministers for Culture and Education, Brixen/Bressanone 2 Declaration on Cultural Diversity and GATS, 18 October 2002, online. 3 Available at www.urfig.org/gats-aer-brixen-bressanone-pt.htm (accessed 4 August 44111 2007). 344 Notes

1111 17 Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, American Council on 2 Education, European University Association, Council for Higher Education 3 Accreditation, Joint Declaration on Higher Education and the General Agreement on Trade in Services, 28 September 2001, online. Available at www.aucc.ca/ 4 _pdf/english/statements/2001/gats_10_25_e.pdf (accessed 4 August 2007). 5 18 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from Japan. Negotiating Proposal for Education 6 Services’, S/CSS/W/137, 15 March 2002. 7 19 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from Switzerland. Education Services and the GATS: 8 The Experience of Switzerland’, TN/S/W39, 4 April 2005. 20 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from US. Higher (Tertiary) Education, Adult 9 Education, and Training’, S/CSS/W/23, 18 December 2000. 1011 21 See D Hirsch, ‘OECD/US Forum on Trade in Educational Services, Washington 1 DC, USA, 23–24 May 2003, Report by Rapporteur’, online. Available at 2 www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/62/1935330.pdf (accessed 10 August 2007). 3 22 NZMFAT (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade), ‘WTO: DDA: GATS Negotiations: New Zealand’s Position on the Discussion of 4 “Complementary Approaches” to the Negotiating Modalities’, undated. On file 5 with author. 6 23 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from New Zealand. Negotiating Proposal for 7 Education Services’, S/CSS/W/93, 26 June 2001; CTS.SS, ‘Communication from 8 Australia. Negotiating Proposal for Education Services’, S/CSS/W/110, 1 October 2001. 9 24 NZMFAT, ‘Services: Elements of Hong Kong Ministerial Text’, WTO/DDA/ 20111 SRVS, 20 October 2005. On file with author. 1 25 NZMFAT, ‘WTO: GATS: Education Services Negotiations’, WTO/GATS/1, 19 2 October 2005. On file with author. 3 26 Trade Observatory, ‘Private Education Services’, undated, online. Available at www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refid=78798 (accessed 20 September 4 2007). 5 27 ‘South Africa Shuns GATS’, Business Day, 7 October 2003, online. Available 6 at www.wes.org/ewenr/03Nov/Africa.htm (accessed 27 August 2007). 7 28 CTS, ‘Communication from the United States. Audiovisual Services’, S/C/W/78 8 8 December 1998; CTS.SS ‘Communication from the United States. Audiovisual and Related Services’, S/CSS/W/21, 18 December 2000. 9 29 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from the United States. Audiovisual and Related 30111 Services’, S/CSS/W/21, 18 December 2000. 1 30 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from Switzerland: GATS 2000 Audiovisual Services’, 2 S/CSS/W/74, 4 May 2001. 31 ‘Plurilateral Request for Audiovisual Services’, undated. On file with author. 3 32 This requires EU broadcasters to reserve a majority of transmission time for 4 ‘European Works’, Council Directive 89/552/EEC, Art 4, 1989 OJ (L 298) 23, 5 amended by Parliament and Council Directive 97/36/EC, 1997 OJ (L 202) 60. 6 33 ‘The Long Arm of Bentonville, Ark’, BusinessWeek, 6 October 2003, pp 50–1. 7 34 ‘Comments With Respect to Doha Multilateral Negotiations and Agenda in the World Trade Organisation’, Wal-Mart to USTR, 1 May 2002. On file with 8 author. 9 35 ‘Statement of Regina K Vargo, Assistant US Trade Representative for the 40111 Americas, Senate Committee on the Judiciary’, 14 July 2003, online. Available 1 at www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/USTR_Deputy_Testimony/2003/ 2 asset_upload_file803_6641.pdf (accessed 10 August 2007). 36 Australia Coalition for Cultural Diversity, ‘Australia-United States Free Trade 3 Agreement Briefing: Cultural Services & Trade’, undated, online. Available at 44111 www.awg.com.au/artman/uploads/fta_briefing2.pdf (accessed 1 August 2007). Notes 345

1111 37 ‘US and Australia Complete Free Trade Agreement’, press release, US Trade 2 Representative, 2 August 2004, online. Available at www.ustr.gov/Document_ Library/Press_Releases/2004/February/US_Australia_Complete_Free_Trade_Agre 3 ement.html (accessed 20 September 2007). 4 38 Singapore Australia Free Trade Agreement, online. Available at www.dfat.gov.au/ 5 trade/negotiations/safta/index.html (accessed 20 September 2007). 6 39 INCD (International Network for Cultural Diversity), ‘Submission from INCD 7 to Office of the USTR, Re: Proposed Free Trade Agreement with Republic of Korea’, 24 March 2006. On file with author. 8 40 Korean Coalition for Cultural Diversity, ‘Recommendation to the Minister of 9 Culture and Tourism, Korea’, 30 June 2002. On file with author. 1011 1 Case study 13 2 41 Melbourne University Private, ‘About Us’, online. Available at www.muprivate. 3111 edu.au/index.php?id=53 (accessed 12 May 2006). See also Annual Report 2003, 4 online. Available at www.muprivate.edu.au/index.php?id=1320 (accessed 12 5 May 2006). 42 ‘Merger Spells End of Melbourne Uni Private’, The Age, 8 June 2005, online. 6 Available at www.theage.com.au/articles/2005/06/08/1118123845353.html? 7 from=top5&oneclick=true (accessed 20 September 2007). 8 43 University of Glasgow, ‘Court: Minutes of the meeting held in the Senate Room 9 on Wednesday 7 May 2003’, online. Available at www.gla.ac.uk/courtoffice/ 20111 courtminutes/7may2003.htm (accessed 21 August 2007). 44 U21Global Programmes, online. Available at www.u21global.com/Education/ 1 Programmes (accessed 7 August 2007). 2 45 U21Global , ‘Joint Venture Business Plan’, 15 December 2000, p 56. On file 3 with author. 4 46 Zivojinovic, A ‘Terra Incognita: Can U21 Global Make a Business out of Online MBAs?’, Canadian Business, 2005, online. Available at www.canadianbusiness. 5 com/managing/education/article.jsp?content=20060108_152221_628 (accessed 6 9 August 2007). 7 47 University of Melbourne, ‘Universitas 21 Global Pte Ltd Due Diligence 8 Committee, Report to Council (Meeting of 14 November 2005)’, Council 9 Meeting 10/05, Council Minutes, online. Available at www.unimelb.edu.au/ Council/minutes/nov05.html (accessed 21 August 2007). 30111 48 ‘Jones International Transfers Global Accrediting Body to the United States 1 Distance Learning Association’, 12 August 2003, online. Available at www. 2 jones.com/gate/ (accessed 7 August 2007). 3 49 IFC, ‘EdInvest’, online. Available at www.ifc.org/edinvest/ (accessed 20 September 2007). 4 50 ‘The Observatory on Borderless Higher Education’, online. Available at 5 www.obhe.ac.uk (accessed 20 September 2007). 6 51 ‘Class Notes’, T.H.E. Journal online, online. Available at http://institute. 7 thejournal.com/classnotes/ (accessed 17 August 2007). 8 52 TA Urdan and JS Lee, ‘Education Services. Class Notes: Weekly Insights on the Education Market’, Robert W. Baird & Co. Incorporated, 2006, online. 9 Available at http://institute.thejournal.com/classnotes/newsletters/CN011706.pdf 40111 (accessed 4 August 2007). 1 53 For example, International Education Finance Corporation, online. Available 2 at www.iefc.com/ (accessed 6 August 2007). 54 ‘Moodies Cuts Sally Mae’s Debt, May Cut Again’, Reuters, 14 August 2007, 3 online. Available at www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/idUSN1493337200 44111 70814 (accessed 30 August 2007). 346 Notes

1111 Case study 14 2 55 ‘French Threat to Talks on Investment Rules’, 15 October 1998, European 3 Voice.com, online. Available at www.europeanvoice.com/archive/article.asp?id 4 =7536 (accessed 20 September 2007). 56 Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade, New 5 Strategies for Culture and Trade in a Global World, February 1999, p 13. online. 6 Available at www.international.gc.ca/tna-nac/canculture-en.asp (accessed 4 7 August 2007). 8 57 ‘Discussion Paper for Ministerial Consideration: International Responses to the 9 Challenges Facing Cultural Diversity’, Working Group on Cultural Diversity and Globalization, online. Available at www.incp-ripc.org/w-group/wg-cdg/ 1011 reader/consideration_e.shtml (accessed 6 August 2007). 1 58 INCP, ‘An International Instrument on Cultural Diversity By the Working Group 2 on Cultural Diversity and Globalization of the International Network on Cultural 3 Policy’, online. Available at www.incp-ripc.org/meetings/2002/instrument_e. 4 shtml (accessed 20 September 2007). 59 INCD, ‘Proposed Convention on Cultural Diversity’, online. Available at 5 www.incd.net/docs/CCDJan2003Final.pdf (accessed 6 August 2007). 6 60 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, online. Available at 7 www.unesco.ru/files/docs/unesco_universal_declaration_on_cultural_diversity_en 8 g.pdf (accessed 20 September 2007). 9 61 UNESCO, ‘Intergovernmental meeting of experts on the preliminary draft Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic 20111 Expressions’, CLT/PD/2004/CONF.201/5, July 2004. 1 62 ‘Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural 2 Contents and Artistic Expressions’, CLT/CPD/2004/CONF-201/2, July 2004. 3 63 WTO General Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting, 20 October 2004’, WT/GC/M/88, 4 11 November 2004, paras 64–85. 64 ‘Preliminary Report of the Director-General Containing Two Preliminary Drafts 5 of a Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and 6 Artistic Expressions’, CLT/CPD/2005/CONF.203/6, 3 March 2005. 7 65 Online. Available at unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf 8 (accessed 20 September 2007). 9 66 Wilczynski, A ‘Oral report of the Rapporteur, Mr Artur Wilczynski’, at the Closing of the Third Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts on 30111 the Draft Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of 1 Cultural Expressions’, UNESCO, May–June 2004, Paris. 2 67 Martin, RS ‘Final Statement of the US Delegation. Draft Convention on Cultural 3 Diversity “Deeply Flawed”, US Says’, Department of State, online. Available at 4 http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english &y=2005&m=June&x=200506071629501CJsamohT0.2950403 (accessed 7 5 August 2007). 6 68 WTO, ‘Canada – Measures Affecting Film Distribution Services’, WT/DS117/1, 7 22 January 1998. 8 69 INCD, ‘INCD Position on New UNESCO Treaty’, online. Available at www. 9 incd.net/docs/INCDPosition.htm (accessed 6 August 07). 40111 1 8 Dominion over the earth 2 1 Similar issues arose in Canada-Periodicals, 1996, discussed in Chapter 7. 3 2 WTO, ‘Trade Policy Review: Solomon Islands’, WT/TPR/M/45/Add.1*, 18 44111 February 1999, paras 8 and 49. Notes 347

1111 3 Ibid., para 19. 2 4 ‘GATS 2000. Request from the EC and its Member States to the Solomon Islands’, 3 undated, online. Available at www.gatswatch.org/docs/offreq/EUrequests/ SolomonIslands.pdf (accessed 20 September 2007). 4 5 Friends of the Earth International and International Forum on Globalization, 5 ‘WTO’s 2004 “July Package”. NAMA: Threat to Global Environment or Achilles’ 6 Heel of the Doha Round?’, press Release, July 2004. On file with author. 7 6 As noted in Chapter 1, GATS footnote 9 says this does not extend to ‘inputs’; 8 however, there is no sharp boundary between inputs and elements of services supply. 9 7 Every Wal-Mart store manager is issued with ‘A Manager’s Toolbox to 1011 Remaining Union Free’, online. Available at reclaimdemocracy.org/walmart/ 1 manuals_internal_documents.php (accessed 20 September 2007). 2 8 ‘GlobalGAP’, online. Available at www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php? 3111 idart=3&idcat=9&lang=1 (accessed 20 September 2007). 9 Shiva, V ‘Letter on Monsanto’, The Hindu, 1 May 1999, online. Available at 4 http://web.greens.org/s-r/gga/shiva.html (accessed 9 August 2007). 5 10 Plurilateral requests for Mode 3, Distribution Services, Air Transport Services, 6 Logistics, and Maritime Services. On file with the author. 7 8 Case study 15 9 11 Spinex Resources, ‘World Top 100 Retailers Analysed by Country 2005’, online. 20111 Available at www.spinexresources.com/retailing.htm (accessed 9 August 2007). 1 12 Fortune 500, ‘Annual Ranking of America’s Largest Corporations’, online. Available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2007/full_list/ 2 (accessed 20 September 2007). 3 13 Quoted in ‘The Long Arm of Bentonville, Ark’, BusinessWeek, 6 October 2003, 4 pp 48–9. 5 14 CTS, ‘Distribution Services. Background note by the Secretariat’, S/C/W/37, 10 6 June 1998, Table 6. 15 Kearney, AT ‘Growth Opportunities for Global Retailers. The AT Kearney 2007 7 Global Retail Development Index’, online. Available at www.atkearney. 8 com/main.taf?p=5,3,1,171 (accessed 20 September 2007). 9 16 Kleffman, S ‘Wal-Mart in Petition Drive to Overturn California County Ban 30111 Prohibiting Full-service Grocery Stores in Supersized Retail Centres’, Contra 1 Costa Times, 24 June 2003, online. Available at www.mindfully.org/Industry/ 2003/Wal-Mart-Overturn-Ordinance24jun03.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 2 17 WPDR, ‘Examples of Measures Addressed by Disciplines under GATS Article 3 VI:4’, WTO informal note by the Secretariat JOB(02)/20/Rev.2, 18 October 4 2002. 5 18 ‘Wal-Mart’s Losses in Japan Continue, but Retailer Reaffirms Commitment’, 6 USA Today, 22 August 2006, online. Available at www.usatoday.com/money/ companies/earnings/2006-08-22-wal-mart-japan_x.htm (accessed 20 September 7 2007). 8 19 Naughton, K ‘The Great Wal-Mart of China’, Newsweek, 30 October 2006, 9 online. Available at www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15364026/site/newsweek/ (accessed 40111 12 August 2007). 1 20 Chan, A ‘Made in China: Wal-Mart Union’, YaleGlobal online, online. Available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=8283 (accessed 20 February 2007). 2 21 Howley, K ‘Has Wal-Mart Peaked? The Big Box Global Takeover is Falling 3 Short’, Reasononline, online. Available at www.reason.com/news/show/36762. 44111 html (accessed 6 August 2007). 348 Notes

