BJDP-5.00
Brunei Joint Doctrine Publication JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING BJDP-5.00
(Edition 2.0)
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BJDP-5.00
JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING (Edn 2)
Brunei Joint Doctrine Publication BJDP-5.00 (Edn 2.0) dated 30 January 2018
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT OF BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
1. This document is to be kept within the Ministry of Defence or Royal Brunei Armed Forces establishments.
2. It is issued for the information of such persons only as need to know its content in the course of their official duties.
3. Any person finding this document should hand it in with the particulars of how and where found to a Royal Brunei Armed Forces Military Establishment, or to a Police Station for its safe return to:
JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS ROYAL BRUNEI ARMED FORCES MINISTRY OF DEFENCE BOLKIAH GARISON BB3510 NEGARA BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
THE UNAUTHORISED RETENTION OR DESTRUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS AN OFFENCE
i BJDP-5.00 FOREWORD
“The general who wins the battle makes many calculations in his temple before the battle is fought. The general who loses makes but few calculations.” Sun Tzu – The Art of War
At the core of successful operational execution, lie capable and competent plans. To ensure success, at the operational level, Commanders and their Staff must be accomplished in both the art and the science of planning. This second edition of the RBAF’s ‘Joint Operations Planning’ Doctrine is designed to consolidate the lessons learned and best practice identified since the publication of the first edition in 2013.
The ‘science’ of planning refers to the processes that we use. This doctrinal guide comprehensively describes the RBAF’s revised operational planning approach, known as the Operational Military Appreciation Process (OMAP). Linking with current and future designs for Single Service Tactical planning tools, this publication has delivered an integrated planning system throughout the RBAF.
While planning processes guide our consideration of complex problems, it is our intellectual ability that produces solutions. Our ability to analyse, understand, problem solve and make decisions represents the ‘art’ of planning. This doctrinal examination of the ‘art’ is therefore essential reading for all operational planners, whilst also being of core relevance to all in the RBAF who are required to plan, irrespective of level and context.
PEHIN DATU PEKERMA JAYA DATO PADUKA SERI MOHD TAWIH BIN ABDULLAH Major General Commander Royal Brunei Armed Forces
Date – 13 Jamadiawal 1439 Date – 30 January 2018
ii BJDP-5.00 PREFACE
1. This second edition of BJDP-5.00 ‘Joint Operations Planning’ aims to enhance the RBAF’s degree of understanding of operational planning processes, and specifically introduce the RBAF’s revised methodology. In publishing this doctrinal guide, all operational level organisations within the RBAF will be able to collectively adopt a planning process known as the Operational Military Appreciation Process (OMAP). While acting as an adaptation from planning processes used by regional partners, the design of OMAP specifically reflects the requirements placed on the RBAF to deliver enhanced operational planning capability. The development of OMAP provides one of a series of similar integrated planning processes that link tactical planning (using TMAP1) by Single Service units with the operational planning conducted by Single Service and Joint Forces HQs. This publication must also be used in conjunction with other operational doctrinal publications 2, which highlight specialist planning considerations using the OMAP format.
2. BJDP-5.00 (Edn 2) also aims to assist operational planners (Commanders and Staff) by developing a greater awareness of the cognitive skills essential to support the continued delivery of cohesive and coherent planning. The development of an understanding of these skills acts as a first step in enhancing operational planning capacity; however, this must be combined with frequent and challenging training opportunities to allow such skills to practiced and improved.
3. This second edition does not represent a wholesale shift in guidance for operational planning. Much of the theory provided in the first edition is consistent will all military operational planning. As such, while undergoing some refinement and reorganisation, this previous guidance has been carried across into this publication to provide some familiarity. For ease of understanding, BJDP-5.00 (Edn 2) has been divided into three Parts, as follows:
1 Tactical MAP (TMAP) remains, at the time of publication, under development within Single Services in order to integrate planning methods. TMAP will consist of TMAP (Quick) and TMAP (Deliberate). Concepts and developments are further described in Chapter 7. 2 Specifically those contained within the Functional area of the RBAF doctrinal suite, for example BJDP-4.00 Logistic Support to Operations, Chapter 6. iii BJDP-5.00 a. Part 1 – Fundamentals. Part 1 contains 4 Chapters and sets the foundations from which all planning activity can be conducted. Chapter 1 provides a broad understanding of Planning through an examination of approach, principle and context. Chapter 2 concentrates on the importance of understanding the wider (tangible and intangible) environment; and specifically how this relates to problem solving and decision making in an operational planning context. While Chapter 3 conceptually describes analysis and the essential skills necessary for its application, Chapter 4 considers similar areas that relate to Decision Making. b. Part 2 – Definitions, Tools & Techniques. Part 2 contains two Chapters which both deliver guidance on a range of methods which are required to be applied in the conduct of OMAP. Chapter 5 focuses on the essentials to support Analysis; while Chapter 6 provides the same for Planning. c. Part 3 – RBAF Joint Operational Planning – The Operational Military Appreciation Process (OMAP). Part 3, delivered in six chapters, describes in detail the functional process of using OMAP as the RBAF’s operational planning process. In conducting OMAP it will be necessary for operational planners to cross reference Part 3 with Part 2 as the OMAP sequences progress. d. Lexicon. Definitions and abbreviations are detailed within the text of the publication to allow for immediate understanding. For completeness, and ease, abbreviations are also listed in the lexicon at the end of this publication.
iv BJDP-5.00 JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING (Edn 2)
CONTENTS
Foreword ii Preface iii Contents v Amendment Proposals x Disclaimer x Acknowledgements xi Distribution xii
PART 1 - FUNDAMENTALS
Chapter 1 – Planning Philosophy, Principle and Practice
The Approach to Planning – Philosophy 2 The Approach to Planning – Principles 5 The Approach to Planning – Context & Practice 7
Chapter 2 – Understanding
Defining Understanding 14 Principles of Understanding 16 Understanding Complexity 18 Understanding Time and Consequence 20 Understanding the Situation 22 Enabling Understanding 24
Chapter 3 – Analysis
Defining Analysis 26 Analytical Principles 28 Analytical Context 30 Analytical Practices 40
v BJDP-5.00 Framing Analysis 41
Chapter 4 – Decision Making
Thinking What is Thinking 43 How We Think 45 Thinking Processes 49 Developing Thinking 51 Problem Solving 53 Military Decision Making 55
PART 2 – DEFINITIONS, TOOLS & TECHNIQUES
Chapter 5 – Analytical Definitions, Tools & Techniques
Environmental Analysis 58 Stakeholder Analysis 61 Human Factors Analysis General Methods and Application 64 ASCOPE 66 STEEPLEM 73 Utilising HTA Methods to Develop Further Analysis 77 Analytical Modelling SWOT Analysis 79 Centre of Gravity Analysis 84 Three Column Format Analysis 96 Risk Analysis Risk and Operating Levels 101 Risk Analysis and Management 106 Risk Analysis and Management Techniques 108
vi BJDP-5.00 Chapter 6 – Planning Definitions, Tools, Techniques and Products
Operational Planning Concepts 115 Operational End States & Objectives 117 Decisive Points & Supporting Effects 119 Lines & Groupings of Operation 133 Changes in the Operational Plan 140 Operational Planning Products 144
PART 3 – RBAF JOINT OPERATIONAL PLANNING: THE OPERATIONAL MILITARY APPRECIATION PROCESS (OMAP)
Chapter 7 – OMAP Background
Context 152 OMAP Overview 154 OMAP Preparation 156
Chapter 8 – Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Area (IPB)
IPB Process 158 IPB Steps IPB Step 1 – Define the Operational Battlespace 160 IPB Step 2 – Effects of the Operational Environment 164 IPB Step 3 – Threat Evaluation 168 IPB Step 4 – Threat Integration 173 IPB Brief 180
Chapter 9 – OMAP Step 1 (Mission Analysis)
Introduction 181 Stages of Mission Analysis Stage 1 – Review the Situation 183 Stage 2 – Identify and Analyse Superior Commander’s Intent an develop own Mission 188 Stage 3 – Identify and Analyse Tasks 190 Stage 4 – Identify and Analyse Freedoms of Action 192
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Stage 5 – Identify and Analyse Critical Facts and Assumptions 193 Stage 6 – Commander’s Guidance 194 Stage 7 – Mission Analysis Brief 197
Chapter 10 – OMAP Step 2 (Course of Action Development)
Introduction to Step 2 (COA Development) 198 The Stages of COA Development Stage 1 – Confirm CoG 199 Stage 2 – Critical Capabilities Analysis 200 Stage 3 – Develop Decisive Points and LoO 201 Stage 4 – Develop Broad COA 203 Stage 5 – Develop Detailed COA 204 Stage 6 – Test COA 210 Stage 7 – COA Development Brief 212 Chapter 11 – OMAP Step 3 (Course of Action Analysis)
Introduction 213 Wargaming What is Wargaming? 214 Wargame Benefits & Limitations 217 Comprehending Risk 219 COA Analysis (Wargame) Conduct Stage 1 – Prepare the Wargame 221 Stage 2 – Conduct the Wargame 231 Stage 3 – Action Resulting from the Wargame 235
Chapter 12 – OMAP Step 4 (Decision and Execution)
Introduction 237 Decision Compare COAs 238 Select COAs 244 Execution Develop and Issue the Plan 245
viii BJDP-5.00 Execute the Plan 246
LEXICON
Acronyms and Abbreviations 248
ix BJDP-5.00 AMENDMENT PROPOSALS
The Joint Doctrine and Warfare Centre is responsible for publishing Brunei Joint Doctrine Publications (BJDPs) within a hierarchy of similar publications. Comments on factual accuracy or proposals for amendment are welcomed by the Doctrine Editor at:
Joint Doctrine and Warfare Centre Ministry of Defence BOLKIAH GARISON BB3510 NEGARA BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
DISCLAIMER
Any examples used to describe elements of the Operational planning processes contained within this publication are entirely fictitious and are for instructional purposes only. The geography contained within any example is entirely synthetic; similarly names, historical, political, economic, social and security aspects relating to any examples are also fictitious. Any similarities to actual circumstances are entirely coincidental and no correlation to the real world should be inferred.
x BJDP-5.00 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Joint Doctrine and Warfare Centre acknowledge intellectual debt in preparing this publication to a number of overseas military doctrinal publications, including:
‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Level Planning’ (JDP 5-00), Ministry of Defence, London, United Kingdom, 2013.
‘Campaign Planning’ (JDP 5-00 Edn 2, Change 2), Ministry of Defence, London, United Kingdom, 2013.
‘Understanding and Decision Making’ (JDP 04 Edn 2), Ministry of Defence, London, United Kingdom, 2016.
‘Wargaming Handbook’, Ministry of Defence, London, United Kingdom, 2017.
‘Plan Series: Joint Military Appreciation Process’ (ADFP 5.0.1 Ed 2), Australian Defence Force, Canberra, Australia, 2016
Joint Operation Planning (JP-5), Washington, USA, 2011.
Joint Operations (NZDDP-3.0), Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, New Zealand, 2010.
xi BJDP-5.00 DISTRIBUTION
Copy No. Unit (of 100)
DMOD Secretariat Office 001 to 002 Comd RBAF Secretariat Office 003 to 004 Inspectorate Unit 005 to 006 Directorate of Intelligence 007 to 008 Directorate of Personnel 009 to 010 Directorate of Logistics 011 to 012
HQ ROYAL BRUNEI LAND FORCE 013 to 022 1Bn Royal Brunei Land Force 023 2Bn Royal Brunei Land Force 024 3Bn Royal Brunei Land Force 025 Sp Bn Royal Brunei Land Force 026 HQ CSS 027 Logistic Depot 028 Land Engineering 029
HQ ROYAL BRUNEI NAVY 030 to 037 Fleet HQ (including copies for vessels as needed) 038 to 045 Naval Training Centre 046 to 047 National Maritime Coordination Centre 047 to 048 Logistic Depot 049
HQ ROYAL BRUNEI AIR FORCE 049 to 058 RBAirF Operations Group 059 to 062 RBAirF Support Group 063 to 066 RBAirF Training Group 067 to 070
JOINT FORCE HQ 071 to 080
HQ SPECIAL FORCE REGIMENT 081 to 082
HQ GURKHA RESERVE UNIT 083
HQ ROYAL BRUNEI MALAY RESERVE REGIMENT 084
DEFENCE ACADEMY, ROYAL BRUNEI ARMED 085 to 094 FORCES
TRAINING INSTITUTE, ROYAL BRUNEI ARMED 095 to 100 FORCES
Spare (kept in JDWC) 101 to 110
xii BJDP-5.00 PART 1 – FUNDAMENTALS
1 BJDP-5.00 CHAPTER 1 – PLANNING PHILOSOPHY, PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES
THE APPROACH TO PLANNING – PHILOSOPHY
1.01 Planning must be at the heart of all Military conduct. At the Operational Level it is an essential requirement to correctly prepare, deploy, maintain (sustain), recover and restore assigned forces with the RBAF’s Operational Readiness Cycle (see figure 1.1). While planning is commonly initiated as early as possible, it is also continuous and evolutionary in nature in order to meet the changing requirements of the situation. Planning for operations occurs at all levels (Strategic, Operational and Tactical) and therefore must be integrated closely to ensure that respective ends are met accordingly using meticulously synchronised ways and means.
x R – Ready to conduct Ops
0 R – Ready to conduct specific Ops
Sustain
Maintain Op Momentum
RIT – Ready In Theatre of Ops to conduct specific Ops
Figure 1.1 – The RBAF’s Operational Readiness Cycle.
2 BJDP-5.00 1.02 Operational planning is defined as military planning at the operational level to design, conduct and sustain campaigns, major operations and/or framework operations in order to accomplish strategic objectives in accordance with the National Security framework of Brunei Darussalam. Operational planning translates strategic objectives into tactical actions. It is normally, but not exclusively, conducted for the employment of more than one Service and must incorporate perspectives from the strategic and tactical levels, as well as civilian considerations when these are deemed necessary for comprehensive planning solutions.
1.03 Operational Planning mixes the need to incorporate all three Components of Fighting Power. Planning must be Manoeuvrist and must employ Mission Command.
a. Components of Fighting Power.
(1) Moral Component. Planning must consider the effects that the conduct of operations will have on those who are either directly or indirectly involved. Breaking the ‘will’ of any adversary while maintaining one’s own morale is fundamental to all military activity; however, in the complex arena of contemporary operations, it is now also equally essential to consider the consequence of military actions on all other actors in order to retain, and gain, support. For this reason all military conduct must be bound by legal and social (national and international) parameters which provide the necessary acceptable standards to operate within. Leadership is central to the conduct of military operations – it is therefore essential to the conduct of planning where Commanders play a critical part in supporting their Staff to plan effectively and accept responsibility for their decisions and direction.
(2) Conceptual Component. Planning must employ intellectual rigor in ensuring that plans are robust and practical. Planning should capitalise on the experience and knowledge gained by all Commanders and their Staff
3 BJDP-5.00 to establish courses of action that are considerate to the situation and all specialist requirements. Planning must be innovative – while actions may follow set practices and procedures, the approach to any solution should aim to meet the required ends in the most efficient manner.
(3) Physical Component. Planning must consider the resources available and should seek to maintain these resources at the highest level of effectiveness throughout the conduct of operations. Acknowledging that resources will be degraded or lost during operations, will ensure planners are forward looking and are able to devise contingencies to maintain momentum and readiness for concurrent and subsequent operational activity.
b. The Manouevrist Approach. By searching for methods which meet operational ends in the most efficient manner, planning will become naturally manoeuvrist. Detailed coordination and synchronisation are fundamental to planning and ensure that conduct of operations retains ‘momentum, tempo and agility’. Understanding the situation from the onset of planning ensures that the Planner acknowledges possible outcomes of any action and therefore will consider what resources will provide the most efficient, and potentially innovative, solution to the problem. c. Mission Command. While operational planning must be detailed it must not be overly prescriptive so as to prevent subordinate Commanders from being provided with a freedom of action to complete their own missions and tasks successfully. Planning must provide subordinates with realistic tasks and allocate appropriate resources to complete these. At the same time, planning must identify sensible and necessary restrictions on subordinates, whilst not overly constraining. While the activity of planning is driven by process (a science), the product of planning is borne out from the application of operational art which employs freedom of thought at its very core.
4 BJDP-5.00 THE APPROACH TO PLANNING – PRINCIPLES
1.04 The planning for operations in a complex and uncertain security environment generates particular challenges for both civilian and military actors. Planning should conform to the following principles:
a. Coherence. Every plan must positively contribute towards the accomplishment of strategic objectives within the context of the National Security Framework of Brunei Darussalam. Accordingly, it is essential that the planning process is coherent internally, as well as externally with other actors.
b. Comprehensive Understanding of the Environment. Achieving the desired strategic outcomes must be understood at all echelons during the planning and conduct of operations. Commanders at all levels must build and foster a shared comprehensive understanding of the environment central to the situation and promote this understanding continuously throughout the entire planning process.
c. Mutual Respect, Trust, Transparency and Understanding. Operational planning in support of wider National Security objectives is underpinned by a culture of mutual respect, trust, transparency and understanding. Trust is built through information sharing and practical cooperation and must be encouraged to allow collaboration and cooperation across all security force actors, Government and Non-Government Organisations.
d. Consultation and Compatible Planning. Mutually supportive, compatible, and wherever possible, concerted and harmonised planning is fundamental for success of a Comprehensive Approach. Operational Plans (OPLANs) must meet the politically agreed level of interaction with external civil and military actors. As a minimum, plans must allow consistency between actions, operations, and effects and those of external actors. Planners should establish mechanisms and procedures to
5 BJDP-5.00 support early shared situational awareness which will contribute to compatible planning.
e. Efficient use of resources. This principle is founded on two requirements:
(1) First, planners should achieve a balance between tasks and resources. Decision makers should be made aware of the risk of not adequately resourcing an operation prior to approval of a strategic OPLAN.
(2) Second, to maximise effectiveness, planners must allow both military and non-military contributions to focus on and leverage their core competencies in response to the crisis. f. Flexibility and adaptability. The planning process must allow for maximum latitude between action and interaction within the mission and agreed political and resources framework. No two situations or crises are the same or evolve the same way. Therefore, the planning process must be robust but flexible; adaptable and agile enough to allow the plan to evolve. Planning should accommodate an expanding set of circumstances, allowing due consideration for likely costs evaluated against benefits gained. Political control, guidance and approval, particularly with respect to planning and force activation, in response to an actual or developing crisis are paramount. Operations planning should be flexible enough to adjust to evolving political guidance, civil and military advice needed to facilitate collaborative planning and adapt to political requirements during a crisis. The planning process is iterative and should also allow Staff to periodically review and assess the mission and amend or redraw plans when necessary to move towards the desired end state.
6 BJDP-5.00 THE APPROACH TO PLANNING – CONTEXT & PRACTICE
1.05 Strategic Planning.
a. Strategic Direction. In the event of a crisis affecting Brunei Darussalam, as Prime Minister, His Majesty, the Sultan, assisted by his Cabinet, provides strategic political direction on crisis management. Within this overall strategic context, the National Security Committee (NSC) provides strategic direction for dealing with any associated national security issues. Based on direction from the NSC, the Defence Executive Committee (DEC) identifies the military End State and the means available to achieve it, allowing Commander Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF), as the Military Strategic Commander to issue a Directive to the Joint Force Commander (JFC). This Directive identifies the Operational End State, allocates the means to achieve it, and confers freedoms and constraints upon JFC, allowing him to commence his planning process.
b. Strategic Outcomes. The term strategic outcome describes the Government’s aims and objectives3 for a particular crisis. How these are articulated will vary depending upon the nature of the crisis, the nature of the intended response (with varying degrees of emphasis on the diplomatic, economic and military instruments of power), and the extent of collaboration envisaged with other nations, multinational institutions and International Organisations (IOs). Strategic outcomes evolve over time, their definition and detail increasing as the situation unfolds. Assumptions play an important part in strategic planning. They may inform initial planning, and how the Commander envisages change (to ensure that long-term contingency planning, for example, is not delayed awaiting definitive planning guidance). As the strategic outcomes evolve, military commanders must ensure that assumptions are revalidated, and military activity adjusted as
3 Strategic objectives are reliant upon the contributions made by each of the national instruments of power. In describing strategic outcomes, military-strategic objectives are accompanied by diplomatic and economic objectives. 7 BJDP-5.00 required. In such circumstances a balance will need to be struck between the Principle of War of ‘selection and maintenance of the aim’ on one hand, and ‘flexibility’ on the other.
(1) National Strategic Aim. A national strategic aim is His Majesty’s Government’s declared purpose, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome4. It is articulated personally by His Majesty, or by members of his Cabinet on his behalf. Achieving the national strategic aim invariably requires contributions from cross- Government, and perhaps from multiple agencies. It provides the unifying purpose for military commanders and leaders of non-military organisations.
(2) Strategic Objectives. A strategic objective is a goal to be achieved through one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the national strategic aim. It may be explicit, or deduced from Government policy, strategic direction or the decisions of committees. Objectives are likely to require significant coordination across departmental boundaries, even if allocated to a particular Department to lead. In practice, formulating strategic objectives by consensus between Departments may be challenging; the process should, ideally, be coordinated centrally. c. Military Contribution to the National Strategic Aim. The extent of the military contribution to meeting the national strategic aim is termed the Military Strategic End-state, expressed as a series of military strategic objectives. Military Strategic Objectives are goals to be achieved by the military in order to meet the national strategic aim. Within the resources, including time and space, assigned to him, JFC is responsible for a series of Operational Objectives5, expressed in terms of one or more Decisive
4 A desired outcome is a favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention and/or as a result of some other form of influence. It invariably requires contributions from all instruments of power; it should be determined collectively. 5 An Operational Objective is a goal, expressed in terms of one or more Decisive Points, that needs to be achieved in order to meet the national strategic aim. 8 BJDP-5.00 Points (DPs), the achievement of which indicates his Operational End State. The Operational End State is reached when all the Operational Objectives have been achieved. It therefore represents the extent of the Operational Commander’s contribution to meeting the National/Military strategic aim. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1.2 below.
Across Theatre Government Cabinet
Economic Contribution
Military Strategic
Objective
National Strategic Objectives Strategic National Operational Objectives State End Strategic Military
Aim Strategic National State End Operational
Military Strategic
Objective
Military Strategic
Operational
Objective
Objectives
Diplomatic Contribution
Figure 1.2 – Outcomes and End States.
1.06 Operational Planning.
a. Hierarchy of Military Activities. Military activity takes place at all levels of warfare. There is a hierarchy of terms that describe military activities and how they fit together linking strategy to tactical activity. This linkage is illustrated in Figure 1.3.
(1) At the highest level, National Strategy directs the application of the levers of national power to resolve a
9 BJDP-5.00 crisis; this is crisis management. The military contribution to meeting the National Strategic Aim is one or more operations that are designed to achieve the military Strategic Objectives. The contribution the operation(s) makes to the National Strategic Aim is expressed as the Operational End State.
(2) The operational level of warfare is the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. Operations are invariably joint, and most often multinational and multiagency.
(3) A campaign consists of a single or a series of operations6 that achieve, or shape progress towards, one or more campaign objectives.
(4) Operations have a unifying theme (for example, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief or Countering Irregular Activity) that gives the underlying purpose and helps the Commander frame the operating environment and problem. Operations consist of a series of synchronised military actions that achieve the Commanders’ specified objectives articulated as Decisive Points (DPs) and their constituent Supporting Effects (SEs).
(5) Actions comprise tactical military activities that are orchestrated through Joint Action7.
6 Operations may be concurrent or sequential. Although they can be discrete there is likely to be significant interdependencies between them. If operations are sequential they may be aligned with the phases of a campaign. 7 BJDP-3.00 Joint Operations Execution defines Joint Action as: the deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to realise effects on an actors’ will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them. 10 BJDP-5.00
Across Theatre Government Cabinet
Activity Economic Contribution Activity
Supporting Effect Military Strategic (SE) Objective Activity
Operational
Decisive Point Objectives
SE (DP)
National Strategic Objectives Strategic National
Activity DP State End Strategic Military National Strategic Aim Strategic National
State End Operational SE Activity DP
Military Strategic Activity SE Objective
Activity
Activity Operational SE Objectives
DP
Military Strategic
Activity
Objective
DP Activity SE
Activity
Diplomatic Contribution
Task Purpose Legend
DP Decisive Point (DP) achieved through Military Joint Force activity Decisive Point (DP) achieved through DP Subordinate/tactical civil-military cooperation missions
Figure 1.3 – Relationship between Operational and Strategic Planning.
1.07 Command-led Planning. RBAF Operational planning is command-led and dynamic. While staff may assist JFC, ultimately it is his plan and he drives its development. The essence of this relationship is based on an acknowledgement that planning is a mental activity, aided but not driven by process. Although each individual operation has a unique context, scale and mix of military activities, all operations share a common purpose: to translate strategic intent into tactical activity. Operational level planning requires JFC to determine how (the ways) and a favourable situation (the dictated ends) may be created within the time and resources
11 BJDP-5.00 available (his allocated means). Such planning should be conducted in concert with Other Government Departments (OGDs) and other agencies, whose combined, and often inter-dependent, efforts are required to achieve the National Strategic Aim.
1.08 Operational Art. Operational art is the theory and application of planning, preparing and conducting operations to accomplish Operational and Strategic Objectives. In practice, it is essentially a commander’s skill in orchestrating tactical actions in concert with other agencies to achieve the desired outcome. What is to be achieved can be expressed in broad terms such as outcome, Decisive Points and Strategic Effects, which leaves room for individual tactical flair and initiative. However, when describing what an individual or organisation is to achieve, then clear aims, objectives and activities should be used. The broader terms tend to indicate the purpose or criteria that underlie these clear aims, objectives and activities. Operational art is realised through a combination of a commander’s skill and the staff-assisted processes of operational design and operational management. It is fundamentally JFC’s business and its impetus is his creative and innovative thought or operational ideas.
1.09 Operational Design and Management. Operational Design develops and refines a Commander’s operational ideas to provide detailed, executable plans. It is underpinned by a clear understanding of the political and strategic context together with an effective framing of the problem. Tools and processes, for example the Operational Military Appreciation Process (OMAP), enable operational design. Operational Management integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises the execution of operations and assesses progress. Operational design and operational management are inter-related; during an operation, the management function of assessment informs subsequent planning. The relationship between Operational Art, Operational Design and Operational Management is represented diagrammatically in Figure 1.4 below:
12 BJDP-5.00 Strategic Objectives
Commander’s Skill
Operational Design • Frame the problem • Refine and develop ideas • Express vision Analyse Plan • Revise plan
Operational Art Operational Management • Integrate Assess Execute • Coordinate • Synchronise • Prioritise • Disseminate • Assess Progress
Tactical Employment of Forces
Figure 1.4 – Operational Art and Orchestration at the Operational Level.
1.10 Speed of Planning. The product of planning will be determined by a combination of quality and speed. While acting early and fast is generally beneficial, the ideal is to assess, analyse and act earlier and faster than the adversary. Speed should always be seen in its appropriate context; sometimes it is right to gather all available information for a crucial decision. At other times, no amount of information will resolve ambiguity; sometimes more information will increase ambiguity. Optimum speed enables optimum weight of planning effort. Therefore, a principal skill for JFC is to sense the last sensible moment to make any decision. Planning too quickly also risks the missing or misunderstanding of crucial information. Always seeking more information to resolve ambiguity slows down planning and risks decision paralysis. The test of any Commander and the efficiency of his Staff is how well they can issue clear, achievable and above all timely orders.
13 BJDP-5.00 CHAPTER 2 – UNDERSTANDING
DEFINING UNDERSTANDING
2.01 Defining Understanding. Understanding falls into three types. These are individual understanding, collective understanding and common understanding, which are explored below:
a. Individual understanding is defined as: the personal interpretation of the facts held by a person within their own mind. Individual understanding (even of the same problem) will inevitably vary across a group or population. Individual understanding is prone to being shaped by personal experience. Peer pressure can also affect individual understanding.
b. Collective understanding is defined as: the shared perspective held by members of distinct groups that have their own ethos, creed and identity. Members of specific institutions or professions have collective understanding ranging from professional standards or methods, to generally held perceptions of the institution’s role in the world. Collective understanding also arises in political, religious or ethnic groups. Organisational cultures, rituals, stories and norms will shape collective understanding.
c. Common understanding is defined as: the ability to comprehend perceptions of groups other than our own and to establish a common baseline for communication, interpretation and action. Common understanding is achieved when institutions, professions, communities and other groups cooperate for a purpose, or to co-exist. These groups may have different kinds of collective understanding that involves potentially divergent interpretations of the world and events, including views of one another. Working within, between and across multiple groups with their different understanding provides opportunities to be exposed to divergent views. Common understanding may be a settled compromise of different views.
14 BJDP-5.00
2.02 Defining Context. The term context is used to describe the relevant circumstances, participants and relationships, surroundings, and other influences that, collectively, form the ‘setting’ for an event or crisis. Work to understand context should aim to indicate:
a. The conditions under which military activity is required (including geospatial, political, demographic, cultural and language factors).
b. The actors involved (hostile, friendly, neutral or belligerent), and to what extent they are involved and why.
c. The nature of participants’ involvement (history, culture, relationships, motivations, perceptions, interests and desired outcomes).
d. Other influences, both internal (for instance, societal factors) and external (for example, regional hegemony).
e. The nature of the military activity required from our own forces, with whom it is to be carried out (including allies, coalition partners and Other Government Departments (OGDs)), and who such activity is intended to affect or what it should achieve.
15 BJDP-5.00 PRINCIPLES OF UNDERSTANDING
2.03 The principles of understanding detailed below aim to improve awareness of our own strengths, weaknesses and biases. They also promote our capacity to recognise and consider the views of other actors and the need to think creatively and open-mindedly about problems:
a. Self-awareness. We should be aware of why or how we know something (as opposed to thinking something) and the limitations to certainty that knowing entails. Subconscious knowledge may be so engrained that it is difficult for us to both recognise and assess it. We should regularly audit our knowledge for its assumptions, origins and composition, taking into consideration our own biases and perceptions.
b. Critical Analysis. Critical analysis is defined as: the intellectual discipline that applies deliberate introspective judgement to interpret, analyse and evaluate a problem and explain the context upon which that judgement is based. Critical analysis is subject to the same biases and perceptions as those inherent in developing understanding and it relies on intellectual integrity. Tools such as creating analogies and red teaming should be used as common practice to encourage individuals and groups to apply critical analysis.
c. Creative Thinking. Creative thinking is defined as: the examination of problems or situations from an original or unorthodox perspective. Background, training and experience can often create conditional thinking, which may be prejudicial to critical analysis. Creative thinking should be encouraged to examine a situation from a fresh perspective and to create imaginative and competing hypotheses. Hypotheses should be tested against existing information to deduce meaning, or to develop alternative solutions.
d. Continuity. In areas where change is slow, or the requirement is enduring, developing and maintaining understanding
16 BJDP-5.00 requires continuity in observation and expertise. Achieving continuity requires us to:
Develop an effective network of sources to provide access to the knowledge needed; Create a common way of storing and sharing knowledge; and Share insight between relevant subject matter experts.
17 BJDP-5.00 UNDERSTANDING COMPLEXITY
2.04 Complexity is the degree to which the context does (or is likely to) impact on the conduct of activity for which planning aims to provide resolution for. Understanding the complexity of the context depends on not only acquiring the requisite knowledge, drawing upon information and intelligence, but also on applying intellect. It is ultimately a commander’s own reasoning and judgement that provide him with his comprehension or individual perception of a crisis situation. This thorough comprehension is perhaps the primary challenge for the Joint Force Commander (JFC), as he prepares to frame the problem and to plan the military contribution to the response. Like all security threats that are defined by the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE), crises are invariably complex (with a multitude of frequently interconnected parts), which also tend to be:
a. Adaptive. Adaptive such that any action causes reaction and any benefit has an associated cost.
b. Uncertain. Uncertain often confusing; some risks may be incalculable.
c. Ambiguous. Ambiguous in that they can be perceived in quite different ways by different actors or external observers; there is seldom a universal view of the context to any particular problem (however manifestly ‘clear’ the situation may appear from an individual perspective).
d. Competitive or adversarial. Competitive or adversarial requiring compromise, or possibly submission, from one party, in relation to conflicts of interest or need, or perceived security.
e. Constrained. Constrained by different parties’ varying commitment to resolve a crisis, their capability to do so, and (internal and external) legitimacy to try.
18 BJDP-5.00 f. Unbounded. Unbounded and spreading through, or being affected by, regional dynamics and, with increasing globalisation, the rest of the international community as well.
g. Dynamic. Dynamic altering from the moment that military or other intervention is anticipated, let alone occurs.
2.05 A crisis situation should be examined in its entirety as a system, recognising that no single element exists in isolation. Intervention in crisis itself invariably alters the dynamics of a situation. Moreover, almost all situations are open systems affected by external intervention and influences as well as by internal dynamics.
19 BJDP-5.00 UNDERSTANDING TIME AND CONSEQUENCE
2.06 Building understanding takes time, and commanders may not have a comprehensive understanding at the outset of a crisis. While knowledge derived from information is a key source for building understanding, commanders should remain flexible and adaptive enough to consider views from a range of experts.
2.07 As factors including the context, the role of actors, politics and power can change over time, understanding is perishable. Evolving situations can present a challenge if insufficient time is available to develop, analyse or refresh our understanding. Commanders may have limited time to develop their understanding and accept that their responses to situations in an unfamiliar environment may result in greater risk, negative consequences or missed opportunities. This highlights the importance of recognising intended and unintended consequences, and the need to learn and adapt to improve our understanding:
a. Intended and unintended consequences. Potential consequences may be foreseen during planning in the form of best or worst case scenarios, and contingency plans developed accordingly. Unforeseen consequences will need to be addressed as they arise. Commanders should note that unintended consequences are not always negative and may provide opportunities for exploitation; understanding will enable opportunities to be seized.
b. The need to learn and adapt. Learning and adapting allows us to develop our understanding more quickly to account for the changing situation. Learning and adapting also enables:
(1) Reduced likelihood of negative consequences.
(2) Better mitigation of unforeseen consequences.
(3) More effective exploitation.
20 BJDP-5.00 (4) Our ability to influence.
Developing a command culture that embraces a culture of learning and adaptation requires commanders to be both open-minded and able to learn from their own mistakes, as well as allowing their subordinates to make their own mistakes.
2.08 To develop understanding, Commanders must clearly articulate their requirements. Commanders may have direction from a higher authority that frames thinking about a problem, and this will influence their intelligence requirements. A commander’s own knowledge, analytical skills and the command climate they foster each shape the level of understanding that will be achieved. Commanders should continually ask the following questions as a situation develops:
What do we want to understand? How soon do we need to understand? What do we know? What are the potential gaps in our knowledge? How do we fill those gaps? How do we achieve continuity? How do we improve the level of detail?
21 BJDP-5.00 UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION
2.09 Understanding the nature of a crisis situation (to which the term analysis refers) helps to identify the problem as part of the process of planning; both of these are separate from (and should precede) determining the solution. While the concept of gaining understanding is easy, the practical approach is somewhat more complex with the key issues being:
a. Complex crises do not lend themselves to simple definition or analysis. But a significant start point in the crisis management process is a description of the current situation, in terms that promote shared understanding for as many stakeholders as possible.
b. Any particular crisis may usefully be described as a series of conditions that characterise what is perceived to be wrong and what might be changed to improve matters; in other words, that which is required to effect a planned transition from one set of conditions to another, often described as a theory of change.
c. Crises may arise in numerous different ways and, as importantly, be perceived differently by individual actors. There are seldom objective facts to use to establish with any certainty what is happening and where, let alone why. Ambiguity, confusion and contradiction are likely to exist, more or less continuously.
d. The time available for analysis will almost always be limited, demanding a trade-off between the improvement of understanding and the imperative to develop clear orders and instructions.
2.10 The need for a Commander to understand the situation, and to keep on updating that understanding before and during an operation, is not new. There are, however, 2 reasons why analysis is particularly important. First, it provides a commander with an appreciation of the potential complexity and, second, the process begins to indicate (based on existing
22 BJDP-5.00 unfavourable conditions) what might represent a more favourable situation in the future. In addition to affording analysis sufficient time, the other critical requirement is to gather a broad range of perspectives, including, perhaps most importantly, those that challenge any existing (national and/or military) norms.
