PB 80–04–2 December 2004 Vol. 17, No. 2 from the Commandant Special Warfare

Special Warfare The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–04–2 December 2004 Vol. 17, No. 2 From the Commandant Special Warfare

With the rise of insurgent activities around the world in countries like Iraq, the United States has a renewed interest in the requirements of conducting counterinsurgency. Insurgency is not a new phenomenon: Examples of insurgencies can be found throughout history and in various parts of the world. Even today, there are insurgencies occurring in Africa, Latin America, Indonesia, Iraq and the Philippines. While each insurgency is different and must be countered in different ways, they all share common characteristics. The foremost of those is the importance of popular support — whether it’s in actual physical support or by lack of interference from the population — to governments besieged by insurgent activity the success of the insurgents. The insurgents in building or rebuilding its infrastructure do not have to convince the populace that and in providing essential services to its peo- they are right, rather they have to convince ple. Psychological Operations Soldiers can them that the government cannot, or will quell rumors and propaganda by disseminat- not, meet their basic needs. Thus, counterin- ing true information that helps restore the surgency becomes less of a military operation people’s faith in their government. When SF, and more of a political one. Failure to under- CA and PSYOP are coupled with the other stand this key difference leads to military components of SOF,the combination is a truly leaders making sound military decisions, but powerful and unique capability. ultimately poor political ones, which only If current operations are an indication, the helps the insurgents. demand for counterinsurgency operations This is where the training of special opera- will only grow, as will the need for Soldiers tions Soldiers becomes important, and makes with both the military and political skills to them a key component of any counterinsur- operate in this joint, interagency and multi- gency operation. The quiet professionals that national environment. At SWCS, we must make up the special-operations brotherhood provide doctrine that includes lessons not are not only skilled in military operations — only from history but also from current oper- they are Soldier statesmen. Their unique ations, and we must train our Soldiers to training equips them with the skills needed to understand, assess and counter the insur- fight in the shadows and to bring light to the gent movements they will face as special- murky area of insurgency. We see that today operations Soldiers. in Iraq, and it was proven in El Salvador. Salvadoran officials and insurgents alike credited the presence of Special Forces advisers with the Salvadoran army as the most damaging factor to the insurgency in El Sal- vador. SF Soldiers are language-trained, Major General James W. Parker regional experts skilled at working by, with and through indigenous forces to accomplish their mission. Civil Affairs Soldiers can assist PB 80–04–2 Contents December 2004 Special Warfare Vol. 17, No. 2

Commander & Commandant Major General James W. Parker Features Editor 2 Understanding Counterinsurgency Jerry D. Steelman by Major Mark Grdovic Associate Editor Janice L. Burton 6Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq Graphics & Design by Dr. Bruce Hoffman Bruce S. Barfield 18 OPATT: The U.S. Army SF Advisers in El Salvador by Cecil E. Bailey

30 A Structural Analysis of the Ethnic Insurgency in Burma by Major Larry J. Redmon

44 Insurgency in Iraq: A Soldier’s Perspective

V E AS by Captain Eric Lyon R I RT T A E S LI B E T

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special- operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas. Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors. Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Special Warfare is also available on the USASOC internal web (https:asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm). Departments

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 50 Enlisted Career Notes Peter J. Schoomaker General, United States Army 51 Officer Career Notes Chief of Staff 52 Foreign SOF Official: 54 Update 55 Book Reviews Joel B. Hudson Administrative Assistant to the Cover: Special Forces Soldiers patrol an area of Baghdad in support of Operation Iraqi Secretary of the Army Freedom. (ARNEWS photo by Jeremy T. Luck) 0427901 Headquarters, Department of the Army Understanding Counterinsurgency

by Major Mark Grdovic

hroughout the 1960s and 1970s, the becomes clear that counterinsurgency Soviet Union, Cuba and China requires a comprehensive strategy that Tsought to offset the military power of includes much more than solely military the United States by supporting insurrec- goals. tions (or wars of liberation, to use their In 1962, the Marine Corps Gazette pub- words) anywhere they could. To counter lished an issue entitled, “The Guerrilla and this strategy, the U.S. engaged in a global How to Fight Him.” In the introduction, counterinsurgency. While the conflict in Lieutenant Colonel T.N. Greene put into Vietnam is familiar to most, the U.S. efforts context the importance of studying and to support allied efforts to counter insur- understanding the strategy of communist gencies in Africa, the Middle East and insurgents in order to apply the appropri- South America are less well-known. The ate tactics on the battlefield. He also made current efforts of al-Qaeda to ignite radical it quite clear that Soldiers engaged in anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism fighting guerrillas need additional skills to around the world greatly resemble the supplement their existing combat skills. communist subversive efforts of the Cold To beat the guerrilla on his own ground, War. the first essential is knowledge. Knowledge In counterinsurgency, understanding the about the enemy himself, his methods, problem is the first step toward developing strengths weaknesses, tactics and techniques. a solution. As much as insurgency might More than that, to beat the guerrilla, means seem to be an irrational campaign of vio- not to fight in the sharp black and white of lence waged by fanatics, there are factors formal combat, but in the gray fuzzy obscuri- that govern this type of warfare. Without a ty where politics affects tactics and econom- proper appreciation for those governing ics influence strategy. The soldier must fuse factors, it is highly unlikely that we can with the statesman, the private turn politi- develop an effective counter-strategy for a cian. To win, the soldier must think and given situation. understand, and his odds will improve to the It is important to understand that insur- extent that he has done his homework before gency is a strategy. It is the use of armed he arrives on the battlefield.1 conflict and subversion to affect change. Imagine an individual who is expecting to The goals of the strategy are achieved play a game of checkers but instead finds through the application of numerous tac- himself involved in a chess match. Without tics, such as guerrilla warfare, the use of an understanding of the rules that govern terror, propaganda, etc. Once a military that playing board, the individual might planner understands this fundamental, it inaccurately conclude, “This game does not

2 Special Warfare follow any rules; it seems completely ran- counterinsurgency strategy in Malaysia dom and chaotic.” That frustration might be from 1948 to 1960, wrote: further amplified if the apparent similari- It is the secret of the guerrilla force that, ties of the playing board lure the player into to be successful, they must hold the initia- believing that the rules of his original game tive, attack selected targets at a time of their must be applicable, and that there is there- own choosing and avoid battle when the fore no requirement for him to learn new odds are against them. If they maintain rules. Any poor performance would be their offensive in this way, both their regarded as due to some anomaly. This is strength and their morale automatically what Dr. Bruce Hoffman, during his recent increase until victory is won. As a corollary, analysis of the war in Iraq, referred to as the it must be the aim of counter-guerrilla “pathologic resistance on the part of the mil- forces to compel guerrilla forces to go on the itary to (accept) ‘lessons learned’ on coun- defensive so they lose the initiative, become terinsurgency.”2 dispersed and expend their energy on mere The classic conflict or war that most mil- existence.3 itary personnel think of is one in which two Initiative is the advantage that both sides adversaries directly challenge each other. desire, and the secret to maintaining or This is not the case with counterinsur- gaining the initiative resides with the popu- gency. It is a contest, but not in the sense of a boxing match, in which two opponents battle to defeat each other. Counterinsur- Counterinsurgency is like a courtroom battle to gency is like a courtroom battle to win the favor of a jury. In this analogy, the jury rep- win the favor of a jury. … The jury represents the resents the population, and the lawyers population, and the lawyers represent the combat- represent the combatants. In counterinsurgency, the population will decide the out- ants. In counterinsurgency, the population will come of the match-up. History is filled with examples of mili- decide the outcome of the match-up. tary forces battling insurgencies only to be frustrated by successful tactical operations lation. If the insurgent is able to maintain that seem to achieve little or no positive the initiative, he is able to control the envi- strategic result. It is easy to become overly ronment and to ensure that activities occur focused on tactics and not on the overall only when it is in his favor. That is the strategy. Planners must learn that tactical essence of the insurgent’s use of guerrilla success cannot overcome the lack of a com- warfare to mitigate his weaknesses and prehensive strategy. They must avoid the negate the host nation’s military superiori- false notion that enemy attrition will at ty. Mao Zedong explained this clearly by the some point lead to success. statement, “Although they are 10 to our one That notion plagued the U.S. govern- strategically, we are 10 to their one tactical- ment’s strategy during Vietnam and led to ly.” Before the insurgent can achieve the ini- the French government’s defeat in Algeria. tiative, he must have at least the compli- The French military believed that defeat- ance of the local population. ing the guerrillas operating within the It is a misconception that an insurgent urban areas in and around Algiers was the needs the population’s support to be effec- key to countering the insurgency. The mili- tive. The population can desire to support tary employed a brutal offensive to clear the government and the local security force the capitol of the guerrillas and their sup- but refrain out of fear and the need to pro- port networks. The offensive was tactically tect their families. This is how the insur- successful, but it cost the French the sup- gent employs terror as a tactic to shape the port of the Muslim population and resulted environment and enable future operations. in a strategic failure. Indoctrination and propaganda can even- In 1966, Sir Robert Thompson, who was tually transform a compliant population one of the creators of the successful British into a supportive population, leading to

December 2004 3 more effective and larger-scale guerrilla- imagine how armed men could easily warfare tactics. The insurgency does not intimidate the inhabitants of an unprotect- need to transform into a conventional mil- ed population center to provide informa- itary force to win — only to create an envi- tion on security forces’ activities or to ronment in which the conventional mili- refrain from any activities that might sup- tary and the government can be directly port the security forces. challenged. That challenge implies as While the insurgent is clearly to blame much of a degradation of the military’s for its attacks on the inhabitants, the pop- effectiveness and the government’s legiti- ulation sees the government as failing to macy as of a strengthening of the guerrilla perform its duty to protect them and there- forces. fore responsible. This perception is fueled Consider the following example: Minor by insurgent-generated propaganda, which guerrilla attacks on convoys force the mili- plants the seed among the members of the tary to travel in larger groups and perhaps population that the government doesn’t even consolidate forces to larger and more care about them for a variety of reasons. If defendable bases outside the cities. While the insurgency replaced key members of this improves the force-protection for the the civil community with its own trained military, it reduces the overall security for cadre, how long would it take to enamor an the population centers, allowing the insur- impressionable younger generation (possi- gents to coerce the local inhabitants bly in opposition to their parents’ beliefs) through reprisals against civilians who with organized indoctrination dispensed support the government. It is not hard to through schools, religious centers and youth programs, that portrays the guerrillas as freedom fighters and the government as puppets of the U.S.? Thompson’s Five Principles The example compares the traditional view of military vs. guerrilla (the boxing of Counterinsurgency match), to the counterinsurgent view (the courtroom trial). From the traditional Based on his experience as the British Secretary for viewpoint, the military’s force-protection Defence in Malaya during the Malayan Emergency (1948- decision is a good one, but from the coun- 1960), Sir Robert Thompson outlined five guiding princi- terinsurgent-strategy point of view, it is a ples for developing a counterinsurgency strategy: bad decision. The power of subversion and propagan- • The government must have a clear political goal. da cannot be overstated. In undeveloped • The government must function in accordance with the countries in which 75 percent of informa- law (not only the Law of Land Warfare, but the consti- tion is exchanged by word of mouth in cafes tutional laws of the host-nation government, in order or market places rather than on television to maintain legitimacy with the population). or on the Internet, countering propaganda • The government must have an overall plan with objec- is challenging. Unless the security forces tives (short-term and long-term). are in touch with the local community, • The government must give priority to defeating propaganda is likely to go unchallenged. the political subversion and not merely to killing Ironically, successful tactical operations guerrillas. by U.S. Soldiers can have great propaganda value for the insurgents. The insurgents • When the insurgency employs guerrilla warfare, a gov- can cite the operations as evidence that the ernment must give priority to securing the population government is unable to protect its citi- areas first, before launching offensive operations. zens, that the government is a puppet of the U.S., or that the insurgent movement is (Source: Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist so strong that it can be fought only by the Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New U.S. York: Praeger Publishers, 1966). Conversely, marginally effective tactical operations by host-nation troops can show

4 Special Warfare More intelligence leads to Strike more effective strike Operations operations.

Civil- More support from the Focused Information Military population equates to Intelligence Operations Infrastructure more intelligence. Projects

Security activities reduce Basic Security support for the insurgents for the Population and increase support for the government.

Each layer of operations enables the next layer

Figure 1: Prerequisites for Effective Offensive Counterinsurgency Operations that the government is sovereign, is in con- awareness, will allow leaders and Soldiers trol and is trying to protect the population. to better deal with the challenge. Host-nation operations can have other counter-propaganda effects: In Iraq, for example, operations by Iraqi forces against Major Mark Grdovic is Islamist insurgents could defuse the reli- chief of the Special Forces gious aspects of the struggle and counter Doctrine Branch, SF Doc- the perception that the insurgency is some trine Division, in the JFK sort of jihad against the West. Special Warfare Center and The important question here is not School’s Directorate of Train- whether one man’s terrorist is another ing and Doctrine. His previ- man’s freedom fighter. It is, What does the ous assignments include service with the population believe? In counterinsurgency, 1st Battalion, 10th SF Group as S1, and as perceptions can be more important than detachment commander of ODAs 016 and reality. If the host-nation security forces can 032; small-group instructor for the officer prevent intimidation of the population, then portion of the Special Forces Qualification half the battle is won. When a population is Course; company commander and S3, 3rd secure from intimidation and coercion, the Battalion, 10th SF Group; and commander, insurgent is relegated to the status of an A Company, 4th Battalion, 1st Special War- illegitimate criminal. He cannot risk expo- fare Training Group. Major Grdovic holds sure among the population, and he is great- a bachelor’s degree from New York Univer- ly limited in his operational capability. Mili- sity and a master’s degree from King’s Col- tary forces can then conduct effective offen- lege London. sive operations to neutralize the guerrilla elements of an insurgency. Figure 1 is a Notes: template for effective offensive counterin- 1 Lieutenant Colonel T.N. Greene, “Introduction,” The Guerrilla — and How to Fight Him (New York: surgency operations. Praeger Publishers, 1962), v. While counterinsurgency is a significant 2 Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsur- challenge for any government, it is by no gency in Iraq (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corpora- means an insurmountable one. Ideally, an tion, June 2004), 6. understanding of the basic principles and 3 Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insur- gency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: the enemy’s strategy, coupled with the Praeger Publishers, 1966), 115. development of a situational and regional

December 2004 5 Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq

by Dr. Bruce Hoffman

n the 1993 film “Groundhog Indochina’s wars. Vietnam and Iraq ent neglect in the planning for post- Day,” Bill Murray plays an arro- thus form two legs of a historically invasion stability operations fol- Igant television weatherman fraught triangle, with America’s lowing the initial military assault fated to relive the same day — Feb- experiences in El Salvador during on Iraq, the defeat of its military ruary 2 — and the same unedifying the 1980s providing the connecting and the destruction of Saddam experiences over and over.1 The leg. Hussein and his dictatorial eternal cycle of repetition in which This article will not rehash famil- Ba’athist regime.6 In a particularly Murray’s character is condemned iar criticism of Vietnam, El Sal- perceptive analysis, Anthony seems an apt parable to America’s vador or Iraq.2 Rather, it will use Cordesman notes, “The fact mostly ill-fated experiences in the present as prologue in order to remains … that the U.S. govern- fighting insurgencies. understand, in terms of counterin- ment failed to draft a serious or More often than not, the United surgency, where the U.S. has gone effective plan for a ‘Phase 4’ of the States has been frustrated in its wrong in Iraq;3 what unique chal- war: The period of conflict termina- efforts to effectively prosecute this lenges the current conflict in Iraq tion and the creation of an effective unique blend of political-military presents to the U.S. and other coali- national building office.”7 He goes operations. But, whereas Murray tion military forces deployed there; on to quote a senior officer with eventually attains enlightenment, and what light we can shed on intimate knowledge of the opera- a similarly decisive epiphany has future counterinsurgency planning, tion’s planning and execution, who yet to occur with respect to Ameri- operations and requirements.4 told Cordesman, “I can’t judge the ca’s historical ambivalence toward quality of the Phase 4 planning counterinsurgency. Indeed, an Political dimension because I never really saw any.”8 almost unbroken string of frustra- At the foundation of counterin- Whether this was because no plan- tion (and disappointment) can be surgency is the prominence of the ning was undertaken, as Cordes- traced backward over nearly half a political dimension — in doctrine, man argues or, more likely, that century to the early 1960s, when planning, implementation and, planners either “were not given the U.S. became heavily engaged in most importantly, operational coor- enough time to put together the dination. Yet the failure to take this best blueprint for … the ongoing aspect of U.S. military operations in reconstruction of Iraq”9, or because Copyright 2004, the RAND Cor- Iraq sufficiently into account the importance of this phase of poration, used with permission. arguably breathed life into the operations was not fully appreciat- Opinions expressed in this article insurgency that emerged and has ed and not initiated early enough,10 are those of the author and do not continued to gather momentum is immaterial. The point is that this reflect the policies of the Depart- since the summer of 2003. At the aspect of operations was woefully ment of the Army or the Depart- heart of this criticism is the appar- neglected. ment of Defense. — Editor Thus a critical window of oppor-

6 Special Warfare ly the gist of the problem.16 The fact that military planners apparently didn’t consider the possibility that sustained and organized resistance could gather momentum and transform itself into an insurgency reflects a pathology that has long afflicted governments and militaries everywhere: the failure not only to recognize the incipient conditions for insurgency, but also to ignore its nascent manifestations and arrest its growth before it is able to gain initial traction and in turn momentum. Indeed, this was among the central conclusions of a 1991 RAND study that examined Britain’s various experiences in countering insurgencies during the 1950s. Army News Service “Late recognition of an insur- The establishment of trained security forces is a strong counterinsurgency tool. The insurgents’ gency,” the report stated, “is costly, goal is to take away the feeling of security from the people, that is why the Iraqi police are fre- insofar as the insurgents have the quent targets of the insurgents. In this photo a Soldier from the 47th Civil Affairs Battalion, based opportunity to gain a foothold in Florida, conducts close-quarter drills with Iraqi police. before facing any organized opposition.”17 A follow-on RAND effort, tunity was lost because of the fail- the damage already was done.14 which analyzed seven case studies ure to anticipate the widespread This is why Cordesman titled his involving counterinsurgency and civil disorder and looting that fol- analysis, released in November counterterrorist efforts (including lowed the capture of Baghdad.11 In 2003, Iraq: Too Uncertain to Call. a re-examination of the aforemen- something akin to a chain reac- “The bad news,” he wrote, “is that tioned three British campaigns of tion, that failure was in turn exac- the U.S. sowed many of the seeds of the 1950s), reached an identical erbated by the operational discon- both the present low-intensity war conclusion.18 nects that have been cited between and many of the current uncertain- The failure to detect early on the the departments of Defense and ties in Iraq. The good news is that signs of incipient insurgency, com- State in post-conflict planning con- the U.S. has since made major bined with initially hesitant and ducted before the invasion and the efforts to restructure its military uncoordinated responses in terms inadequacy of the initial effort of forces to fight the emerging threat, of meshing political as well as mili- the Organization for Reconstruc- has set up a more effective effort to tary approaches, gave the insur- tion and Humanitarian Assist- create a new government, and has gents or terrorists invaluable time ance.12 Many argue that discon- funded and begun to implement a to entrench themselves in the civil- nects continue between the civil- major aid program. One reason it is ian population and to solidify their ians in the Coalition Provisional so difficult to judge whether the efforts while the security forces Authority, or CPA, and U.S. mili- cup is half empty or half full, is that groped and stumbled about. By the tary commanders.13 the U.S. has only begun to pour.”15 time the authorities realized the The initial missteps seriously While it can be argued that U.S. seriousness of the emergent situa- undermined the U.S. effort in Iraq military planners could not have tion, it was already too late.19 and arguably led to the uncertain been expected to anticipate the This is not to say that progress situation in that country today. emergence of an insurgency any and success remained entirely elu- That they are now recognized and more than they could have foreseen sive for Britain, but that invaluable are being corrected has doubtless the widespread disorders, looting opportunities were squandered to prevented Iraq from sliding further and random violence that followed bring the insurgency immediately into violence and instability — but the fall of Baghdad, that is precise- to heel, and that time, money and,

December 2004 7 most of all, lives were needlessly was clearly recognized. succession of counterinsurgency expended.20 President John F. Kennedy campaigns involving different envi- As Cordesman and other stressed precisely this same point ronments (urban and rural as well observers widely agree, consider- at the outset of the significant esca- as jungle and mountain) against a able progress in the political or lation of U.S. assistance to the gov- variety of opponents (anticolonial- “hearts and minds” dimension of ernment of South Vietnam that ists, communist revolutionaries counterinsurgency has been made commenced during his administra- and ethno-nationalist separatists) in Iraq in recent months. Such tion. According to Roger Hilsman, in places as diverse as Palestine, efforts have included improving who was responsible for counterin- Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus. access to vital services (electricity, surgency policy at the State Counterinsurgency, née imperial water, etc.), reopening schools, Department during the Kennedy policing, tactics developed to sup- establishing an Iraqi police force, administration, from the time that press earlier colonial insurrections restoring the country’s oil produc- Kennedy took office in January throughout the 18th, 19th and tion and generally encouraging 1961, the president was preoccu- early 20th centuries were often normal daily commerce. However, pied not just with counterinsur- readily adaptable to subsequent the general unevenness and incon- gency but also with its critical polit- mid-20th century campaigns.31 sistency of these achievements, and Nevertheless, when the British the fact that for many Iraqis many found themselves embroiled in of these improvements are either New military tactics had overseas internal security commit- too little or too late or both, has cre- to be developed … But ments after World War II, they ated cynicism and animosity, to say were completely unprepared. the least.21 All or at least some of new political tactics Training exercises for troops sent this might have been avoided by to Malaya and Kenya, for example, better planning and foresight. also had to be devised, continued to be based on lessons The critical nexus between the and, most importantly, drawn from the conventional cam- political and military dimensions paigns of World War II. has been widely acknowledged, the two — the military The little time devoted to coun- even by those practitioners of counterinsurgency training mostly con- terinsurgency whose means and and political — had to sisted of executing outmoded, methods once aroused the ire not be meshed together heavy-handed “cordon and search” only of human-rights activists in operations. This tactic had in fact various nongovernmental oversight and blended. already been discredited by organizations but also of the U.S. Britain’s experience in Palestine government. For example, General ical element. “What are we doing during the late 1940s because of Rene Emilio Ponce, the defense about guerrilla warfare?” Hilsman the widespread disruption to daily minister at the height of the insur- quotes JFK asking him shortly life and commerce among the civil- gency in El Salvador during the after he took up residence in the ian population and the anger and 1980s, was often quoted as stating White House. The president then resentment toward the authorities that 90 percent of countering insur- answered his own question, stating that such operations engendered, gency “is political, social, economic that “new military tactics had to be though this passed unnoticed in and ideological and only 10 percent developed … But new political tac- subsequent British campaigns.32 military.”28 tics also had to be devised, and, That U.S. military forces in Iraq Given the massive extent of most importantly, the two — the have similarly applied this tactic American support of the Salvado- military and political — had to be with similar results — alienating ran counterinsurgency effort,29 it is meshed together and blended.”30 the Iraqi civilian population33 — not surprising that one of its main Kennedy’s view closely reflected underscores the overwhelming benefactors should wax eloquent British military thinking on the organizational tendency not to about this critical political-military subject. Surprisingly, though, absorb historical lessons from pre- dynamic. Nonetheless, from almost Britain itself had only recently — vious counterinsurgencies when the beginning, when U.S. coun- and not very readily — come to the planning and conducting this par- terinsurgency doctrine and imple- same conclusion. During the 15 ticular mode of warfare. mentation was being framed in the years that followed World War II, It is interesting to note that this early 1960s, this ineluctable link Britain had become enmeshed in a pathologic resistance on the part of