1111 22 Checkout World Report online. Available at www.checkout.ie/WorldReportlist. 2 asp (accessed 20 September 2007). 3 23 Retail Forward, ‘Wal-Mart Food: Big, and Getting Bigger: Industry report’, cited in Weiner, 2004. 4 24 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from Thailand. Assessment of Trade in Services’, 22 5 July 2002, TN/S/W/4, pp 9–14. 6 25 Ibid., p 12. 7 26 Ibid., p 14. 8 27 Siam Future Development Co Ltd, ‘Superstore: Big Stores Rushing to Get Approvals’, Thai Retail Headline News, 8 December 2002, online. Available at 9 http://www.siamfuture.com/ThaiNews/ThNewsTxt.asp?tid=1437 (accessed 9 1011 August 2007). 1 28 Siam Future Development Co Ltd, ‘Superstore: Outrage as Bill Scrapped’, 2 20 September 2002, online. Available at www.siamfuture.com/ThaiNews/ 3 ThNewsTxt.asp?tid=1404 (accessed 7 February 2007). 29 ‘200 Thai Retailers Protest at Tesco’, NewAge Business, 18 October 2006, online. 4 Available at http://www.newagebd.com/2006/oct/18/busi.html (accessed 12 5 August 2007). 6 7 Case study 16 8 30 UN Environmental Programme, ‘Economic Impacts of Tourism’, online. 9 Available at www.uneptie.org/pc/tourism/sust-tourism/economic.htm (accessed 20111 15 August 2007). 1 31 Online. Available at www.ecpat.net/eng/ecpat_inter/projects/sex_tourism/sex_ 2 tourism.asp. 32 CTS, ‘Tourism Services. Background Note by the Secretariat’, S/C/W/51, 23 3 September 1998, p 8. 4 33 Ibid., p 8. 5 34 ‘Declaration of the International Forum on Indigenous Tourism’, Oaxaca, 18–20 6 March 2002. On file with author. 7 35 Cited in CTS, ‘Tourism Services. Background Note by the Secretariat’, S/C/W/51, 23 September 1998, p 7. 8 36 GNS Working Group on Tourism Services, ‘Classification of Tourism-Related 9 Services. Note by the Secretariat. Revision’, MTN.GNS/TOUR/W/1/Rev.1, 23 30111 October 1990. 1 37 CTS, ‘Tourism Services. Background Note by the Secretariat’, S/C/W/51, 23 2 September 1998, p 13, Table 2. 38 CTS, ‘Communication from the Dominican Republic. Conclusions and 3 Recommendations of the Expert Meeting on Tourism organized by UNCTAD’, 4 S/C/W/149, 23 May 2000. 5 39 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from the Dominican Republic [and others]’, 6 S/CSS/W/19, 5 December 2000. 7 40 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from Brazil [and others]’, 29 September 2004, TN/S/W/23. 8 41 ‘Cancún Declaration of Indigenous Peoples’, 12 September 2003, online. 9 Available at www.tebtebba.org/tebtebba_files/finance/Cancún ipdec.rtf (accessed 40111 20 September 2007). 1 2 9 Energy wars 3 1 For a discussion of the terms of accession of Mexico (1986) and Venezuela 44111 (1990) see UNCTAD, 2000, p 20. Notes 349

1111 2 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co & California Asiatic Oil Co v The Government 2 of the Libyan Arab Republic, 53 ILR 389. 3 3 CTS, ‘Energy Services. Background note by the Secretariat’, S/C/W/52, 9 September 1998, pp 18–19. 4 4 Internal communication of Enron, 29 July 2000. On file with author. 5 5 Exxon Mobil and Chevron from the US, BP and Royal Dutch Shell from Europe. 6 6 ‘The new Seven Sisters: Oil and Gas Giants Dwarf Western Rivals’, Financial 7 Times, 19 March 2007, online. Available at www.ft.com/cms/s/471ae1b8-d001- 8 11db-94cb-000b5df10621.html (accessed 20 September 2007). 7 CTS, ‘Energy Services. Background Note by the Secretariat’, S/C/W/52, 9 9 September 1998. 1011 8 CTS, ‘Communication from the United States. Energy Services’, S/C/W/58, 20 1 October 1998. 2 9 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from the United States. Energy Services’, S/CSC/W/27, 3111 18 May 2000. 4 10 CTS.SS ‘Communication from the European Communities and their Member States’, S/CSS/W/60, 23 March 2001. 5 11 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from Canada. Energy Services’, S/CSS/W/58, 14 6 March 2001. 7 12 CTS.SS ‘Communication from Japan. Energy Services’, S/CSS/W/42/Suppl.3, 4 8 October 2001. 9 13 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from Venezuela. Energy Services’, S/CSS/W/69, 29 March 2001; see also S/CSS/W/69 Add.1 15 October 2001, supported by 20111 CTS.SS, ‘Communication from Cuba. Energy Services’, S/CSS/W/144, 22 March 1 2002. 2 14 Interview by author with Ambassador Oscar Carvallo, Geneva, 28 June 2007. 3 15 ‘Nigeria’s Oil Industry’, online. Available at www.sourcewatch.org/index. 4 php?title=Nigeria’s_oil_industry (accessed 20 September 2007). 5 16 Arruda, M ‘The National and International Contexts and the Struggle Against the FTAA’, PACS and Brazil Network, 18 September 2002. On file with author. 6 17 The first investor-initiated dispute by a US firm was lodged within a year of 7 ratification. It claimed $65 million from the Guatemalan government, which 8 had reasserted its authority over the failing railways that were subject to a 50 9 year concession. 30111 18 JG Poulos, ‘CAFTA is about Security’, The American Spectator, 14 June 2005, online. Available at www.spectator.org/util/print.asp?art_id=8289 (accessed 20 1 September 2007). 2 19 ‘Referendum on FTA Unleashes Political Controversy in Costa Rica’, online. 3 Available at www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=7952 (accessed 20 4 September 2007); Memorandum from Kevin Casas and Fernando Sánchez to 5 President of the Republic of Costa Rica, 29 July 2007, online. Accessible at 6 www.citizen.org/documents/MemoGobiernoTLC.pdf, translated at http://citizen. typead.com/eyesontrade/ (accessed 20 September 2007). 7 20 ‘US–Andean Countries’, online. Available at www.bilaterals.org/rubrique. 8 php3?id_rubrique=69 (accessed 20 September 2007). 9 21 Koffler, K ‘FTA Push Moves to Top of Bush Agenda’, The Gate, 18 July 2007, 40111 online. Available at www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=9034 (accessed 1 20 September 2007). 22 ‘US Trade Representative Promotes Middle East free Trade Area’, 7 October 2 2004, online. Available at http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p= 3 washfile-english&y=2004&m=October&x=20041007184534ndyblehs0. 44111 6444666 (accessed 20 September 2007). 350 Notes

1111 23 US–Middle East Free Trade Coalition, ‘Coalition Members’, online. Available 2 at www.nftc.org/default/trade/mefta/MEFTA%20Coalition%20Company% 3 20List.pdf (accessed 20 September 2007). 24 CTS, ‘Energy Services. Background note by the Secretariat’, S/C/W/52, 9 4 September 1998, p 5. 5 25 Ibid., p 8. 6 26 Several non-European signatories included Japan and Australia. 7 27 ‘Overview of Bilateral Free Trade and Investment Agreements, Background paper 8 to “Fighting FTAs international strategy workshop”’, Bangkok, 27–29 July 2006. 9 online. Available at www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=6206 (accessed 20 September 2007). 1011 28 Southern states have rarely invoked the national security justification. A notable 1 exception was Ghana’s restriction of trade with Portugal, based on the threat 2 posed to peace in the African continent by the conflict in Angola, which was 3 noted in Portugal’s 1961 accession instrument. See Hahn, 1991, p 571. 4 29 Ironically, US law prohibits US companies from complying with secondary 5 boycotts imposed by other states. 30 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, online. Available at www.fas.org/irp/ 6 congress/1996_cr/h960618b.htm (accessed 20 September 2007). 7 8 9 Case study 17 20111 31 Rosales, R Minister of Production and Commerce, ‘Position of the Venezuelan 1 Government in the Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the WTO’, 12 September 2003, 2 online. Available at www.venezuelanalysis.com/docs.php?dno=1000 (accessed 3 8 August 2007). 32 Energy Information Administration, Crude Oil and Total Petroleum Imports 4 Top 15 Countries, 2007, online. Available at www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/ 5 petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html 6 (accessed 4 August 2007). 7 33 ‘About PDVSA’, online. Available at www.pdvsa.com (accessed 8 August 2007). 8 34 Wilpert, G ‘Venezuela’s new Constitution’, 27 August 2006, online. Available 9 at www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1003 (accessed 8 August 2007). 30111 35 PDVSA, ‘True Nationalization’, online. Available at www.pdvsa.com/ (accessed 1 8 August 2007). 2 36 Talbot, K ‘Coup-making in Venezuela: the Bush and Oil Factors’, 27 July 2002, 3 online. Available at www.pww.org/article/view/1655/1/00 (accessed 8 August 4 2007). 5 37 Aharonian, AR ‘Hamburgers, Cured Ham, and Oil’, Proceso, 1 May 2002, online. Available at www.worldpress.org/Americas/581.cfm (accessed 8 August 6 2007). 7 38 Martinez, W ‘Interview with Energy and Mines Minister Rafael Ramirez’, Part 8 2, 12 September 2003, online. Available at www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles. 9 php?artno=1096 (accessed 8 August 2007). 40111 39 ‘Chavez Wants Expansion of Group of Friends, PDVSA Employee Arrested’, 1 People’s Daily online, 19 January 2003, online. Available at http://english. peopledaily.com.cn/200301/19/eng20030119_110416.shtml (accessed 8 August 2 2007). 3 40 INTESA, http://sec.edgar-online.com/2005/09/13/0001193125-05-184150/ 44111 Section11.asp (accessed 8 August 2007). Notes 351

1111 41 ‘Statement of Ali Rodriguez Araque, President, Petroleos de Venezuela’, 14 July 2 2004, online. Available at www.embavenez-us.org/news.php?nid=268 (accessed 3 8 August 2007). 42 PDVSA, ‘True Nationalization’, online. Available at www.pdvsa.com/ (accessed 4 8 August 2007). 5 43 Severo, LW ‘In Venezuela, Oil Sows Emancipation’, Venezuelanalysis.com, 20 6 March 2006, online. Available at www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php? 7 artno=1694 (accessed 4 June 2007). 8 44 Udo, B ‘ExxonMobil, Conoco To Retain Stakes In Venezuelan Oil Project’, The Daily Independent, 28 June 2007, online. Available at www. 9 independentngonline.com/?c=47&a=29422 (accessed 8 August 2007). 1011 45 Interview with Ambassador Oscar Carvallo, Geneva, 28 June 2007. 1 46 INTESA, online. Available at http://sec.edgar-online.com/2005/09/13/ 2 0001193125-05-184150/Section11.asp (accessed 8 August 2007). 3111 47 Márquez, H ‘MERCOSUR-VENEZUELA: Integration by Ultimatum’, 5 July 2007, online. Available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38441 (accessed 4 8 August 2007). 5 48 Arreaza, T ‘ALBA: Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean’, 6 30 January 2004, online. Available at www.venezuelanalysis.com/docs.php? 7 dno=1010 (accessed 8 August 2007). 8 49 PDVSA, ‘True Nationalization’, online. Available at www.pdvsa.com/ (accessed 8 August 2007). 9 50 Quoted in Wynter, C and McIlroy, J ‘Venezuela: Oil, revolution and socialism’ 20111 Green Left Weekly, 30 August 2006, online. Available at http:// 1 venezuelasolidarity.org.uk/ven/web/2006/articles/oil_revolution_socialism.html 2 (accessed 8 August 2007). 3 51 Chomsky, N ‘US threats to Venezuela’, Green Left Weekly, 21 October 2006, online. Available at www.greenleft.org.au/2006/688/35733 (accessed 8 August 4 2007). 5 6 Case study 18 7 52 CSI to Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee, 17 8 August 2005, online. Available at www.uscsi.org/publications/papers/sa_ 9 accessions_08172005.pdf (accessed 7 August 2007). 30111 53 ‘Gaddafi Slams World Economy’, Reuters, 3 March 2007, online. Available at 1 http://tvnz.co.nz/view/page/411749/1010279 (accessed 10 August 2007). 2 54 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran 1979, online. Available at 3 www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html (accessed 10 August 2007). 55 The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005, draft and unofficial translation, 4 Iraqi Electoral Office, online. Available at www.ieciraq.org/final%20cand/ 5 Draft%20Constitution_2005%5B1%5D.09.20_En. Pdf (accessed 10 August 6 2007). 7 56 Escobar, P ‘US’s Iraq Oil Grab is a Done Deal’, Asia Times, 28 February 2007, 8 online. Available at www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IB28Ak01.html (accessed 4 August 2007). 9 40111 Conclusion 1 1 Baker, W and Nordin, J ‘A 150-to-1 Ratio Is Far Too Lopsided for Comfort’, 2 International Herald Tribune, 5 February 1999, online. Available at 3 www.iht.com/articles/1999/02/05/edbaker.t.php (accessed 20 September 44111 2007). 352 Notes

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1111 Antigua 40, 166–7; US-Gambling case Asia, South East 11, 68, 285; see also 2 174, 175, 176, 177–80, 272 specific countries 3 ANZCERTA, see Australia New Zealand Asis, MB 191 Closer Economic Relations Trade Asmal, K 238 4 Agreement asset sales 119, 121, 137; Philippines 5 APEC, see Asia Pacific Economic 147–8 6 Cooperation Association of African Universities 235 7 Apollo Group 234, 243 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 8 AquaFed (International Federation of see ASEAN Private Water Operators) 135 AT&T 78, 154, 157, 164, 166–7 9 Aqua Mundo 134 AT Kearney Retail Development Index 1011 Aquino, C 146 271 1 Arab League 295, 311 audiovisual services 48, 55, 56, 74, 75, 2 Arab states 229, 230, 237, 295, 311–17, 78, 119, 135, 168, 224, 232, 238, 3 322; see also Gulf states 239, 241 4 Argentina 44, 45, 48, 49, 60, 67, 69, 70, Australia 31, 38–9; and cultural services 85; energy 290, 309; higher education 250; and e-commerce 168; and 5 225, 228, 234; pension schemes 185, education services 234, 235, 237; Fiji, 6 186; retail market 271; water services relations with 214, 215, 216; GATS 7 134, 135 2000 negotiations 43, 45, 47, 134–5; 8 Arnold, PJ 38 and GATS genesis 63, 73, 79; labour 9 Aronson, J 59, 63, 76, 78 market 198; PFIs 143; regional trade Arroyo, GM 146, 147, 151, 320 agreements 51; Singapore, bilateral 20111 Arruda, M 293 agreement with 240; Solomon Islands, 1 Arthur Andersen 38; see also relations with 260; trade in services 2 Accenture campaigns 85; and US-Gambling case 3 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 180, 181; and World Summit for 4 Nations) 40, 51, 52, 85, 150, 204; Sustainable Development 115 5 US–ASEAN Trade and Investment Australian Broadcasting Authority Framework Agreement 150 232–3 6 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Australian Coalition for Cultural 7 Services (AFAS) 52, 150 Diversity 240 8 ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 99 Australia New Zealand Closer Economic 9 Asia 3, 6, 37, 51, 103, 160, 178; Relations Trade Agreement 30111 Economic Partnership Agreements (ANZCERTA) 51, 73, 204, 232 with Japan 57; and education services Australia US Free Trade Agreement 1 236, 237, 243; energy 284, 291; (AUSFTA) 50, 85, 150, 205, 240, 2 outsourcing destination 196, 206; 292–3, 299 3 see also specific countries Austria 124 4 Asia, East, financial crisis 11, 52, 97, Azerbaijan 310 5 147, 148, 153, 161, 259, 274; see also 6 specific countries Bahrain 205, 295 Asian Development Bank 84, 101, 147; Baker, CE 3, 155, 221, 222–4, 225, 249 7 and migration-for-remittances 215; balance of payments 10, 36, 92–3, 154, 8 protests against 110 160, 172, 194, 196, 215 9 Asian People’s Tribunal on Poverty and Balboa, JD 150 40111 Debt 149 Bananas dispute 25 1 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Bangalore 206, 208, 209–11, 244 (APEC) 51, 85, 150, 204 Bangladesh 134, 192 2 Asia Pacific region 52, 181 Bank of America 157, 247 3 Asia, South 182, 191; see also specific Bank of International Settlements (BIS) 44111 countries 182–3 Index 377

