Working Paper 1
Armed Forces, the State, and Society Series
AUTHORITARIAN POLICING AND DEMOCRATIZATION:
THE CASE OF THAILAND
EUGÉNIE MÉRIEAU
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that the post-1970s democratization in Thailand had minimal effects on the entrenched practices of authoritarian policing. Democratization, in fact, did not put an end to these practices but instead correlated with their legalization through the enactment of a set of empowering legislation. This empirical finding invites a reconsid- eration of the hypothesis of covariation between regime type and policing practices.
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©The Author 2020
EUGÉNIE MÉRIEAU is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Asian Legal Studies, National University of Singapore. She previously held positions at Sciences Po (France), Göttingen University (Germany) and Thammasat University (Thailand) and worked as a consultant for the International Commission of Jurists. Her publications on Thailand have appeared in the Journal of Contemporary Asia, Asian Journal of Comparative Law, Southeast Asian Affairs, among others, along more popular ven- ues such as the Atlantic or the New York Times. Her upcoming book, Constitutional Bricolage : Thailand's Sacred King versus the Rule of Law, is forthcoming with Hart Publishing.
This paper was written during a residency at Harvard Law School, Institute of Global Law and Policy (IGLP). I would like to thank David Kennedy and all members of the Institute for their support. This is a preliminary version of a chapter commissioned for a book on Authoritarian Policing in Asia edited by Fu Hualing and Weitseng Chen. I would like to thank them both as well as the publisher for allowing me to publish it in preliminary form.
The working papers contained in the Armed Forces, the State, and Society se- ries began as presentations at a conference on the same topic held on Decem- ber 6, 2019 that focused on Southeast Asia, a dynamic and varied region with a mix of historic and cultural experiences. Funding for the conference was gen- erously provided by the New York Southeast Asia Network.
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SERIES EDITOR’S PREFACE
It is often the case that the study of civil-military relations focuses on what Peter Feaver calls its central problematique: how to balance military effectiveness with subordination to civil control. And while this concern exists within the political, policy, and academic agenda in and for Southeast Asia, it is not the sole focus.
We would do well to recall that militaries are social actors. They may be different than other such actors (as Samuel Finer reminds us, they have guns) but they are not wholly sepa- rable. Accordingly, these papers look at the various impacts that armed forces have in their relationships with the states and societies. We want to examine the ways in which these rela- tions shape and are shaped by identities, authority, legitimacy, and legacies.
As such, Michael Mann's quadripartite understanding of social power, consisting of mil- itary, political, economic, and normative elements is instructive here. We take it for granted that armed forces have military power, and are cognizant of their ability to wield political power. However, and if not uniquely, then certainly distinctly, Southeast Asia reveals that the patterns of social power experienced in and espoused by the West are not universal. Formal armed forces may not be the only wielders of military power extant within a given state. The exercise of political power by armed forces is not everywhere rare, or even unwelcome, in the region.
Moreover, in Southeast Asia armed forces exercise economic power, running commer- cial ventures, and providing a range of public services. While not mainstream amongst the study of civil-military relations in the West, these three aspects are not new to scholars looking at Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, or Southeast Asia.
This is where Mann's conceptualization of social power can provide even more assis- tance. In addition to military, political, and economic power, the armed forces across Southeast Asia wield considerable normative power. In turn, though, militaries require legitimacy. In all societies they need to justify their expenditure of treasure and sometimes blood. Some are able to draw on legitimacy gained, for instance, through their role as defenders or builders of the nation. Others are portrayed as special for different reasons, such as being from certain caste or ethnic group. Some must make deals with other holders of social power: partnerships with industrialists, religious figures, or politicians can enable militaries to leverage normative power, enough at least to allow them to operate. Such associations, though, may mean that the 'chain of command' becomes blurry.
An engagement with a fuller appreciation of social power, in all its forms, allows us to better understand the real roles—declared and assumed, formal and informal—played by armed forces. It also enables us to see where opportunities for reform might lie, as civil-military re- lations and security sector reform are often intrinsically linked.