8 Special Warfare the military to “lessons learned” on In Britain’s case, it was not until surgency section of Army Field counterinsurgency (and counterter- the late 1950s — a decade after Manual, Vol. V, Operations Other rorism for that matter) rarely Palestine had ended and Malaya Than War (1995) begins with a afflicts the opponents in a given had started, and while Britain was quote from General Sir Frank Kit- conflict (i.e., guerrilla groups or ter- already heavily involved in both son, one of the best known expo- rorist organizations), who con- Kenya and Cyprus — that its mili- nents of the “British School” of sciously study and learn both from tary strategists, planners and doc- counterinsurgency. their own mistakes as well as from trine writers realized the extent to Kitson emphatically states, “The the successful operations of their which they had gutted their colo- first thing that must be apparent enemies. nial-era counterinsurgency capabil- when contemplating the sort of This same point was made in ities. Although the British eventu- action which a government facing July 2003 by General John Abizaid, ally formulated a series of respons- insurgency should take, is that the commanding general of the U.S. es adaptable to various contingen- there can be no such thing as a Central Command, responsible for cies, they nevertheless repeated the purely military solution because all military operations in Iraq. The same errors in judgment and insurgency is not primarily a mili- insurgency, he asserted, “is getting organization at the onset of each tary activity.”39 The doctrine’s more organized, and it is learning. new insurgency36 until they recog- statement of the fundamental prin- It is adapting to our tactics, tech- nized how critical political-military ciples of counterinsurgency is itself niques and procedures, and we’ve coordination was in waging an pointedly titled “A Matter of Bal- got to adapt to their tactics, tech- effective counterinsurgency. ance.” It states unequivocally: niques and procedures.”35 The approach that they eventually There has never been a purely adapted is not without relevance to military solution to revolution; America’s current involvement in political, social, economic and mili- Iraq: implementing a single, unified tary measures all have a part to policy-and-command authority that play in restoring the authority of a knitted together the political and legitimate government. The security military dimensions. Authority over forces act in support of the civil the course of each counterinsurgency authority in a milieu in which there was delegated to a single British rep- is less certainty than in convention- resentative who was either a retired al war.The problem is that, working or serving British flag officer (e.g., on insufficient information, at least General Sir Gerald Templer in in the early stages, decisions have to Malaya and Field Marshal Sir John be made affecting every aspect of Harding in Cyprus) but who political, economic and social life in nonetheless was thoroughly cog- the country. These decisions have nizant of, and committed to, waging repercussions for the nation far the political as well as the military beyond its borders, both in the efforts against the insurgents.37 diplomatic field and in the all- This measure effectively solved important sphere of public opinion. the problems of bureaucratic rival- Indeed, first among the six coun- ries, disconnects and infighting, terinsurgency principles defined by thereby permitting the effective British doctrine is “political prima- coordination of the civil adminis- cy and political aim” followed by: tration, the military and the police; • Coordinated government machinery. the coordination of intelligence; • Intelligence and information. Army News Service and, most critically, the flexibility • Separating the insurgent from The expansion of provincial reconstruction to respond quickly, often with novel his support. teams in Iraq played a critical role in the policies and tactics, to the problems • Neutralizing the insurgent. “hearts and minds” efforts in Afghanistan. at hand.38 •Longer-term post-insurgency Soldiers’ presence in villages made them Nearly half a century later, these planning.40 appear to be more permanent and more principles are enshrined in British Given that the U.S. Global War familiar, and it allowed them to receive intelli- Army counterinsurgency doctrine. on Terrorism may likely require gence easily and to act on it within hours. The introduction to the counterin- future nation-building efforts in

December 2004 9 similarly violent, polarized and tyrannically ruled countries like Iraq, the ability of the American military similarly to overcome or obviate such institutional patholo- gies as the British once did is not without relevance.41 Indeed, in the case of the U.S. Marine Corps, lessons from the British experience had already figured prominently in their planning for postwar stability operations in Iraq. The Marines were reported to have “consult[ed] with British officers about their experiences in Belfast over the decades” before deployment. “We’ve changed our tactics midstream,” said one Marine liaison officer assigned to the populated areas in and around Nasiriyah, Iraq.42 Army News Service The Marine example testifies to Members of the 416th Civil Affairs Battalion and Turkish military observers speak to officials in the general molding of counterin- the town of Tal Afar about damages to local infrastructure by insurgent activities. surgency doctrine, training and planning that has long been over- country.These teams would provide learned and adjusted operations to shadowed by other priorities and reconstruction and humanitarian address more specifically the polit- requirements in U.S. military strat- assistance as part of a concerted ical dimension of counterinsur- egy and tactics. Indeed, perhaps the “hearts and minds” effort46 in tan- gency. For example, in the north of seminal American encapsulation of dem with other units who would Iraq, Major General David H. the essentials of counterinsurgency play an active role in the renewed Petraeus, the commander of the is the Marines’ Small Wars Manu- hunt for Osama bin Laden by being 101st Airborne Division based in al,43 which was first published in stationed in Afghan villages for Mosul, undertook precisely the 1940, was reprinted in 1987 and has periods of time. The reasoning types of innovative approaches been republished and studied ever behind this move is that “by becom- with respect to the Iraqi civilian since. This honorable exception to ing a more permanent, familiar population and newly constituted the seemingly continuous process of presence … they hope to be able to Iraqi security forces long advocated rediscovery and reinvention of the receive and act on intelligence by British doctrine and at the counterinsurgency wheel44 interest- within hours.”47 heart of effective counterinsur- ingly devotes an entire chapter to In Iraq as well, Marine units gency operations.50 His main con- “Relationship with the State being deployed there in early 2004 straints were insufficient funds to Department” — with the first sec- had similarly been planning to accomplish all he had hoped and tion specifically addressing the position themselves among the intended51 and some friction with “importance of cooperation.”45 population in their areas of opera- the CPA.52 The problem, according- The U.S. military is, however, tion — including the notoriously ly, seemed less not knowing what learning from past operational mis- violent Sunni Triangle. In tactics to do, than a flawed and mostly steps and setbacks in Afghanistan. reminiscent of the Combined uneven application of counterin- In December 2003, for instance, Action Platoons of the Vietnam surgency doctrine. Lieutenant General David Barno, War, a Marine officer responsible As one senior CPA official the commander of the American- for planning explained that the explains, “Some of these command- led coalition force in Afghanistan, “idea is that this platoon, similar to ers have paid close attention to the announced a new strategy involv- Vietnam, will live and work with lessons learned over the years [about ing, among other things, the expan- the police and Iraqi Civil Defense countering insurgency] and are sion of military provincial recon- Corps.”48 applying them in theater but it is not struction teams throughout the The Army has taken lessons division or battalion wide. It often is

10 Special Warfare up to the individual commanders.” ligence was wanting because every HUMINT (human intelligence) pro- So can conventional militaries such effort was in fact not made, cedures and turn away from effectively execute counterinsur- resulting in the failure to antici- reliance on technical intelligence gency missions without the exten- pate the violence and resistance sources. Even now it needs twice as sive training that is de rigueur for that gradually escalated through- many HUMINT teams as it has.”62 special operations forces, or SOF? out the spring and summer of 2003. Indeed, no less an authority than Judging from the U.S. military’s Even though, according to the Abizaid has proclaimed that the experiences in Iraq, the answer is Washington Post, the CIA station in U.S. forces require “better and more far from clear. The problem may be Iraq now has more than 300 full- timely intelligence to crush those one that requires systemic changes time case officers and nearly 500 responsible for the roadside bomb- in doctrine, organizational mind- persons in total (including contrac- ings, ambushes and mortar set and institutional ethos rather tors) compared with its originally attacks.”63 than providing additional training planned complement of just 85 offi- But perhaps the most important opportunities — no matter how cers, problems in intelligence col- reason that the intelligence was detailed or extensive those opportu- lection reportedly remain. None- inadequate concerns the “lesser- nities are. As one U.S. Army Special theless, despite both this signifi- included contingency” status which Forces officer laments: “CT [coun- cant expansion and redirection of the U.S. military has long accorded terterrorism] and COIN are the effort to the insurgency, senior to counterinsurgency. Here, again, bread and butter of SOF, but SOF is intelligence officials and others it is appropriate to cite Kitson’s a minority voice within a largely claim, “It has had little success pen- views on the subject when he conventional military.”54 etrating the resistance and identi- writes in Low Intensity Operations fying foreign terrorists involved in about the necessity of “attuning Dimensions the insurgency.”60 men’s minds to cope with the envi- While emphasizing the political The inadequacies in intelligence ronment of this sort of war.”64 side of counterinsurgency, Kitson on the insurgents can also be attrib- Interestingly, the identical point was equally mindful of the funda- uted to the focus on the search for is made by Joaquin Villalobos. For mental military side of this equa- Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass Villalobos, the solution to America’s tion. Indeed, Kitson forcefully destruction, or WMD. Indeed, it was historical problems with counterin- stresses, “There is no such thing as not until late November 2003 — surgency in general and with the a wholly political solution either, when the daily pace of guerrilla intelligence needed to counter short of surrender, because the very attacks on American troops rose to insurgencies in particular is clear. fact that a state of insurgency some 40 per day — that intelligence “The United States needs to trans- exists implies that violence is officers and analysts were reas- form its Soldiers, its officers, its involved which will have to be signed to focus on the insurgency.61 doctrines to adapt to this kind of countered, to some extent at least, The inexperience of American war.” by the use of force.”56 Essential to forces in counterinsurgency opera- In no area is the intelligence hole the effective application of that tions and the failure of pre-inva- more acute in Iraq than in the force is the acquisition of actionable sion plans and post-invasion policy determination of insurgent identity intelligence, its rapid and proper to take into account the possibility and numbers — two of the most analysis and, perhaps most critical- of violence and resistance occur- basic criteria. “We are quite blind ly, its efficacious coordination and ring, much less escalating into there,” the head of a European dissemination.57 insurgency, is likely another rea- intelligence service monitoring One of the elemental imperatives son. Cordesman, for example, developments in Iraq complained of intelligence in counterinsur- reports that when in November last November.“The Americans and gency, according to Julian Paget — 2003 he visited the 1st Armored Brits know very little about this who served as a lieutenant-colonel Division, which was responsible for enemy.”67 This poverty of definitive, in the British Army and, together Baghdad and the Green Zone, “The much less clear, knowledge about with Kitson, is considered one of unit was not trained or equipped our opponents in Iraq underscores Britain’s foremost experts on the for the mission when it arrived. … Paget’s admonition to “know the subject — is that “every effort must The division has had to change its enemy.” A figure of 5,000 Iraqi insur- be made to know the enemy before whole operating style after 20 years gents or former regime elements, or the insurgency begins.”59 But intel- of focusing on fighting conventional FREs, also referred to as former heavy forces. It has had to develop regime loyalists, or FRLs — mostly

December 2004 11 Sunni Muslims who belonged to the The lack of accurate information on grim picture. According to Lieu- Ba’ath Party or served in the mili- precisely this subject was cited by tenant General Sanchez, the aver- tary, police or security and intelli- Ambassador Bremer as well. “The age number of attacks on American gence services — was cited by most critical problem,” Bremer forces had grown from five per day Abizaid in November 2003 and reportedly stated, according to in June to “the teens” in September appears to be the generally accept- Cordesman’s notes of the briefing, to 30-35 in October86 and to 40 by ed number.68 It is also widely “is intelligence.”75 the end of November.87 The capture claimed that 95 percent of the In this respect, estimates of the of Saddam Hussein in mid-Decem- attacks69 or 95 percent of the number of foreign fighters in Iraq ber, however, brought newfound threat70 or more than 90 percent of range widely from the low hun- optimism that a decisive corner had the violent insurgents71 consist(s) dreds to the low thousands.76 been turned in the violence which, of FREs — who either carry out According to U.S. and coalition mil- it was hoped, would now decline — attacks themselves or pay others to itary sources on the one hand, even though Hussein maintained do so. approximately 200-400 foreign that he played no active role in It is increasingly reported that fighters are thought to be fighting directing the insurgency.88 hired criminals or unemployed in Iraq.77 U.S. military command- Nonetheless, the symbolic value “angry young men” are being paid ers, moreover, at least as of Decem- of his apprehension was thought to by FREs to attack U.S. forces.72 ber 2003 had detected no indica- have greater significance.89 Indeed, And, according to Major General tions of a large number of foreign a month later, U.S. military officials Raymond T. Odierno, the command- volunteers converging on Iraq.78 “It in Iraq were already pointing to er of the Army’s 4th Infantry Divi- is not correct to say that there are declines both in insurgent attacks sion, the bounty for attacks on floods of foreign fighters coming in, and American military casualties. coalition military targets is rising. or thousands,” Abizaid has stated. The average number of daily “When we first got here,” he Indeed, foreign nationals make up attacks, they said, had fallen from explained in an October 2003 inter- only about 300 of the 5,000 insur- 23 during the four weeks preceding view with the press, “we believed it gents being held prisoner in Iraq.79 Hussein’s capture to 18 in the four was about $100 to conduct an Bush administration officials, on weeks since he was found. Still bet- attack against coalition forces, and the other hand, have reportedly ter news was that U.S. combat $500 if you’re successful. We now estimated the number of foreign injuries had declined as well believe it’s somewhere between jihadists in Iraq at between 1,000 (though only slightly) — from 233 $1,000 and $2,000 if you conduct an and 3,000 — which is also what the to 224 over the same time period — attack, and $3,000 to $5,000 if Pentagon claims.80 prompting Brigadier General Mark you’re successful.”73 Whatever the number of FREs Hertling, assistant commander of These assertions mostly dovetail compared with foreign jihadists,83 the 1st Armored Division, to with what Cordesman was told it appears clear the violence is declare, “We are winning this when he visited the 4th Infantry a worsening. Indeed, to a great fight.” At the same time, however, it month later. Indeed, he was extent, numbers are immaterial. is more significant to note that informed that some 70-80 percent For 20 years, a hard core of just 20 more American troops — 31 — of captured insurgents in that to 30 members of the Red Army were killed by insurgents between unit’s area of operations were paid Faction (Baader Meinhof Gang) Dec. 14, 2003, and Jan. 10, 2004, attackers — among them criminals effectively terrorized West Ger- than between Nov. 16 and Dec. 13, freed by Hussein during the inva- many. when 22 lost their lives in insur- sion. Cordesman’s information Where numbers do matter is in gent attacks.90 diverges from these claims, howev- respect to number of attacks, num- Viewed from this perspective, the er, in the area of local FREs vs. for- ber of casualties and the less easily news is far less salutary: Despite eign jihadists. For example, in the calculated but more profound the fact that the number of attacks division’s operational area, he was impact that the violence has on the declined by 22 percent over this told, “[a]lmost all the threat is local Iraqi people’s sense of security and time period, the number of fatali- FREs. All claim, however, that the confidence. In these respects, both ties actually increased by 41 per- threat is foreign”74 — thus raising the numbers and the impact are cent. Accordingly, one can make the the crucial question of the number disquieting. By early November argument that the insurgents’ of non-Iraqis summoned to that 2003, U.S. military commanders in killing efficiency and the effective- country for the purpose of jihad. Iraq were themselves painting a ness of their attacks in fact

12 Special Warfare improved and that Hussein’s cap- bloodshed, the insurgent seeks to the security forces as oppressors ture did not have the impact many foment a climate of fear by demon- rather than protectors. This is what assumed or hoped that it would.91 strating the authorities’ inability to Major John Nagl, the operations It is a truism of counterinsur- maintain order and thus highlight officer for the 1st Infantry Division, gency that a population will give their weakness. Spectacular acts of found following the car bombing of its allegiance to the side that will violence, such as the suicide bomb- an Iraqi police station that killed best protect it. Charles Simpson ings that have rocked Iraq since 24 policemen, two women and one made exactly this point with refer- August 2003, are meant to demor- child in December 2003. “The crowd ence to Vietnam in his history of alize the population and under- that gathered after the blast,” he the U.S. Army Special Forces. “In mine trust and confidence in the recalled, “didn’t seem angry at the the dirty and dangerous business authorities’ ability to protect and insurgents responsible for the car- of revolutionary war,” he explained, defend them. nage. Instead, many of them “the motivation that produces the Here, the fundamental asymme- blamed the G.I.s.”97 only real long-lasting effect is not try of the insurgency/counterinsur- In a nutshell, this is what the likely to be an ideology, but the ele- gency dynamic comes into play: The current struggle in Iraq is all mental consideration of survival. guerrillas do not have to defeat about.98 This is clearly recognized Peasants will support [the guerril- their opponents militarily; they just by U.S. military commanders. “If las] … if they are convinced that have to avoid losing.96 And, in this you don’t have security,” Hertling failure to do so will result in death respect, the more conspicuous the observes, “you can’t bring back the or brutal punishment. They will security forces become and the economic base, and the enemy is support the government if and more pervasive their operations, still trying to prevent that.”99 Yet when they are convinced that it the stronger the insurgency this is a battle that the U.S. and offers them a better life, and it can appears to be. Hence, the insurgent coalition forces are not winning — and will protect them against the banks on the hope that the disrup- as the mass demonstrations held in [guerrillas] … forever.”95 tion caused to daily life and com- Baghdad the day after the Ashura Accordingly, the highest impera- merce by security-force operations bombings attest. “They promised to tive of the insurgent is to deprive countermeasures will further alien- liberate us from occupation,” an the population of that sense of ate the population from the author- Iraqi insurgent explained to a security. Through violence and ities and create an impression of United Press International reporter in December. The Ameri- cans “promised us rights and liberty,” he continued, “and my colleagues and I waited to make our decision on whether to fight until we saw how they would act. They should have come and just given us food and some security. … It was then that I realized that they had come as occupiers and not as liber- ators, and my colleagues and I then voted to fight.”100 Counterinsurgency’s future Abizaid has described the current conflict in Iraq as a “classical guerrilla-type campaign.”102 The reality is that it is not — which doubtless explains why the insurgency is proving so difficult to defeat and the Army News Service insurgents themselves so resilient. A PSYOP Soldier passes out newspapers in Iraq in an effort to counteract insurgent claims. Unlike a “classical guerrilla-type He also takes the time to listen to the concerns of the local populace in an effort to devel- campaign,” the Iraq insurgency has op solid human intelligence about the ongoing conflict.

December 2004 13 no center of gravity. There appears erate with religious extremist for- vant to the real problem at hand. to be no clear leader (or leader- eign jihadists along with domestic “Iraq reminds us,” one U.S. Army ship);103 no attempt to seize and (Iraqi) jihadists. Special Forces officer notes, “that actually hold territory;104 and no In this loose, ambiguous, and the U.S. government must adapt to single, defined or unifying ideolo- constantly shifting environment, a formidable opponent that is wide- gy.105 Most important, there is no constellations of cells or collections ly dispersed, decentralized and identifiable organization. of individuals gravitate toward one whose many destructive parts are Indeed, none of the four stages of another to carry out armed attacks, autonomous, mobile and highly an insurgency defined in the CIA’s exchange intelligence, trade adaptive.”112 renowned Guide to the Analysis of weapons or engage in joint training It is therefore possible that the Insurgency seem to be relevant to and then disperse at times never to insurgency in Iraq may indeed rep- the situation in Iraq. These are: operate together again. “Here the resent a new form of warfare for a • Preinsurgency:Leadership emerges Ba’athist/Islamic divide does not new, networked century. It is too in response to domestic griev- exist in a practical sense,” accord- soon to determine whether this ances or outside influences; ing to a senior CPA official with development, involving loose net- • Organizational: Infrastructure direct knowledge and experience of works of combatants who come built, guerrillas recruited and this matter. “I wouldn’t have together for a discrete purpose only trained, supplies acquired and thought it possible as they were so to quickly disperse upon its domestic and international sup- diametrically opposed to each other achievement, will prove to be a last- port sought; during the [Saddam Hussein] ing or completely ephemeral char- • Guerrilla warfare:Hit-and-run regime — but it is happening.”109 acteristic of postmodern insur- tactics used to attack govern- Accordingly, watching and study- gency. However, if it gains traction ment. Extensive insurgent polit- ing the monumental film “The Bat- and is indeed revealed to be a har- ical activity — both domestic tle of Algiers,” as Pentagon officials binger of the future, the implica- and international — may also were reported to have done in Sep- tions for how military forces train, occur simultaneously during this tember 2003,110 is largely irrele- equip and organize to meet this stage; vant to an enemy organized in this challenge and avoid preparing to • Mobile conventional warfare: loose, amorphous manner. In one of fight yesterday’s (mostly conven- Larger units used in convention- the film’s most compelling scenes, tional) wars will be of paramount al warfare mode. Many insur- its main protagonist, the French importance. gencies never reach this stage.106 paratroop commander, Lieutenant Rather, what we find in Iraq is Colonel Mathieu, depicts on a Author’s note: This paper was the closest manifestation yet of net- blackboard the cellular structure of researched and written during Feb- war, the concept of warfare involv- the FLN terrorist organization ruary 2004 and presented on March ing flatter, more linear networks against whom they were fighting. 6, 2004 — that is, before the author rather than the pyramidal hierar- This was described by Alistair had the opportunity to visit Iraq. He chies and command and control Horne, in his seminal work on the subsequently served as a senior systems (no matter how primitive) conflict, A Savage War of Peace, as a adviser on counterterrorism and that have governed traditional “complex organigramme [that] counterinsurgency to the Coalition insurgent organizations. began to take shape on a large Provisional Authority in Baghdad Netwar, as defined by the term’s blackboard, a kind of skeleton pyra- from mid-March to mid-April. The originators, John Arquilla and mid in which, as each fresh piece of paper also benefited tremendously David Ronfeldt, involves “small information came from the interro- from the incisive reviews provided groups who communicate, coordi- gation centres, another name (and by Lieutenant Colonel Fred T. Kraw- nate and conduct their campaigns not always necessarily the right chuk, U.S. Army Special Forces, and in an internetted manner, without name) would be entered.”111 RAND colleague Dr. Steven Hosmer. a precise central command.”107 The problem in Iraq is that there In addition, Professor Ian Beckett, This description comes closest to appears to be no such static wiring Dr. Tom Marks and Dr. Gordon explaining the insurgent phenom- diagram or organizational struc- McCormick — along with RAND enon that has unfolded in Iraq ture to identify, unravel and sys- colleagues both in Washington and since August 2003.108 It is a situa- tematically dismantle. If that is in Baghdad — provided many other tion in which secular Ba’athists fact the case, then our entire strat- helpful comments. and other FREs increasingly coop- egy and approach may be irrele-

14 Special Warfare 10 See the Letter to the Editor from Joseph as Iraq’s Turmoil Persists,” New York Times, Dr. Bruce Hoffman is director of J. Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 14 December 2003; Roger Cohen, “Iraq and the RAND Corporation’s Washing- Defense, in response to Fallows, “Blind into Its Patron, Growing Apart,” New York ton, D.C., office. He is also a senior Baghdad,” published in the April 2004 issue Times, 21 December 2003; Knights and of The Atlantic Monthly at http://www.the White, “Iraqi resistance proves resilient,” 24; fellow in the Combating Terrorism atlantic.com/issues/2004/04/letters.htm. The Metz, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Center at the U.S. Military Academy argument that plans were commissioned in Iraq,” 27-28; and Rieff, “Blueprint for a and an adjunct professor in the and prepared but not taken into account was Mess.” Security Studies Program at substantiated in discussions with U.S. 28 Quoted in Benjamin C. Schwarz, Ameri- Georgetown University. His latest Department of Defense officials, April 2004. can Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Sal- 11 Fallows, “Blind into Baghdad,” pp. 73-74; vador: The Frustrations of Reform and the book, Inside Terrorism, is published and Metz, “Insurgency and Counterinsur- Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica, by Columbia University Press. gency in Iraq,” p. 27.Insurgency and Coun- Calif.: The RAND Corporation, R-4042- terinsurgency in Iraq 3 USDP, 1991), 22. Schwarz writes that Ponce Notes: 12 Rieff, “Blueprint for a Mess.” previously “served as chief of personnel and 1 For an interesting account of how this 13 Email communications with a senior CPA later as deputy director (essentially com- film is used to illuminate spiritual real-life official, Baghdad, Iraq, January and Febru- mander under an inactive director) of the issues, see Alex Kuczynski, “Groundhog ary 2004. See also Joshua Hammer, “Tikrit Treasury Police-the unit of the Salvadoran Almighty,” New York Times (Sunday “Fash- Dispatch: Uncivil Military,” The New Repub- armed forces most notorious for its sadistic ion and Style” section), 7 December 2003. lic, 1 March 2004. and particularly extravagant crushing of 2 See, for example, Anthony H. Cordesman, 14 As one U.S. Army officer involved in coun- dissent-from 1979 to 1982, the height of the Iraq: Too Uncertain to Call (Washington, tering the insurgency observes, the real period of political violence in El Salvador … D.C.: Center for Strategic and International problem is that success “demands coordinat- and was in fact denied a U.S. visa for years Studies, 14 November 2003; James Fallows, ed military, political, informational and eco- because of suspicion of human rights abuse.” “Blind into Baghdad,” The Atlantic Monthly, nomic efforts to remove the fundamental Footnote 12, 22. Vol. 293, No. 1 (January-February 2004), pp. sources of strength-it is here where we are 29 Between 1980 and 1990 the United 52-74; Joshua Hammer, “ Tikrit Dispatch: encountering our greatest difficulties.” Quot- States poured more than $4.5 billion into El Uncivil Military,” The New Republic, 1 ed in Vernon Loeb, “Rumsfeld Seeks Better Salvador ($1.3 billion in the form of direct March 2004; Steven Metz, “Insurgency and Intelligence on Iraqi Insurgents,” Washing- military assistance and over $850 million in Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” The Washing- ton Post, 11 December 2003. unsubsidized credits-excluding an estimated ton Quarterly,Vol. 27, No. 1, Winter 2003-04; 15 Cordesman, Iraq: Too Uncertain to Call, CIA investment of over $500 million) in an and David Rieff, “Blueprint for a Mess,” New 3. effort to defeat the communist insurgency York Times Magazine, 2 November 2003. 16 See Brian Knowlton, “Iraq Resistance there. American training teams and adviso- 3 This is also the thrust of an article by Lasting Longer Than Expected, Powell Con- ry personnel also oversaw the fivefold Robert R. Tomes, “Relearning Counterinsur- cedes,” International Herald Tribune (Paris), expansion, equipping, and training of the gency Warfare,” Parameters, Spring 2004, 26 October 2003; and Lizette Alvarez, 57,000-man Salvadoran armed forces during 16-17. “British Official Sees No Early Exit from this time period. See Schwarz, American 4 Although the sources cited throughout Iraq,” New York Times, 5 January 2004. Counterinsurgency Doctrine, xiii and 2; and this paper are published secondary scholar- 17 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer M. Taw, Bruce Hoffman et al., Lessons for Contem- ly sources or journalism accounts, the argu- Defense Policy and Low-Intensity Conflict: porary Counterinsurgencies: The Rhodesian ments presented here are based primarily The Development of Britain’s “Small Wars” Experience (Santa Monica, Calif.: The on discussions held between December 2003 Doctrine During the 1950s (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, R-3998-USDP, 1991), 2. and February 2004 with serving American Calif.: The RAND Corporation, R-4501-A, 30 Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons, 124. military and intelligence officers, U.S. and 1991), vii. 31 John Pimlott, “The British Army,” in Ian British officials in the CPA, and journalists 18 The three key British counterterrorist/ Beckett and John Pimlott (eds.), Armed who are currently in or have recently report- counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1940s Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency ed from Iraq. and 1950s involving Malaya, Kenya, and (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 16-17. 6 See Christopher Dickey, “Learning from Cyprus; the more recent struggle in North- 32 Hoffman and Taw, Defense Policy and the Pros,” Newsweek, 16 January 2004; ern Ireland (though covering only the period Low-Intensity Conflict, 1. James Dobbins et al., America’s Role in between 1969 and 1991); the 1965-1980 33 Dexter Filkins, “Dual Role of GI’s difficult Nation-Building: From Germany To Iraq Rhodesian conflict; and the counterterrorist to juggle,” International Herald Tribune (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corpora- experiences of Germany and Italy during (Paris), 3 November 2003; and Michael tion, MR-1753-RC, 2003), pp. 167-222; Metz, the 1970s and 1980s. See Bruce Hoffman Knights and Jeffrey White, “Iraqi resistance “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in and Jennifer M. Taw, A Strategic Frame- proves resilient,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Iraq,” pp. 27-28; and Rieff, “Blueprint for a work for Countering Terrorism and Insur- November 2003, 24; and P. Mitchell Mess.” gency (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Cor- Prothero, “Iraqi Guerrillas: ‘Why we fight’,” 7 Cordesman, Iraq: Too Uncertain to Call, poration, N-3506-DOS, 1992). United Press International, 4 December p. 2. 19 Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Frame- 2003. 8 Quoted in Cordesman, Too Uncertain to work,6. 35 Quoted in Brian Knowlton, “Top U.S. Gen- Call. 20 Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Frame- eral in Iraq Sees ‘Classical Guerrilla-Type’ 9 See Rowan Scarborough, “US Rushed work, vi, 3-6 and 77-78. War,” International Herald Tribune Post-Saddam Planning,” Washington Times, 21 See, for example, Alex Berenson, “A Bagh- (Paris), 16 July 2003. 3 September 2003. dad Neighborhood, Once Hopeful, Now Reels 36 Hoffman and Taw, Defense Policy and