1111 banks and banking systems 159, 160, 161; Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America 2 foreign ownership 156; guarantees for and the Caribbean (ALBA) 309, 320 3 deposits 266; privatisation 156; Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, see subprime mortgage crisis 152, 153, Venezuela 4 185; subsidiaries, joint ventures and Bolivia 57, 75, 85, 185, 294, 320, 322; 5 branches 173; Thailand 153 water services 134, 135, 136–7, 144 6 Barblan, A 235 Bond, P 52, 110, 112, 123, 135 7 Barbuda 174 Botswana 134 8 Barker, SA 167 Bottari, M 258, 271, 272 Barnett, C 284 Braithwaite, J 81, 153, 154, 157 9 Barshefsky, C 76, 113, 163 Brazil 11, 203, 309; cultural services 1011 Bartlett, P 52, 150 230; energy 288, 290, 315; food 1 Bautista, P 70, 71, 73 supply 264; FTAA, opposition to 2 Baxi, U 89 85, 293; GATS 2000 negotiations 3111 Bechtel 78, 136, 312 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 114; 4 Belgium 135 GATS, resistance to 58, 60, 61, 67, Bermuda 206, 306 69, 70–1, 72; Group of 20 46; higher 5 Bernier, I 231, 232, 239 education 229; ‘new Quad’, member 6 Bhagwati, J 7, 79, 192, 195, 307 of 46, 47, 201; pensions, and women 7 Bhala, R 53, 291, 293, 295, 297, 298, 185; retail market 271, 273; US 8 299, 301, 312, 313, 321 investigation of law on informatics 9 Bhattasali, D 310 68; tourism 278–9; water services bilateral investment treaty 136, 269; 134 20111 Bolivia/Netherlands 136; investor- Bremner, P 315 1 initiated enforcement 309, 315, 324, Bressie, K 155, 162 2 between US and South Korea, 85, 240 Bretton Woods institutions 19, 90, 91, 3 bilateral trade agreements 3, 4, 11, 25–6, 92, 93, 97, 100, 114, 309 4 28, 31, 33, 34, 36, 42, 50, 51, 52–3, Bretton Woods Project 2002 106, 107 5 54, 57, 321, 324; and agri-food supply Britain, see United Kingdom chains 269–70; as threats against British Invisibles 79 6 non-supporters of GATS 59; ASEAN Brittan, Leon 43, 80 7 members 150; cultural services and Brixen Declaration 234 8 services 239–41; e-commerce 55, 56, broadcasting 229, 230, 232, 240; local 9 176; energy-related services 55, 284, content 232–3; 30111 291–2, 295–6; financial services 55, Brock, William 65, 80–1 56; and GATS obligations 102, 131; Bronfenbrenner, K 206, 208, 211 1 government procurement provisions Brown, R 215, 216 2 37, 127, 143, 299; and labour Brunei 290 3 204–6; opposition to 60, 84, 86, Buchanan, R 191, 210, 211 4 87; Philippines 150; restrictions build-operate-transfer arrangements 127; 5 on monopolies and exclusive service Philippines 146, 147, 149 6 suppliers 127; retail distribution Bullard, N 153 272; services 11, 51, 55–7, 124, Burch, D 263 7 131; and social essence of services Bush, G W 54, 179, 205, 294, 295, 301, 8 104; telecommunications 55, 56, 173; 306, 307, 309, 317 9 United States 36, 52–3, 54, 56, 57, Business Action for Sustainable 40111 59, 86, 150, 154 Development 117 1 biodiversity 256, 277 Bivens, LJ 207 CAFTA 205, 293–4, 320 2 BizClim (Private Sector Enabling call centres 189, 191, 195, 206, 208–13 3 Environmental Facility) 143 Cambodia 142 44111 Blair, T 122, 138 Camdessus, M 132 378 Index

1111 Canada 10, 11, 31, 60; call centres 206, Center for Strategic and International 2 208; and cultural services 231, 232, Studies 78 3 233, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254; Central Product Classification (CPC) 15, and education services 234–5, 237; 32, 33, 195, 199, 202; energy 149, 4 and energy 289, 291, 292, 295, 304; 287, 288; food production and supply 5 GATS 2000 negotiations 49, 134–5; 256, 257, 269; forestry 261; gambling 6 and GATS genesis 73, 80; and Helms- 174, 175–6; information technology 7 Burton Act 300; Kahnawake Mohawk 169, 170, 204, 239; midwife services 8 territory 178; labour market 200; 128, 129–30; public services 124; outsourcing destination 208; PFIs 143; tertiary education supply chain 247; 9 regional trade agreements 51, 55; and tourism 268; water for irrigation 267 1011 resolution of political disputes in WTO Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) 1 300; split-run magazines dispute with 142, 143, 226 2 US 233; trade in services 66; trade in Cevallos, D 115 3 services campaigns 85; Trade, Chanda, R 192, 198, 199, 201, 202, 4 Investment and Labour Mobility 203, 204 Agreement 322; United States, Charveriat, C 100 5 relations with 68, 81; and US- Chatterjee, P 105 6 Gambling case 180, 181; and World Chaudhuri, S 202 7 Summit for Sustainable Development Chávez, H 115, 290, 294, 303, 304, 8 115; see also North American Free 305–10, 320, 322 9 Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Chavez-Malaluan, JJC 98, 99 Canada US Free Trade Agreement Cheney, D 294 20111 (CUSFTA) 51, 85, 158, 231, 232, Chevron 147, 285 1 292 Chevron Texaco 295, 304; see also 2 Canadian Coalition for Cultural Texaco 3 Diversity 248, 254 Chile 45, 49, 50, 52; and cultural 4 Cancún, impact of tourism 279–83 services 239, 250; energy 290; higher 5 Cann, V 135 education 229; pension schemes 184, Cann, WA 297, 300 185–6; US–Chile Free Trade 6 capacity building 102, 103–4 Agreement 36, 154, 201, 204, 205, 7 capital: internationalisation of 7–8, 11; 239 8 mobility of 7–8, 12; national 7, 8; Chilean Coalition for Cultural Diversity 9 redistribution of wealth from labour 239 30111 to 190, 207; states as enablers of 89; China 3, 4, 10, 11, 114, 115, 239, inflow and outflow 36, 154, 156, 160 260, 293, 321; APEC 51; assessment 1 capitalism: global 8, 123, 321; industrial of GATS 1994 44; bilateral trade 2 2, 5, 6, 8; social nature of services agreements 57, 150, 321, 324; 3 integral to 1–2; transformation, late and cultural services 230, 250; and 4 twentieth century 6, 17 education services 234, 242, 243, 5 Capra 102 244; and energy 284, 288, 290, 295–6, 6 Caribbean 293, 309 309, 321; GATS 2000 negotiations 49, Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 54, 50; information technology 11, 229; 7 204 internet firewall 16–70; migrant labour 8 CARIFORUM 54, 252 from 192; outsourcing destination 196, 9 Caritas International 98 208, 213; PFIs 142; retail market 271, 40111 Carrefour 259, 270, 271, 273, 275 273; US imports from 270; and World 1 Carter, K 245 Trade Organization 100, 310 Castells, M 6, 8, 227 Ching, P-y 296 2 Castro, F 114, 115, 294 Chomsky, N 310 3 CEC (Centre for Education and Chossudovsky, M 111 44111 Communication) 211, 212 Choy, CC 214 Index 379

1111 Citicorp 76, 78, 80, 157 corporatisation 35, 99, 117, 119, 120–1; 2 civil society 91, 98, 122, 209 broadcasting 232 3 classification of services 10, 32–3, 45, Costa Rica 44, 178, 180, 181, 293–4, 56, 63, 138; audiovisual services 238; 320 4 e-commerce 168; energy 288–90; Cotonou Agreement 2000 53, 102, 258 5 gambling 174–6; occupations 198–9, Council for Foreign Relations (US) 78 6 202; PFIs, 138; telecommunications Council for International Business (US) 7 170–1, 173, 239; tourism 278; see also 78 8 Central Product Classification; W/120 Council for Trade in Services 31, 34, 37, Service Sectoral Classification List 40, 79, 106, 297, 312; assessment of 9 Clerq, W de 71 trade in services under GATS 1994 44; 1011 climate change 284, 289, 325 notification of services agreements to 1 Clinton, B 51, 167, 292, 300–1 55 2 Coalition of Service Industries (CSI) 38, Council of Economic Advisers 80 3111 74, 78, 202, 206, 236, 245 Cox, R 325 4 Codex Alimentarius Commission 263 Crawford, J-A 56 Cold War 225, 294 Croome, J 70, 73 5 collective bargaining 205, 207 cross-border supply, see GATS mode 1 6 Colombia 49, 69, 70, 185, 200, 290, cross-subsidisation 29, 125, 127, 131, 7 294, 300, 310, 315 134, 163, 164, 265–6, 289 8 colonisation 189, 225, 230, 285 Cuba 43, 47, 48, 49, 50, 57, 69, 115, 9 Comfort, S 230 171, 250, 290, 300–1, 302–1, 305, commitments, see GATS commitments 309, 320 20111 Committee for Economic Development Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 1 (US) 78 (LIBERTAD) Act 1996 300 2 competition, as driver of quality 105–6 cultural exchange 33, 55, 65, 70, 135, 3 concession contracts 127 221–2; counter-convention on cultural 4 Connell J 215, 216 diversity 248–54; marketising 229–30; 5 ConocoPhillips 304, 308, 309 and neoclassical trade theory 222–3, construction 9, 10, 12, 33, 63, 77, 78, 224; state-directed approaches 224–5; 6 138–9, 140, 141, 147, 149, 153, 189, and supermarkets 271, 273, 274; and 7 191–2, 203, 277, 287, 308 tourism 279; trade and culture 231–3, 8 consultants 8, 9, 25, 121 238–41 9 consumers 221; choice 105, 121; Curacao 178 30111 preferences 222–3; protection 35, 38, 70, 169, 173, 192 Dahal, N 100 1 Convention on the Protection and Danaher, K 105 2 Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Davidson-Harden, A 225, 235 3 Expressions 248–54 De Barra, C 98, 99 4 Convergys 206 Decision on Professional Services 1995 5 Cooper, MN 156 38 6 Coopération Internationale pour le Deckwirth, C 134, 135 Développement et la Solidarité Declaration on the Right to Development 7 (CIDSE) 98 89 8 Copenhagen Summit on Social Deffeyes, KS 284 9 Development 90, 93, 110 Deloitte & Touche 142, 143 40111 Corbet, H 79 De Sousa Santos, B 87 1 Corporate Europe Observatory 124 developing countries 3, 17, 19, 39; debt corporate lobbies 58, 59, 60, 61–2, 63, relief 59, 65, 69, 90, 97–8, 101, 108, 2 75, 76, 77–80, 91, 115 114, 142; and Doha round 113–14, 3 corporate training 195, 212, 215, 243, 303; energy 285, 286, 288, 290, 291; 44111 244 European Union, relations with 86; 380 Index

1111 free trade agreements 50, 52, 53, 55, firewall 169–70; energy 288, 289, 2 56; GATS 1994 43, 44–5, 53, 107–8; 291, 292; government procurement 3 GATS 2000 negotiations 47, 48, 49, 127; and Helms-Burton Act 300; 108; and GATS genesis 58–60, 61, 62, labour 199, 203; public services 4 65, 66–71, 72–3, 74, 81; offshore 143; supermarkets 272, 275–6; 5 outsourcing 7, 9; participation in telecommunications 163; tourism 6 global economy 20; participation in 279, 281; and US-Gambling case 7 trade in services 27–8, 303; PFIs 174, 177, 179 8 142–3; regulatory frameworks and Dominican Republic 48, 54, 269; globalisation 154; and tourism 276–7, DR-CAFTA 205, 293–4 9 279–83; World Trade Organization Drahos, P 81, 153, 154, 157, 263 1011 accession 100–2, 107–8; and World Drake, W 14, 20, 77, 81, 121, 169, 241 1 Development Report 2004, Making Drakich, J 6 2 Services Work for Poor People Dresser 307 3 106–10; see also least developed Drucker, P 145 4 countries; North/South divisions; Dryden, SJ 81 trade-related rights and development; Dubai 191 5 and specific countries Dubai Ports World 295 6 development 27–8, 34; Millennium Duffy, G 240 7 Development Goals (MDGs) 89; right Duke, C 224, 241, 244 8 to 89, 130; shift to market conception Dunkel, A 68, 69, 75 9 of 89–118; see also sustainable Dunning, J 300 development 20111 Devereux, C 258 Eastern Europe, see Europe, Eastern 1 DiamondCluster International Inc. 208 EBRI (Employee Benefit Research 2 digital divide 28, 155–6, 170, 173 Institute) 183 3 digital technologies 56, 168, 170, 238, e-commerce 26, 155, 163, 167–70, 173, 4 239–40; in education 228; in 239; bilateral agreements 55, 56, 176; 5 telecommunications 173, 176 goods or services 167–9; regulation Dinham, B 267, 268 169 6 Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in Economic Partnership Agreements 7 the Accountancy Sector 38 (EPAs): European Commission 53–4, 8 discrimination, see non-discrimination 85, 102, 214, 215, 252, 258, 261; 9 disputes process 4, 40–2, 323, 324; Japan 57 30111 Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 40, 41, economic regulation 22 299–300; Dispute Settlement Ecuador 85, 257, 258, 290, 294 1 Understanding 40, 41, 42 education 108, 119; bilateral agreements 2 division of labour, international 5, 56; and GATS 126, 135, 234–8; 3 11–12, 20, 230, 324 distance 228, 236; ‘lifelong learning’ 4 Docena, H 315, 316 226, 228, 243; and neoclassical trade 5 Doha round 21, 39, 45–6, 49, 50, 52, theory 223–4; primary 107, 111, 126; 6 57, 76, 90, 95, 110, 113–14, 323; private, for-profit schools 126; right to agriculture 270; environmental goods 130; travelling overseas for 130; 7 and services 133; India’s participation subsidies 126, 237, 268; United 8 46, 95, 194, 201; labour 201, 203; Kingdom PFI funding 138, 139, 141; 9 telecommunications 167; and World universal access to 131; vocational 40111 Summit for Sustainable Development 217, 228, 243; World Development 1 116; see also GATS 2000 negotiations Report 2004, Making Services Work Doha Work Programme 55, 94, 113, for Poor People 105; see also 2 116, 133 corporate training 3 domestic regulations 29, 31, 37–8, education, higher: accreditation agencies 44111 108–9, 149, 321, 323; China’s internet 245–6; courseware, materials and Index 381