23 BJDP-5.00 ENABLING UNDERSTANDING
2.11 Developing understanding is supported by information management, education and training, and collaborative networks.
a. Information Management. Information management includes the physical aspects of managing information (personal and staff management procedures) and the technical aspects (procurement, operating systems, technical support and upgrades). Physical information management aims to present relevant information to Commanders to enable effective decision-making and to protect Commanders from the negative impact of information overload. Several factors should be considered:
What information is essential that we must protect? What are the priorities for information and intelligence? How much detail is required to allow a decision to be made? Which key decision makers need what information? What resources are available and for how long? How best to balance the need to circulate information to enable understanding and the need to maintain security (including Operational Security - OPSEC) and to protect sources and methods?
b. Education and training. Education and training enable understanding. Command and Staff training must advance the skills that develop understanding; this should promote self- awareness, critical and creative thinking skills and open- mindedness. For a specific operation, Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) will undergo specialised training. All other personnel should undertake pre-operational deployment training that includes a focus on areas like cultural awareness and skills that enable military personnel to interact with the relevant operating environment.
24 BJDP-5.00 c. Collaborative networks. The single intelligence environment aims to establish a collaborative network that fuses all sources of intelligence to provide a common resource within the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE).
(1) A single intelligence environment will allow better adaptation to complex environments and the changing requirements for intelligence over time.
(2) Establishing networks requires significant investment in education and training, and the technical solutions to make it viable.
25 BJDP-5.00 CHAPTER 3 - ANALYSIS
“It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred battles; if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperilled in every single battle.” Sun Tzu – The Art of War
DEFINING ANALYSIS
3.01 Analysis is the detailed examination of something to help us interpret or explain it. Analysis, in itself, is not Understanding, but is an essential component in the process of converting situational awareness into Understanding. We can use analysis to evaluate information about the current and past behaviour of a state, system, organisation or individual. Analysis tests and refines hypotheses about future behaviour, including responses to our behaviour, and enables decision-makers to evaluate potential courses of action as fully as possible.
3.02 Analysis is expansive and open-minded; it is different from problem-solving itself, which of necessity tends to be more narrowly focused on the key issues. Analysis not only takes into account all relevant factors, better to understand the complexity and causes of a complex situation, issue or crisis, but it also actively seeks to discover what has hitherto been unknown, and to include different perspectives, including those that novel, opposing and extreme in nature. Effective analysis is best achieved by accessing multiple sources of information and intelligence in the time available; not just from the traditional military intelligence community, but from any relevant source, especially where that may provide an alternative perspective.
3.03 Analysis is based on a combination of objective data (for example, physical and demographic data) and subjective opinion (such as actors’ reported aspirations and views). In interpreting the information presented, steps should be taken to guard against preconception or bias, especially given the natural inclination to exclude the unexpected, the inexplicable, the unpalatable or the counter-intuitive. Analysis is never exhaustive, nor
26 BJDP-5.00 absolutely certain, for the dynamics of most crises are too complex and volatile, but effective analysis can help a Commander and his Staff to rationalise (though not necessarily reduce) that complexity and ambiguity to some degree.
3.04 Periodic review, including by those previously uninvolved, can provide a fresh perspective on a Commander’s analysis and offset any tendency towards ‘group-thinking’ a solution. During the execution of an operation, while analysis will often become better informed, the gap between perception and reality is unlikely to be fully closable.
3.05 Analysis does more than look at the current situation, it also addresses what might happen next, based upon alternative assumptions regarding the actions and reactions of different actors (both intended and unintended consequences). Together these enable a Commander to:
a. Understand the context in which he is operating or intends to operate.
b. Understand the potential impact of his actions or other events.
c. Act upon this understanding to maximise the positive effects of any operational involvement (and to minimise the negative).
3.06 As well as informing a Commander of what is known (its primary purpose), analysis also identifies knowledge gaps, indicating risk – of the unknown – which should be managed accordingly. Analysis also highlights risk in broader terms, namely the risk associated with acting or not acting, and the risk of failure. Risk management is covered in further detail in Chapter 6.
27 BJDP-5.00 ANALYTICAL PRINCIPLES
3.07 To enable greater and more finite understanding, all analytical work should be:
a. Purposeful. As a preliminary activity to planning, albeit one that continues during both planning and execution, analysis is invariably carried out against a finite, and often challenging, timeline. It should be managed pragmatically and purposefully, to provide situational understanding; analysis is a means to an end.
b. Expansive. Analysis is about understanding the nature of the crisis situation; it is during the planning process that a Commander and his Staff search for a solution. Analysis involves revealing factors, exploring different perspectives and expanding knowledge rather than focusing on what ought to be done to address a perceived issue.
c. Inclusive. Although time is always a limiting factor, consideration must be given to as many sources of information and ideas, perspectives and opinions as possible. Additional credible views and insights, however inconsistent or contradictory, can enrich understanding.
d. Receptive. The tendency to adopt a particular perspective early on, and then ignore information that fails to support that view, must be resisted. The impact of a closed mind may be to reject contrary views, and even exclude those who hold them, thus breaching an inclusive approach.
e. Challenging. A balance should be struck between being inclusive and being sufficiently discerning or discriminating. All ideas and information should be tested for their validity; any gaps in information should be similarly examined in a bid to build a comprehensive picture of the situation in the time available.
28 BJDP-5.00 f. Forward-looking. It is important that analysis looks forward as well as examining the present, with its roots in the past. Outcome assessment involves the generation of a range of alternative scenarios, of varying likelihood and with variable consequences (more or less beneficial). These can then be represented as a spread of alternative outcomes. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Worst Case
Information Analysis Scenarios Most Likely Case
Best Case
Figure 3.1 – Alternative Scenarios derived from Analysis.
29 BJDP-5.00 ANALYTICAL CONTEXT
3.08 Breadth of Analysis. While analysis aims to enhance understanding, it is unlikely that any planning process will enjoy the luxury of unlimited time. Therefore, it is essential to bound analytical work to areas of greatest significance within the context of the situation. However, it is equally important not to restrict analysis so that it becomes removed from reality in order to simply produce product – balance is key. Experience, intuition, collective working and Commander’s Direction will all allow Staff to identify the appropriate methods and areas of research to conduct. Broadly analysis is likely to need to be considered in one or all of the following:
a. Environmental Analysis.
b. Stakeholder Analysis.
c. Human Factors Analysis.
3.09 Environmental Analysis. Environmental Analysis primarily makes consideration of the physical environment and the factors that affect it (noting in the RBAF’s Operational Military Appreciation Process this is known as ‘Defining the Operational Battlespace’). Analysing where people are located will contribute to a Commander’s understanding of the situation. Analysis should include consideration of:
a. Geography. Terrain affects the range of actors’ potential activities, helping some tactics and frustrating others.
b. Hydrography and Oceanography. Hydrography and oceanography influence the nature of maritime, riverine and littoral activity.
c. Climate. The weather and seasons affect both of the previous two factors and must therefore be included into the overall terrain/maritime analysis process. Climate may precipitate disease or drought and can affect planned responses to an existing crisis,
30 BJDP-5.00 for example by making worse the impact of poor road infrastructure. Disputes over water access and grazing rights, deforestation and desertification, and population displacement affect populations and economies, contributing to instability.
Further information on areas for analysis is contained in Part 3 of this Publication, BJDP-2.00 (Joint Intelligence) and the RBAF Intelligence Operators Handbook.
3.10 Stakeholder Analysis. Stakeholder Analysis equates to the consideration of individuals or groups who either are impacted as result of military operations or have the ability to influence outcomes (both positively and negatively). In this respect, Stakeholder Analysis relates to the development of understanding of ‘actors’. In the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE), the analysis of actors must extend well beyond basic historical norms of friendly and enemy forces. Due to the dynamic nature of the COE, it is essential to understand an actors’ positioning and motivations8 amongst other actors and importantly gain an understanding of how, when and under what conditions, this position and motivation may (or may be) changed. Actors are grouped in a range of different categories. Core category groups are: Type; Position; and Membership. Each category is can then be subdivided as follows:
Type Position Membership State Actor Adversaries Key Leader Non State Actor Belligerents Power Broker Global Actor Neutrals Popular Forces Local Actor Friendly Private/Commercial Sector Spoilers IOs NGOs
Based on the above categories and sub-categories, it is therefore possible to identify actors in a wide range of possibilities (e.g. an individual or group that is a Global, Neutral NGO). Categories/sub-categories should be understood as follows:
8 Motivation is based on a combination of self-interest, values, ideology, survival and fear. 31 BJDP-5.00 a. Type.
(1) State Actors. State actors are individual or group actors aligned with or representing their State. State actors include: Governments and government agencies (political, military and economic); State-controlled industries (such as defence industries or utilities providers in some States); and State representatives in global organisations or alliances.
(2) Non State Actors. Non-state actors are individuals or groups that are independent of a State. Non- state actors include: State aspirants (those that aspire for State recognition in wider regional or global communities); Independent groups (such as NGOs); and Individuals (such as lobbyists, donors, sponsors, criminals, refugees and Displaced Persons).
(3) Global Actors. Global actors operate and have influence at the global level. These include: Groups of states working together through a formal and legal body (such as the United Nations - UN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN, or the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation grouping – APEC); Transnational companies and multinational corporations; Global organisations (for example, G20 Protest Movements); and Individual actors who transcend their own state affiliations.
(4) Local Actors. Local actors possess the ability to hold a common or collective perspective at the lowest level within or without the formal state structure. Local actors include communities based on regional, provincial, town, village, family, ethnic or tribal lineage. They also include communities based on criminal activity and those supporting warlords.
32 BJDP-5.00 b. Position.
(1) Adversaries. Adversaries, or opponents, are potentially hostile to the achievement of the desired outcome. They may employ legitimate political means, within a democratic system or resort to violence. Some adversaries may use both. Opposition may be singular and monolithic9, but is more likely to comprise a multitude of actors with shared10 or multiple goals11.
(2) Belligerents. Belligerents are hostile to each other; they may oppose the desired outcome, even if not directly hostile to the presence of an intervention force.
(3) Neutrals. The degree of neutrality spans those who stop short of active opposition to the desired outcome, to those who support it with few reservations. They may or may not remain neutral. Neutral actors may include International Organisations (IOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).
(4) Friendly. Friendly actors broadly support the achievement of the desired outcome; they may include allies and coalition partners, host nation security forces, as well as local population groups and those IOs and NGOs who are amenable to being characterised in this way.
(5) Spoilers. Spoilers have an interest in maintaining the status quo and attempt to frustrate progress or to prevent any change that could adversely affect their activities. Examples include groups benefiting from a war economy: arms/drug dealers, smugglers and individuals or
9 As in the (Communist-led) Malay Races Liberation Army during the Malayan Emergency, 1948 – 1960, or the Viet Cong in Vietnam, 1965 – 1972; both organisations allowed no rival. 10 As in Northern Ireland, where the main Republican groupings (The Official Irish Republican Army (IRA), Provisional IRA (PIRA) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)) all shared the same goal of a united, independent Ireland. 11 As in Iraq, where the common goal amongst the majority of actors was the removal of what they saw as Western occupation; beyond that, they had a multiplicity of goals. 33 BJDP-5.00 groups, such as warlords, whose influence and status would decline if the crisis were to be resolved.
c. Membership.
(1) Key Leaders. The identification of, and subsequent engagement with, key leaders may be critical to success. Key leaders may be political, religious, tribal or military, acting as individuals or in cliques. Even within unitary states12, including those with apparently cohesive leaderships, such identification and engagement is not always simple.
(2) Power Brokers. Power Brokers may include: Political parties and networks (and non-political interest groups, such as peace groups); Military leaders and armed groups; Traditional authorities, such as tribal and clan leaders/elders; and Religious leaders and organisations.
(3) Popular Forces. Popular Forces include: Civil society; Population (including refugees and internally displaced people); and Diaspora groups.
(4) Private/Commercial Sector. Private and commercial sector groupings should also considered the influence of any associated trade unions.
3.11 Human Factors Analysis. The human factors that affect the operating environment can be broken into three areas for analysis: Population and Culture; Institutions; and Technology and Infrastructure. The three areas overlap significantly. Considering the role of people as actors in isolation on the global stage – as states, non-state actors, populations, organisations, groups and individuals – provides insufficient depth to develop understanding. Commanders must analyse each area both in isolation and how they interact locally, regionally and internationally.
12 A unitary state is a state governed as one single unit, in which authority is held or delegated by the central government. 34 BJDP-5.00 Beyond that, Commanders must consider where they can create effects and lever influence within the operating environment. Some facets may be so culturally distant from us that there is little common ground; others are universal, for example, the need for security and food. By respective element of Human Factors work, the following may be considered as areas for analysis:
a. Population and Culture. Understanding the population is essential as all military operations will interact, engage and have an impact on every aspect of a population (due to the creation of both intended and unintended operational and tactical effects). While aspects of population and culture are closely entwined, the following in each area should be considered to allow greater understanding:
(1) Population. A population13 may be divided on the basis of many different variables, many of which are not discreet in nature and therefore add complexity to analytical work. Areas for analysis should include:
(a) Ethnicity. The ethnic make-up of a population often reveals on the one hand overt distinctive cultural traits of a group in society, yet on the other hand much subtler differences between ethnic groups, which needs detailed study to appreciate. Ethnic boundaries may not overlap with physical borders or other boundaries; an additional complication that could restrict freedom of manoeuvre.
(b) Language. Languages are a key component of identity and, through variations in understanding, create barriers between actors and groups.
13 referred to as ‘the human terrain’ within the RBAF Operational Military Appreciation Process (OMAP) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). 35 BJDP-5.00 (c) Class. Class may naturally conform to recognisable sociological models that relate to wealth and ideals; however may be further complicated by status, or environmental (rural, urban, nomadic) differences.
(d) Demography. Over 85% of people under the age of 25 live in the developing world, providing a large pool of fighting age males with low economic expectations. Countries and regions where young adults comprise more than 40% of the population are statistically more than twice as likely to experience societal conflict.
(e) Distribution. Changes or extremes in population distribution, such as an urban/rural divide, major population centres and densely/sparsely-populated areas, can cause tension, which is frequently compounded by internal migration.
(f) Health. Knowledge of regional health issues is essential, not only for planning purposes, but also as part of an Integrated Approach. Preventative drugs/vaccinations or cures for many debilitating diseases can be cheap; so that improved health for an indigenous population may contribute to lasting crisis resolution.
(2) Culture. Culture affects how people interpret and orient themselves towards an environment. Culture includes the universal ideas of a society14. Culture may be sub-divided into two categories:
14 Language; historically-rooted concepts of collective identity; and fundamental existential and moral beliefs such as those provided by religion. 36 BJDP-5.00 (a) Ideology. Ideology concerns common ideas, language, rituals and theories providing a common bond for communities such as tribes, religious groups and ethnic groups.
(b) Psychology. Psychology concerns the mental and emotional state, and behaviour, of individuals or groups and their interrelation. It concerns what motivates them, their fears, attitudes and perceptions, and how these factors affect the courses of action available to them. It relates to the notion of competing narratives of individuals and groups with different interests and needs, which sometimes join in a common cause. b. Institutions. Institutions embody cultural ideas such as practices and conventions that form the landscape of social life. This includes political institutions, law and judicial machinery, and bonded communities such as families, clans and tribes. It also includes criminal associations and dissident groups operating outside of institutional conventions. Institutions can be broken into four categories:
(1) Political. Political Institutions represent the political system within which a population operates and may include global, regional, national and provincial systems.
(2) Military. Military Institutions represent the system and allegiances within which military personnel operate, their reputation at home and abroad, their relationship to the political environment and the capabilities, structures and equipment they can bring to bear in support of the state.
(3) Economic. Economic Institutions represent the economic bodies and organisations that influence the
37 BJDP-5.00 material prosperity of an area. These also cover the ability to produce and distribute goods, their consumption, and the provision of financial services. Economic considerations can be local, national or international and are linked to the political environment.
(4) Legal. Legal Institutions are those that oversee the international and national laws applicable to a state, community or organisation. These include institutions such as the courts and judiciary. c. Technology and Infrastructure. An understanding of technology and infrastructure provides clarity on the conditions that allow people to survive and adapt to meet their needs in any given environment. This includes physical elements such as communications systems and infrastructure, roads, irrigation and buildings. Analysing technology should consider the level of technical and scientific development and supporting infrastructure within the environment. The following may need to be considered:
(1) Transport and Transport Networks. Road, rail, waterways and internal air services, and associated airports and seaports.
(2) Manufacturing and Industry. Nature of Industry (Primary/Secondary); type of industry (Munitions, chemicals, nuclear, electronic).
(3) Energy Generation. Electricity supplies, coal, oil, gas and nuclear.
(4) Financial. Scale of banking and commerce; linkages to regional and global infrastructure.
(5) Information and Communications Technology. Internet and telephones (fixed and mobile networks).
38 BJDP-5.00 (6) Cyber Capability. Capacity for resilience and attack.
(7) Media. Radio, television and the press.
(8) Military and Security Sector. Police forces, army, judiciary, prison service (including sensors, weapons and intelligence gathering).
(9) Medical. Hospitals, clinics and pharmacies.
(10) Education. Primary, secondary and tertiary.
39 BJDP-5.00 ANALYTICAL PRACTICES
3.12 Analytical Process. Analysis, which includes the intelligence process, is a continuous, whole Headquarters (HQ) activity to gain knowledge of the factors that characterise a situation. As a situation evolves, analysis is updated by continuous assessment of progress. The analysis process comprises the following stages:
a. Stage 1 – Collation. Collation is the first stage in analysis, grouping together related items of information or intelligence to provide a record of events and facilitate further processing.
b. Stage 2 – Evaluation. Evaluation involves appraising an item of information in respect of the reliability and credibility of the source and the information.
c. Stage 3 – Integration. Integration involves a structured review to identify significant facts for subsequent interpretation using a variety of tools and techniques. The techniques chosen should ensure that the approach to a particular problem or issue is robust and not subject to cognitive or institutional biases.
d. Stage 4 – Interpretation. Interpretation judges the significance of new information in relation to the current body of knowledge. It is used to provide a final assessment and to integrate other relevant information or intelligence to identify patterns.
e. Stage 5 – Continuous Review. Understanding is continuous; therefore, the analysis from which it derives must also be continuous. An assessment that is fixed in time has limited utility and a review process ensures that we will recognise, learn and adapt to changes in circumstances.
40 BJDP-5.00 FRAMING ANALYSIS
3.13 Analytical frameworks help us identify the context, social factors and stakeholders in a given situation. When selecting an analytical framework, the focus must be on whether it provides the appropriate degree of detail. Analytical Frameworks are examined in further detail in Chapter 5 of this publication; however, in general terms, the following frameworks help to gain a wide perspective on problems:
a. Analytical Models.
(1) SWOT. Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats.
(2) Centre of Gravity (CoG). CoG, Critical Requirements (CRs), Critical Capabilities (CCs), Critical Vulnerabilities (CVs).
(3) Three Column Format Analysis. Factor, Deductions, Considerations (output).
b. Human Terrain Analysis (HTA).
(1) CAT (Cultural Assessment Tool). Beliefs and values, Social organisation, Political organisation, Economic organisation, Interaction and communication.
(2) ASCOPE. Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organisation, People, Events.
(3) PEST. Political, Economic, Social and Technological.
(4) PESTLEI. Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal, Environmental and Information.
41 BJDP-5.00 (5) PMESII (PTT). Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (Physical, Terrain and Time).
(6) STEEPLEM. Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental, Political, Legal, Ethical and Military.
42 BJDP-5.00 CHAPTER 4 – DECISION MAKING
THINKING
WHAT IS THINKING
4.01 Introduction. Thinking is activity that allows us to understand, plan, reason, solve problems, innovate and make decisions; however, the way our thinking approaches any these tasks will differ from one person to another. Strategic thinking does not use the same mental resources as tactical planning and a person’s thinking will not be equally effective in all tasks. This Chapter provides the reader with an understanding of the way in which people think and make decisions in order to place cognitive ability into context with operational analysis and planning.
4.02 Cognition. Cognition describes the acquisition, storage, retrieval and use of information or knowledge to achieve understanding, reasoning, meaning, judgement, learning and memory. Cognition occurs in the human brain because it has evolved specialised structures and functions to do so. At birth, babies possess the ability of memory, attention, perception and some cognitive processes already working in specified ways. Cognition develops further through life with both environment and experience having a significant influence; those with common experiences and those sharing a culture will develop some similarities in the way that they think. However; different experiences can cause people to recognise and understand the same situations very differently. Cultural differences in cognition are also important when assessing potential adversary/actor Courses of Action (COA); whereby an understanding that an actor’s thinking can (is likely to) be very different to your own is critical in planning and execution of operations.
4.03 Individual Thinking. Even within a given cultural group there will be significant differences in some aspects of thinking. Various factors can account for this: intelligence, personality, experience, learning, motivation, status and role as well as physical condition. The emotional state of individuals, influenced by many of these individual factors, also has a fundamental role in thinking. 43 BJDP-5.00
4.04 Group and Organisation Thinking. Ideas, understanding, perceptions and attitudes are often developed through the accumulated thinking of individuals interacting with each other. The products of thinking can be captured in external constructs such as concepts, languages and processes that are then shared and used collectively.
4.05 Leader Based Thinking. Leadership is key in unlocking solutions to complex problems that exist in unfamiliar environments. Leadership enables individuals and organisations to think for themselves and develop ideas using the full breadth of skill, knowledge and experience. Communication, trust, and the ability to permit originality without fear of failure are fundamental to leader facilitated problem solving and decision making.
44 BJDP-5.00 HOW WE THINK
4.06 Evolution has allowed human thinking to become both instinctive and deliberate; while at the same time also being based on reason and emotion. While we are able to adapt and enhance individual thinking, we all start with an element of genetic pre-programming that allows us to function in ever demanding and complex environments. This pre- programming can be usefully categorised as the abilities which:
Deal with complexity; Deal with a broad range of situations; and Enable learning.
4.07 Dealing with Complexity. All environments contain vast quantities of constantly changing and evolving information. The capacity and ability of the human brain is not appropriately designed to be able to process all of this information so it has evolved mechanisms to deal efficiently with the information we need most critically. Mechanisms include:
a. Attention (Conscious Mechanisms). Attention allows us to direct our conscious thinking in different ways according to our needs. We can concentrate with a narrow focus to read detail or to apply analytical rigour, or look more widely and superficially to remain alert to the broader environment. Attention, and as a result, conscious thinking therefore has a limited capacity. As the human brain is also able to group information into meaningful items that can be remembered and recognised this is therefore a useful tool in dealing with complexity.
b. Pre-filtering of Data (Subconscious Mechanisms). Pre-filtering data that we acquire through our senses can sensitise us to things that are important so that we only focus mental effort on relevant factors. This is a subconscious function which the human brain conducts automatically. This mechanism explains why humans are generally not good at identifying the unexpected as the brain evaluates what is familiar and therefore should exist.
45 BJDP-5.00 While pre-filtering affords us mental efficiency in many situations, it is likely to act as a weakness in those complex situations that are unfamiliar to us initially. c. Bias (Subconscious). The human brain has evolved so that it will add greater weight to information that provides the most common and therefore generally the most desirable solution. In most circumstances, this bias allows for information to be used efficiently; however, where information may not be familiar or as rationale as other data, the human brain is likely to subconsciously influence us to discount options. In such circumstances we are able to take steps to counter this. Simply by working in groups where members will view problems from different perspectives can add balance. d. Heuristics (Subconscious). Heuristics are cognitive rules borne out of what is deemed as common sense. These allow us to make the rapid mental calculations that are necessary for us quick decisions and responses. They are short-cuts, but as they lack rigor they do not work in all situations; however it is difficult for to avoid their influence and significant conscious action is required to provide balance through an ability to question the norm. e. Sense Making (Subconscious). Our subconscious processing is adept at creating links to make sense of situations. Different ideas and memories, which may not have been related, are associated into new groupings. These processes are also particularly effective at ‘filling in the gaps’ where incomplete information exists. This sense making is based upon the subconscious brain using connections which appear rationale given previous experiences – this is known as intuition. While this ability helps the conscious brain to understand situations better and thus innovate in solving complex problems, it can also force us to provide wrong solutions or false memories where the gaps have subconsciously be filled in incorrectly.
46 BJDP-5.00 4.08 Dealing with a Broad Range of Situations. The brain has evolved to be able to think about and understand factors that influence a wide range of complex situations and interactions. The brain allows us to make sense of other individual or group behaviour by interpreting intent, motivation and attitude.
a. Culture. Over time, people have developed cultural tools such as traditions, languages and beliefs, as well as legal, political and educational systems. Cultural tools can be very powerful as they are able to influence the establishment of core values (what is believed to be right and wrong).
b. Emotion. Emotion drives important social behaviours such as communication, affinities, status and positioning, and control. Emotions influence most aspects of our thinking. They can both enhance or reduce the efficiency of how we conduct necessary functions like that of judging situations, problem solving or learning lessons from experiences. Emotions are therefore both positive and negative and each will create influence on our action in certain ways. It is impossible to be completely emotionless and therefore decision makers must aim to understand their own emotional bias as an important factor.
c. Interaction. Our subconscious understanding of other peoples’ emotions will influence how we respond to them. Our brains are therefore capable of dealing with a vast array of social interactions. Understanding this, enables Military Commanders to use their subconscious (like intuition and inference) to formulate interactive skills effectively both within our own organisations but also in the resolution of complex social engagement.
4.09 Enabling Learning. The human brain is able to develop and remember complex concepts, using them to learn and adapt. We are born with an instinct to look for cause and effect by experimenting with the environments that surround us. Emotional and physical states all affect our ability to learn – it is therefore important, where possible, to ensure that conditions remain favourable to support learning. The ability to be logical,
47 BJDP-5.00 analytical and rational is a skill that can be learned, and which may be easier for some people than others.
48 BJDP-5.00 THINKING PROCESSES
4.10 While our brains are capable of evaluating information that covers a hugely broad spectrum of content, the processes that are used will either been as a result of analytical thinking or intuitive thinking.
a. Analytical Thinking. Analytical thinking is best applied when detail, complexity, accuracy and evidence are needed to provide solution. It can be enhanced where logic skills are able to be refined. As analytical thinking requires depth and breadth it will naturally take longer to process. Analytical thinking is usefully applied in situations that are unfamiliar (but where information exists) as facts, rather than bias and emotion, are the drivers. Conversely where a lack of information exists (i.e. they are poorly understood), analytical thinking will lose momentum. As analytical thinking is predominantly process driven, it can lead to solutions being created that are devoid of aspects that may be considered as irrational. This can lead to solutions that are linear or stove-piped and therefore unable to deal with the ‘what if’ factor. Analytical thinking can be easily mapped to problem solving tools – like OMAP – in order that problem solving and decision making is cohesive, coherent and auditable.
b. Intuitive Thinking. Intuitive thinking naturally occurs when decision making time or information available is scarce. Intuitive thinking is by nature based on experiential learning where connections between experiences are able to provide rapid solutions. However, as previously described (see Sense Making above), these connections may not always be reliable in providing the most efficient response or answer. Where bias and/or the application of broadly accepted rules (heuristics) exists there is a risk that intuitive thinking may become skewed. The greater the range of experience that a decision maker has, the greater the likelihood of successful application of intuitive thinking as the individual will be able to subconsciously and consciously guard against evaluation based on limited sources of data.
49 BJDP-5.00 4.11 Cognitive Styles and Preferences. We have different abilities and preferences that affect when and how well we use different types of thinking. Education, training, experience and changing circumstances influence abilities and preferences. In general, the brain is able to apply the use of analytical and intuitive thinking in balance with one another. In so doing the brain is able to best use the information available, combined with the application of cognitive norms to balance the usefulness of each process according to the situation.
50 BJDP-5.00 DEVELOPING THINKING
4.12 Develop Understanding. The ability to think can be improved; however, understanding is critical to achieve improvement. Understanding of personal preferences to decision making; understanding of the conditions in which thinking can occur; and understanding the environments where complex situations may occur will all support both individual and collective ability to intuitively and analytically think. Developing understanding therefore reduces the effects bias and heuristics as both balance and cognitive connections are respectively enhanced.
4.13 Cognitive Well Being. The ability for individuals and groups to maintain momentum in pursuit of solutions to complex and challenging problems is provided through:
Continuous training and rehearsal to support more acute analytical skill and wider base of experience from which to base analogy; Protection from external influences which create stress on our cognitive abilities; and Continual positive mental and physical stimulation.
4.14 Avoiding Process Over-Dependency. Many planning tools have been created to help support thinking and the solving of problems – these are critical in dealing with the many complex environments that we face. However, these tools must always be viewed as aides to support our brain activity; over reliance on process will stagnate cognitive abilities and prevents both analytical and initiative based thinking – becoming a slave to process increases the chances of catastrophic failure in decision making.
4.15 Enhance Group Access to Decision Making. While Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) are able to provide detailed perspectives on particular areas of interest, these can be prejudiced and inflexible. The inclusion of a wide range of perspectives which cover the same area of interest will support the broader, more innovative solutions. Group access must not replace SME experience, but can provide a necessary check and balance. Group access must be carefully controlled (but not overly controlled to create organisation constraint) to ensure that concept
51 BJDP-5.00 development does not become competitive (and thereby result in inefficient or unnecessary options being developed simply to be better than the last).
52 BJDP-5.00 PROBLEM SOLVING
4.16 Problem Solving is a step to Decision Making – the two are not the same. Problem Solving uses both Analytical and Intuitive thinking to provide greater understanding of an environment and/or situation and subsequently deliver a range of options to potentially provide resolution. Decision Making is the end process once problem solving has been conducted. However, in reality the processes of establishing the facts, providing options and deciding on the correct solution all blend into one another as the environment is dynamic and hence the process is continuous. Problem Solving is achieved, either in groups or as individuals through the application of a combination of acquired knowledge, physical experience, intuition and reflection (Figure 4.1).
Reflection
Acquired Physical
Knowledge Experience
Intuition
Figure 4.1 – Problem Solving attributes.
4.17 Acquired Knowledge. Acquired knowledge is collective data which has been learned (generally through academic rather than physical 53 BJDP-5.00 experience) and therefore assimilated with other information to develop greater understanding. Learning is accumulated from a range of sources: from cognitive development from birth, from experience and from subconscious connection.
4.18 Physical Experience. Physical experience is gained from a variety sources ranging from opportunities provided by comprehensive training (both collective and individual) and direct involvement in events and situations. In order to enhance problem solving abilities, physical experiences should aim to be as wide ranging as possible (in type, conditions and environment). Depth of involvement in experiences is also a key factor. The scale of involvement provides differing levels of cognitive understanding: Observation provides a more complete overview, however immersion provides detailed understanding in specific areas.
4.19 Intuition. Intuition is covered in detail in the previous section. To summarise, intuition is developed both consciously and subconsciously from a combination of heuristics, sense making, pre-filtering and bias.
4.20 Reflection. Critical to all problem solving is the ability to reflect on analysis (and subsequently also on the decisions that result from problem solving). Without time and resources being allocated to reflection, lessons cannot be learned resulting in issues like repetitive mistakes or pattern setting remaining as a common feature in execution.
54 BJDP-5.00 MILITARY DECISION MAKING
4.21 Military Decision Making is not unlike that of any other organisation, however some differences do exist. Military Decision Making is similar in that, like any other organisation, decisions are made either individually or collectively based on experience, knowledge and intuition which develops understanding and sets the conditions for problems to be solved. Processes employed in decision making are also the same, with decision makers basing their decisions on the processing ability of their own (and others) cognitive capacity. Similarly, most organisations, including the military, use tools to support analytical thinking; while these tools may differ in construct and specific environmental content, the purpose remains the same. Although the military structure may be perceived as more hierarchical than other organisations, the decision making chain broadly remains the same. Just like any other organisation, while the ultimate responsibility for decision making rests the Commanders, it is a foolish leader who does not carefully consider the advice of their Staff. The key difference between Military Decision Making (particularly in the RBAF), and other approaches which are employed in other organisations, is a focus on decisions based on Ends, Ways, Means and Risk. The remainder of this section provides a brief insight of each in turn.
4.22 Ends. In an operational context (as the focus of this publication), the Ends refers to the achievement of a set of preconceived conditions (known as Operational Objectives – see Chapter 6). An Operational Commander will establish the Ends based on an understanding of the wider context which may include factors both internal and external to the military context. Declared Ends (known as the Operational End State) must remain dynamic as they must respond to changes in the external and internal environment. While broad Ends would mitigate the need for change given a change in situation, they should be sufficiently focussed to allow subordinates to understand their direct requirement and part in the plan to achieve it.
4.23 Ways. The Ways refer to the methods by which the Ends can be achieved. In the Operational Context (and using OMAP as the tool to support the delivery of operational decision making), the Means refers to
55 BJDP-5.00 the identification of Decisive Points (DPs) subordinated by Supporting Effects (SEs). SEs are created by the conduct of activities (normally at the tactical level). Chapter 6 provides further explanation of DPs, SEs, Activities and their relationship to one another.
4.24 Means. The Means relate to the resources available to accomplish the Ways. The Means can comprise of both tangible and non- tangible resources. Commonly at the operational level, tangible resources refer to those military forces (equipment and personnel capabilities) that have been assigned to the Operational Commander. Non-tangible resources relate to the ability to bring to bear other resources outside of the Operational Command (which may include areas like OGDs, NGOs, civilian populations, Industry, Commerce, Space and Time). In using Means to achieve the Ways an Operational Commander must remain constantly aware of the strengths and weaknesses of each resource to both exploit opportunities and guard against the threats that may be posed.
4.25 Risks. Risk is a situation involving exposure to some form of danger. It is assessed by the likelihood of its occurrence and the gravity of its impact. A disconnect between Ends and Ways creates risk. Similarly the incorrect application of the Means in meeting the Ways also generates potential risks. Risk can be mitigated, however only if identified with sufficient time. Chapter 5 examines risk in further detail.
56 BJDP-5.00 PART 2 – DEFINITIONS, TOOLS & TECHNIQUES
57 BJDP-5.00 CHAPTER 5 – ANALYSIS DEFINITIONS, TOOLS & TECHNIQUES
ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS
5.01 Environmental analysis considers terrain (land, maritime and air environments), the weather and their effects on the conduct of operations. Within the Operational Military Appreciation Process (OMAP), this is known as Battlespace Area Evaluation (Terrain and Weather) – BAE (Terrain and Weather). The conduct of BAE is described in detail in the RBAF Intelligence Operators Handbook (Part 6) and in Chapter 8 of this publication; however, in summary, the process is conducted in 6 stages:
a. Stage 1. Identify the Area of Intelligence Interest (AII).
b. Stage 2. Analysis and assessment of environmental factors through the consideration of physical geography factors. Note – this Stage may be linked with the wider conduct of Human Factors Analysis as the two areas are interlinked.
c. Stage 3. This stage seeks to understand how the effects of weather may impact a wider situation or crisis and specifically the conduct of operations.
d. Stage 4. Stage 4 aims to identify how mobility may be affected and subsequently achieved. In this context ‘mobility’ should not be simply considered as movement from A to B (although this forms a considerable part of the work traditionally understood with the identification of Mobility Corridors 15 - MCs). Mobility should also be considered conceptually and may include other non-tangible aspects of mobility that may provide both wanted and unwanted influence and consequence.
15 Mobility Corridors (MCs) identify areas where mobility is achievable (although it must be specified the nature that the corridor is suitable for. MCs are commonly positioned in relation to Unrestricted, Restricted and Severely Restricted terrain. 58 BJDP-5.00 e. Stage 5. Stage 5 focusses on the identification of Avenues of Approach (AAs). AAs broadly represent general trends of mobility and therefore bind a number of MCs together. Again AAs can represent intangible concepts as well a physical mobility. Similarly AAs (like MCs) should represent all ‘actors’ within a given situation.
f. Stage 6. This stage identifies decisive and important areas of battle space (known as Vital Ground – VG16; and Key Terrain – KT17).
