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Privacy, wiretapping and the citizen Congress’ battle to set legal boundaries on government wiretapping in the 1970s Olsen, E.A.
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Citation for published version (APA): Olsen, E. A. (2020). Privacy, wiretapping and the citizen: Congress’ battle to set legal boundaries on government wiretapping in the 1970s.
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Download date:29 Sep 2021 Privacy, Wiretapping and the Citizen: Congress’ Battle to Set Legal Boundaries on Government Wiretapping in the 1970s
ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT
ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. dr. ir. K.I.J. Maex ten overstaan van een door het College voor Promoties ingestelde commissie, op donderdag 25 juni 2020 te 13.00 uur door Erik Alfred Olsen geboren te New York Promotiecommissie Promotor: prof. dr. R.V.A. Janssens Universiteit van Amsterdam Copromotor: dr. E.F. van de Bilt Universiteit van Amsterdam
Overige leden: prof. dr. B. Roessler Universiteit van Amsterdam
prof. dr. I.G.B.M. Duyvesteyn Universiteit Leiden
prof. dr. J.A. Peters Universiteit van Amsterdam
dr. G.H. Blaustein Universiteit van Amsterdam
prof. dr. M. van Leeuwen Universiteit van Amsterdam
Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen
The research of this doctoral thesis received financial assistance from the Ford Presidential Library.
Table of Contents
Introduction 1 a. Research Topic 3 b. Existing Scholarship 10 c. Thesis Statement 25 d. Sources 36 e. Subtopics 41
Section 1: The Era of Regulation Without Oversight 46
Chapter 1: Privacy Rights in the Early Twentieth Century 47
1.a. Wiretapping Regulations in the Absence of Fourth Amendment Protections 49
1.b. Early Twentieth Century Decisions by the Supreme Court and Congress’ Foray into Wiretapping Regulations 56
1.b.1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) 56
1.b.2. The Communications Act of 1934 60
1.b.3. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 370 (1937) 72
Conclusion 79
Chapter 2: The 1960s: Berger, Katz and Congress Link Wiretapping to Fourth Amendment Protections 82
2.a. Privacy Evolves into a Constitutional Right, 1967-68 91
2.a.1 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) 91
2.a.2. Katz v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1967) 97
2.b. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 105
2.c. Warrantless Wiretapping Threatens a Constitutional Conflict 108
Conclusion 118
Section 2: Congress Investigates the White House – Intelligence Community Relationship 124
Chapter 3: The Watergate Scandal, the Houston Plan and The Effects on the White House – Intelligence Community Relationship 125
3.a. Congress Learns About the Houston Plan 127
3.b. The Watergate Scandal Damages the Executive Branch 141
Conclusion 144
Chapter 4: The Rockefeller Commission, the Executive Branch’s Overture to Dominate the Intelligence Investigation of the 1970s 146
Conclusion 156
Chapter 5: The Pike Committee, A Failed Investigation from the House 157
5.a. The Failed Nedzi Committee 161
5.b. The House Kills the Pike Committee Final Report 164
Conclusion 173
Chapter 6: The Church Committee, Privacy, and Warrantless Wiretapping 177
6.a. The Church Committee’s Formation and Their Success as Contrasted with the Pike Investigation 181
6.b. The Scope of the Church Committee Investigation 190
6.c. The Imperial Presidency 195
6.d. Why Was Privacy and Warrantless Wiretapping of Such Interest to the Committee? 200
Conclusion 203
Chapter 7: The Church Committee Investigation of the FBI and COINTELPRO 206
7.a. What Was COINTELPRO and Why Was It Created? 208
7.b. The Main Five COINTELPRO Operations and Their Budgets 211
7.b.1. COINTELPRO I: ‘Communist Party, USA’ Program (1956-71) 212
7.b.2. COINTELPRO II: ‘Socialist Workers Party’ Program (1961-69) 215
7.b.3. COINTELPRO III: ‘White Hate Group’ Program (1964-71) 216
7.b.4. COINTELPRO IV: ‘Black Nationalist – Hate Group’ Program (1967-71) 218
7.b.5. COINTELPRO V: ‘The New Left’
Program (1968 – 71) 220
7.c. The Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. and the FBI 222
7.d. COINTELPRO Exposes the Need for Congressional Regulations on Wiretapping and Oversight of the White House Intelligence Community Relationship Stakeholders 227
Conclusion 240
Chapter 8: The Church Committee, the Central Intelligence Agency, and Operation CHAOS 242
8.a. The Creation of the Central Intelligence Agency 245
8.b. Operation CHAOS 247
8.c. How the Church Committee’s Findings with Respect to Operation CHAOS Helped Formulate Their Reform Recommendations 254
Conclusion 267
Section 3: Congress Creates New Regulations and Oversight on the White House-Intelligence Community Relationship 270
Chapter 9: The Corrective Actions of Congress and the Establishment of the Permanent Congressional Oversight Regime 271
9.a. Why the Focus on Privacy, Warrantless Wiretapping and Violations of the Fourth Amendment? 274
9.b. Historical Problems Related to Congressional Controls of Intelligence and
the End of the Buddy System 285
9.c. How Does Congress Best Regulate and Perform Oversight in the White House – Intelligence Community Relationship 294
Conclusion 299
Chapter 10: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 302
10.a. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 – S. 1566 305
10.b. Defining Terms Under FISA 311
10.c. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 315
10.d. Surveillance with Warrant 319
10.e. Pre-Warrant Surveillance 322
Conclusion 328
Chapter 11: Senate Resolution 400 and the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 333
11.a. Congressional Intelligence Oversight, Privacy and Wiretapping 341
11.b. Senate Resolution 400 (1976) 345
11.c. The ‘Cannon Compromise’ 348
11.c.1. 12 May 1976 Introduction of S.R. 400 Cannon Compromise 350
11.c.2. 13 May 1976 Debate and Amendment on the Cannon Compromise 351
11.c.3. 17 May 1976 Debate and Amendment on the Cannon Compromise 353
11.c.4. 18 May 1976 Debate and Amendment on the Cannon Compromise 356
11.c.5. 19 May 1976 Debate and Amendment on the Cannon Compromise 358
11.d. The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 – S.2284 361
11.e. Reporting Requirement and Covert Activity 365
Conclusion 375
Section 4: The Intelligence Reforms of the 1970s in the Changing Political Climates Over Subsequent Decades: From Church to the Torture Report 379
Chapter 12: Changes to FISA From Boland Amendments Through the Patriot Act and Torture Report 380
12.a. Congressional Oversight in the Post-1970s 386
12.a.1. The Boland Amendments 386
12.a.2. USAPATRIOT ACT of 2001 395
12.a.3. Changes to FISA via Amendment to the USAPATRIOT ACT of 2001 401
12.a.4. The CIA Torture Report and the Senate Intelligence Committee 412
12.b. Congress Abdicates Oversight
Responsibilities: Two Case Studies 416
12.b.1. The Aspin-Brown Commission 416
12.b.2. The 9/11 Commission and the Bush White House Controlled Investigation 418
Conclusion 422
Conclusion 424
References 439
Summary, English 475
Summary, Dutch 479