1111 journals, e-publishing 245; financing Europe, see European Union 2 246–7; marketisation 225–9, 234–5, European Commission 3, 45, 46, 49, 3 238, 242; para-education services 227, 65; adjustments to schedules of 228, 246; supply chain 241–7; see also commitments 34; and audiovisual 4 universities services 232; and banking guarantees 5 Education International (EI) 234 266; bilateral trade agreements 51, 6 ‘edupreneurs’ 222, 235, 242, 243 52–3, 102, 321–2, 324; and cultural 7 Egypt 49, 60, 66, 67, 69, 229, 286, 290, services 232, 250, 251, 252; and Doha 8 295 round 46, 113; EC-Bananas case 25, EKOS Research Associates 156 256–8; and e-commerce 167–8, 170; 9 electricity, see energy Economic Partnership Agreements 1011 electronic commerce, see e-commerce 53–4, 85, 102, 214, 215, 252, 258, 1 El Salvador 185, 278, 293 261; and education services 234, 237; 2 emergency safeguard measures 37 and energy 288–91; failure to list 3111 Eminent Person’s Group on World Trade MFN exception 32, 257; and financial 4 79 services 159–60, 161, 172, 184; GATS employment markets, see labour markets 2000 negotiations 43, 47, 48, 49, 173, 5 energy 7, 9, 284–5; bilateral agreements 260–1, 281, 289; GATS 2000 requests 6 55, 291–2, 295–6; climate change 289, 87, 133–5, 149, 170–1, 184, 200, 204, 7 325; nationalisation of resources 285, 260–1, 266, 267, 275, 290–1, 313; 8 286, 287, 304, 308, 309; oil wealth as government procurement proposal 9 basis for alternatives 309–10, 320–1; 126; and maritime 269; Mercosur Free peak oil 21, 284, 325; privatisation Trade Agreement 309; and mode 4, 20111 121, 142, 287, 317; privatisation, temporary movement of people 193, 1 Philippines 144–51; regional 194, 200, 203, 204; and pension fund 2 agreements 292, 293–5; secondary management 184; and Philippines 149; 3 markets 289; security 284, 286, Private Sector Enabling Environmental 4 296–302, 307; trade in services Facility 133, 143; regional trade 5 285–91; universal access to 131, agreements 50, 53, 321–2; and security 289–90; World Development Report 299, 300; and telecommunications 6 2004, Making Services Work for 171, 172, 239; and US-Gambling case 7 Poor People 105; and World Trade 180–1; and water services 132–7; and 8 Organization accessions 310–17 World Trade Organization accessions 9 Energy Charter Treaty 295 311, 313, 314; see also Bananas 30111 Energy Services Coalition (US) 287–8, dispute; Maastricht Treaty; and specific 289 countries 1 Engels, F 18 European Court of Justice 124 2 Enron 38, 106, 147, 281, 282, 287–8 European Economic Area 204 3 environment: exploitation 123; protection European Economic Community 51; and 4 35, 116, 133, 205; see also sustainable GATS genesis 60, 62, 64–5, 69, 70, 5 development 73, 74, 75, 160 6 environmental services 125, 133 European Energy Charter 295 ‘epistemic community’ 77, 81–2 European Parliament 134 7 Equations (India) 276 European Roundtable of Industrialists 8 Equatorial Guinea 310 231 9 Ernst & Young 142, 143 European Services Forum (ESF) 43, 80, 40111 Escobar, P 317 134, 202, 206, 281 1 Estonia 156 European Union 51, 181; agriculture Estrada, J 144, 147, 151 264; and cultural services 248; and 2 Ethiopia 310 energy 284, 295–6, 304; external 3 EurepGAP 263 competitiveness 53; Global Europe 44111 Eurocommerce 269 strategy 53, 295; and imperialism 382 Index

1111 53–4, 86, 295; international trade in phenomenon 153–4, 156; MFN on 2 services 10; loss of competitiveness to 75; and PFIs 141–2; privatisation 121, 3 Asia 6; and Millennium Development 156; and privatised higher education Goals 112; and national security market 246; universal access to 131; 4 300, 302; opposition from NGOs Uruguay round negotiations 157–61; 5 86; private sector services 10; see also banks and banking systems; 6 reorganisation of historical trade insurance; pension schemes 7 relationships 4; retail market 270, Financial Times 79, 84, 140–1, 185, 8 272; subordination of aid to trade 288 102; supermarkets 270, 271; Fine, B 1 9 telecommunications 154, 173; and Fink, C 56 1011 United States sanctions 300–1, 302; Finland 62 1 Water Facility 102; Water Initiative Fiorentino, R 56 2 132–3; water investments 132–7; and Fitzpatrick, P 18 3 World Trade Organization 41 Fluour 78 4 Europe, Eastern 51, 97, 103, 105; energy Focus on the Global South 117 284, 295; EU water investments in Food and Agriculture Organization 266 5 132; foreign ownership of banks 156; food production and supply chains 9, 6 higher education 226, 229; outsourcing 261–70; food security, market model 7 destination 196, 208; retirement 268; GATS 2000 negotiations 268–70; 8 income plans 182; ; see also specific just-in-time system 264–5; purchasing 9 countries alliances 264; standards 263–4 Evans, M 2 foreign investment 9, 11, 15, 19, 130, 20111 Evenett, SJ 101 169; alternative to aid 112; ASEAN 1 exclusive service suppliers 29, 30, 31, countries 150; driver of development 2 127 114, 115, 130, 280, 281; education 3 externalities 14; cultural and knowledge services 228, 236, 242, 246; energy- 4 exchange 223, 224; tourism 277 related services 287, 291; financial 5 Exxon Mobil 270, 295, 304, 308, 309, markets 156; and GATS 25, 26, 37, 312 61, 62, 71, 73, 78, 276; government 6 discrimination against 108–9; joint 7 fair trade production chain 262, 263 ventures 308; media 230; and natural 8 Farley, R 266 resources 286; Philippines 144–5, 147, 9 Farrell, D 207 149, 151; regulation of 13, 95, 173; 30111 Feketekuty, G 13, 32, 60, 61–2, 63, 64, regional trade agreements 55; 65, 66, 76, 79, 80, 81, 157–8 safeguard measures 37; Saudi Arabia 1 Fiji, migrant labour from 214–20, 320 311; Solomon Islands 260–1; tourism 2 film industry 222, 229, 230, 231–2, 239, 276, 280; and WTO accession 101–2; 3 240–1, 252 see also Multilateral Agreement on 4 Financial Leaders Group 80 Investment (MAI); privatisation; 5 financial markets 8 transnational corporations 6 financial services 8, 9, 11, 33, 51, 59, 69, forestry, Solomon Islands 259–60, 261 74, 75, 78, 87, 97, 119, 152–3; Forum on Trade in Education Services 7 agriculture 265–6; bilateral agreements 236 8 55, 56; energy-related 287; GATS France 10, 69, 78; agriculture 264; and 9 2000 negotiations 42–3, 49, 171–3; cultural services 231, 232, 239, 248, 40111 GATS Annex on Financial Services 39, 249, 253; energy 285, 302; 1 158–9, 183–4; GATS Understanding supermarkets 259, 270, 271, 273 on Commitments in Financial Services free trade agreements 50–7, South/South 2 159–60, 172, 184; information 50, 52, 53; see also bilateral trade 3 transfers 157–8, 159, 162; meta- agreements; multilateral trade 44111 regulation 152, 158–61; as social agreements; regional trade agreements; Index 383

1111 trade in services agreements; and Organization accession 100; see also 2 specific agreements specific sectors 3 Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) GATS Articles: I: Scope and Definition 51, 85, 292, 293, 309, 320 22, 25–6, 34–5, 106, 124–6, 127–8, 4 Freeman, H 77–8, 80 143, 149, 159, 197, 235, 257; II: 5 Frye, N 229 Most-Favoured Nation Treatment 6 ‘funder-provider split’ 121 28–9, 35, 257, 300; III: Transparency 7 169, 259, 300; IV: Increasing 8 G7/8, see Group of Seven/Eight major Participation of Developing Countries powers 27, 44, 45, 231, 245, 290; V: 9 Gaddafi, M 313 Economic Integration 28, 55; VI: 1011 Gaffney, D 138 Domestic Regulation 29, 31, 37–8, 1 gambling, US-Gambling case 32, 38, 42, 127, 163, 169–70, 199, 279, 300, 323; 2 174–81, 272 VII: Mutual Recognition 31, 199; VIII: 3111 GATS: ‘affecting’, definition 22, 25; Monopolies and Exclusive Service 4 Annex on Financial Services 39, Suppliers 29, 31, 125; IX: Business 158–9, 183–4; Annex on Movement of Practices 31; X: Emergency Safeguard 5 Natural Persons Supplying Services 26, Measures 37; XI: Payments and 6 198, 300; Annex on Negotiations on Transfers 31, 36; XII: Restrictions to 7 Basic Telecommunications 39, 127, Safeguard the Balance of Payments 36, 8 162; Annex on Telecommunications 93; XIII: Government Procurement 35, 9 39, 127, 162, 164, 165, 168, 171, 37, 126–7, 143, 299; XIV: General 239; as legal imperialism 16–20; as Exceptions 35–6, 127, 128, 169, 170, 20111 legal text 22–7; ‘café au lait’ proposal 177–8, 273; XIV bis: Security 1 70, 71; corporate lobby 58, 59, 60, Exceptions 36, 285, 296–302, 314; 2 61–2, 63, 75, 76, 77–80, 91, 115; XV: Subsidies 37, 266; XVI: Market 3 disputes process 4, 40–2, 299–300, Access 27, 30, 35, 36, 37–8, 160, 177, 4 323, 324; exclusions 34–6, 130, 136; 259, 300; XVII: National Treatment 5 failure, as tool of consolidation 100; 28–9, 30–1, 35, 300; XVIII: Additional framework agreement 73–5, 124; Commitments 22, 25, 31, 203; XIX: 6 General Obligations and Disciplines Negotiation of Specific Commitments 7 (GODs) 27–9, 169; genesis and 34, 42, 44, 45, 75, 100, 269; XX: 8 establishment 3–4, 58–88; and human Schedules of Specific Commitments 31; 9 rights 130; institutional arrangements XXI: Modification of Schedules 33–4, 30111 40–2; ‘measures’, definition 22, 24; 102, 180, 298, 299, 314; XXIV: ‘Members’, definition 22, 24; negative Council for Trade in Services 28; 1 list approach 31–2, 37, 51, 56, 73, 74, XXVI: Relations with Other 2 102, 131, 232, 312, 323; opposition to International Organizations 42; 3 58, 60, 61, 65, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, XXVIII: Definitions 26–7, 257, 261 4 82–8; positive list approach 29, 31, 32, GATS commitments 30–4, 47, 56, 109, 5 35, 37, 38, 44, 60, 73, 74, 75, 202–3; 149, 153; audio-visual services 232–3; 6 priorities 11; Reference paper on education 234, 235; financial services Regulatory Principles for Basic 159–60, 161, 183–4; food production 7 Telecommunications 163, 164, 165, and supply 269, 271; midwives 128; 8 166, 168, 171, 172, 289; rules 24, research 268; telecommunications 155, 9 36–9, 131; ‘services mafia’ 76–82; 162–3; tourism 161, 278; US- 40111 ‘supply’, definition 26–7; ‘trade in Gambling case 174–7; WTO accession 1 services’, definition 22, 25–7; 100–2, 107–8, 284, 310–17; see also Understanding on Commitments in GATS modes 2 Financial Services 159–60, 172, 184; GATS mode 1: cross–border 25, 26, 3 UNDP position on 96; and water 31, 36, 56, 95, 269; EC-Bananas 44111 services 133; and World Trade case 257; education 236, 242, 247; 384 Index