December 2004 15 Low-Intensity Conflict, 2. 163-64. ly recruited by loyalists to Saddam Hussein 37 Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Frame- 60 Dana Priest, “Violence, Turnover Blunt to join the resistance against American work, 9-10, 13-15. CIA Effort in Iraq,” Washington Post, 4 forces in Iraq.” Michael R. Gordon with Dou- 38 Hoffman and Taw, Defense Policy and March 2004. glas Jehl, “After War: Militants,” New York Low-Intensity Conflict, vi. 61 This entailed the reassignment of the lin- Times, 22 June 2003. 39 Quoted in DGD&D 18/34/56 Army Code guists, analysts, and other experts serving in 77 Ned Parker, “Suicide Bombings in Iraq No 71596 (Pts 1 & 2), Army Field Manual, the 1,400-person Iraq Survey Group to the Blamed on Group of Foreign Fighters,” vol. V, Operations Other Than War, “Section counterinsurgency mission from the search Agence France Presse, 30 October 2003. A B: Counter Insurgency Operations, Part 2 for WMD. See Douglas Jehl, “U.S. to Shift former senior CIA officer in August reported The Conduct of Counter Insurgency Opera- Some Experts from Arms to Anti-terror,” that U.S. and allied intelligence estimated tions,” (London: Prepared under the direc- New York Times, 27 November 2003. that 500 to 600 foreign fighters had come to tion of the Chief of the General Staff, 1995), 62 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Current Mil- Iraq. See Alissa J. Rubin, “Iraq Seen as Ter- 3-1. itary Situation in Iraq (Washington, D.C.: ror Target: Anti-Western extremists have 40 DGD&D, Army Field Manual, vol. V, Center for Strategic and International been infiltrating and may be looking to Operations Other Than War, 3-1 to 3-2. Studies, 14 November 2003), 13-14. attack symbols of America and its allies, offi- 41 As Nagl notes, this is an institutional pat- 63 Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “Guer- cials say,” Los Angeles Times, 10 August tern of behavior in the U.S. Army transcend- rillas Posing More Danger, Says U.S.,” New 2003. See also Michael R. Gordon, “Terror ing half a century. See Nagl, Counterinsur- York Times, 13 November 2003. Group Seen as Back Inside Iraq,” New York gency Lessons, 6. 64 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 165. Times, 9 August 2003. 42 Quoted in Peter Baker, “Tactics Turn 65 Author of, among other works, With the 78 General Abizaid was reported to have Unconventional; Commanders Draw Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of said in November that FREs and not foreign Lessons of Belfast in Countering Attacks,” Nicaragua (New York: Simon & Schus- terrorists “pose the greatest danger to Amer- Washington Post, 30 March 2003. See also ter,1987). ican troops and to stability in Iraq.” Schmitt Maass, “Professor Nagl’s War.” 66 Dickey, “Learning from the Pros.” and Sanger, “Guerrillas Posing More Dan- 43 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual 67 Don Van Natta, Jr. and Desmond Butler, ger, Says U.S.” (reprint of 1940 edition) (Washington, D.C.: “Hundreds of militants head to Iraq for 79 Quoted in Desmond Butler and Don Van U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), pas- Jihad,” International Herald Tribune Natta, Jr., “Recruiters: Trail of Anti-U.S. sim. (Paris), 3 November 2003. Fighters Said to Cross Europe to Iraq,” New 44 Bruce Hoffman, “Current Research on 68 Marianne Brun-Rovet, “Insurgents are York Times, 6 December 2003. This figure Terrorism and LIC,” Studies in Conflict and ‘few in number but organised’,” Financial dovetails with that provided by Ambassador Terrorism, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1992), 31. Times (London), 14 November 2003. See Bremer in September, when he reported 45 U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, also, Schmitt and Sanger, “Guerrillas Posing that 248 foreign fighters had been appre- 33-34. More Danger, Says U.S.”; and Jehl, “U.S. to hended in Iraq, of whom 19 were members of 46 Carlotta Gall, “U.S. Military Unveils Shift Some Experts from Arms to Anti-ter- al Qaeda and 123 were from Syria alone. See Changes in Strategy in Afghanistan,” New ror.” Douglas Jehl, “Bremer Says 19 Qaeda Fight- York Times, 21 December 2003. 69 Ambassador Bremer cited in Cordesman, ers Are in U.S. Custody in Iraq,” New York 47 David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, “New The Current Military Situation in Iraq, p. 2. Times, 26 September 2003. The number of al U.S. Effort Steps up Hunt for bin Laden,” 70 Major General Raymond T. Odierno cited Qaeda detainees in November had increased New York Times, 29 February 2004. in Raymond Bonner and Joel Brinkley, “Lat- by only one to 20, according to Lieutenant 48 Quoted in Thomas E. Ricks, “Marines to est Attacks Underscore Differing Intelli- General Sanchez. See Brian Knowlton, Offer New Tactics in Iraq: Reduced Use of gence Estimates of Strength of Foreign “Iraqi Security Forces Outnumber American Force Planned After Takeover from Army,” Guerrillas,” New York Times, 28 October Troops, U.S. Says,” International Herald Tri- Washington Post, 7 January 2004. 2003. bune (Paris), 11 November 2003. The 300 49 Ricks, “Marines to Offer New Tactics.” 71 John E. McLaughlin, Deputy Director of figure was also cited by American officials in This point is corroborated by a senior CPA Central Intelligence quoted in Dana Priest, December. See Desmond Butler and Don official in Baghdad. E-mail communication, “The CIA’s ‘Anonymous’ No. 2: Low-Profile Van Natta, Jr., “Recruiters: Trail of Anti-U.S. January 2004. Director Leads Agency’s Analytical Side,” Fighters Said to Cross Europe to Iraq,” New 50 See Hammer, “Tikrit Dispatch.” Washington Post, 9 January 2004. York Times, 6 December 2003. 51 Discussion with serving U.S. Army officer 72 General Abizaid quoted in Schmitt and 80 Bonner and Brinkley, “Latest Attacks directly familiar with General Petraeus’s Sanger, “Guerrillas Posing More Danger, Underscore Differing Intelligence Estimates initiatives, U.S. Military Academy, West Says U.S.” See also Brun-Rovet, “Insurgents of Strength of Foreign Guerrillas.” In Sep- Point, New York, February 2004. are ‘few in number but organised.’” tember, “American military, intelligence and 52 Hammer, “Tikrit Dispatch.” 73 Quoted in Bonner and Brinkley, “Latest law enforcement figures” had put the num- 53 E-mail communication with senior CPA Attacks Underscore Differing Intelligence ber of foreign fighters at “as many as 1,000.” official, Baghdad, Iraq, January 2004. Estimates of Strength of Foreign Guerril- See Eric Schmitt, “Iraq Bombings Pose a 54 U.S. Army Special Forces officer, e-mail las.” See also Maass, “Professor Nagl’s War.” Mystery U.S. Must Solve,” New York Times, communication with the author, May 2004. 74 Cordesman, Current Military Situation, 7 September 2003. 56 DGD&D, Army Field Manual, vol. V, 25. 83 And, in this context, it is argued that Operations Other Than War, 3-1. 75 Cordesman, Current Military Situation, domestic American politics influence the 57 Hoffman and Taw, A Strategic Frame- 2. depiction of the insurgency problem in Iraq work, 77. 76 See reports such as those from June that variously as the product of FREs or foreign 59 Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Cam- cited American military commanders’ asser- jihadists. For example, an account published paigning (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), tions that “foreign fighters are being active- in Time magazine explained that “The Bush

16 Special Warfare Administration, for its part, wants to por- February 2004. (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corpora- tray the insurgency as mainly homegrown. 95 Charles Simpson, Inside the Green tion, MR-989-AF, 1999), 47. That allows Washington to claim, as it Berets: The First Thirty Years (Novato, 108 It should be noted that the netwar con- repeatedly does, that when the die-hards Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982), 62. cept as explicated by Arquilla and Ronfeldt run out of men and munitions, the insur- 96 In Iraq, interestingly, success is in the envisioned technologically adept and infor- gency will dissipate. It also allows Bush to process of being defined by U.S. military mation technology-savvy adversaries, avoid the charge that the war actually commanders in a similar vein. “If we’re exploiting IT for offensive and defensive increased danger to the U.S. by stirring up a being held to a standard that the only way to operations. This aspect of network is cer- hornet’s nest of terrorism.” Bennett and win is have no more bombs go off, we won’t tainly not apparent in Iraq. Ware, “Life Behind Enemy Lines.” See also live up to that,” Brigadier General Hertling 109 E-mail communication with a senior CPA Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Presidential Poli- conceded. “Our standard is to reduce them official, Baghdad, Iraq, February 2004. tics and Self- Rule for Iraqis,” New York every day. This is the hardest thing I’ve ever 110 See, for example, Michael T. Kaufman, Times, 18 February 2004, 56, 61, 64. done.” Quoted in Eric Schmitt, “For G.I.’s, “What Does the Pentagon See in ‘Battle of 85 Significantly, to maintain stability and Pride in War Efforts but Doubts About Iraq’s Algiers’?” New York Times, 7 September order in Northern Ireland, the ratio of Future,” New York Times, 4 January 2004. 2003; Philip Gourevitch, “Comment: Win- British security forces maintained in North- 97 Maass, “Professor Nagl’s War.” ning And Losing,” The New Yorker, 22 and ern Ireland (military plus police from the 98 See, for example, the comments of Raad 29 December 2003; and, Stuart Klawans, Royal Ulster Constabulary) was at a ratio of Khairy al-Barhawi, a Mosul city councilman “Lessons of the Pentagon’s Favorite Training 20 security force members per 1,000 inhabi- who says that he wants the “Americans to Film,” New York Times Sunday Arts and tants. In Iraq, the ratio of coalition military succeed,” but also complains of death threats Leisure Section, 4 January 2004. forces to population is a considerably lower and therefore wishes that the Americans 106 Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the 6.1 per 1,000 inhabitants. See James T. will leave. Quoted in Filkins, “Attacks on Analysis of Insurgency (Washington, D.C.: Quinlivan, “Burden of Victory: The Painful G.I.’s in Mosul Rise as Good Will Fades.” As U.S. Government Printing Office, no date), 3. Arithmetic of Stability Operations,” RAND one U.S. Army officer knowledgeable about 107 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Summer 2003), 28-29. counterinsurgency also notes, “There’s a Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and See also, idem, “Force Requirements in Sta- ‘Catch-22’ with military-NGO [nongovern- Information-Age Terrorism,” in Ian O. Less- bility Operations,” Parameters (Winter mental organization] interface” that affects er et al., Countering the New Terrorism 1995), 59-69, available online at the security equation. “NGOs,” he explained, (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corpora- http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parame- “need a secure environment to do their job tion, MR-989-AF, 1999), 47. ters/1995/quinliv.htm. In a November op-ed, … without it they can’t do their work. If 108 It should be noted that the netwar con- Edward Luttwak further underscored the NGOs can’t do their work, then the US mil- cept as explicated by Arquilla and Ronfeldt inadequacy of military forces deployed to itary has to tackle more civic action projects envisioned technologically adept and infor- Iraq noting that “The support echelon is so to win hearts and minds. Less troops for mation technology-savvy adversaries, large that out of the 133,000 American men security makes it harder to get NGOs in the exploiting IT for offensive and defensive and women in Iraq, no more than 56,000 are field.” E-mail communication with the operations. This aspect of network is cer- combat-trained troops available for security author, May 2004. tainly not apparent in Iraq. duties. … For comparison, there are 39,000 99 Quoted in Schmitt, “For G.I.’s, Pride in 109 E-mail communication with a senior CPA police officers in New York City, and they at War Efforts but Doubts About Iraq’s official, Baghdad, Iraq, February 2004. least know the languages of most of the Future,” 100; P. Mitchell Prothero, “Iraqi 110 See, for example, Michael T. Kaufman, inhabitants, few of whom are likely to be guerillas: ‘Why we fight’,” United Press “What Does the Pentagon See in ‘Battle of armed Ba’athist fanatics.” Idem, “So Few International, 4 December 2003. Algiers’?” New York Times, 7 September Soldiers, So Much to Do,” New York Times, 4 102 Quoted in Knowlton, “Top U.S. General in 2003; Philip Gourevitch, “Comment: Win- November 2003. Iraq Sees ‘Classical Guerrilla-Type’ War.” ning And Losing,” The New Yorker, 22 and 86 John F. Burns, “General Vows to Intensify 103 The infamous Abu Musab Zarqawi clear- 29 December 2003; and, Stuart Klawans, U.S. Response to Attackers,” New York ly has pretensions to such a role, as evi- “Lessons of the Pentagon’s Favorite Training Times, 12 November 2003. denced by the letter he wrote to bin Laden Film,” New York Times Sunday Arts and 87 Thom Shanker, “Rumsfeld, on the Ground that was seized by U.S. authorities (see “Text Leisure Section, 4 January 2004. in Iraq, Gets a Report on Progress Against from Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi Letter,” 111 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: the Insurgency,” New York Times, 7 Decem- accessed at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/tran- Algeria 1954-1962 (Harmondsworth: Pen- ber 2003. scripts/20040212_zarqawi_full.html), but guin, 1977), 194. 88 Thom Shanker and James Risen, “Hus- has yet to merit or achieve such a distinc- 112 Email communication with U.S. Army sein Tells Interrogators He Didn’t Direct tion. Special Forces officer, May 2004. Insurgency,” New York Times, 15 December 104 E-mail communication with a senior CPA 2003. official, Baghdad, Iraq, February 2004. 89 See Michael R. Gordon, “For U.S. Foes, a 105 Knights and White, “Iraqi resistance Major Blow: Fighters Now Lack a Symbol,” proves resilient,” 20. New York Times, 14 December 2003. 106 Central Intelligence Agency, Guide to the 90 Figures and Brigadier General Hertling Analysis of Insurgency (Washington, D.C.: quoted in Jim Michaels, “Attacks down 22% U.S. Government Printing Office, no date), 3. since Saddam’s capture,” USA Today (Wash- 107 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and ington, D.C.), 12 January 2004. Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and 91 Email correspondence with Christopher Information-Age Terrorism,” in Ian O. Less- Dickey, Newsweek’s Paris bureau chief, 2 er et al., Countering the New Terrorism

December 2004 17 OPATT: The U.S. Army SF Advisers in El Salvador

by Cecil E. Bailey

ver the course of the 12-year was it recognized as a foreign inter- Sandanistas in Nicaragua encour- United States military-assist- nal defense, or FID, mission that log- aged the Salvadoran leftist move- Oance program to El Salvador, ically belonged to SF.3 Once fielded, ment to coalesce into a single organ- the mission of the Brigade Opera- the SF teams were tasked with one ization, the Farabundo Marti tional Planning and Assistance of the most critical U.S. missions of National Liberation Front, or Training Team, or OPATT,1 stands the ground war, yet they operated in FMLN. The FMLN began an armed out as one of the longest running of the brigades with little support, no rebellion in 1980, and in 1981 it all Special Forces missions. It was leverage and abundant scrutiny. attempted an offensive to seize also one of the most controversial, For nearly eight years, OPATTs power in El Salvador. Even though evoking memories of the advisory cycled through the brigades, each the offensive failed to spark the pop- role in Vietnam, the “slippery slope” one extending the progress of the ular uprising that the FMLN hoped that led to the U.S. combat role there. preceding team. Their achievements would enable it to seize control of The 55-man force cap on trainers and successes must be judged by the the government, the offensive that was imposed in El Salvador, cumulative effect of their influence underscored the FMLN’s strengths along with other restrictions, was on increasing ESAF counterinsur- and the ESAF’s weaknesses. established in 1981 to ensure that gency capabilities over time and The Salvadoran Army had no U.S. trainers would not take on a especially on improving the ESAF’s experience, training or doctrine for combat role. When the first OPATT human-rights record. The OPATT counterinsurgency warfare. Much mission deployed three-man SF concept is now being revived in of the army’s manpower was com- teams to every brigade in the Sal- Colombia for the war on drugs, and it mitted to static defense of critical vadoran Army in 1984, the advisers’ may have potential for use in coun- sites and the economic infrastruc- role appeared suspect. Their objec- tries now struggling with terrorist ture, forfeiting its offensive poten- tive — to help the Salvadoran Army, threats. In order to determine tial. The FMLN, on the other hand, or ESAF, prosecute its war more lessons that can be applied to future demonstrated an impressive capa- aggressively and more humanely — advisory missions, this article exam- bility for coordinating operations was a step beyond the ongoing SF ines the ad hoc way in which the nationwide. Even after the 1981 training missions in El Salvador. It brigade OPATT mission developed offensive failed, the FMLN man- was believed that the assignment of and how the teams dealt with their aged to hold the initiative in the SF teams at the brigade level would mission environment. field, operating freely throughout help the ESAF to seize the initiative the countryside in a protracted while improving its performance in Background guerrilla campaign designed to regard to human rights. Conditions in El Salvador had demoralize the army and cripple Initially, the operation in El Sal- been building toward revolution for the economic infrastructure. vador was not a Special Forces mis- decades, and the 1979 victory of the To counter advantages accruing sion, and only after an aborted effort to the insurgents, a team of U.S.

18 Special Warfare officers, led by Brigadier General Fred F. Woerner, worked with the ESAF general staff to develop a survival strategy of immediate expansion and rapid moderniza- tion to get the army on the offensive.6 To support this strategy, SF teams were sent to train the Sal- vadoran Army into a force capable of holding back the FMLN until the ESAF was strong enough to seize the initiative. This expansion effort took the ESAF from a 9,000-man, poorly trained, poorly equipped force to a capable and effective counterinsurgency force of 40,000 by 1984.7 For the army, the cornerstone of the program to seize the initiative was the creation of five 1,000-man immediate-reaction infantry bat- USASOC Historical Archive talions, or Batallónes de Infanteria The creation of five 1,000-man immediate-reaction infantry battalions was key in the Salvadoran de Reacción Inmediata, or BIRI, to army’s expansion and defense against the FMLN. provide a strategic-deployment capability for the army’s general brigade level. Any serious attempt Salvadoran public services and staff, or Estado Mayor.8 to influence brigade operations infrastructure while enhancing By 1983 it was clear that the needed to be a long-term effort, popular support for the govern- security-assistance program to El with advisers programmed for suc- ment. The departments of San Salvador would be a longer cessive assignments. The U.S. secu- Vicente and Usulutan were select- endeavor than expected only two rity-assistance mission that pro- ed to host the pilot project, after years before.9 U.S. advisers also vided deployments of up to one which the plan was to be imple- recognized the need to move the year was the ETSS — engineering mented nationwide. training program beyond small- and technical services specialists, At the same time the Estado unit training and to work with the later renamed extended training Mayor was developing the NCP, a six Salvadoran brigades to service specialists.10 ETSS were team from the 3rd Battalion, 7th improve their staff operations and already being used to provide Special Forces Group, based in their coordination between the advisers for other missions in El Panama, was in San Salvador brigade and national levels. There Salvador, and they would be used training ESAF officers in internal simply were not enough trainer to deploy advisers to the brigades defense and development, or positions to permit this until the when the OPATT mission began in IDAD. The commander of the U.S. National Training Center in LaU- 1984. But first the 1983 National Military Group, or MILGP, nion was activated in early 1984, Campaign Plan had to demon- Colonel John D. Waghelstein, making the ESAF less dependent strate what a U.S. advisory pres- directed the leader of the SF team, on SF mobile training teams, or ence could do for ESAF operations. Major Peter Stankovich, to review MTTs, for its infantry training, the plan with Salvadoran plan- and thus freeing up a number of The national campaign plan ners already involved in the the 55 trainer positions. The OPATT concept got a trial preparations. Working with senior Additionally, the short-term run during planning for the 1983 military officers and civilian offi- MTTs that typically deployed for National Campaign Plan, or NCP. cials, Stankovich’s team helped no more than six months with spe- The NCP was a combined civil- develop a detailed plan to be exe- cific and limited training purposes military campaign designed to cuted under the direction of a Sal- did not provide the continuity jump-start the reconstruction of vadoran joint task force, or JTF, to needed to effectively advise at establish security throughout the

December 2004 19 brigade zone and create conditions knowledgeable advisers during was to have advisers from the U.S. favorable to civil reconstruction.11 the planning and coordination of Marine Corps.13 Because of his involvement in operations. The concept was for each team planning for the NCP, Stankovich chief to work with the brigade staff joined a 10-man team sent by the The 1984 mission to improve planning and opera- United States Southern Com- Waghelstein saw only the begin- tions capabilities. The training offi- mand, or USSOUTHCOM, to help ning of the NCP before Colonel cer was to advance the brigade’s the Salvadoran JTF execute its Joseph S. Stringham replaced him training program, while the MI plan. The military component of as MILGP commander in July officer would work to improve the plan worked well because the 1983. Despite the failure of the intelligence operations. JTF controlled the majority of the NCP, Stringham felt it demonstrat- The U.S. Embassy had another army’s deployable ground forces ed the viability of small teams of motive for getting the teams quick- and had a complete, well-organ- U.S. advisers in the Salvadoran ly identified and deployed. Sal- ized staff.12 But after six months brigades. Based on the experience vadoran presidential elections of intense operations, the ESAF in San Vicente, he approached the were scheduled for May 1984, and could not sustain the campaign. Estado Mayor in late 1983 with a the embassy wanted to have U.S. As operations slowed in Septem- recommendation that advisory officers inside each Salvadoran ber, the JTF was disbanded. Most teams be assigned to each of the six brigade to monitor the Salvadoran of the USSOUTHCOM team brigade headquarters. armed forces.14 The elections went returned to Panama. It was agreed that teams would well, although some brigade com- The follow-on phase planned for be composed of a lieutenant colonel manders were far from enthusias- Usulutan was abandoned and the as team chief and a captain as tic about having the U.S. teams FMLN gradually reinfiltrated the training officer, both assigned for suddenly placed inside their head- Department of San Vicente. Even one-year ETSS tours, augmented quarters and expressing a serious though the NCP failed in its objec- by a Military Intelligence, or MI, interest in the way they ran their tive, Stankovich’s 1983 experience officer on a six-month tour. All of brigade. with the 5th Brigade and the the team members would be Army experimental JTF demonstrated officers, except those assigned to Brigade commanders object the value of experienced and the 6th brigade in Usulutan, which Within months after the lieutenant colonels arrived, the brigade commanders were regis- tering objections: The captains were acceptable; the colonels were not.15 Part of the issue was that some of the rank-conscious Sal- vadoran staff officers felt that their authority was challenged by an adviser of equivalent or senior rank.16 But there was more to the objection than rank. According to the 1st Brigade OPATT team chief, Lieutenant Colonel James Roach: “I know that the brigade commanders weren’t comfortable with [us] because we were bold enough to ask questions about their plans and operations. And the brigade commanders wanted people who responded … instead of asking USASOC Historical Archive questions.”17 Until 1985, no efforts were made in El Salvador to influence popular support for the government through By late summer, the new U.S. civic-action programs like the one being run above by members of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. Civic- MILGP commander, Colonel James action missions are designed to show the populace that the government can meet its basic needs.