Christopher Ankersen, PhD
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AUTHORITARIAN POLICING AND DEMOCRATIZATION: THE CASE OF THAILAND
EUGÉNIE MÉRIEAU
s David Bayley remarked in his sem- tially political in that its function was to con- inal study of policing, “Police activi- solidate a specific regime and protect its A ties determine the limits of freedom power-holders; from the 18th to the 20th cen- in organized society, an essential feature in tury, as the police professionalized, it in- determining the character of government creasingly focused on suppressing crime; th (…) A government is recognized as being au- and, from the late 20 century onwards, “communitarian policing”, with its emphasis thoritarian if its police are repressive, dem- on delivery of public goods and trust-build- ocratic if its police are restrained.”1 In other ing, became the new standard in democratic words, the type of policing practiced in a so- states.5 In line with the tenets of moderniza- ciety is indicative of regime type, broadly tion theory, political policing is considered to conceived as either authoritarian or demo- recede along with democratization, thereby cratic. Hence, during democratization pro- acting as one of the key markers of the au- cesses we should observe corresponding thoritarian/democratic dichotomy, which changes in modes of policing, from “author- also maps onto a non-modern/modern di- itarian” to “democratic policing”2. vide.6
A key distinction between “authoritarian” The Thai case is particularly relevant in any and “democratic” policing lies in the differ- testing of the hypothesis that sees policing ence between law-enforcement, service- as a function of regime type in the broader oriented type of policing and the policing of frame of modernization theory. Since the political activities. As societies democratize, overthrow of absolute monarchy in 1932, police undergo a process of “professionali- Thai political history has been dominated by zation” whereby it progressively relin- long periods of military dictatorship punctu- quishes its political activities to focus on law ated by shorter periods of democracy. For enforcement. Derived from the nine princi- the first forty years of its history (1933-1973), ples of “the founder of modern police” Sir Thailand was ruled by military juntas, alt- Robert Peel3, professionalization entails hough elections were sometimes held. The specialization on crime reduction (referred so-called Third Wave of democracy hit the to as “low policing”) as opposed to political Kingdom in 1973, one year before the Portu- policing (“high policing”).4 guese Carnation Revolution7, but it was short-lived. The “democratic parenthesis” Against this background, the literature on lasted only three years, before a coup policing identifies three “historical” stages : plunged the country back into military dicta- prior to the 18th century, policing was essen- torship in 1976. Following the ouster of the
1 David H Bayley, Patterns of Policing (Rutgers University 4 Jean-Paul Brodeur, ‘High Policing and Low Policing: Re- Press 1985) 5, 189. marks about the Policing of Political Activities’ (1983) 30 So- 2 Liqun Cao, Lanying Huang and Ivan Sun, ‘From Authoritarian cial Problems 507. Policing to Democratic Policing: A Case Study of Taiwan’ 5 George L Kelling, ‘The Evolving Strategy of Policing’ (1988) 4 (2016) 26 Policing and Society 642. Perspectives on Policing 1. 3 Keith L Williams, ‘Peel’s Principles and Their Acceptance by 6Peter K Manning, ‘Jean-Paul Brodeur on High and Low Po- American Police: Ending 175 Years of Reinvention’ (2003) 76 licing’ [2012] Champ pénal
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junta a few years later, Thailand was la- The police are charged with serving belled a “semi-democracy”: notwithstanding the public. This police service in- election results, prime ministers would in- cludes the rendering of facilities and evitably come from the ranks of the mili- assistance to the public, such as giv- tary.8 In 1991, yet another military coup gave ing information on location of places, rise to a popular movement for democracy streets, or, when requested, seeing calling for an end to military rule and a new that vehicles or other things left with Constitution. The outcome of this process, the police will not be tempered with, the 1997 Constitution, was a watershed mo- taking a sick person to hospitals, giv- ment in the history of the country. The