5.02 Where specific understanding of an area of terrain (or infrastructure) is required, tactical methods can be used to produce the necessary detail. The mnemonic OCOKA should be used where additional detail is required (again, this is described further in the RBAF Intelligence Operators Handbook – Part 6). OCOKA details:
O – Observation and Field of Fire (view) C – Cover and Concealment O – Obstacles K – Key Terrain and Vital Ground A – Avenues of Approach
5.03 Analysis of the weather is best considered concurrently with that of terrain. In conducting weather analysis it is essential that Staff do not simply produce a weather forecast – rather the impact of the weather must be understood in relation to terrain and operational capability within the area of operational terrain (by examining effect on each of the components of fighting power, but specifically with regard to personnel, equipment and mobility). Weather Analysis should usually consider: climate (longer term); weather forecasts (short term); temperature; rainfall; lunar (phases) and
16 Vital Ground (VG) represents areas of Battlespace that are considered ‘decisive’. Without achieving some form of desired effect on these areas it is likely that operational conduct will be ultimately unsuccessful. 17 Key Terrain (KT) represents areas of Battlespace that are considered ‘important’ in the conduct of operations. It is likely that conducted a required effect in areas of KT will aid the conduct of operations, but they are not deemed as essential to achieving successful operational outcomes. 59 BJDP-5.00 solar data; and tidal information. Analysis should identify the impact as either Nil, Low, Medium or High (noting that the classification of each category must be consistent and understood by all Staff and subordinate Assigned Forces to avoid misunderstanding).
5.04 Outputs. Environmental analysis forms an element of the wider IPB output. Specifically Environmental analysis should be included as part of the IPB brief and should contain a series of overlays which depict terrain and weather analysis; and a summary of the critical impacts effecting operational capability of all actors.
60 BJDP-5.00 STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
5.05 Chapter 3 indicated that Stakeholder Analysis centres on the analysis of ‘Actors’ and their individual or collective impact upon a situation to varying degrees depending upon their aims, intentions and capabilities. Analysis of groups must be systematic and conducted in a similar fashion across all actor group areas in order to maintain a coherent output.
5.06 Analysis Criteria. The following analytical areas should be considered during the conduct of Stakeholder Analysis for each respective group or individual:
a. Aims. An actor’s underlying aim drives their activities. Their aim may be broad and aspirational or specific and of local, national, regional or even global significance.
b. Motivation. The achievement of an aim provides part of an actor’s motivation, but local factors and allegiances such as score settling, personal gain and the thrill of risk taking or challenging authority may play a part. Motivations differ between individuals or sub-groups, and senior or junior echelons within an organisation.
c. Positions. Actors may adopt specific positions for particular issues, irrespective of the interests and goals of others. An actor may, for instance, take what he sees as a principled position based on his political views, regardless of the potential consensus elsewhere.
d. Intentions. Intentions are an actor’s plans for current and near-term activities.
e. Sub-culture. Individual groups of actors, although part of a wider culture, often have their own sub-cultures, which influence their aims.
61 BJDP-5.00 f. Relationships. Relationships are reflected in the interactions between actors at various levels; perceptions of these interactions may be as important as reality. As a situation changes, so too may the relationships. Seemingly strong alliances may therefore, in reality, be transient and must be considered in the long term to gain a more full understanding. Analysis, informed by Red Teaming (concept is describe later in this Chapter), should identify:
(1) Historical relationships.
(2) Current relationships and the rationale behind them.
(3) Possible future relationships as the situation changes.
g. Capacity. An actor’s capacity is their capability to affect a situation, positively or negatively. Capacity is defined in terms of personal authority, arms, resources, access, social networks and alliances, within a given context and at a given time.
h. Critical Vulnerabilities. All actors have vulnerabilities; actors are vulnerable to each other, to environmental and natural disasters, and to external intervention. These vulnerabilities are a key factor in Centre of Gravity analysis.
5.07 ‘Leader’ Analysis Criteria. In the conduct of Stakeholder Analysis it is essential to understand the dynamics of individuals and groups. Therefore it is critical to examine leaders to understand how their involvement and influence can change (both positively and negatively) situational outcomes. Leader analysis should identify/consider the following aspects:
a. Real Leader. The apparent leader may be a figurehead, and the real power may lie with separate power brokers or activists.
62 BJDP-5.00 b. Power Structure. The structure of organisations may be pyramidal or flat. In understanding how an organisation under consideration is structured will allow the Operational Commander and Staff to identify where the power lies and who (or what) has the biggest influence on senior level decision making, for example a close cohort of advisors or followers. c. Power Base. A leader’s power base may be a democratic mandate, an institutional party, a tribe or religious sect. It may be economic, in that the leader maintains his power while he continues to provide perceived benefits to all, or to a powerful group within that society. The leader may derive his power from arms, as a dictator or warlord. d. Leadership Style. The leader may be autocratic or consensual. Analysis of leadership styles provides an understanding of how a Leader may potentially act given a certain set of circumstances. This analysis is therefore useful in testing response to delivery operational effect. e. Strengths, Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities. A leader’s strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities may be institutional or personal, internal or external. Similar to the necessity of gaining an understanding of a Leader’s style, it is also essential to analyse their strengths, weaknesses and vulnerabilities in order to identify suitable tactical activities which will need to be conducted to achieve the required level of operational influence and/or effect (while at the same time minimising negative consequence). f. Aims and Intentions. A leader’s aims and intentions may similarly be institutional or personal, internal or external. In some cases, his only aim may be to retain power. Conducting analysis of a Leader’s motivations adds a further layer of understanding to the likely responses a leader may take as a reaction to our own operational conduct. Similarly, analysis can also provide indicators as to the subsequent likely response of the Group as a reaction to the Leader’s direction.
63 BJDP-5.00 HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS
GENERAL METHODS AND APPLICATION
5.08 The consideration of Human Factors is fundamentally essential in the analysis of the operational situation. Human Terrain Analysis (HTA) is the process that allows Human Factors to be understood in sufficient detail. Understanding the Human Terrain is complex; arguably the most complex element of situational analysis as it presents the most dynamic, and in many cases, intangible factors which require consideration.
5.09 Analysis of Human Factors is now commonly broken into categories and sub-categories to ease the analytical complexity; however, planners must understand that each category must still be considered with each other category (none must be considered in isolation) in order to gain a full and realistic understanding of a population’s core characteristics. This section compliments the RBAF’s Intelligence Operators Handbook (Processing, Part 4), which provides further detail and should be read in concert with this section.
5.10 While all categories should be considered, some will have a greater significance than others when analysing a population. Understanding which categories are more or less important can only be fully comprehended when the full HTA has been completed – removal of categories must not be done at the start of the process, simply to reduce quantity of work load. It is common that HTA will produce an incomplete level of understanding; in conducting HTA it is also common for a number of Information Requirements (IRs) to be raised in order to establish a more thorough level of comprehension. The conduct of HTA is usually facilitated/combined by other analytical approaches in order to ensure that analysis is conducted in sufficient detail. The use of practices, such a Three Column Format or SWOT, provide the tools to examine each aspect of HTA work in the necessary detail and should therefore be used as the norm during HTA (SWOT and Three Column Format are described in detail later in this Chapter).
5.11 A variety of methods have been developed to facilitate the HTA, with none being more effective than any other. Experience, personal (or 64 BJDP-5.00 Commander) choice and a broad understanding of the situation and the Human Terrain environment will allow the planner to establish which analytical method is likely to produce the most effective answer. A complete single method should be used as a minimum when conducting HTA; the inclusion of additional factors or the use of multiple methods is likely to produce greater comprehension where time allows. The following methods are widely accepted as useful HTA tools:
a. CAT (Cultural Assessment Tool). Beliefs and values, Social organisation, Political organisation, Economic organisation, Interaction and communication.
b. ASCOPE. Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organisation, People, Events
c. PEST. Political, Economic, Social and Technological.
d. PESTLEI. Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal, Environmental and Information.
e. PMESII (PTT). Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information (Physical, Terrain and Time).
f. STEEPLEM. Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental, Political, Legal, Ethical and Military.
The RBAF Intelligence Operators Handbook provides examples of CAT and PMESII (PPT) and should be referred to if further explanation is required for these methods. This section will provide more detail of ASCOPE and STEEPLEM to further complete understanding.
65 BJDP-5.00 ASCOPE
5.12 Analysis of Human Factors using ASCOPE provides the planner with an understanding of what are more commonly perceived as physical or tangible factors which describe or quantify populations. ASCOPE analysis is categorised by:
a. A – Areas where people live, work, meet and/or worship.
b. S – Structures; types, location and reason for structure.
c. C – Capabilities/Services (both tangible and non-tangible) provided for the population.
d. O – Organisations that exist and why.
e. P – People who are important to and within populations and the reasons why.
f. E – Events that are key and why.
5.13 Analysis using the ASCOPE tool is best supported through analysis using the Three Column Format (Factor, Deductions and Outputs), which is described later in this Chapter. The above categories for ASCOPE are further defined by potential factors requiring consideration (the planner should understand that the lists below are not exhaustive and further factors are also likely to need analysing):
A – Areas factors
Areas where people live, work meet and/or worship. Population Centres Cities Towns Villages 66 BJDP-5.00 Population Boundaries Municipalities Districts Regions Government Centre Level of Governance provided Linkages with higher and lower Governance Level of support to population in immediate vicinity (direct/indirect) Urban, Rural and Industrial divides Discreet/Non-discreet boundaries Location in relation to key population centres Industrial Areas Nature of industry Relevance to Population (direct/indirect) Proximity to other areas Infrastructure links to other areas Agricultural Areas Same factors as Industrial Areas Resource Extraction and Mining Areas Type of resource extraction Relevance to Population (direct/indirect) Linkages (direct/indirect) to other elements of critical infrastructure and industry Religious, Ethnic and Tribal Areas Ethnic/Religious/Tribal areas (geographical bounded/not bounded) Relationship between ethnic/religious/tribal groups and scale of separation (if any) Territory Non-Disputed Areas Disputed Areas Areas of Conflict Government Controlled Areas Other actor controlled areas Base areas for actor groups Neutral Areas
67 BJDP-5.00
S – Structures factors
Types, location and reason for structure; aid or hinder operations Government Buildings Type Location (in relation to other structures and areas) Reason for structure (known or likely) Support to which element of Population Assessment of ability to aid or hinder operational conduct (assess by conduct of range of possible effects) Military Headquarters and bases As per Government Buildings Police and other Security Force Structures As per Government Buildings Roads and Bridges Type and Classification Key or Vital to networks (which ones – civ or mil) Linkages and redundancies Communications Nodes (TV, Radio, Comms towers and buildings) Where and what What element of population do they support Protection (by what, where and response times) How are the nodes sustained & resourced Necessity to maintain functionality Religious Structures As per Government Buildings Critical Resource Infrastructure (Power, Water and Waste) As per Government Buildings Necessity to maintain functionality Health Structures As per Government Buildings Necessity to maintain functionality Education Structures As per Government Buildings Necessity to maintain functionality
68 BJDP-5.00
C – Capabilities factors
Capabilities/Services (both tangible and non-tangible) provided for the population. Public Administration What type and how comprehensive Effectiveness (meet population needs) Level of public support Emergency Services Type Response times Scale and effectiveness Supportive of specific groups/actors Public Safety Scale of political governance Adherence to policy Areas of risk/danger to population and mil operations Public Health Ability to meet public demand Specialist skills Locations Targeted at all/specific groups of population Food and Water Ability to meet demand Reliance on networks/redundancy Method of delivery and transportation Skills and Employment Level of employment/unemployment Generalist and Specialists skills sets Ability to meet commercial and industrial demand Shortfalls and impact
69 BJDP-5.00
O – Organisation factors
Organisations that exist and why. Political Organisations Type (by group) and role Power Base (popular required/not required) Scale of population support Nature of interaction with other political organisations (requirement and usefulness) Non Political Organisations As for political organisations, Consider factors for each: o IGO o NGOs o Labour Unions National and Multinational Corporations Type Importance nationally and internationally Ability to influence key actors/groups/stakeholders. Community Organisations Type and Agenda Scale of influence and with whom Other paramilitary organisations (not considered elsewhere) Type and agenda Scale of influence and with whom Capabilities Morale Ability to prosecute operations (and against who) Criminal Organisations Type (what is the criminal interest) Scale of effort Linkage to other organisations (paramilitary for example)
70 BJDP-5.00
P – People factors
People who are important to and within populations and the reasons why. Government Officials Agenda Scale of Influence and with which element of population (individuals, groups) Character Strengths and Weaknesses Tribal Leaders As for Government Officials Religious Officials What scale religious practitioner (moderate, extremist) As for Government Officials Professionals What sector As for Government Officials Civil Society Leaders As for Government Officials Other (factors as for Government Officials) may include: Social classes and honorific title holders Displaced persons Refugees Evacuees Nomadic Press Peace-makers Celebrities
71 BJDP-5.00
E – Events factors
Events that are key and why including those that are regular, planned and/or spontaneous. Events that will need to be considered may include:
Elections Political Rallies Military events Public Holidays and celebrations Religious Festivals Sporting and social events Incidents Demonstrations Riots
In all cases the following should be analysed:
The reasons and requirement for the event to take place The threat to the event and the need for security The likelihood of the event being de-stabilised by direct or indirect influences (of what nature) Who will be involved Who represents the leadership for the event What measures are the event leadership taking (or are likely to take) to provide control
Figure 5.1 – Possible Factors for consideration using ASCOPE
72 BJDP-5.00 STEEPLEM
5.14 Analysis of Human Factors using STEEPLEM provides the planner with an understanding of the overall character of a situation or population – it therefore tends to be attributed to analysis of the macro-environment (where ASCOPE allows for a more detailed analysis of categories). STEEPLEM analysis is categorised by:
a. S – Social. Analysis of the social environment must consider those factors that are necessary to support a population’s requirements. Although not exhaustive, analysis should consider the functionality and effectiveness of systems like health, education, housing, power and water provision, waste disposal and public services. Analysis must also consider factors such as employment, gender, race wealth and social equality. Finally it is essential to understand the scale to which social groupings are able to influence governmental practices. It is likely that where these sorts of social services and structures are capable, reliable and functioning within the rule of law, populations will be supportive and thus behave in line will sociably acceptable norms. Where these systems are failing, there is a heightened chance of population unrest and frustration towards the leadership responsible for the provision of wider security.
b. T – Technological. The scale at which technology exists does not simply become proportional to a population’s effectiveness as a group. Analysis must aim to gain an understanding of how technology is being used within a society and whether it supports essential services or not. Analysis must also establish where technology is prevalent – whether this is at the wider industrial or commercial level or providing wide accessibility for domestic purposes. Analysis should provide clarity on the levels of control of technology and how capabilities may be used for multiple purposes beyond that which they were designed for. Analysis must provide the planner with comprehensive understanding of strengths and weaknesses of technological solutions so that these can be exploited for operational gain.
73 BJDP-5.00 c. E – Economic. Analysis of economic factors will establish an understanding of a population’s ability to support and sustain itself; it will also provide the evidence for the scale and distribution of wealth and employment that had been deduced within the Social category of STEEPLEM. Economic considerations must analyse each economic sector (Primary, Secondary and Tertiary) in both urban and rural environments to establish which sector (and specifically what area) provides most influence to central prosperity agendas and is therefore afforded greatest priority for support. d. E – Environmental. Environmental considerations must consider geographical usage which supports population development. Analysis should seek to understand where critical resources exist and how they are extracted and subsequently refined (if necessary) and used. Similarly analysis must examine how the use of the wider environment supports the creation of necessities for stable population sustainment like power generation, water production and waste disposal. Technological analysis provides an indication of how developed an economy may be and also the priority that is placed by a governing organisation on the generation of income and the provision of basic needs. Critically analysis should seek to establish the sustainability of the use of the environment. A lack of controls and bad management will most likely indicate ill or poorly placed investment; while also indicating possible limitations in the provision of essential services to the population. Limited investment in environmental management provides indicators of risks that will need to be resolved, mitigated against or avoided during operational conduct. e. P – Political. Political analysis critically aims to develop understanding of how a population is governed and critically the degree to which support exists for the respective political forces agendas and policies. It is also important to analyse how governing bodies enforce their political direction (link to Legal and Ethical) in support, or otherwise, of the population. Identification of key political leaders is often simple; however, in the conduct of
74 BJDP-5.00 operations, it is often essential to also analyse how these leaders level of influence (at all levels across the political/governance spectrum) can be used to reinforce operational requirements. f. L – Legal. Analysis of the legal architecture will not only indicate how a population is bound by the rule of law, but it will also highlight how effective the systems that have been established by a governing body (police and judiciary) are in enforcing the legal requirements. The lack of a functioning rule of law and/or effective capabilities to manage it are likely to suggest complications in the operating environment that may need military resources applied (beyond specified operational tasks) to establish a secure operating environment. Analysis of the legal systems will indicate where military operations should be targeted to re-establish stability. g. E – Ethical. Ethical analysis aids the understanding of those cultural norms that may differ from the operational force that is conducting military operations. Ethical analysis can be both macro through the examination of relevant legal systems and specifically the adherence to the law (both national and international law and convention) and preservation of human rights; or at a more micro level by examination of groupings of races, religious or ethnicities who may perceive matters in similar or contrasting ways. Gaining an understanding of who provides ethical leadership within a population is of absolute importance so that operational forces can engage if necessary to ensure that support is gained where common ground exists and differences can be understood. h. M – Military. While analysis of military elements, is often considered in terms of functional capability, morale and preparedness (relating to the Components of Fighting Power), consideration of the military within HTA generally focusses on the relationship between the military and the population that it is likely to engage with. Analysis will determine the level at which confidence in military forces may be maintained by adherence to
75 BJDP-5.00 international conventions; in turn it will also indicate what actions are likely to lose the support of a population and potentially how rapidly in the event. Analysis of military activities, cognisant of the analysis conducted within other categories of STEEPLEM, will indicate which sections of a population are most likely to support military action (either directly or indirectly) and in what form.
5.15 While STEEPLEM analysis can be supported by Three Column Format work, it is often best supported by SWOT analysis, due to its macro analytical nature. In each key category of STEEPLEM (noting that, depending on the situation, the same may apply to any sub-categories also) deductions can be made in relation to Strengths and Weaknesses which when matched against the planners own operational capabilities or other related factors produce a suite of opportunities and threats which can either be exploited or mitigated against.
76 BJDP-5.00 UTILISING HTA METHODS TO DEVELOP FURTHER ANALYSIS
5.16 Combining HTA Output. Any two HTA methods of analysis may also be combined together to provide a greater depth of analysis. It is essential to conduct each method first in turn; to ensure that the correct level of detail is established, and followed by a comparison of the product in a combined matrix. The method of combining HTA tools allows an analyst to gain greater clarity of the relationships that affect change in the factors that have been considered. Figure 5.2 provides an example how HTA methods may be combined to provide summative/critical considerations for planning staff (using ASCOPE and STEEPLEM for demonstration):
A S C O P E Areas Structures Capabilities Organisations People Events S Social T Technological E Key Economic Deductions from combining ASCOPE & STEEPLEM analysis for Economic Capabilities P Political L Legal E Ethical M Military STEEPLEM ASCOPE Economic Capabilities Analysis Analysis
Figure 5.2 – Combining HTA tools to provide summative analysis.
77 BJDP-5.00 5.17 Use of Graphics. Further clarity of complex HTA can also be provided by linking analytical work (such as that described in the ASCOPE and STEEPLEM sections above) with graphical representations of the factors that have been analysed. In IPB, this is an important step in achieving evaluation and integration of threats (see Chapter 8). Figure 5.3 provides an example of this:
Population Density Population (x1,000)
10,00 0 2,5 00 • Town 1 1,0 00 50 • City D 0 20 City A 0 • City B 10 • City E 0 0
• City C
• City D 0 10 20 30 0 0 0
• Town 2 Km (approx)
Figure 5.3 – Pictorial representation of Population Density.
78 BJDP-5.00 ANALYTICAL MODELLING
SWOT ANALYSIS
5.18 Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT). SWOT Analysis is a well-known analytical tool that analyses the strengths and weaknesses of an organisation, as well as the opportunities and threats it faces. SWOT analysis is frequently used in both strategic and operational planning formulation. The comparative value in using a SWOT analysis framework as one of a number of analytical tools is to identify the opportunities that a specific (operational) organisation may be in a position to exploit. The effective and efficient exploitation of opportunities is an important aspect of Joint, Combined and Multi-Agency operational coordination that, as a result, leads to the provision of meaningful effect in operational execution. Strengths and Weaknesses should be focused on those issues which are ‘internal’ to the analytical factor, group or organization and, therefore, issues over which an element of command and control can be exercised. In contrast, Opportunities and Threats are dynamics that are external to the operational organisation and therefore those that are potentially difficult to exert some, if any, direct control over. Therefore a problem situation can thus be understood as a balance between protecting strengths, minimising weaknesses, exploiting opportunities and mitigating threats. Defining SWOT, the following should be understood:
a. Strengths. Strengths support the successful accomplishment the organisation’s mission and/or specific tasks and are enabled by capabilities and the ability to deliver necessary effects. Strengths are also the basis by which an operational organisation is capable of continuing and sustaining operations. Strengths can be either tangible or intangible. While operational organisations may thrive on their strengths, it is likely that these will also be understood by any effective adversary (who will view these strengths as their own external threats). Strengths must therefore be concealed or protected so that they can be used to full effect when needed.
79 BJDP-5.00 b. Weaknesses. Weaknesses are represented by those internal capabilities or qualities that would prevent an operational organisation from completing missions or specified tasks successfully. Weaknesses are characterised by attributes that have failed to meet required standards. As such weaknesses are controllable and, with mitigating action, can be either removed or minimised. It is essential that an operational organisation is realistic in its comprehension of its own weaknesses and is committed to taking the necessary action required to guard against an adversary exploiting these.
c. Opportunities. Opportunities are provided by the external environment and the factors that influence the conditions within this environment. Opportunities only exist when an operational organisation understands the factor in detail and is able to take advantage of a specific situation, while remaining cognisant of the potential consequences of their actions. Generally one organisation will view another’s weaknesses as areas where advantage may be gained, and thus these will be the opportunities to exploit.
d. Threats. Threats occur when elements within the external environment have analysed and understood your own operational organisation’s weaknesses and have the potential capabilities to exploit them. Unlike weaknesses, threats are defined as uncontrollable – i.e. an operational organisation has little or no ability to prevent external exploitation.
5.19 Using SWOT Analysis. SWOT Analysis is one of many tools that can support planning activities. It must therefore be used in combination with other practices (Environmental, Stakeholder or Human Factors) to ensure that a range of practical deductions can be achievably gained. In the conduct of SWOT Analysis, it is essential to identify a series of lines of analysis from which Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats can then be considered. This approach (the selection of lines of analysis) is of course subjective; therefore planners should aim to use situational awareness, rather than standard categories, to identify as broad a range of
80 BJDP-5.00 criteria as possible. SWOT Analysis is able to provide a set of relatively comprehensive deductions in a comparatively short amount of time; due to the formatting of SWOT Analysis, these deductions can also then be presented in a concise manner ideal for briefing. SWOT Analysis is best conducted as a group to enable wider consideration of each area. Group work also minimises the risk of bias being introduced into deductions; however this is also reliant upon each group member maintaining a comprehensive understanding of the situation as a pre-requisite. In conducting SWOT Analysis, the following advantages and disadvantages should be understood:
a. Advantages.
(1) With comprehensive situational understanding, SWOT Analysis can provide reliable analysis in a short period of time.
(2) SWOT Analysis allows planners to concentrate on the critical (most important) factors.
(3) SWOT Analysis is useful for comparison between friendly and adversary organisations as it highlights friendly vulnerabilities to be avoided and adversary vulnerabilities to be exploited.
(4) The method helps to identify adversary intentions and capabilities and therefore critical threats.
(5) Analysis enables a 360 degree examination of the situation – analysis is neither friendly nor adversary centric; it is balanced.
(6) SWOT Analysis supports the identification of intelligence gaps; which stimulate the requirement for further collection.
81 BJDP-5.00 (7) SWOT Analysis allows friendly operational forces to build on their strengths and make attempts to reverse, mitigate or protect weaknesses.
(8) Analysis provides deductions which support the synchronisation of the most appropriate assigned capabilities to meet identified threats.
b. Disadvantages.
(1) SWOT Analysis can be highly subjective without a depth of situational understanding and can therefore become reliant upon assumptions. It is therefore best used as a guide alongside other tools rather than assuming that it will provide objective answers.
(2) SWOT Analysis considers factors in broad categories. There is a risk for planners to over simplify analysis which subsequently will not support later planning during the consideration of Courses of Action (COA).
(3) The method only enables consideration of definitive factors (i.e. it is a strength or it is a weakness). The method does not allow for consideration of factors that potential sit in the middle ground – SWOT does not provide scalability.
(4) SWOT Analysis does not prioritise deductions; therefore it merely provides a list of considerations from which further analysis will be required.
5.20 SWOT Analysis Example. Figure 5.4 provides an example of the SWOT Analysis format (noting that the context for the lines of analysis and therefore the deductions are fictional and therefore irrelevant for further consideration):
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Lines of Analysis – Utilise Assess capabilities and capacity of the party to achieve its objective Peacekeeping Principles: Strengths Weaknesses • Consent. What internal strengths does an What internal weakness does an • Impartiality. organisation have to fulfil its organisation have that would • Minimum Force for Self objective? hamper its ability to fulfil its Defence and the objective? Group ideology Implementation of the Leadership Fractured Mandate. Weaponry command/ideology • Political Primacy. Lack of mobility • Legitimacy. Lack of funds • Cause No Harm: Conflict- Sensitive Activity. • An Integrated Approach. Focus - Deterrence
What factors from an analysis Integrated planning considerations of the external environment, for example, political, military, Strengths/Opportunities Weaknesses/Opportunities economic, social, infrastructure analysis analysis and information (PMESII), can Analysis of strengths and Weaknesses should be exploited be exploited by the opportunities will provide insight by the peacekeepers wherever organisation to fulfil its into where the threat is most possible, in a way to deter violent
objective? dangerous. activity. Certain areas Risks should be identified and Indicators could be initiated that inaccessible by deterrence measures taken to monitor whether weaknesses peacekeepers mitigate them where possible. become strengths over time. Host-government forces For example, warning systems Opportunities ineffective and reaction forces. Regional political actor supportive of spoiling behaviour Safe havens available in certain communities that support the political motives of the party What factors from an analysis Strengths/Threats analysis Weaknesses/Threats analysis of the external environment, Perpetrators will most likely Perpetrators will most likely avoid for example, PMESII, can avoid these areas. these areas. threaten the group from Be cautious when considering Continue to monitor any changes
fulfilling its objective? the re-distribution of in the factors represented in these Certain areas peacekeeping resources. 2 categories.
dominated by credible Diluting the environmental Threats peacekeepers threats may make them future Host-government forces opportunities. operating in the area Lack of political support from regional actors
Figure 5.4 – Example of SWOT Analysis format.
83 BJDP-5.00 CENTRE OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS
“What the theorist has to say here is this: one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed”. Major General Carl von Clausewitz, ‘On War’, 1832
5.21 Centre of Gravity Definition. For military purposes a Centre of Gravity (CoG) is a characteristic, capability, or influence from which an actor18 draws its freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or will to reach an identified end state.
5.22 Understanding CoGs.
a. All actors involved in a specific crisis and/or conflict are likely to have a Centre of Gravity (CoG) which, if effected in a specific and targeted manner will generate an appropriate desired affect which will either render the actor’s position untenable or provide the necessary support in meeting the actor’s Ends as planned. The CoG may therefore represent the key to unlocking the solution (noting that both you and any adversary may view each other’s CoG in the same way). It might not need to be attacked or destroyed, but it will need to be affected in some way for the End State to be reached. It is of paramount importance that the CoGs of all significant actors are correctly identified, analysed, and incorporated into the operational design.
b. The identification of CoGs is one of the most significant decisions that a Commander can make; the right selection will enable the operational level plan to be focused on what is decisive in delivering the End State, whereas the wrong choice will lead to effort being wasted on chasing a goal that does not necessarily lead to operational success. The choice should be clearly justifiable with evidence to show why alternatives have been rejected.
18 Actors, for example: a nation, an alliance, a military force or other civil or militia grouping. 84 BJDP-5.00 Intuition will rarely suffice. The process of identifying CoGs will also expose more detail on the operating environment, as the Commander and Staff focus their energies on considering their, and their adversary’s, sources of strength.
c. Once CoGs have been identified, analysis seeks to expose their vulnerabilities; those of the friendly forces will be protected, and those of the opponent attacked. In this way CoGs represent an adversarial relationship. CoG analysis will allow the progression of the operation to be defined, as Objectives or Decisive Points (DPs) which are identified and sequenced across different Lines of Operation (LoO) within different Courses of Action (COAs) – see Chapter 6 for definitions. Analysis must also be done from a perspective other than one’s own. The obvious perspective is from that of the adversary, but widening the analysis community of interest or ‘Red Teaming’ may provide alternative viewpoints.
d. There may be different CoGs at different levels of operation (Strategic, Operational and Tactical) but, if so, they may be nested19. At the Strategic level a CoG is often a non-physical entity such as the cohesion of an alliance; at the Tactical level it is usually represented by a physical capability or strength that can be affected through defined influence over limited time-scales. Identifying an Operational level CoG depends on context, circumstances and anticipated military activity. Even where there is no obvious single CoG, a Commander may still find the concept useful to ensure that he remains focused, in potentially complex and multifaceted crises, on what is militarily critical to the desired outcome.
e. In situations where there is no particular adversary, and no obvious value to be gained by focusing effort on any one actor, a more abstract CoG may be useful. This is more likely to be the case in a complex operation in which conflict is not simply between two parties, but represents a web of competing interests.
19 CoG nesting refers to analysis in which the strategic CoG has Critical Capabilities that are effectively regarded as the operational CoG and, in turn, the operational CoG has Critical Capabilities that are regarded as tactical CoG. 85 BJDP-5.00 f. CoGs might change during the course of an operation. Commanders must also be open to the possibility that the wrong CoG may have been selected during operational planning. CoGs should therefore be reviewed throughout an operation as understanding of the relationship between cause and effect within a conflict evolves. g. While CoG is a fundamental element in the construct of the Operational Military Appreciation Process (OMAP), it may not always be possible to identify in certain circumstances. In these circumstances, and understanding that the unifying focus of an operational plan is the Commander’s intent, if a clear and useful CoG is not identifiable, alternatives such as SWOT analysis can be used to underpin an operational plan.
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RED TEAMING
All groups of people suffer from a degree of bias. The closer the environment of a well disciplined and highly motivated group only exacerbates this problem and can lead to flawed assumptions and decision making. As an insurance against this, and other forms of faulty analysis and planning, it is useful for a Commander to employ a ‘Red Team’ to assist them, or their Staff, in understanding a/the specific problem.
A red team is an enabled cell, discrete from the main staff, which develops opponent, neutral, and other contextual perspectives in order to challenge the perceived norms and assumptions of the Commander and his Staff. A Red Team is formed under a nominated leader, however for the remainder of the Team no ‘best-fit’ structure exists as the nature of the operation will dictate the requirement. Red Teams should not be linked with any other responsibilities within the HQ that may create bias and should be selected based on their Subject Matter Expertise (SME). Red Teaming is not a simple examination of the adversary, and is therefore not solely focused on provision by J2. A Red Team will draw on the same data as the planning team and will conduct an adversarial planning process in step with the Planning Team’s activities.
A Red Team’s work is to identify and assess assumptions, alternative options, vulnerabilities, limitations and risks for the actor they represent and as such subject the main Planning Team’s plans, programmes, ideas and assumptions to rigorous analysis and challenge in order to identify gaps, check logic and deductions.
Th e overarching purpose of the Red Team is to improve understanding and decision making by considering alternative perspectives through critical thinking. Any actor or group that could influence completion of an Operational
Commander's mission should ideally be Red Teamed. Where there is more than one significant actor to consider, time and resources permitting, it could be appropriate to conduct a number of ‘Red’ MAPs.
87 BJDP-5.00 5.23 CoG Analysis Terminology. Paragraph 5.22(c) has previously stated that Objectives and Decisive Points (DPs) are derived through CoG Analysis. CoG Analysis therefore provides a method of ensuring that friendly forces target weakness rather than strength and that Joint Action is conducted using an indirect (or Manoeuvrist) approach. CoG Analysis also allows us to identify and protect our own vulnerabilities. CoG identification is therefore reliant upon the analysis of the following: . a. Critical Capabilities. Critical Capabilities (CC) are the essential abilities that allow an identified CoG to realise an adversary’s End State (or prevent Friendly Forces from achieving our own End State). CCs are what the CoG can do or cause to be done, either to us or to other parties (they are therefore verbs). For example, the CoG might have: The capability to defeat our forces; seize our capital; hold the opposing army together; or turn the population away from the local government
b. Critical Requirements. Critical Requirements (CR) are those resources, enablers, facilities, or competencies required to generate or apply CC in the desired manner to allow the CoG to be met (CRs are therefore nouns). They are therefore what the CoG needs to be effective.
c. Critical Vulnerabilities. Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) represent the fundamental areas of weakness that relate directly to the CoG. CV are often more detailed elements or components of CR that support and enable CC to function. They therefore point to ways that the CoG might be defeated or altered through careful and considered targeting. They may relate to either CCs or CRs.
The relationship between CoG, CC, CR and CV is critical to establish what action might be necessary to create the required effect on an adversary’s CoG. Therefore a CoG may have a number of CCs, which in turn may have a number of CRs to enable the CC. Some of these CRs may enable one or more CC. Similarly, CVs are identifiable for each CR, noting that different CRs may share the same vulnerabilities. Figure 5.6 provides a diagrammatic example of the relationship between CoG, CC, CR and CV.
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5.24 Identifying a CoG. Identifying CoGs is complex, but fundamental to the delivery of OMAP. The following should be noted when identifying CoGs:
a. A detailed understanding of the causes of crisis, the actors involved with that crisis, their ability to affect the outcome, and the nature of their relationship with each other is necessary to ensure that the right CoGs are selected. Potential CoGs should exhibit most or all of the following characteristics. They should be:
(1) Identifiable;
(2) Critical to the ability of a party to a conflict to achieve its aims;
(3) Susceptible to change (one form of which might be defeat);
(4) Able to effect change in others; and
(5) Related to the conditions of that conflict.
b. Whilst a CoG need not always be a tangible entity, at the operational level it usually will be. CoG determination is focused on the Ends. Therefore CoG and the identification of objectives are closely linked. It would therefore be appropriate to suggest that affecting an adversary’s CoG could therefore be considered as a key Operational Objective. As objectives are identified later than the CoGs, it is necessary for the Staff to continuously return to their earlier planning work to ensure that it is integrated and cross- referenced.
c. While there may be times when the CoG appears clearly obvious to the Commander or Planning Staff, often the correct CoG will, in reality, could be significantly more difficult to determine, particularly where complexity exists in the modern Contemporary
89 BJDP-5.00 Operating Environment (COE). Misidentifying CoG poses the very real danger of skewing planning and so raising operational risk during execution phases. As with every planning cycle there is always a risk that critical facts may be missed; however, utilising the following steps will assist with the identification of CoGs:
(1) List the actors that are party to the crisis. These may represent a wide and diverse range of entities, from States, through military or civilian groups, to individuals (see Human Factor Analysis).
(2) For each actor, summarise the aims and objectives and the means that the actor has available (or potentially may have available in the future) to achieve these objectives.
(3) List all the possible sources of strength which might enable each actor to achieve its aims and objectives within the means that it has available. These are the possible CoGs. It is essential to scrutinise the strengths (and weaknesses) of an adversary that can be protected against by an adversary’s forces or targeted and exploited by friendly forces. If the right effects are achieved then the CoG, whether specified or not, will still be impacted in favour of friendly forces.
(4) For each possible CoG answer the question, ‘Can the actor achieve its aims without this entity (either tangible or non-tangible capability) remaining intact?’
(a) If the answer is yes, it is not a suitable CoG.
(b) If the answer is no to only one of the possible options, then by default that is the CoG.
90 BJDP-5.00 (c) If there is more than one ‘no’, it is necessary to establish how directly each of the remaining options is related to the achievement of the end-state. For example:
‘Two options for Op CoG remain; the enemy Air Defence Force and the enemy Air Force. Defeating the Air Defence Forces might open the path to the enemy’s collapse, but only because it would enable the destruction of its Air Forces which would then force the outcome. The Air Forces would therefore be a more appropriate CoG than the Air Defence Forces, which would become a more likely CC. The enemy cannot achieve its aims without either, but the destruction of one is only necessary to set the conditions for the destruction of the other, and it is this which unlocks the End State.
d. Answering this question posed above needs to be more than a simple intuitive process. Historical precedent, analysis of relative strengths, strength of motive and political influences are among the considerations to be addressed. However, most important is the relationship between cause and effect. There must be sufficient evidence (or at least the basis of evidence) to indicate that effecting a change to the proposed CoG will have the predicted affect and therefore meet the desired End State.
