The making of terrorists: Anthropology and the alternative truth of America’s ‘’ in the

Jeremy Keenan

Abstract: This article, based on almost eight years of continuous anthropological research amongst the Tuareg people of the Sahara and , suggests that the launch by the US and its main regional ally, Algeria, in 2002–2003 of a ‘new’,‘sec- ond’,or ‘Saharan’ Front in the ‘War on Terror’ was largely a fabrication on the part of the US and Algerian military intelligence services. The ‘official truth’,embodied in an estimated 3,000 articles and reports of one sort or another, is largely disin- formation. The article summarizes how and why this deception was effected and examines briefly its implications for both the region and its people as well as the future of US international relations and especially its global pursuance of an in- creasingly suspect ‘War on Terror’. Keywords: Algeria, disinformation, Sahara, Tuareg, ‘War on Terror’

I first undertook anthropological fieldwork Sahara following its effective closure to the out- amongst the Tuareg of the Central Sahara, side world during the eight-year period of civil mostly amongst the Kel Ahaggar of southern conflict that followed the Algerian army’s annul- Algeria, during the period 1964–1971.1 It was ment of the 1991–1992 elections that would have a period of tumultuous change, following the brought to power the world’s first ever demo- recent independence of Algeria (1962), during cratically elected Islamist government. I was thus which a number of pressures, notably successive able to witness an entire society, in one of the drought years and a number of ideologically world’s most isolated and remote regions, re- driven government policies, led to some 50 per- enter and begin to catch up, as it were, with the cent of the Kel Ahaggar being more or less sed- modern world. The Tuareg entered the new mil- entarized by the time I left at the end of 1971 lennium having skipped globalization and asso- (Keenan [1977] 2002: xi–xxviii). ciated technological changes that had charac- I did not return to the Sahara again until terized the last decade of the twentieth century. 1999. The ensuing almost eight years of more or The first three years of this century were thus less continuous fieldwork in the Central Sahara a new dawn for many Tuareg. The re-opening and northern Sahel have been remarkable for of the Sahara not only enabled them to rebuild two reasons.2 The first is that my 1999 return their tourism industry, their point of insertion coincided with the reopening of the Algerian into the global cash economy, but the arrival of

Focaal—European Journal of Anthropology 48 (2006): 144–151 The making of terrorists | 145 the Internet around 2001 enabled them to exer- there were several signs, which, when read with cise a large measure of control over the process hindsight, show how the US and Algeria were of that insertion by giving them direct access planning to launch a ‘New’ or ‘Second’ Front in to their markets (mostly in Europe) and the the War on Terror that would link the ‘terrorist’ means to engineer their development toward groups of the Maghreb (North West ), no- the environmentally sustainable goals that sev- tably northern Algeria, with the Sahel. Although eral Tuareg leaders had actually drafted at an local Tuareg, especially in southern Algeria and international WTO-sponsored conference in northern , had noted that US intelligence Tamanrasset, the administrative capital of the agencies were showing an interest in the extreme region, in 1989. The Internet provided them with northern parts of Mali and that Algeria’s mili- the means to explore the freedom that lay be- tary was engaged in a number of suspicious ac- yond the inefficiencies, constraints, and con- tivities on its side of the border, none of them trols of Algeria’s statist system. Also, along with had any inkling at that stage of the headline- satellite phones, it has enabled me to remain in grabbing events that were to lead US military more or less continuous communication with commanders3 to describe their hitherto relatively my informants during the increasingly difficult tranquil region as a “Swamp of Terror”. times that I address below. The “nightmare situation”,as one prominent These circumstances, namely my fortuitous Tuareg described it, began in the second week of return to the region at that time and the new March 2003 with reports that European tourists, technological means of communication, have mostly German or German-speaking, were given rise to the second remarkable feature of ‘missing’ somewhere in southern Algeria. As the this ‘return’.This is that I have been able to wit- wider picture unfolded, it became clear that ness and record the ‘truth’,or what I have referred thirty-two tourists had been captured and taken to in other articles on this subject (Keenan 2004a, hostage in the Algerian Sahara. The hostage- 2004b, 2004c, 2005, 2006, forthcoming) as the taking was soon attributed by the Algerian au- ‘alternative truth’, about a most appalling se- thorities and their American allies to Algeria’s quence of events that many Tuareg now believe Islamist ‘terrorist’ organization, the Groupe has irreversibly transformed the Central Sahara Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC; and Sahel, as well as their lives and livelihoods. Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat). The The events to which I refer relate to Amer- mastermind of the plot was presumed to be the ica’s ‘War on Terror’. In 2002–2003, the US, in GSPC’s second-in-command, who went by at collusion with its new regional ally, Algeria, least a dozen aliases, including El Para after his launched what has generally become known as stint as a parachutist in the Algerian army. a ‘New’ or ‘Second’ Front in its global War on The hostages were held captive in two groups Terror across the Sahara and Sahelian regions of in the mountains of Tamelrik and Immidir, two Africa. The precise nature of this Saharan War of the many ranges that comprise the Tassili-n- on Terror; the intelligence on which it was based; Ajjer and Ahaggar regions of southern Algeria. the motives of the US and Algerian govern- After nearly three months, one of the groups ments in various stages of its pursuance; and its was liberated by an Algerian army assault. The local, regional, and global implications have all other group was taken by its captors to north- been shrouded in opacity, dissemblement, and ern Mali where its fourteen members (one had obfuscation. That is not at all surprising in the died en route) were finally released in August, light of the fact that senior members of the US after six months in captivity, following the al- administration, including the president him- leged ransom payment of EUR 5 million. self, are on record as saying that disinformation Even before the hostage-taking, the US had is a legitimate weapon in their post-9/11 War on identified a banana-shaped swath of territory Terror. In late 2002 and in the weeks immediately across the Sahelian regions of the southern Sa- preceding the US invasion of in March 2003, hara that it presumed was harboring Islamic mil- 146 | Jeremy Keenan itants and bin Laden sympathizers on the run hostage taking in March 2003, no act of terror, in from . The hostage-taking confirmed the conventional meaning of the term, had oc- US suspicions and even before the hostages were curred in this vast region. Yet, by the following released, the Bush administration was branding year, US military commanders were describing the Sahara as a ‘terror zone’ and El Para as a top terrorists as “swarming” across the Sahel and the al-Qaida operative and ‘bin Laden’s man in the Sahara as a “Swamp of Terror” (in Powell 2004). Sahel’. They were describing the region as having be- Between the time of the release of the hos- come “a magnet for terrorists … A terrorist tages in August 2003 and the end of the year, the infestation … [that] we need to drain” (ibid.). entire Central Saharan region of southern Alge- Typical of the media hype are articles like the ria, northern Mali, and northern became one in the Village Voice titled “Pursuing terror- heavily ‘securitized’, with Algeria reporting var- ists in the Great Desert: The US military’s $500 ious, albeit small-scale, ‘bandit’ activities in the million gamble to prevent the next Afghanistan. region. Then, following earlier visits from the Part one: Hunting the ‘bin Laden of the Sa- US Office of Counterterrorism to , Mali, hara’” (Khatchadourian 2006). , and Niger, Bush’s Pan-Sahel Initia- This summary account of the events that tive (PSI)4 rolled into action with the arrival of took place in the Sahara-Sahel during this pe- a five-hundred-strong US ‘anti-terror team’ in riod has been described, albeit sometimes in Nouakchott (Mauritania’s capital) on 10 Janu- nothing more than short newspaper items, in ary 2004. A further four hundred US Rangers an estimated 3,000 official government press re- were deployed into the Chad-Niger border re- leases, articles, and media reports of one sort or gion the following week. another.5 Virtually all of them are ultimately By the end of January, Algerian and Malian sourced, although sometimes rather vaguely, to forces, reportedly with US support, were said to US and/or Algerian government spokespersons have driven the GSPC from northern Mali. Then, and/or their military intelligence agencies. in a series of engagements, El Para’s men were However, we now know that this very dra- chased by a combined military operation of Niger matic account, what I call the ‘official truth’,was and Algerian forces, supported by US satellite US-Algerian spin and largely untrue. It was, in surveillance, across the Tamesna, Aïr, and Ten- short, a remarkably well-constructed narrative ere regions of Niger into the Tibesti Mountains of disinformation. As a result of more or less of Chad. There, thanks to the support of US continuous and at times microscopically detailed aerial reconnaissance, Chadian forces engaged field research, much