fragile ing advice and opinion in civil cases, young Thai democracy appeared to be helping in the settling of compound- morphing into a consolidated, participatory able offences, helping children and democracy. Yet in 2006, a twelfth military the aged across the street, removing coup ushered in a return to military rule, fol- such obstructions as vehicles and lowed by a short period of democracy other things from roadways, helping (2008-2014), military rule again (2015 – 2019) others with personal service when and the return to a “semi-democracy” possible such as lifting loads onto headed by a soldier legitimized by elections. vehicles, giving first aids in emer- gency, finding the home of children To test the hypothesis of policing as a func- who have lost their way, returning tion of regime type, this paper will focus on lost property to the rightful owners the evolutions of political policing in light of and others. In other words a police- recent Thai political developments – as only man is a friend of all and is always political policing is expected to be affected helpful to the public.10 by democratization/modernization. As Bay- ley puts it, “[r]egime character does not af- In contrast to “helping children and the aged fect the nature of tasks performed by police, across the street”, the quintessential apart from those related to politics.”9 Indeed, marker of “high” policing signaling authori- whether in times of full-fledged military dic- tarianism is the policing of political dissent. tatorship or in times of electoral democracy, Dissent manifests itself in variegated ways, routine service-oriented, law-enforcement including in the staging of street protests. type of policing remains relatively constant. Protest policing might be one of the domains For instance, in 1970, as the Thai Police was where the dichotomy between authoritarian involved in violent counter-insurgency and democratic policing appears most practices including extrajudicial killings and sharply : “brutal versus soft”, “illegal versus enforced disappearances on a large scale, legal”, “confrontational versus consensual”, they still performed highly service-oriented, “repressive versus accommodative.”11 “low policing” tasks on a daily basis. Asked about his everyday routine, a Thai policeman In a democratic society, political dissent tells of his role in the following terms: manifesting itself in street protests will be channeled and protected, whereas in an au-
8 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, ‘Democracy in Thailand: A Case 11 Janjira Sombatpoonsiri, ‘The Policing of Anti-Government of a Stable Semi-Democratic Regime’ (1987) World Affairs Protests: Thailand’s 2013–2014 Demonstrations and a Crisis 150, 31. of Police Legitimacy’ (2017) 4 Journal of Asian Security and 9 Bayley Patterns of Policing 210. International Affairs 95. 10 Quoted in Albert C Weed, Police and the Modernization Pro- cess: Thailand (Woodrow Wilson School of Public and Inter- national Affairs 1970), 25.
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thoritarian polity it will be violently re- lated with their legalization has been the en- pressed. Democratic policing is defined a actment of a set of empowering legislations. minimal use of State violence against the This empirical finding invites a reconsidera- citizen, and whenever it is used, there will tion of the hypothesis that there exists a be a concomitant interest in restraining its strict covariation between regime type and use.12 In a democracy, “police view their job policing practices. to be managing, rather than repressing, pro- test, protecting the right to demonstrate, The next section provides a brief overview of and guaranteeing (even to those whose the genealogy of the Thai Police. views they may find intolerable) due process of law.”13 Besides restraint in the use of THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN THAI POLICE: COLO- force and due process of law, police ac- NIAL ORIGINS AND FOREIGN MODELS countability and transparency are key char- acteristics of democratic policing. Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia to have never been directly colonized. By contrast, authoritarian policing involves A stone inscription from the Sukhothai era the reliance on secret police, arbitrary ar- (13th – 15th century) refers to the role of in- rests and unlawful detention, extrajudicial spectors or phu truat mandated by the King killings, torture, and enforced disappear- for various missions of public ordering.17 ances. Moreover, police violence is under- During the Ayuthaya era (14th – 18th century), stood, in the authoritarian context, as struc- bureaucracy was divided into military and tural as opposed to deviant; and impunity as civilian domains.18 A form of “Metropolitan the norm rather than the exception. Demo- police” tasked with patrolling around the cratic policing must be neutral and account- palace appeared during that time.19 The word able,14 whereas authoritarian policing is for police, tamruat, can be found in sixteenth both politicized and unaccountable.15 Sev- century court chronicles.20 The police func- eral studies also associate democratic po- tion was then exclusively to provide security licing with decentralization of police struc- to the royal family.21 In the 18th century, the tures, and authoritarian policing with hyper- newly founded kingdom of Rattanakosin at- centralization.16 tracted a large influx of Chinese, and a “po- lice constabulary division” was formed to In this paper, I argue that post-1970s democ- police Bangkok’s Chinese residents activi- ratization in Thailand had minimal effects on ties involving opium trafficking and gang the entrenched practices of authoritarian warfare in Chinatown (Sampeng area)22. policing. Democratization, in fact, did not put an end to these practices; instead, corre-
12 Gary T Marx, ‘Some Reflections on the Democratic Policing 16 Kevin Carty, Guidebook on Democratic Policing (2. ed, OSCE of Demonstrations’ in Donatella Della Porta and Herbert 2008). Reiter (eds), Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demon- 17 Eric Haanstad, ‘A Brief History of the Thai Police’ in Paul strations in Western Democracies 253. Chambers (ed), Knights of the Realm: Thailand’s Military and 13 Marx Some Reflections 254. Police, Then and Now (White Lotus Press 2013) 452. 14 Puangthong R Pawakapan, Central Role of Thailand’s Inter- 18 Reign of King Trailokanat (15th century). Haanstad A brief nal Security Operations Command in the Post-Counter-In- History 453. surgency Period (ISEAS Publishing 2017) 3. Peter K Manning, 19 Eric James Haanstad, ‘Constructing Order through Chaos: ‘The Study of Policing’ (2005) Police Quarterly 8, 23. A State Ethnography of the Thai Police’ (Doctor of Philosophy 15 “Democratic policing refers to the police practice where (Anthropology), Wisconsin-Madison 2008) 50. political neutrality holds in domestic conflicts and a civilian 20 Weed Police and the Modernization process 14. supremacy prevails. Police officers are accountable to the 21 Haanstad Constructing Order 42. law and ultimately to a democratically elected parliament” 22 Haanstad Constructing Order 51. Cao et all From Authoritarian Policing 645.
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From the second half of the 19th century on- that emulated those from Prussia, were in- wards, Siam was crypto-colonized23; that is troduced in Thailand, and later included in to say, the government was involved in the the first modern Penal Code (1908).31 Within hiring of numerous foreign advisors to build that context, Chulalongkorn hired French and reform the State on a Western model. In advisors to draft a Martial Law in 1907,32 1860, King Mongkut created a “Police Con- modeled on the French état de siège. Re- stabulary” under the command of a British vised in 1914, Martial law allowed the military former official, Samuel Joseph Bird Ames. to take over civilian administration and rule The unit comprised Malayan and Indian con- by decree, make arbitrary arrests, and order stables,24 as well as many British officers.25 detention without charge. It granted immun- In 1871, King Chulalongkorn undertook a ity to acts taken by the military, while mili- study trip to Singapore and in 1875, he asked tary officers as well as targeted civilians Samuel Joseph Bird Ames to reform the po- were put under the exclusive jurisdiction of lice, based on the Singaporean-British martial courts.33 Martial Law was put to use model. More than fifty regulations were is- for the first time in 1912 to quell a revolution- sued to that end, assigning specific duties to ary attempt to overthrow the monarchy and constables based on their locations.26 In replace it with a republic. In 1913, a Criminal 1897, Rama V established a provincial gen- Investigation Department was created to darmerie on the French model27, while sim- centralize intelligence on