5.25 Displaying CoG Analysis. CoG Analysis can be displayed either as a matrix or diagrammatically, as follows:
a. CoG Analysis Matrix. Refer to Figure 5.5 over the page:
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Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix (Figure 5.5) Details of Actor (who are they; what is it)
Assessed aim and desired outcome What is the actor’s main goal and what conditions does he seek to achieve by his actions.
1 – Centre of Gravity (CoG) 2 – Critical Capabilities (CC) …is the principal source of strength or power …is the primary ability (or abilities) that for achieving one’s aim. give(s) the CoG its strength. What is the primary element of power upon What can the CoG do or cause to be done? which an actor depends to accomplish his What are the primary means that enables strategic objectives? the CoG to gain and maintain dominant To be targeted in an opponent; ones own to influence over an opponent or situation? be protected. To be influenced/denied to an opponent; For each CoG there will be a number of one’s own to be exploited. critical capabilities and critical requirements. The key word is the verb; the ability to…. A noun; an entity; a complex system; a thing.
4 – Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) 3 – Critical Requirements (CR) …exists when a critical requirement is …are the specific conditions, components or deficient, degraded or missing and exposes a resources that are essential to sustaining the critical capability to damage or loss. critical capabilities. What are the weaknesses, gaps or What does the CoG need to be effective? deficiencies in the key system elements and What are those key systems, elements and essential conditions, characteristics, essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationships and influences capabilities, relationships and influences through which the CoG may be influenced or required to generate and sustain the CoG’s neutralised? critical capabilities, such as specific assets, Critical vulnerabilities should be used to physical resources, and relationships with generate operation objectives, decisive other actors? conditions or supporting effects. To be denied to an opponent and one’s own To be attacked in an opponent and one’s own provided. protected. Nouns, things. Critical vulnerabilities can relate to either capabilities or requirements. A noun with modifiers.
Conclusion Which weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationships and influences could be exploited in an opponent and must be protected if owned. Which of these change the capabilities, relationships and behaviours that would lead to improved conditions in the engagement space to support a theory of change. Figure 5.5 – CoG Analysis displayed as a Matrix.
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CV CV CV CV CV CV CV 1 2 3 5 6 7 8
CR CR CR CR CR 1 2 3 4 5
CC CC CC 1 2 3
Op CoG
Figure 5.6 – CoG Analysis displayed as a diagram.
5.26 Defining Relationships Between Connecting Actor CoG. In complex operating environments where multiple Actors will wish to reach their own desired Ends by affecting another (one or more) Actor’s CoG, it is useful to define how these relationships may exist. As such the following terminology should be applied (also see Figure 5.7 below):
a. Bipolar Centres of Gravity. Each side engaged in a bi- polar conflict should identify, and then affect and protect respectively, their adversary’s CoG and their own. Force is then applied offensively against an opponent’s vulnerabilities (in order to undermine his CoG, restrict his freedom of action and frustrate his aims) and defensively (to safeguard one’s own CoG against reciprocal attack).
b. Multiple Centres of Gravity. In other situations, there may be no simple bi-polar construct. The identification and analysis
93 BJDP-5.00 of CoGs may nonetheless help a Joint Operational Commander to understand the critical aspects of the situation, most notably the characteristics of key actors. c. Non-Opponent Centres of Gravity. In situations where there is no particular enemy, and no obvious value to be gained by focusing effort on any one actor, a more abstract CoG may be useful. For example, during Peace Enforcement operations where a range of belligerents may be fighting each other, defeat of one or more of them may not be appropriate, but fostering support for a peace agreement may be. Similarly, during Peacekeeping or Disaster Relief Operations in an otherwise benign environment, there may simply not be a discernible CoG. In such circumstances other analytical tools, such as adapting the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) model may assist planners (refer to paras 5.18 – 5.20). d. Focal Centres of Gravity. In particularly complex situations, involving a multitude of actors engaged in a hybrid of major combat, security operations to enable stabilisation, and other Peace Support activity, a Joint Operational Commander may seek to encapsulate, as a CoG, either:
(1) The most significant factor preventing him from reaching his End State, or;
(2) A factor that appears predominant amongst (or common to all) other participants in promoting their own contrasting aims – for example, the support of the local population.
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Bipolar CoGs Focal CoG
Warfighting Friendly Opponent CoG CoG
Bipolar CoGs
Opponent CoG Countering CoG Irregular Friendly CoG Activity Opponent CoG
Non-Opponent CoG(s) Peace or Support NoCoG
Figure 5.7 – CoG Relationships between Actors.
95 BJDP-5.00 THREE COLUMN FORMAT ANALYSIS
5.27 The 3-Column Format is a proven useful method for articulating and recording complex analysis in a clear and concise manner. Using the 3-Column Format helps Commanders and Staff to maintain a written record of factors that have been considered, the deductions and analysis that was necessary to be conducted in relation to these factors and the outputs that have resulted from the analytical work. Not only does the 3-Column Format provide a record of Staff work that can subsequently be referred to in later planning work, but it also provides a critical legal document which identifies why Command decisions were made. Recording analysis in such a manner significantly helps with the continuity of planning and ensures that all Commanders and their Staff are provided with a single reference point. 3-Column Format analysis can be used effectively at all levels of operation. Figure 5.8 describes the 3-Column Format process for analysis.
Factor Deduction Output (a) (b) (c)
(1) A fact, (2) What are the (3) Planning or consideration implications analysis or other issue of this fact, action relevant to the consideration requiring operation. or issue – the further staff so what? work
(3a) Additional staff activity (3c) Reintroduce actioned or resolved
output (3b) External requests for information or clarification
Figure 5.8 – 3-Column Format.
5.28 Categories for Listing Outputs. It is essential to categorise Outputs that result from analytical deductions. Categorisation using standard terminology ensures Planning Staff are able to track and account
96 BJDP-5.00 for all outputs at the appropriate moment of the planning cycle. The standard terminology that must be assigned to each respective output in the Output Column includes:
a. Planning Guidance (PG). PG refers to analytical output that is required to be used by Planners to support the formulation of later stages of the planning cycle.
b. Tasks (T). T relates to the identification of actions that must be undertaken by assigned Forces. Tasks should be collectively listed so that they can be analysed and prioritised at specific stages in the OMAP.
c. Information Requirement (IR). IRs highlight areas where insufficient information is known about a specific factor and hence require further activity to be initiated. Like Tasks, IRs must be listed and tracked collectively to ensure that information is collected in a timely manner in order to support current and future planning and operational execution.
d. Risk (Ri). Risks (Ri) represent areas where Planning Staff must guard against vulnerabilities becoming exploited unnecessarily by other Actors. Risks may therefore result in additional tasks being identified, which again should be listed as individual outputs.
e. Freedoms (F). Freedoms (F) are factors which refer to time, space and/or capabilities that will enable the achievement of the identified Ends in the most efficient and practical manner.
f. Constraint (C). Constraints (C) are actions imposed by a Superior Commander or another authority which must be undertaken (i.e. you must do something). Constraints will generally, although not necessarily entirely, be identified directly from specified tasks.
97 BJDP-5.00 g. Restrictions (R). Restrictions (R) are prohibitions on activities that a Superior Commander or another authority might impose (i.e. you must not do something). Restrictions may be legal (imposed by international and domestic laws); moral and ethical; or political.
h. Assumption (A). Where information is not known (and therefore normally requiring the identification of an IR) it may be necessary to make an assumption (A) to allow planning to continue. Assumptions are not guesses; rather they are well informed decisions based on realistic likelihood based on outcomes and thorough evidence. Every effort must be taken to either confirm or deny assumptions at the earliest opportunity with the correct information.
i. Resource Bid (RB). Where tasks are identified that either require additional or specialist resources to be allocated outside of those forces already assigned, it is essential to highlight these as Resource Bids (RB) so that the necessary Staff action can be taken with Higher Authorities. Assumptions may need to be made where resources are not provided, but tasks are required to be conducted – these assumptions must be updated once direction on the RB has been given by the Higher Authority.
An example of 3-Column Format analysis is shown overleaf (Figure 5.9).
98 BJDP-5.00 Factor Deduction Output Insurgents have popular Contain geographic spread of Information Requirement (CCIR) support on Eastern insurgency to Eastern What are levels of Insurgency support and capability in Towns ‘A’ and ‘B’ Peninsula, but lower levels of Peninsula Planning Guidance (PG) support in the Capital and Reduce support base for Looking at planning options to isolate Eastern Peninsula further to the West insurgents in Eastern Decisive Point (DP) Peninsula Insurgency contained in Eastern Peninsula Potential wider irregular Supporting Effects (SEs) activity (IA) threat Eastern Peninsula Isolated. National Governance/Infrastructure secured PG Are there any ‘quick wins’ which will reduce level of support to insurgency? Oil Site ‘C’ isolated with food Resupply to Oil Site ‘C’ reliant IR supplies running low upon helicopters What are the resupply requirements for Oil Site ‘C’ PG Would I be better evacuating Oil Site ‘C’? PG Look at planning options for airborne resupply. Consider evacuation of Oil Site ‘C’ DP Oil Site ‘C’ Resupplied Freedom (F) All SH allocated to Op Comd for duration of Operation. Oilfields provide main source Must secure oilfields with IR of economic wealth damage to oil facilities What is the insurgent presence on/around oilfields and land-based support minimised infrastructure? What are the insurgent intentions towards oil facilities? How could I mitigate the risk of oil facilities being ‘damaged’? Task (T) SECURE Oilfields PG Look at planning options to secure the oilfields and land-based support infrastructure SE Oilfields and land-based support infrastructure secured Risk (Ri) Toxic/environmental hazard from burning oil-wells and storage/processing facilities
99 BJDP-5.00 Factor Deduction Output Known sympathies to Potential for external Ri insurgent cause in Country intervention/support to the Military intervention by Country ‘Y’ ‘Y’ insurgency IR What are Country ‘Y’s intentions and capabilities? Assumption (A) Based on political positioning of Country ‘Y’ it is unlikely to intervene with direct military support; however is likely to support insurgents with resources and SF Ops DP Country ‘Y’ dissuaded from intervening in the insurgency IR Extent of the Joint Operations Area? Rules of Engagement against ‘other’ nations? Road network to East of Resupply relies on single costal Constraint (C) Capital extremely limited, road Mobility relies on helicopters with interior primary Movement elsewhere restricted C rainforest until reach more to helicopters and foot Sustaining combat supplies for the Logistics Component Commander likely cultivated areas near Town Geography should assist with to be key factor throughout early phases ‘B’ isolating Eastern Peninsula Civic Leaders including Military activity to counter IR Police Chiefs of Towns ‘A’ insurgency may be succeeded What government efforts are planned to address the political stability on the and ‘B’ and Mayor of Town by political, and perhaps tribal, Eastern Peninsula? ‘A’ killed, others collaborating power struggle – threat to Restriction (R) – no obvious leadership to fill longer term stability Initial military engagement in governance vacuum Insurgency forces lightly Insurgency leadership is PG armed, with majority lacking potential Centre of Gravity Conduct CoG Analysis on Insurgency Leadership formal military training (CoG) Insurgency has caused Winning consent, and DP disruptions to key mitigating impact of political Potable water provided and electric power restored infrastructure – particularly power vacuum, will be reliant IR water and power on limited, yet effective, military Where is key infrastructure relating to water and power? reconstruction activities Figure 5.9 – Operational Planning example (extract) of 3-Column Format Analysis.
100 BJDP-5.00 RISK ANALYSIS
RISK AND OPERATING LEVELS
5.29 BJDP-D Brunei Military Doctrine introduces the concept of risk and risk management within the military context; military risk is defined as the probability and implications of an activity or event, of potentially substantive positive or negative consequences, taking place. Risk indicates the likelihood of something going right or wrong, and the impact, good or bad. The potential adverse consequences of any event (or risk) are generally referred to as threats, and potentially beneficial consequences as opportunities; many events present a combination of the two20. Risk has different implications at different levels of warfare:
a. Strategic Risk. Events that impact upon or change the overall strategic context may have strategic implications, in extremis jeopardising the achievement of desired strategic outcomes. Strategic risks are often associated with national standing, and the ability to exert influence at home and abroad. There may, for example, be an overly optimistic assessment of what the military instrument can achieve, undermining the credibility and potentially even the feasibility of (continuing) military operations. Alternatively, any perceived lack of legitimacy may undermine political and domestic resolve, and support from the international community. Amongst partners in regional or wider coalitions, any lack of cohesion – whether political or military – may also give rise to the risk of discord and, potentially, to dysfunction.
b. Operational Risk. Risk at the operational level is associated with the characteristic gearing between strategic objectives and tactical activity. It may manifest itself in at least 2 different ways.
(1) First, the risk may arise due to an act of operational planning – such as the selection of an
20 The expression ‘risk’ is used to encompass both threats and opportunities, unless it is relevant to distinguish between them. 101 BJDP-5.00 inappropriate CoG or subsequent Decisive Point or Objective. Mis-planning of this sort may threaten the Operational Commander’s achievement of his Operational End State. Alternatively, creating a particular Decisive Point – even an initially ill-judged one – may present an unforeseen opportunity that can be turned to the Operational Commander’s advantage.
(2) Secondly, even an Operational Commander’s best-laid plans may not preclude risk arising during operation execution, either through external events or influences (such as a change in political circumstances) or through the performance of the (Joint) Operational Force (which may include unexpected successes as well as unwelcome reverses). The most likely consequence of operational risk is that the Operational Commander’s freedom of action is curtailed, thereby causing the Operational Force to pause or culminate; however, unexpected successes may also present an opportunity which can be exploited to gain tempo. c. Tactical Risk. Tactical risk arises from the effects of both planned activity and other anticipated events, and the entirely unplanned and unforeseen (events of chance). Planned activity or foreseen events may create both intended and unintended (foreseen and unforeseen) effects, which may be favourable or unfavourable. Favourable effects, whether intended, unintended or even unforeseen, represent opportunities to be seized, while unfavourable effects represent potential threats. Clearly some of these risks can be addressed through contingency planning, but those that are unforeseen, or arise from unforeseen activities or events, are the most difficult to mitigate. Figure 5.10 below illustrates how activities, events and resulting effects may give rise to opportunities and threats:
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Activity or Event Effect Consequence
Intended or Favourable Opportunity foreseen
Planned or foreseen
Unintended and/or Unfavourable Threat unforeseen Un-planned or unforeseen
Figure 5.10 – Tactical Risk.
d. Linkage between Levels of Risk. In the same way that tactical events can have strategic repercussions, and strategic decisions can have tactical implications, so too, risks at the tactical level can have consequences at both the operational and strategic levels. Those managing risk (described below) should always be cognisant of this broader perspective, when assessing likelihood, impact and ownership. Indeed, it may be appropriate for strategic, operational and indeed tactical commanders to compare their assessments of risk, to identify those that are likely to pass down as well as those that could rise up the chain of command.
5.30 Risk Appetite. Military Commanders have always practised risk management in military decision making, but their appetite for risk and their approach to it may vary widely depending on their level of training and experience. Recognising the factors that affect their own and others’ perceptions of risk is an important aspect of the Operational Commander’s leadership. The perceived level of risk is often related to potential losses and gains, and the Operational Commander should apply judgement to weigh, in so far as is possible, the estimated cost against the potential benefits with regards to achievement of the End State. The right attitude of mind is important; one that sees risks not only as threats, but also as
103 BJDP-5.00 potential opportunities to be exploited. Risk analysis and management supports the taking of calculated risks, rather than gambles, while avoiding unduly cautious decision making, and missed opportunities.
5.31 Multi-agency Operations. While Other Government Departments (OGDs) and other civilian partners21 can, and do, work in highly hazardous situations, they may withdraw their personnel if they judge that a lack of security is preventing them from working effectively. Accordingly, the Operational Commander should appreciate the risk appetite of civilian partners, determine their commitment of resources and personnel, and address as an integral part of his planning the consequences of their support being periodically or conditionally unavailable.
5.32 Multinational Operations. In multinational operations the difficulty of risk assessment is compounded as a result of the number and range of potential variables. Two common areas of risk often associated with multinational operations are:
a. Strategic Cohesion. Establishing a multinational aim and associated objectives can prove challenging; unless there is a clear collective purpose, different national interests, domestic politics (including changes of Government), and interpretations of international propriety and obligation, are all likely to impinge. In such a dynamic strategic context, perhaps devoid of an agreed strategy, an Operational Commander has to navigate through a series of national interests and ‘red cards’. Accordingly, some of the most significant risks the Operational Commander may encounter are those associated with multinational cohesion at the strategic level.
b. Multinational Risk Appetite. Each nation determines how its personnel are employed, normally based upon their own acceptable levels of risk. Moreover, as the threat is unlikely to be uniform across the Joint Area of Operations (JAO) and may be
21 For example, non-military departments of multinational partners, International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations. 104 BJDP-5.00 subject to frequent change, risk reduction and mitigation measures are unlikely to be uniform across a Joint Force.
105 BJDP-5.00 RISK ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT
5.33 Military risk analysis is complementary to all military operational planning processes. It seeks to identify and quantify expected risks, and to pursue those that maximise the potential for military advantage without prejudicing the overall military position. While subordinate Commanders should also conduct local reviews, ultimate responsibility for assessment and coordination of risk resides with the Operational Commander, who dictates the overall risk posture accordingly (in conjunction with the direction provided by the strategic military leadership). Risk analysis is an ongoing process, subject to continued review and adaptation in response to the constantly changing situation.
5.34 Risk analysis identifies those activities and events that may give rise to significant risk, assesses their likelihood, potential impact and ownership. Risk management implements plans and activities to reduce the possibility of the events occurring, to mitigate their consequences should they occur, and exploit the opportunities they may present. Risk analysis and management form a continuous process (Figure 5.11), and one that cannot be addressed separately or in isolation from operational design. They are intrinsic to planning as their results lead to refinement and adjustment of the operational plan, and to a series of indicators to be monitored and contingency plans that may be implemented, requiring ongoing operational management.
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Risk Analysis Risk Management
Identify
Assess • Risks (activities & events) Plan • Likelihood • Impacts • Owners/Thos e at risk Manage • Reduction • Mitigation • Exploitation • CONPLANS • Responsibility • I&W • Reassessment
Figure 5.11 – Risk Analysis and Management.
107 BJDP-5.00 RISK ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES
5.35 Military planning is invariably based on the premise that things will, as a rule, go according to plan – that is to say that planned activity will have (at least) the favourable effects intended. Consequently, risk analysis and management tends to focus on the ‘what if’ things do not go to plan, or unplanned things happen, with unfavourable effects. While the rest of this section addresses this aspect of risk, an equally important consideration is how the Operational Commander can best capitalise upon activities or events whose effects are more favourable than anticipated. An appetite for risk is as much to do with seizing fleeting opportunities as it is about preparing for possible setbacks.
5.36 Identifying Risk. Risk identification generally involves recognising what could go wrong, and how it could happen, and should begin from the onset of operational planning. All the steps of OMAP can be used to identify risk, however:
a. Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Area (IPB) and Step 1 (Mission Analysis), Stages 1 and 2 may be used to identify strategic risk, and any consequent operational risks.
b. Step 1 (Mission Analysis), Stages 3 - 5 may be used to identify operational and tactical risks.
c. Further risks may also be identified during Step 2 (Course of Action – COA – Development) and Step 3 (COA Analysis).
5.37 Assessing Risk. Having identified risks, the next stage is to assess them, which should be conducted in parallel with OMAP and especially Step 2 (COA Development). Risk assessment seeks to understand the likelihood of the activity or event occurring, the potential severity of the outcome, and to ascertain who owns each risk (that is to say, who is impacted upon). While risks should be analysed individually, it is also important to understand their collective impact across all levels of command. For instance, an activity may be deemed to have minimal
108 BJDP-5.00 impact at the tactical level but to have significant implications at the strategic level.
5.38 Likelihood and Impact of Risk. Any potential risk should be assessed, in terms of its likelihood and its impact, using all available objective and subjective methods and techniques. The importance or weighting attributed to each risk assists the prioritisation of measures to mitigate or reduce their impact, and aids the development of potential exploitation options:
a. Risk Matrix. The risk of any particular event occurring may be plotted on a matrix, such as that at Figure 5.12, showing likelihood versus impact. An activity or event may, for example, be classified as high likelihood of occurrence, and high impact – overall, a high risk score. To aid subsequent management, the Operational Commander may draw his own risk tolerance line, to provide broad guidance rather than a prescriptive ‘rule’ to be followed. In particular, the acceptable threshold may need to be adjusted to the political situation or context. However, no matter what the nature of the operation, the threshold should not be set to such an extreme that the plan itself becomes risk averse. Casualties, deliberate or accidental, are a reality of military operations and the desire to avoid them totally may well impact adversely on the achievement of the mission; the Operational Commander should always balance the level of acceptable risk with the context of the operation.
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Impact Likelihood Very High High Medium Low Very Low Very High E E H M M High E H M M L Medium H M M L L Low M M L L L Very Low M L L L L
Risk Tolerance Line
Key: E Extremely High; Mission likely to fail. H High Risk; Inability to accomplish all parts of Mission. M Moderate Risk; Mission accomplishment likely but possibility of reduced capability. L Low Risk; Little or no impact on accomplishment of the mission.
Figure 5.12 – Risk Assessment Matrix.
b. Probability Impact Graph. Risk may also be plotted using a Probability Impact Graph, an example of which is at Figure 5.13. This builds on the matrix approach, by plotting each risk in terms of its impact and likelihood, within environmental or thematic areas. This allows the most severe risks to be highlighted, and predictions of trends to be forecast.
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Severe
Risk Low Impact Impact Low Impact
Opponent ROE/Political 1 Insurgents destroy Oil Facilities . 2 4
2 Costal Resupply Route blocked Unlikely Unlikely 5 . through Insurgent Activity 3 Resupply to Oil Site ‘C’ delayed by . bad weather 1 7 4 Adverse Media Coverage Extreme Risk to . Operational 5 Military Intervention by Country ‘Y’ Almost Almost Commander’s . Certain Certain 6 Toxic/Environmental Damage from Mission 8 . Burning Oil Wells
7 Irregular Activity against National 6 . Governance Infrastructure
8 Limited tactical mobility due to
. terrain; heavily reliant upon limited 3 numbers of helicopters
Environment Joint Force
Unlikely Unlikely Prediction Low Impact Severe Low Impact Impact
Figure 5.13 – Probability Impact Graph. c. Risks as Opportunities. While these analytical approaches treat risk predominantly as a threat, they can also be used to better understand any opportunities that might present themselves. Each risk can be analysed both for adverse outcome, but also for the likelihood and impact of favourable advantages that might be gained. For example, weather may present a threat to friendly forces, but may present an even greater threat to potential opponents, thereby providing an opportunity to be exploited. Figure 5.14 illustrates one such approach, whereby each event is plotted for both the threat it could represent, as well as the opportunity it might generate, using side-by-side matrices. The Operational Commander is likely to be particularly interested in events that present the greatest opportunity, or a threat to his plans (denoted by the triangular area).
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V High V High
High High LIKELIHOOD
Medium Medium
LIKELIHOOD Low Low
V Low V Low
V Low Low Medium High V High V High High Medium Low V Low
NEGATIVE IMPACT POSITIVE IMPACT (Threats) (Opportunities)
Figure 5.14 – Threats and Opportunities.
d. Risk Analysis and Decision Making. The techniques described above provide the Operational Commander with some potential frameworks for his deliberations on risk and risk taking. There are other risk models available, with many being software based. While the Operational Commander is free to use any process which aids his thinking, they should be wary of placing too much stall in their outputs. As in all aspects of operating at the operational level, it is the Operational Commander’s skill and judgement that remains of absolute importance when decision making is placed in relation to risk.
5.39 Ownership of Risk. Identifying where risk consequences are likely to be felt, and the most appropriate level of ownership and management, is an important aspect of risk analysis, but not necessarily a straightforward one – even if a risk impacts most severely at one level of command, it’s effects may also be felt at others. The Operational Commander should gain an understanding of the relationship between risks at the tactical, operational and strategic level, and how the impacts of each may pass down or rise up the chain of command. Tactical risks generally deal with the physical cost in terms of life and equipment. While
112 BJDP-5.00 these risks clearly impact upon Component Commanders and their subordinates, they may also have operational, or indeed strategic, implications. Military operations are necessarily linked to political decisions, with a natural tendency for risk to migrate upwards, particularly in complex, multinational or multi-agency operations. Consequently, the Operational Commander should assess whether, and to what extent, tactical risks (whether singly or compounded) could unduly constrain his freedom of action, and therefore where the ‘ownership’ of such risks best lies. Equally, political risks are owned by the Government, but their impacts may cascade down to the Operational Commander. They may not necessarily exercise any control of events associated with them, but they may nonetheless affect the conduct of the operation.
5.40 Risk Reduction, Mitigation and Exploitation. Having identified and assessed likely risks, the Operational Commander and Staff should develop measures to reduce their likelihood, mitigate unfavourable outcomes, and exploit opportunities that may arise. This occurs throughout the OMAP, and specifically during the formulation, development and validation of COAs (Step 2). Associated risks should be amongst the comparative criteria when evaluating differing COAs (Step 3), and feature in the decision brief given to the Operational Commander (Step 4). Operational risks should be prioritised, so that attention can be focused on mitigating the most severe first. The Operational Commander may decide to deal with risks in a variety of ways:
a. Terminate. Removing a risk entirely is always the preferred option wherever possible. Termination may be achieved by changing the plan so the risk no longer presents itself, or through treatment (see below) to the point where the risk no longer represents a threat. Alternatively, the situation may change such that the risk is overtaken by events.
b. Treat. Treating a risk to reduce its impact, or mitigate likely adverse outcomes, is the next best option. Balancing, or trading-off, the various constituent elements of each risk requires considerable skill on the part of the Operational Commander, for military risk-taking can never be considered an exact science. For
113 BJDP-5.00 instance, risks arising through uncertainty may be reduced by the answering of Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), or through the development of I&W to enable timely decision making. The better the situational awareness and control of the variables, the more precisely a risk can be assessed and treated. The Operational Commander may also direct Staff to prepare and issue contingency plans to address any consequences associated with foreseeable risk. At its most extreme, risk treatment may lead to a change in the existing plan, but should always consider the opportunities to be exploited by any risk situation.
c. Tolerate. Provided a risk falls below his personal tolerance line (see Figure 5.12), the Operational Commander may decide to tolerate it without attempting treatment by changing plans or re-directing resources.
d. Transfer. Where a risk cannot be treated, and the Operational Commander is unwilling to tolerate it, he may seek to transfer the risk up the chain of command, or sideways to partners; both require considerable negotiation.
5.41 Directing Risk. Once a COA has been selected for development into a plan (Step 4), risk mitigation options are further refined to a point where they may be managed effectively during the operation. Each risk should be articulated clearly in the Operational Staff Work (directives, plans, and orders) - OSW. It is essential that ownership, potential impacts, assessed likelihood, I&W, and any plans to reduce, mitigate and/or exploit each risk are clearly understood by subordinates. The implications and impact of each risk is likely to vary through the course of the operation. Revisiting risk assessments and plans, included as part of operation effectiveness assessment, is an important on-going remit.
114 BJDP-5.00 CHAPTER 6 – PLANNING DEFINITIONS, TOOLS & TECHNIQUES
OPERATIONAL PLANNING CONCEPTS
6.01 Operational planning uses a variety of building blocks known as Operational Planning Concepts (OPCs) to focus planning (i.e. they aid analysis and understanding and therefore support later decision making), and to describe a plan in directives and orders (i.e. they aid communication). Different concepts have utility at different times during operational planning; not all concepts are useful on all occasions. The following paragraphs might suggest – especially in the calm of an academic environment – that an Operational Commander is forced into adopting a mechanistic approach to planning. However, Chapter 4 provided guidance to suggest that Planning and Decision Making is as much based on human experiences and intuition as it is process. The planning process is but one way to deconstruct a complex problem to a level at which elements of it might be better understood. No matter how carefully any plan is conceived, it is not likely to endure contact with any determined adversary. Operational planning, like most contemporary operations, is highly dynamic. The OPCs relevant to OMAP are explained in the following sections of this Chapter. Figure 6.1 highlights the ‘symbology’ necessary to diagrammatically display these essential OPCs.
115 BJDP-5.00 Operational End State Decisive Point (DP) DP (Number) DP (Number)
Operational DP DP descriptor expressed as Objective DP a noun or verb in completed
Figure 6.1 – Operational Planning Symbology for OMAP.
116 BJDP-5.00 OPERATIONAL END STATES & OBJECTIVES
6.02 The Operational End State. The Operational End State refers to the extent to which the Operational Commander is capable of contributing to the meeting of the National Strategic Aim and Military Objectives (provided within the Commander RBAF’s Directive). The Operational Commander may be provided with his Operational End State, or it may have to be formulated as a result of the Operational planning process that the Commander and his Staff undertake. Subsequent analysis will help the Operational Commander to appreciate the political and military strategic purpose (and the intended relationship with the other instruments of power) behind the specific operational activity for which the Operationally Assigned Forces have be task with. In order to identify the Operational End State, this can be mapped against other strategic outcomes – this is known as Hierarchical Mapping. Figure 6.2 demonstrates provides an example of this mapping, but only shows the military contribution in terms of identified military strategic and operational objectives (this could be expanded to include the contributions of all other associated actors).
117 BJDP-5.00
His Majesty (Prime Minister and Cabinet) National Strategic Aim
National Security Committee (Political Strategic Analysis)
Diplomatic National Strategic Objectives Military
Economic Defence Executive Committee Military Military MilitaryEnd Strategic Strategic Objective Objective State
Military Military Strategic Strategic Objective Objective
Joint Force HQ
Operational Operational Operational Operational EndState Objective Objective Objective Operational Operational Operational Objective Objective Objective
Figure 6.2 – Hierarchical End State Mapping.
6.03 Operational Objective. An Operational Objective is a goal, expressed in terms of one or more Decisive Points, which need to be achieved in order to meet the National Strategic Aim and Military Objectives. Operational Objectives are assigned to the Operational Commander, as part of the overall military strategy; their collective achievement represents the Operational End State. Operational Objectives are expressed using an active verb, e.g. ‘DEFEAT the enemy’, or ‘RESTORE essential infrastructure’. A military operation is seldom, however, conducted in isolation. The Operational Commander’s Operation Objectives are likely to be linked to those of other actors; collaboration is invariably required to ensure that all actors’ activities contribute to the National Strategic Aim and Military Objectives.
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DECISIVE POINTS & SUPPORTING EFFECTS
6.04 Decisive Point. A Decisive Point (DP) represents a specific combination of circumstances, or events deemed necessary to achieve an Operational Objective. In defining this set of circumstances or events DPs can be considered as operational building blocks. DPs may relate to the physical conditions of particular people or places (though they need not be geographically bounded), less tangible virtual phenomena such as the control of information (including its reception, transmission or manipulation), and even psychological factors such as levels of comprehension, mutual trust or cohesion between individuals and organisations. DPs are:
a. Pre-requisites for the achievement of Operational Objectives and, by inference, the Operational End State: e.g. ‘enemy reconnaissance DEFEATed’ or ‘electric power RESTOREd’. They are derived from analysis of the Operational End State (or relevant CoG(s)) – during the earlier OMAP Steps, and then later refined during the latter Steps of the OMAP.
b. Articulated in a way that helps make it clear when they have been achieved. At the same time that the Operational Commander identifies DPs, they should also plan how to assess progress towards them22.
c. DPs are limited in number to ensure that an operation is properly focused, and that effort is duly concentrated on that which is truly decisive.
DPs are the criteria against which the achievements of assigned Operational Objectives are judged. The Operational Commander is
22 For additional clarity, Decisive Points (DPs) can be expressed as a verb in the past tense to described the desired circumstances (for example, Insurgent Leader A deterred), to focus attention on outcomes rather than activity (how Insurgent Leader A is deterred is a matter for subsequent planning). Alternatively the circumstances can be described as the effect and result (i.e if X effect occurs, then Y outcome will result). The latter method can, however, lead to complications in establishing the correct operational under if written in Operational Staff Work (OSW) as it can cause amibiguity. 119 BJDP-5.00 unlikely to create and sustain all the conditions necessary for success without support from other actors. Moreover, the Operational Commander may also be dependent on others for the effective exploitation of DPs. In either circumstance, the Operational Commander should negotiate with others to resolve the situation collaboratively or refer the issue to Commander RBAF for resolution at a higher level.
6.05 Supporting Effects. Supporting Effects (SE) are the intended consequences of actions or activities. DPs are derived through a top-down analysis of Operational Objectives. They are achieved by realising SEs; activities are conducted to create these effects23. Activities may, of course, have unintended effects as well. SEs are:
a. Derived through analysis of DPs, an example of which is shown in Figure 6.3. It may also be appropriate to indicate:
(1) The domain (physical, virtual or cognitive) in which SE are to be realised.
(2) The dimension(s) of the battlespace, including time, in which SEs are to be created. They may be geographically localised or more widely distributed, be instantaneous or delayed, permanent or transitory.
b. Measurable, either directly or indirectly.
c. Used to expand upon the changes or effects required to create the necessary DPs, e.g. ‘insurgents isolated’ or ‘enemy dispositions identified’.
23 Activities are tasks undertaken for specific purposes, that contribute to or realise SEs; for example ‘BLOCKADE of Coastal areas in order to prevent resupply of insurgents by sea’ or ‘DEPLOY Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in order to identify enemy dispositions’. 120 BJDP-5.00
Supporting Effect Insurgent LOCs Interdicted 3.1
DecisiveDecisive Condition Point 3 3 Supporting Effect Local Villages Secured 3.2
Insurgents Isolated Supporting Effect Own LOCs Protected 3.3
Supporting Effect 9.1 ‘Y’ Armed Forces Regrouped
Supporting Effect 9.2 ‘Y’ Police Force Regrouped
Supporting Effect C2 of Armed Forces and DecisiveDecisive Condition Point 9 9 9.3 Police Re-Established
‘Y’ Armed Forces Supporting Effect ‘Y’ Armed Forces Trained and Police 9.4 and Equipped Re-Asserted Supporting Effect ‘Y’ Police Force Trained 9.5 and Equipped
Supporting Effect Achieved through Military Supporting Effect Requires civil-military x.x activity alone x.x cooperation
Figure 6.3 – Deriving SE from analysis of DPs.
6.06 Developing Supporting Effects Schematics. Noting that Supporting Effects (SE) Schematics are commonly referred to as ‘Effects Schematics’, these describe the Operational Commander’s Intent. As such it forms the basis of all subsequent planning in the planning cycle and the foundation of the Operational Plan (OPLAN) product. Effects Schematics provide a useful means to visualise and communicate the Commander’s Intent, or at least one aspect of it by time or space. They can be generated at any stage throughout the planning process to aid in the development, evaluation and selection of Courses of Action COA; however commonly the initial (or first draft) Effects Schematic may be devised by the Operational Commander in the concluding stages of OMAP Step 1 (Mission Analysis). Effects Schematics should also be included within OPLANs and Operational Orders (OPORD) in order to aid subordinate understanding.
121 BJDP-5.00 The SEs included on operational Effects Schematics need not be confined to those from the physical domain; a schematic can also be enriched by inclusion of SEs to be achieved in the virtual and cognitive domains. Figure 6.4 demonstrates how SEs can be diagrammatically displayed on Effects Schematics.
Country ‘Y’ SE 4.2
Town ‘A’ SE 5.1 Capital SE 1.4 SE 1.3 SE 1.2 Oil Site ‘C’ SE 5.3 SE 4.1 SE 4.3 Insurgency Town ‘B’ SE 5.2
SE 1.4 SE 1.3
SE 1.2 – National Governance Structures and Infrastructure SECURED SE 1.3 – Land Access to Eastern Peninsula BLOCKED SE 1.4 – Sea Access to Peninsula Coast DENIED SE 4.2 – Town ‘A’ Oilfields SECURED SE 4.3 – Town ‘B’ Oilfields SECURED SE 5.1 – Town ‘A’ SIEZED SE 5.2 – Town ‘B’ SIEZED SE 5.3 – Insurgent Forces CONTAINED
Figure 6.4 – Example Effects Schematic.
6.07 Linking Decisive Points and Supporting Effects. In the development of Operational Concepts and COAs it is essential that every SE is linked and integrated to achieve one or more DPs. Failure to achieve this will result in inefficient or unnecessary use of resources and capabilities. DPs and SEs should be accounted for using a DE/SE Table (Figure 6.5). These can then be sequenced and synchronised over time 122 BJDP-5.00 and/or Phases (Figures 6.6 and 6.7) – noting Phasing is defined later in this Chapter.
