A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts And
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DEVOLUTION FROM ABOVE : THE ORIGINS AND PERSISTENCE OF STATE -SPONSORED MILITIAS A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By Ariel I. Ahram, M.A. Washington, DC July 30, 2008 Copyright 2008 by Ariel I. Ahram All Rights Reserved ii DEVOLUTION FROM ABOVE : THE ORIGINS AND PERSISTENCE OF STATE -SPONSORED MILITIAS Ariel I. Ahram, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Andrew Bennett, Ph.D. ABSTRACT This study examines the proliferation of militias and other armed groups who act in conjunction with, but outside, the state’s military apparatus. Groups like the Sudanese janjaweed , the Serbian paramilitaries, and Colombian self-defense forces figure prominently in a host of contemporary conflicts in the developing world. They are widely identified as banes of human and international security and harbingers of anarchy. Their very existence violates the Weberian ideal-type of the state as a monopolist over the use of force. I argue, however, that reliance on non-state violence-wielders has been a common form of military development and is not necessarily associated with state failure. I use small, medium, and large-n methods to develop a theory of how and why developing states rely on non-state actors to implement coercion. Through historical case studies of Indonesia and Iraq, regional comparisons of Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and statistical analysis across eighty-five cases, I draw the following conclusions: First, decolonization was a critical juncture that led states to adopt different techniques for organizing coercion. Specifically, revolutionary states tended to decentralize coercive power by assimilating former revolutionary fighters into informal local militias. In contrast, non-revolutionary states directly inherited European-trained armies with more iii conventional, centralized organizational patterns that placed the use of force firmly in state hands. Second, post-colonial conditions of regional competition compelled some states to continually upgrade and centralize coercive power, while states facing weaker external challengers could co-opt militias for counterinsurgency without needing direct control over coercion. By exploring the dynamics of state-militia relations and the historical and structural factors that inhibit or enable the use of state-sponsored militias, I highlight the futility of many efforts at state reconstruction aimed to regain the illusory monopoly over coercion. The emergence of both centralized and decentralized institutions of violence are responses to the international system and can scarcely be addressed through piecemeal efforts at the country level. Rather, I suggest that violence devolution may alleviate, rather than cause, some of the dangers commonly attributed to frail or failed states. iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Many people deserve acknowledgement for their sacrifices of time and energy on my behalf in the past five years. Andy Bennett, my dissertation advisor, saw a first proposal for the project in 2003 and was unwavering in both critique and encouragement since then. Charles King, Jack Goldstone, and Debbie Avant read drafts at various stages and gave me valuable feedback about ways to shape and hone the argument. Hillel Frisch, Meyer Kestnbaum, and Sunil Dasgupta—specialists themselves in the subject of militias—took an active interest in my work and gave me pointers about steering the project through to completion. Among the Georgetown faculty, I thank Dan Brumberg, Steve Heydemann, and Marc Howard particularly for introducing me to a realm of research topics I would otherwise have overlooked. Equally important, my graduate student colleagues, John Gledhill, Sara Wallace Goodman, Gabe Rubin, and Rachel Templer, merit special thanks as my cohort and co-commiserators during the most difficult months of writing. My interest in the Middle East dates to my undergraduate training at Brandeis University under Kanan Makiya and Yitzhak Nakash. Subsequently, I was lucky to receive further guidance from Amatzia Baram, Phebe Marr, and Ken Pollack. A novice and interloper in Southeast Asia, I am grateful to David Steinberg and Fred Von Der Mehden from indulging and correcting me, as well as the staff of the Sudirman Museum in Yogyakarta and Museum Proklamasi in Jakarta for their patience and assistance. v George Shambaugh and Mike Bailey lent me important advice about the statistical analysis. Errors in any portion of the work are mine, not theirs. The project benefited from a number of sources of institutional support, notably the Title VI Foreign Language and Area Studies Program, the Boren National Security Education