criminals and con- ultaneously recruiting British colonial offic- spirators.34 At that point, the Thai Police still ers in India to build a “Patrol Police Unit.”28 included many foreigners, including West- Under the supervision of key European ad- erners filling the top ranks. In 1915, the visors, the police force professionalized its French-influenced Provincial Gendarmerie training and practices: the first training merged with the British-influenced Patrol academy was established in 1901, and a set Department. During the 1920s and early of binding regulations based on the British 1930s, Siam was increasingly emulated by model were codified in 1903.29 Japan and reformed its police forces ac- cordingly.35 The reign of Chulalongkorn was one of state-building, centralization and consolida- In June 1932, a faction of foreign-educated tion of royal power. The highly-educated civil and military bureaucrats seized power Prince Damrong, brother of Chulalongkorn, from King Prajadhipok, replacing absolute headed the Ministry of Interior. In 1906, he monarchy with constitutional monarchy. The established the first secret police composed People’s Committee centralized the Royal of officers in plainclothes, whose role was Thai police and put it under the direction of a to gather and report information on crimi- powerful Director-General. In November nals30. Meanwhile, criminal law was mod- 1932, a few months after the revolu- ernized with the help of foreign advisors: tion/coup, King Prajadhipok issued the San- numerous laws criminalizing offences to the tiban Act, creating a Special Branch of the State, including laws against lèse-majesté police tasked specifically with the protection
23 Michael Herzfeld, ‘The Absent Presence: Discourses of 30 Haanstad A brief History 460. Crypto-Colonialism’ (2002) 101 South Atlantic Quarterly 899. 31 Eugénie Mérieau, ‘Thailand’s Lèse-Majesté Law : On Blas- 24 Haanstad A Brief History 455. phemy in a Buddhist Kingdom’ (2019) 4 Buddhism, Law and 25 Weed Police and Modernization 15. Society 54. 26 Haanstad Constructing Order 52. 32 The Criminal Code was promulgated in 1908, the Civil and 27 Weed Police and Modernization 15. Commercial Codes in 1935, and the first Constitution in 1932. 28 A.J Jardine was the first Patrol Police Unit director. Eric St. 33 Article 7 of the 1914 Martial Law. J. Lawson succeeded him in 1904. Haanstad Constructing Or- 34 Haanstad Constructing Order 56. der 54. 35 Weed Police and Modernization 16. 29 Haanstad Constructing Order 56.
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of the monarchy and threats to national se- POLICING UNDER MILITARY DICTATORSHIP: curity. The Royal Thai Police Department de- EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS & ENFORCED DISAP- veloped into the main intelligence unit con- PEARANCES ducting data collection on dissident activi- ties. Plainclothes officers were assigned to After the war, the United States inaugurated, monitor anti-royalist communists. as part of its policy of anti-communist con- tainment, a “special relationship” with the In 1941, Siam declared war on the Allies and Thai security forces in the domains of intel- expelled all European advisors including ligence gathering and covert operations.37 In those in the police. Prime Minister Field 1950, American officials including OSS vet- Marshal Phibun Songkhram, a fervent ad- eran Willis Bird and CIA official William Lair mirer of Mussolini, declared Martial Law met with leading Thai generals and the Po- while Japan occupied Siamese territory. He lice Chief to launch intensive cooperation. reorganized the police on the very central- An initial anti-communist act was passed in ized “Asian Police Organization” model. As 1952, called the Anti-communist Activities Eric Haanstad puts it, “the martial law period Act (ACAA). It empowered the police to de- under Phibun during WWII was a watershed fine “Communist-infiltrated” zones and to moment for the centralization and expan- subsequently limit civil liberties, especially 36 sion of the Thai police.” The Santiban Police freedom of movement, in these areas. At was to spy on political opponents. Phibun in- first, the US directed its efforts at the Thai tended for the project to merge the police police, at the time under the leadership of and the army, but it failed. Nevertheless, Police Chief Phao Sriyanond, rather than at both branches of the security forces were the military. The CIA armed and trained the