DP 1 SE 1.1 SE 1.2 SE 1.3 SE 1.4 Insurgency Forces Mobilised National Land Access to Sea Access to Isolated Governance Eastern Peninsula Coast Structures and Peninsula Denied Infrastructure Blocked Secured DP 2 SE 2.1 SE 2.2 SE 2.3 SE 2.4 Oil Site ‘C’ Oil Site ‘C’ Oil Site ‘C’ Oil Site ‘C’ Oil Site ‘C’ Resupplied Airhead Secured Resupplied Personnel Personnel Assembled at Evacuated by Air Airhead DP 3 SE 3.1 SE 3.2 Country ‘Y’ International Territorial Waters dissuaded from Community Policed SEs related to Intervening Engaged dormant CONPLAN
DP 4 SE 4.1 SE 4.2 SE 4.3 Oilfields Oil Site ‘C’ Town ‘A’ Oilfields Town ‘B’ Oilfields Secured Secured Secured Freed from Insurgent Control DP 5 SE 5.1 SE 5.2 SE 5.3 Insurgent Town ‘A’ Seized Town ‘B’ Seized Insurgent Forces Forces Contained Defeated DP 6 SE 7.1 SE 7.2 SE 7.3 SE 7.4 Potable Water Sufficient Water Filtration Systems Appropriate Water Provided Sourced Established Water Storage Distribution Established System Established DP 7 SE 8.1 SE 8.2 SE 8.3 Electric Power Sufficient Electric Electricity Grid Power Restored Power Generated Storage Distribution Established Established DP 8 SE 10.1 SE 10.2 National Authority of National Authority Re- National Police governance instated Re-established in Structures Re- Eastern established in Peninsula Eastern Peninsula
Figure 6.5 – DP/SE Table.
123 BJDP-5.00 Phase 1 – Phase 2 – Phase 3 – DC SE Shape Attack Restoration SE 1.1 Forces Mobilised SE 1.2 National Governance Structures and Infrastructure DP 1 Secured Insurgency Isolated SE 1.3 Land Access to
Eastern Peninsula Blocked SE 1.4 Sea Access to
Peninsula Coast Denied SE 2.1 Oil Site ‘C’ Airhead
DP 2 Secured Oil Site ‘C’ Resupplied SE 2.2 Oil Site ‘C’
Resupplied SE 3.1 International DP 3 Community Engaged Country ‘Y’ dissuaded SE 3.2 Territorial Waters from Intervening Policed SE 4.1 Oil Site ‘C’ Secured SE 4.2 Town ‘A’ Oilfields DP 4 Secured Oilfields Secured SE 4.3 Town ‘B’ Oilfields
Freed from Insurgent Control SE 5.1 Town ‘A’ Seized DP 5 SE 5.2 Town ‘B’ Seized Insurgent Forces SE 5.3 Insurgent Forces Defeated Contained SE 6.1 Sufficient Water
Sourced SE 6.2 Filtration Systems
DP 6 Established Potable Water Provided SE 6.3 Appropriate Water
Storage Established SE 6.4 Water Distribution
System Established SE 7.1 Sufficient Electric
Power Generated DP 7 SE 7.2 Electricity Grid
Electric Power Restored Storage Established SE 7.3 Power Distribution
Established SE 8.1 Authority of National Police Re-established in DP 8 Eastern Peninsula National Authority Re- SE 8.2 National governance instated Structures Re-established in Eastern Peninsula
Figure 6.6 – DP/SE Table synchronised by Phases.
124 BJDP-5.00
D D+10 D+20 SE 1.1 Forces Mobilised SE 1.2 National Governance Structures and Infrastructure Secured SE 1.3 Land Access to Eastern Peninsula Blocked SE 1.4 Sea Access to Peninsula Coast Denied SE 2.1 Oil Site ‘C’ Airhead Secured SE 2.2 Oil Site ‘C’ Resupplied SE 3.1 International Community Engaged SE 3.2 Territorial Waters Policed SE 4.1 Oil Site ‘C’ Secured SE 4.2 Town ‘A’ Oilfields Secured SE 4.3 Town ‘B’ Oilfields Freed from Insurgent Control SE 5.1 Town ‘A’ Seized SE 5.2 Town ‘B’ Seized SE 5.3 Insurgent ForcesContained SE 6.1 Sufficient Water Sourced SE 6.2 Filtration Systems Established SE… etc SE… etc
OPLAN 1: D to D+20
OPLAN 2: D+21 to D+40
OPLAN 2: D+21 to D+40
Figure 6.7 – DP/SE Table synchronised by time.
125 BJDP-5.00 6.07 Joint Action. BJDP 3-00, Joint Operations Execution, describes Joint Action in detail; but, in summary it is implemented through coordination and synchronisation of:
Fires (physical or by virtual means to achieve primarily physical effects); Information activities (to manipulate information or perceptions of information to affect understanding); Manoeuvre (used to gain advantage in time and space); and Outreach (including stabilisation, support to governance, capacity building, and regional and key leader engagement).
This definition recognises the centrality of influence as an effect, the integration of activities to realise it and that operational forces may seek to influence a range of actors including themselves, allies, civilian partners and regional audiences in addition to any adversary. Although an integral part of the RBAF’s approach to operations, Joint Action is neither a new capability nor an activity in its own right. It is, instead, a framework for considering the coordination and synchronisation of all military activity within the battlespace. Joint Action is best executed with a unified command so that orchestration can be directed rather than simply invited. It embraces supported and supporting relationships between subordinate commands while delegating the freedom to act, under mission command. In the absence of unity of command, for example, where non-military actors are engaged in activities alongside the military, unity of purpose can help maintain coherence between planned activities. Figure 6.8 illustrates this concept.
126 BJDP-5.00
Joint Force Activity
Capability Fires
Understanding Manoeuvre
Coordination
Influence Will Activity
Supporting Effects OGD Activity
Figure 6.8 – Joint Action and its relationship with Supporting Effects.
6.08 Realising Supporting Effects through Joint Action and Activity. For operational SE to be realised there normally will be a dependency on the completion of Tactical Activities in each Component operating environment. Mission command recognises that events rarely proceed according to a master plan, and while military operations are undertaken to achieve specific effects (in order to improve conditions cumulatively and progressively), experience, intuition and operational art must have their primacy retained. Joint Action provides a framework for the orchestration of fires, influence activities and manoeuvre also all collectively to realise SE. Figure 6.9 to Figure 6.11 demonstrate how the connectivity between DPs, SEs and Activity (through Joint Action) should be coordinated and annotated when constructing and developing COAs during operational planning sequences (OMAP Step 2 – Development of COAs) using Joint Action Tables, Schematics and Synchronisation Matrices.
a. Joint Action Table. A Joint Action Table (Figure 6.9) is used as a tool to reinforce the relationship between DPs, SEs and activities. It also describes where supported/supporting command relationships need to be established.
127 BJDP-5.00 Manoeuvre Influence DP SE Fires Supported Supporting Activity DP 1 SE 1.1 Forces Mobilised Insurgency SE 1.2 National Governance Secure key Isolated Structures and Infrastructure Government Reassure Secured Facilities, National OGD Joint Force Armed Forces Population bases SE 1.3 Land Access to Secure Costal Land Air
Eastern Peninsula Blocked Road Component Component SE 1.4 Sea Access to Maritime Air
Peninsula Coast Denied Component Component DP 2 SE 2.1 Oil Site ‘C’ Airhead Secure Air Land
Oil Site ‘C’ Secured Airhead Component Component Resupplied SE 2.2 Oil Site ‘C’ Resupplied Air Land
Component Component DP 3 SE 3.1 International Engage Country ‘Y’ Community Engaged through OGD Joint Force dissuaded from International Intervening Organisations SE 3.2 Territorial Waters Maritime Air
Policed Component Component DP 4 SE 4.1 Oil Site ‘C’ Secured Land Air
Oilfields Secured Component Component SE 4.2 Town ‘A’ Oilfields
Secured SE 4.3 Town ‘B’ Oilfields
Freed from Insurgent Control DP 5 SE 5.1 Town ‘A’ Seized Artillery & Land Air & Maritime Insurgent Forces Naval Gunfire Component Component Defeated Support
128 BJDP-5.00 Manoeuvre Influence DP SE Fires Supported Supporting Activity SE 5.2 Town ‘B’ Seized SE 5.3 Insurgent Forces
Contained DP 6 SE 6.1 Sufficient Water Secure key Land
Potable Water Sourced water sources Component Provided SE 6.2 Filtration Systems
Established SE 6.3 Appropriate Water
Storage Established SE 6.4 Water Distribution
System Established DP 7 SE 7.1 Sufficient Electric
Electric Power Power Generated Restored SE 7.2 Electricity Grid Storage
Established SE 7.3 Power Distribution
Established DP 8 SE 8.1 Authority of National Reassure National Authority Police Re-established in population on Land OGD Re-instated Eastern Peninsula Eastern Component Peninsula SE 8.2 National governance Structures Re-established in Eastern Peninsula
Figure 6.9 – Joint Action Table.
129 BJDP-5.00 b. Joint Action Schematics. An Operational Commander uses Joint Action as a framework with which to plan, coordinate and synchronise, and then execute activities to realise SEs. The full range of available capabilities should be exploited - joint and multinational, orchestrated fires, influence activities and manoeuvre together to optimise their coherent impact. The Operational Commander should consider, where appropriate, those multiagency activities which, while not under the assigned forces control, might be coordinated with the assigned operational forces military activities in order to better achieve the directed SEs. He may establish supported/supporting relationships between Component Commanders for each effect, while delegating the maximum practicable freedom of action as to how these activities are conducted. Joint Action Schematics (Figure 6.10) are a useful means by which planned activities can be described and communicated. It is unlikely that a single schematic could depict the entirety of an operation. More likely is that respective Operational Orders (OPORDs) (and associated Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs)) will use Joint Action Schematics to depict the key activities involved in a particular phase, stage or period of the operation.
130 BJDP-5.00
Country ‘Y’
Broadcast messages of reassurance Town ‘A’
Capital
Oil Site ‘C’
Broadcast messagesInsurgency of reassurance Town ‘B’
Figure 6.10 – Joint Action Schematic. c. Joint Action Synchronisation Matrices. Linked to the construction of a Joint Action Schematic, which displays SE in terms of space, a Joint Action Synchronisation Matrix (Figure 6.11) describes the same effects in terms of time.
131 BJDP-5.00
D D+10 D+20 Fires & Manoeuvre
SF Planned Activity… Planned Activity… Component Planned Activity…
Land Access to Eastern Peninsula Blocked Land Airhead Secured Insurgent Forces Contained Component Town ‘A’ Seized Town ‘B’ Seized
Territorial Waters Policed Maritime Sea Access to Peninsula Coast Denied Component Oilfields Secured Planned Activity…
Planned Activity… Planned Activity… Air Resupply Oil Site ‘C’ Planned Activity… Component Planned Activity…
Logistics Planned Activity… Planned Activity… Component Planned Activity… Planned Activity…
Influence Reassure National Population Planned Activity… Planned Activity… Activities Planned Activity…
Engage through International Organisations OGD Planned Activity… Planned Activity… Planned Activity…
Figure 6.11 – Joint Action Synchronisation Matrix.
132 BJDP-5.00 LINES & GROUPINGS OF OPERATION
6.09 Lines and Groupings of Operation. Termed Lines of Operation (LoO) and/or Groupings of Operation, both are used to visualise the linkages and relationships between DPs, Operational Objectives, the Operational End State and CoG(s) in both time and space. As operations are conditions-based and therefore must be adaptive to events, a LoO indicates a route rather than a timetable of events. They indicate how, and in what order (and with what dependencies), it is envisaged that the activities of the Joint Operational Force will contribute to the achievement of the DPs and desired outcomes, but without stipulating precisely when. For this reason Groupings of Operation rather than LoO, especially in the initial stages of operational design, may offer a more appropriate means of visualisation. Depending upon the nature of the crisis, lines or groupings of operations may be environmental (air, maritime, etc), functional (force protection, intelligence, manoeuvre, etc) or thematic (governance, security, etc). Environmental lines may be appropriate for traditional warfighting between 2 opponents; thematic lines may better suit complex crises.
6.10 Sequencing and Synchronisation.
a. Sequencing. Sequencing is the arrangement of activities within an operation in the order most likely to achieve Operational Objectives and/or DPs. Sequencing is represented by the logical ordering of effects and activities based on how they relate to each other; that is, effect/activity ‘B’ is to follow ‘A’.
b. Synchronisation. Synchronisation addresses time and space; effect/activity ‘B’ is to occur at a certain time in a specific place that differs from ‘A’.
Sequencing establishes order and synchronisation establishes feasibility (especially where activities compete for finite resources). Broadly speaking: DPs are sequenced; SEs are sequenced and may be synchronised; activities are sequenced and synchronised. The Staff process of sequencing and synchronisation can make a considerable contribution to the successful balancing of ends, ways and means.
133 BJDP-5.00 6.11 Phases. An operational plan may be expressed in conditions- based phases, characterised by a predominant type of military activity, or a particular set of DPs that bear close relation to one or more Operational Objectives. Phasing assists an Operational Commander to plan his operation logically; it provides a framework for planning and execution, but should not be seen as prescriptive, over-simplistic or absolute.
Figures 6.12 to 6.16 provide examples of how the articulate diagrammatically the use of LoO and Groupings of Operation to provide a visual representation of the relationships between DP, SE, Operational Objectives, Operational End States and CoGs.
134 BJDP-5.00
Current Situation Favorable Situation
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Shape Attack Restoration
LoO 1 DP 4 Operational (Maritime) Operational Objective End State B Operationa LoO 2 Opponent l Objective The Defeat of DP 1 DP 5 Operational A the Insurgency (Land) CoG and the Re- establishment of LoO 3 National DP 2 Government (Air) Operational Authority LoO 4a – Governance Objective DP 8 D LoO 4 DP 3 (Civ/Mil DP 6 DP 7 Operational Own CVs Objective Own LoO 4b – Infrastructure 1. C Operational 2. CoG 3.
Operational End State The Defeat of the Insurgency and theRe - establishment of National Government Authority Operational Objective A Operational Objective B Operational Objective C Operational Objective D Insurgency Contained Insurgency Defeated Restore Essential Services Re- establish National Governance DP 1 Insurgency Isolated DP 4 Oilfields Secured DP 6 Potable Water Provided DP 8 National Authority Re- DP 2 Oil Site ‘C’ Resupplied DP 5 Insurgent Forces DP 7 Electric Power instated DP 3 Country ‘Y’ dissuaded Defeated Restored from Intervening
Figure 6.12 – Example 1: LoO – Bi-Polar CoG.
135 BJDP-5.00
National Strategic Aim/National Strategic Objectives/
Civ/Mil Military Strategic Objectives
Operational End State DP 8 Maritime
DP 3
DP 6 DP 4 DP 7 DP 1 Opponent Operational DP 5 CoG
DP 2
Air Own CoG Land
Operational End The Defeat of the Insurgency andState theRe - establishment of National Government Authority
Operational Objective A Operational Objective B Operational Objective C Operational Objective D Insurgency Contained Insurgency Defeated Restore Essential Services Re- establish National Governance DP 1 Insurgency Isolated DP 4 Oilfields Secured DP 6 Potable Water Provided DP 8 National Authority Re- DP 2 Oil Site ‘C’ Resupplied DP 5 Insurgent Forces DP 7 Electric Power instated DP 3 Country ‘Y’ dissuaded Defeated Restored from Intervening
Figure 6.13 – Example 2: Groupings of Operation – Bi-Polar CoG.
136 BJDP-5.00
Current Situation Favorable Situation
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Intervention Sustainment Transition and Withdrawal
LoO Operational 1 DP 3 DP 4 End State (Governance) Operational Objective Security conditions B LoO in which the threat 2 DP 1 DP 2 of violence and civil (Security) war has been Operational curtailed thereby Objective A allowing Country ‘X’ LoO 3 DP 5 DP 6 to generate mature (Electoral Reform) political structures, supported by reliable LoO 4 DP 7 DP 8 infrastructure and (Reconstruction) governance Operational Objective C Focal Ability to CoG Govern
Operational End State Security conditions in which the threat of violence and civil war has been curtailed thereby allowing Country ‘X’ to generate mature political structures, supported by reliable infrastructure and governance Operational Objective A Operational Objective B Operational Objective C Provide Security across Establish Governance across Restore Country ‘X’ Country ‘X’ Country ‘X’ Infrastructure DP 1 Secure Environment DP 3 Interim Governance Provided DP 7 Key Infrastructure Restored DP 2 MaintainedSelf- sustaining Security DP 4 Self- Governance Established DP 8 Sustainable Infrastructure Established DP 5 Electoral Process Reformed Established DP 6 Elected Government Empowered Figure 6.14 – Example 3: LoO – Focal CoG.
137 BJDP-5.00 National Strategic Aim/National Strategic Objectives/ Governance Military Strategic Objectives
Electoral Reform Operational End State
DP 6
DP 2 DP 4
DP 3 DP 5 Own CoG DP 8
Ability to Govern DP 1 DP 7 Security Reconstruction
Operational End Security conditions in which the threat of violence andState civil war has been curtailed thereby allowing Country ‘X’ to generate mature political structures, supported by reliable infrastructure and governance Operational Objective A Operational Objective B Operational Objective C Provide Security across Establish Governance across Restore Country ‘X’ Country ‘X’ Country Infrastructure DP 1 Secure Environment Maintained DP 3 Interim Governance‘X’ DP 7 Key Infrastructure Restored DP 2 Self- sustaining Security DP 4 ProvidedSelf- Governance DP 8 Sustainable Infrastructure Established DP 5 ElectoralEstablished Process Established DP 6 ElectedReformed Government Empowered
Figure 6.15 – Example 4: Groupings of Operation – Focal CoG.
138 BJDP-5.00 Current Situation Favorable Situation
Phase Phase 2 Phase 3 Intervention1 Sustainment Transition and Withdrawal LoO DP 3 Interim Governance Provided Operational End 1 State (Governance) DP 4 Self -Governance Established Security conditions in which the threat DP 1 Secure Environment Maintained LoO of violence and civil 2 (Security) DP 2 Self -sustaining Security Established war has been curtailed thereby allowing Country ‘X’ LoO DP 5 Electoral process Reformed to generate mature 3 (Electoral Reform) DP 6 Elected Government Empowered political structures, supported by reliable LoO DP 7 Key Infrastructure Reformed infrastructure and 4 governance (Reconstruction) DP 8 Sustainable Infrastructure Established Coalition Coalition Capability Focal Ability to Cohesion Coalition CoG Govern Employability Coalition Authority Operational End State Security conditions in which the threat of violence and civil war has been curtailed thereby allowing Country ‘X’ to generate mature political structures, supported by reliable infrastructure and governance Operational Objective A Operational Objective B Operational Objective C Provide Security across Establish Governance across Restore Country ‘X’ Country ‘X’ Country ‘X’ Infrastructure DP 1 Secure Environment Maintained DP 3 Interim Governance DP 7 Key Infrastructure Restored DP 2 Self- sustaining Security DP 4 SelProvided- Governance Established DP 8 Sustainable Infrastructure Established DP 5 fElectoral Process Established DP 6 ElectedReformed Government Empowered Figure 6.16 – Example 5: Lines/Groupings of Operation – Focal CoG.
139 BJDP-5.00 CHANGES IN THE OPERATIONAL PLAN
6.11 Contingency Plans. A contingency plan is defined as a plan that is produced in advance in preparation for potential military activity to be conducted in the future. Unintended effects (which may be positive or negative) are inevitable and should be planned for. Risk analysis and management (see Chapter 5) together with Red Teaming, Wargaming and Operational Analysis (see Chapters 5 and 11) identify requirements for Contingency Plans (CONPLANS). Some activities will have unforeseeable effects; these cannot be planned for in advance, but the possibility that such effects may arise (unexpectedly) requires agility on the part of the Operational Commander. CONPLANs address both reverses (which must be countered) and opportunities (which must be seized) 24 . The Operational Commander can execute CONPLANS using elements of his assigned (Joint) Operational Force that are already committed, with an attendant opportunity cost, or by using an uncommitted Reserve. There are 2 forms of CONPLAN:
a. Branch. A branch provides an alternative way (different combination of supporting effects and activity) to achieve a DP within a given phase of the operation.
b. Sequel. A sequel provides an alternative option for the next phase of an operation, based upon the outcome of the preceding phase. The default sequel is the next planned phase, but there may be alternatives, such as the creation of DP in a different order or sequence.
Branches and sequels are usually expressed in terms of alternative, or successive SE, or groups of SE to create DP in different ways or in different orders. If the situation changes significantly, or an assigned Operational End State is modified, then the Operational Commander may also be obliged to consider alternative DPs. Figure 6.17 describes the relationships between LoO and Branches and Sequels.
24 Note the important difference between CONPLANs and contingency planning. The former are written with clear intent and form part of crisis response planning; the latter are not written with intent, but are an appraisal of potential RBAF military involvement in future crises. Indicators and Warnings (I&W) are an implicit element of contingency planning. 140 BJDP-5.00
Space
DP DP DP DP 1 2 5 4 LoO 1
DP DP DP DP 1 2 5 4 Operational End State
LoO 2 Operational CoG DP 6 Branch
DP DP DP 1 3 4
LoO 3
Time Figure 6.17 – Using Branches and Sequels.
6.12. Operational Fulcrum. An Operational Fulcrum is a point in a contested operation where one side starts losing and the other starts winning – where the tide turns and the initiative switches irreversibly. In practice, reaching an operational fulcrum is difficult to predict in advance. However, the very act of attempting to define it and its distinctive criteria can help to identify opportunities to create the requisite conditions for success.
141 BJDP-5.00 6.13 Culminating Point. A military force reaches its Culminating Point when operations are just maintained but not developed to any greater advantage. Making use of the culminating point (either exploiting an opponent’s or responding to that of one’s own force to break a potential deadlock) is intrinsically difficult for two reasons. Firstly, it is often challenging to identify in advance what criteria bring about culmination. During combat, an attacking force culminates when it is unable either to sustain or re-launch an offensive and is limited inescapably to defence. During stabilisation, a Force may culminate if it loses authority. Secondly, even if the criteria are known, it is often hard to determine (at the time) when the criteria are met. Culminating Points can be physical or more abstract. Studying historic operations or campaigns, as well as effective and timely assessment may allow the Operational Commander to appreciate when and where he should bring his influence to bear. The possibilities are unlimited; it could be through Key Leader Engagement, KLE, (friendly, adversary or neutral) as much as it might be the timely initiation of an operational branch or sequel. The Operational Commander who recognises the imminent culmination of an opponent should act swiftly to exploit the situation and to drive home the advantage against a Force that is stalled. If an Operational Commander recognises his own prospective culmination with sufficient notice, then they may defer or even prevent its onset, by imposing an operational pause, reassigning resources (including the Reserve), or executing a relevant CONPLAN.
6.14 Operational Pause. An Operational Pause can be imposed out of necessity (e.g. a change in mandate) or through choice (e.g. to allow time for the orchestration of military and non-military activity, or as part of a deception plan) in order to retain the initiative. Although a pause tends to reduce tempo, at least in the short term, it can also provide greater effectiveness and improved tempo later on. Indeed, implicit in the term ‘pause’ is the ability to re-activate the operation in order to regain the initiative and re-establish momentum. An Operational Pause can apply to a whole operation or to just one LoO (in order to concentrate effort on other LoOs). Therefore, an Operational Pause should be clearly identified (along with its causes and conditions), preferably in advance, and never allowed simply to occur. Regaining the initiative afterwards may require a
142 BJDP-5.00 concerted effort, purposefully planned and clearly directed, to include any necessary reallocation of resources or reassignment of missions and tasks.
143 BJDP-5.00 OPERATIONAL PLANNING PRODUCTS
6.15 While the RBAF’s OMAP is the principal tool for operational level planning; it acts as the foundation for subsequent operational management. Once initial planning is complete, the Operational Plan provides both an expression of operational design and the means by which it is managed. Operational management involves actionable directives and orders, the orchestration of capabilities and activities, and the assessment of progress. In much the same way that OMAP is kept under continual or at least periodic review, so too must an Operational Plan be. Throughout an OMAP cycle the Operational Commander issues Warning Orders to the assigned Joint Operational Forces. This section examines the products that are issued by an Operational HQ to subordinates which result from the conduct of an operational planning process cycle.
6.16 Warning Orders. Warning Orders (WngO) indicate Commander’s Intent to subordinates, who are then able to contribute to higher level planning and also conduct their own informed planning. The Operational Commander should strike a balance between providing too little information too late, and inundating subordinates with a succession of evolving, but potentially contradictory, directions. There is no prescribed format; WngOs are likely to become progressively more definitive as the planning process progresses.
6.17 Operational Plans. The Operational Commander should have a single plan, albeit this may be nested within a broader Integrated Approach, including:
a. Analysis of the background to the crisis, as well as its causes, and any assumptions and limitations upon which planning is based.
b. The Mission and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) – which includes Intent, Scheme of Manoeuvre (SoM) and Main Effort (ME).
144 BJDP-5.00 c. The assignment of Force Elements (FE) between components and prioritisation of logistic effort.
d. Command and Control (C2) and liaison arrangements for the Joint Force, and arrangements for comprehensive, inter- agency coordination.
6.18 Directives, Plans and Orders. Operational Plans more likely to be conveyed in a series of documents; rather than just one. Formats may vary based on Commander and Subordinate relationships (Operational formats for the RBAF are detailed within JFHQ SOPs), but should include:
a. Operational Directive. An Operational Directive, produced by J5, provides the Operational Force‘s Mission, and the Operational Commander’s CONOPS.
b. Operational Plan (OPLAN). An OPLAN, produced by J5, provides the detailed CONOPS for the near-term phase(s) of the operation. It provides increased resolution and precision on selected aspects of the overall operation. An OPLAN can trigger force preparation and the detailed synchronisation of activities (fires, influence activities and manoeuvre) between subordinate commands and other agencies. The development of an OPLAN should identify any requirement for subsequent CONPLANs.
c. Operational Order (OPORD). An OPORD is produced by J325, in collaboration with Component Commanders (CCs) and, where appropriate, OGDs and other agencies. It provides detailed direction and authorisation for the execution of a phase, period or stage of an operation, or for a specific operation itself:
(1) Each OPORD is derived from an OPLAN (or CONPLAN) and includes: Component missions and tasks (with associated purposes directly related to SEs); and a comprehensive CONOPS.
25 specifically the element of J3 that has worked with J5 and will be responsible for taking over the plan for operational execution – commonly known as J3/5 145 BJDP-5.00
(2) Fragmentary Orders (FragO) are produced by J3 Current Operations (commonly referred to as J3/3) to achieve a specific purpose. Each one is related to and serves to amend a particular OPORD; a FragO cannot stand in isolation. An OPORD may remain extant for several weeks, or even months, during which time a series of FragOs may be issued to refine and alter it to address emerging issues and challenges.
d. Force Instruction Document. A Force Instruction Document (FID) provides supplementary instructions and supporting information to the Joint Operational Force; it complements the Operational Directive, and subsequent OPLANs and OPORDs.
6.19 Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The Operational Commander’s CONOPS is the most important aspect of his Operational Plan; it provides an enduring reference point to which subordinates can refer in order to confirm their understanding of Commander’s Intent and to orientate themselves to their role in his overall scheme. In setting out the Operational Commander’s vision to subordinates, an indication of what lies ahead must be incorporated, including the likely nature and scope of subsequent orders and plans. Clarity is vital. As a guide, the Operational Commander’s CONOPS should run to no more than a side (or 2 as a maximum) of A4 paper. While the Operational Commander should have engaged with his Superior Commander (likely to be Commander RBAF) throughout the planning process, he may nonetheless wish to confirm his proposed concept prior to promulgation, giving him an opportunity to endorse the plan formally and, if necessary, obtain political approval. The Operational Commander’s CONOPS is described at various levels: the Operational Directive (the what), the OPLAN (the how) and the OPORD (task and purpose). Each should include:
a. Commander’s Intent. Intent is a concise and precise statement of how the Operational Commander intends to achieve his assigned Operational End State. It should demonstrate the
146 BJDP-5.00 enduring logic underlying the operation. The Operational Commander can usefully reinforce intent by re-stating it on each occasion that direction is provided to subordinates. Commander’s Intent should be broadly enduring, unless there is a significant change to the situation or the mission. b. Scheme of Manoeuvre. A Scheme of Manoeuvre (SoM) describes how the Operational Commander sees the operation unfolding; it sets the missions assigned to Subordinate Commanders in a broader (and potentially multi-agency) context. It explains where, when and how the Joint Operational Force is to achieve its purpose, so that Subordinate Commanders can understand their role in the overall plan. c. Main Effort. The Operational Commander declares the operational Main Effort (ME) to direct the concentration of capability or activity in order to bring about a specific outcome. ME indicates what the Operational Commander considers to be crucial to the success of the operation. The ME is given substance in a variety of ways:
(1) Additional resources may be allocated to the lead Component assigned to the ME.
(2) Other Components may be assigned specific tasks to support the ME either directly or indirectly.
(3) Other steps may be taken, such as the narrowing of boundaries and economy of effort elsewhere, to concentrate fighting power.
Cognisant of the Operational Commander’s ME and priorities, subordinates can use their initiative to take timely and independent decisions and action, thereby optimising tempo. A Subordinate Commander may declare his own ME to support that of the Operational Commander.
147 BJDP-5.00 d. Key Themes and Messages. The key themes are the essential ideas in the Operational Commander’s concept or intention that have been derived from the narrative. They are designed for broad communication across all target audiences and explain the overarching operational plan. They are supported by messages that are more narrowly focussed on specific target audiences.
6.20 Mission Statements. The Operational Commander should write a mission – a clear concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose – for each of his Subordinate Commanders. There are 3 broad types of mission statement: single tasks; multiple tasks; and (usually for Reserves) a list of contingent or ‘Be Prepared To’ (BPT) tasks.
a. Each mission statement contains task, purpose, and unifying purpose (the ‘in order to’ or effect required in relation to the CONOPS). Subordinates’ freedom of action and scope for initiative is made clear.
b. The sum of the purposes, of all the Operational Commander’s mission statements, covers all the SoM (otherwise some aspect has been left untasked).
c. Mission statements are expressed precisely and unequivocally, using defined language. This is particularly important in multinational operations, where orders are translated, and in multi-agency situations where military terminology has to be interpreted (abbreviations and jargon should be omitted).
6.21 Missions for Reserves. The Operational Commander should distinguish between his Reserve and Echelon Forces. Echelon Forces are those that, while not committed initially, have an explicit role in the plan; they have a given mission. Reserve Forces are uncommitted in the plan but are retained to deal with unforeseen circumstances, to exploit unexpected success or guard against setbacks. They should be given planning tasks or options, rather than a mission within the plan. Once
148 BJDP-5.00 committed, they should be given a specific mission; and a further Reserve must be generated.
149 BJDP-5.00
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150 BJDP-5.00 PART 3 – RBAF JOINT OPERATIONAL PLANNING THE OPERATIONAL MILITARY APPRECIATION PROCESS (OMAP)
151 BJDP-5.00 CHAPTER 7 – OMAP BACKGROUND
CONTEXT
7.01 The Operational Military Appreciation Process (OMAP) is like any other operational military planning process, as it acts a tool to facilitate problem solving and decision making by structuring analysis and cognitive action in a constructive and orderly manner. The RBAF’s OMAP has evolved as an operational planning process from similar methods and tools used by regional partners. However, in its evolution it has been designed to specifically reflect and support the requirements placed on the RBAF in it’s delivery of enhanced operational planning capability.
7.02 The MAP Series of Planning Tools. The development of OMAP provides one of a series of similar integrated planning processes that link tactical planning and operational planning by use of a similar Military Appreciation Process. At the time of this publication going live, the full series remains under development (specifically at the tactical level). Once complete the series will include:
a. OMAP. OMAP represents the planning tool for all operational level HQs within the RBAF (which include the Joint Force Headquarters, JFHQ; and the three Single Service Headquarters 26 ). The OMAP must also be used by those academic and training establishments that seek to train military personnel in the area of Joint Operational Planning.
b. TMAP (Tactical Military Appreciation Process). The TMAP planning tool is designed for use at Unit level (or Single Service equivalents) for tactical level planning. TMAP is to be further divided as follows (noting that respective Single Services will have different uses and applications for the general descriptors provided below):
(1) TMAP (Deliberate). TMAP (Deliberate) is designed for Unit level planning where there is likely to be both sufficient resource (including Staff quality and quantity) and time prior to the commencement of tactical activity. TMAP (Deliberate) can be used at lower levels;
26 Note: this publication uses ‘J’ terminology when indicating Staff branch function (e.g. J2 or J5). The use of this terminology equally relates to the equivalent Staff branches in the Single Service HQs). 152 BJDP-5.00 however, its use has the potential to over complicate the execution of low level tactical actions. Increased experience operating with the TMAP (Deliberate) method, will support smooth transition to OMAP for those Staff that progress to Operational HQs.
(2) TMAP (Quick). TMAP (Quick) is designed for use below sub-unit, where it is likely that neither time nor resources will be available to conduct more detailed planning. TMAP (Quick) is introduced to decision makers from the point of initial training (e.g. OCS) and should be used by tactical planners in both operational and routine conduct to ensure that familiarity in both process and analysis becomes second nature.
153 BJDP-5.00 OMAP OVERVIEW
7.03 OMAP Purpose. The RBAF’s OMAP is for use primarily at the Operational level; however it is equally useable for the planning of Joint Campaigns. The application of the OMAP planning tool is designed to support the production of comprehensive and coherent Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) which can subsequently be used to develop integrated and synchronised operational plans and orders. Like all other military planning tools it supports rational analysis, problem solving and decision making; but, as such, it will not provide the planner with answers – the answers are reliant on his/her experience and knowledge (with some intuition). However, continued exposure to the OMAP tool will increase familiarity and support the development of cognitive ability.
7.04 OMAP Structure. Figure 7.1 details the OMAP approach. Chapters 8 -12 of this publication provide a description of the process in order to allow the operational planner sufficient guidance to undertake their tasks27. In summary, the OMAP follows a four step process, with the conduct of IPB acting as a continuous ‘fifth step’ spanning the full duration of the planning cycle. The OMAP Steps are:
a. Intelligence Preparation of the Battle Area (IPB) – Chapter 8.
b. OMAP Step 1 (Mission Analysis) – Chapter 9.
c. OMAP Step 2 (COA Development) – Chapter 10.
d. OMAP Step 3 (COA Analysis) – Chapter 11.
e. OMAP Step 4 (Decision and Execution) – Chapter 12.
27 Operational Planning Staff, particularly specialists must cross-reference this publication with other doctrinal guidance provided in the RBAF’s suite of ‘functional’ operational doctrine (e.g. BJDP-2.00 Joint Intelligence and BJDP-4.00 Logistic Support to Joint Operations). 154 BJDP-5.00
Step 1: Mission Analysis Step 2: COA Development • Review the situation • Confirm COG • Identify Superiors Commander’s • Conduct CC Analysis Commander’s Intent and Guidance • Develop Decisive Point identify own mission and Lines of Operation • Identify and analyses • Develop Broad COA tasks • Develop detailed COA • Identify and analyse • Test COA freedom of action • Identify and analyse critical facts and assumptions • Draft commander’s guidance
Viable COAs The Plan Branches and Supporting Plan Sequels and Orders
Step 4: Decision and Step 3: COA Analysis Execution • Determine Wargame start • Compare the COAs states • Select the preferred COA • Select Wargame method • Develop and issue the • Select the Wargame plan record • Conduct the Wargame • Execute the plan
Modified COAs
Figure 7.1 – The RBAF’s Operational Military Appreciation Process (OMAP).
155 BJDP-5.00 OMAP PREPARATION
7.05 Mental agility is essential in tackling the realities any planning process conduct (generally with imperfect or incomplete information, in uncertain and changing circumstances and against challenging timelines). Sound preparation, delegation, proven Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), and concurrent activity at all levels (triggered by timely Warning Orders) can mitigate much of the friction.
7.06 Planning Timelines. A planning timeline, showing what Staff actions must be complete by when, is fixed by the time orders and directives need to be conveyed to subordinates. This is different from consideration of time as a factor in the planning process itself, which gives rise to a separate Operational Timeline. Further guidance is provided in Chapter 9 (para 9.08).