1111 energy-related services 291; financial 48–9, 56, 134–5, 149, 172–3, 184, 2 services 154, 156, 160, 161, 172, 173; 188, 203–4, 237, 238, 269, 290–1, 3 labour 189, 192, 195–7, 197, 200, 308, 313, 324; public services 124, 201–4; professional services 143; and 133–4; qualitative targets 46–7; 4 rights to health services 130; quantitative targets 46; ‘signalling’ 5 telecommunications 171; US-Gambling conference 49; telecommunications, 6 case 168–9, 175, 176, 179; Venezuela e-commerce and financial services 7 305; water services 134 170–3; tourism 278–9; water services 8 GATS mode 2: consumption abroad 25, 267; and World Development Report 26, 95, 269; e-commerce 169; 2004, Making Services Work for 9 education 234, 242, 247; financial Poor People 106–10; see also 1011 services 172, 173; labour 200, 204; Doha round 1 and rights to health services 130; GATT see General Agreement on Tariffs 2 telecommunications 171; US-Gambling and Trade 3 case 169, 175, 179 GATT ministerial meetings Brussels 4 GATS mode 3: commercial presence 1990, 74; Montreal 1988, 72; Punta 25–6, 56, 143, 144, 261, 269; del Este 1986, 60, 70, 71 5 EC-Bananas case 257; education 236, GAWU (Guyana Agricultural and 6 242, 247; energy-related services 291; General Workers Union) 54 7 financial services 154, 156, 160, 161, Gay, D 101 8 172–3; forestry 261; labour 200, 201; gender inequalities: call centres 211; 9 professional services 143, 144; and labour market 190, 191–2, 214; rights to health services 130–1; retirement income 184–5 20111 supermarkets 270, 272; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1 telecommunications 171; US-Gambling (GATT) 4, 13, 16, 19, 20, 27, 28, 52, 2 case 175, 179; Venezuela 305, 308 110, 240; Article III 126; Article XIX 3 GATS mode 4: presence of natural bis 299; Article XX 35, 36; Article 4 persons 12, 25, 26, 44, 47, 48, 95, XXI 296, 297; disputes process 5 103, 131, 143; education 242, 247; 40; EC-Bananas case 256–8; and labour 26, 28, 46, 49, 103, 189, 191, e-commerce 167–8; and energy 6 192, 193–5, 197–8, 199, 200–4, 214, 285–6; and GATS genesis 58, 59, 7 215, 220, 320; professional services 60, 62, 63, 64–6, 67–8, 69, 70, 72, 8 143; and rights to health services 131; 75, 78; Japan-Distribution Services 9 US-Gambling case 175, 179; case 258–9; safeguard provisions 37; 30111 Venezuela 305 Tokyo round 61, 65, 287; Work GATS modes of supply 15, 25–6, 31, 32, Programme for 1980s 65 1 33, 45, 47, 48, 55, 138 General Agreement on Trade in Services 2 GATS 2000 negotiations 21, 22, 33, 34, see GATS 3 38, 39, 42–50, 59, 60, 75, 80, 100, Geneva 80, 87, 92 4 114, 118, 323, 324; audio-visual Georgia 310 5 services 238, 239, 241; and cultural Germany 10, 11, 78, 79, 115, 207, 249, 6 exchange 250; education services 271, 273 234–8; ‘Enchilada’ talks 49; Ghandi, R 196 7 environmental services 133–5, 267; Gibbs, M 52 8 energy-related services 284, 287–91, Gibraltar 178 9 308, 312; food production and supply Giddens, A 122, 319 40111 268–70, 272, 276; and ‘GATS attack’ Gilbert, A 244 1 82; labour 200–4, 215; minimum Gill, I 5, 13, 16, 186, 221 commitment benchmarks proposal 47; Gillespie, J 39, 43, 159, 160, 170, 171–2 2 model schedules proposals 45, 47, 107, Ginsberg, M 226, 229 3 202–4, 289; Philippines 149–50; Global Alliance for Transnational 44111 plurilateral requests 33, 34, 45, 47, Education (GATE) 245–6 Index 385

1111 GlobalGAP 263 Report 2004, Making Services Work 2 Global Europe strategy 53, 295 for Poor People 105 3 globalisation 3, 5, 20, 75, 78, 313, 321; Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) ‘globalisation from below’ 255; and initiative 97–8, 114 4 regulation of socio-economic relations Hellinger, D 97 5 123 Helms-Burton Act 300 6 Global Risk Security 218 Henisz, WJ 97 7 Global Services Network 84 Hermele, K 98 8 Gold, M 292 higher education, see education, higher Gonzales, CH 282, 283 Hilary, J 92 9 Gould, E 83, 164, 174, 179, 258, 271, Hill, JB 245 1011 272 Hills, C 288 1 government procurement 35, 37, 55, 56, Hinz, R 187 2 126–7, 143, 299, 323 Hoare, Q 82, 84 3111 Gramsci, A 82, 84 Hoekman, B 13 4 Greater Arab Free Trade Area 295 Holliday, CO 117, 136 Greece 249 Holzmann, R 187 5 Greenberg, H 77 Honduras 134, 278, 293, 300 6 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 10 Hong Kong SAR 10, 250; APEC 51; 7 Group of Five 67, 71 GATS 2000 negotiations 43, 45; retail 8 Group of Seven/Eight major powers 16, market 271; United Filipinos in Hong 9 110, 132, 167, 301 Kong 191 Group of 10 70, 182 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration 48 20111 Group of 20 agricultural exporting Hong Kong People’s Alliance 86 1 countries 46 Hoogvelt, A 11–12, 190–1 2 Group of 77 19, 67, 68, 114, 115 Howard, J 292 3 Grynberg, R 100, 101, 310 HSBC Infrastructure Company 141 4 Guatemala 48, 293 Huang, S 192 5 Gulf Cooperation Council 295–6 human rights 93; Philippines 144; shift Gulf states 54, 294; Fijian migration to to market conception of 89, 90–1, 6 215 93–7, 98–100, 104, 105, 110, 130; 7 Guttal, S 98, 99 state’s obligation to promote and 8 protect 130–1; United Nations 9 Haas, PM 77 organisations 96–7 30111 Haffajee, F 114, 115 Human Rights Watch 191 Haggard, S 97 Hunt, A 18 1 Hahn, MJ 297, 299 2 Halliburton 287, 294, 298, 312 IBON 135, 147, 148 3 Hardstaff, P 276 ICTSD (International Centre for Trade 4 Hardt, M 7, 11, 12, 152, 155, 189 and Sustainable Development) 94, 180 5 Hartridge, D 76 Iga, M 236 6 Harvey, D 2, 230, 255, 270 immigration 26, 193, 198, 201, 204, Hauknes, J 6 236, 242; Service Provider Visa 202; 7 Head, S 263 see also migrant labour 8 health, right to 130 income, widening gap in 2, 190–1 9 health services 1, 9, 10, 49, 56, 91, 95, India 3, 4, 10, 11, 16, 26, 44, 203, 321; 40111 96–7, 98, 101, 104, 108, 128, 135; bilateral trade agreements 57, 321; call 1 hospitals 107, 119, 125; private 125, centres 206, 208–13; and cultural 130–1; Thailand 131; travelling services 230, 250; and Doha round 46, 2 overseas for 130; United Kingdom PFI 95, 114, 194; and education services 3 funding 138, 139, 141, 142; universal 234, 243, 244; energy 284, 290; 44111 access to 130–1; World Development GATS, resistance to 58, 60, 61, 65, 386 Index

1111 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 84–5; GATS 2000 intellectual property 20, 40, 62, 71, 72, 2 negotiations 43, 46, 47, 48, 50, 200–1, 81, 131, 167, 169, 224, 227, 229; 3 203–4, 320; Group of 20 46; higher indigenous peoples 268; see also education 225; India Shining 84–5, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 4 194, 209, 212, 213; IT industry 11, of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 5 170, 196, 197, 200, 201, 206–10, 229; International Alliance of Midwives 129 6 migrant labour from 194, 198, 200–1; International Association for the Study of 7 National Association of Software and Insurance Economics Programme for 8 Service Companies (NASSCOM) 196; Research on the Service Economy ‘new Quad’, member of 46, 47, 201; (PROGRES) 79–80 9 outsourcing destination 196, 197, International Aviation Transport 1011 200–1, 206–7, 208–13; United States, Association (IATA) 63 1 relations with 58–9, 65, 194, 198, International Bank for Reconstruction 2 200, 201, 207, 213; and US-Gambling and Development, see World Bank 3 case 180, 181; water supply 266 International Cancún Declaration of 4 Indian Institute of Management 244 Indigenous Peoples 279 indigenous peoples: and colonialism 225; International Centre for the Settlement of 5 knowledge 268; resistance to trade in Investment Disputes 309 6 services agreements 85; rights 55; and International Chamber of Commerce 7 tourism 277, 278, 279 (ICC) 79 8 Indonesia 48, 49, 52, 79, 195; energy International Confederation of Free 9 290, 304; water services 135 Trade Unions 86, 205 industry 22, 65, 114; tariffs 115; see also International Court of Justice 286, 300 20111 specific industries International Energy Agency 287, 288 1 inequalities 13, 16, 19, 20, 75, 94, 123, International Federation of Coalitions for 2 130–1, 145, 155, 184–5, 214, 304, Cultural Diversity 253 3 319, 322, 325; income 2, 190–1; see International Federation of Private Water 4 also gender inequalities; race Operators (AquaFed) 135 5 inequalities International Finance Corporation (IFC) ‘information economy’ 167 99, 147, 228, 245, 267; EdInvest 6 information technologies 8–9, 11, 69, Facility 246 7 152, 154, 155–6; China 11, 229; International Financial Services, London 8 and cultural and knowledge exchange 38, 79 9 224, 227, 228, 230; and export of International Forum on Indigenous 30111 professional services 9; India 11, Tourism 278 170, 196, 197, 201, 206–10, 229; International Labour Organization 205; 1 and offshore outsourcing 195, 196; International Standard Classification of 2 regulation of 13; remote control of Occupations 198 3 data 306–8; and splintering of services International Liaison Committee of 4 7, 79, 195, 287; see also digital divide; Coalitions for Cultural Diversity 248 5 digital technologies; e-commerce; International Mass Retail Association 6 internet 271 Infosys 206–7, 209 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 10, 7 Innisfree 139 15, 19, 20, 21, 36, 42, 74, 102, 104, 8 innovation 227 317; and financial services and 9 Institute for Agriculture and Trade telecommunications 153, 161; and 40111 Policy 266 foreign investment 281; and higher 1 insurance 78, 79, 158, 159, 161, 172–3, education 229; and Millennium 266 Development Goals 91, 112; and 2 Integrated Framework for Technical Philippines 145, 146, 147; Poverty 3 Assistance to Least-developed Reduction Strategies 89, 97–100, 102, 44111 Countries 102–3 104; protests against 110; and Index 387

1111 retirement income plans 182; structural GATS genesis 63, 70, 79; Japan- 2 adjustment programmes 69, 97; and Distribution Services case 258–9; 3 Venezuela 304, 309; World Bank, labour market 200; and Millennium relationship with 42, 91–23, 97–8 Development Goals 112; and PFIs 4 International Network for Cultural 142; regional trade agreements 51, 5 Diversity (INCD) 248, 249, 253–4 321; and resolution of political 6 International Network on Cultural Policy disputes in WTO 300; retail market 7 (INCP) 248, 249, 250 272, 273, 320; telecommunications 8 International Organization for Migration 167; and Understanding on 103 Commitments on Financial Services 9 International Telecommunication Union 159–60; United States, relations with 1011 (ITU) 16, 62, 63, 165–6 68; and US-Gambling case 180, 181; 1 International Telecommunications Users and World Summit for Sustainable 2 Group 157 Development 115 3111 International Trade Centre 102, 103 Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership 4 international trade in services, see Agreement 150–1 services, international trade in Jara, A 46 5 International Trade Union Congress 86 Jaramillo, F 69 6 International Union of Foodworkers Jessop, B 122, 123 7 (IUF) 134, 267 Jha, V 197, 201 8 internet 25, 155, 168, 169; China’s Joint Integrated Technical Assistance 9 firewall 169–70; and education 234; Programme (JITAP) 103 gambling case 32, 38, 42, 169; and Jones, GR 245–6 20111 opposition to trade in services Jones, T 135 1 agreements 87; US-Gambling case Jonquières, G de 84 2 174–81, 272, 320 Jordan 54, 204, 205, 295, 310, 311 3 Internet Gambling Council 179 Jospin, L 248 4 INTESA 307, 308, 309 Joy, C 276 5 investment, see foreign investment Joy, RM 101, 310 Iran 284, 286, 288, 296, 298, 301–2, Julsaint, M. 44 6 310, 311, 313–15 Jung, I 245 7 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act 1996 301–2 Juscanz group 115 8 Iran Sanctions Act 2007 302 Jussawala, MF 156, 163 9 Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 302 30111 Iraq 195, 215, 218, 219; energy Kahnawake Mohawk territory 178 resources 284, 286, 292, 296, 297–8, Kamidza, R 54 1 299, 304, 310, 311, 315–17 Kapstein, E 153 2 Ireland 196, 208 Karnataka 209, 210; see also Bangalore 3 Islamic states 311, 313, 314–15, 316 Katz, J 16 4 Israel 68, 81, 232, 251, 296, 298, 311 Kaufman, RR 97 5 Israeli-Palestinian conflict 296 Kazakhstan 310 6 Kelsey, J 31, 53, 101, 232, 237 Jackson, JH 256, 257, 258 Kenya 48, 49, 238, 264 7 Jamaica 70 Kerneis, P 134 8 Japan 4, 11, 81, 259; audio-visual Kerruish, V 17, 32 9 services 232; bilateral trade agreements Kertzer, J 229 40111 150–1, 321, 324; and cultural services Khor, M 93, 116, 303 1 250; Doha round 46; Economic Kirkbride, M 100 Partnership Agreements 57; and Kluver, R 170 2 education services 235, 236; and Knight, J 235 3 energy 284, 289; GATS 2000 knowledge creation and exchange 221–2; 44111 negotiations 45, 49, 134–5; and marketising 225–9; and neoclassical 388 Index

1111 trade theory 223–4; state-directed Lawrence, G 263 2 approaches 224–5; see also education Lay, K 288 3 ‘knowledge economy’ 8, 11, 224, 228 Lazaro, DC 150 Kodak 258–9 least developed countries 20, 27; ACP 4 Konefal, J 255, 262, 263 countries 53; debt cancellation 97–8, 5 Korea, North 298, 313 101, 108, 112, 114; Doha round 45, 6 Korea, South 44, 46, 49, 54, 79, 150, 46, 47; Integrated Framework for 7 229, 259, 266, 271, 273; GATS 2000 Technical Assistance to Least- 8 negotiations 49, 134–5; US-Korea Free developed Countries 102–3; World Trade Agreement 86, 223, 240–1, 252, Trade Organization accession 100–2, 9 293, 320 107–8, 310; see also North/South 1011 Kostecki, M 13 divisions; trade-related rights and 1 KPMG 142, 143, 245 development; and specific countries 2 Krajewski, M 124, 125, 127 Lebanon 296, 310 3 Krugman, P 153 legal services 125 4 Kurian, R 195 Lenn, MP 245 Kuwait 69, 219, 286, 290, 295, 297–8 Lerman, S 245 5 Kwa, A 40, 113 Leys, C 120 6 Kyrgyz Republic 310 Leyton-Brown, D 292 7 Liberalisation of Trade in Services 8 labour 105; affective 12, 189; child Committee (LOTIS) 38, 79, 83, 157 9 labour 205; content in services vs Libya 284, 301, 304, 310, 311, 313; commodities 12; immaterial 12, 189; Libya Texaco case 286 20111 integration agreements 28; managerial licensing requirements 29 1 and mundane, distinctions between Lindio-McGovern, L 191, 214 2 1–2, 12, 189, 193, 194; mobility 74, Lindner, C 257 3 189, 190, 193; redistribution of wealth Lines, T 264, 271 4 from labour to capital 190, 207; Lion Nathan School of Business Ltd 243 5 semi- and unskilled 12, 26, 49, 191–2, Lister, J 139 194, 200, 203, 211; services workers Lloyd’s of London 79 6 as tradeable commodities 190–3; shift logging, see forestry 7 from manual to mental 12, 196; logistics 269 8 see also division of labour; migrant Lomé agreements 32, 256, 258, 259 9 labour; trade unions Low, P 107 30111 labour markets: deregulation 121, 123, Luce, S. 206, 208, 211 185, 190, 230; ‘flexibilised’ 12, 121, 1 190, 194; and higher education 226; Maastricht Treaty 51, 124 2 integrated 28; public sector 121 Macao 180, 181 3 Lamy, P 50, 113, 136 McBurnie, G 237 4 Larsen, K 235, 242 MacDonald, Mott 139 5 Latin America 51, 54, 68, 74, 103, 160, McKinsey Global Institute 207–8, 209 6 235, 320; debt crisis 69; EC-Bananas Maclellan, N 219 case 256–8; and education services McMichael, P 264, 274 7 237, 243; energy 292, 293, 309; higher McMurtry, J 227 8 education 225, 229; leftist leaders, Madrick, J 6 9 threat to US 303, 322–3; natural Mahler, SJ 195 40111 resources 293; outsourcing destination Malaysia 47, 48, 49, 150, 15, 161, 237, 1 206, 208; private management of 271, 288, 290, 302 water in 96; retirement income plans Malig, ML 117, 315 2 182; supermarkets 271; see also Mamani, A 137 3 specific countries managerial and mundane labour, 44111 law, public international 41 distinctions between 1–2, 12 Index 389