Program, Georgetown University Graduate School, and the Center for Democracy and Civil Society. It was strengthened by the opportunity to present at the Institute for Qualitative Methods Research, American Political Science Association, International Studies Association, Midwest Political Science Association, Social Science History Association, Georgetown Working Group on Internal Security, Culture and World Politics Workshop, and the DC Workshop on Contentious Politics. I also thank the staff of the Georgetown University Library, the Africa and Middle East Reading Room at the Library of Congress, and the National Archives and Record Administration in College Park, Maryland, for their assistance. Finally, I wish to acknowledge a number of people outside the academia whose role was no less important to my success. Joe Neumann has buoyed me in my hardest time in graduate school and every day since then. Jacob Ebin, Kathryn Hinkle, and Jason Kohn served variously as inspirations, exemplars, and sounding boards. Throughout my life, my mother, Judi, brother, Roey, and sister, Sharon, were steadfast in their support. I can only hope I was the same for them. Finally, I thank my fiancé, Marni Lefkowitz, whose companionship during the last year turned the most daunting part of my education into the most exciting and wonderful one as well. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1 : Introduction .................................................................................................. 1 Chapter 2 : A Theory of Violence Devolution …………………………………...…….13 Chapter 3 : Limited Wars and Limited States: Violence Devolution in Indonesia………………………………………………………………………………... 43 Chapter 4 : Oversized Wars and Overgrown States: Building the Garrison State in Iraq…………………………………………………………………………………….. 111 Chapter 5 : Wider Perspectives on Revolution, War, and Military Development……. 197 Chapter 6 : Conclusion: Distant Battles, Historical Pathways, and the Future of Violence Devolution………………………………………………………………………………224 Appendix A: Type and Intensity of Conflict of Time: Middle East vs. Southeast Asia……………………………………………………………………………………..241 Appendix B: Variable Descriptions……………………………..………….………….244 vii List of Figure and Tables Figures Figure 2.1 : Continuum in the Organization of Violence………………………………..14 Figure 2.2 : Conceptual Map of Violence Devolution…………………………………...15 Figure 2.3 : M-form Military Organization……………………………………………...22 Figure 2.4 : U-form Military Organization………………………………………………22 Figure 2.5 : Militia Mobilization with Competing Sources of Clientage and Brokerage………………………………………………………………………………...27 Figure 2.6 : Militia Mobilization with Limited Clientage and Brokerage……………….27 Figure 2.7 : Pathways of Late Developing State Military Development………………...37 Figure 3.1 : Location of Major Internal Uprisings in the Late 1950s……………………85 Figure 5.1: Pathways of Military Development Compared: Iraq and Indonesia………199 Figure 5.2: Military Budgets as Percentage of Government Expenditure, 1960s- 1990s……………………………………………………………………………………203 Tables Table 1.1 : Conflict by Type and Region, 1945-2006 (Tally and Crosstab by Row)……7 Table 1.2 : Military Spending Among LDSs, 1999……………………………………….8 Table 2.1 : Comparison Between U-form and M-form Governance………………….…23 Table 4.1 : Changes in the Size of the Iraqi Military…………………………………...113 viii Table 5.1 : Military Expenditure as a Percentage of Central Government Expenditure……………………………………………………………………………..202 Table 5.2 : Growth in Military Size of Selected Middle Eastern Countries………………………………………………………………………………..209 Table 5.3a : Multivariate Regression Using Robust Standard Error for PARAMILITARY (Model includes major conflicts only)………………………………………………….221 Table 5.3b : Multivariate Regression Using Robust Standard Error for PARAMILITARY (Models includes all conflicts)………………………………………………………….222 Table 6.1 : Types of International Engagement in Frail States…………………………230 Appendix A : Type and Intensity of Conflict of Time: Middle East vs. Southeast Asia……………………………………………………………………………………..240 Appendix B : Variable Descriptions……………………………………………………243 ix Chapter 1 Introduction In 2003, a new word entered Western parlance, drawn from colloquial Sudanese Arabic—janjaweed (devil-horsemen). The term connoted a phenomenon that seemed suddenly to catch the world’s attention: nomadic tribal bands rampaging through Sudan’s Darfur region, attacking villages and destroying the crops of the sedentary population. Despite protestations by the Sudanese Defense Minister that they are nothing but “gangs of armed bandits” whom the government is unfortunately powerless to stop, the United Nations commission of inquiry has well-documented the way the janjaweed is a “militia acting, under the authority, with the support, complicity or tolerance of the Sudanese