20 Special Warfare J. Steele, announced that the had been the team chiefs in the that only qualified officers and OPATT lieutenant colonels would 1983 OPATT mission, were in place NCOs were assigned to the teams. be moved to new positions specifi- at the Salvadoran national level for This was relatively easy with the cally created for them elsewhere.18 each of these missions, but no sup- O&I ETSS positions, which were The MI captains continued only porting U.S. effort to push the mis- filled in less than six months from until their six-month assignments sions existed in the brigades, the field of experienced senior expired, and the Army could not where most of these activities NCOs and warrant officers, or find six Spanish-speaking MI cap- would have to be managed. This WOs, from the 3rd Battalion, 7th tains to replace them.19 Only the was the argument that MILGP SF Group. Most SF senior NCOs captains assigned as training offi- commander Steele took to the and WOs had O&I education and cers stayed on in the brigades. The Estado Mayor in mid-1985 for once experience, and they were capable MILGP’s attention shifted to other again having U.S. advisers linguists as the result of both for- matters, leaving the OPATT mis- assigned to the brigades. mal training and practice on multi- sion in limbo. It was not revisited The concept agreed to by the ple training missions in the region. until mid-1985. Estado Mayor was little different It was more difficult with the team from the earlier plan, but it was chiefs. The 1985 mission adjusted to address the difficulties Because SF did not yet exist as 1984 was a pivotal year for the experienced during the 1984 mis- a separate career-management ESAF. Expansion of the Salvado- sion. The plan called for each field, there could be no guarantee ran armed forces appeared sus- brigade headquarters to have a that SF-qualified officers would be tainable, and the logistics flow was three-man team of U.S. advisers selected for the mission. The adequately supporting the ESAF’s assigned: a combat-arms major, MILGP commander, anxious to get operations tempo. All five of the preferably with an SF background, teams into the brigades quickly, BIRIs were in the field.20 The Sal- and two SF NCOs or warrant offi- began to “recruit” officers who vadoran Air Force, which had been cers with training and experience were personally and professional- essentially destroyed on the in operations and intelligence, or ly known by SF officers already in ground during the January 1982 O&I.22 El Salvador, and to request them FMLN attack on Ilopango, had In the 1985 mission, unlike its by name for the assignment. been rebuilt with aircraft more predecessor, all team positions Desired qualifications included: suited for counterinsurgency, such were to be year-long ETSS assign- combat-arms major or promotable as UH-1 Huey helicopters and A-37 ments in order to improve mission captain with line-company com- Dragonfly close-air-support jets.21 continuity and avoid the personnel mand experience, battalion or By mid-1984, if there was little turbulence associated with MTTs. higher staff experience, advanced- hope of defeating the FMLN, there Having a major leading the team course completion and language was confidence that the Salvado- instead of a lieutenant colonel skill.23 ran military was itself no longer at defused the rank issue. While Not surprisingly, most officers risk of defeat. working to improve O&I integra- in the initial selection, like the With the ESAF now capable of tion, the team was tasked to focus NCOs and WOs, had served in the preventing an FMLN victory, the directly on the missions the ESAF 3rd Battalion, 7th SF Group. Most MILGP assessed that it was time tended to disregard — CD, civic had extensive experience in the to shift its strategic focus toward action and PSYOP — but which region from numerous MTTs in El efforts to influence popular support were now key components of the Salvador and Honduras, and sig- for the government, an essential advisory mission. nificantly, most had worked pro- part of counterinsurgency warfare fessionally with each other in that had been all but ignored to Qualification, selection past assignments. This would that point in the war. This meant The OPATT mission required become important in efforts to trying to engage the ESAF in low- less than half of the 55 trainers help ESAF units coordinate their intensity conflict, or LIC, missions permitted in country — generally operations. promoting civil defense, or CD; fewer than 20. With such a small Even though the Army’s require- civic action; and psychological number of advisers allowed for the ment was for only five officers per operations, or PSYOP. mission, and with six brigades to year, the preference for SF majors U.S. advisers, several of whom support, it was critical to ensure shrank the field of eligibles considerably, and the informal screening

December 2004 21 for long, as there was only one more iteration of OPATT assignments to fill before the peace plan went into effect in December 1991. Defining the mission The OPATT mission in 1985 was driven by assessments that the ESAF expansion program was close to completion and that the ESAF’s capability for conducting its own tactical-level training was progress- ing satisfactorily. Although the SF advisers continued to monitor and assist unit training programs, their attention turned to staff operations so that they could improve coordination between the brigade and national levels and could advance operational coordination with adjacent military detachments, or DM USASOC Historical Archive (destacamento militar). Staffing the The Salvadoran army had to be taught the importance of human rights. Violations of basic human OPATTs with two O&I ETSS per- rights escalated violence in the country and caused protests against the government. sonnel gave the team the flexibility to deploy to other headquarters in of known officers had the effect of Actually, the pool had been quite the brigade zone, effectively influ- further reducing the number of small from the outset. Allowing for encing the action in several brigade candidates. Finding qualified offi- approximately five years between units at the same time. In some cers for OPATT assignment had promotion to major and promotion cases, O&I ETSS personnel were gotten difficult enough by 1990 to to lieutenant colonel, it would be deployed full-time to subordinate prompt the MILGP operations offi- difficult for officers to acquire all DMs and tasked with performing cer, Major Francisco J. Pedrozo, to the assignments and professional the complete OPATT mission. travel to Washington for discus- education that would qualify them The only significant changes in sions with the Special Forces for OPATT duty and still be avail- the original mission over the Branch (established in 1987) to able for the assignment. course of the war involved human- find a solution. Holding strictly to An additional discriminator was rights enforcement and implemen- qualifications established by the language. The initially-required tation of the 1991 Peace Plan. In MILGP, the SF Branch prepared a 3/3 reading and speaking level 1990, the mission of monitoring list of all SF officers who were (5/5 is the equivalent of native flu- and reporting suspected human- qualified for the duty. What the ency),25 was lowered to 2/2 for offi- rights violations was added.27 branch found was startling: There cers, and the SF Branch made an Then, after the peace plan was were only 17 names on the list. effort to ensure that at least one of signed in December 1991, new Nearly half of those officers were the other members of the team in guidance reflected the approaching already in El Salvador, and about each brigade had a higher lan- end of the war: the same number had returned guage capability. For all of the Presently, all training activities during the past year. There were compromises on ETSS require- are restricted to the cuartel and only three or four candidates in all ments that the MILGP was will- must be coordinated with United of SF who were fully qualified for ing to make at this point in the Nations Observers. Advisory assist- assignment to El Salvador as a war, the preference for SF officers ance is now more concerned with brigade adviser — and the mission remained firm, and no compro- civic action, psychological opera- required five officers per year. mise was considered on the O&I tions and garrison operations and Pedrozo realized, “The pool was requirement.26 Fortunately, the the development of peacetime unit exhausted.”24 1990 shortage would not matter

22 Special Warfare training management systems. ly communicated with each other, by U.S. security assistance. They Peacetime training activities exchanging information and ideas, commanded no support capabili- should increase in the future as the and confirming the “azimuth” for ties for combat or logistics, FMLN is demobilized and dis- their mission. Instruction by any- although they could influence armed. Possible human rights inci- one else was often considered irrele- intelligence activities. dents continue to be monitored and vant: The ground truth for their The shift in priorities after 1985 reported.28 mission existed in the minds of meant that they would spend less Interestingly, it is rare to find a those who were immersed in it. Iso- time on training, which most brigade adviser who recalls having lated from anyone who could assess brigade commanders valued, and seen what he considered a mission what they did, they discounted their new objectives were in precise- statement. All of the veterans guidance from others when it con- ly those subjects that their counter- express an understanding that tradicted the reality of the brigade’s parts cared about the least — which their mission was to improve com- circumstances. included monitoring and reporting bat effectiveness of the brigades Major Gregory Banner recalled human-rights violations. Finally, and to do what they could to influ- an example of guidance he received assorted policy and administrative ence human-rights performance. during a visit by a MILGP staff “rules” constrained what the advis- Major Christopher St. John officer to the 2nd Brigade head- ers were permitted to do and when recalled no formal mission being quarters in Santa Ana, “He does and where they were allowed to go. given him during predeployment not understand. I am on the practi- In SF vernacular, getting the job activities and none when he cal level of trying to figure out how done under these kinds of circum- arrived in El Salvador in Septem- to get things done, he is talking stances required exceptional rap- ber 1986 as OPATT team chief to theory.”31 port with one’s counterpart — an the 2nd Brigade. Reflecting on the Variations of that complaint ability to communicate and have frenetic atmosphere inside the U.S. were common. For the OPATTs, suggestions well-received. It also Embassy, which was caught up in any instruction beyond a general depended on the brigade com- its own priorities, St. John noted mission statement would only have mander’s attitude toward advisers, that upon his arrival, “I read two clouded their vision of how to get and that was mixed. Some com- three-ring binders of policy … the job done, when so much manders were simply too reticent signed that I read them, was sworn depended on circumstances that to be won over. Some were also in as a Regular Army officer … and were unique to each brigade. Few notorious human-rights offenders, left for Santa Ana. … I didn’t meet “outsiders” understood how differ- or they were known to be involved Colonel Steele [the MILGP com- ent the brigade zones were in in illegal profiteering. This obvi- mander] during my first 100 days terms of terrain, threat and a host ously complicated the relationship, in El Salvador. The other OPATTs of other factors. Fewer still under- but the brigade commander was helped the most in telling me what stood how supremely critical the rarely put off-limits to the OPATT. was going on and what I needed to very personality of the brigade Although the brigade command- do.”29 Briefings for new arrivals at commander could be in determin- er was the principal counterpart, the Embassy are remembered as ing the way the advisers advisers tended to consider anyone “telling me what not to do … noth- approached their missions. who was receptive to assistance to ing about what to do.”30 be a viable counterpart. Generally, The reliance on other advisers Counterpart relations the advisers focused their atten- for mission guidance often began The SF maxim about the necessi- tion on the operations and intelli- during deployment preparation. ty of establishing rapport with one’s gence staffs. That’s where the OPATTs always knew in advance counterpart in order to be effective action was, and both staffs were to which brigade they were was never truer than for brigade central to other missions, especial- assigned, permitting incoming and advisers in El Salvador. They had ly CD and PSYOP, that required outgoing advisers to agree between no authority beyond that agreed staff support. But the brigade com- themselves on what needed to be upon with their counterpart — the mander was always the central fig- done to build on past progress, to brigade commander. They held no ure. Working directly with him or continue effective programs and to leverage with their counterparts with his staff, advisers sought avoid those activities certain to since they controlled none of the ways to help the commander waste time and resources. resources provided to the brigades achieve his goals. Once in country, advisers routine- One of the reasons SF Soldiers

December 2004 23 were preferred for the mission in the advisory role being the first you were cuartel-bound. I think El Salvador was that the FID mis- step onto the slippery slope toward certainly if we had been able to sion tasked to SF included the role a full engagement of American selectively go out, it would have of working with host-nation coun- forces in a ground war in Central enhanced our ability to establish terparts — advisory work. The America. rapport at the junior levels.”33 value of repetitive regional tours If one was a trainer and not an There was also the conclusion that are common during a career in adviser, went the official reasoning, that junior officers wanted U.S. SF was critical in El Salvador. It he didn’t need to go on combat advisers in the field with them, was a significant advantage to operations — a logic that support- having seen their leadership exam- have a resource pool of Soldiers ed casualty-averse policies but ple in training. Most senior officers experienced in dealing with the frustrated adviser-counterpart were in no position to question the idiosyncrasies of Salvadoran cul- relationships.32 Although the restriction, since so few of them ture and the military’s role in it. restriction chafed most advisers, accompanied operations in the A review of the list of officers they believed that their counter- field. and NCOs who served on parts generally understood the rea- Ignoring the potential policy OPATTs illustrates the point. sons behind it. implications, some advisers went Many of the officers had several But the advisers also insisted on operations anyway. Isolated tours in the region. Some had that the restrictions remained a from anyone who could enforce the multiple tours in El Salvador credibility and rapport issue, and rule, they would have a problem alone. Virtually all of the NCOs they also viewed the restriction as only if something went wrong. The grew from junior to senior rank limiting their ability to influence joke among advisers who skirted as they served in a variety of mis- counterparts. Major William R. the rule was, “Just remember to sions throughout the region dur- Nealson, the 1st Brigade OPATT, tell someone, ‘If I get killed, drag ing the 1980s and the 1990s. It recounted, “Not the brigade com- my body back to the cuartel, call was common for them to have mander, but some of the junior offi- the Embassy and report a terrible crossed paths over the years with cers were pretty curious about why training accident.’ ” A common be- the same officers with whom they were working to train and lead battalions in counterinsurgency. Clearly, adviser-counterpart relations were not uniform. Some advisers reported positive and comfortable relationships, and others reported the opposite. Personal and professional factors could com- bine with cultural differences to make for trying circumstances, especially against the backdrop of the drawn-out insurgency. Effect of restrictions The restriction against U.S. military members accompanying ESAF units on operations was especially onerous to the advisers, who often cited the restriction as affecting not only their relationship with their counterpart but also their professional credibility.The restriction was rooted in the trainer vs. adviser issue and in the ongoing USASOC Historical Archive concern of the U.S. Congress about Working as counterparts, Special Forces Soldiers worked to bring more professionalism to the Salvadoran army by teaching basic soldiering skills, such as map reading.

24 Special Warfare lief among advisers was that the rights was a delicate undertaking, trate how ESAF human-rights per- Embassy, including the MILGP, given the ESAF’s connection with formance was related to military winked at the rule anyway, accept- the atrocities and abuse that char- aid.38 The U.S. Congress insisted ing that brigade advisers could go acterized Salvadoran contempo- on measurable improvement, or on operations any time they want- rary history, and it put the advisers aid money would be cut off; the ed and that no one in the Embassy center stage in the most sensitive ESAF needed the aid, so they would ever know. issue of the war. Proximity and “improved.” The extent to which This uneven practice among the purpose thrust them into a multi- improvement was genuine advisers did not escape the notice ple roles: observer, reporter and remained difficult to judge, and it of the Salvadorans, who sometimes moderator of ESAF behavior. If was even more difficult to evaluate chided those who would not accom- need be, they could take on the during combat operations because pany them on operations. It potentially risky role of being an U.S. advisers were not allowed to became one of the few issues of con- object of intervention. accompany their Salvadoran units tention among the otherwise close Advisers interpreted their mis- on operations. group. Those advisers who broke Human rights were a practical the rule insisted that they had to if matter for the OPATTs as well. All they were to be effective — their Enforcing human rights of them understood the Law of credibility was at stake. Those who was a delicate undertak- Land Warfare and all its attendant stuck to the rule argued that the international conventions.39 None risk of being caught disobeying a ing, given the ESAF’s of the OPATTs harbored illusions Congressional mandate far out- about how critical the issue was to weighed any passing esteem that connection with the the rest of their mission. The way might be gained from their Sal- they approached the subject vadoran counterparts. atrocities and abuse reflected the absolute necessity of After advisers began visiting that characterized Sal- finding common ground for com- forward command posts in late municating with their counter- 1986, it was easier for them to see vadoran contemporary parts on such a sensitive issue.40 how operations were being man- Nealson, with nearly three years in aged at that level. But advisers’ history, and it put the El Salvador, had this view of analysis of company-level combat advisers center stage in human-rights guidance: operations conducted in the field It was very, very delicate because was still based on what the advis- the most sensitive issue almost everybody had … something er could gather from after-action in their closet, … I came to under- reports or from discussions with of the war. stand that my most important role individuals who had been on the was getting the ESAF to respect operations. It was common for the sion as carrying the explicit objec- human rights without ever men- information from soldiers to con- tive of improving ESAF behavior tioning that term, because that was flict with after-action reports by across all operations. They saw a real turn-off. … I approached it their leaders, and the conflict gen- human rights as being essential to from a very practical sense, just erally was due to more than a any chance of success in the coun- talked about the practicality of mere difference in perspective.34 terinsurgency effort. Specifically, observing human rights, that you the ESAF needed to be perceived would lessen the recruitment for the Human rights by the population as being on their enemy, it makes your job easier and Every aspect of the U.S. security- side.35 you can get to the end of this thing, assistance program was tied to the For the Salvadorans, human that there’s a reason they are guer- Salvadoran armed forces’ respect — rights were a practical matter. rillas and part of the reason is the or disregard — for human rights. Prior to 1982, the ESAF practice awful performance of the ESAF.41 No one from the U.S. mission was regarding prisoners was to take The OPATTs, unlike any other more deeply involved in enforcing none.36 Even as late as 1985, indi- U.S. effort with the Salvadoran human rights than the SF advisers cations were that not much had army, were positioned to reinforce who lived and worked inside Sal- changed.37 The decline in human- all the human-rights instruction vadoran units. Enforcing human rights violations by the Salvadoran that had gone before. For example, military after 1981 may also illus- while advising the 1st Brigade in

December 2004 25 for the decline in human-rights violations by the ESAF during the war. The study notes that the lion’s share of abuses accrued to the five BIRIs and that, among them, the BIRI Atlacatl Battalion’s record of violence was triple that of the other BIRIs.46 SF Soldiers trained all of them. BIRI Belloso was the only one trained in the U.S., and three others were trained in Honduras.47 Only the BIRI Atlacatl was trained in El Salvador, giving it the least exposure to U.S. values. Once trained, none of the BIRIs had a U.S. advisory presence assigned, while the rest of the army did. USASOC Historical Archive How much of the Salvadoran Restrictions placed on SF Soldiers that forbade them from going on patrol with the Salvadoran Army’s human-rights progress can soldiers were seen as problematic. Advisers felt that the restrictions affected their relationships be attributed to the brigade with their counterparts, as well as their credibility. OPATTs is difficult to judge, since many factors could have con- 1985, Nealson realized that on oper- guy was captured. That was what it tributed to the improvement. ation after operation, units from his was designed for, rapid information Threats by the U.S. Congress to cut brigade returned without prisoners. extraction so that the brigade could off aid, doubtless a powerful moti- He was convinced that there had capture more people before they vator, guaranteed a measure of to be guerrillas who tried to sur- could shut down and move on. progress. How that compares with render but were killed on the bat- [Throughout], human rights were progress achieved through years of tlefield. Sergeant First Class always a concern … [they] were persistent pressure by the U.S. William Strobel, O&I NCO on the addressed and documented. Physi- advisers in the brigade can only be team, had helped build a facility in cal means of extracting information conjectured. In El Salvador’s case, the brigade for interrogating pris- were never used.44 both motivators were probably nec- oners and had trained interroga- The human-rights/intelligence essary. However, the advisory pres- tors and analysts on how to profes- symbiosis helped advance other ence in the brigades, with a charter sionally and humanely extract mission areas, as well. In some to monitor and report on their information from prisoners to pro- cases the intelligence became the behavior, was a powerful influence duce actionable intelligence. But cornerstone for civic action, and it for compelling the ESAF to consid- he lacked live prisoners. was almost always the case for CD er the effect of its conduct, not only Nealson cajoled his counterpart and PSYOP. But the prisoner issue on the battlefield, but also in its to deliver them: “I convinced [the in the 1st Brigade underscores that relations with the Salvadoran citi- brigade commander and intelli- it was only through OPATT per- zenry in general. gence officer] to just humor me one sistence and influence at the time … bring in some prisoners brigade commander’s level — the Negotiation, demobilization and let’s see how it turns out. … level that counted most — that The December 1991 Peace They brought back four prisoners action was directed to handle pris- Accords set an unfamiliar course that night.42 Strobel explained oners in a way that made sense for everyone involved in the 12- what typically ensued during rather than to senselessly dispose year struggle in El Salvador. Both interrogation once his staff began of them under the convenient cir- the FMLN and the ESAF maneu- to get prisoners: cumstance of combat. vered to preserve their hard-won We could capture a prisoner at One persuasive study, which gains, hedging against risks that last light and be rolling up the cell used data gathered by the United the peace might collapse. The U.S. at daybreak before the D/Ts, (or Nations Truth Commission,45 gave advisers transitioned to “peacetime delincuente/terrorista),43 knew the large credit to the OPATT mission

26 Special Warfare training activities,” and they joined was recognized as a FID mission mission; nevertheless, it was a the ESAF in having their role mon- and, except for the USMC OPATT tremendous improvement over the itored by third-party U.N. in Usulutan, SF officers and NCOs six-month MTTs, and it permitted observers. The war was essentially filled all of the positions on the the continuity essential for effec- over, and soon so was the OPATT teams. This permitted the MILGP tively advising and making an mission. By June 1991, several of to rely on the pool of regionally enduring impact. Provisions exist- the NCO positions were phased out experienced and culturally orient- ed within the security-assistance as tours ended. Officers began to ed personnel in the 7th SF Group, program for extending beyond the leave as well, partly by attrition as whose specific mission area is one-year limit for ETSS assign- tours ended and partly by design Latin America. ments, and a number of the OPATT as they were assigned other jobs The informal recruiting and vet- team members did serve longer now more important in a post-war ting arrangement worked well in tours. But the difficulty of filling El Salvador. By mid-summer 1993, El Salvador’s case, but it is a poor the team-chief positions with SF no U.S. advisers were left in the way to organize that kind of mis- majors for the one-year tours sug- brigades. sion. The mission defaulted to SF gests that it would have been even more difficult to fill the positions if Conclusions the tours had been longer. That dif- From the outset, the idea for a Contemporary studies ficulty should alert future advisory U.S. presence in the Salvadoran missions to resist arbitrary restric- brigades was not a very clear one, evaluating the U.S. mili- tions on rank imposed by the host in the sense of what the mission tary role in El Salvador country, when those restrictions was to accomplish and how the will constrain the field of candi- teams were to perform it. The often praise the brigade dates for the mission. hasty deployment of the teams for Measuring the effectiveness of the 1984 elections seemed reason- advisers as being the the brigade OPATT mission would able, but methods for fielding suc- leading contributors to be a daunting task. One indicator, cessive missions do not appear to however, was the FMLN’s insis- have been considered. It may have ESAF combat effective- tence during peace-plan negotia- been fortuitous that the Salvado- tions that the OPATTs remain in rans broke up the mission rather ness, improved human- the cuartels through demobiliza- than having it fail because the rights performance and tion and reorganization as their Army either could not fill the slots best insurance against any ESAF or because it filled them with “best professional behavior change of heart during those proc- available personnel.” esses.48 The OPATTs’ effectiveness The rejection of the lieutenant supporting constitution- was reinforced by FMLN com- colonels during the 1984 OPATT al democratic values. mander Joaquin Villalobos’ obser- mission is less instructive about vation after hostilities ended that organizing a FID training and putting American advisers in the advisory mission than it is about Soldiers because they were eager brigades was the most damaging dealing with a host who may not to get the brigade-adviser assign- thing that happened to them dur- want advice and does not want ments when those in other branch- ing the war. He believed that, as someone looking over his shoulder. es in the Army were not. Once SF the advisers’ influence on ESAF Whether the lieutenant colonels was established as a branch in made them more professional and were the right officers for the job is 1987, it should have undertaken less abusive, the FMLN lost much a fair question. The advisory role is the responsibility for selecting and of its earlier propaganda advan- a specific FID mission for SF; assigning officers to OPATT duty tage and recruiting appeal.49 advising host-nation forces in and, given the nature and impor- OPATT after-action reports and fighting a counterinsurgency tance of the mission, should have interviews, occasionally exuberant should have been tasked to SF scrutinized candidates with the about achievements, ambivalently from the beginning. same diligence as did the MILGP. express acute frustration over The organization of the 1985 The one-year assignment for their perceived failure to accom- mission is instructive because it OPATT duty has often been criti- plish objectives that they mainly cized as being too brief for such a set for themselves. Yet contempo-