of which was undertaken El Para’s group in early March in a battle lasting by and in collaboration with local Tuareg in Al- three days, reportedly killing forty-three GSPCs. geria, Niger, Mali, Libya, and Toubou in Chad, El Para managed to escape the carnage but re- we now know that all the incidents used to jus- portedly fell into the hands of the rebel Mouve- tify the launch of this New Front in the War on ment pour La Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad Terror were either fiction, in that they simply did (MDJT). This group held him hostage until Oc- not happen, or fabricated by US and Algerian tober 2004 when he was returned to Algeria, al- military intelligence services. legedly with the help of Libya. In June 2005, There is insufficient space here to itemize all an Algerian court convicted him of “creating an the evidence. Suffice it to say that El Para was armed terrorist group and spreading terror not ‘bin Laden’s man in the Sahara’ but an agent among the population” and sentenced him to of Algeria’s counter-terrorist organization the life imprisonment. Direction des Renseignements et de la Sécurité We can thus see how, within the space of one (DRS; see Mellah and Rivoire 2005), and one year, the United States and its allies had trans- whom many Algerians believe was trained as a formed the Sahara-Sahel region into a Second Green Beret at Fort Bragg in the 1990s (Cheva- Front in the global War on Terror. Prior to the lérias 2003). In the case of the hostage capture, The making of terrorists | 147 there is now strong evidence in support of the after two years of scratching around in the area, alternative truth. Firstly, it appears that elements have still not found a single cartridge case or within the Algerian security forces communi- other material evidence. It is therefore hardly cated the travel schedules of the tourists taken surprising that El Para’s conviction and sentence hostage to their captors. Moreover, El Para was in by an Algerian court was made in absentia! radio contact with outside parties, presumably How and why did such a monstrous decep- his handlers, and his radio transmissions, as tion take place? The ‘how’ is simple. First, the well as those between the two groups of hostage Algerian and US military intelligence services takers, were being monitored by US Airborne channeled a stream of disinformation to an in- Warning and Control System (AWACS) surveil- dustry of ‘ experts’, conservative ideo- lance. In addition, both the Algerian security logues, a dissipated academe, and compliant forces and US intelligence had precise knowl- media hacks, whose research methodology is edge of the hostage locations almost from the limited by their predominant ‘cut and paste’ cul- outset and most of the official statements issued ture. The result is that some 3,000 articles have by the Algerian authorities throughout the en- turned the great ‘lie’ into the official ‘truth’.Sec- tire hostage drama were false and nothing more ond, if a story is to be fabricated, it helps if the than deliberate disinformation. It appears more- location is far away and ‘beyond verification’. over that Algeria’s ground troops were pulled The Sahara is the perfect place: larger than the back whenever they got too close to the hostage United States and effectively closed to public locations and that the Algerian army’s assault access. that liberated the first group of hostages was an The ‘why’ has much to do with Washington’s act of theatre: there were almost certainly no fa- ‘banana theory’ of terrorism, so named because talities and all the captors were allowed to es- of the banana-shaped route Washington be- cape, regroup, and be taken to Mali. Also, there lieved the dislodged terrorists from Afghanistan is evidence that the ‘escape’ of the second group were taking into Africa and across the Sahelian from Tamelrik was arranged and facilitated by countries of Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania the Algerian military intelligence (DRS), as was to link up with Islamist militants in the Maghreb. the entire six-week long journey to Mali, in- Hard evidence for this theory was lacking. There cluding the provision of such things as fuel sup- was little or no Islamic extremism in the Sahel, plies, etc. And finally, there is strong reason to no indigenous cases of terrorism, and no firm believe the Malian terrain was ‘cleared’ by Al- evidence that ‘terrorists’ from Afghanistan, Pak- gerian agents, with at least six of the negotiators istan, or the Middle East were taking this route. in the hostage release being found subsequently Washington appears to have based its banana to have had links with the DRS. theory on an unpublished academic commen- As for the sojourn of El Para and his GSPC tary and Algerian press reports on banditry in the group in the Sahel, detailed ‘field research’ has Sahel and associated smuggling across the Sa- revealed no evidence for the dramatic official hara.6 It also misconstrued the Tablighi Jama’at7 