7.07 Planning Teams. The size, composition and modus operandi of an Operational Commander’s planning team should be decided in advance. The team should be trained and practised wherever possible. Human Factors research indicates strongly that the composition, experience and degree of collaboration displayed by a planning team is one of the biggest factors determining its ability to plan well. Notwithstanding the dangers of ‘group-thinking’ (coming to premature conclusions that affirm prevailing assumptions), the importance of a well-practised, efficient planning team is as fundamental as the quality of the information it works with. The key planning and coordination forums which take place as a crisis breaks are:
a. Operational Command Group. A Operational Command Group (OCG) initiates operational planning, meeting as required at the outset of a crisis, and on a regular basis once the operation has begun. Core membership of a OCG is likely to include the Operational Commander, the Deputy Commander and the Chief of Staff (COS). Potential other inclusions in the OCG may include specialists like a Political Adviser (POLAD) and/or a Legal Adviser (LEGAD) if allocated. A OCG may grow depending on the size of the Joint Force Headquarters (HQ) to include lead functional officers from the Staff branches. Component commanders, Force
156 BJDP-5.00 Elements (FE), and other multi-agency partners may also participate. Indeed, early representation from multi-agency partners, where appropriate, may significantly improve the overall coordination and synchronisation of the operation. The role of the OCG is to prioritise the planning effort and provide direction and guidance. Within the estimate process the OCG develops situational understanding, conducts early Mission Analysis, and assists the Operational Commander by providing direction on the formulation of early possible Courses of Action (COA), depending on the situation. b. Operational Planning Group. The Operational Planning Group (OPG) is the principal working level planning group for the Operational HQ. Under the direction of J5, it fuses planning by drawing representation from across the Staff branches. Importantly, it also includes Component level representation. Notwithstanding the requirement for cross-HQ participation and input, J2 representation is fundamental to the conduct of the Group and the products produced; indeed, J2 may open meetings with an intelligence update. It is through this mechanism that emerging issues and concerns are addressed, priorities assigned and the developing plan endorsed. Initially, during planning cycles, the OPG will meet only when necessary, although this should be at least daily to allow J5 to outline and update the planning schedule, and highlight deadlines or points for clarification or direction. In this way, emerging thinking can be tempered by factors and constraints. Within the planning process, the primary function of the OPG is to: evaluate objects and factors; develop and validate COA; evaluate COA relative merits for the Operational Commander’s selection; and produce the Operational Directives.
157 BJDP-5.00 CHAPTER 8 – INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLE AREA (IPB)
‘By the word ‘information’ we denote all the knowledge which we have of the enemy and his country; therefore, it is in part the foundation of all our ideas and actions. The commander…finds himself in a constant whirlpool of false and true information…’ Carl von Clausewitz
IPB PROCESS
8.01 The IPB process is conducted in four steps and is designed to integrate comprehensively throughout an OMAP planning sequence. The four steps of IPB do not correspond with the steps of the OMAP. IPB is not conducted in isolation by J2 Staff (although they have the lead) – it must be a collaborative effort by all Staff branches within the Operational HQ with the Operational Commander holding ultimate responsibility for its conduct. Figure 8.1 highlights the four IPB Steps:
DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL BATTLESPACE
STEP 1
THREAT INTEGRATION
STEP STEP 4 2
EFFECTS OF THE OPERATIONAL STEP ENVIRONMENT 3
THREAT EVALUATION
Figure 8.1 – IPB Process. 158 BJDP-5.00
8.02 Chapter 8 acts a summary of the IPB Process to be conducted during OMAP planning cycles. Further guidance is provided within BJDP- 2.00 ‘Joint Intelligence’ and the RBAF’s Intelligence Operators Handbook. Operational planners must be familiar with the contents of this Chapter and also the contents of the aforementioned references to ensure that IPB is conducted correctly and in a sufficient level of detail.
159 BJDP-5.00 IPB STEPS
IPB STEP 1 – DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL BATTLESPACE
8.03 IPB Step 1 (Define the Operational Battlespace) outlines the broad situation in terms of environment, stakeholders and own forces. It also identifies, for further analysis, significant characteristics of the battlespace. The outcome of this Step is to determine the Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AIR) and the Area of Intelligence Interest (AII). IPB Step 1 also aims to provide the Commander and Staff with sufficient background knowledge of the environment’s characteristics that may affect both the friendly and adversary Courses of Action (COAs). These characteristics may include terrain; force capability; cultural, political and religious stakeholders; infrastructure; economic data; Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC); Laws of the Sea and identification of critical Human factors.
8.04 IPB Step 1 is conducted in five stages, as follows:
a. Stage 1 – Review the existing situation.
b. Stage 2 – Scope the threat.
c. Stage 3 – Identify significant operational environment characteristics.
d. Stage 4 – Determine battlespace limitations (AIR and AII).
e. Stage 5 – Draft Priority Intelligence Requirements.
Each stage of IPB Step 1 is explained in turn in the following paragraphs.
8.05 Stage 1 – Review the Existing Situation. This is either a wide- ranging examination of the new situation faced by an Operational HQ or a simple objective examination at the end of one Phase of the operation and the start of the next. The review will: elicit the overall context in which operational military conduct is to be undertaken; determine the range of
160 BJDP-5.00 intelligence sources and agencies available to support IPB; and, address the validity of previous assumptions and estimates. Actions are taken to:
a. Identify how much time is available for IPB and the level of detail that can be achieved. This time is dictated by wider timing requirements necessary for the completion of the OMAP cycle (See Chapter 9, para 9.08).
b. Review start-point data and known friendly force information.
8.06 Stage 2 – Scope the Threat. An overview of likely threat sources is required. This will include identifying the broad nature of potential hazards, threats and risks posed by all known actors and the operational environment. Where an actor can be clearly identified with an intent that will create conflict or crisis with our own Operational Commander’s likely mission, then the priority, nature and extent of subsequent Staff Work required in IPB Steps 3 and 4 (Threat Evaluation and Threat Integration) can be ascertained.
8.07 Stage 3 – Identify Significant Operational Environment Characteristics. This involves identifying focal points for subsequent analysis of the operating environment. At the strategic and operational level, factors will normally include, but should not be restricted to:
a. Environmental (Land, Maritime, Air, Space, Cyber). Includes consideration of:
Topography (land and marine) Hydrography Vegetation Weather
b. Human. Includes consideration of:
Stakeholders Infrastructure
161 BJDP-5.00 Lines of Communication Population Social Religion Culture Economics Politics
c. Information. Includes consideration of:
The electro-magnetic spectrum Social media Radio, TV, newspapers Cyberspace activity
8.08 Stage 4 – Determine Battlespace Limitations (AIR and AII). Aside from identifying/confirming the Area of Operations (normally given by the Higher Authority), this stage will also define the:
a. Area of intelligence responsibility (AIR). An Operational Commander will usually be allocated an AIR (which is identified through allocated taskings within the Higher Authority’s Decision Support Overlay and Decision Support Overlay Matrix – DSO/DSOM). The size of the area is dependent on the scale of the intelligence requirement. Operational Intelligence Staff should ensure that sufficient Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities have been assigned to the Operational Commander so that the assets have sufficient reach and scope to achieve the required tasks.
b. Area of Interest (AII). Commanders will require intelligence about events in areas outside their allocated AO and AIR. The AII is determined by defining the reasonable limits within which the environment or actors active outside the AO can impact on the Operational Commander’s mission relative to the speed of reaction to any situation changes (the Commander’s observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop). Since these extremes of the area 162 BJDP-5.00 will not usually be within the Operational Commander’s control (in the AO), Intelligence Staff will be required to request information or intelligence concerning these additional areas from higher or flanking Forces.
8.09 Stage 5 – Draft Priority Intelligence Requirements. This includes the recommendation for Information Requirements (IR) for the Commander. IRs are those intelligence needs for which an Operational Commander will need to answer (as part of an allocated task, to conduct planning, or to execute operations). Prioritisation of IR will need to occur to match resources and time constraints – Priority IRs are termed PIR. Identifying Intelligence Gaps is an ongoing process that commences from the onset of any planning cycle.
8.10 IPB Step 1 Outputs. The key products of IPB Step 1 are:
a. A representation or definition of AII and AIR.
b. Brief assessment of the threat situation.
c. Initial IRs and PIRs.
d. An understanding of ISR resources available.
163 BJDP-5.00 IPB STEP 2 – EFFECTS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
8.11 IPB Step 2 (Effects of the Operational Environment) analyses in detail the effects (on own Forces and any other actors) created by the characteristics of the operational environment identified in IPB Step 1. The effect of actors and the operational environment on our own forces may be analysed using a wide range of relevant factors. The process for understanding the effects on the operational environment is broken into two core areas: Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE); and the examination of Human Factors using Human Terrain Analysis (HTA) and Stakeholder Analysis.
8.12 Conduct of Analysis. The operational environment is not homogenous. As such, the way in which military operations are conducted to achieve specific ends will differ from one environment to the other. During analysis of the operational environment, Intelligence Staff must aim to identify areas (both in time and space) that favour the potential conduct of specific types of operations (including tactical activities where planning time allows) and particular balances of forces. This analysis must be conducted from a neutral perspective so that assessments provide the same breadth of deduction and objectivity for all relevant actors.
8.13 Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE). This stage of IPB Step 2 assesses the effects of particular characteristics of the battlespace on operations conducted by both friendly forces and other actors. Its primary purpose is to identify adversary and friendly forces’ Mobility Corridors (MC) and Avenues of Approach (AA), as well as Key Terrain (KT) and Vital Ground (VG). In evaluating the battlefield area, it is essential to consider the effects of terrain and weather concurrently. To establish MCs, AAs, KTs and VGs, BAE defines the battlefield area in terms of operational accessibility (defined as the ability to conduct military activity through the successful application of each of the Tactical Functions 28). Operational Accessibility is classified as areas of Severely Restricted, Restricted and Unrestricted terrain. Figure 8.2 summarises how operational accessibility
28 Tactical Functions – Command, Information and Intelligence, Firepower, Manoeuvre, Protection and Sustainment. 164 BJDP-5.00 can be categorised in each environmental operating space. The process for the conduct of BAE is described in Chapter 5 (paras 5.01 – 5.04) of this publication. For further detail, planners and Intelligence Staff should refer to the RBAF Intelligence Operators Handbook (Chapter 6).
Severely Restricted Unrestricted Restricted Movement Movement Movement Joint Area over which Area over which Area, which is open Operations manoeuvre by the manoeuvre is only to all Components. Area force is impracticable possible at reduced due to terrain, weather speed or with caution, or political is likely to be canalised considerations. or will only be possible with the deployment of additional assets. Land Ground over which Ground over which Ground, which is manoeuvre by the manoeuvre is only open. type of force being possible, at reduced considered is speed, is likely to be impracticable. canalised or will only be possible with the deployments of additional assets. Maritime Water space in which Water space in which Water space open to (separate ships or submarines manoeuvre is only all shipping without overlays for will not operate due to possible with caution is restrictions. surface and sub- depth of water, likely to be canalised surface obstacles, threat or will only be possible elements may levels or political with the deployment of be necessary) considerations. additional assets (e.g. minesweepers). Air Airspace cannot be Airspace can be used Airspace control is physically used due to with caution. It is likely achieved, thus lack of control, threat that specific control providing unhindered or weather. measures will be access (Note – in required in time and crisis, this level of space to ensure control is unlikely to mitigation of threat and be permanent and or weather may be restricted to specific areas only).
Table 8.2 – Operational Accessibility.
165 BJDP-5.00 8.14 Human Factors Analysis. Human Factors Analysis is categorised by the conduct of Stakeholder Analysis and Human Terrain Analysis (HTA).
a. Stakeholder Analysis. The primary focus of Stakeholder Analysis is to examine relevant Actors to gain an understanding of how they may (as individuals or collective groups) affect the Operational Environment. Chapter 5 (paras 5.05 – 5.07) provides the necessary detail on the conduct of Stakeholder Analysis.
b. Human Terrain Analysis (HTA). HTA provides a detailed examination of the human domain within the Operational Environment and is focused on identifying operational threats. Chapter 5 (paras 5.08 – 5.17) describes how the conduct of HTA should be undertaken. The concept is further explained in the RBAF Intelligence Operators Handbook (Chapter 4, Part 4 and Chapter 6)
8.15 IPB Step 2 Outputs. The following outputs should be delivered:
a. BAE.
(1) Graphical overlays showing results of analysis of the physical environment including: Objectives, AAs, KT and VG.
(2) Summary of critical effects and issues describing the impact of physical factors on key operational aspects.
(3) Ground and BAE elements of the IPB Brief.
b. HTA.
(1) Graphical overlays showing results of analysis of the human environment.
166 BJDP-5.00 (2) Descriptions of applicable non-physical characteristics of the Operational Environment.
(3) Summary of the critical effects and issues describing the impact of Human Factors on key operational aspects.
(4) Human Terrain Situational Overlays and Human Terrain Evaluation of the IPB Brief.
167 BJDP-5.00 IPB STEP 3 – THREAT EVALUATION
8.16 The aim of IPB Step 3 (Threat Evaluation) is to identify the exact nature of the adversary (or adversaries or other relevant actors) and to provide an assessment of their capacity to conduct operations. The adversary’s/actor’s capabilities and habits are identified from the consideration of a range of factors29 and assessment is made regarding the threat that they pose to our own forces and those objectives that we will potentially need to successfully complete in meeting our Operational Ends. Importantly, Threat Evaluation is completely independent from the consideration of the Environmental and Human factors conducted in IPB Step 2. Threat Evaluation seeks to portray how an adversary/actor would like to conduct operations under ideal conditions or given limited constraints. Using Human Factor analysis tools can aid Intelligence Staff in the organisation of Threat Evaluation analysis. The RBAF Intelligence Operators Handbook provides significant detail covering IPB Step 3; however, in summary the following are considered in the conduct of Threat Evaluation:
a. Stage 1 – Adversary/actor current dispositions.
b. Stage 2 – Adversary/actor mission analysis (including CoG analysis).
c. Stage 3 – Threat modelling.
d. Stage 4 – Capability & relative strength analysis.
e. Stage 5 – Targeting.
f. Stage 6 – Counter Intelligence.
g. Stage 7 – Statement of the Enemy Intent and Capability.
29 Organisation, equipment, training, morale, doctrine (philosophies, principles, practices and procedures), tactics, behavioural patterns, and personalities. 168 BJDP-5.00 8.17 Stage 1 – Adversary/Actor Current Dispositions. Current intelligence updates will provide known or assumed adversary/actors positions of force elements. This information provides the baseline for the conduct of analysis in later stages which aim to establish if and how an adversary or actor is operating in accordance with (or otherwise from) their operating norms.
8.18 Stage 2 – Adversary/Actor Mission Analysis. During Threat Evaluation, Intelligence Staff will review and fully develop the adversary/actor Mission Analysis initiated in ‘Scope the Threat’ (Step 1, Stage 2). Adversary/Actor Mission Analysis aims to provide an assessment of the known and/or perceived, in order that subsequent threat modelling can be conducted. A number of Mission Analysis activities may be conducted based on the range of adversary levels of command in operation or the spread of relevant actors. The processes and steps used for adversary/actor Mission Analysis are the same as those used to conduct analysis of our own forces’ missions (See Chapter 9). The following must be determined and subsequently analysed:
a. The level(s) of command held by any adversary commander that will be able to affect our own Operational CoG.
b. The adversary’s/actor’s wider aims and COAs, including assessed Strategic, Operational and Tactical (if identified) military objectives and End States.
c. The adversary/actor’s assessed Commander’s Intent, mission, tasks and CoG (see Chapter 5, paras 5.21 – 5.26).
d. Perceived limitations placed or experienced by the adversary/actors. At both the operational and strategic levels these may usually include:
(1) The attitude and behaviour of the international community, including neutral, hostile and friendly nations.
169 BJDP-5.00 (2) Attitudes to international laws including Laws Of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and Laws of the Seas.
(3) Capability limitations.
(4) The relative influence on the adversary’s/actor’s decision making process based on their assessed understanding of the wider environment (Political, Economic and Military).
8.19 Stage 3 – Threat modelling. During this stage, Intelligence Staff are required to generate or update threat models. This modelling draws on information contained within assessments of strategies, warfighting concepts, Order Of Battle (OOB) databases, biographical data on key personnel, and doctrinal templates. Such models seek to portray how adversaries/actors may normally execute operations. Separate models may need to be produced where adversaries/actors may have a range of potential COAs or factors given differing situational circumstances. Using tools, such as SWOT analysis (see Chapter 5, paras 5.18 – 5.20), threats models will identify capability strengths and weaknesses (and therefore potential vulnerabilities).
8.20 Stage 4 – Capabilities: Relative Strengths. Intelligence Staff should provide analysis of adversary/actor capabilities and specifically those which could create a negative impact on our own operational conduct if brought to bear. At the operational level this is primarily likely to include consideration of weapons and equipment, but need not be bounded solely within the military domain. Examining weapons and equipment, the following should usefully be produced and analysed:
a. Equipment and Weapon data.
b. Weapon Range Templates.
c. ISR Range Templates.
d. Relative Strength Tables.
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8.21 Stage 5 – Targeting. The analysis conducted during the previous stages of IPB Step 3 (Threat Evaluation) enables Intelligence Staff to propose possible areas of adversary/actor capability (opportunities) that would be appropriate for targeting. Based on adversary/actor CoG analysis (Critical Capabilities (CCs), Critical Requirements (CRs) and Critical Vulnerabilities (CVs)), Intelligence Staff are required to identify potential targets and propose appropriate effects that may mitigate threat. Once listed, Intelligence Staff are then able to prioritise targets with the focus on assessing which may form as High Value Targets (HVT). HVT are those capabilities that an adversary/actor requires for the completion of their assessed mission. HVT is an Intelligence Function and differs from the identification of High Payoff Targets (HPT) – which is a function of the Operations Staff – as the latter represents adversary/actor capabilities which if unable to the bring to bear would contribute to the likely success of our own mission.
8.22 Stage 6 – Counter Intelligence. An important component of threat modelling and the intelligence planning process is identifying the adversary’s intelligence capability in terms of covert, clandestine, and overt collection. An understanding of these capabilities is important in deriving adversary COA during the final step of IPB. This understanding is also key to informing our own operational Counter Intelligence (CI) Staff on the relative vulnerability of friendly force COA. Further refinement of the intelligence threat will occur as part of a wider CI estimate, which will be developed as a function of OMAP Steps 2 and 3 (COA Development and COA Analysis).
8.23 Stage 7 – Statement of the Enemy Intent and Capability. Based on the considerations made during Threat Evaluation the Intelligence Staff must produce an intent and capability overview and include this as part of the Threat Evaluation element of the IPB brief.
8.24 IPB Step 3 Outputs. The following outputs should be delivered:
a. Current Enemy/ Threat Dispositions.
171 BJDP-5.00 b. Enemy/Threat Mission Analysis including adversary’s/actor’s mission statement (purpose, method, end- state), objectives, tasks, limitations and centre-of-gravity. c. Enemy/Threat ORBAT matrices and other capability listings including intelligence collection and ISR capabilities. d. Summary of critical effects and issues describing the impact of Threat/Enemy Capabilities. e. HVT list. f. Enemy/Threat doctrine statements – tactics, targets and procedures. g. Enemy Capability Statement. h. Threat Evaluation element of the IPB Brief.
172 BJDP-5.00 IPB STEP 4 – THREAT INTEGRATION
8.25 Step 4 (Threat Integration) of the IPB process combines the results of Step 2 (Effects of the Operational Environment) and Step 3 (Threat Evaluation). The process of Threat Integration is described in detail within the RBAF Intelligence Operators Handbook (Chapter 6); however the process is conducted in eight stages, as follows:
a. Stage 1 – Identify Ways and Means.
b. Stage 2 – Development of COAs (Situational Overlay).
c. Stage 3 – Test COAs.
d. Stage 4 – Selection of Most Likely and Most Dangerous COAs (MLCOA and MDCOA).
e. Stage 5 – Indicators and Warnings (Event Overlay).
f. Stage 6 – Audit.
g. Stage 7 – Threat Estimate.
h. Stage 8 – Targeting.
8.26 Stage 1 – Identify Ways and Means. Identifying Adversary/Actor Ways and Means will assist the later identification of their possible COAs. This stage is conducted in three elements:
a. Friendly Critical Capability Analysis. An analysis of friendly force vulnerability and CoG is conducted from the adversary/actor perspective and in accordance with the adversary/actor Mission Analysis.
b. Development of Operational Planning Concepts (OPCs). The development of OPCs aims to identify adversary/actor Decisive Points (DPs), Supporting Effects (SEs) and Operational Objectives and bind them through applying Lines 173 BJDP-5.00 of Operation (LoO) in order to affect the perceived friendly force CoG. All possible adversary and actor COAs, which will impact on the friendly force Commander’s Mission, are identified in brief from the adversary perspective.
c. Identify means. The options for the ‘means’ available to an adversary to achieve the ‘ways’ noted above are then deduced. This assessment will include likely organisations, objectives and tasks required to achieve DPs, SEs and Operational Objectives.
8.27 Stage 2 – Development of COAs (Situational Overlay). Adversary/Actors are then developed (see method used in Chapter 10) for each possible eventuality identified by Stage 1 of Threat Integration. All COAs should be both described in writing (a description of the CONOPS, Groupings and likely Missions/Tasks) and by use of an overlay (known as a Situation Overlay). Each of the adversary’s/actor’s potential COAs are then prioritised based on likelihood and an assessment made as to the ‘most likely’ and ‘most dangerous’. A range of COAs should exist within each category. Based on time available, selected adversary/actor COAs will be developed further. The following tools should be used:
b. Situation overlay. The situation overlay is a map-based graphic display of an adversary/actor COA. Each potential COA is represented on separate overlays. The overlay must show the critical aspects of each COA which includes where the adversary/actor is expected to be operating in the battlespace. At the operational level, the Situation Overlay may focus on DPs where these are focussed on: operations which may reach culmination; installations; and activities associated with the adversary’s/actor’s CoG. Apart from showing where adversary/actor potentially could be deployed in the battlespace, the Situation Overlay also includes a depiction of the assessed time line of adversary/actor actions. The overlay can therefore graphically present those Named Areas of Interest (NAI) where adversaries and actors may be constituted or appear over a given time if a particular COA is adopted. These NAI link the adversary COA to the Indicators and Warning (I&W) process detailed below.
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c. Situation matrix. Adversary/actor COA may also be depicted in matrix form. These Situation Matrices should include detail of Objectives, broken into tasks required to achieve those Objectives, and subsequently, the means available to achieve those tasks. Such matrices may be used in concert with Situation Overlays, especially in the depiction of NAI. Focussing solely on NAIs, this Situation Matrix provides an embryonic version of the Event Overlay Matrix (see Stage 5 – para 8.30).
d. Adversary Critical Capability (CC) Matrix. CC which are associated with specific Adversary/Actors are generally force characteristics that are central to their respective ‘fighting’ capability. The adversary/actor COA will indicate which friendly force CC are likely to be targeted but the adversary CC will not necessarily be apparent. Therefore, it may be necessary to produce a separate adversary CC matrix that may or may not change based on each adversary COA. This CC matrix may be displayed on Situation Overlays or attached to Situation Matrixes. Such lists will assist the conduct of OMAP during the development of Friendly Force COAs.
8.28 Stage 3 – Test COAs. Each COA developed is then tested against the following criteria:
a. Is it suitable? Does it meet the intent stated in adversary mission analysis?
b. Is it feasible? Is there sufficient time, space and means?
c. Is it acceptable? Is it worth the risk or cost?
d. Is it sustainable? Can the adversary/actor sustain this level of operational readiness or deployment for any length of time?
e. Is it distinguishable? Is it different from the other developed COA? (Where a ‘combination’ of COA is assessed as
175 BJDP-5.00 the ‘most likely’ adversary action, normally there is only the one real COA and analysis should begin again until a number of useful options can be presented).
Further detail concerning testing of COAs is provided in Chapter 12 of this publication.
8.29 Stage 4 – Selection of Most Likely and Most Dangerous COAs (MLCOA and MDCOA). Using the advantages and disadvantages, adversary/actor CCs and HVTs and the test criteria, the Intelligence Staff must select Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA) and a Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) for each adversary/actor. The MDCOA will aid friendly forces to plan for contingencies should any adversary or actor use part or all of their respective MDCOA.
8.30 Stage 5 – Indicators and Warnings (Event Overlay). Indicators and Warnings (I&W) is an intelligence tool used to monitor and assess the development of threats as part of the warning function of intelligence. It has broad application within the wider Intelligence Staff process and is conducted continuously through both planning and execution. However, the output of ongoing I&W will still support the initiation of planning when appropriate levels of warning are reached. I&W thereby provides the link between the identification of potential threats (adversary/actor COA Development) and the provision of warning to the Operational Commander and Staff that a threat is actually developing (i.e. the early identification of points in time and space where decisions by the Operational Commander may need to be made). To facilitate I&W the Event Overlay acts as the primary tool.
a. The Event Overlay. The Event Overlay is derived from the Situation Overlay and identifies graphically when and where key tactical events might take place. Locations where events of importance to the conduct of the operation may occur are designated as Named Areas of Interest (NAI). These may include Point, Line or Area NAIs or a combination. Detection and recognition of events or activities at these points and/or areas will confirm or deny the adversary’s/actor’s intention to pursue a
176 BJDP-5.00 specific COA. Furthermore, the identification of NAIs prompts the tasking of collection assets in order to establish and maintain surveillance over these areas. It should be noted that while several Situation Overlays may be produced, only one Event Overlay is produced. This is because the NAIs shown in the Event Overlay are intended to identify which CoA any adversary/actor is following.
8.31 Stage 6 – Audit. A summary of intelligence deductions from IPB Steps 3 and 4 are maintained as part of the intelligence estimate. These include COA advantages and disadvantages, and each adversary’s/actor’s strengths and vulnerabilities.
8.32 Stage 7 – Threat Estimate. In the case of a specific adversary/actor which may affect our Operational Commander’s CoG, an intelligence and CI estimate will normally be produced. Both are iterative documents, with the CI estimate developing in line with friendly COA development while the intelligence estimate develops in line with assessments of emerging adversary/actor COA.
8.33 Stage 8 – Targeting. The identification of gaps in information and the prioritising of IR given I&W analysis is ongoing activity throughout the IPB process. Collection assets are focused on the key indicators of adversary’s/actor’s activity in order to support the Operational Commander’s decision requirements. Surveillance assets are synchronised with other collection assets to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and to ensure coverage at the time or in the sequence the indicator is expected to be triggered. These may be placed on a synchronisation matrix specifically held by the HQ Collection Manager. In support of the Event Overlay, the information contained can also be displayed in matrix form as shown in Figure 8.3. This Event Overlay matrix is the beginning of what will become the Decision Support Overlay Matrix – DSOM. For DSO and DSOM see Chapter 10.
177 BJDP-5.00 Operational Nomenclature:
NS - NSC Originated JF - JFC/JFHQ Originated L - RBLF HQ Originated N - RB N HQ Originated A - RB Air Force HQ Originated S - RB SF Originated
Ser Originator NAI Loc Grid Description Effect/Action Task Potential Force Elements to be Remarks used to achieve effect/action required 1 e.g.NSC NS001 pE 123456 En Base Loc CONFIRM/DENY Observe Recce, UAV, Avn Point NAI 2 e.g. JFHQ JF001 pE 123456 En Route CONFIRM/DENY Trigger Recce Line NAI pE 234567 3 e.g JFHQ JF002 pE 123456 Assy Area FIND Identify UAV, Avn Area NAI pE 234567 pE 345678 pE 456789 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 8.3 – Event Overlay Matrix.
178 BJDP-5.00 8.34 IPB Step 4 Outputs. The following outputs should be delivered:
a. Courses of Action developed. Minimum of two:
(1) Most Likely COA (MLCOA).
(2) Most Dangerous COA (MDCOA).
b. Situation Overlay for each COA.
c. Event Overlay showing Indicators and Warnings for the COAs and NAIs.
d. Amended Collection Plan with key Information Requirements (IRs).
e. Advice on Targeting.
f. Audit Information on each COA.
g. Threat Estimate – The enemy’s ability to affect FF CoG/Critical Capabilities.
h. Threat Integration element of the IPB Brief.
179 BJDP-5.00 IPB BRIEF
8.35 An IPB Brief consists of detailing each element of the IPB process sequentially in a logical format. While formats for briefs will vary between Operational Headquarters, the following must be included by Intelligence Staff as a minimum to brief the remainder of the HQ on the conclusion of the IPB process:
Prelims Define purpose and scope of brief Specify Classification Introduce visual aids State the intended duration and ensure that is acceptable State a questioning policy Enemy/ Human Terrain Recent Situation Situation Update Vital Intelligence (if any) Ground Brief See RBAF Intelligence Operators Handbook (Chapter 3) Battlespace Area Restricted and Severely Restricted Terrain Evaluation Effect of Weather Mobility Corridors Avenues of Approach Vital Ground (Decisive Terrain) and Key Terrain Human Factors Key factors that will Impact or Influence Operations Targets for operations, including influence operations Threat Evaluation Enemy/ Threat ORBAT matrices and other capability listings including intelligence collection and CI capabilities Enemy/ Threat Mission Analysis including adversary mission statement (purpose, method, End State), objectives, tasks, limitations and centre-of-gravity Summary of critical effects and issues describing the impact of Threat/Enemy Capabilities HVT list Enemy/ Threat doc trine statements – tactics, targets and procedures Threat Integration Situation Overlay Most Likely COA Most Dangerous COA Other Identified COAs Advice on Targeting Event Overlay Event Overlay Matrix Enemy Indicators and Warnings (potential Decision Points DPts) Information Requirements Summary Questions
180 BJDP-5.00 CHAPTER 9 – OMAP STEP 1 (MISSION ANALYSIS)
INTRODUCTION
9.01 OMAP Step 1 (Mission Analysis) applies processes which facilitate understanding of the Superior Commander’s intent and support the development of the operational plan. The products of Mission Analysis allow Operational Commanders to develop and articulate their guidance.
9.02 Mission Analysis ensures that Operational Commanders and Staff clearly understand the intent of their Superior Commander up to two levels above that which they are operating at Operationally (therefore potentially Military Strategic and National Strategic). This focuses planning within the boundaries of that intent. It assists Operational Commanders and their Staff to identify the Mission and Tasks that are essential to the successful outcome of the Higher Formation’s plan. Mission analysis results in a clear statement of the Operational Commander’s Mission and Intent, and through Commander’s guidance, provides the basis for all subsequent decision making and planning.
9.03 Mission Analysis requires input from all supporting staff processes to provide the ‘situational awareness’ required for the continuation of OMAP (Steps 2 – 4); for example:
J2 Staff provide the Operational Commander and the Operational Planning Group (OPG) with a clear picture of battlespace through the IPB (See previous Chapter). J3 Staff provide an awareness of current operational capability, dispositions and intent. J4 Staff provide advice on logistic restrictions and freedoms of action affecting operations. J9 (Legal) Staff indicate what legal constraints exist.
9.04 Mission Analysis provides a platform to develop viable COAs, and helps to focus planning on decisively managing the threat CoG and CCs, while identifying and protecting our own. 181 BJDP-5.00
9.05 OMAP Step 1 (Mission Analysis) is conducted in seven stages as follows:
a. Stage 1 – Review the Situation.
b. Stage 2 – Identify and Analyse Superior Commander’s Intent and Develop Own Mission.
c. Stage 3 – Identify and Analyse Tasks.
d. Stage 4 – Identify and Analyse Freedoms of Action.
e. Stage 5 – Identify and Analyse Critical Facts and Assumptions.
f. Stage 6 – Commander’s Guidance.
g. Stage 7 – Mission Analysis Brief.
182 BJDP-5.00 STAGES OF MISSION ANALYSIS
STAGE 1 – REVIEW THE SITUATION
9.06 Acknowledging that elements of IPB and OMAP Step 1 occur concurrently, Stage 1 (Review the Situation) centres on the receipt of intelligence updates delivered during the IPB process. These updates take the form of intelligence briefs that include environmental and threat updates, threat COA and assessed threat CoG. Reviewing the situation must also review our own assigned Operational Forces, our CoG and CCs. It is also essential to conduct initial time analysis, from which the conduct of the operational planning cycle will be based. Critically, in reviewing the situation the Operational Commander is aiming to identify gaps in knowledge that will affect necessary decisions. Three-Column Format analysis (see Chapter 5, paras 5.27 – 5.28) is a useful tool for the conduct of this stage, although it should be noted that it is unlikely that deductions will be mature enough at this stage to identify firm outputs. Stages conducted during OMAP Step 1 include:
a. Step 1 – Environment and threat update.
b. Step 2 – Own forces review.
c. Step 3 – Time analysis.
9.07. Step 1 – Environment and threat update. The environment and threat update draws on the key products from the IPB. These products include a definition of the Operational environment and a description of the effects on the Operational Environment based on Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE) analysis and Human Terrain Analysis (HTA). In addition the threat is evaluated and the adversary’s/actor’s COAs are determined (MLCOA and MDCOA). Further details on the outputs from IPB are contained within Chapter 8 of this publication.
9.08 Step 2 – Own forces review. In order to review our own forces, the following sequence should be applied:
183 BJDP-5.00 a. Analyse own forces CoG and determine Critical Capabilities (CCs) that characterise the CoG (refer to Chapter 5, paras 5.21 – 5.26).
b. Examine, in brief, own forces to determine:
Asset availability; The dispositions of own forces; and Essential capabilities focussing on Manoeuvre, ISR, Mobility and Counter Mobility Support, Protection, Fires, Sustainment and Communications.
c. Assess own force capability. This assessment must examine issues such as readiness levels, training levels achieved and morale of personnel. An ‘own forces’ review seeks to determine whether forces are positioned, figuratively, to conduct operations within a specified timeframe.
9.08 Step 3 – Time analysis. Time is the most essential non- renewable resource able to be exploited by an Operational Commander. The Operational Commander must balance the desire for the perfect plan against the need to act before the adversary can, in order to seize and retain the initiative. Therefore, the establishment of a series of timelines is one of the most important early decisions taken by an Operational Commander (or at least, his Chief of Staff – COS). Two timelines are required:
a. An Operational Timeline. This articulates key known timings from which the operation is bound by. Identifying a critical timing (H Hr; Ready to Move) from which the operation cannot be halted, allows (using the 1/3:2/3 rule) Staff to establish how long in total the planning timeline will be. An example of an Operational Timeline is included in Figure 9.1.
184 BJDP-5.00
b. A Planning Timeline. This identifies when, and for how long, the key activities of the planning cycle will occur30. When constructing a Planning Timeline, basic administrative needs (eating, sleeping) as well as briefing and product production time must all be included. An example of a Planning Timeline is included in Figure 9.1.
30 As a guide, the available planning time (the ‘⅓’) might be allocated: 30% to understanding the situation and the problem; 50% to formulating, developing and validating potential CoAs; and 20% to producing and issuing formal direction. 185 BJDP-5.00
Operational Timeline.
13 1400H Jan XX 16 1700H Jan XX 18 1700H Jan XX Planning 2x Coy to JFC JFHQ Orders 28 0500H Jan XX Commenced Force Reserve D Day – H Hour
15 20 25 30
14 09 00H Jan XX 19 0900H Jan XX Ops Phase 1 x Coy xBn to RBPF NMB Op Recce 28 0500H Jan XX to JFHQ Planning Time 30 0900H Jan XX 13 1400H Jan XX to 18 1700H Jan XX
186 BJDP-5.00 Planning Timeline.
ROOB OMAP Step 1 OMAP Step 2 OMAP Step 3 13 1600H Jan XX Backbrief Backbrief Backbrief 14 2200H Jan XX 16 2200H Jan XX 16 2100H Jan XX
13 1400H Jan XX Scope Problem OMAP Step 1 (MA) OMAP Step 2 OMAP Step 3 OMAP Step 4 JFHQ Orders Planning 13 1400H Jan XX to 13 1700H Jan XX to (COA Dev) (COA Analysis) (D&E) 18 1700H Jan XX Commenced 13 1700H Jan XX 14 2359H Jan XX 15 0500H Jan XX to 17 0500H Jan XX to 18 0600H Jan XX to 16 2359H Jan XX 17 2200H Jan XX 18 1600H Jan XX
1 3 14 15 16 17 18 19 Rest Rest Rest Rest Rest
IPB Step 1 IPB Step 2 IPB Step 3 IPB Step 4 13 1400H Jan XX to 13 1700H Jan XX to 14 1200H Jan XX to 15 0900H Jan XX to 13 2100H Jan XX 14 1200H Jan XX 15 0900H Jan XX 15 2359H Jan XX
Figure 9.1 – Example of Operational and Planning Timelines.