not strictly separated: they shared a com- Thai Police, supporting the Santiban Police mon system of ranks and titles and officers as well as helping in the establishment of could easily move from one body to another. the Border Patrol Police in 1955, which This is how General Luang Adul Detcharat, would become “the paramilitary force of the chief of the national police during WWII, and Royal Thai Police.”38 The BPP’s mission was key figure of the anti-Japanese resistance extremely broad: it included border security, movement, became, at the end of the war, counter-insurgency and intelligence, as well army chief. In 1944, as the Allies were win- as more traditional anti-smuggling and ning the war, Phibun was forced to resign counter-banditry activities.39 It also engaged and the Police Department was reformed massively in the building of schools and towards gaining more autonomy: instead of hospitals in impoverished areas.40 being placed under the Ministry of Interior, its Director became solely responsible for By the end of the 1950s, the Thai police was its management. fully formed, trained and equipped to carry out counterinsurgency missions as part of the US anti-communist insurgency policy. Already in 1951 the New York Times had noted that the Thai police was bigger than
36 Haanstad Constructing Order 60. 40 Sinae Hyun, ‘Mae Fah Luang : Thailand’s Princess Mother 37 Daniel M. Fineman, A Special Relationship: The United and the Border Patrol Police during the Cold War’ (2017) 48 States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947-1958 (Uni- Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 262. Sinae Hyun, ‘Inte- versity of Hawai'i Press 1997). grating a Nation from the Margins: The Remote Area Security 38 Pawakapan (n 14) 3. Development of the Border Patrol Police in Northern Thai- 39 Paul Chambers, ‘Securing an Alternative Army’ in Pavin land 1’ (2010) 3 Rian Thai: International Journal of Thai Studies Chachavalpongpun (ed), Routledge Handbook of Contempo- 233. rary Thailand (London: Routledge 2019) 103.
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the military, and was very well equipped and to detain suspected communists for up to trained, including in counter-guerilla war- 480 days without charge.47 Several other fare.41 The massive American aid delivered anticommunist acts succeeded one another: to the Thai Police installed Phao Sriyanond, Revolutionary Announcement 78 followed the head of the police, as the strongman of by Revolutionary Announcement 199, the lat- Thailand and locus of power. As police chief, ter allowing indefinite detention of sus- he engaged in extrajudicial killings and en- pected communists.48 In 1973, the Com- forced disappearances of his opponents. He munist Suppression Operations Command was notoriously known for having his own became the Internal Security Operations police bodyguards, the Knights of the Dia- Command (ISOC). Its mission was to conduct monds Ring, or Asawin, assassinate whom- surveillance of political opposition, activist ever he pleased, before disappearing the populations, and coordinate the suppression body, either in the Chao Phraya River or of threats to national security. ISOC included elsewhere.42 He notably had four members members of the army as well as the police of parliament killed by the police.43 chief.49
In order to reestablish military dominance As can be expected, policing during the first over security issues and Thai politics at decades of the Cold War period involved the large, Army chief Sarit Thanarat staged a perpetration of extra-judicial killings and military coup in 1957 and another in 1958. To enforced disappearances against alleged consolidate his rule, he staffed the entire communists and political opponents, to the police apparatus with military men.44 He en- extent that “state killings” became a defining acted an interim constitution granting him feature of post-WWII politics. As Ben Ander- full powers, including broad police and judi- son puts it, “Political murders by the ruling cial powers, which he used to execute his cliques have been a regular feature of mod- opponents.45 Around this time, the CIA ern Thai politics - whether under Marshal switched allegiances, favoring to the Thai Phibunsongkhram's dictatorship in the late Military and Sarit. In 1962, with the help of 1930s; under the Phibunsongkhram - Phao the CIA, he established the Central Security Sriyanond - Sarit Thanarat triumvirate of the