1111 Manchester, A 217 meta-regulation 13, 123, 152, 158–61, 2 Manila 134, 149 204, 221, 319–20 3 manufacturing 6–7, 8, 11, 12, 122 Meunier, S 257 Marcos, F 144, 146 Mexico 51, 55, 65, 85, 156, 171, 172; 4 maritime services 43, 48, 63, 70, 74, 77, and cultural services 231–2, 249, 250; 5 265, 269, 277 energy 288, 290, 292, 304; foreign 6 market access, for services 13, 19, 27, investment in 266, 281; retail market 7 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37–8, 42, 59, 271; telecommunications dispute 41, 8 70, 73, 74, 75, 101, 106; audio-visual 42, 128, 164–6; tourism 279–83; and services 232; energy-related services United States sanctions 300, 302; 9 291, 313; GATS 2000 negotiations 45, water supply 266, 281–2; see also 1011 59, 114; financial services 159, 160, North American Free Trade Agreement 1 172–3; government procurement MFN, see most favoured nation 2 exclusion 127; Japan-Distribution treatment 3111 Services case 259; labour 193, 194, Michaels, L 264, 270, 274 4 200, 202–3; and PFIs 143; public Middle East 244, 284, 285, 291, 292, services 126, 127; supermarkets 272; 294–6; see also Arab states; Gulf 5 tourism 279; telecommunications 162, States; and specific countries 6 163, 164, 167; US-Gambling case 177; midwife services 15, 128–30 7 water services 132, 134; and World migrant labour 26, 70, 103, 189, 190, 8 Development Report 2004, Making 191–3, 213–20; bilateral and regional 9 Services Work for Poor People 106 agreements 204–6; contractual services market-oriented approach 2–3, 5, 19, suppliers (CSS) 202; GATS 2000 20111 89–91; cultural exchange 229–30, negotiations 200–4, 215; men 191–2, 1 231–3, 238–41; and GATS 4; impact 214, 215; migration-for-remittances 2 on human rights and development 190, 191, 197, 214–20, 320; mode 1 3 89–118; impact on social development 195–7, 197, 200, 201–4; mode 3 200, 4 110–18; knowledge creation and 201; mode 4 131, 193–5, 197–8, 199, 5 exchange 225–9, 234–8, 242–3; public 200–4, 214, 215, 220, 320; Service services 119–23; and trade in services Provider Visa 202; virtual 196; wages 6 agreements 3, 5, 13–14; World 190, 192, 193; women 191–2, 214, 7 Development Report 2004, Making 215; see also immigration 8 Services Work for Poor People Mihyo, PB 225, 228, 235 9 105–10; see also neoliberalism Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 30111 Marshall, A 98 89, 91, 104, 111–12, 114, 116, 118, Mashayekhi, M 44 119, 123, 137; MDG1 111; MDG7 1 Mateo, F de 48, 49 102, 111, 135; MDG8 91, 96, 112, 2 Mattoo, A 33, 56, 92, 107–10, 161, 201, 135 3 202–3 Millennium Summit, United Nations 90, 4 Maule, C 231 91, 111–12 5 Mauritius 44 Mining, Minerals and Sustainable 6 Maxwell, R 186 Development project 117 Mbeke, T 122–3 Minns, R 183, 185, 186 7 Medalla, EM 150 Mirant Corporation 147, 148 8 media 86, 221, 223, 224, 229, 230, 245 model schedules 45, 47, 107, 202–4, 289 9 Melbourne University Private 243–4 modes of supply, see GATS modes of 40111 men: in call centres 211; migrant labour supply 1 191–2, 214, 215, 218–20 Monbiot, G 231, 272 Menotti, V 307 Mongolia 50 2 Mercosur 309 monopolies 29, 30, 31, 109, 121, 125, 3 Meridian (Fijian recruitment firm) 219 127, 131, 154, 158, 173, 235, 287, 44111 Merrill Lynch 78 289, 290 390 Index

1111 Monsanto 266–7 Making Services Work for Poor 2 Monterrey Consensus 114–15, 116 People 106 3 Moore, M 82 natural resources 255, 256–61, 279, 291, Morales, E 75, 136, 322 321; UN Commission on Permanent 4 Morgan, B 13, 18 Sovereignty of Natural Resources 286 5 Morocco 49, 205, 249, 250, 295 ‘necessity’ tests 35, 38, 39, 56, 107, 136, 6 most favoured nation (MFN) treatment 170, 272, 289 7 13, 28, 29, 53, 59, 73, 74, 324; audio- negative lists 31–2, 37, 51, 56, 73, 74, 8 visual services 232; EC-Bananas case 102, 131, 232, 312, 323 32, 257; e-commerce 167; education Negri, A 7, 11, 12, 152, 155, 189 9 services 235; financial services 75, 160, neoclassical trade theory, application to 1011 184; government procurement cultural and knowledge exchange 1 exclusion 35, 127; health services 131; 222–4 2 labour 199; supermarkets 272; neocorporatism 122 3 telecommunications 172; and US- neoliberalism 2–3, 4, 7, 9, 13, 20, 30, 4 Gambling case 180 34–5, 75, 77, 84, 90, 112; backlash MRAs, see mutual recognition against 122; ‘democratic deficit’ of 5 agreements 319; mainstreaming 91; TINA 3, 323; 6 Multilateral Agreement on Investment see also market-oriented approach 7 (MAI) 25, 84, 85, 87, 248, 281; and neostatism 122 8 cultural sovereignty 248 Netherlands 136, 271, 285 9 multilateral trade agreements 4, 9, 22, New Delhi 68, 73 50, 56, 60; see also Doha round; New International Economic Order 17, 20111 General Agreement on Trade in 19, 286 1 Services; World Trade Organization New Partnership for Africa’s 2 Mundy, K 236 Development (NEPAD) 52 3 Murdoch, R 244 New York 73 4 Murdock, G 232 New Zealand 31; audio-visual services 5 Mushita, TA 293 232; Australia New Zealand Closer Muttitt, G 294 Economic Relations Trade Agreement 6 mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) (ANZCERTA) 51, 73, 232; bilateral 7 143, 245 trade agreements 51, 52; education 8 Myles, J 188 services 227, 234, 235, 237–8, 243; 9 Fiji, relations with 214, 215, 217; 30111 NAFTA, see North American Free Trade GATS 2000 negotiations 43, 45, 46, Agreement 49; and GATS genesis 73; NZ- 1 National Association of Software and Thailand Closer Economic Partnership 2 Service Companies (NASSCOM, Agreement 204; regional trade 3 India) 196, 209, 211 agreements 51; trade in services 4 National Committee for International activists 85; and World Summit for 5 Trade in Education (NCITE) 236 Sustainable Development 115 6 National Foreign Trade Council (US) Newberry, S 9, 38, 142 78 News Corporation 244 7 national treatment 13, 27, 28, 29, 30–1, Nicaragua 69, 278, 293, 300, 309 8 32, 70, 73, 74, 75, 106; audio-visual Nicolaidis, K 14, 20, 77, 81, 121, 169, 9 services 232; EC-Bananas case 257; 241 40111 and education subsidies 126, 237; Nigeria 49, 69, 290 1 financial services 159, 173; government Noble, DF 245 procurement exclusion 35, 127, 134; non-agricultural market access (NAMA) 2 health services 125; labour 202–3; and 45, 46, 49, 256, 261, 269, 270, 303, 3 PFIs 143; supermarkets 272; tourism 323 44111 279; World Development Report 2004, Non-Aligned Movement 19 Index 391

1111 non-discrimination 28–9, 30–1 High Level Group on Trade and 2 non-government organisations (NGOs) Related Problems 61, 79; and 3 111, 116; activist 84, 85, 86, 91, 95, Millennium Development Goals 112; 107, 112, 235, 248, 319 ‘positive adjustment’ work 64; and 4 non-state actors 91, 122 retirement income plans 182–3, 184; 5 North American Free Trade Agreement seminar on trade and migration 103; 6 (NAFTA) 26, 51, 54, 55, 74, 85, 160, Trade Committee 15, 16, 62, 63, 65, 7 172, 204, 231–2, 233, 280, 283, 80; and Understanding on 8 292–3, 322; and United States Commitments in Financial Services sanctions 300, 302 159–60; see also Multilateral 9 North/South divisions 11–12, 19–20, 40, Agreement on Investment (MAI) 1011 234; Council for Trade in Services OECD countries 6, 46, 232; and energy 1 assessments 44; cultural exchange 289, 290; and GATS genesis 66, 67, 2 222–3, 224–5, 229–30, 248; Doha 69, 70; retirement income plans 182; 3111 round 76, 95; energy 284–91; food and WTO accessions commitments 4 production and supply 261–76; free 101 trade agreements 50, 95, 321–2; GATS Ohlhoff, S 301 5 1994 17, 27, 28–9, 40, 43, 44–5, 323; oil, see energy 6 GATS 2000 negotiations 39, 43, 45, Oman 205, 290, 295, 310, 311 7 47, 100; GATS, genesis of 20, 58–60, OPEC, see Organization of Petroleum 8 61, 62, 66–71, 72–3, 74, 81; income Exporting Countries 9 12, 190–1; international division of Operation Enduring Freedom 298 labour 1, 5, 11, 20, 189, 190, 200, ‘organic intellectuals’: of capital 82, 84, 20111 206, 220, 230; knowledge creation and 324; of resistance 84, 319 1 exchange 224–9, 242–3; labour 26, Organization for Economic Cooperation 2 190–5, 196, 198–9, 200–20; trade in and Development see OECD 3 services agreements 17, 84–6, 321–2; Organization of American States 249 4 tourism 276–83; United Nations Organization of Petroleum Exporting 5 Conference on Financing for Countries (OPEC) 285, 286–7, 295, Development 114–15; World Summit 298, 304, 309, 311, 312 6 for Sustainable Development 116–18; Ortega, D 294 7 WTO Working Party on Trade, Debt Ostrovsky, A 27 8 and Finance 94; see also developing outsourcing: of cultural services 230; of 9 countries education-related services 245; of 30111 Norway 63, 66, 134–5, 227, 238 energy-related services 287, 289; of Nowell Smith, G 82, 84 government functions and social 1 nuclear weapons 298, 313–14 services 7, 121, 122; of intra-firm 2 nurses, export from Fiji 214, 215–18 services 7; of manufacturing 11; 3 offshore 7, 9, 191, 192, 195–7, 200, 4 Observatory on Borderless Higher 202–3, 206–8, 265; see also call 5 Education 246 centres 6 OECD 14–15, 16, 20, 25, 137; Centre Oxfam 100 for Educational Research and Oyer, H 302 7 Innovation (CERI) 226–7; Code of 8 Liberalisation of Current Invisible Pacific Economic Agreement on Closer 9 Operations 62; Committee on Economic Relations (PACER) 215 40111 Financial and Fiscal Affairs 62; and Pakistan 69, 290, 311 1 education services 235, 236, 242, 244; Panagariya, A 56 and financial services and Panama 205, 278 2 telecommunications 153, 160; and Pan-Arab Free Trade Area 295 3 ‘GATS attack’ 83; and GATS genesis Paraguay 48, 309 44111 61, 62–5, 66, 67, 68, 69, 73, 79, 81; Partnerships UK (PUK) 139, 140, 142 392 Index

1111 Paul, H 268 Poverty Reduction Strategies 89, 91, 2 Pauwelyn, J 37–8, 177, 178 97–100, 102, 103, 104, 115, 142 3 peak oil 21, 284, 325 power 1, 2, 5, 17, 52–3, 122, 145, 152, Pearson plc 245 154, 206; inequalities in 16, 19, 20, 4 pension schemes: contribution based 184, 81, 84, 91, 106, 109, 262–3, 321 5 185, 186; Fiji, as funding for temporary President’s Trade Promotion Authority 6 migration 216; and GATS 183–4; 173 7 gender inequality 184–5; pre-funded PriceWaterhouseCoopers 142, 143 8 183; private 181–2, 183–8; public 181, Primo Braga, CA 101 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187 privacy protection 167 9 Peru 59, 85, 205, 290, 294 private finance initiatives (PFIs) 33, 35, 1011 Pessar, PR 195 119, 121, 122; conflicts of interest 1 Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad 142; secondary market in contracts 2 Anómina (PDVSA) 288, 290, 304, 141–2; United Kingdom 137–44 3 305–7 private sector: services 7, 10, 123, 130–1; 4 petroleum, see energy United Nations Conference on Philippine Institute for Development Financing for Development 114; World 5 Studies 150 Development Report 2004, Making 6 Philippine Overseas Employment Services Work for Poor People 105–6 7 Administration 194 privatisation 3, 7, 8, 9, 31, 33, 35, 97, 8 Philippines 48, 49; agriculture, financing 98, 99, 101, 105, 106, 117, 119, 9 266; bilateral trade agreements 150–1; 121–2, 190; and cultural exchange Chamber of Commerce and Industry 230, 232; financial services 121, 156; 20111 150; Constitution 1987 144–5, 149, and GATS 123, 124; opposition to 84, 1 150, 151, 320; debt 146, 149; energy 86; second phase 137–8; 2 144–51, 290; Japan-Philippines telecommunications 121, 142, 154; 3 Economic Partnership Agreement water services 132–7, 142 4 150–1; migrant labour from 194, 195, production: integration of information 5 214; migrant labour to 217; opposition into 11, 12; reorganisation of 6–8, 9, to trade in services agreements 84; 195, 206, 262 6 water services 134, 135; WTO professional services 78; Decision on 7 accession 145–6 Professional Services 38; response to 8 Philippines Energy Ad Hoc Working globalisation 9; Working Party on 9 Group 151 Domestic Regulation 38–9; see also 30111 Philippines 2000 privatisation strategy accountancy 145 public choice 105, 121 1 Picciotto, S 22, 41, 96 Public Citizen 135 2 Pierson, P 188 public management 119, 121 3 Pinochet, A 75, 185, 186, 229 public-private partnerships (PPPs) 35, 91, 4 Pogge, T 111, 112 104–5, 116, 117, 119, 122, 137; 5 policy transfer, international 2 environmental sector 133, 135; and 6 Pollock, A 138, 139 GATS 124; offshore outsourcing 196, positive lists 29, 31, 32, 35, 37, 38, 44, 208; university research 227 7 60, 73, 74, 75, 202–3 public-public partnerships (PUPs) 143 8 postal services 125 public sector 124; restructuring 7, 9 9 poverty 85, 89, 91, 96, 97, 111–12, 113, public services 7, 9, 10, 14, 34–5, 87, 40111 117, 213, 228, 280, 318; in old age 108, 137; defining 120; and GATS 1 182, 185, 186, 187; MDG1 111; and 106, 120, 121, 123–8, 137; legal migration-for-remittances 214, 215; obligations 34–5, 130–2; marketised 2 World Development Report 2004, 96, 119–23; midwife services 128–30; 3 Making Services Work for Poor protection of 106; unbundling 7, 29, 44111 People 93, 105–10 33, 106, 124, 147, 154, 163, 195, Index 393