187 BJDP-5.00 STAGE 2 – IDENTIFY AND ANALYSE SUPERIOR COMMANDER’S INTENT AND DEVELOP OWN MISSION
9.10 Stage 2 (Identify and Analyse Superior Commander’s Intent and Develop Own Mission) aims to identify the core requirements of the Higher Authority’s plans and critically provide detailed analysis of the Friendly Force operational level role within the context of these Superior plans. Once analysis has been conducted it is then possible to develop understanding of the mission and tasks allocated to the Operational Commander. In all sections of this Stage it is advised to record analysis using the Three-Column Format (see Chapter 5, paras 5.27 – 5.28).
9.11 Identify and Analyse Superior Commander’s Intent. The levels above of Superior Commander’s Directives, Orders and Instructions must be analysed to establish and understand the wider context from which the assigned forces will conduct operations. The Operational Commander and his Staff are required to analyse both the ‘2 Up’ and ‘1 Up’ to ensure that context is fully understood. Analysis must be methodical and structured – while time consuming, the most effective approach is to analyse line by line, word by word to ensure meanings are not missed. In each case the following must be analysed:
a. ‘2 Up’. Analyse:
(1) Intent (Purpose). The Intent paragraph contained within the Concept Of Operations (CONOPS) – or similar, when considering non-military approaches to direction at the Strategic level – determines the reason for the force conducting the operation.
b. ‘1 Up’. Analyse:
(1) Intent (Purpose). As above.
(2) Scheme of Manoeuvre – SoM (Method). The method is predominantly threat focussed. It clarifies the desired effects on the adversaries and actors in relation to the respective CoGs and the CCs that must be exploited. 188 BJDP-5.00 The statement does not give detailed tasks or actions, rather it uses verbs (Decisive Points and Supporting Effects) to describe the desired effect on each adversary or actor.
(3) End State. The End State is the desired positioning, figuratively, required once the operation has culminated (in preparation for subsequent operations). It defines the success criteria for the operation and the Commander’s desired outcome and/or the state in which the Commander wishes his forces to exist when the operation is complete.
9.12 Develop Own Mission. Having gained the necessary understanding of the Higher Commander’s intentions, it is essential that the Operational Commander must turn his attentions to the analysis and understanding of his own specific mission. In the pursuit of operational conduct which allows Mission Command to be fully practiced, it is preferable that Superior Commander’s should provide their Subordinates with a Mission Statement. A mission statement provides a task with a purpose, and can usually be expressed using elements such as WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN and WHY (noting that it is not essential to provide a WHEN in Mission Statements). Analysis must be conducted by the Operational Commander and Staff in the same systematic manner that the Superior Commander’s Intent was analysed. Where no Mission is provided it will be necessary for the Operational Commander to devise his own. In these circumstances, it is essential that once drafted, the Operational Commander must consult with the Superior Commander, at the earliest opportunity, to agree the drafted Mission Statement.
189 BJDP-5.00 STAGE 3 – IDENTIFY AND ANALYSE TASKS
9.13 Mission Analysis enables Commanders at all levels to clearly identify the specified, implied and essential tasks required to satisfy the mission. Analysis of these tasks should be conducted using the Three- Column Format (see Chapter 5, paras 5.27 – 5.28). Task identification and analysis can be very time-consuming. Operational Commanders may find it more efficient to break the OPG into smaller groups to examine allocated parts of the Superior Commander’s Orders. A central back brief is then required to collate all tasks into a single list. The tasks are defined as:
a. Specific tasks. The Superior Commander directs these tasks explicitly within his Orders to particular Organisations for their completion.
b. Implied tasks. These tasks are not specified by the Superior Commander explicitly (although they may be directed, but not initially obvious within the Orders). Implied tasks are those that are necessary in order to meet the Superior Commander’s intent. Not all implied tasks will be identified during mission analysis, some will be revealed later during COA Development and COA Analysis. However, an attempt to identify all implied tasks must be made during Mission Analysis as this provides the basis from which the COAs are developed.
c. Essential. These tasks are those that must be successfully conducted to achieve the Mission, directed Operational Objectives and the Superior Commander’s Intent. Essential tasks are identified from the list of Specified and Implied tasks. In order to down-select Essential Tasks it is useful to provide a provisional prioritisation of all tasks as this will assist elements of OMAP Step 2 (COA Development). Where possible tasks should be prioritised as:
(1) Priority 1. Those tasks that must be achieved.
190 BJDP-5.00 (2) Priority 2. Those tasks that should be achieved as they will significantly assist in the achievement of the priority 1 tasks.
(3) Priority 3. Those tasks that could be achieved, however time and resources may preclude there successful completion. Priority 3 tasks are not likely to impact on the completion of the wider operational mission and the meeting of Operational Objectives or End State if not conducted.
191 BJDP-5.00 STAGE 4 – IDENTIFY AND ANALYSE FREEDOMS OF ACTION
9.14 Freedom of Action involves identifying the parameters within which a Commander can act to achieve the Superior Commander’s intent. This will involve the consideration of factors, which may limit possible options. As with other stages within this OMAP Step, it is advised to conduct analysis using the Three-Column Format. Freedoms of Action are categorised as:
a. Freedoms. Freedoms are those parameters that will significantly assist in the completion of the Commander’s Operational Mission and Tasks. These may include aspects of time, space and/or resources.
b. Restrictions. These are actions that a Superior Commander imposes, prohibiting activities, which affect the way a Subordinate Commander can conduct the operation. For example, a restriction could be non-violation of third-party airspace. It could also be a limitation on operations, such as not being allowed to complete a pre-emptive strike or only placing a small military footprint on a specific area. Restrictions may be represented back to the higher authority for change. In simple terms, Restrictions are things that must not be done.
c. Constraints. These are characteristics that cannot be changed that affect the conduct of the operation, such as distances, timings and the limitations of pieces of equipment for example range of weapon employment within the Area of Operation (AO).
9.15 The conduct of Risk Analysis is also to be considered as part of this Stage (see Chapter 5 – Risk Analysis). This will include the development of what the acceptable risks are to the Commander in terms of cost versus gain and measured against the operational requirements and mission. These limitations include restrictions and constraints.
192 BJDP-5.00 STAGE 5 – IDENTIFY AND ANALYSE CRITICAL FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS
9.16 In this stage, the Staff aim to gather two categories of information that will significantly affect the way in which they plan the mission. These are the facts and assumptions which the Operational Commander and Staff identify using deductive reasoning to consider all the factors applicable to the situation.
a. Facts. The facts are statements of known data (for example, the situation, threat and friendly force dispositions, available troops, unit strengths and material readiness). Mission and Commander’s Intent are also key facts, which, included in this must be staff projections and assessments of tangible factors (for example, subordinate unit NTM, capability and sustainment). The aim is not to simply regurgitate the Superior Commander’s orders; rather this action aims to evaluate what is critical for understanding.
b. Assumptions. These are developed as substitutes for facts to allow planning to continue immediately. An assumption is only appropriate if it is valid and realistic (i.e. an assumption must not be a guess). Valid assumptions are those that have a solid foundation, a strong likelihood of being confirmed as fact at a later date and will affect the way in which the plan is shaped. Assumptions critical to the planning process must be clarified as soon as possible. Any assumption made about the battlespace environment or the threat should be resolved by identifying these as Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).
193 BJDP-5.00 STAGE 6 – COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE
9.17 The Commander is integral to the conduct of OMAP. Mission Analysis provides the clarity on necessary Commander’s guidance early in the process and it is the essential output of this OMAP Step. This is critical as it focuses the Staff on the Operational Commander’s intent and supports the timely and effective development of own COA and adversary/actor COA. The Commander will specify in planning guidance those CCs to be exploited, the Commander’s priorities (intelligence reviews, capabilities, logistics etc.), the acceptable degree of risk and the understanding of the directed Operational Objectives (linked to provisional Decisive Points – DPs; and Supporting Effects – SEs) to be achieved in arriving at the desired End State.
9.18 Commander’s guidance forms the basis of the Operational Commander’s themes and should flow from the products produced in each stage of Mission Analysis. The Operational Commander guides the coordinated application of force to achieve the desired Operational Objectives by combining operational art, the warfighting concepts, the forces and capabilities available, and the prevailing time and space conditions applicable to the specific theatre within the Joint (or respective Component) environment.
9.19 The essential aspects of Commander’s guidance are:
a. Identification of which adversary/actors MLCOA and MDCOA are to be developed.
b. Outline of the Joint Area of Operations (JAO) Concept Of Operations.
c. Production of the Operational Commander’s Intent statement and confirmation of own Operational Mission.
d. Production of appropriate (draft) Intent Schematics which should be articulated in terms of DPs, SEs, Operational Objectives, CoG, Operational End States and possible Lines or Groups of Operation – refer to Chapter 6 ‘Operational Planning Concepts’. 194 BJDP-5.00 Planners must note that it may not be possible for the Commander to articulate their Intent fully at this stage (i.e. while Operational Objectives should be clearly identified, as these are dictated by Higher Formations, other descriptors like DP, SE and LoO are likely to need further development in subsequent Steps of OMAP).
e. Identification of Operational Commander’s guidance to Staff (using the Tactical Functions as a handrail).
f. Operational Commander’s CCIR (given in order of priority to the Staff);
g. Provisional requirement for Information Operations (IO) by objective, ie; deception, OPSEC.
h. The acceptable degree of risk (articulated usually from higher command, could be as simple as “I will not allow a major fleet unit to be lost”);
i. The Planning Timeline.
j. The Operational Commander’s priorities (Note: These must be developed by the Operational Commander and not the Staff).
While HQs are likely to generate their own Commander’s Guidance formats to allow their Operational Commanders to provide the necessary detail31, Figure 9.2 offers a format option for an Operational Commander to provide their guidance.
31 Commander’s Guidance is very much a personal activity that is reliant on the articulation of the Commander’s character, experience and knowledge. 195 BJDP-5.00 COMMANDER’S GUIDANCE (STEP 1 MISSION ANALYSIS) Intent Schematic: Intent:
Endstate:
DP SE Op Obj Purpose DP 1.2 SE 2.3 LoC SECURED SE.2.4 Obj DESTOYED ME: SE.2.5 A etc DP 1.3 SE 4.2 SE.4.6 SE.1.4 Framework for SoM development: e.g Operational, Tactical, Geographic, Stabilisation Planning Guidance Command Intelligence/Information Firepower Manoeuvre Protection Sustainment
Figure 9.2 – Commander’s Guidance Template. 196 BJDP-5.00 STAGE 7 – MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEF
BRIEFER SUBJECT COS, J3 Purpose of the briefing Condition of own force (CoG, task ORBAT, capability) Time analysis J2 Initial Int estimate: o Brief on initially important factors (including ISR management) o Brief on situation (threat CoG, CCs and potential DPs) o Threat COAs o Recommend threat MLCOA and MDCOA J3/J5 Intent and mission of 2 Up and 1 Up. Critical facts and assumptions Limitations on the op Specified, implied and essential tasks Ops conclusions; capability shortfalls and risk J1 Personnel assumptions (replacements, host nation support, other) Personnel conclusions; projected personel and shortfalls; financial considerations and risk J4 Logistics (Log) facts (Log requirement shortages, infrastructure and force capabilities) Log assumptions (infrastructure capabilities, memorandum of understanding validity) Log conclusions; potential logistics shortfalls and risk Health factors (capability shortfalls, force health requirements and risk) J6/Comms Communication information system (CIS) facts CIS assumptions CIS conclusion – capability shortfall and risk COS, J3/J5 COS recommends comd’s guidance. (Optional): o Threat COAs (to be developed) o Superior comd’s intent and own mission and broad themes o Outline theatre of JAO o CCIRs o Acceptable degree of risk o Timeline and type of Order to be issued Comd Comd confirms guidance.
197 BJDP-5.00 CHAPTER 10 – OMAP STEP 2 (COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT)
INTRODUCTION TO STEP 2 (COA DEVELOPMENT)
10.01 OMAP Step 2 (Course of Action – COA – Development) takes the products of the IPB and Mission Analysis, including the Commander’s Guidance and develops them into detailed COA. The output of this Step is the production of a number of detailed COA.
10.02 Planners and Staff are required to use military knowledge and experience during COA Development in order to develop the Commander’s broad themes into a number of different COAs. The aim of COA Development is to create a number of different COAs that are achievable, meet the mission requirements and are detailed enough to be wargamed in the next Step of OMAP. In developing COAs, it is essential for Staff to also consider the principle of integrated battlespace planning (Battlespace Management – see BJDP-5.30), coordination and synchronisation.
10.03 OMAP Step 2 (COA Development) is conducted in seven stages, as follows:
a. Stage 1. Confirm CoG.
b. Stage 2. Critical Capability Analysis.
c. Stage 3. Develop DPs and LoO.
d. Stage 4. Develop Broad COAs.
e. Stage 5. Develop Detailed COAs.
f. Stage 6. Test COA.
g. Stage 7. COA Development Brief.
198 BJDP-5.00 THE STAGES OF COA DEVELOPMENT
STAGE 1 – CONFIRM CoG
10.04 Taking forward the CoG Analysis conducted during IPB (Step 2)32 and also within OMAP Step 1 (where further detail was added to that of the J2 Intelligence Staff’s work in IPB), the Commander and Staff are required to conduct a final review of all CoG Analysis that has been previously conducted. Where previous CoG Analysis has proved to be incomplete now is the moment to ensure that it is re-worked in order that it can be used in subsequent stages of this OMAP Step (reference should be made to Chapter 5 paras 5.21 – 5.26 of this publication which provides further detail on the conduct of CoG analysis).
10.05 The Commander’s Intent, provided during guidance at the end of OMAP Step 1, must be related to both the adversary/actors and the friendly force CoGs. This is to ensure that we exploit the adversary/actor operational level CoG and protect our own CoG.
10.06 By conducting a cross-referencing exercise, Staff will be able to map specific requirements of the 1 Up and 2 Up Comd Intent with the identified adversary/actor CRs from earlier CoG Analysis. This mapping can be further enhanced by linking this referencing back to the assigned Operational Mission to ensure that the mapping exercise is coherent and where it is not, the need for further work/analysis can be identified. Figure 10.1 provides an example of how this may be formatted:
1 Up Comd’s Intent Possible Adversary CRs Own Mission and Specified direction (same table used affected by meeting Tasks (within Mission for 2 Up) Comd’s Intent Statement) that affect Adversary CRs in line with Superior Comd Intent
Figure 10.1 – Suggested format for CoG/Comd Intent mapping exercise.
32 which examined, adversaries, actors and friendly forces 199 BJDP-5.00 STAGE 2 – CRITICAL CAPABILITY ANALYSIS
10.07 Once reviewed, Stage 2 (Critical Capability Analysis) allows the Staff to be in a position to ensure that friendly force Critical Capabilities (CCs) are matched appropriately to adversary and/or actor CCs and Critical Vulnerabilities (CVs) – depending on whether friendly forces are supportive or otherwise of each respective actor, in line with the stated Operational Objectives.
10.08 Targeting the threat CoG directly may not be the most effective approach. Therefore, in order to affect the threat CoG whilst avoiding the adversary’s strength and reducing risk, the CC of the adversary must be targeted. The planning staff analyses the CC Matrix provided in the IPB to determine which of the adversary’s CCs may be affected given the nature of indicative force assignment. The Staff do this by first identifying what effects could be employed to affect adversary CCs33. Subsequently, the Staff are to decide which assigned Force Elements could be employed to achieve these desired effects through affecting the adversary’s Critical Requirements (CRs). These CRs may then be further analysed for the appropriate application of effect against specific Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) relevant to the identified CRs – the identification of possible specific tactical activity. By conducting this process through examination of CoG, the Staff will develop an early ‘Troops to Task’ matrix that can be cross-referenced with the identified tasks list from OMAP Step 1 to provide an early indication of possible COAs based on resource limitations and requirements.
10.09 Critically, in the conduct of CC analysis, the aim is to determine what adversary/actor CCs can be affected and in what way. The effect on the CC is achieved by having a physical, functional or psychological outcome, event or consequence on the adversary’s CVs and CRs as a result of a specific action. This action and desired outcome is considered and filtered through the Mission, forces available, constraints and time to ensure that the effect is achievable.
33 This relates to the identification of possible Supporting Effects, SE, which support the Decisive Points, DPs, articulated by the Operational Commander’s Intent guidance at the end of OMAP Step 1. 200 BJDP-5.00 STAGE 3 – DEVELOP DECISIVE POINTS AND LINES OF OPERATION
10.10 Developing Decisive Points (DPs). Dependent on the operational situation, this stage either supports the re-confirmation of, amendment of and/or addition to the DPs provided by the Operational Commander’s guidance at the end of OMAP Step 1 or seeks to develop DPs from the basis of an understanding of the Mission and Objectives to be achieved. CC analysis examines the range of possible effects and results in selection of the desired effects known as Supporting Effects (SE). A DP is the achievement of the SE (one or more). SE are normally the result of the completion of a number of tasks (or activities) drawn from OMAP Step 1 (Mission Analysis) and/or identified during the conduct of CC analysis. Similar tasks (activities) can be grouped under operational terms (SEs). These terms collectively can be used to identify or confirm DP. Information regarding the development of DPs is provided within Chapter 6, paras 6.04 – 6.07 of this publication). Of importance the following should be noted:
a. The DP and SE which the Commander is seeking to achieve, based on the targeting of an adversary’s/actor’s CoG and/or CCs, must be also linked to the achievement the Commander’s directed Operational Objectives and End State.
b. When creating/confirming DPs, planners should always:
(1) Define them in terms of their effect on the adversary/actor, environment, or friendly forces.
(2) Ensure that they are measurable.
(3) Clearly articulate their purpose.
c. The DPs are developed and recorded using a simple matrix so that the affected CCs, actions to be achieved, the effect and possible subordinate tasks are captured for use in the development of detailed COA.
10.11 Lines of Operation. Lines of Operation (LoO) establish the interrelationship between DPs, in order to construct a critical path to the 201 BJDP-5.00 adversary/actor CoG, and to ensure that events are tackled in a logical progression. A LoO is a description of how military force is applied in time and space through the DPs. LoO may be expressed in a number of different ways, all of which should be directly related to the logical achievement of the Operational Commander’s Intent. Examples of possible LoO include:
a. By Component. Land, Maritime, Air, Logistic and SF.
b. By Framework.
(1) Operational. Shaping, Decisive, Sustaining, and Protecting.
(2) Tactical. Find, Fix, Strike and Exploit.
(3) Geographic. Deep, Close and Rear
(4) Stabilisation. Shape, Secure and Develop.
c. By Operational Principle. For example: Principles of Peace Support Operations (PSO), Principles of Counter Insurgency (COIN), Principles of Offense Operations, Principles of Defensive Operations.
d. By Essential Task. LoO defined by the list of Essential Tasks to be achieved which were identified within OMAP Step 1, Stage 3.
In constructing LoO, there may be more than one order in which DPs can be sequenced – this provides potential sub-options for broad COA identification. Additionally, some DPs may need to be achieved more than once during a LoO.
202 BJDP-5.00 STAGE 4 – DEVELOP BROAD COA
10.12 Broad COAs are scoped, using both direct and indirect approaches, taking into account an adversary’s/actor’s expected COA, wider aims and intent. Broad COAs are developed by filtering the various LoO through the mission, broad themes and limitations articulated in Commander’s guidance. Note that this may require the DPs to be re- sequenced into other LoO. Different COAs are developed by emphasising distinctions in three areas; focus of the Main Effort (ME), the time associated with prosecution and the management and acceptance of risk. These broad COAs create the framework that can be developed into a detailed COA in subsequent stages of this OMAP step.
10.13 Identify Possible Branches and sequels. Inherent within the development of a COA is the identification and analysis of a range of branches and sequels which should be cross-referenced to the DPs on the COA to which they refer. Sequels, on the other hand, are significant shifts in focus. A sequel is therefore the identification of movement from one LoO to another. At this stage the identification of Branches and Sequels is likely to be only in the broadest of terms. Branches and Sequels can be formulated in more detail in the following stages of the OMAP Step, but must be centrally managed within the Operational Planning Group (by J5) to ensure that the cross-over between COAs remains valid.
10.14 Identification of Decision Points and Target Areas of Interest. A Decision Point (DPt) is a point in time and space at which the Operational Commander must make a decision in order to influence the operation in particular Target Area of Interest (TAI). DPts must be offset from the point at which the action has taken place, in order to allow sufficient lead-time for action to be initiated. The identification of DPts assists the Operational Commander in synchronising all of the potential assigned force capabilities. During this stage of analysis the Staff identifies these possible DPts and position appropriate capabilities to support the decision process by identifying/confirming Named Areas of Interest (NAI) and Target Areas of Interest (TAI) in the battlespace34.
34 It is therefore common for NAIs and TAIs to be linked by DPts. 203 BJDP-5.00 STAGE 5 – DEVELOP DETAILED COA
10.15 Based on the identification of Broad COA (DPs linked by LoO), The Operational Planning Group (OPG) should now split into smaller groups (COA Development Teams) in order to develop these COAs with the necessary level of detail to ensure that they could be used as workable operational plans. Under careful central management of the OPG (via J5), these sub-groups are directed to develop a manageable number of detailed COAs, based on the broad COAs that had been previously identified. All COAs must be distinguishable in their own right, based on one or more of the following areas:
a. Force structure.
b. Command and control (C2).
c. Acceptance and mitigation of operational risk.
d. Battlespace Management within the Area of Operations.
e. Synchronisation.
f. Development of LoO themed COAs.
g. Focus on Decision Support and contingency.
h. Consideration of Freedoms and Limitations.
These considerations are examined in the following paragraphs.
10.16 Force Structure. The development of possible ‘Troops to Task’ earlier within this OMAP Step demonstrated that a variety of assigned Force Elements (FE) may be used separately or in different combinations to achieved the required effects, End States or Objectives. Differing configurations of FE therefore provide options from which detailed COA can be developed. The structuring of FE is of particularly importance when considering those elements that deliver Battlefield Operating System (BOS)
204 BJDP-5.00 Capabilities35 – where necessary SME advice may be required to ensure that tasks are viable and the application of capabilities are correctly integrated. Each BOS Capability must be considered in its own right and therefore specific BOS COA will, at this stage, need to be developed in outline in order to ensure that they are integrated with the wider detailed COAs. Planners must also remain mindful of the requirements for subsequent operations and any limitations that have been placed on the Operational Commander in the use of designated FE. FE should be attributed to the completion of identified tasks which must then be mapped to the achievement of SEs and DPs.
10.17 Command and Control. Command and Control (C2) considers both how subordinate units are to be grouped in the achievement of allocated tasks; and how the Operational HQ will provide the necessary oversight of operational conduct and the means by which to convey direction.
a. Grouping. COA Development Teams are likely to place FE into distinct groups where each element is commonly focused on the achievement of specific SE or DP. This method of grouping allows subordinate units to be provided with a necessary C2 channel operating within a directed level of Command Status. Generic Command Status is summarised in Figure 10.2.
b. Command Direction. COA Development Teams must consider how the Operational Commander is to continue to provide C2 during the conduct of operations. This is likely to prove particularly challenging when resource may scare, terrain complex, or duration extended. COA Development Teams must ensure that the full use of operational Command Information Systems (CIS) are maximised, while ensuring that redundancy exists so as to prevent loss of operational momentum simply because of ineffective or unresponsive C2 planning.
35 BOS includes all aspects of the operational concept beyond those of the key manoeuvre units. BOS can include (dependant on operation and operation environment): ISR, (Joint) Fires and Fire Support, Mobility Support, Counter Mobility, Air Defence, Air, Aviation, Force Protection, Counter Intelligence, EOD and CBRN, Captured Persons etc. 205
BJDP-5.00
7
status
forces
elements of of elements
Deploy units Deploy
area defence area
Specify Tasks Specify
Delegate equal equal Delegate
Coordination of Coordination
within assigned assigned within
assigned forces assigned
battlespace and and battlespace
Reassign forces Reassign
Military Logistics Logistics Military
Specify Missions Specify of Administration
command/control command/control
Allocate separate separate Allocate
Command action: Command localised movement, movement, localised Command Status FULLCOMD1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes THEATRE COMD2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes OPCOM1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes If specified Yes5 TACOM4 Yes No Yes3 Yes3 Yes Yes If specified Yes5 OPCON4 No No Yes No Yes Yes If specified Yes5 TACON No No No No Yes Yes If specified No Notes: 1. A commander assigned forces under FULLCOMD and OPCOM (Operational Command) may employ those forces for any purposes. 2. Allocation of THEATRE COMD requires the full agreement of all contributing nations. 3. A commander assigned TACOM (Tactical Command) may only allocate tasks, in accordance with the mission given by the higher authority who assigned the forces. 4. Forces assigned under OPCON (Operational Control) may only be employed with certain constraints (such as function, time or location) imposed by the higher authority that assigned the force. 5. The wider Military Logistic (see BJDP-4.00) responsibility will be specified for each operational relationship. Only FULLCOMD and THEATRE COMD automatically assume CSS responsibility.
Figure 10.2 – Generic States of Command and Operational Authority36.
36 The above command status table presents common conditions. Strategic Commanders (DEC and Comd RBAF) will direct Command status (and definition) as part of the Strategic Direction to the Operational Commander for any given operational situation. 206 BJDP-5.00 10.18 Acceptance and Mitigation of Operational Risk. Where areas of risk were identified and analysed in OMAP Step 1, the approach to either accepting levels of risk or taking measures to mitigate/remove the risk will differ between COA options. Staff within COA Development Teams must use collective experience to mitigate risk in order that the likelihood of achieving the Operational Commander’s SEs, DPs and directed Objectives is maximised.
10.19 Battlespace Management within the Area of Operations. The coordination of Battlespace within the Area of Operations (AO) is fundamental to the creation of potential Operational COAs. Battlespace must be apportioned correctly to all FE elements with regards to their grouping, task and capability. In simple terms each aspect of the operational force must be allocated suitable battlespace which is de- conflicted and is therefore fully integrated with all other FE. Battlespace must also be carefully defined so that FE are aware of what activity and effect can and cannot be conducted. In the event that space cannot be integrated to deliver the required operational effect, synchronisation through time (see para 10.20) may be necessary. Battlespace Management planning and delivery is covered within BJDP-5.30.
10.20 Synchronisation. Where Battlespace management aims to integrate and de-conflict effect and activity spatially, Synchronisation aims to achieve the same aims through time. The key product of Synchronisation is the construction of the Operational Synchronisation Matrix for each COA. Synchronisation can be considered in terms of Sequencing and Phasing:
a. Sequencing. While sequencing aims to simplify activity by reducing complexity caused by concurrency, it is essential for COA Development Teams to remain mindful of those fundamental Principles of War which are reliant upon Offensive Action, Surprise and Concentration of Force. Therefore, where possible, sequencing of activity must also ensure the maintenance of operational tempo and the conduct of simultaneous action across the full extent of the battlespace as this is likely to produce the
207 BJDP-5.00 most successful approach in achieving the Operational Commander’s End State
b. Phasing. Like sequencing, Phasing aims to minimise operational complexity, by de-conflicting conduct over time. Phasing is necessary when operational conduct reaches a point in time where: specific groups of DPs have been achieved (and therefore potentially successfully completed a directed Operational Objective); a significant shift in C2 arrangements is required (thus also potentially requiring an operational pause); and/or when insufficient resources are available to conduct operational tasks concurrently (possibly also requiring some form of operational regrouping on Phase change). As phases are directly linked to DPs, phases cannot be declared ‘complete’ until all DPs within the respective phase have met the required criteria for success. Operational Phases (unlike sequences) may be allocated specific Main Efforts (ME) by the Commander, particularly where the focus is on the achievement of one or more critical outcomes and requires resources to be allocated accordingly. Additionally (and again unlike sequencing), phases can be conducted concurrently (if conditions allow) – planners, in the development of COA must guard against sticking rigidly to sequenced phases and should continuously consider exploitable reactions in response to the creation of (intended or unintended) opportunities.
10.21 Development of LoO Themed COAs. In certain circumstances it may be necessary for COA Development Teams to focus on specific LoO, in order that attention can be provided to the delivery of particular DPs. This may be essential where LoO represent different thematic areas where there is likely to be little or no interaction or interface (e.g. the Maritime and Land environment, where no amphibious or Naval Gunfire Support activity is perceived).
10.22 Focus on Decision Support and Contingency. Utilising the Situation and Event overlays (developed during IPB and refined by the establishment of the Operational Commander’s Guidance), the establishment of Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR),
208 BJDP-5.00 and the development of broad COAs, each COA Development Team is likely to consider the relationship between NAIs and TAIs through the application of Decision Support in a variety of different ways. The detailing of NAIs and TAIs will vary depending on the effect required, the resource applied, the specific location and the time at which activity is likely to be conducted. Similarly the way in which each are connected, via Decision Points (DPt) will vary between COAs. The generation of draft Decision Support Overlay and Matrix (DSO and DSOM) will also shape the requirement for the examination of contingency within each COA and across to alternative COA. COA Development Teams are therefore likely to establish different options for the generation of Reserves and the conditions when they will be required. Exploitation should also be considered when generating contingencies within COAs; however, planners must understand the extent to which operational reach can be achieved before becoming overextended.
10.23 Consideration of Freedoms and Limitations. OMAP Step 1 provided analysis of perceived Freedoms and Limitations (Restrictions and Constraints). COA Development Teams are likely to resolve limitations using a range of different approaches (effect, terrain, resource or time). Similarly, the utilisation of the benefit provided by freedoms is likely to draw different conclusions across COA Development Teams.
209 BJDP-5.00 STAGE 6 – TEST COA
10.24 COA Development strives to develop a range of courses according to criteria laid down by the Operational Commander. The principle test of a COA is therefore whether it meets the Operational Commander’s Intent and Mission. Planning Staff should not discount any discarded LoO as these could subsequently form branches to the final plan. For each COA, the COA Development Team must conduct a validation exercise using the following test criteria:
a. Suitability. Have all necessary tasks been accomplished? How likely is this COA to succeed? The COA is subjectively assessed as to whether it actually accomplishes the mission and meets specified, implied and essential tasks derived from Mission Analysis.
b. Feasibility. Is there sufficient time and means to achieve the COA? The COA is analysed against the following questions:
(1) Time. Is there sufficient time to execute the concept as envisioned?
(2) Space. Is there adequate battlespace to conduct the Operation?
(3) Means. Are indicative FE capable of deploying to and conducting the Operation appropriately (effectively and efficiently)?
c. Acceptability. The COA is assessed for acceptability, by comparing the probable risk versus the probable outcome of the COA, in fulfilling the Operational Commander’s Intent.
d. Sustainability. The COA is assessed for sustainability during each aspect of the Operational Framework (Operational, Tactical, Geographic or Stabilisation). Does the COA allow enough time for forces to prepare/deploy and reconstitute for subsequent
210 BJDP-5.00 operations? Is the logistic support for COA realistic (referring to the guidance within BJDP-4.00), or is it unattainable?
e. Distinguishability. The COA is assessed on its uniqueness in comparison with other COAs (that the COA Development Team has been responsible for developing). Each COA must be a viable alternative and substantially different from other COAs. For example is the Operational Commander being presented with different COAs, or are they just variations on the same theme with different branches and sequels? Is there another way to approach this task that has not been considered?
10.25 Articulating COA. Although many formats exist which support the articulation of developed COAs, the following must be included:
a. Detailed description of COA CONOPS (Intent, SoM, End State and ME).
b. Detailed OPLAN Schematic (including battlespace management, dispositions and description of effect/activity).
c. COA Strengths and Weaknesses.
d. Additional Guidance to Operational Commander (described using the Tactical Functions and covering areas of the COA not otherwise described, including further development required).
e. Subordinate Missions and Tasks.
f. TASKORG.
g. BOS Concepts (a description of CONOPS for each BOS element).
h. Synchronisation Matrix.
i. COA Validation/Testing results and descriptions.
211 BJDP-5.00 STAGE 7 – COA DEVELOPMENT BRIEF
10.26 COA Development finishes with a brief to the Operational Commander, which details all COAs developed. The Operational Commander then assesses which COAs are to be further developed and wargamed during OMAP Step 3 (COA Analysis), and provides any necessary further guidance on modifications to the selected COAs. The number of COAs developed depends on the time made available by the Commander for the wargame. The following briefing format can be used to assist COA Development Teams in providing the necessary brief to the Operational Commander:
BRIEFER SUBJECT COS, J3/J5 Intent of own and higher comd. Mission. Reconfirm own CoG. J2 Updated intelligence estimate: o Changes to threat situation. J3/J5 Brief on each COA (as per para 10.25) J1 Support concepts assumptions and conclusions. J4 Support concepts assumptions and conclusions. J6 Support concepts assumptions and conclusions. SME/BOS Support concepts assumptions and conclusions. COS, J3/J5 Recommended COA for wargaming.
212 BJDP-5.00 CHAPTER 11 – OMAP STEP 3 (COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS)
INTRODUCTION
11.01 Course of Action (COA) Analysis identifies the advantages and disadvantages of each COA developed in the previous steps of the OMAP. COA Analysis is heavily reliant on the outputs of IPB Steps 3 and 4 of the IPB for its success. The outputs are viable COA for the Operational Commander to decide upon (in OMAP Step 4).
11.02 COA Analysis is conducted through the process of ‘Wargaming’. COA Analysis involves wargaming each friendly COA through to its intended End State, progressively identifying the advantages and disadvantages of each COA, and improving them if required. It highlights the degree of risk associated with each COA, overlaid within each Staff and Battlefield Operating System (BOS – refer to para 10.16) function, and enables the Operational Commander to make subsequent decisions based on a judgement of acceptable risk. The methods for wargaming vary depending on the level of analysis required and time available. Irrespective of the method chosen to conduct the wargame, it should be conducted throughout the entire battlespace of the operational environment.
213 BJDP-5.00 WARGAMING
WHAT IS WARGAMING?
11.03 Wargaming enables users to integrate different methods, tools and techniques (quantitative and qualitative) with a human element, thereby creating a capability that is greater than the sum of its parts. The wargame process is complex. The more time and detail applied, the more useful the results. This must be balanced with the reality that during the conduct of operations, normally; there will be not enough time to conduct in-depth wargames for more than one to three friendly COAs, against one or two enemy COAs (probably MLCOA and MDCOA). As a result Commander’s Guidance is crucial; to focus the Staff on which friendly and enemy COAs are to be wargamed. Wargaming identifies potentially critical points where the Operational Commander must make a decision to exploit or respond to developments.
11.04 Wargaming is used to examine COAs during the OMAP planning cycle. It is focused on the coordination of capabilities and activities at Component level and, in particular, with the orchestration of their respective efforts to realise Joint and Combined Effects. It addresses all the various facets of Joint Action (fires, influence activities and manoeuvre), as well as the activities of other military and civilian actors, within the operating space. Due to the potential number of manoeuvring elements at the operational level, the Operational Commander, or more likely the Chief of Staff (COS), should consider the degree of aggregation, and consequently the span of activity, that can practically be wargamed.
11.05 As an adversarial technique, wargaming plays friendly, neutral and hostile elements together to identify any shortcomings in potential or selected COAs. The interaction between friendly elements can be represented from within the Operational Commander’s Staff, supported by Components, while the actions and reactions of adversaries and actors require a fully enabled Red Team. Wargaming at the operational level should also identify any broader implications of military activity, for example across the international community, which should then be notified to the appropriate national or multinational Military Strategic Commander. Wargaming can vary in scope and complexity, from informal discussions 214 BJDP-5.00 around a map to the use of sophisticated computer simulations; time and availability of resources are likely to limit what can be done. Regardless of which techniques are employed, wargaming should provide:
a. A thorough understanding of the likely actions and reactions of friendly, neutral and hostile actors within the Joint Area of Operations (JAO) and, where appropriate, beyond.
b. An indication of the likely effects of military activity, and the associated risks – threats and potential opportunities – that such activity might generate.
c. A specific assessment of any friendly COAs versus those of an opponent.
d. Refinement and development of COAs, including the detailed determination of relevant timings, force (re-)deployments and logistic implications.
e. Identification of the areas for improvement to support the final development of the Operational Commander’s chosen CoA.