December 2004 27 rary studies evaluating the U.S. 7 A.J. Bacevich, et al., American Military referring to U.S. assistance, is quoted as military role in El Salvador often Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Sal- saying: “Specifically, I asked them to give praise the brigade advisers as vador (Cambridge, Mass.: Pergamon me sergeants or captains but no colonels — Brassey’s, 1988), 4. the colonels who were here spent their time being the leading contributors to 8 Before the BIRIs were fielded, the gener- playing mini-golf and swimming in the pool. ESAF combat effectiveness, al staff had no strategic-maneuver capabili- Sergeants and captains are people to train improved human-rights perform- ty. Most infantry capability resided within troops.” Max Manwaring, and Court Prisk, ance and professional behavior the command of the departmental com- El Salvador at War (Washington, D.C.: supporting constitutional demo- manders and was not routinely deployed National Defense University Press, 1988), outside the department. 331. This speaks also to the issue of whether 50 cratic values. 9 Woerner interview. senior ESAF colonels wanted advisers in That is significant, considering 10 Security Assistance Management Manu- their brigades at all. the small numbers of advisers al, DD 5105.38 5, February 2002, 16 Roach, e-mail, 11 April 2003. involved and the magnitude of the 8. The SAMM defines ETSS as DoD Roach, e-mail, 11 April 2003. After the lieu- military and civilian personnel technically tenant colonels had been withdrawn from the through FMLN demobilization and qualified to provide advice, instruction and brigades, the positions created for them were: ESAF reorganization at the end of training in the installation, operation and 1st Brigade OPATT — Lieutenant Colonel Jim 1992, just over 140 SF officers and maintenance of weapons, equipment and Roach, Special Forces, responsible for strategic NCOs served as advisers to a 40- systems. ETSS may be provided for up to site security,worked with the National Electric battalion army of 40,000 men scat- one year, unless a longer period is specifi- Company to improve defensive systems for the cally approved by DSCA. four major dams and power transmission tered across the country in 14 gar- 11 Stankovich interview, 18 May 2003. lines. 2nd Brigade OPATT — Lieutenant risons with responsibilities for the Round-the-clock operational saturation of Colonel Frank Gramer, Infantry, became the security of dozens of critical sites the zone with four of the newly formed Coordinator of Assistance, later Civic Action and hundreds of civil-defense BIRIs and several Cazador battalions sup- Coordinator. 3rd Brigade OPATT — Lieu- units. It was one of those rare ported by artillery, air force and a constant tenant Colonel Les Smith, Infantry, became flow of real-time intelligence developed by team chief for the newly established National assignments that attracted SF Sol- the JTF intelligence staff. Military Training Center at LaUnion (the only diers because they believed the 12 Stankovich interview 18 May 2003. one who moved into a planned position). 4th mission was important and that it Stankovich worked with the joint task force Brigade OPATT — Lieutenant Colonel Gil was “theirs” to accomplish. They commanded by Colonel Rinaldo Golcher. Tijerina, Infantry, titled Hot Spot OPATT, knew that they could make a dif- Most of the JTF was staffed by recent grad- tasked to observe and report on issues uates of the ESAF Command and General throughout the country.5th Brigade OPATT — ference, and they were willing to Staff School — all recent students of Lieutenant Colonel Al Adame, Military Police, pay the price to do it. Stankovich’s San Vicente IDAD course. first worked with the Maestranza, the major 13 The reason for the decision to make Usu- maintenance facility for the armed forces, and lutan a USMC OPATT is unclear. The 6th after the Zona Rosa incident, with the Nation- Cecil E. Bailey is a retired Special brigade area of operations was coastal al Police. 6th Brigade OPATT — Lieutenant swamp land and an ingress route for arms Colonel Miles Crafton, USMC, was named Forces officer whose assignments infiltration, suggesting a need for USMC senior OPATT to supervise the remainder of included service in the 3rd Battalion, expertise, notwithstanding that the brigade the OPATT mission. 7th SF Group, and two tours in El was an Army unit. After it was designated 19 Roach, e-mail, 11 April 2003. Salvador. for fill by the USMC in the 1984 mission, 20 Chris L. Lukasevich, “Training and Advi- the MILGP decided not to change it. sory Assistance to the Armed Forces of El 14 El Salvador had promulgated a new con- Salvador from 1981-1991 and the Resulting Notes: stitution in 1983 that called for the elections Decline in Human Rights Abuses: The Role 1 The mission title of OPATT was applied in May 1984. This was a crucial election of U.S. Army Special Forces,” master’s the- to many deployments supporting security from the U.S. view, because since it was seen sis, University of Arizona, 2002, 28, 29. assistance to El Salvador, including support as the acid test of the military’s willingness 21 James S. Corum, “The Air War in El Sal- and technical functions. The acronym to support a free democratic process, espe- vador,” Aerospace Power Journal,Vol. XII, OPATT here refers to the brigade advisory cially since the Christian Democrat candi- No. 2 (Summer 1998), 31-32. missions. The term OPATT originated in the date, favored by the U.S., was Napoleon 22 Strict recognition of rank as a source of program for El Salvador and has not been Duarte, whom the military had deposed and authority is common throughout Latin used since. exiled after he won the 1972 presidential American militaries. It generally derives 3 Richard Duncan Downie, Learning From elections. from rigid regulations governing promotion, Conflict, The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El 15 James Roach, e-mail to the author, 11 assignment and other career-progression Salvador, and the Drug War (Westport, April 2003. Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa, com- influences. El Salvador’s military was gen- Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1998), 99-102. mander of the 4th Brigade in El Paraiso, erally regarded as stricter than most Downie discusses the FID mission in sup- and perennial nemesis to American advis- regarding rank. See Brian J. Bosch, The Sal- port of LIC doctrine as an advisory and ers, was reported as the leader of the effort vadoran Officer Corps and the Final Offen- training role. to remove the unwelcome lieutenant sive of 1981 (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & 6 General Fred Woerner, interview with colonels. In Manwaring and Prisk, Ochoa, Company, 1999), Chapter One, for a detailed Kalev Sepp, 7 May 1998, 114.

28 Special Warfare discussion of the ESAF officer corps. reported human-rights violations gathered by 23 Mark A. Meoni, “The Adviser From Viet- the U.N. Truth Commission. nam to El Salvador,” master’s thesis, Uni- 36 Manwaring and Prisk, 324-25. See also versity of Scranton, 1992, 59. Nealson interview with Sepp, 15 June 1996. 24 Frank Pedrozo, interview with the 37 Nealson interview, 15 May 2003. author, 4 May 2003. 38 Lukasevich, 21-24. 25 Language skill is evaluated in reading 39 For a summary of international conven- and speaking levels. tions regarding human rights in conflicts 26 In 1989, the MILGP’s Colonel Milton and how they were applied to the situation Menjivar wanted to replace all SF advisers in El Salvador, see Lukasevich, 29-33. with Airborne Ranger Infantry officers and 40 Roach, e-mail to the author, 2 August Ranger Regiment NCOs, but few spoke 2003. Roach points out, “Unfortunately the Spanish, and the NCOs lacked the requisite Embassy and SOUTHCOM wanted to count O&I training. Kalev Sepp, e-mail to author, hours of human-rights instruction present- 7 August 2003. ed to the Salvadoran military as a measure 27 Memorandum for Director, Security of effectiveness. Absolutely self-defeating. Assistance Training Management Office, OPATT effectiveness was in spite of Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000, Subject: Train- SOUTHCOM.” ing Assistance Evaluation, El Salvador 41 Nealson interview, 15 May 2003. ETSS (OPATT), 14 June 1991. 42 Nealson interview, 15 May 2003. 28 Memorandum for Director, Security 43 ESAF use of “delinquent” and “terrorist” Assistance Training Management Office, when referring to insurgents was an indica- Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000, Subject: Train- tor of ESAF attitudes that resisted any ing Assistance Evaluation, El Salvador notion of legitimacy for the FMLN. To the ETSS (OPATT), 24 April 1992. ESAF, they were criminals and terrorists 29 Christopher St. John, e-mail to the rolled into one. author, 20 May 2003. 44 William Strobel, e-mail to author, 14 30 Hy Rothstein, e-mail to the author, 16 April 2003. May 2003. 45 The U.N. Truth Commission was estab- 31 Gregory Banner, personal notes, 12 June lished to investigate human-rights viola- 1991. tions at the end of the war.The data used for 32 These policies were driven in large part this study by Chris Lukasevich included by the Reagan administration’s objective of human-rights violations reported and rea- avoiding triggering the 1973 War Powers sonably substantiated by the commission to Resolution, which requires the president to have been committed by specific persons or report to the Congress when deploying U.S. units in the Salvadoran army. forces overseas into “hostilities” or “immi- 46 Lukasevich, 16, 17. nent hostilities” and gives the Congress the 47 The U.S. established a regional training power to require the president the with- center in Honduras in August 1983 to train draw them. If forces sent to El Salvador ESAF units away from the distraction of were titled “trainers” and restricted from operations that routinely took units out of going on combat operations, they could training. arguably not be committed into hostilities, 48 Michael Childress, Effectiveness of U.S. and therefore Congress could not compel Training in Internal Defense and Develop- the president to withdraw them. ment: The Cases of El Salvador and Hon- 33 William R. Nealson, interview with the duras (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995) 38. author, 15 May 2003. 49 Pedrozo interview, 4 May 2003. 34 Some OPATTs report they favored talk- 50 Ernest Evans, “El Salvador’s Lessons for ing to troops to get the facts about how oper- Future U.S. Interventions,” World Affairs ations went. After-action reports were not (Summer 1997); Waghelstein, “The El Sal- always formal written documents, rather vador Case.” See also Meoni and Lukasevich. they were more often a verbal report, normally from the officer leading the mission, who might be reluctant to report a poor performance. Soldiers, on the other hand, had little to protect or embellish. Nealson interview, 15 May 2003. 35 Lukasevich, 23-26. Lukasevich argues that U.S. Army Special Forces “significantly and disproportionately” contributed to improved ESAF human-rights performance because of the continuous presence during training programs in that 10-year period. He uses data on

December 2004 29 A Structural Analysis of the Ethnic Insurgency in Burma

by Major Larry J. Redmon

ne of the main missions of have thousands of guerrilla fighters most serious challenge to the govern- United States Army Special and are well-organized militarily ment, the CPB was never able to OForces in unconventional war- and politically; others are few in build a united front or to take its war fare is to support insurgencies or to number and have little organization. beyond the countryside. By the end of conduct counterinsurgency opera- The various ethnic insurgent the 1970s, the CPB had ceased to be tions. Some of the most interesting groups are struggling against the a serious threat because they lost insurgencies have taken place in current government in Burma, better China’s military cooperation and Southeast Asia, with the ongoing known as the State Peace and Devel- support.5 The CPB had disbanded insurgent movements in Burma opment Council, or SPDC, which a altogether by 1989, although its serving as a perfect case study of the military dictatorship. Other than influence is still felt in the UWSA analysis of an insurgent movement. that struggle, the ethnic groups have and among the Shan resistance. The Burmese insurgency is a little in common. Each of the groups The CPB’s rank and file (mainly complex ethnic insurgency com- appears to have its own objectives.1 ethnic Wa, with some Shan) and its posed of as many as 14 different Many of the insurgent groups, such ethnic Chinese leadership either sur- ethnic groups. While there is a fair as the Karen National Union, or rendered to the government, disap- amount of material available about KNU, and the National League for peared, moved to China or, in the case some of the ethnic groups, such as Democracy, or NLD, led by the Noble of the Shan, became the Mong Tai the Karen, Kachin and Shan, other laureate Aung San Suu Kyi,4 are Army. The Wa reorganized as the groups, such as the Naga, Arakan fighting for a revolution to replace United Wa State Army, or UWSA, and Pao, have virtually nothing the current government with a feder- fielding a force composed of primarily written or published about their alized democracy. Others, namely the ethnic Wa. struggle. Some of the groups fight Shan, are fighting a civil war for At the end of World War II, the with primitive weapons such as secession and independence. The KMT was still operating in Northern spears, bows and arrows; others, other insurgent groups fall some- Thailand, Burma and Southern such as the Wa, use machine guns, where between revolution and civil China. Though similar in appearance mortars, artillery and even antiair- war. to insurgent groups and often assist- craft artillery. Many of the groups Two groups continue to influence ing them, it was never really more the situation in Burma even though than a lost army used by the U.S. they are for all intents and purposes Central Intelligence Agency to spy on Opinions expressed in this arti- now defunct — the Communist Party China and for other anticommunist cle are those of the author and do of Burma, or CPB, and the National activities during the Cold War. The not necessarily reflect the policies Chinese Army, or the Kuomintang, or KMT, led by the warlord General Li or views of the U.S. Army, the KMT. Wenhuan, dealt in narcotics6 and Department of Defense or the U.S. The Maoist-inspired CPB lasted often brutalized the people and the government. — Editor from 1939 to 1989. At one time the area it occupied. The KMT’s presence

30 Special Warfare in the Shan States prompted the Burmese Army to move in and occupy the Shan States, sparking the fire of Shan nationalism. The KMT ceased to exist when its last rem- nants were airlifted to Taiwan in 1954.7 Revolution or civil war? In his 1990 publication, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revo- lutionary Warfare, Bard E. O’Neill describes seven types of insurgencies: anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist and preservationist. The first four types are revolutionary, because they seek to completely change an existing political system. All seven types are different, but they have one factor in common: They dispute the legitimacy of the ruling power. Although O’Neill probably intended that only one insurgency type would apply to each conflict, the insurgencies in Burma contain three types: pluralist, secessionist and reformist. The KNU is making revolution through a pluralist insurgency. Plu- ralist insurgents seek a revolutionary transformation of the political system.8 We normally think of revolution as being communist-inspired, but insurgents who are not communists also carry out revolutions. The KNU rejects current government policies and advocates a complete overthrow of the regime. Its goal is to units of the 3rd Karen Rifles. When from Burma, they were secessionists. establish a system that emphasizes the Burma government failed to Later, when they saw attempts at individual freedom, liberty and com- address Karen grievances of a Karen democratic reform, the Karens promise. The KNU does not desire to massacre by the Burma Independ- pushed for inclusion in the union, separate itself from the union. It ence Army during World War II, as with reforms in the government — wants to live in a Kawhtoolei, or a well as the Karens’ desire for a Karen thus making them reformists. separate Karen state, with some mea- homeland, Karen units defected to The Karen movement might still sure of autonomy under a federalized the hills and formed the Karen also be seen as a reformist insur- democracy. Defense Organization, or KNDO.2 gency. In a reformist insurgency, the The roots of the Karen insurgency In the early years of their struggle, insurgents demand autonomy and reach back to the granting of Burma’s the Karens rejected the government are primarily concerned with the independence in 1948. The Karen because it didn’t address their existing allocations of political and were once part of the Burmese demands for a Kawthoolei or for rep- material resources, which they con- British Army, making up the 1st and resentation in the Burmese democra- sider discriminatory and illegitimate. 2nd Karen Rifles and the partial cy. Because they demanded their own The Restoration Council of the independent Kawthoolei separate Shan State, or RCSS, on the other

December 2004 31 hand, is fighting a secessionist or sympathy among the military. religion is not a goal of the insurgents, insurgency. The Shan have at times There has been no single ideology religion has been used as an ideologi- been pluralist, willing to accept that would help the groups to form cal factor by the SPDC for unifying autonomy under a federalized sys- the united front they need in order to opposition to the various non-Bud- tem. In fact, the Shan were signato- take the war to Rangoon. What seem dhist insurgent groups. Former Prime ries to the 1997 Mae Thaw Ra to be the common ideologies are: com- Minister U Nu (1948-56, 1957-58, agreement, in which ethnic dele- munism, religion, democracy and 1960-62) made great attempts to gates representing the various ethnic rights. instill Buddhism as the state reli- insurgent groups agreed to a feder- gion.13 Some leaders of the SPDC alized union. But on May 27, 2000, Communism claim that Buddhism is the only reli- the Shan changed their stand to one When we think of insurgent ideol- gion for Burma and attack Christian- of seeking full independence.10 ogy, communism usually comes to ity and Islam with claims that the The Shan insurgency began during mind. Communist ideology was a insurgents discriminate against and the late 1950s. In the 1947 constitu- motivating factor for the CPB and its persecute Buddhist hill tribes. tion, there was a provision for the Maoist-inspired attempt at revolu- The attempt to make Buddhism Shan to secede if after 10 years they tion. The CPB’s longevity and suc- the state religion fueled the insur- were not happy with the union. As cesses led the Karen, the Shan and to gency. While the ethnic insurgents the end of the 10 years approached, a lesser extent, the Kachin, Pao and never included religion as a strong the Shan, feeling that they were not others, to re-examine their strategies. reason for rebellion, the improper use properly represented in the union The works of Mao Zedong were of religious ideology by the govern- and that there was inadequate gov- translated into Burman, and they ment has led the insurgents to mis- ernment protection from KMT forces were widely read and followed by trust the government even more. in the Shan State, and even worse, most ethnic insurgent groups. Even Christians, especially among the fearing an occupation of the Shan today, some groups, namely the Shan Kachin and Karen, have become State by Burmese government forces, and the Wa, still follow Mao’s strate- wary of the largely Buddhist, mostly made it known that they were going gy, but they have pushed his commu- Burman military. Indeed, Tatmadaw to exercise their constitutional right nist ideology aside. attacks and abuses are often directed to secede. For a time, communist ideology against Christian hill tribes, minis- The Shan have gone to great was a unifying factor for a short-lived ters and churches. Similar attacks lengths to explain their position on military alliance between the CPB have been reported among the vari- secession, citing their right to seces- and the KNU. The alliance was suc- ous Muslim insurgents along the bor- sion under the 1947 Constitution, the cessful in combating the Tatmadaw, ders with India and Bangladesh.14 historical recognition even by the or Burmese Army, but the groups Although the Shan are mostly British of their hereditary rulers and were too diverse in their goals and Buddhists, that doesn’t keep the Tat- autonomous regions as proof that their religious beliefs to follow Mao.11 madaw from attacking them, as well. they never really were part of the Communist ideology caused serious, In fact, the past few years have seen union. The Shan feel that they have sometimes violent, factionalism some of the fiercest fighting between no choice but to expel outsiders from between the KNU’s Karens and the Shan State Army,or SSA, and the the Shan State and preserve their Kachins, however, for a time the ide- Tatmadaw. The Shan’s Buddhist cul- peoples in the form of an independent ology had an impact among the Bud- ture and ethnic ties to the Thai peo- state. dhist ethnic groups, because its prin- ple engendered limited sympathy ciples seemed at first to go hand in and support from the Thai military. Ideology hand with Buddhist views of materi- The government has had some suc- Although ideology does not play as alism.12 Today the SPDC no longer cess using religion to split the insur- predominant a role as in the Iranian faces any real threat from any com- gent factions. The Buddhist-dominat- revolution or in Communist China, it munist-inspired insurgents. ed Democratic Karen Buddhist does play a role among the ethnic Army, or DKBA, is one of the most insurgent groups and within the Religion feared and ruthless groups operating Burmese government. Ideology has Religion has neither unified the alongside Tatmadaw troops against not developed into a unifying factor insurgent groups nor rallied support the Karen who support the KNU and that rallies the masses across the for either the government or the KNLA. The DKBA once made up a board or motivates mass defections insurgents. But while a particular battalion from the KNLA’s 7th Brigade. In 1995, the battalion com-

32 Special Warfare mander made a secret deal with Tat- madaw commanders that allowed his entire unit to continue to operate and keep their weapons as long as they assisted the Tatmadaw in fighting the ethnic insurgents. The DKBA’s knowledge of the Karen areas and operations has allowed its members to move quite easily among the Karen, attacking villages and KNLA units. The DKBA is also reputedly heavily involved with methamphetamine trafficking for the Tatmadaw. There are on-going battles between the DKBA and the KNLA very near the Thai border, and at times they spill over into nearby Thailand. It should be noted that among the ethnic insurgent groups themselves, Photo from the collection of Larry Redmon there are religious subgroups, and A Burmese family flees into the jungle to escape the Burmese Army. misunderstandings between them cause splits. The DKBA split from the leaders who are dedicated to their fought behind Japanese lines.18 KNLA resulted partially because of cause are not easily swayed by the Ethnic rights were partially, misunderstandings and perceived SPDC, but those who are fighting for though inadequately, addressed in inattention from the Christian-led power and rewards find it difficult to the 1947 constitution, which granted KNU. KNU officials have told the carry on their fight. the Shan State the right to secession author that they at times have a com- after 10 years but did not address the munication problem with the Bud- Democracy, ethnic rights Karen state homeland at all.19 Karen dhist Karen, and that they need to do Democracy and ethnic rights are leaders, including General Smith a better job of understanding them the real ideological factors at work in Dunn, discussed the dream of the and giving them equal representa- Burma’s insurgency. Burmese society Karen people for a Kawthoolei with tion within the political and military is made up of so many different eth- Aung San, who led Burma to its inde- framework of the KNU and KNLA.16 nic groups that it is a wonder the pendence from Britain but was later In cases in which the SPDC has state could ever have been self-gov- assassinated. Aung San convinced successfully used religion to split erning. Ethnic rights were a serious the Karens that not until a constitu- insurgent groups, their success has problem during British rule, and the tion had been signed, and then only been coupled with lucrative rewards British often sent troops into the hin- through normal parliamentary pro- for corrupt leaders. The real reasons terlands to quell rebellion, which ceedings, could the Kawthoolei state that insurgent groups split, especial- they often did brutally. be realized.20 It never was. ly in the case of the DKBA and The British administration in After the KMT had been expelled KNLA, are: fatigue and depression Burma, however, was able to control from the Shan State in 1954, the Tat- among various insurgent groups; the widespread discontent by creat- madaw remained, and the Shan offers of lucrative business conces- ing roles for some ethnic groups and viewed its presence as an occupation sions, amnesty and power by the Tat- by allowing others, such as the of their sovereign state. The Tat- madaw; real inequities faced by some Shan, a measure of autonomy.17 The madaw proved to be in many ways Buddhist officers among the KNU British used the Karen and Kachin worse than the KMT, and it quickly and KNLA; the perception that as soldiers, and many of them became the object of attacks by small Christian officers get better tax became officers and policeman, the armed units — the forerunners of the opportunities and promotions; and most famous being General Smith SSA — under Sao Noi, who with only the inability of the KNU leadership Dunn, a Karen officer who served in 31 men and 17 weapons formed the to correct the problems and the British Burmese Army and Noom Serk Harn (young warriors) on inequities listed above. Insurgent May 21, 1958. The small group was

December 2004 33 perfect for insurgent activity and for guerrilla operations. Until 2002, Thailand allowed the insurgent groups to maintain bases and strongholds within Thailand. Many times, the Tatmadaw, in pursuit of Karen or Shan troops, has received Thai artillery fire upon reaching the border, while the insurgents fled safely inside Thailand. Thai support even included joint operations with the insurgents against Tatmadaw forces. The granting of sanctuary also led to great amounts of material support. Through the sanctuary of Thailand, the insurgents could obtain weapons, ammunition, food, Photo from the collection of Larry Redmon clothing, medicines and other types A Burmese family displaced by the Burmese government’s four-cuts policy. of material support on the open market or the black market. They the beginning of the Shan insurgency NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi; indeed, could even receive military train- that has lasted until today under a the presentation of the 1991 Noble ing and education. The leadership variety of names. Peace Prize to Suu Kyi was a huge likewise was allowed to live in rel- All the ethnic groups in Burma morale boost to the NLD’s struggle ative safety in Thailand and even want an equal voice in a government against the SPDC. Likewise, the to travel freely in the country. that they have seen become increas- opportunity for the Karen leadership The SPDC for years accused ingly controlled by Burmans.21 All to testify in front of a human-rights Thailand of supporting the resist- groups want to retain their identities, caucus in the U.S. Congress in Octo- ance movement, and it went so far culture, language and historic home- ber 2000, and subsequent wording in as to give Thailand lists of insur- lands. It is this quest for their rights support of the Karen in the Congres- gents and Thai army commanders and for the preservation of their eth- sional Review,was a show of moral that the SPDC saw as threats to nicity that has led to open rebellion. support for the Karen insurgents.22 national security. Recently, under The rallying cry for the NLD is But moral support doesn’t win bat- the government of Prime Minister democracy and ethnic rights, and the tles; it must lead to political support, Thaksin, Thailand, seemingly in a two must be paired together, for with- of which the insurgents have little. If policy of appeasement to the out democracy there can be no ethnic there were true political support, the SPDC, removed or transferred sev- rights. international community would rec- eral Thai army special forces offi- ognize Suu Kyi and her NLD as the cers who supported the insurgents, External support rightful democratically elected gov- as well as a widely respected for- If insurgents are to combat govern- ernment of Burma, not the military mer commander in chief of the ment military forces effectively, they dictatorship. In 1988, the NLD won Royal Thai Army. must have external support. In most an overwhelming victory in the Thailand has also established a cases, a lack of external support will national elections, but the military policy that it will not interfere in lead to the insurgents’ demise. nullified the election. the internal affairs of Burma and At one time or another, almost all It has been through material that it will no longer allow insur- the ethnic insurgents have received support from Thailand, especially gents to attack Burmese forces or to some external moral support from the granting of sanctuary, that the use Thailand as sanctuary.23 Under foreign governments, such as Thai- insurgents have been able to con- the new policy, the Thai government land; nongovernmental organiza- tinue their struggle. The Thailand- is forcing insurgents and their fam- tions; the United Nations, the Euro- Burma border is an extremely ilies back inside Burma to face the pean Union or religious groups. Moral remote area with thick jungles and government forces.24 The denial of support is most often given to the mountainous terrain. The area is sanctuary has put the insurgents in

34 Special Warfare an almost impossible position. fact, the Burmese government has large successes against government There are two important compo- had the cooperation of those coun- forces. The leadership of the SPDC is nents of the environment of an insur- tries, especially China, in suppress- keenly aware of the human environ- gency. The first component is the ing the Naga and Kachins. ment, and its efforts to homogenize physical environment — the terrain, The rugged terrain of Burma’s jun- all aspects of Burmese society are an climate and lines of communication. gle regions is conducive to sustaining effort to erase cultural differences The second component, and in the insurgent groups, offering cover even at the expense of killing Burma’s case, the most important, is and concealment for their guerrilla Burma’s ethnic peoples. the human environment — the peo- activities. The terrain also makes it Myriad differences in race, culture ple, and in this case, the ethnic insur- difficult for government forces to and religion make it difficult for the gents. Both components are crucial to exploit their advantages in equip- insurgents to unify either in a mili- a complete understanding of the comment and transportation. Vehicular tary or political alliance or even to plexity of the insurgency. movement, especially by armor, is agree on an overall strategy for sup- extremely difficult at best, resulting porting pro-democracy movements Physical environment in the Tatmadaw having to fight within Burma. The best known of The physical environment of essentially on the same level as the these movements, the NLD, while it Burma is clearly a contributing factor insurgents. The advantage normally seems to support the ethnic rights of to the insurgency’s longevity of more goes to the insurgents, who are fight- all people of Burma and has the sup- than 50 years. Almost all of the insur- ing on familiar terrain. port of many of the ethnic groups, is gent groups are located along the bor- not representative of the ethnic ders of Thailand, China, India and The human environment minorities or insurgents. Suu Kyi, the Bangladesh. The strongest, the The human environment is one of vocal leader of the NLD, is Buddhist Karen and the Shan, are located the most misunderstood dimensions and western-educated, while many of along the Thai border, and the Wa are of the ethnic insurgency in Burma. the ethnic groups are not Buddhist located along the Chinese and Thai Indeed, misunderstanding of the and not western educated. borders. All these border areas are complexity of the human environ- One aspect of the human environ- remote locations that are inaccessible ment has led to divisions among ment that deserves further study in to government troops, yet they pro- tribes of the same race that are of dif- the Burma insurgency is the political vide the insurgents with protective ferent religions, such as the Buddhist structure. In The Civic Culture, bases and access to sanctuary and to Karen and Christian Karen. Gabriel A. Almond characterizes peo- popular support. It has led to the breaching of insur- ple in terms of their awareness of the The Karen and the Shan have gent alliances — alliances that had political process and categorizes greatly benefited from their proximity to the Thai border, getting support from Thai military commanders and units, having access to markets inside Thailand and even receiving revenue from taxing goods crossing the border from insurgent-controlled areas. The Wa have benefited from their proximity to the Chinese border, receiving material assistance and training from the Chinese communists. The closeness of the Wa to China is crucial to survival of the UWSA. The Naga and Kachin also benefited in similar ways from their proximity to India, Bangladesh and China, but they receive little in the way of either passive or official support from any of those nations. In Photo from the collection of Larry Redmon Members of the Shan State Army undergo training at an insurgent camp in Burma.