1111 245, 287, 289; user charges 121, 127, Roy, A 212 2 130; see also pension schemes; Roy, M 50, 55, 56 3 privatisation; and specific sector Royal Dutch Shell 285, 304 services Royal Indian Raj International 4 Public Services International (PSI) 234 Corporation 209 5 Public Warehousing Company (PWC, Ruggiero, R 4, 93, 161 6 Kuwait) 219 Russia 4, 51, 100, 271, 284, 288, 295, 7 302, 310, 321 8 qualification requirements 29, 31 Rwanda 230 Qatar 290, 295 9 Salas, M 256, 257, 258 1011 race inequalities: education 242; labour Salinas, C 231, 282 1 market 190, 193, 211–13, 215; Salmi, J 228 2 retirement income 185 Samonte-Pesacayo, S 147 3111 Raghavan, C 10, 17, 36, 69, 81, 87, Sampson, GP 92 4 161 Sánchez-Ruiz, E 232 Ramos, F 145, 146, 151 sanitation 98, 105, 115, 118, 119, 133, 5 Ranade, S 178, 181 135 6 Ranald, P 292 Santa Fe IV document 293 7 Ratha, D 214 Santiago, LQ 230 8 Raworth, P 158, 162, 173 Sassen, S 191 9 Reagan, R 65, 75 Saudi Arabia 286, 288, 290, 295, 304, Reddick, A 156 311–13 20111 Reddy, M 216 Saudi Aramco 288, 313 1 Reed, J 78 Sauvé, P 39, 43, 83, 123, 124, 126, 159, 2 Reference Paper on Basic 160, 170, 171–2 3 Telecommunications 39 savings, retirement 182 4 regional development banks 103 Schloemann, HL 301 5 regional trade agreements 3, 4, 25–6, 28, Schneiderman, D 13 50, 55, 57, 59, 321, 324; campaigns Schrijver, N 19 6 against 60; energy-related services 292, Schugurensky, D 225, 235 7 293–5; and exceptions 36; and labour Science Applications International 8 204–6; types 50 Corporation (SAIC) 306–7 9 Reichart, T 264, 271 Seattle to Brussels Network 53 30111 research 227, 229, 267–8 Secondary Market Infrastructure Fund restrictive business practices 31 142 1 retail market, see supermarkets; and securities 159, 161 2 under specific countries Security and Prosperity Partnership 55 3 retirement income, see pension schemes; security exception 36, 285, 291–2, 4 saving, retirement 296–302, 308, 314 5 Reuters 83 security workers in conflict zones, Fijian 6 Rey report 61, 79 215–20 Riesco, M 185, 186 self-determination 19, 83, 85, 88, 99, 7 Rimban, L 147 221, 223, 270, 278, 283 8 Robert W Baird and Co. 246 Senegal 249 9 Roberts, G 245 service providers: exclusive 29, 30, 31, 40111 Robertson, S 235 127; foreign 29; legal form 30; parity 1 Robinson, J 78 between 15; World Development Robinson, V 208 Report 2004, Making Services Work 2 Rohlfs, JH 163, 167 for Poor People 106; see also supply 3 Rokoduru, A 220 Service Sectoral Classification List, see 44111 Romania 207, 228–9 W/120 394 Index

1111 services: commodification of 2, 5, 7, 13, social movements 51, 60, 85, 86, 91, 2 15, 104, 120, 121, 128, 152, 221; 136, 190, 319 3 domestic 4, 9–10, 16, 29, 30, 31, social services 7, 9, 10, 87, 90, 97–9, 37–9; fragmentation of 33; impact 119, 122 4 of information technologies 7, 122; socio-regulatory adjustment 13–14, 123, 5 impact of reorganisation of production 241 6 6–7; inter-firm 7; intra-firm 7; policies Solomon Islands 255, 259–61 7 on 2, 4, 16, 34, 122; private sector Sørenson, O 238 8 7, 10, 123, 130–1; regulation of Sorsa, P 36, 161 2–3, 4, 9, 13–14, 16, 29, 31, 37–9; South Africa 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 84, 117, 9 secondary service industries 122; social 122–3; and education services 234, 1011 nature of 1–2, 4–5, 12, 13, 15, 20, 238; energy 290; outsourcing 1 96, 104, 318–19; see also classification destination 196, 208; retail market 2 of services; professional services; 271; water services 134, 135 3 public services; social services; South Africa Contact Centre Community 4 universal access to services; and (Sacccom) 208 specific sectors South Centre 93–4, 104, 192, 201, 202 5 ‘services economy’ 2, 5, 6, 8, 9 South Korea, see Korea, South 6 services, international trade in 9–12; South/North divisions, see North/South 7 assessment by Council for Trade in divisions 8 Services 44–5; barriers to 62, 63–4; South/South cooperation 93 9 contractual relationships 13–14, 19; South/South free trade agreements 50, GATS definition 22, 25–7; info- 52, 53 20111 industrial model 11; and national Southern countries, see developing 1 services markets 14–15; physical countries; least developed countries 2 geography of 11–12; service industry sovereignty: people’s 84, 144, 286, 3 model 11; social geography of 11–12; 318–19, 324; state 18, 19, 20, 24, 38, 4 socio-regulatory adjustment 13–14, 40, 131, 145, 221, 286, 297, 311, 5 123, 241; statistics 9–11; see also 319, 324 trade in services agreements Soviet Union 3, 226, 227, 307, 323 6 ‘services mafia’ 76–82 Spain 79, 253, 273, 313 7 Services World Forum 80 special purpose vehicles (SPVs) 139–40 8 Sexton, S 183, 185, 186 Spinex Resources Top 100 retailers 270, 9 Shaffer, G 20, 41 271 30111 Shaoul, J 139, 140, 141 Spires, T 245 Shashikant, S 50, 53, 55 Spivak, G 18 1 Shaw, W 214 splintering of services 7, 79, 195, 287 2 Shelp, R 77–8 Sreberny, A 230, 231 3 Shiva, V 117, 266–7 Sri Lanka 69 4 Shukla, SP 16–17, 19, 59, 65, 66, 67, stakeholders 91, 95, 103, 106, 115, 116, 5 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 319–20 117, 122 6 Sidak, JG 163, 165, 166, 167 standards, technical 29, 37, 143, 170, Siegel, DE 93 199, 253, 256 7 Singapore 36, 50, 52, 150, 154, 172, Steinbrecher, R 268 8 191–2, 201, 204, 205, 229, 240, 244 Stiglitz, JE 97, 153 9 Singer, HJ 163, 165, 166 Stoppard, A 134 40111 Singh, JP 70, 74 Storey, D 215 1 Singh, VP 71 Street, J 230 Slatter, C 214, 277 subsidies 30, 37, 73, 108, 131, 323; 2 SLM Corporate (Sallie Mae) 246–7 agriculture 264, 266; education 126, 3 Snape, RH 19 237, 268; targeted 105 44111 social class 1, 12, 189, 190 Sudan 310 Index 395

1111 Suez water company 132, 133, 134, 135, negotiations 170–1, 172; International 2 136, 137, 281–2 Simple Resale 165; Mexican dispute 3 Sumner, C 5 41, 42, 128, 164–6; privatisation 121, Supachai, P 93, 95 142, 154; regulating 162–7; universal 4 supermarkets 255, 262–4, 270–6; impact access to 131; Uruguay round 5 on local community and retail sector negotiations 157–8, 162–7; value- 6 270, 271, 272–6 added 168, 171, 172; see also 7 supply chains, internationally integrated information technologies 8 6, 7; public services 124; see also Television without Frontiers 168 education, higher; food production and Telmex 164, 165, 166 9 supply chains Tesco plc 270, 271, 275 1011 supply of services: GATS definition 26–7; Texaco 285, Libya-Texaco case 286; see 1 see also GATS modes of supply; also Chevron Texaco 2 service providers Thailand 48, 49, 52, 85, 150, 192, 195, 3111 sustainable development 115–18, 255; 204; and East Asian financial crisis 4 and trade in services agreements 255, 153; energy 290; National Human 256–61; World Summit for Sustainable Rights Commission 131; retail market 5 Development, Johannesburg 115–18, 274–6; US-Thailand Free Trade 6 132, 137; see also environment Agreement 150, 275, 293, 320 7 Sweeney, J 205 Thaksin, S 85, 275, 293, 320 8 Switzerland 45, 46, 69, 70, 134–5, 172, Thames Water 133, 134, 135 9 235, 238 Thanh, VT 52, 150 Sykes Corporation 208 Thatcher, M 63, 75, 79, 186 20111 Syria 296 Third Way 115, 122, 138, 232 1 Third World, see developing countries; 2 Taipei 237 least developed countries 3 Taiwan 46, 51, 134–5, 229, 238, 250, Thomson Learning 244, 245 4 260 Time Warner 231 5 Tajikistan 310 TINA (There Is No Alternative) 3, 323 Tandon, Y 50, 52–3 tourism 9, 25, 61, 78, 161, 256, 260–1, 6 Tanzania 156 276–83; eco-tourism 277–8, 282; 7 Tascon, L 310 impact on local communities 276, 8 taxation, direct 74 277–8, 279–83; and indigenous 9 Taylor, RD 156, 163 peoples 277, 278, 279–83; sustainable 30111 Tayob, R 50, 53, 55 277 Teaiwa, T 218 Trachtman, JP 176, 177, 178 1 technical assistance 102–4, 109; trade in services agreements 3, 9; as 2 Integrated Framework for Technical meta-regulation 13, 123, 152, 158–61, 3 Assistance to Least-developed 204, 221, 319–20; and cultural 4 Countries 102–3; Joint Integrated exchange 252–4; and development 91, 5 Technical Assistance Programme 100, 116; and energy 149, 284; and 6 (JITAP) 103; World Bank Public human rights 131; and knowledge Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility and cultural exchange 221, 226; 7 (PPIAF) 142 new generation 321–4; opposition 8 technological neutrality 32, 129, 168, to 82–8, 123, 234–5, 244, 318–19, 9 176, 197, 238, 323 322–3; and PFI privatisations 143; 40111 technology transfer 6, 70, 116, 264, 291 politicised nature of 5, 102; and 1 telecommunications 7, 8, 9, 29, 31, 33, public services 119; and retail markets 39, 42–3, 49, 51, 59, 69, 74, 87, 97, 271, 272–3; self-referencing nature of 2 152–3; as social phenomenon 153–6, 17–18; and sustainability 255, 256–61; 3 164, 165, 166, 229; bilateral unsustainability of 318, 321–5; and 44111 agreements 55, 56, 173; GATS 2000 Western states’ dominance 17; see also 396 Index

1111 General Agreement on Trade in 142; and supermarkets 9, 270; World 2 Services; services, international trade in Development Report 2004, Making 3 Trade Policy Research Centre, London Services Work for Poor People 105; 61, 79; High-Level Group on Services see also air transport; maritime services 4 79 Treaty of Rome 1957 64–5 5 trade-related rights and development Treaty of Vienna 101 6 89–91; case studies 104–10; TRIMS, see Agreement on Trade-related 7 institutional coherence 91–7; Investment Measures 8 operational coherence 102–4; policy TRIPS, see Agreement on Trade-Related coherence 97–102 Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 9 trade unions 83, 85, 86, 122, 134, 197, Tsang, J 303 1011 204–6, 211, 217, 234 Tucker, T 201 1 Tran, V-T 70, 71 Tunisia 134 2 transfers and payments, international 31 Turkey 45, 290 3 transnational corporations 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 4 15, 20, 26, 41, 47, 67, 84, 94, 109, Uganda 69 303, 319–20; agro-chemicals 267–8; unbundling 7, 29, 33, 106, 124, 147, 5 and alignment of trade with aid 53; 154, 163, 195, 245, 287, 289 6 banks 156; and cultural and unemployment 99, 185, 194, 208, 213, 7 knowledge exchange 224, 230; and 215, 219 8 education 235; and energy 285, 287, UNESCO 234, 253; Convention on the 9 288, 289, 290, 295–6, 302, 304, 308, Protection and Promotion of the 309, 312–13; and food supply 261–76; Diversity of Cultural Expressions 249, 20111 Fortune 500 companies 91, 270; 250–4; World Declaration on Higher 1 guaranteed rights 89; and human Education for the Twenty-First 2 rights 130; inability of GATS to meet Century 225; World Water 3 needs 323; and intellectual property Development Report 2003 266 4 rights 81; and offshore outsourcing Unilever 262 5 206; personnel working internationally Union of Industrial and Employers’ 189, 194, 200; and PFIs 142, 143; Confederations of Europe (UNICE) 6 post-conflict stabilisation and 226 7 reconstruction 298–9; and public unions (labour) 83, 85, 86, 122, 134, 8 services transformation 119–20, 123; 197, 204–6, 211, 217, 234 9 subsidiaries, joint ventures and United Arab Emirates 290, 205 30111 branches 173; UNCTAD Code of United Filipinos in Hong Kong 191 Conduct for Transnational United Kingdom 10, 11, 38, 122, 259; 1 Corporations 67; United States 13, 58, agriculture 264; Army, Fijians in 215, 2 59, 60, 61–2, 63, 74, 75, 77–8, 80, 218, 219; call centres 208; Department 3 151 (see also specific sectors and for International Development 95; and 4 corporations); and World Development education services 234; energy 285, 5 Report 2004, Making Services Work 294; and EC water requests to GATS 6 for Poor People 106; and World 2000 135; and GATS genesis 63, 64, Summit for Sustainable Development 69, 78, 79; Government 7 116–18; see also foreign investment; Communication Headquarters 8 and specific corporations (GCHQ) 137, 142; National Audit 9 transparency 70, 73, 74, 169, 173, 203, Office 141; on-line gambling industry 40111 259, 272, 289 178, 179–80; private finance initiatives 1 Transparency International Corruption (PFIs) 138–44; retailers 270, 274; Perceptions Index 144 retirement income plans 183, 185, 2 transport 1, 6, 7, 9, 74; for just-in-time 186–7; Select Committee on Public 3 delivery 264–5; government Accounts 143; supermarkets 270, 271, 44111 procurement 127; privatisation 121, 272, 273, 274; trade in services 66; Index 397