11.06 The Elements of a Wargame. A wargame consists of various elements, all of which will usually be present to some degree. No single element constitutes a wargame. For example, a simulation might provide the ‘engine’ that determines outcomes, but is not the wargame; in other words, the tools are not the wargame. The elements of a wargame are as follows.
a. Aim and Objectives. Well-considered aims and objectives are essential to ensure that the problem(s) to be wargamed has (have) been properly framed.
b. Setting and Scenario. The setting and scenario provide the immersive environment where all game play takes place.
215 BJDP-5.00 c. Players (and their Decisions). Player decisions drive all wargames. The primacy of player decisions is discussed at para 11.11. d. Simulation. Simulation can be computer-assisted, computerised or manual. It is the execution over time of the models contained within the wargame. e. Rules, Procedures and Adjudication. Wargames require robust rules and procedures. Adjudication is a key concept and is the process of determining the outcomes of player interactions. f. Data and Sources. Data is required to build the setting and scenario. Furthermore, all simulations rely on data and data sources to populate their models. g. Supporting Personnel and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). Experts are usually required to assist with the design and delivery of a wargame. h. Analysis. Analysis, reliant on data gathered in-game, is normally required to help understand what has happened during a wargame and consolidate the benefits of wargaming.
216 BJDP-5.00 WARGAME BENEFITS & LIMITATIONS?
11.07 Wargames offer an environmental removed and therefore safe reflection of some of the situational and decision making dynamics associated with operational conduct. Wargaming is based on a determination of risk versus reward to determine possible outcomes. However, as both the tools used to conduct the wargame and the players represent an imperfect system (through bias or incomplete data), while the wargame process affords many benefits, it also has its limitations.
11.08 Benefits of Wargaming. There are a number of benefits of wargaming. These include:
a. An opportunity to explore options and take risks without risking lives or disrupting operational conduct.
b. A cost-effective way to practise Command, and exercise Staff procedures and management skills.
c. Exposure to friction and uncertainty, including adaptive, thinking adversaries, competitors, allies and stakeholders.
d. A mechanism for exploring innovation in the conduct of specific operations.
e. A method for discovering new factors and questions not previously identified.
11.09 Limitations of Wargaming. Wargames are not a panacea and should only be applied when appropriate. The following should be understood as the limitations of wargaming:
a. Wargames are not reproducible. Wargames are driven by player decisions. Players will make different choices even when presented with the same situation. Add to this the element of chance inherent in wargaming and no game will ever be the same, even when the starting situation is replicated. Of course, it is this very unpredictability, coupled with the creativity of participants, 217 BJDP-5.00 which enables wargames to generate new ideas. Such variations must be balanced by the underlying continuities and the opportunity to explore the degree of certainty inherent in each situation. b. Wargames are qualitative. If the output required from an event is numerical, a wargame is unlikely to be an appropriate tool. While most wargames include mathematical systems that produce numerical results, precise outcomes will vary. Wargames can complement, but are not a substitute for, more rigorous or detailed forms of analysis. Wargames are best used to inform decisions by raising questions and insights, not to provide a definitive answer. c. Wargames are not predictive. Wargames illustrate possible outcomes, so there is a risk of false lessons being identified from a single run of a wargame. Wargames can illustrate that something is plausible, but will not be able to definitively predict that it is probable. Using multiple games, perhaps with different scenarios, starting conditions or players, allows more robust conclusions to be drawn. d. Wargames are only as good as the Participants. An uninformed, unqualified or overconfident wargame team is unlikely to add value, and may be detrimental to the activity. Furthermore, the product of a successful wargame will be of benefit only if it is accepted or considered by the Planning Staff after the event. Finally, greater diversity among participants is likely to generate richer collective insight. In some cases, having military officers as the only participants, or having military officers with common experiences and perspectives, may limit the quality of the game.
218 BJDP-5.00 COMPREHENDING RISK
11.10 Risk Assessment. During wargaming, key events are identified which incorporate risk to the success of the plan. Staff must plan to manage risk by developing options to synchronise the Operation effectively. This may take the form of planning branches or sequels within the operational plans at designated Decision Points (DPts) and therefore form as Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR). By assessing risk (see Chapter 5) throughout the wargame process, mitigation can be offered through the application of the following measures:
a. Contingency Planning. An Operational Commander should never be without options, and the development of Contingency Plans, CONPLANs, (also see Chapter 6, para 6.11) could reduce the risks associated with transition between phases. In order to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing circumstances, it will be important that the Operational Commander incorporates options into the operational plans. This process is known as ‘contingency planning’. Careful consideration of the potential consequences of each phase will enhance the flexibility of the campaign plan.
b. Branches and sequels. Inherent with the wargaming process is identification and analysis of arrange of branches and sequels (also see Chapter 6, para 6.11) which should be cross- referenced through the wargame record to DPts on the COA to which they refer.
(1) Branch. A branch relates to the options available to an Operational Commander to achieve the same objective. Major branches usually lead to different COA to be wargamed; however, within each COA, there are opportunities to achieve an objective with minor variations to the basic theme. These areas should be identified as (Commander’s) DPts and should be wargamed to ensure the satisfactory outcome when analysing each friendly force COA.
219 BJDP-5.00 (2) Sequels. Sequels, on the other hand, are significant shifts in focus. Enemy COA sequels potentially stand to invalidate our assessment of developed COAs. It is important that these be identified because, if Operational plans are predicated upon the adversary/actor seeking a particular objective when in reality they seek a different orientation, operational planning will become too inflexible. With sequels, the Staff must attempt to identify the critical information requirements that indicate such a shift and this will lead to contingency planning to tackle the adversary/actor reorientation.
220 BJDP-5.00 COA ANALYSIS (WARGAME) CONDUCT
STAGE 1 – PREPARE THE WARGAME
11.11 Participation. The scope of COA Analysis will depend on the number of headquarters (HQ) staff involved, from the core Operational Planning Group (OPG) through to Specialist Planning Groups (SPGs), subordinate and superior HQ representation or specific Force Elements (FE). Too many participants, however, can distract from capturing essential modifications to the plan and could add unnecessary complication. Potential wargaming participants include:
a. Blue Team. The Blue Team represent those who have supported the development of the Operational Commander’s COA/plan. The Blue Team should include:
(1) J1. J1 analyses: the COA being wargamed to determine the casualty liability.
(2) J2. J2: Develops the threat Decision Support Overlay (DSO) and Synchronisation Matrix for each friendly COA; identifies IRs to support DPts; identifies Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) that support Target Areas of Interest (TAIs) and DPts; refines the Situation Overlays; identifies reactions, project enemy losses and verifies NAI and TAI determined by IPB; and, identifies counter- intelligence requirements.
(3) J3/J5. J3/J5: manoeuvres friendly forces allocated for the COA in accordance with the CONOPS; develops the synchronisation matrix for the COA being wargamed; identifies IRs to support DPts; identifies any shortfalls in rules of engagement; and, identifies NAI that support TAI and DPts.
(4) J4. J4: analyses each COA during the wa game to determine potential logistic problems and shortfalls; and,
221 BJDP-5.00 identifies potential shortfall and options to overcome them or reduce detrimental effects.
(5) J6. J6: analyses each COA to identify potential weaknesses in Communications Information Systems (CIS) and probable solutions.
(6) J9. J9: analyses COA to determine compliance with applicable law.
Note – all Blue Team players are responsible for analysing risk and evaluating measures to reduce identified risk. b. Red Team. Either the full red team participates or, if preferred, the team leader or a mentor represents their views. Based largely on the planning team within J2, but enhanced by additional Staff from other branches to deliver SME support, the Red Team is responsible for conducting the same functions as the Blue Team; however their focus is that of playing the role of all other adversaries and actors that are required to be examined as part of the selected COA to wargamed. c. Chairperson/Referee. The chairperson/ referee, who will have been empowered to exercise authority during the game, should have had little part to play in the conduct of either the operational (Blue) or the Red COA Plans. They can, therefore, act impartially, as well as providing an honest broker in situations where opposing sides lose sight of the purpose of the event – namely, to test the Operational Commander’s plan, not to beat each other. It is common for the Chief of Staff (COS) to fulfil this role. d. Secretary. A secretary records the output of the game and should be sufficiently familiar with all of the plans to catch the emerging issues logically and succinctly. The secretary should be an experienced Staff Officer who has a firm comprehension of Operational Planning and the wider operational environment.
222 BJDP-5.00 e. Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and OGD Personnel. Available SMEs and OGD personnel should support wargaming, sharing their time between Red and Blue teams where necessary. f. Supporting Staff. Depending upon the wargaming technique(s) being employed, a variety of specialist staff may be required. Some, such as Operational Analysis (OA) staff, provide substantive input while others simply enable the wargaming process to run smoothly. g. The Operational Commander. The Operational Commander may wish to attend the wargame personally for the greater insights they can bring. These benefits, however, should be balanced against other effects that may be realised by his presence; for example, the Staff may be uneasy about criticising those elements of the plan they assess as unsatisfactory. The Operational Commander may, however, judge that for reasons of efficiency (when time is short) or effectiveness (when his personal perspective is vital) they should attend the wargaming. Under these circumstances, they may provide guidance, reject unwanted concepts, and assist in keeping the Staff focused. If an Operational Commander attends the wargaming of multiple COAs, they may rapidly identify which COA is favoured.
223 BJDP-5.00 Operational Analysis (OA)
Purpose and Characteristics. OA is the use of mathematical, statistical and other forms of analysis to explore situations and to help decision makers to resolve problems. OA delivers quantitative rigour and objectivity to operational planning and decision-making. OA specialists draw on mathematical techniques and modelling to: examine or test a developing plan; estimate or simulate assumptions regarding likely changes as a consequence of a plan; and present data and information to realise better-informed decisions. OA is characterised by its:
Independence. OA is impartial, and analysts should not have a vested interest in any aspect of the plan or its implementation.
Credibility. OA provides the Operational Commander with justifiable advice, based on quantitative, systematic examination.
Clarity. OA should be presented in a way that is meaningful, comprehensible and useful to the Operational Commander and Staff.
Tasks. During the planning process, OA may provide:
Course of Action Evaluation. Assistance to risk analysis, wargaming support, and calculations of relative probability of success.
Correlation of Forces. Assessments of relative capability and force ratios.
Combat Resolution. Estimates of combat duration, personnel casualty, combat equipment losses and remaining combat effectiveness.
Logistics Planning. Support to deployment, sustainment, movement, equipment support, medical and other logistics planning.
Operational Assessment. Support to the identification and development of Measurements of Activity and Measurements of Effect.
Scientific and Technical Advice. Technical advice, for example, on equipment capabilities, and a conduit for further assistance from the scientific research community and industry.
224 BJDP-5.00 11.12 Select the Events to be Wargamed. Having confirmed the participation, the first task in preparation is to identify the event(s) to be wargamed, based on what the Operational Commander wishes to achieve, or needs to know, in the time available. As Figure 11.1 illustrates, when deciding what to wargame, the Operational Commander should consider both the aggregation of forces (or resolution), and scope of the event(s). There is no preferred approach, and indeed it is important to be flexible and to adjust the wargame to the issues to be resolved. For example, the Operational Commander may wish to take an overview of the whole operation, or a phase thereof; they may look at single or grouped Decisive Points (DP) or Supporting Effects (SE) or instead, concentrate on specific activities requiring detailed synchronisation between Components. The event(s) should be those the Operational Commander believes to hold most risk, either due to vulnerability to adversary/actor action, or perhaps the complexity of coordination required. Adversary/Actor Courses of Action (COAs), usually the most likely or most dangerous, should also be considered. Time available for the wargame may also impact on what can be examined. The COS should use the Planning Timeline to ascertain the time available for the wargaming.
225 BJDP-5.00
High aggregation of forces (Low resolution)
Overview of specific Overview of
operational operation or entire elements phase
area/Timeperiod Detailed Protracted detailed Wargaming Wargaming
Limitedarea/Timeperiod Limited eg . specific component interactions
Low aggregation of forces (High resolution)
Figure 11.1 – Wargame Options.
11.13 Determine Wargame Start States. This activity establishes the start state for the wargame and includes dispositions of friendly and enemy forces, critical assumptions remaining, known critical events, DPts and significant factors that will affect the conduct the wargame. The majority of this information will be available from the IPB and OMAP Step 1 (Mission Analysis). The wargame must commence at known and identified points within the plan. The COA Development Team leader in conjunction with the wargame Chairperson will determine this point. To enable the wargame to be conducted the following information will be required:
a. Friendly Forces. Friendly forces are considered in terms of either indicative force assignment or as identified Task Forces (TFs). These forces need to be considered in terms of disposition, readiness and capability at the wargame start point.
b. Critical Assumptions. List all critical assumptions needed for the start of the wargame.
226 BJDP-5.00 c. Identified Adversary/Actor Decisive Points (DPs). List all identified adversary/actor key events and DPs.
d. Significant Factors. Significant factors that affect COA analysis are derived from Commander’s guidance and through Staff analysis during the COA development. Significant factors may include areas such as acceptable risk, Force Protection (FP) and time analysis.
11.14 Select Wargame Method. The Chairperson/referee should select the wargame technique(s) to be used, the number of game turns possible within the time allocated, and thus the length of each turn. In addition, they should specify the (notional) start time for the wargame in terms of the operations or activities under review and in conjunction with the identified start states. The following methods should be considered to support the focusing in of events within each COA (used separately or in combination):
a. The Time Box Method. The Time Box method focuses on one critical part or task of a COA. This method is useful if time is extremely limited and only the DPs of the COA are wargamed. As it focuses on a single portion of the COA it may not fully take into account those activities occurring elsewhere in the battlespace.
b. The Time Event Method. This method allows for wargaming of the COA using a logical sequence of time driven events. This method is beneficial in that it highlights the sequencing of activities throughout the battlespace, in relation to the Framework described within the SoM, at any time during the COA allowing for ease of development of the synchronisation matrix on completion.
c. Avenue in depth. This method is useful for modelling the manoeuvre of a key capability or Components over a number of operational phases and across a large area of the Operational Environment, focusing on specific opportunities and threats. It can also be used to focus on a single LoO within a multiple LoO COA.
227 BJDP-5.00 d. Belt. This method may be used where there are multiple actions occurring simultaneously over a wide area of the Operational Environment (either in actual of figurative terms). It takes into account the interdependency of numerous DP to be achieved in a short space of time. This entails the analysis of a ‘vertical’ slice through all LoO of a COA based on related or dependent DP.
e. Computer simulation. The conduct of the COA utilising a dedicated computer simulation system may be an option. Available systems allow for the ‘play’ of any portion of the COA any number of times with different inputs as required. As most systems are times with differing inputs to achieve a spread results. Use of these simulation systems may be time intensive (development of plan, constructions of computer orders, development of system requirements etc) which may preclude their use for all but long term deliberate planning.
11.15 Select Wargame Recording Method. Recording the results of the wargame ensures that information is displayed in a manner that later assists the Operational Planning Group (OPG) to prepare the plan, the Decision Support Overlay (DSO), the DSO Matrix (DSOM) and the Synchronisation Matrix. It is important for the OPG to identify and provide a method that suits the Operational Commander’s analytical and decision making style. Wargaming results can be recorded and displayed using a matrix, narrative or the sketch note method, or a combination of these.
a. The Wargame Matrix. The wargame matrix is a very effective method of recording results. It is useful to capture the time and space relationship of an operation and should ensure that all elements are incorporated. The wargame matrix is based upon the Synchronisation Matrix (both matrices are organised in exactly the same way) and it provides the framework for the development of the Synchronisation Matrix. It may be organised according to Joint TF, Component, or Framework (Operational, Tactical, Geographic etc) and displays the detailed coordination required for the final plan and the information displayed on the DSO/DSOM. As
228 BJDP-5.00 such, the use of the wargame matrix during wargaming may save time during OMAP Step 4 (Decision and Execution).
b. The Narrative Method. The narrative method describes the operation in sentence form. It provides extensive detail and clarity, but is time consuming to design and read. Narratives are also more difficult to transfer data from, when designing the Synchronisation Matrix for the final plan. The narrative method is best used at higher levels in deliberate campaign planning.
c. The Sketch Note Method. The sketch note method employs a sketch and brief notes outlining critical events and tasks. All pertinent data for each critical event is quickly recorded on a wargame worksheet during the conduct technique, but it can be time consuming to use when transferring data, during the later design of the Synchronisation Matrix.
11.16 Confirm the Wargame Rules. The reliability and quality of products resulting from wargaming are dependent on adherence to some basic rules. These general rules are designed to ensure the integrity of the wargaming process and avoid bias. They include:
a. Always remain objective and impartial. Wargame conduct must not let personalities have undue influence over the process irrespective of team (Red or Blue). Staff must not become emotionally attached to any particular COA.
b. Ensure each COA remains credible. If at any time during the wargame a COA becomes implausible, stop the wargame and remove the COA as an option or modify it to ensure that it becomes suitable.
c. Avoid drawing premature conclusions and presenting facts or assumptions to support them.
d. Each friendly COA must be wargamed against each adversary/actor COA.
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11.17 Orchestration.
a. Positioning. The wargaming area should be formally arranged, with seats designated for players, usually with the Blue team on one side and the Red team on the other, with an additional seating area made available for other participants. The Chairperson/referee should direct the assembly of appropriate aids, and, depending upon the complexity of the game, conduct rehearsals (especially where heavy reliance is placed upon computer support).
b. Briefing. It may be useful for the Chairperson/referee to conduct a briefing to ensure all Staff are conversant with the various COAs and how the wargame will be conducted. It should cover:
(1) The technique(s) and format of the game.
(2) Timings (including breaks).
(3) Player appointments and other participants.
(4) Aids required and responsibilities for their preparation.
(5) Recording system, wargame output, and responsibilities.
(6) Final Staff products and responsibility for their delivery.
(7) Wargame rules.
(8) Red team review and update (as required).
(9) Blue team review and update (as required).
230 BJDP-5.00 STAGE 2 – CONDUCT THE WARGAME
11.18 Wargaming Process.
a. The Operational Commander confirms and directs which enemy COAs will be wargamed. The process involves wargaming each critical event in turn, this is usually done using agreed time increments. The wargame allows the Staff to analyse selected events and identify the activities the Force must accomplish. This identifies strength and weaknesses for each event within each COA and enables the Staff to make adjustment.
b. The Chairperson/referee should open with a review37 of the strategic guidance, the Operational Commander’s direction, any assumptions, and the conduct of the wargame. Players then confirm that their forces have been set-up in accordance with their COA and the game Start State.
c. Wargaming relies heavily on judgement and experience. The wargame consists of an action/reaction/counteraction sequence for each critical event. This process quickly identifies strength and weaknesses for each event within each COA. COAs are modified as weaknesses are found. This ensures force assignment is appropriate and allocated tasks are realistic. To save time only workable COAs are completely analysed, normally through to their End State.
11.19 Wargame Action Sequencing. It is crucial that the Chairperson/referee coordinates and adjudicates the process. It is important that each Staff member brings to the analysis a thorough understanding of the capabilities and limitations of their respective component or cell, which are crucial to a realistic appreciation of each COA. Representatives who are also wargaming their component or cell for any adversary/actor must also be aware of their capabilities and doctrinal procedures. As previously identified, the wargame is conducted using
37 The depth of this scene-setter will depend upon what was covered during the pre-brief, to whom and how long ago. 231 BJDP-5.00 action/reaction/counteraction drills. The sequence is determined by whoever has the initiative going first and conducting the initial ‘action’. The wargame is continued for each critical events until a decisive outcome is achieved, including identification of possible branches and sequels. These branches and sequels should be noted for detailed wargaming once the Operational Commander has decided upon the final COA, if time permits. The requirements for each drill are addressed according to the following headings.
a. Action. The Red or Blue Team positions the respective Force Elements onto their start locations at the selected wargame start time. The representative states what action the Forces will take at this point, using Purpose (Intent), Method (SoM) and End State. This is done by visualising, as accurately as possible, the events that those units will be conducting. These events are recorded on the Wargame Record (latterly Synchronisation Matrix).
b. Reaction. The respondent (the opposite team who did not initiate the ‘action’) positions their forces in accordance with the selected COA and describes the effect they will have on the battlespace environment in response. All possible reactions should be stated. This includes forces outside the AO which could influence battlespace environment. All the assets that will be required to carry out the counteraction must be identified and how they were positioned in the battlespace explained. Actions and assets are recorded on the wargame record, which is later refined to become the Synchronisation Matrix.
c. Counteraction. This is the final stage which details the response to the action/reaction sequence of events:
(1) If the friendly forces have the initiative, the aim of this stage is to identify the friendly response to adversary/actor reaction and determine the assets the friendly Commander will require to carry out the counteraction. The friendly counteraction and assets requirements are recorded on the Wargame record.
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(2) Alternatively, if the adversary/actor has the initiative, the aim is to identify possible responses to friendly reactions. Once again, all possible reactions should be stated. This includes forces outside the AO which could influence the battlespace environment. All assets required to carry out the counteraction must be identified and how they were positioned in the battlespace explained. Again actions and assets are recorded on the Wargame record.
At the end of the above sequence and based on the different actions, attrition is applied and players agree to the new unit locations and strengths to be used in the next game turn – adjudication from the Chairperson/referee may/will be required to establish to final decision. Operational Analysis, OA, (if available) may inform this process, and the Chairperson’s/referee’s judgement is final should there be any disagreement. Although the most likely outcome should be accepted, a possible worst case should also be examined if the outcome may influence subsequent actions or decisions. During these drills, the Chairperson/referee and Staff identify the assets that each action, reaction and counteraction will require. If the demand for assets exceeds the available forces, then the COA must establish priorities for their use and re- examine the forces allocated to the activity. Conversely, it may be determined that the force allocation is more than ample and excess forces should be moved to support another DP. Experience with these drills, will result in individual Staffs perfecting their own methods of refining this process.
11.20 Wargame Results. A member of Staff should be appointed as the recorder – this is normally the Secretary. Continuous attention must be given to the requirement to accurately record the wargame as it progresses. Detail omitted from the wargame record may lessen the utility of the subsequent Synchronisation Matrix when used to monitor the execution of the plan and battlespace activities. Functions of the Wargame record may include:
233 BJDP-5.00 a. The relevance of actions to the future production of a Synchronisation Matrix.
b. Force organisations for tasks.
c. Use and locations for NAIs and TAIs.
d. Decisions taken and Decision Points (DPts), both own and adversary/actor forces.
e. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).
The results of the wargame are designed not to be actioned while the wargame is still be conducted (unless absolutely necessary, in which case there may need to be a pause in proceedings). Rather, once the results of the wargame are collated, refinement tasks can then be allocated back to planning groups and Staff branches.
234 BJDP-5.00 STAGE 3 – ACTION RESULTING FROM THE WARGAME
11.21 COA Analysis Brief. COA analysis finishes with a brief, by the Staff to the Operational Commander (if necessary – i.e. if not present during the wargame), which details the modified COAs and their advantages and disadvantages. Sections 4 to 6 of COA Analysis Brief should be repeated for each COA. The brief should include:
BRIEFER SUBJECT COS, J3/J5 Intent of own and higher commander. Mission. Own forces status (position, condition). Reconfirm own COG. J2 Threat situation update. Enemy COAs war gamed. J3 Brief on each Friendly COA war gamed: o Operation assumptions. o War game technique used. o COAs war gamed. J2 Possible threat actions/reactions considered during the war game for each En COA. J3 Results of the war game for each COA: o Modifications to COA. o C2 measures and TASKORG. o COA diagram. o Priority for Log Sp. o Estimate (Est) time of op. o Est threat losses. o Est friendly losses. o Advantages and Disadvantages of COA. o Degree of risk of COA. COS, J3/J5 Recommended COAs for consideration in step four.
11.22 Following the COA Analysis Brief, it may be necessary for the Operational Commander to provide further direction in order to refine COA into fully developed Operational Plans and Orders (OPLAN and OPORD). In order to do this, the Operational Commander supported by the wargame Chairperson/referee will provide guidance (for refinement) on:
a. Generation of additional CCIRs.
235 BJDP-5.00 b. Implications for Intelligence Requirements Management, including adjustments to the Intelligence Collection Plan. c. Identified risks requiring further analysis and management. d. Preparation of CONPLANs. e. Adjustments to operational schematics. f. Synchronisation of manoeuvre, fires and influence (Synchronisation Matrix). g. Refinement of NAIs, TAIs and DPTs including known and additional critical events (DSO/DSOM). h. Subordinate tasks and priorities. i. C2 measures including task organisations.
236 BJDP-5.00 CHAPTER 12 – OMAP STEP 4 (DECISION AND EXECUTION)
INTRODUCTION
12.01 OMAP Step 4 (Decision and Execution) represents the point in the planning process where the Operational Commander commits the force to a plan. Outputs from the decision are developed into Operational Plans and Orders (OPLAN and OPORD) for execution by assigned forces. During execution, the plan is followed and updated as the situation changes. This may include the execution of branches and sequels or the recommencement of a further OMAP cycle.
12.02 In this step, the Operational Commander compares the strength and weaknesses of each modified COA and decides which COA is to be developed into a plan and subsequently executed. Products from the decision step are:
a. The confirmed friendly COA.
b. The requirement for contingency plans.
c. Adjustments to the COA as required.
d. Plans for subsequent operations.
237 BJDP-5.00 DECISION
COMPARE COA
12.03 The aim of comparing COAs is to determine the one that has the highest probability of success against the adversary MLCOA and MDCOA. In addition, the Operational Commander assesses the risk associated with each COA. The situation and the Superior Commander’s Intent will determine the elements of risk, and their relative importance. COAs that are not selected may be kept as the basis of contingency plans and can be used as branches and sequels to support the execution phase, should changes to the plan be required. In comparing COAs, key Staff firstly conduct their own COA comparison and then recommend a COA to the Operational Commander for approval. The actual comparison may follow any technique that allows both the Staff to provide the best recommendation and the Operational Commander to make the best decision. COA Comparison Techniques are described in the following paragraphs:
12.04 COA Comparison Technique 1 – Numerical Analysis. A numerical analysis matrix is detailed in Figure 12.1. The matrix contains the following three components:
a. COAs. These are the modified COAs remaining after wargaming.
b. Criteria. The criteria are usually identified by the Operational Commander as priorities during COA development. They may be refined by the Operational Commander or the Chief of Staff and may include:
(1) Suitability, Feasibility, Acceptability, Sustainability, and Distinguishability.
(2) Achievement of the mission and essential tasks.
(3) Achievement of the Decisive Points (DPs).
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(4) Adherence to the Principles of War.
(5) Adherence to the doctrinal principles and fundamentals for the kind of operation being conducted (e.g. Principles of Peacekeeping, Principles of Offensive Operations).
(6) Adherence to the Tactical Functions.
(7) The level of risk against perceived operational gain.
c. Weighting. The weight of each criterion is usually determined by the COS based on the relative importance of the criterion to the Operational Commander’s Intent and priorities.
Each COA is then compared and scored or ranked in order of priority against each criterion. The COA scoring/ranking for the criterion is then multiplied by the weighting factor to produce a numerical score for the selected criterion. The numerical scores for each COA are then calculated, with the highest score indicating the strongest COA. The benefit of a numerical analysis is that it provides a relatively simple means of determining a preferred COA based on the given criterion. The disadvantage of this method lies in the fact that Commanders will often require more substantial justification than a numerical score before they select one COA over another. For this reason, advantages and disadvantages may have to be used to support the Staff’s recommendation. Each COA is numbered in order of priority of advantage for each criterion. The best COA for each criterion receives the highest score.
239 BJDP-5.00 Criteria Weight COA 1 COA 2 COA 3 Raw/Weighted Raw/Weighted Raw/Weighted Suitability 3 2/6 1/3 3/9 Feasibility 2 2/4 3/6 1/2 Acceptability 2 2/4 1/2 3/6 Sustainability 3 1/3 2/6 2/6 Distinguishability 1 2/2 3/3 1/1 TOTAL 9/19 10/20 10/24 RANK 3 2 1
Table 12.1 – Numerical Analysis Decision Matrix.
12.05 COA Comparison Technique 2 – Broad Categories Analysis. The advantage of the Broad Categories Analysis method results from being simple and relatively quick to use. Unlike the numerical analysis, this approach does not give weighting to criteria. The assessment for each criteria is simply expressed as a positive (+), neutral (0) or negative (-). Against each criterion, COA are compared to provide a broad awareness of the merits of the one COA over another. This approach is useful in indicating each COAs strength and weaknesses and is particularly useful if the Staff are uncertain how weighting criteria may unrealistically skew the comparison result. Like the numerical analysis, the method alone will rarely provide the Operational Commander a comprehensive argument as to why one COA should be selected over another. Figure 12.2 demonstrates this approach.
Factor COA 1 COA 1 COA 3 Suitability + - + Feasibility 0 + - Acceptability + 0 + Sustainability - + 0 Distinguishability 0 - + Moral Auth 1+ 0 2+ TOTAL 2 3 1
Table 12.2 – Broad Categories Analysis Decision Matrix.
12.06 COA Comparison Technique 3 – Advantages and Disadvantages. An additional method of analysis is to list the advantages and disadvantages of each COA against all of a selection of criteria. This 240 BJDP-5.00 method is particularly useful when combined with either of the other methods. The analysis matrix allows the Staff to expand upon those criteria that the Operational Commander indicated as the most important. Additionally, it may be used to summarise each COA. An example of this format for this method is shown in Figure 12.3.
12.07 Subjective Analysis. Subjective analysis is simply the use of the other matrices to analyse criteria by individual Staff members. Each individual Staff member conducts subjective analysis before the Staff’s collective comparison brief.
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Factor COA 1 COA 2 COA 3 Suitability Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages Advantages
Feasibility Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages Advantages
Acceptability Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages Advantages
Sustainability Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages Advantages
Distinguishability Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages Advantages
Figure 12.3 – Advantages and Disadvantages Decision Matrix.
242 BJDP-5.00 12.08 Commander’s Decision Briefing. After completion of the analysis and comparison, the Staff identifies the preferred COA and makes their recommendations to the Operational Commander. If required, the Staff conduct a formal briefing for the Operational Commander to obtain a decision, allowing the selected COA to be developed into a plan. A suggested format is provided below:
BRIEFER SUBJECT COS, J3/J5 Intent of own and higher comd. Mission. Own force status (position, condition). Confirm own COG. J2 Threat situation update: o Modified COA diagram (after war game). o Recommended CCIRs. J3 Brief on each COA: o Ops assumptions. o Results of staff decision matrix. o COA advantages and disadvantages. o COA degree of risk. Recommended COA. Endorsement of COA. J1 Brief on each COA: o Personnel (Pers) assumptions. o Results of pers staff est. o COA advantages and disadvantages. o COA degree of risk. o Finance (costs). Recommend COA. J4 Brief on each COA: o Log Sp assumptions. o Results of J4 staff Log MAP. o COA advantages and disadvantages. o COA degree of risk. Recommended COA. J6 Brief on each COA: o CIS assumptions. o Results of CIS staff est. o COA advantages and disadvantages. o COA degree of risk. Recommended COA. COS, J3/J5 Combined Staff recommended COA. Comd Comd selects COA as plan.
243 BJDP-5.00 SELECT COA
12.09 The Operational Commander selects the preferred COA. If the commander modifies a proposed COA, the Staff must go back to COA Analysis. Once a COA has been selected, the Operational Commander’s statement of intent and CCIR’s may be refined. The selected COA is developed into a full and comprehensive Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Those COA not selected by the Operational Commander may become CONPLANS or possible deception plans.
244 BJDP-5.00 EXECUTION
DEVELOP AND ISSUE THE PLAN
12.10 Based on the Operational Commander’s decision and final guidance, the Operational Planning Group (OPG) refines the COA, completes the plan and prepares to issue the necessary Orders. Once the Operational Commander accepts the revised COA, the following activities occur:
a. Preparation and issue of a Warning Order (WngO) – if not already issued.
b. Full development of the Synchronisation Matrix. Once the plan is identified, the information from the wargame record is used to produce a detailed Synchronisation Matrix. This matrix displays the detailed coordination of friendly activities across the battlespace, and confirms NAIs, TAIs and DPts.
c. Development of the plan and supporting plans. Once the Synchronisation Matrix is developed, the full plan and supporting plans are developed using the Synchronisation Matrix as the coordination handrail in accordance with the Operational Commander’s CONOPS.
d. Preparation and issue of orders. Once the Orders are complete, the OPG may conduct a CONOPS/OPORD Brief (if required). This brief ensures all Headquarters Staff (who may have been left out of aspects of the planning process) understand the plan and their Operational Commander’s intent. This brief may also be used as a handover point from Planning Staff to Operations Staff. Handover points, if any, will largely be a function of the Headquarters structures, manning and procedures. Orders are then prepared and issued.
245 BJDP-5.00 EXECUTE THE PLAN
12.11 Administratively, the IPB is continually updated, as is the Synchronisation Matrix. Both the Operational Commander and Staff must continually review the situation to determine if there is a requirement to modify plans or orders. Dependent on the size of the Headquarters involved, other staff may be allocated the task of preparing CONPLANS (branches and sequels).
12.12 Termination. The Operational Commander and Staff must remain focused throughout the conduct of the plan to bring the operation to a close and ensuring that the desired End States are achieved and can be maintained. Actions on achievement of the End State must also be considered, including, withdrawal, de-mobilisation if required or whether a force should remain deployed. Logistic and financial implications will aso need to be considered.
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247 BJDP-5.00 LEXICON
This Lexicon contains acronyms/abbreviations used in this publication.
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
A Assumption AA Avenue of Approach AII Area of Intelligence Interest AIR Area of Intelligence Responsibility AO Area of Operations APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation ASCOPE Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organisation, People, Events ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
BAE Battlefield Area Evaluation BOS Battlefield Operating System BPT Be Prepared To
C Constraint C2 Command and Control CAT Critical Assessment Tool CC Component Commander CC Critical Capability CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirement CI Counter Intelligence CIS Command and Information Systems COA Course(s) of Action COE Contemporary Operating Environment CoG Centre of Gravity COIN Counter Insurgency CONOPS Concepts of Operations CONPLAN Contingency Plan COS Chief of Staff CPERS Captured Persons CR Critical Requirement 248 BJDP-5.00 CV Critical Vulnerability
DEC Defence Executive Committee DP Decisive Point DPt Decision Point DSO Decision Support Overlay DSOM Decision Support Overlay Matrix
F Freedom FE Force Elements FID Force Instruction Document FP Force Protection FRAGO Fragmentary Order
G20 Leading 20 developed economic nations
HQ Headquarters HPT High Payoff Target HTA Human Terrain Analysis HVT High Value Target
I&W Indicators and Warnings IO Information Operations IO International Organisation IPB Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace IR Information Requirement ISR Intelligence Surveillance and Target Acquisition
J1 Joint Personnel Support J2 Joint Intelligence J3 Joint Operations J4 Joint Logistic (also Equipment and Medical) Sp J5 Joint Plans J6 Joint Communication and Information Systems J7 Joint Training J8 Joint Finance and Resource J9 Joint Legal
249 BJDP-5.00 JAO Joint Area of Operations JFC Joint Force Commander JFHQ Joint Force Headquarters
KLE Key Leader Engagement KT Key Terrain
LEGAD Legal Advisor LOAC Law of Armed Conflict LoO Line of Operation
MC Mobility Corridors MDCOA Most Dangerous Course of Action ME Main Effort MLCOA Most Likely Course of Action
NAI Named Area of Interest NSC National Security Committee
OA Operational Analysis OCG Operational Command Group OGD Other Government Department OCOKA Observation and Field of Fire, Cover and Concealment, Obstacles OMAP Operational Military Appreciation Process OOB Order of Battle OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, Act OPC Operational Planning Concepts OPG Operational Planning Group OPLANS Operational Plans OPORD Operational Order OPSEC Operations Security OSW Operational Staff Work
PEST Political, Economic, Social, Technological PESTLEI Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal, Environmental, Information
250 BJDP-5.00 PG Planning Guidance PIR Priority Information Requirement PMESII (PTT) Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information (Physical, Terrain, Time) POLAD Political Advisor PSO Peace Support Operation
R Restriction RB Resource Bid RBAF Royal Brunei Armed Forces Ri Risk
SE Supporting Effect SME Subject Matter Expert SoM Scheme of Manoeuvre SOP Standing Operating Procedure SPG Specialist Planning Group STEEPLEM Social, Technological, Economic , Environmental, Political, Legal, Ethical, Military SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
T Task TAI Target Area of Interest TASKORG Task Organisation TF Task Force
UN United Nations
VG Vital Ground
WngO Warning Order
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