December 2004 35 them as one of three types of actors: forces. Unless they have personally ably. Insurgent armies that were parochials, subjects or participants. been subjected to the torture or brutal- once part of the British Burmese According to Almond, “The ity of the regime, it will take great coer- Army, namely the Karen, and others parochials are those citizens who cion by the insurgents to get them to who had experience from the war have little or no awareness of the join the movement.27 The subjects are fighting alongside the American OSS political system at the national level the people the SPDC takes great had a considerable amount of combat and no perception of their ability to efforts to intimidate through harass- experience. Many of their leaders had influence it.”26 The parochials are ment, imprisonment or terror. been officers and NCOs, and they generally illiterate, live in poverty, The participants are the group to became well-trained guerrilla fight- isolated, and their condition keeps which the insurgents want to belong. ers. The CPB was trained and them passive and indifferent. This “Participants are generally educated equipped by the Chinese People’s can be seen among the oppressed citizens who are not only aware of Liberation Army, or PLA, and the ethnic hill tribes and rural people, national political institutions and CPB’s guerrilla forces and political who even though they are oppressed, policies but are also cognizant of the cadre received extensive training in for the most part take no action, pre- political process and wish to actively China. Once the CPB was defeated, ferring to be left alone. engage it.”28 many of its rank and file joined the Likewise, the city dwellers who The participants generally offer Shan insurgents and the UWSA.31 take no action despite being con- the best potential for insurgent Insurgent groups also received stantly watched; being denied jobs, recruitment, especially when govern- training and assistance from the fair pay and medical treatment; and ment becomes authoritarian and KMT. The KMT commanded large being subject to arrest, intimidation excludes many of them from the proc- amounts of weapons, cash and con- and harassment, are also parochial. ess. This group is small in Burma siderable power and at times provid- It seems that the SPDC is content to because its members have been ed assistance to and formed alliances keep everyone except for a few elite imprisoned, put under close scrutiny with the Karen and the Shan. Thai- in this category. or intimated to the point of submis- land has also provided support to the The subjects are the citizens who are sion; or have become dissidents Karen and Shan, as well as to other aware of the impact of the political sys- abroad or killed for their beliefs. groups operating along the Burma- tem on their lives but who are not Thailand border, using them as a active in shaping policy or in making Training and professionalism proxy force to keep regular Burmese the government. The subjects aren’t The professionalism and quality of troops off the border or to assist in normally inclined to join insurgent the insurgent groups varies consider- Thailand’s drug war with the Burmese and the UWSA. The largest insurgent group, the UWSA, is trained and led predomi- nantly by ethnic Chinese. The Wa are a primitive people, and it wasn’t until the 1970s that they abolished the age-old practice of head-hunting. The troops of the UWSA are Northern Wa or Chinese Wa, with some Southern Wa and Wa from the Shan State. The UWSA has a cease-fire agreement with the SPDC and the Tatmadaw32 that allows them to control their own areas, to continue to grow opium and to produce amphetamines. In return, they cooperate with the Tatmadaw in its fight against the other insurgents, now almost exclusively the Shan. Still, the UWSA is no friend of the Photo from the collection of Larry Redmon SPDC and is not overly anxious to do Karen insurgents discuss strategy prior to going on patrol. The insurgents often patrol in an effort its bidding, and it makes great efforts to help displaced families who are fleeing the Burmese Army. to avoid battle with the Shan.

36 Special Warfare Members of the UWSA receive mil- fully embrace ethnic rights, as she known at times as the Shan State itary training within their own is Burman herself. Army. In the beginning, Khun Sa ranks, but there are rumors that they The Karen are nominally organ- sounded and acted like an insurgent, are still trained by PLA troops in ized under the KNU. An elected and in all fairness, he most likely China. It should also be pointed out member chairs the political arm, and was. Later, however, he became a that the UWSA is no more than an the KNU holds biannual congresses warlord out for his own interests, and army controlled by an ethnic Chinese to choose new delegates and to make he eventually betrayed his people for warlord who is only after profit and policy. The KNLA and KNDO fall the safety of Rangoon and the per- power. The UWSA does demand an under the military command of the sonal use of his drug profits. Khun Sa autonomous region in the Eastern KNU. Members from the military was looking for power and profit, and Shan State. It claims to want to turn arms can be either elected or stand- he had no real aspirations of leading away from drug-trafficking, but its ing members of the KNU. The KNLA his people to freedom. If he did, his alliance with the SPDC proves other- and KNDO are broken down along aspirations were easily overcome by wise. As one Wa official told a mis- traditional British military lines of the lucrative concessions made by sionary friend of the author’s, “The districts, brigades, battalions and the SPDC and the life of luxury that Wa are for the Wa.”33 companies. Most of these units are he now lives. Similarly, the KMT was ethnic Karen, but they also contain never an insurgent organization but Organization whole or partial units of other ethnic was led by an increasingly powerful The Burmese insurgents are some groups who have formed part of the general who controlled the drug of the best-organized insurgents in KNLA, such as the Kayan, Karenni trade, became part of a criminal the world. Most have home pages on and even some Burman. organization and turned into a war- the Internet, many, mainly the The Shan State is organized under lord out for profit. Karen, the Shan and the Kachin, the RCSS, a coalition of the various The insurgent leaders are well- have delegates in the U.S. and Eng- military and political arms in the educated men who have ideals and land. The Karen and Kachin began Shan State. The aim of the RCSS “is vision. They are not simple peasants, their insurgency with an organiza- to restore unity, independence, although most have known extreme tion already intact. The Shan had a democracy and peace to the Shan hardships, and some even came from standing tradition of limited autono- people in Shan State. It is a wartime a peasant life. The ethnic insurgents my, but they had no real armed council responsible for the adminis- are poor, hill-tribe peoples who forces. The Wa have Chinese-commu- tration, military and political affairs endure primitive living conditions, nist influence within their military of the Shan State.”35 The RCSS was but their leadership, both military structure. That Chinese legacy also formed mainly from the combination and political, is made up of lawyers, carries over into the Shan. of the SSA and an executive commit- teachers, doctors, professional sol- Politically, the NLD, nationally tee from the RCSS, and in 1999 it ders, former policemen, engineers, led from Rangoon, has taken the became known simply as the RCSS. monks and pastors and even univer- lead in the Burmese resistance. Kyi What is important in analyzing polit- sity students. General Bo Mya of the leads but one pro-democracy group, ical arms is the publications of doc- Karen National Union, or KNU, and and she doesn’t command the eth- trine or policies among and within the Karen National Liberation Army, nic insurgents in any unifying the ethnic groups. As an example, in or KNLA, was once a member of the action or structure. The ethnic its declaration of goals and objectives, Karen Constabulary under the insurgents are not politically led by the RCSS clearly states that all mili- British administration and later any of the groups in Rangoon but tary arms of its organization, i.e., the fought behind Japanese lines.37 He rather from their guerrilla bases or SSA and others, are under the con- has been the cornerstone of the from what sanctuary is left in Thai- trol and guidance of the political Karen since the struggle for freedom land. All ethnic insurgent groups leadership of the RCSS. and recognition began. except the Wa signed the Mae Raw Likewise, Brigadier General Isaac Tha Agreement in 1997, supporting Leadership Po of the KNLA and Colonel Htoo the NLD and the formation of a fed- The leadership of the insurgent Htoo Lay of the Karen National eral democracy.34 While the ethnic groups must be understood in order Defense Organizational, or KNDO, insurgents groups support Suu Kyi to distinguish whether the group is a and the KNU, are university-educat- in principle, they still have some true insurgent organization. For ed men, the formerly an engineer suspicion about whether she will example, Khun Sa led an army who fled to the resistance after the 1972 crackdown, and the latter for-

December 2004 37 merly a Karen lawyer and state pros- tracted popular war strategy, mili- tracted war of retreat, not yet total ecutor from Rangoon. Colonel Yod tary-focus strategy and urban-war- guerrilla warfare, mostly along con- Suek, the leader of the SSA, rose up fare strategy. The second of these is ventional lines with maneuver and through the ranks of the Mong Tai the most evident among the Burma unit-to-unit engagements. Army, split with Khun Sa, and later insurgents. The second phase, the strategic formed the SSA. Yod Suek has a clear Students of revolutionary war- stalemate, is characterized by guer- vision for his people and has united fare will undoubtedly be familiar rilla warfare. This is the insurgency’s the Shan people under the leadership with the protracted popular war current state of affairs. The insur- of the RCSS.38 strategy — the strategy envisioned gents have been primarily concerned The insurgents are also led by peo- by Mao Zedong. According to O’Neill, with retaining their territory, and, in ple who have never ventured beyond “The strategy of a protracted popular the past, have commanded most the insurgent-controlled areas, but war articulated by Mao is undoubt- areas outside of Rangoon. The fall of even those people, while somewhat edly the most conceptually elaborate Mannerplaw to the Tatmadaw in primitive, are nonetheless educated, and perhaps the most widely copied 1995 was the beginning of the end of motivated and dedicated to their insurgent strategy.”39 The Maoist- large Karen-controlled areas. Now cause. The insurgents know the value inspired CPB fought this strategy, the insurgents control few areas. of education to preserving their lan- and the Shan, the Karen and other One exception may be the UWSA, guage, their culture and their way of groups read translations of Mao’s who, by virtue of a cease-fire with the life. The Karen and Shan have exten- works and adjusted their strategies SPDC, have retained control of their sive education programs, within the to the protracted popular war, as territory. limitations of their refugee camps. The they believed that it was the best During the second phase, the guer- author has witnessed education in method for defeating the SPDC and rillas are supposed to begin an esca- progress at a large Karen refugee bringing peace and democracy to lation of military action and victories. camp inside the Thai border north of Burma. The Karen and Shan leaders Those victories are supposed to lead Mae Sot, Thailand. While the camp fully understand Mao’s strategy and to “demoralization, lethargy and was primitive, it was apparent that, have described to the author Mao’s defections on the government side within their meager means, the three phases as they relate to their that ushers in the strategic offensive Karens had made every possible effort struggle. phase.”40 During the third phase, the to provide the best education for their The Karen clearly understand that strategic offensive, the insurgents are children. The education process is a the first phase, the strategic defen- supposed to move from guerrilla war- result of educated leaders who realize sive, is a time when the enemy is on fare to mobile conventional tactics on that through education they can the offensive. It was the period dur- a large scale, and the political and change their destiny, maintain their ing which the KNU, KNLA and SSA psychological effects of the insurgent identity, culture and language, and concentrated on survival, political victories are supposed to lead to col- continue their struggle for freedom. organization and low-level violence. lapse of the government.41 Often wrongly accused of being They see this phase beginning when Unfortunately, the strategic offen- drug armies, the insurgent groups the first Karen units defected from sive phase has largely eluded the are led by real leaders. The leaders the Burma Army in the late 1940s insurgents. It is true that the insur- aren’t driving luxury cars or living in and began organizing their insurgents have fought battles during luxurious houses like the drug lords gency in the mountains of Burma. In which they were organized along con- in South America; they share the the beginning, they believed they ventional lines. The Karen and the burdens and hardships of their peo- would win by superior military tac- Wa forces have faced the Tatmadaw ple. Most importantly, they share tics and political pressure on the head-on in maneuver and artillery their people’s values, ideals and leaders of the Burma government. duels. The insurgents have so far vision for democracy and freedom. Their organization began with a few failed to destroy the government battalions, multiplied into a well- forces, which is the principal military Strategic approach organized guerrilla force consisting of objective of the third phase, and they In his book, Insurgency and Terror- several brigades, and became a large have failed to displace the govern- ism: Inside Modern Revolutionary political and military structure over- ment authority,which is the principal Warfare, Bard E. O’Neill lists four seeing what has become essentially a political objective. The last time they broad strategic approaches to insur- government in exile. As they retreat- were even close to achieving the polit- gency — conspiratorial strategy, pro- ed into the hinterland and moun- ical objective was during the 1990 tains, the insurgents fought a pro- elections, when the NLD won a

38 Special Warfare majority of seats in the government. During the subsequent crackdown by the SPDC, the insurgent groups lacked unity, took no military action and lost the chance to exploit the situation to their favor. It is important to point out that in Mao’s theory, victory can come during any phase; it isn’t necessary to progress through all the phases. The insurgent leadership needs to be able to recognize the stage it is in and be flexible enough to revert to a previous stage, if necessary. This element of flexibility is what makes Mao’s protracted popular war strategy so successful. Overall, the strategy of a protract- Photo from the collection of Larry Redmon ed popular war has allowed the vari- A displaced Burmese villager hides in the mountainous region near the border. ous ethnic insurgents to carry on their struggle. But protracted popu- counterinsurgency. Under the cur- But there is always the possibility lar war depends on extreme popular rent situation, the successful use of that the government will simply con- support and on the creation of exten- Mao’s strategy will be difficult at duct COIN through intimidation, sive political and military organiza- best. The insurgents do not have imprisonment of dissidents, repres- tions. The insurgents have achieved extensive external support; they are sion, murder, torture and even geno- popular support, but large portions of isolated in remote mountainous cide. This is the case in Burma. While that support have been passive. areas that are mostly inaccessible the SPDC practices some of funda- While the insurgents can obtain to any outside assistance; they are mental elements of COIN, it is not recruits and supplies in remote areas increasingly denied sanctuary; and trying to answer the needs of the peo- under their control, they haven’t been they face an increasingly better- ple or to alleviate the grievances of successful at turning large-scale pop- organized and more mobile army the insurgents but rather to main- ular support into action and open that is growing in size. tain its grip on power. rebellion. The SPDC’s use of violence is effec- The insurgents have been suc- Government response tive because it is brutal, heavy-hand- cessful at organization among their During a COIN campaign, a gov- ed and applied almost immediately own groups, but they have not been ernment should use all of its ele- at any sign of dissent. During the successful bringing the various ments of national power — econom- 1988 student uprising against the groups together to form a united ic, political, military and informa- government, hundreds were killed in front. The insurgents have signed tional — to defeat the insurgency. the streets, people were imprisoned agreements of cooperation with The government must possess a never to be seen again, and others each other and with the NLD, but unity of effort between its civilian were brutally tortured. Similar meth- those agreements have not devel- and military organizations. Its use of ods are taken against innocent vil- oped into true cooperation that violence in quelling the insurgency lagers in rural areas who are sus- would unify their insurgency. must be impartial and proportionate. pected of supporting insurgents. The insurgents have been some- The government must be responsive The people of Burma are among what successful at retaining control to the needs of the people, taking care the poorest in Asia, but the SPDC is of the countryside, but the country- of their economic well-being, respect- not responsive to the needs of the side is not where the SPDC gains its ing cultural differences, and allowing people, whether they are Burman or power. As long as the insurgents public participation in government, members of ethnic minorities. Except keep to the remote areas, they play especially when insurgent forces are for an elite few, such as government into the hands of the SPDC, which accusing the government of being officials and military officers, will continue to isolate them and unresponsive in those areas. Burma’s citizens are denied proper wear them down — a classic form of health care and education, fair wages

December 2004 39 and good economic conditions are Problems arose later when KKY The divide-and-rule concept and elusive, and the flow of information is units became uncontrollable and the four-cuts concept were originally controlled by the government propa- were involved in banditry,warlordism developed by the British, namely Sir ganda agency. In conducting COIN, and drugs. The government was Robert Thompson, in order to fight the Burmese government has relied forced to abandon its KKY program in the communists in Malaysia. on primarily four methods: the for- 1973, but it has recently renewed the The divide-and-rule concept is mation of militia units; the concept of practice of signing cease-fires with being applied to split the ethnic divide and rule; the fours-cuts policy; ethnic groups and giving them the insurgents among themselves by and the use of terror. same rights and responsibilities as appealing to their corrupt leaders, by From 1963 to 1973, the Burmese under the old KKY program. playing on the superstitions of the government tried to gain the support The largest group to sign a cease-fire ethnic minorities and by splitting of the smaller ethnic insurgent is the UWSA, and its cooperation with Buddhist groups from non-Buddhist groups by giving them limited auton- the SPDC continues.42 If one were to groups. The case of the split of the omy and amnesty in return for sign- believe The New Light of Myanmar, DKBA from the KNLA is an exam- ing a cease-fire agreement. Once the the official publication of the Burmese ple: The SPDC played on religious agreement was signed, the military government, the government has differences between the Buddhist would form the groups into militia already signed cease-fire agreements and non-Buddhist Karen units and organizations that would cooperate with 15 groups, but that number can coerced the corrupt Buddhist Karen with government forces and support be misleading. The SPDC lists the leader into splitting from the KNLA the Tatmadaw in counterinsurgency Kachin Independence Organization, or and signing a cease-fire with the gov- operations against other insurgents. KIO, as a cease-fire signer, but in real- ernment. Likewise, the relocation of These militia units became known as ity, the entire KIO did not sign, and the Wa into the Shan State and the the Ka Kwe Ye, or KKY. At first, the many of its members are still in armed subsequent removal of Shan villagers program was successful; many small- opposition to the government. The gov- to other locations split the Shan peo- er groups signed the cease-fire agree- ernment also lists the SSA as a signer, ples into various localities and groups ments, allowing government troops to but the SSA is still in armed struggle and caused tension between the concentrate their efforts elsewhere. against the SPDC. Shan and Wa. Divide-and-rule tactics also are used to separate ethnic people from the insurgents in order to prevent the insurgents from maintaining their support bases and their sources of recruitment. It is a classic COIN tactic, but what is supposed to happen is that the separated peoples are taken care of by the government, which tends to their basic needs and proves to them that the cause of the insurgents is wrong. Instead, in the case of the SDPC, the government has vio- lated the human rights of the people. The four cuts policy began in earnest in Burma during the 1970s. It was the policy initiated by General Ne Win to establish a security cordon around the central plains and to deny the insurgents their four main links with their families and local villagers: food, funds, intelligence and Photo from the collection of Larry Redmon recruits. Burmese generals have Insurgent medical personnel work on an soldier who has been wounded in a confrontation denied the existence of the four-cuts between insurgent “rangers” and government forces. The insurgency is strengthened when the policy, but it is well-documented, and people feel that the government is not meeting their basic needs, such as the need for health care. recently many generals, including

40 Special Warfare the ex-defense minister, General Tin undertaken by a group that is oppos- There have been suggestions that Oo, and Brigadier General San Yu, ing a government led by a military General Bo Mya of the KNU prac- longtime deputy of Ne Win, have spo- dictator who uses brutal force to quell ticed terror against those who ken openly about the policy.43 discontent and practices human- betrayed the cause of the KNU and The four-cuts policy begins with rights abuses? The FBI’s definition KNLA. These were not terrorist ordering the entire population of all seems to imply that using force reprisals as the SPDC would have us villages within a 40-50 km area to against a civilian population might believe, but rather punishment after relocate to a government-controlled be considered terrorism, even if a the suspects had been tried by the area in the plains. Villagers remain- government does it. The U.S. Army’s KNU and found guilty of treason. ing behind are considered to be rebels definition seems more ambiguous. That is not terrorism. The ethnic or rebel supporters, and they are shot. O’Neill best defines terrorism in insurgents realize that terrorist tac- Often soldiers surround the relo- Insurgency and Terrorism:“Terror- tics would be counterproductive to cated villagers, and their new village ism is a form of warfare in which vio- their cause. There is no need for them essentially becomes the center of a lence is directed primarily against to use terror to obtain recruits or to military compound. The soldiers then non-combatants, (usually unarmed get locals to support the insurgency. force the villagers to become sentries, civilians) rather than operational Recruits aren’t hard to find among lookouts and porters. Villagers are military and police forces, or econom- the Shan people when the Tatmadaw trained and put into the ranks as pri- ic assets (public and private).”47 This makes it a regular practice to enter vates, leaving them no choice but to definition closely describes what the villages, burn churches, houses and defend themselves against the insur- Tatmadaw is trying to achieve under crops, gang-rape the women, and gents and thus fight their own peo- the banner of so-called national unity murderer the old and sick. The sys- ple. It is not unusual for insurgents to in Burma. tematic use of terror by the govern- fight Tatmadaw troops who are of If we accept the FBI’s and the U.S. ment has made any use of terror by their own ethnic group. Although the Army’s definitions of terrorism in the insurgents unnecessary.48 49 tactic is simple, it is successful. regard to groups opposing govern- The ethnic insurgents’ actions do Terror is an ongoing element in the ments, then it appears that what the not fit O’Neill’s definition of terror- conflict in Burma, however, the eth- ethnic insurgents are doing fits the ism, but they do fit his definition of nic insurgents openly state that ter- definition of terrorism. But those def- guerrilla warfare: “Highly mobile hit- ror serves them no purpose; in fact, initions are meant to apply to violent and-run attacks by lightly to moder- the KNU has an official policy activities taken against legitimate ately armed forces that seek to renouncing terrorist tactics.44 governments, not against govern- harass the enemy and gradually There are many definitions of ter- ments that take violent actions erode his will and capability.”50 rorism, especially in light of the against their own people. O’Neill also states: “Guerrilla war- advent of the al-Qaeda network. The The SPDC would like the rest of fare also differs from terrorism FBI defines terrorism as “the unlaw- the world to believe that the ethnic because its primary targets are the ful use of force or violence against insurgents are terrorists. One has government armed forces, police, and persons or property to intimidate or only to look at the New Light of their support units, and in some coerce a government, the civilian pop- Myanmar, on any given day, to see cases, key economic targets, rather ulation, or any segment thereof, in articles filled with rhetoric calling the than unarmed civilians.”51 furtherance of political or social insurgents terrorists. The SPDC tries The use of terror is a means to an objectives.”45 The U.S. Army defines to spread its propaganda by high- end, and persons, groups or govern- terrorism as “the unlawful use of or lighting so-called terrorist acts by the ments who use it to achieve their threatened use of force or violence insurgents, but upon close examina- goals become terrorists. The ethnic against individuals or property to tion, those acts are merely battles insurgents are not using acts of terror, coerce or intimidate governments or between government troops and but the SPDC is using them to main- societies to achieve political, religious guerrillas, or between government tain power, quell dissension and or ideological objectives.”46 troops and their cease-fire groups. destroy the insurgents’ support bases. These definitions don’t well define The bombings in May 2003 in Taich- The Tatmadaw’s use of terrorism what terrorism is or who a terrorist lek, Burma, at first attributed to is well-documented. In 2003, the can be. What if a government under- Shan terrorists, are now widely Shan Human Rights Foundation takes that violence? What if that vio- believed to have been the work of Wa published a book, License to Rape,on lence is undertaken by a military dic- drug lords upset over their deals with the Burmese military’s use of sexual tatorship? What if that violence is local Tatmadaw commanders. violence in the ongoing war in the