narrative outlined above. Local people are ada- movement, whose two hundred or so members mant that no combined military force chased El in Mali are nick-named ‘the Pakistanis’ because Para and his men across the Sahel. Nor, as inter- the sect’s headquarters are in Pakistan. Finally, views with local residents and guides have re- local government agents told US officials what vealed, was El Para even with his men as they they wanted to hear. stumbled around the Aïr Mountains, lost, in Notwithstanding the lack of evidence, Wash- search of a guide, and having themselves pho- ington probably saw a Saharan Front as the linch- tographed by tourists! As for the much-lauded pin in creating the ideological conditions for battle in Chad, there appears to be no evidence the militarization of Africa, and especially (but that it actually took place. Leaders of the rebel not exclusively) its oil resources8, and for sus- MDJT say it never occurred, while nomads, taining ‘old Europe’s’ involvement in America’s 148 | Jeremy Keenan contentious counter-terrorism program. More El Para was proof that ‘terrorism’ was far from significantly, by demonstrating that al-Qaida’s eradicated in Algeria and that Islamic militancy influence had spread to North Africa, a Saharan now linked the Maghreb and Sahel. His activi- Front reinforced the intelligence justifying the ties not only eased Washington’s political reti- invasion of Iraq that had been cherry-picked by cence on military support for Algeria, but also Paul Wolfowitz, then Deputy Secretary of De- provided the crucial missing link in its banana fense, and Douglas Feith, then Under-Secretary theory of terrorism. of Defense for Policy and Director of the Penta- Who conned who is perhaps immaterial, al- gon’s controversial Office of Special Plans. though the US lack of human intelligence on the ground and its cherry picking of unverified intelligence certainly made the Bush Administra- The Algerian connection tion vulnerable to Algeria’s military intelligence services. The Sahara-Sahel replicated the ‘Chal- Washington’s interest in the Sahel and the flimsi- abi syndrome’.9 However, while Algeria certainly ness of its intelligence were extremely propitious duped US intelligence services, the overall fab- for Algeria’s own designs. As Western countries rication of the so-called Second Front involved became aware of the Algerian army’s role in its the collusion of both parties. The extremely close ‘dirty war’ of the 1990s against Islamic extrem- relationship between the two countries’ intel- ists, they became increasingly reluctant to sell it ligence agencies and the US monitoring of the arms for fear of Islamist reprisals and criticism hostage situation, including the provision of from human rights groups. As a result, Algeria’s AWACS surveillance, are testimony to Washing- army became progressively under-equipped, and ton’s willing participation. increasingly preoccupied with acquiring mod- The Second Front deception has done im- ern, high-tech weapon systems, notably night mense damage to the people and fabric of the vision devices, sophisticated radar systems, an Sahara-Sahel region. The launch of a Sahara integrated surveillance system, tactical commu- Front in the War on Terror has created immense nications equipment, and certain lethal weapon anger, frustration, rebellion, political instability, systems. Whereas the Clinton administration and insecurity across the entire region. The suc- kept its distance, the Bush administration in- cessful Mauritanian coup (2005), the Tuareg re- vited Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika as volts in Niger (2004) and Mali (2006), the riots one of its first guests to Washington. Bouteflika in southern Algeria (2005) and the political cri- told his American counterpart that his country sis in Chad (ongoing) are direct outcomes of this was seeking specific equipment that would en- policy. Indeed, the regime of Ould Taya in Mau- able it to maintain peace, security, and stability. ritania, as in many other countries, such as Libya, September 11 was a golden opportunity for used the cover of the War on Terror to crack both regimes, especially Algeria, which sold its down on political opponents, as well as legiti- ‘expertise’ in counter-terrorism to Washington mate Islamic organisations. In Niger, the govern- on the basis of its long ‘war’ against Islamists ment directly provoked the Tuareg of Aïr into through the 1990s that had left 200,000 people taking up arms by trumping up false murder dead. This common ground in the war against charges and jailing their main leader, Rhisa ag terrorism was the basis of a new US-Algerian Boula. (In the ensuing operation, Niger’s US- relationship. However, by late 2002, Algeria was trained military forces were seriously embar- publicly admonishing the US for its tardiness in rassed by the Tuareg!) In Mali, it now appears that delivering on its promises of military equipment. the rebellion of former Tuareg rebels around Washington’s caution, however, was justified by Kidal in May 2006 was at least partly orchestrated the fact that Algeria was on top of its ‘terrorist’ by Algeria’s counter-terrorism services in order problem and consequently no longer in need of to provoke such trouble in the region and thus such sophisticated equipment. convince the US of the region’s potential for The making of terrorists | 149