1111 Treasury 138–9, 141; UK Food Group services 232, 238; call centres 206, 2 262; US-UK Energy Dialogue 293 208, 211–12; Central Intelligence 3 United Nations: Charter functions 94, Agency 112; Chamber of Commerce 297; Commission on Permanent 61, 62, 63, 77, 78; China, imports 4 Sovereignty of Natural Resources 286; from 270; corporate lobby 58, 59, 60, 5 Economic and Social Council 61–2, 63, 75, 76, 77–80, 91, 115; and 6 (ECOSOC) 93; and GATS 42; cultural services 222–3, 231–2, 233, 7 Millennium Summit 90, 91; 248, 250, 251–2; e-commerce 167, 8 peacekeepers 215, 218; summits 90–1; 168, 169, 170; and education services Third World bloc 19, 20; Working 234–6, 237, 238, 243, 244–5, 246–7; 9 Group on the use of mercenaries EC-Bananas case 257, 258; and energy 1011 219–20; see also Central Product 284–5, 286, 287–9, 290, 291–2, 1 Classification 294–5, 296, 302, 304–10; fast track 2 United Nations Conference on Financing authority 49, 50, 51, 54, 86, 147, 150, 3111 for Development, Monterrey 112, 201, 209, 241, 284, 292, 294, 295, 4 114–15, 116, 137 322, 323; Federal Communications United Nations Conference on Trade and Commission (FCC) 152, 163; Fijian 5 Development (UNCTAD) 20, 44, 58, migration to 215; financial services 6 62, 67, 72, 86, 102; Code of Conduct trade 160, 161, 172, 173; foreign 7 for Transnational Corporations 67; policy 4; GATS 2000 negotiations 44, 8 conformity to mainstream views 93–4; 45, 46, 48, 49, 134–5, 201, 203, 204; 9 and energy 285–6, 291, 292, 312; and ‘GATS attack’ 83; and GATS and government procurement 127; genesis 16–17, 22, 39, 58–78, 80–1; 20111 hostility of major powers to 94; hegemony 3, 57, 58, 236, 303, 309, 1 Indian regional office 95; and labour 321; Helms-Burton Act 300–1; India, 2 201; marginalisation of 69, 81, 93; relations with 58–9, 65, 194, 198, 3 Partnership for Development 94; 200, 201, 207, 213; Industry Sector 4 promotion of mode 4 103; reports Advisory Committee for Services 61, 5 94–5; role as partisan for the South 78; International Service Industries 81, 93, 94; Shipping Liners Code 63; Committee 78; Interstate Horseracing 6 South Centre report, ‘Reinventing Act 178, 179; Iran-Libya Sanctions Act 7 UNCTAD’ 93–4; technical assistance 1996 301–2; Japan-Distribution 8 and capacity building 103–4; and Services case 258–9; labour market 9 tourism 276, 278; and universal access 192, 193, 194, 196–7, 198, 200, 201, 30111 to services 131–2 203, 204; Malaysia, FTA negotiations United Nations Development Programme 271; manufacturing 6; Mexico 1 (UNDP) 95–6, 102, 209; Human telecommunications dispute 41, 42, 2 Development Report 2005 262 128, 164–6; and Millennium 3 United Nations Environmental Development Goals 112; and national 4 Programme 276 security 36, 54–5, 150, 179, 197, 236, 5 United Nations Millennium Development 271, 285, 291–301; and outsourcing 6 Summit 90, 91, 111–12 196–7, 207; private sector services 10; United Nations Security Council 297, retail market 270, 272; retirement 7 299, 301 income plans 183; sanctions against 8 United Nations Sub-commission on the countries with ‘unfair trade practices’ 9 Promotion and Protection of Human 58, 59, 60, 61, 72, 300–2, 309, 40111 Rights 96 313; section 301 powers 67, 68, 1 United States: adjustment to schedule of 72; security 36, 54–5, 291–2, 296, commitments 34; Advisory Committee 297–8, 299–302, 313; service industry 2 for Trade Negotiations 61, 77; model 11; and services markets 3, 6; 3 agriculture 264; Asia, loss of split-run magazines dispute 233; 44111 competitiveness to 6; audio-visual statistics on international trade in 398 Index

1111 services 10; supermarkets 270–6; United States Trade Representative 2 telecommunications regime 39, 154; (USTR) 34, 54, 101, 113; Assistant 3 telecommunications trade 157–8, 162, USTR 60–2, 76, 80–1; and audio- 163, 164–6, 167, 170–1, 172, 173, visual services 233; and cultural 4 239; Thailand, relations with 85; services 239, 240; and education 5 Trade Act 1974 61, 77; Trade and services 236; EC-Bananas case 257, 6 Tariff Act 1979 78; trade in services 258; and financial services 160; and 7 campaigns 86; trade policy 4; GATS genesis 58, 59, 61, 65, 66, 70, 8 unilateral trade preferences 293; and 71, 74, 80–1; Japan-Distribution UNCTAD 95, 291, 292; and UNESCO Services case 258–9; and labour 201; 9 249; US-Gambling case 32, 38, 42, and Philippines 151; and security 299; 1011 174–81, 272; US-UK Energy Dialogue Services Policy Advisory Committee 1 293; and United Nations Conference 61, 78; and telecommunications 163, 2 on Financing for Development 114; 164, 167, 170, 173, 239; and US- 3 Venezuela, relations with 303–10, Gambling case 174, 179, 180, 181; see 4 322–3; water services 135; and World also Barshefksy; Brock; Feketekuty; Summit for Sustainable Development Zoellick 5 115; and WTO accessions 100, 101–2, universal access to services 2, 30, 35, 108, 6 311–12, 313, 314, 315–17; and WTO 121, 130–2; financial services 156; 7 public law 41; see also Coalition of pensions 181, 183; telecommunications 8 Service Industries; North American 155, 164, 165, 166 9 Free Trade Agreement Universal Postal Union 63 United States Distance Learning Universitas 21 Global 244–5 20111 Association 246 universities 221, 224, 225–9; academic 1 United States free trade agreements: opposition to trade in services 2 Andean Free Trade Agreement 85, agreements 234–5, 244, 319; foreign 3 294, 321; Australia US Free Trade students 242–3, 244; research 227, 4 Agreement (AUSFTA) 50, 85, 150, 229, 268; virtual 244; see also 5 205, 240, 292–3, 299; bilateral trade education, higher agreements 52–3, 54, 56, 57, 59, 86, University of Melbourne 243–4 6 150, 154, 239–41, 291–3, 321–2, Upadhya, C 196, 197, 209, 210, 211, 7 324; Canada US Free Trade Agreement 212–13 8 (CUSFTA) 51, 158, 231, 232, 292; Uruguay 45, 48 9 regional agreements 50, 51, 54–5, Uruguay round 9, 16, 20, 33, 36, 51, 87, 30111 74, 292, 293–4, 321–2; US African 89, 100, 110, 319; audio-visual Growth and Opportunity Act 2000 services 232; education 234, 237; 1 293; US-ASEAN Trade and Investment energy 287, 291, 295; financial services 2 Framework Agreement 150; US-Chile and telecommunications 157–67; 3 Free Trade Agreement 36, 154, 201, labour 192, 197–8, 199; public 4 204, 205, 239; US-Dominican services 119, 121, 133; shaping of 5 Republic-Central America Free Trade GATS 27, 31, 38, 39, 44, 45, 60, 70, 6 Agreement 205, 293–4; US-Jordan 71–6, 78, 79, 80, 81 Free Trade Agreement 204, 205; Uzbekistan 310 7 US-Korea Free Trade Agreement 8 86, 223, 240–1, 252, 293, 320; Vandemoortele, J 96 9 US-Middle East Free Trade Agreement Vander Stichele, M 156, 184 40111 (MEFTA) 294–5; US-Peru Trade Vanuatu 101–2 1 Promotion Agreement 205; Vasavi, AR 196, 197, 209, 210, 211, US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement 212–13 2 36, 154, 201, 204, 205; US-Thailand Venezuela 21, 43, 47, 48, 49, 50, 57, 85, 3 Free Trade Agreement 150, 275, 293, 322–3; energy resources 285, 44111 293, 320 286, 288, 289–90, 303–10, 320 Index 399

1111 Vienna Convention on the Law of women: in call centres; and labour 2 Treaties 1969 36, 42, 125, 176 market 190, 191–2, 210, 214, 215–18; 3 Vietnam 99, 230 retirement income 184–5 Villaneuva, E 191 Woodhouse, EJ 147, 148 4 Vivendi (Veolia) 133, 134, 135 Woodroffe, J 98 5 Voon, T 250 Working Party on Domestic Regulation 6 Vorley, B 262, 264, 268 (WPDR) 38–9 7 Working Party on Professional Services 8 W/120 (Service Sectoral Classification 38 List) 32–3, 39, 44, 45; banking and World Bank 15, 19, 20, 42, 104, 130, 9 financial services 266; education 234, 137, 281, 317; Averting the Old Age 1011 241, 247; energy 149, 287, 288, 289, Crisis 182; and Bangalore 209; 1 290; financial services 159; food Country Policy and Institutional 2 supply chain 265; gambling 174, 176; Assessments 99; and development 91, 3111 insurance 266; midwifery services 128; 93, 97–100, 101, 102, 103, 104; and 4 occupations 199; PFIs 138; research education 227–8, 229, 236, 245, 246; 268; telecommunications 168, 171; and financial services and 5 tourism 278; water for irrigation 267; telecommunications 153, 161; and 6 water services 133, 134–5 foreign investment 281; and labour 7 Wade, R 97, 105, 106, 153 201, 214, 215, 217; and Millennium 8 Wagel, S 52 Development Goals 112; and pension 9 Walker, J 244 plans 186, 187; and Philippines 84, Wallach, L 201 145, 146, 147; Poverty Reduction 20111 Wal-Mart 239, 259, 263, 270–6 Strategies 89, 97–100, 102, 104; 1 Washington Consensus template 14, 97, promotion of WTO membership 101; 2 115; post-Washington Consensus 52, protests against 110; structural 3 97, 105, 122 adjustment programmes 69, 75, 97; 4 water 1, 9, 21, 43, 85, 86, 91, 98; Trade Research Group 103; see also 5 distribution 107, 133, 266–7; GATS, International Centre for the Settlement and water services 84, 96, 132–7; of Investment Disputes; International 6 MDG7 102, 111, 135; privatisation of Finance Corporation 7 services 91, 95, 96, 99, 102, 132–7, World Bank Institute (WBI) 100, 103 8 142, 266–7, 281–2; right to 130; World Bank Public Private Infrastructure 9 universal access to 131; World Advisory Facility (PPIAF) 142 30111 Development Report 2004, Making World Bank, World Development Services Work for Poor People 105 Reports: 1991, The Challenge of 1 Watson Wyatt 183 Development 104; 1993, Investing in 2 wealth: inequalities in 2, 20; Health 104; 1994, Infrastructure for 3 redistribution from labour to capital Development 104–5; 1995, Workers in 4 190, 207 an Integrating World 105; 1997, The 5 Wesselius, E 83, 161 State in a Changing World 105; 2004, 6 Western states and norms 17, 18, 19, 20, Making Services Work for Poor People 89, 122, 229, 230, 273, 274, 276, 285 93, 105–10 7 Whitfield, D 138 World Business Council for Sustainable 8 Williams, M 190 Development 117, 136 9 Williams, S 297, 300 World Development Movement (WDM) 40111 Williamson, J 14 83 1 Winham, GR 70 World Economic Forum 110 Wipro 206–7 World Health Organization 96–7 2 Wolf, M 79 World Intellectual Property Organization, 3 Wolfensohn, J 93, 105 Union for the Protection of New 44111 Wolfowitz, P 317 Varieties of Plants 268 400 Index

1111 World Summit for Sustainable for Sustainable Development 116; 2 Development, Johannesburg 115–18, US-Gambling case 38, 128, 174–81, 3 132, 137 320; see also Agreement on Trade- World Tourism Organization 277–8 Related Aspects of Intellectual 4 World Trade Organization (WTO) 3, 4, Property Rights (TRIPS); Council 5 10, 11, 16, 19, 24, 28, 31, 32, 36, 39, for Trade in Services; Doha round; 6 43, 76, 104; accession commitments Uruguay round 7 100–2, 107–8, 284, 310–17, 322; World Trade Organization ministerial 8 Agreement Establishing the World conferences: Cancún 46, 76, 94, 126, Trade Organization 40, 42; Agreement 167, 279, 281, 303; Doha 2001, see 9 on Agriculture 37, 256; Appellate Doha round; Geneva 1998 76, 110, 1011 Body 25, 32, 40, 41, 42, 174, 176, 167; Hong Kong 2005 48, 76, 85–6, 1 177–8, 179, 233, 257; bilateral 94, 103, 134, 167, 172, 191, 195, 2 agreements, study of services in 55–7; 203, 213–14, 269, 290, 302–3, 308, 3 Committee on Balance of Payments 312; Seattle 1999, 43, 52, 76, 90, 94, 4 Restrictions 36; and cultural exchange 111, 248, 319; Singapore 1996, 102, 250–1; and development 89, 90, 91, 205; see also GATT ministerial 5 93, 102–3, 104; Dispute Settlement meetings 6 Body (DSB) 40, 41, 299–300; Dispute World Travel and Tourism Council 7 Settlement Understanding 40, 41, 42; (WTTC) 276 8 EC-Bananas case 257–8; European World Water Forum, Kyoto 132–3, 134 9 Commission in 25; and foreign WorldCom 164, 166 investment 281; and GATS 75, 86; Wunsch-Vincent, S 33, 167, 168, 170, 20111 and ‘GATS attack’ 82–3; and health 173, 201, 202–3 1 services 96–7; and human rights 2 96, 130; IMF, relationship with Yang, G-H 223 3 91–23; Institute for Training and Yemen 310 4 Technical Cooperation 103; Japan- Yeoh, B 192 5 Distribution Services case 258–9; Yeutter, C 68, 71, 292 Mexico-Telecommunications 29, Yu, J 144 6 41, 42, 128, 164–7; and Millennium Yugoslavia 60, 67, 69 7 Development Goals 91; Sanitary and 8 Phytosanitary Agreement 256; Trade Zambia 44 9 Negotiations Committee 46; Trade Zapatista rebellion, Mexico 85 30111 Policy Reviews 124; and trade unions ‘zero quota’ 174, 177, 272 205; and United States financial sector Ziguras, C 237 1 76; Working Party on Trade, Debt Zillman, DN 297, 299 2 and Finance 94; and World Summit Zoellick, R 54, 174, 292, 294 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111