Command to centralize counter-insurgency late 1940s and 1950s, or the Sarit Thanarat - actions. Following the failure of Sarit’s Cen- Thanom Kittikachon - Praphat Charusathien tral Security Command, his successor Gen- regime of the 1960s and early 1970s.”50 There eral Praphat Jarusathien established the was little distinction between an extra-judi- Communist Suppression Operations Com- cial killing and a judicial execution, as the mand (CSOC) in 1965.46 It was a hybrid com- military had, under Sarit’s rule, the power to mand center, coordinating the actions of the order executions. Execution and the threat police and the army with support from the of execution were also used to crackdown CIA. In 1969, a second Anti-Communist Ac- on ordinary crime including even breaches tivities Act was passed, allowing the military
41 “Thai Police Force bigger than Army, Equipment includes 49 “The original command structure gave the directorship of Bren Guns and Mortars – Some of men get guerilla training”, ISOC to the Army commander; the deputy director was the New York Times, 23 July 1951. deputy commander of the Army; four assistant director posts 42 Chaloemtiarana (n 38) 60. belonged to two assistant Army commanders, to the perma- 43 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Pa- nent secretary of the Ministry of Interior and the national po- ternalism (Cornell University Press 2019) 48. lice chief; and the position of ISOC chief of staff went to the 44 Haanstad A Brief History 68. Army chief of staff.“ In 1987, by order of then Prime Minister 45 Article 17, 1959 Interim Charter. Prem Tinsulanond, the Prime Minister became the director of 46 Pawakapan (n 14) 7. ISOC instead of the Army chief. 47 Tyrell Haberkorn, In Plain Sight: Impunity and Human 50 Ben Anderson, ‘Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Rights in Thailand (University of Wisconsin Press 2018) 78. Aspects of the October 6 Coup’ (1977) 9 Bulletin of Concerned 48ibid. Asian Scholars 13, 13.
9 of social regulations. In one mythical exam- were covered by sounds of truck engines – ple, Sarit, confronted with the proliferation the thang daeng killings53. In 1975, half-way of deadly fires in factories, promised the through the “democratic parenthesis”, ex- death penalty to factory owners whose trajudicial killings peaked tremendously54. building would ever catch fire – and, so the story goes, the fires instantly stopped.51 The next year, on September 25, 1976, two labour activists were found hanged in Na- The period also saw the creation of paramil- khon Pathom Province, allegedly by the po- itary police organizations. Most notably, the lice. This prompted students to stage pro- Village Scouts, established by the Border tests against the methods used by security Patrol Police in 1971, had massive outreach : forces to silence labor activists within the in 1975, their membership peaked at roughly broader context of anticommunist opera- 10 % of the Thai adult population52. Paradox- tions. They gathered at Thammasat Univer- ically, the intense militarization of the Thai sity in Bangkok on October 6, 1976, only to be police and the society at large coincided with raped, shot, hanged, and drowned by secu- a period of democratization. rity officials including police, military and paramilitary organizations. The Border Pa- POLICING IN TIMES OF DEMOCRATIZATION: trol Police had a leading role in the massa- MORE EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS & ENFORCED cre, prompting scholars and intellectuals to DISAPPEARANCES question the American responsibility in the 55 bloodbath. This episode epitomizing au- In 1973, students took to the streets to call thoritarian policing ended the democratic for an end to military rule and a new consti- experiment: by the evening of that day, the tution, as well as the dissolution of ISOC. The military seized power in a coup, ousting the military resigned – the so-called “three ty- government of Seni Pramot. The 1976 coup- rants” even left the country. A three-year makers issued many “revolutionary de- period of democracy ensued. Yet occur- crees” affecting policing. They increased the rences of extrajudicial killings surged in the jail penalty for lèse-majesté to 15 years and 56 “democratic parenthesis” of the 1970s. Rem- issued a number of other security laws. In iniscent of techniques used in the Argentin- any case, the democratic experiment did not ian dirty war, suspected communists and la- lead to either a halt in state violence or even bour activists were killed and their bodies some first steps towards accountability of disappeared, thrown out of helicopters or the security forces. As Tyrell puts it: “Even if burnt down in boiling drums. In the province only the three years between 14 October of Patthalung (South), police and military of- 1973 and 6 October 1976 are examined, let ficers conducted a campaign of massive ex- alone the periods before or since, impunity tra-judicial killings. Villagers were arrested, was the established norm for state vio- 57 knocked unconscious and their bodies lence.” dropped in boiling drums, while screams