‘terrorism’. Algeria also sought to embarrass tion still further, reinforcing the already wide- Libya, whose Leader, Mouamar Qadhafi, had spread belief that much of what it has been say- been trying to expand his influence in that part ing about terrorism is simply not true. While of of the Sahel, by suggesting that Qadhafi’s ac- little consequence for those countries with which tions in the region had been largely responsible US relations are already at an all-time low, the for the rebellion. Similarly, the riots in Taman- ramifications will be far more serious for coun- rasset in July 2005 were whipped up by Algerian tries such as those in the EU on whom America government agents provacateurs, almost certainly still relies for a modicum of support. Increasing working for the state’s military intelligence ser- public skepticism toward the Bush administra- vices. One of the reasons for this was to justify a tion’s claims about terrorism and disapproval of greater military presence and state repression in the conduct of its War on Terror has been forc- the region. However, the rioters, mostly Tuareg ing the governments of many of these countries youths, were all released from jail when the role to reconsider the extent and nature of their sup- of the agents provacateurs was explained in court. port for the American enterprise. The Second Front has also destroyed the re- This North African imbroglio also holds se- gion’s tourism industry and the livelihoods of rious implications for America’s principle re- families across the entire region, forcing hun- gional allies in the deception. In Algeria, Mali, dreds of young men into the burgeoning smug- Niger, Chad, and pre-coup Mauritania, the launch gling and trafficking businesses. In Washington, of the Saharan Front went hand in hand with an the same people who failed to find Weapons of increase in repressive behavior by the security Mass Destruction in Iraq and al-Qaida links to establishments of those countries against their Saddam Hussein are now busy classifying these civilian populations. Not surprisingly, the US victims of US foreign policy as putative ‘terror- ‘invasion’ of the Sahara-Sahel, as some locals ists’. Given the absurdity of this failed policy, refer to it, is now leading to outbreaks of rebel- and the Tuareg’s sense of humor, most of the re- lious anger against these governments and a gion’s inhabitants will soon be able to call consequent increase in political instability and themselves ‘terrorists’. insecurity. In fact, the most likely and ironic out- The not-so-empty spaces of the Sahara-Sahel come of US policy in the region is that the at- are likely to soon leave US African policy in tat- tempt to fight ‘terrorists’ in what was a ‘terrorism’- ters. They provide the proof, if any was needed, free region will most likely produce the very that the Bush Administration has fabricated an movements and activities that the US govern- entire Front in the War on Terror for its own ment claimed it wanted to expunge in the first political purposes. Its obsession with secrecy is place.10 not for reasons of national security, but to con- ceal a falsehood. That is why the Senate Intelli- gence Committee is stalling its investigation of Jeremy Keenan is Teaching Fellow in Social An- Douglas Feith and his role at the Pentagon’s con- thropology at the University of Bristol, Visiting troversial Office of Special Plans. The investi- Professor at the Institute of Arab and Islamic gation is likely to open an “even bigger can of Studies at the University of Exeter, and Director worms”, as one former intelligence officer has of the Saharan Studies Program. He has under- warned (in Byrne 2006). taken fieldwork amongst the Tuareg of the Sahara The revelation, accomplished largely by the in 1964–1971 and 1999–2006. He has written Tuareg themselves, notably the network of in- five books on the Tuareg (and the Sahara) and formants with whom I was working, that the over a hundred academic articles. He has also Saharan Front in the War on Terror has been made several documentary archaeological- based largely on disinformation is likely to have anthropological films on the cultural heritage widespread implications. At a global level, it will of the Sahara and North Africa. reduce the credibility of the Bush administra- E-mail: [email protected]. 150 | Jeremy Keenan