December 2004 41 Shan State. The book contained evi- interfere is immediately shot. The directly threatens that grip on power. dence of more than 173 incidents of squads do not wear uniforms; their In spite of the lack of unified effort rape by Burmese soldiers from 1996 civilian clothing allows enable them among the ethnic insurgents, they to 2001, documenting the use of rape to move relatively undetected. They share the objectives of freedom, justice, by 52 different Tatmadaw battalions. demand food and money from vil- ethnic rights and restoration of democ- According to the book, 83 percent of lagers and stay in their homes, often racy. The insurgency in Burma contin- the rapes were committed by officers, abusing the females in the process. ues; almost daily, lives are lost at the many times in front of their troops. Villagers are forbidden to look into hands of the brutal regime of the Torture and murder often followed their faces; those who do are shot or SPDC while the world does virtually the raping of the victims. tortured — all as part of the SPDC’s nothing. The limited international Attacks on refugee camps in neigh- counterinsurgency campaign. moral support given to some pro- boring Thailand, in so-called safe democracy groups and ethnic insur- areas, are another tool of terror Conclusion gents is not enough. The ethnic insur- employed by the Burmese military. The ethnic insurgents in Burma gents desperately need immediate and These camps, some recognized as UN share characteristics with other insur- rapid external support. It is the only refugee camps, have been raided by gencies throughout the world in the thing that will change the regime. DKBA troops, with Tatmadaw sup- areas of ideology, organization and The insurgency campaign should be port, in order to instill fear and com- structure. What is difficult to under- fought on all fronts, military as well as mit genocide. The attacks have stand is how a brutal regime can political, and the pro-democracy resulted in more than 20 Karen repress its people for so long without groups need assistance in establishing refugees killed, a similar number some sort of insurgent success. The a common ground on which the coun- wounded, and 27 Thai soldiers killed answers are many: The SPDC has try can build a base government and protecting the camps.52 total control over Burmese society. democratic reforms. The insurgents Death Squads and Displacement: SPDC officers often have dual roles as also require an all-out propaganda Systematic Executions, Village military officers and civil administra- war that will counter the regime’s Destruction and the Plight of Villagers tors. Every facet of society is under the rhetoric, play on superstitions and in Nyaunglebin District, published by watchful eyes of the SPDC’s intelli- motivate the people into action. the Karen Human Rights Group in gence services, and the SPDC is able to Without all of this, the ethnic May 1999, describes human-rights infiltrate into every social, political or insurgency is doomed to fail. The abuses committed by the Tatmadaw. insurgent group in Burma. All indus- SPDC will maintain power; the eth- The report documents for the first try and commercial ventures are con- nic minorities will either be subjugat- time reports of death squads being trolled by the SPDC and the military, ed, subjected to massive human- employed by the military.These units and all foreign investments must go rights violations or murdered; the are known as the Sa Sa Sa or Sa Thin through the SPDC. SPDC will continue to be a security Lon, or guerrilla retaliation units. The military has been successful at threat to the region and to the world They belong to the SPDC’s much- COIN. It has isolated the ethnic through its drug-trafficking and feared Directorate of Defense Ser- insurgents into remote areas. It has international crime; and the 50-year vices Intelligence, or DDSI. gained external support from China struggle for democracy in Burma will The units began operations in Sep- that allows it to modernize and equip be extinguished. tember 1998. Their sole mission is to its military forces.53 At the same execute, without question, anyone time, the SPDC has successfully Author’s note: Much of the informa- suspected of present or past connec- pressured neighboring countries not tion for this article was gained first- tion with the KNU or KNLA, regard- to support insurgent groups, thus hand from talking to insurgent lead- less of how long ago or how slight denying the insurgents much-needed ers, especially among the Karen and that connection may have been. Their external support. Shan. At times the author was able to activities are no longer confined to International pressure, economic gather information through conversa- one district but have spread over all sanctions and dialogue have not tion with Thai officers with whom he of the Karen and Kayin states. swayed the SPDC’s generals to has served along the border regions According to the report, the units reform. Why should they? Their cen- where many of the insurgent groups come at night in small groups, pull ter of gravity is their grip on power, operate and find refuge. Most of the suspects from their beds and drag and the only thing that will force the examples depict the Shan and the them into the jungle, from which they SPDC to change is violence that Karen, with which the author is most never emerge alive. Anyone trying to familiar, but there are many more

42 Special Warfare complex groups that need further munist Party of Burma (New York: Cornell this information from reviewing old Viet- study, such as the Wa, the Mon, and University Press, 1990), 3-37. namese government documents discussing the 6 the Kachin. Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 226-27, 235. China-Vietnam border conflicts. 7 Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 146-47, 149-51. 31 Shelby Tucker, Among Insurgents: Walking 8 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Through Burma (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Lon- 2000), 355. Major Larry J. don: Brassey’s Inc.), 9. 32 Smith, 379. Redmon is the opera- 9 O’Neill, 18. 33 This information about training by PLA was 10 tions officer of the J3, Shan World, Official Web Site of the Shan, given to me by two different sources, the first www.shanworld.com, 9/25/02. from a Christian missionary friend of mine, who Joint United States 11 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the is also a former U.S. Army Special Forces officer. Military Advisory Politics of Ethnicity (Bangkok: White Lotus This missionary makes overland journeys into Group-Thailand and Press), 148-52. remote Wa-controlled territory and has seen the military adviser 12 Smith, 152. firsthand many training camps. Although he 13 to the Royal Thai Special Warfare Smith, 180-81. has not seen firsthand any PLA troops, he has 14 Christina Fink, Living Silence: Burma been told of their presence. The second source is Command. His previous assign- Under Military Rule (Bangkok: White Lotus a former Thai military-intelligence officer who ments include 10 years of enlisted Press), 226. has made several journeys contacting the Wa. service in the infantry and in Spe- 15 All this evidence and some very graphic He has confirmed the PLA presence and insists cial Forces; detachment command- photos of Burmese atrocities can be obtained he witnessed firsthand their cadre. 34 er, Company A, 1st Battalion, 10th from “Christians Concerned for Burma, Chi- Congress, House, Congressional Human ang Mai, Thailand.” Their website is: Rights Caucus, Human Rights in Burma; SF Group, Stuttgart, Germany; www.prayforburma.org. Hearings before the Congressional Human exchange officer with the Royal 16 Personal discussion with KNU leaders and Rights Caucus, 106th Congress, 2d sess., 28 Thai Army Group; staff officer, missionary friend. October 2000, E2007-08. HHC, 1st SF Group, Fort Lewis, 17 Shan World, Official Web Site of the Shan, 35 Shan World, 9/25/02. 36 Wash.; and commander, Company www.shanworld.com/politics, 9/25/02 “Why Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, The Shan of Independence?” Burma: Memoirs of a Shan in Exile (Singa- B, 3rd Battalion, 1st SF Group, 18 Smith, 147. pore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, during Operation Enduring Free- 19 Khaing Soe Naing Aung, 31-32. 1987), 116. dom-Philippines. Major Redmon 20 Smith, 85. 37 Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 511. holds a bachelor’s degree in history 21 Personal conversation with former defense 38 No biographies exist of these three men, but from Cameron University and a attaché in Burma, Colonel Jack C. Dibrell, U.S.Army. I gained this information from my personal 22 Congress, House, Congressional Human relationship with all three. master’s degree in unconventional Rights Caucus, Human Rights in Burma; 39 O’Neill, 34-35. warfare from American Military Hearings before the Congressional Human 40 O’Neill, 36. University. He is a graduate of the Rights Caucus, 106th Congress, 2d sess., 28 41 O’Neill, 36-37. Royal Thai Army Command and October 2000, E2007-08. 42 Fink, 45; and Smith, 258-60. 23 43 General Staff College. “Thaksin Vows to Maintain Policy,” Smith, 259. Bangkok Post, 30 June 2002. 44 Personal note: Many discussions with KNU 24 Personal conversation with Thai Army offi- and SSA leaders reiterate that terrorism is Notes: cers who recalled former joint military cooper- not, nor will it be, employed by them. 1 Report about the Burma Ethnic Dialogue, ation with the KNU during Thailand’s prob- 45 Terrorism Research Center, www.terror- adopted from the meeting held by the KNU lems with communist insurgents. For recent ism.com 6/12/03. and KNPP, September 6, 2000. This report situation of Thai Army forcing refugees back 46 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-25, cites that are at least ten armed groups still in into Burma, see 63 Lives That Do Not Matter, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces open opposition to the SPDC, they are: KNU, by Saw Takkaw, December 2002, KNU. This (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing KNPP, NUPA, ACP, SSA, CNF, LDF, WNO, publication traces the plight of 63 refugees Office, 1991), Glossary-25. PNLO, PSLO, and the only real cease-fire who were eventually forced back across the 47 O’Neill, 24. groups being the UWSA and KIO. border by the 9th Infantry Division to face war 48 The Shan Human Right’s Foundation, 2 John H. McEnery, Epilogue in Burma 1945- and the SPDC. License to Rape: The Burmese Military 1948: The Military Dimensions of British With- 25 Personal conversation with Brigadier Gen- Regime’s Use of Sexual Violence in the On- drawal (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2000), eral Isaac, KNU, and a missionary friend of going War in Shan State (Chiang Mai, Thai- 25, 46, 84-85. mine. This missionary works almost daily with land: SWAN, 2002), 1, 7-125. 3 Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and the leadership of the KNU, KNLA much of the 49 Karen Human Rights Group, Death Squads Insurgency Since 1948 (Chiang Mai, Thailand: time inside Burma. and Displacement: Systematic Execution, Vil- Silk Worm Books, 1999), 69-71. 26 O’Neill, 63. lage Destruction and the Flight of Villagers in 4 Khaing Soe Naing Aung, National Demo- 27 O’Neill, 64. Nyaunglebin District (1999), 6-19. cratic Movement of Ethnic Nationalities (Ran- 28 O’Neill, 65. 50 O’Neill, 25. goon, National Democratic Front, 2000), index. 29 Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 129, 131-32. 51 O’Neill, 26. Herein are listed no less than 14 united fronts 30 This fact was recently told to me by the cur- 52 Images Asia and Borderline Video, “A Ques- in political opposition from the SPDC. rent (2003) U.S. defense attaché to Hanoi, tion of Security” (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Nop- 5 Bertil Lintner. The Rise and Fall of Com- Socialist Republic of Vietnam. He came across buri Press, 1998), 11-27.

December 2004 43 Insurgency in Iraq: A Soldier’s Perspective

by Captain Eric Lyon

here is an organized and ded- weakness in organization and struc- coalition, with the approach of the icated insurgent movement ture at its highest levels. As such, it upcoming elections.1 The Sunnis Tfighting a deadly war of attri- is at times difficult to discern an are in a tenuous position, with tion in Iraq. While there are three overarching goal or strategy for the Kurds in the north, Iranian Shia to distinct insurgent movements in insurgents because of their leader- the east and Iraqi Shia to the Iraq, the most prominent is the ship conflicts and lack of a single south. Sunni resistance stems from Sunni insurgent movement, which vision; however, certain strategies fear of reprisals for past actions. dominates the central and north- and goals have become clear based Sunnis believe that they are fight- ern regions of Iraq. Less-well upon the insurgents’ actions. ing not only for their current liveli- organized and less visible are the hoods but also for their future pros- Islamic fundamentalist movement Motivation perity and security. in the Kurdish regions adjacent to The Sunnis’ fundamental goal, the Iranian border and the Shia one of the central tenets that the Strategy insurgent movement in the south- leadership does agree on, is a The insurgents’ strategy is to con- ern region of Iraq. The Sunni move- return of national power to the duct an unconventional war of attri- ment is the most virulent, persist- Sunni people. Prior to the U.S. tion in an effort to wear down the ent and widespread. Names like invasion, the Sunnis dominated the coalition over time. The insurgents Ramadi, Fallujah and Baqubah country and kept the Shia and Kur- do not have to win today, tomorrow underline the seriousness and dish populations under the jack- or next year. They know that the deadliness of the Sunni insurgent boot of Stalin-esque rule. For the key to success is the ability to sus- movement. insurgents, there is no compromise tain combat operations over time, on the issue of national control. year after year, until the enemy is Insurgency organization The Sunni people, who provide no longer willing to continue. While the Sunni movement is the popular support base for the The insurgents will not wear organized and disciplined at the insurgents, are motivated by the down the coalition militarily, but local level, it does not have a unified fear of living in a country populat- they hope to outlast the coalition front at the provincial and regional ed by their former victims. They are politically. The models for the insur- levels. The Sunni insurgency is a frightened at their own prospects gents’ war of attrition can be found fledgling movement that had its under a government that would in Vietnam, Afghanistan and inception during the coalition’s clearly be dominated by a Shia Chechnya. The insurgents seek to occupation of Iraq. The insurgency’s majority. The Shias make up about avoid a conventional conflict based largest failing, because it is a new 65 percent of the countries popula- on a timetable or a sense of urgency, movement, is its lack of unity of tion, and have begun to organize choosing instead to wage a protract- command and a corresponding themselves into a strong political ed guerrilla war that focuses on

44 Special Warfare defeating the enemy in the same were transparent, and the Kurds a specific effort to drive a wedge way that the dripping of water and Shia opted to follow independ- between the Muslim world and the wears away the toughest rock. ent courses. The decision not to fall Christian world. Additionally, the in line with the Sunnis has cost insurgents hope to portray them- Terrorism both groups in blood. The Sunni selves as victims of the U.S. in Embarking on an aggressive strat- insurgents have not hesitated to order to transform Iraq into a light- egy of international terrorism, the punish those who do not support ning rod for other terrorists moti- insurgents aim to manipulate coali- the insurgency: They have vated by the desire to weaken and tion forces, their allies and their employed a variety of tactics, from attack the U.S. That desire is a domestic publics. An example of this tune that plays well in the Middle strategy is the March 2004 bombing East, and it is a convenient excuse of the Spanish public rail system that They know that the key to for other Islamic extremists to per- killed and wounded almost 2,000 success is the ability to petrate attacks on the West. Spanish citizens. The attack was effective, forcing a change of govern- sustain combat opera- Exit strategy ment in Madrid and ensuring that The insurgents have made it a the Spanish people would no longer tions over time, year after priority to target indigenous organ- support the war in Iraq. The insur- year, until the enemy is izations and personalities for gents have used similar terror tactics destruction including the Iraqi to pressure the Philippines, Turkey no longer willing to con- Police, the Iraqi National Guard and Egypt to prevent their involve- and prominent government offi- ment in Iraq or force their early exit. tinue. The insurgents will cials. The insurgents believe that An example is the kidnapping of not wear down the coali- their own countrymen pose the Philippine workers, which led to the biggest threat to the insurgent early withdrawal of Philippine troops tion militarily, but they movement, and they understand from the region. that if the coalition is going to The insurgents’ strategic use of ter- hope to outlast the coali- implement an effective exit strate- rorism, while deplorable, has been tion politically. gy, the Iraqi government and successful and should be expected to armed forces will have to stand on continue at an increased pace. By their own. employing terrorism, the insurgents car bombs to assassinations and The insurgents believe that the are trying to divide the coalition part- kidnappings, targeting Kurdish U.S. is not going to occupy their ners and to cause rifts within the indi- and Shia leaders. country indefinitely and that the vidual countries between the popu- American public will not support a lace and the elected government. East vs. West protracted and costly war. The link The insurgents have followed a One goal of the insurgents is to to a successful exit for the coalition divide-and-conquer policy within incite a larger conflict on many lev- is a competent and confident Iraq’s borders, much like they have els. They are willing to take some indigenous capability — as repre- with the coalition forces. The Sunni losses in provoking a Shia-Sunni sented by an effective police force, a resistance initially tried to garner conflict in Iraq. Although the Shia successful military and a stable support from the Kurdish and Shia are a majority in Iraq, they are a government — that has the sup- elements within the country by minority in the Arab world, and the port of the Iraqi people. By target- building a coalition under the flag Sunnis believe that such a conflict ing the fledgling government, the of nationalism and anti-Western would mobilize the Sunni Arab insurgents have targeted the foun- sentiment. That attempt failed to world against the Shia. The insur- dation for the coalition’s successful win any real support. The Kurds gents would incite this greater withdrawal from the country. The and Shia were not interested in Shia-Sunni conflict knowing that premature withdrawal of coalition participating in a movement that the Sunni would prevail. The insur- forces because of a lack of U.S. would be dominated by their for- gents would also like to incite a domestic support, while the Iraqi mer oppressors and which would larger East-West conflict between government is still too weak to ultimately end in Sunni rule of the Islamic world and the U.S. defend its position, is a major goal Baghdad. The Sunni motivations Clearly, the insurgents have made of the insurgent. Such a withdraw-

December 2004 45 al by the coalition would allow the insurgents to concentrate on over- throwing the government. Left unchecked, the Sunni insurgents will build a better future for themselves on the backs of their countrymen. That is no surprise to the coalition or to the citizens of Iraq. Clearly, the insurgents are willing to employ any tactic or method, no matter how gruesome, to achieve their goals. They will continue to develop and evolve as an outlawed organization by capi- talizing on their successes and con- tinuing to employ policies and tactics that seek to upset the coalition’s efforts of counterinsurgency, or COIN. However, aggressive Army News Service implementation of the COIN model Sergeant First Class Ron Miko, 416th Civil Affairs Battalion, trains correction cadets at the Mosul by the coalition can lead to the Regional Confinement Facility in July. The cadets were learning riot-control techniques. defeat of the insurgents. It will take a significant commitment of gents cannot exist at a level that is role that the Iraqi people play, and manpower and resources to defeat a real threat to the government. On they have implemented an aggres- the enemy, but it is feasible if the the other hand, the coalition needs sive and effective information cam- proper COIN strategy is employed the support of the people to man the paign that is shaping the opinions in an aggressive manner. Iraqi police force, to fill the ranks of of the population. Imams the military, to support the govern- entrenched in their mosques have COIN strategy ment and to inform on the insur- energized the leaders of the Islam- In order for the coalition to gents. It follows that the coalition ic community to create a propagan- implement a comprehensive COIN must enforce a nationwide cam- da machine that is working over- strategy it must have a thorough paign to win the support of the pop- time to win the hearts and minds of understanding of unconventional ulation, which includes the ener- the people. The coalition must do warfare and take into account the getic employment of Civil Affairs the same, but they must do it better mentality and tactics of guerrilla units, medical civic-action pro- than the insurgents. fighters and terrorists. The mem- grams, or MEDCAPs, public works, bers of the coalition must convey humanitarian aid, and most impor- Security organizations that understanding to their own tantly, information operations. As the war for the minds of the people to ensure that there will be The coalition must present the Iraqi people moves forward, the domestic support for the coalition’s conflict to the Iraqi people in a way coalition must embark on a com- COIN strategy. The coalition coun- that will show the benefits of sup- prehensive training program for tries’ own populations must under- porting the new government and local security elements. The Iraqi stand that deadlines cannot be set will also show the price that comes Police, or IP, must be trained, for defeating the insurgents. of following the destructive path supervised and advised on a daily The coalition must win the sup- blazed by the insurgents. It is criti- basis. The police are the first line port of the Iraqi people and deny the cal that the coalition implement a of defense against the insurgents insurgents the support of the local nationwide information campaign and are the government’s most populace. The insurgents exist to win the war of perception, atti- effective information network in because they have a certain mea- tudes and ideas. An effective cam- the intelligence battle. The IP sure of popular support. People hide paign will require the coordinated must have a robust SWAT capabil- them, supply them and heal them. employment of every media asset, ity and well-trained undercover Without the Iraqi people, the insur- and Internet sites. The insurgents surveillance units that can gather have already recognized the key

46 Special Warfare incriminating information and evi- taries if necessary.The three organ- This will take a concerted effort dence on the insurgents. The Iraqi izations — IP, ING and IA — must that focuses on retooling the justice National Guard, or ING, is the be capable of providing security to system, legitimizing the govern- next layer of defense. The ING the people and stability to their ment and providing the Sunni peo- must handle any situation that the own government. If they are not ple with protection and rights police cannot. They must have a capable of doing that, they will lose under the new government. strong light-infantry capability the struggle once the coalition The Sunni population has to be and possess specialized units that forces exit the country. convinced and assured that its are skilled in surveillance and members will be protected under direct-action operations. Both the Primary military target the new government and that a IP and the ING need to be well- As indigenous security organi- government composed largely of equipped and operating effectively. zations become trained, the coali- Shia representatives will not The Iraqi Army, or IA, must be tion must make it a priority to tar- oppress them. That will be a tough trained in the execution of success- get and destroy the insurgent idea to sell, as the Sunnis are ful COIN operations. Proper train- leadership. This campaign of lead- already balking at the idea of the ing and equipment will prepare ership “decapitation” must be elections’ legitimacy. Many of the them to defeat an insurgent move- relentless and merciless. The insurgents and sympathizers ment that may advance into a war- insurgent leadership must be pre- believe that voting in the scheduled of-movement phase. Beyond these vented from developing their January elections is equivalent to unconventional military capabili- movement into a more sophisticat- selling out to an American-crafted ties, the IA must be capable of ed and popularly supported organ- election process. maintaining Iraq’s national ization. The leadership must be However, Sunni Muslim politi- integrity, defending the nation harried and hounded so that it cal leaders have begun to look at against hostile countries and mili- cannot effectively lead the move- the elections in a different light. ment because its leaders are on They are encouraging the insur- the run, imprisoned or dead. A gent groups to become part of the leaderless organization will political process, while other Sun- founder and will be unable to nis do not have to be encouraged. accomplish its ambitious political Some of the population has begun goals. to disagree with the insurgents, If the enemy leadership is asserting that free, democratic allowed to perform its role, the elections are the only way to curb insurgent organization will the Islamic extremism in the become more skilled, more Sunni territory.2 resilient and more deadly. The key For the remaining Sunnis, it to keeping the insurgency disorga- must be proven that their fears of nized and divided is to target and retribution are unfounded. A eliminate the leadership at all lev- strong legal system must be con- els. Army special operation forces, structed and enforced, giving or ARSOF, have proven them- assurance to the insurgent sup- selves to be uniquely adept at this porters that they will be treated task of leadership removal, and fairly and justly in the new Iraq, ARSOF missions should continue and that criminals, insurgents and to be emphasized and supported terrorists will be punished. as an integral part of the coali- The Iraqi government must be Army News Service tion’s COIN operations. viewed by the people as strong, A Civil Affairs Soldier with the 422nd Civil Affairs fair, just and purposeful. The Iraqi Battalion, an Army Reserve unit based in Greens- Undercutting the insurgents people have to trust their govern- boro, N.C., consoles a crying Iraqi baby after it ment, which in turn must be was given shots to prevent diseases such as While the insurgency is reeling from its leadership losses, the coali- founded on laws and rules, not on measles or mumps. Immunization clinics and tribal affiliations and nepotism. If other medical clinics are one way of winning the tion has to steal the insurgents’ the Iraqi legal system remains hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. movement out from under them. corrupt and the government weak

December 2004 47 Members of the U.S. Army's 422nd Civil Affairs Battalion provide security for visitors to the Al-Salhya fire station in Karkh, Iraq. Providing stability and security for the Iraqi people is one way of defeating the insurgents.