Notes rorists’,reflecting both a fundamental disrespect and inherent racism toward these people. In Ger- 1. This is a revised version of a paper entitled “An- many, the Tuareg name has already been expro- thropology in the firing line: Alternative truths priated and commoditized by Volkswagen. in the US War on Terror” originally given at the Would such a crass symbol of Western gas- workshop on “Ourselves and the great powers” guzzling hedonism have sold better if called at the 9th EASA Biennial Conference, 18–21 ‘The Arab’? And, for what reason other than ig- September 2006, Bristol (UK). A similar but norant racism did the Italian police name their slightly longer version of this article is being operation against a suspected terrorist cell in published in the December (2006) issue of An- Milan on 2 October 2006 as ‘Operation Tuareg’? thropology Today. What thought processes, if any, led Milan’s Com- 2. In addition to the work of Mustafa Barth (2003), missioner of Police to go for ‘Operation Tuareg’ this fieldwork has resulted in the publication of in preference to ‘Operation Arab’ or ‘Operation three books a fourth in preparation and forty- Algerian’,especially when no Tuareg were in the four book chapters and journal articles. Those slightest way involved? relating specifically to the War on Terror in the Sahara include Keenan (2004 a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005, 2006, forthcoming). References 3. For example, US Air Force General Charles F. Wald, deputy commander of US-EUCO, quoted Barth, Mustafa. 2003. Sand-castles in the Sahara: in Powell (2004). US military basing in Algeria. Review of African 4. In 2005, the Pan-Sahel Initiative expanded to Political Economy 30 (98): 679–85. include Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, and Byrne, John. 2006. Prewar intelligence probe grinds Nigeria, and the organization became the Trans- towards end as parties accuse each other of Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative. delay. The Raw Story April 11. http://www 5. This number is probably an under-estimate con- .rawstory.com/news/2006/Prewar_intelligence_ sidering that reports by the world’s main line probe_grinds_to_end_0411.html. agencies are translated into dozens of languages Chevalérias, Alain. 2003. Qui a enlevé les otages du and reproduced in countless newspapers around Sahara? http://www.recherches-sur-le-terrorisme the world. There have also been countless radio .com/Documentsterrorisme/sahara.html. and TV broadcasts of news and commentary on Keenan, Jeremy. [1977] 2002. The Tuareg. People of ‘Terror’ in the Sahara. Ahaggar. London: Sickle Moon Books. 6. Most of these articles refer to the activities of ———. 2004a. Americans and ‘Bad People’ in the Mokhtar ben Mokhtar, who, like El Para, is re- Sahara-Sahel. Review of African Political Econ- garded by many Algerians, especially those of omy 31 (99): 130–39. the Sahara, as a ‘phantom’: there are at least two ———. 2004b. Political destabilisation and ‘Blow- official reports of El Para’s death prior to 2003, back’ in the Sahel’. Review of African Political while Mokhtar’s death has been reported at Economy 31 (102): 691–98. least six times! ———. 2004c. Terror in the Sahara: The implica- 7. Tablighi Jama’at is usually translated as “prose- tions of US imperialism for North and West lytizing group” or “group that propagates the Africa. Review of African Political Economy 31 faith”. Tabligh in Arabic means “to deliver (the (101): 475–96. message)”. Tablighi Jama’at claims to revive this ———. 2005. Waging war on terror: The implica- duty which they consider as a primary duty of tions of America’s ‘New Imperialism’ for Saha- Muslims; it is basically a missionary organization ran peoples. Journal of North African Studies and regards itself as a-political and law-abiding. (special issue on the Sahara, past, present, and 8. Africa will supply 25 percent of US hydrocar- future) 10 (3–4): 610–38. bons by 2015 (see Volman 2003). ———. 2006. Security and insecurity in North 9. Ahmed Chalabi manipulated US intelligence Africa. Review of African Political Economy (spe- agencies in the run-up to 2003 invasion of Iraq. cial issue on North Africa) 33 (108): 269–96. 10. The Sahara-Sahel has been ‘securitized’ and its ———. Forthcoming. The banana theory of terror- people, notably the Tuareg, re-branded as ‘ter- ism: Alternative truths and the collapse of the The making of terrorists | 151

‘second’ (Saharan) Front in the War on Terror. Maghreb’s Bin Laden. Le Monde Diplomatique Journal of Contemporary Africa Studies (special February. http://mondediplo.com/2005/02/ issue on the Sahara). 04algeria. Khatchadourian, Raffi. 2006. Pursuing terrorists in Powell, Stewart M. 2004. Swamp of Terror in the the Great Desert: The US military’s $500 million Sahara. Air Force Magazine 87 (11). http://www gamble to prevent the next Afghanistan. Part one: .afa.org/magazine/Nov2004/1104sahara.asp. Hunting the ‘bin Laden of the Sahara’. New York Volman, Daniel. 2003. ‘The Bush administration Village Voice 24 January. http://www.villagevoice and African oil: The security implications,’ .com/news/0605,khatchadourian,71993,6.html. Review of African Political Economy 30 (98): Mellah, Salima, and Jean-Baptiste Rivoire. 2005. 573–84. Who staged the tourist kidnappings? El Para, the