Army News Service and confused, the Iraqi people will Allowing the insurgents to find tive ease, among Iran, Syria, not look to them for answers to safe havens across borders is a Lebanon and Iraq.3 their problems. The government cardinal mistake in the attempt to must provide the solution to its implement a comprehensive COIN Conventional forces peoples’ problems, or the insur- campaign. Consequently, the coali- One of the singular tasks the gents will. tion must focus significant forces coalition’s conventional military on Iraq’s borders, as must the forces must accomplish is providing Closing the borders Iraqi indigenous government and immediate, short-term security and The coalition’s job of implement- its respective military organiza- stability for the Iraqi people. The ing the above COIN elements will tions. Iraq’s less-than-helpful insurgents offer only a negative be extremely difficult if it does not neighbors must be pressured force in this arena, for they have achieve control of Iraq’s borders, politically into denying support created Iraq’s insecurity and insta- especially those with Iran and for the insurgents and leveraged bility. They create the daily havoc Syria. The insurgents receive a into closing their borders to the and destruction that Iraq now wit- great deal of their support from insurgents. nesses. The insurgents capitalize on outside Iraq’s borders. Foreign A prime example of the need to this self-produced chaos and argue fighters, money and weapons flow close the borders is the growth of that the coalition and the govern- across the borders and into the the insurgent movement under ment cannot protect the people and insurgent organizations. The Shia Abu Musab Zarqawi. Zarqawi is that only the insurgents can bring insurgents receive massive aid the most wanted man in Iraq, and about stability. Ironically, this sta- and support from Iran, making he is leading a new generation of bility can be achieved only when the coalition efforts to monitor or con- Islamic radicals. Zarqawi and his insurgents purposely cease their trol Shia insurgent organizations followers have embraced tactics destructive combat operations. The difficult, if not impossible. designed to generate publicity. coalition is forced to play the insur- It has also been established that They are responsible for the kid- gents’ game in order to prevent vio- Sunni insurgents travel regularly napping and subsequent behead- lence and insecurity. to Syria and Jordan in their ings of Nicholas Berg, Jack Arm- In order to achieve security, the efforts to avoid capture by the strong and Jack Hensley, all coalition must introduce popula- coalition. Their resilience as an American businessmen. It is hard tion-control measures such as organization is helped significant- for U.S. intelligence sources to pin checkpoints, searches, curfews and ly by this border transparency. Zarqawi’s location down, as he identity-card systems, and they moves frequently, and with rela-

48 Special Warfare must enforce the peace with rou- In Vietnam, military command- against the insurgents. In fact, mil- tine and omnipresent security ers were more concerned with itary force is a minor part of an patrols. The coalition has to be able punching their ticket, getting pro- overall COIN campaign. The U.S. to enforce this peace on a daily moted and toeing the optimistic won all the battles in Vietnam and basis so that normalcy and com- party line. Few senior leaders were still lost the war. The U.S. has and merce dominate daily life, not willing to stand up and say that all will continue to win all the military drive-by shootings and assassina- was not rosy with the military’s battles in Iraq. However, the insur- tions. Conventional coalition mili- COIN efforts in Vietnam until gents do not have to win the military forces must also successfully Saigon collapsed and tens of thou- tary battles: Commitment and ded- defeat any insurgent war of move- sands of Americans had been ication trump tanks and heli- ment that arises (such as the upris- copters. It is a war of political attri- ings in Najaf and Fallujah) until tion and a war of national wills, not the Iraqi government can do so on The insurgents capital- a war of massed formations and its own. ize on this self-produced massive firepower. Often, conventional military Synergy chaos and argue that the might is irrelevant and counterpro- The coalition’s COIN campaign ductive. Nation building, economic must be comprehensive. All the ele- coalition and the govern- stability, indigenous training pro- ments that make up a successful ment cannot protect the grams and political legitimacy are COIN program have to be integrat- the real war-winning weapons of ed and coordinated at the national people and that only the the coalition. The insurgents win by level and implemented simultane- not losing, and they seek to fight the ously. When these elements com- insurgents can bring war in America’s living rooms and bine, they have a synergistic effect about stability. Ironically, on Americans’ televisions. The against the insurgency and will insurgents need to beat the coali- achieve a significantly greater this stability can be tion’s domestic publics, not their effect. militaries. A war of attrition, If only some measures are achieved only when the dragged out over time, as coalition applied and others are not, or if insurgents purposely casualties mount day after day, is specific measures are halfheartedly the war the insurgents are prose- implemented, holes will be created cease their destructive cuting. Only an intelligent, compre- in the campaign that will be quick- hensive COIN strategy, implement- ly identified and exploited by the combat operations. ed and enforced at the national enemy. In this sense, the insur- level, and based on a thorough gents are like water; they will flow shipped home in body bags. The understanding of unconventional through holes in the plan and con- American military was doctrinally warfare, will defeat the insurgency tinue to thwart COIN goals. The unprepared to fight a guerrilla war and provide Iraq with a brighter coalition must critically analyze its before, during and after Vietnam. future. own COIN program, honestly Its primary focus was on the high- assessing the successes and fail- intensity warfare that would have ures of the program and adjusting been employed if the U.S. had Captain Eric Lyon is a detach- it accordingly. fought a war with the Soviet ment commander with the 3rd Bat- In historical examples of COIN Union. talion, 10th Special Forces Group. failures, interagency bickering, He recently completed a tour of duty internal Army politics, entrenched Conclusion in Iraq. careerism and a lack of under- The Iraq insurgency exhibits standing of unconventional war- fundamental elements found in Notes: 1 Nancy A. Youssef and Hannah Allam, fare have doomed COIN efforts to insurgencies like Vietnam and in “Seeking Vote Clout, Sunnis Woo Militants,” failure despite very real prospects the Afghani resistance to the Sovi- Philadelphia Inquirer, 13 October 2004. of success. Vietnam provides a vivid et Union. The coalition in Iraq 2 Youssef and Allam. example of such a self-inflicted must understand that military 3 Craig Whitlock, “Grisly Path to Power in COIN failing. force is just one tool in the battle Iraq’s Insurgency,” The Washington Post,27 September 2004.

December 2004 49 Enlisted Career Notes Special Warfare

CMF 38 approved, MOS 38A The Department of the Army approved the revision of Career Management converts to 38B Field, or CMF, 38 (Civil Affairs) on July 21. Changes to CMF 38 will be effective Oct. 1, 2005. The 38B military occupational specialty, or MOS, (Enlisted Civil Affairs) will be added to the Active Army, and Soldiers serving in MOS 38A (Enlisted Civil Affairs) will be converted to MOS 38B. Accordingly, all 38A positions and selected positions in the 11B, 21B and 18 series will be recoded to 38B. The Army is developing a process that will allow Soldiers currently assigned to the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion to request reclassification to MOS 38B and remain in the Active Army Civil Affairs community. Other Soldiers seeking to reclassify into Civil Affairs must have five years of service and be in the grade of E5 or E6. The Army is also developing a process that will enable Army Reserve Soldiers to become members of the Active Army 38B MOS. To ensure the proper filling of the force, the Army is devising an implementation strategy that includes publication of the accessions process, development and execution of a 38B reclassification course (targeted for July/August 2005) and the Human Resources Com- mand/Special Operations Recruiting Company recruitment mission. For additional information, telephone Major Kevin M. Shackleford, CA branch manager, SWCS Directorate of Special Operations Proponency, at DSN 239-6406, commercial (910) 432-6406, or send e-mail to: [email protected].

CMF 37 attains 100-percent The fiscal year 2005 master sergeant promotion board selected all 24 Soldiers selection rate to E8 from Career Management Field 37 (Psychological Operations) who were eligi- ble. This was the first year that the CMF has had a 100-percent selection rate. The selectees’ average time in service was 14 years, and their average time in grade was three years. More than 60 percent had some college education. For additional information, telephone Master Sergeant Donald C. Barton at DSN 239-6995 or commercial (910) 432-6993, or send e-mail to: [email protected].

E8 promotion board The fiscal year 2005 master sergeant promotion board selected 238 Special selects 238 SF NCOs Forces NCOs for promotion. That number surpassed the previous high of 187 set in FY 2004. SF’s selection rate was 19 percent; Infantry’s was 20 percent, and the Army overall selection rate was 13 percent. The increase in promotion rates is due primarily to the creation of vacancies as master sergeants who were retained under stop-loss during FY 2002-03 retire or make plans to retire in FY 2005. A look at the results of the FY 2005 board shows the average SF E7 selected for promotion had 16 years service, had four to five years’ time in grade, and was 35 years old, which is on par with historical norms. For additional information, telephone Master Sergeant Larry P. Deel at DSN 239-7594 or commercial (910) 432-7594, or send e-mail to: [email protected].

50 Special Warfare Officer Career Notes Special Warfare

SF officers get 55-percent The fiscal year 2004 colonel promotion board selected 11 of the 20 Special promotion rate to O6 Forces officers in the zone, making SF’s promotion rate 55 percent. One SF officer was selected of the 22 above the zone, and two were selected of the 31 below the zone. For additional information, telephone Lieutenant Colonel Mark Strong at DSN 239-3296 or commercial (910) 432-3296, or send e-mail to: [email protected].

FA 39 SSC selection rate The 2004 senior-service-college selection rate for FA 39 was below the below OPCF average average for the Army’s Operations Career Field, or OPCF.The OPCF average selection rate was 8.4 percent; FA 39’s rate was 5.7 percent. FA 39 needed only two more officers selected for SSC to meet the OPCF average.

Exception to policy grants On Oct. 15, Lieutenant General James J. Lovelace, Department of the ILE credit for NPS programs Army G3, approved an exception to policy granting credit to Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs students for completion of their intermediate-level education, or ILE, upon their completion of a degree program at the Naval Postgraduate School, or NPS. Officers attend- ing NPS must complete the 12-week ILE Core Course while in residence. For additional information, Special Forces officers should telephone Major Dale R. Buckner in the SF Officer Branch, Human Resources Command, at DSN 221-5739, commercial (703) 325-5739, or send e-mail to: buckn- [email protected]. CA and PSYOP officers should telephone Lieu- tenant Colonel Leo Ruth, Human Resources Command, at DSN 221-3115, commercial (703) 325-3115, or send e-mail to: [email protected].

SF officers earn 10-percent The fiscal year 2004 board for senior service college, or SSC, selected eight selection rate for SSC Special Forces officers for attendance. Six of the selectees are from year group 1984, and two are from year group 1985. The overall selection rate was 10 percent, as the year groups are roughly the same size (40 and 39 officers, respectively). Successful battalion command continues to be the dominant trend among SSC selectees.

FA 39’s above-the-zone O6 In-the-zone promotion rates for Functional Area 39 under the fiscal year selection rate tops OPCF 2004 colonel promotion board were below the average of the Operations average Career Field, or OPCF. Only three of the eight in-the-zone FA 39 officers were selected. Officers not selected included two former battalion commanders. However, FA 39’s above-the-zone selection rate was above that of the OPCF: 9.1 percent vs. 3.4 percent. For additional information, telephone Jeanne Goldmann at DSN 239-6922, commercial (910) 432-6922, or send e-mail to: [email protected].

December 2004 51 Foreign SOF Special Warfare

Private intelligence draws The longstanding, widespread and growing use of private security scrutiny in Brazil firms in many parts of the world evokes acute concern among governments that exercise little control over the firms’ activities. Security and intelligence companies — whose capabilities are often quite sophisticated thanks to new information-management and surveillance tech- nologies — play a major role in providing corporate risk assessments, protecting private assets and proprietary information, and providing direct security for other aspects of business operations. In Brazil, the director of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency, or ABIN, and other members of the nation’s intelligence establishment are supporting legisla- tion that would improve their oversight and control of sophisticated intelligence-gathering activities within the country. The initiative is sparked not so much by private security efforts themselves, but by the murky areas where government-corporate interaction may subject national or foreign government personnel and organizations to private intelligence gathering activities. In July, a large international security firm hired by a Brazilian telecommunications corporation collected information on a rival foreign corporation that came to involve the communications and activities of government members. The ABIN wants to more closely regulate the work of private intelligence agencies and prevent the usurpation of activities that are reserved for official government organizations.

Basque leadership may The terrorist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty, or ETA, is facing create new group difficult organizational and leadership problems. Its cadre has been badly damaged in a series of recent arrests of key personnel. At the same time, splits among some aging veteran members who favor political activity and younger, more militant members who favor continued violence, are raising questions about the direction of ETA’s future. Spanish and French counterterrorist crackdowns in the wake of the March 11, 2004, terrorist train bombings by Islamic extremists have also created a more hostile operational environment for ETA activities. The revulsion of Spanish citizens at losses from the attacks has reduced an already shrinking traditional support base. Old ETA veterans — now in their middle years but once among the most active and violent of European terrorists — don’t decry the violence itself, but they believe that the ETA no longer has the capacity and freedom to continue on its old path. Younger group members — less ideological, less sophisticated internationally, more militant and practitioners of “kale borroka” pro-ETA street violence and thuggery — appear to have embarked upon the creation of a new group that avoids the old local infrastructure that they believe to be infiltrated and exhausted. There is a fear that ETA, like a number of post-Cold War terrorist organizations, may become as much interested in criminal profit or in unfocused violence as the ETA once was in pursuing the Marxist/separatist organizational goals that animated recruiting and

52 Special Warfare activities. The role that still-extensive ETA networks in Latin Amer- ica might play in such a development is far from clear. In addition, some analysts think that a new ETA might be more inclined to cooperate with the most extreme Islamic groups, drawing on their “revolutionary energy” to revitalize their activities, reaching some per- verted common cause in the interest of mutual support. For the present, this remains speculation, but it is clear that ETA is in the throes of change that is drawing the closest attention from Spanish, French and international security organizations.

Russian GRU honored on This year’s Russian Armed Forces Special Forces Day, commemorated Russian Special Forces Day on Oct. 24, 2004, highlighted some new or little-known details of the Russian general staff's Main Intelligence Directorate, or GRU, forces of special designation — Spetsnaz. GRU Spetsnaz is said to have been formed in 1950. As Russian military reform continues, discussion is underway regarding the effectiveness, manning practices and compen- sation of GRU Spetsnaz — which still relies at least in part on conscripts — in comparison to units now largely manned by volunteers under contract. For example, in describing the effectiveness for one Spetsnaz unit in the 1979-89 Soviet-Afghan war — the 15th GRU Spet- snaz Brigade — it is claimed that the unit maintained control of an area twice the size of Chechnya. Brigade units are said to have eliminated or captured 9,000 mujahedin in the last three years of the Afghan occupation and to have seized huge numbers of armaments, at a cost of 140 GRU officers and men killed. The GRU is judged to have been more effective than other forces. Further, using the example of Chechnya, it is claimed that GRU Spetsnaz are extraordinarily effi- cient in comparison with other units. For example, the following (unverifiable) figures are cited for the number of Russian troops from various types of units that are required to eliminate a single Chechen fighter: The 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, permanently deployed in Chechnya and almost fully manned on a contract basis, has a ratio of 1,000 motorized rifle personnel per Chechan combatant eliminated; the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or MVD, units, which in Chechnya include “operational designation” units as well as MVD spetsnaz and special police, have ratios from 149 to 30 soldiers per combatant eliminated (the latter, lower ratio is presumably associated with the more elite Internal Troop special-designation forces, which are based on mixed conscript-contract manning); airborne troops — notably the contract- manned 76th Guards Pskov Airborne Division — require 27 paratroop- ers on the average to eliminate one militant. In the GRU Spetsnaz, where conscripts serve, the ratio is reported to be four soldiers per militant eliminated. These kinds of claims have generated arguments that GRU forces are under-compensated in comparison to the better-paid contract personnel and are more effective — even with conscripts — for the type of actions being fought in Chechnya. These kinds of discussions will clearly continue as Russian military “transformation” is debated and implemented.

This feature is produced under the auspices of the Joint Special Operations University, Strategy Division, Stra- tegic Studies Group. Items in this issue were written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., a senior fellow of the JSOU Strategic Studies Group.

December 2004 53 Update Special Warfare

New PSYOP battalion autobiographical sketches of individ- activated at Fort Bragg ual Soldiers; and photographs, said Lieutenant Colonel David B. Spencer, The Army’s newest Psychological USACAPOC historical officer. For Operations battalion was formally additional information, telephone activated during a ceremony held Spencer at DSN 239-1733, commercial at Fort Bragg Oct. 19. (910) 432-1733, or send e-mail to: The 5th Psychological Opera- [email protected]. tions Battalion is the latest addition to the 4th Psychological Oper- DoD to increase language ations Group and is a much-needed proficiency pay supplement to PSYOP forces engaged in the fight against terror- President Bush has signed into law ism, said Colonel Jack Summe, the the authority for the Department of 4th POG commander. Defense, or DoD, to increase foreign- After its activation, the 5th language proficiency pay, or FLPP, for PSYOP Battalion became the sixth members of the active Army and U.S. subordinate battalion of the 4th Army Reserve, or USAR. POG. The battalion will assume Under the new law, the FLPP cap responsibility for all PSYOP activi- for the active Army will be raised from $300 per month to $1,000 per ties in the U.S. Pacific Command Photo by Kyle Cosner theater of operations, which month. USAR FLPP will be LTC Kyle D. Hickman (left), commander of the 5th changed to an annual bonus that includes the Far East and the Pacif- PSYOP Battalion, receives his unit's colors from ic Rim, Summe said. — SGT Kyle COL Jack Summe, 4th PSYOP Group commander. will not exceed $6,000. Because the Cosner, USASOC PAO law provides no additional funding, excess of current numbers. For addi- it will be incumbent upon the ser- CA, PSYOP to increase tional information, telephone Lieu- vices to allocate the funds. in-service recruiting efforts tenant Colonel Curtis D. Boyd of the Implementation guidance from SWCS Directorate of Special Opera- DoD is pending. Once DoD guid- In an effort to meet the needs of a tions Proponency, at DSN 239-7576, ance has been issued, the services transforming Army and to address commercial (910) 432-7576, or send e- will in turn develop their own the challenges of the Global War on mail to [email protected]. instructions for implementation. Terrorism, Army special-operations For further information, contact forces will expand their mission of in- USACAPOC developing either Lieutenant Colonel John J. service recruiting to include officers GWOT historical collection Donnelly, chief of the U.S. Army and NCOs for Civil Affairs, or CA, and Special Operations Command’s The U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations, or PSYOP. SOF Language Office, at DSN 239- Psychological Operations Command Programmed growth in CA and 2534, commercial (910) 432-2534, e- is collecting data from USACAPOC PSYOP over the next two years moti- mail: [email protected]; or Jeanne units concerning their activities in vates a recruiting effort to ensure that Goldmann, Directorate of Special the Global War on Terrorism. the ARSOF community accesses the Operations Proponency, at DSN The U.S. Army Reserve Citizen War- best candidates. Moreover, the forma- 239-6922, commercial (910) 432- rior Message 2003-13, dtg 061200 Nov tion of CA and PSYOP branches for 6922, e-mail: [email protected]. officers and the creation of an active- 03, requires Army Reserve units to component CA enlisted military occu- provide the following information as a pational specialty, 38B, require the minimum: a unit narrative; an after- ability to access officers and NCOs in action review; unit briefing slides;

54 Special Warfare Book Reviews Special Warfare

Red Acropolis, Black Terror: period (and often between periods) usage would have been a great The Greek Civil War and the within one chapter. I have read help. In defense of the author, the Origins of the Soviet-American extensively on this subject and reviewed copy was a pre-publica- Rivalry. By Andre Gerolymatos. have written about it as well, and I tion draft, and it can be assumed New York: Basic Books, 2004. could not follow him most of the that many of these problems will ISBN: 0-465-02743-1, 352 pages. time. A novice would have real be cleaned up in the final version. $27.50. problems. A timeline with major As to the content, Gerolymatos events and characters at the begin- gives quite a bit of new informa- For a student of the Balkans, ning of the book would have tion, mostly from interviews. He insurgencies and United States helped. The bottom line is that a does tend to get in the weeds, national security, Andre Geroly- more disciplined use of chronology spending a great deal of time on matos’ new book, Red Acropolis, would have greatly aided the read- small and insignificant incidents Black Terror, appears to be filled er’s understanding. that he says typify the lives of with promise and potential. Unfor- Stylistically, Gerolymatos is a far “nearly all Greeks,” a claim that is tunately, appearances can be better writer than most historians, broad enough to require proof. deceiving, and the book disap- and the book reads well (except for Gerolymatos also leans toward points on nearly all counts. the confusion noted above). The the left, or at least well away from The subject is timely, given that author can never be accused of the right, as to who is to blame and the Greek Civil War resulted in writing for sheer volume, because who were the “bad guys” in the pro- America’s first real success in he makes his point and moves on, tracted struggle. Looking at the nation-building, and it could pro- and that helps the book to flow. chapter titles is instructive here. vide some valuable lessons for the Gerolymatos has a tendency to Chapter 4 is entitled “The Pogrom U.S.-led efforts of building a demo- use names of Greek personalities of the Left: The Prelude to White cratic nation in Iraq. But while the that are probably not familiar to Terror.” This covers almost exclu- subject could be instructive for U.S. the average reader. A fuller expla- sively the terrible atrocities com- policy-makers, this book is not. nation of each player at the first mitted by the communists after Red Acropolis, Black Terror is their defeat in the Battle of Athens nominally organized on a chrono- (Chapter 3). logical basis, but Gerolymatos has Gerolymatos apparently is com- taken what should be a simple and pelled to point out, even in the title, explanatory method and made it that even though this was terror- confusing. He provides a short ism by the left, more rightist terror introduction, five long chapters was coming, pre-emptively absolv- and a short epilogue. The introduc- ing the left of much of its blame. tion adds almost no value. The Throughout the book, the author main chapters cover the pre-World mentions the depredations of the War II period, the Axis occupation left but always immediately points period, the so-called Battle of out that the right was up to no Athens, the immediate aftermath good, as well. of that period and the final portion Gerolymatos continually puts of the civil war, all about equal in the blame on the outside world length. The epilogue tries to make (mostly the British and later the the connection to Vietnam. U.S.) for the problems in Greece. What causes most of the confu- Again, Gerolymatos is faithful in sion is Gerolymoatos’ tendency to chronicling the actions of the jump about within each chapter’s Greek leaders and citizens, but in

December 2004 55 his analysis, he always reminds the ing to fill in the gaps. Readers who reader that it was those pesky out- have a good background should siders who meddled and set the read it. You will not agree with all Greeks up for failure. of the author’s analysis, regardless Gerolymatos spends too much of your views, but one always time on the prewar and World War II learns from that. The Greek Civil periods (chapters 1 and 2), way too War was an important time for the much on the Battle of Athens (Chap- Greek nation and for the budding ter 3), and very little on the major U.S. superpower. The lessons of part of the war (Chapter 5) that that war need to be applied in Iraq, would have illuminated his subtitle as we attempt to rebuild a country and provided lessons for today. He and fight an insurgency at the never does effectively make his case same time. We would do well to try that the U.S. experience in Greece to learn from history. Red Acropo- led directly to Vietnam. lis, Black Terror will not fill that The book provides some utility: need alone, but it is a start. It gives a good historical background of the Greek Civil War and COL Steven Bucci some good insights into the plight Office of the Secretary of Defense of the common Greek during that Washington, D.C. period. Unfortunately, it is of little use for the policy-maker or the Insurgent Collective Action divided her time primarily national-security-studies student. and Civil War in El Salvador. By between case-study regions in two Gerolymatos never covers in any Elisabeth Jean Wood. New York: contested areas. She conducted her detail the massive effort executed Cambridge University Press, 2003. case studies in the municipality of by the U.S. and the Greek govern- ISBN: 0-521-01050-0. 308 pages. Tenancingo (similar to a U.S. coun- ment in defeating the insurgency. $23. ty) and in the department of Usul- He makes it appear that the U.S. tan (similar to a U.S. state). The gave lots of money and equipment In Insurgent Collective Action closely defined areas allowed Wood (true), and a few military advisers and Civil War in El Salvador, Elis- to perform an in-depth analysis of (way off the mark). There was liter- abeth Jean Wood presents a highly each area’s activities and resi- ally an American counterpart detailed academic study of the fac- dents, but her study is limited in advising and assisting every mem- tors that led to insurgent collective its representation of the nation- ber of the Greek government action in El Salvador. wide population. bureaucracy. A thorough knowledge of the Wood’s research was based on A great deal of the U.S. effort was motives and tactics behind insur- interviews with more than 200 Sal- ground-breaking, and while some gent collective action is critical on vadorans, including campesinos, lessons were applied in Vietnam, today’s battlefields, and Wood’s members of the local elite, religious many were not. The single biggest book provides insight at the lowest leaders and rebel leaders. Notably accomplishment, contributing levels of action. She explores the absent from the list of interviewees immeasurably to the victory, was motivations behind joining an are representatives from the Sal- the U.S. success in turning the war insurgency when the cost of such vadoran government or military. from one of “Greek royalists vs. membership may be death. Unlike The greatest benefit of Wood’s Greek communists,” into one of other researchers who focus on research seems to be that it pro- “Greeks vs. communists.” In today’s material grievances, Wood con- vides a view of the insurgency from terminology, the U.S. won the infor- cludes that emotional and moral the bottom up, allowing the reader mation-operations war. Geroly- motives were instrumental in the to view the insurgency through the matos never mentions that at all, emergence and consolidation of campesino’s eyes. which is a shame. insurgent collective action. Her Wood finds that while tradition- Readers who have no back- book also provides limited insight al Marxist motivations existed, ground knowledge of the Greek into the motives that prevented the critical motives inducing col- Civil War should read Geroly- collective action. lective action in El Salvador were matos’ book with some trepidation. Wood spent three months in El emotional and moral. Liberation They should look at the bibliogra- Salvador in 1987, followed by trips theology, practiced by Roman phy and find some additional read- there until the end of the war. She Catholic priests and nuns, provid-

56 Special Warfare ed the catalyst for the initial polit- reaction could occur in Iraq if the ical organization and mobilization radical leaders inciting rebellion by giving campesinos the hope of a were to be targeted. better life that ignited the insur- Wood’s research provides a view gent movement. of the way insurgency works. For Wood identifies three main emo- example, the primary contribution tional and moral motives for the of the indirect supporters was the support and growth of the insur- provision of intelligence on govern- gent movement: participation, defi- ment movements to the insurgents, ance and pleasure in agency. Par- and the denial of intelligence on ticipation is the involvement in insurgent movements to the gov- activities that reflect moral com- ernment. Therefore, the population mitment, the cause that is worthy is absolutely critical (thus the cen- of support no matter the outcome. ter of gravity) to both insurgency Wood writes, “Nearly all the and counterinsurgency, indicating campesinos interviewed resented that popular perception must be a the poverty and humiliation they consideration and the focus in all endured before the war.” Some operations. came to believe that social justice To her detriment, Wood spends a was the “will of God,” and thus par- lot of ink justifying her findings ticipation in the struggle was with statistics and explaining the morally just. psychological analysis behind her Defiance was the result of moral conclusions. Her work does provide outrage at the government’s important points on the motiva- response to perceived just actions tions that lead to collective action, and the campesino/insurgent’s but focused reading is required to refusal to submit. “Repression by seize the key points. This book is government forces appears to have not intended for junior officers who been the best recruiter for insur- need a concise introduction to gent forces throughout Usulutan,” insurgency theory or to the war in Wood says. Defiance is forced; it is El Salvador. But for a student of a reaction to injustice, rather than insurgency, the book provides a a decision. Pleasure in agency is a glimpse of what makes an insur- public assertion of self-worth, dis- gent organization operate and playing pride in the effectiveness of grow. The book also provides a non- change. Prior to the war, campe- typical view of the reasons behind sinos felt like animals tied to the mobilization, which helps to land. After the war, campesinos expand the tools for the counterin- could claim land in pursuit of their surgency planning so critical in own material interests and had modern-day conflicts. hope of a decent future for their families. They had established dig- MAJ Peter J. Canonico nity and self-worth. Naval Postgraduate School Many of the same patterns, reac- Monterey, Calif. tions and motivations that Wood identifies can also be seen in current U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a better understanding of insurgent motivations is critical. In El Salvador, religion was instrumental to the spread of the insurgency, and the killing of religious leaders only increased the recruitment of insurgents. One might ask if the same

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