51 As recalled by Tarend J. Terwiel, informal discussion, May BPP. Vasit Dejkunjorn Memoir at 2 “The close relationship be- 2018, Göttingen. tween HM King Bhumipol and the BPP, especially the PARU, 52 Pawakapan (n 14) 3. was well-known in uniformed circles.” 53 Tyrell Haberkorn, ‘Getting Away with Murder in Thailand, 56 David Streckfuss, Truth on Trial in Thailand (Routledge State, Violence and Impunity in Phattalung’ in N Ganesan and 2011), Tyrell Haberkorn, ‘The Hidden Transcript of Amnesty: Chull Kim Sung (eds), State Violence in East Asia (The Uni- The 6 October 1976 Massacre and Coup in Thailand’ (2015) 47 versity Press of Kentucky 2013)
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In the 1980s, the “semi-democracy” under era for Thai politics and a possible embrace- the premiership of Prem Tinsulanonda, a ment of the values of “democratic policing.” non-elected yet parliamentarily-accounta- Meanwhile, Thailand drafted its new, liberal, ble ex-general, seemed to have called vio- Constitution. The next year, then-prime min- lent crackdowns on protesters to a close. ister Chuan Leekpai launched a reform of ISOC was downsized and its power reduced. the police, transferring it from the supervi- It refocused its activities on the monitoring sion of the Ministry of Interior to the direct of the Malay-muslim insurgency in the south supervision of the Prime Minister.61 The hy- of the country. In the three southernmost per-centralization of the Royal Thai Police, provinces of Thailand, the majority popula- with a powerful Commissioner-General at tion of Malay Muslims had voiced demands the top reporting directly to the Prime Min- for autonomy from the Thai Buddhist State ister was a direct outcome of democratiza- and a possible reunion with Malaysia as part tion. of a federation of Malaya (a sultanate of Patani). Prem instructed several military- The 1997 constitution—the most democratic dominated agencies, notably the Southern Thai constitution to date—was promulgated Border Provinces Administrative Center that same year. Under the new charter, a (SBPAC), to adopt a conciliatory approach former policeman, Thaksin Shinawatra, was with the insurgents – to be coordinated by elected prime minister with a near-absolute ISOC.58 In spite of this relative democratiza- majority. Thaksin was a former policeman tion, enforced disappearances did not stop. who had also completed a degree in crimi- Between 1976 and 1982 alone, some sixty nology from the United States.62 Yet under cases of enforced disappearances were his rule, brutal policing including extrajudi- recorded, mostly involving environmental cial killings and enforced disappearances and human rights activists.59 peaked, probably at levels not experienced since the rule of military dictator Sarit Tha- Yet following the 1991 coup, which inaugu- narat in the late 1950s. rated another period of semi-dictatorship under the prime ministership of civilian lib- Upon his election in 2001, one of Thaksin’s eral Anand Panyarachun, protests against first measures was to launch a massive the army’s resilient role in politics were met “War on Drugs.” Drawing inspiration from with the same violence: protesters were the policing techniques of ex-Police Chief shot by the security forces during the “Black Phao Sriyanond, whom he liked to quote, he May Incident.”60 Deaths and disappearances once declared to “his” policemen: “Police remained part of the possible means of po- General Phao Sriyanond said ‘There is noth- litical policing. The violence of policing ing under the sun that the Thai police cannot sparked renewed calls for democratization do.’ So I'm confident that drugs are some- and “political reform.” In 1996, the Thai gov- thing that the Thai police can deal with. Do it ernment ratified the International Covenant to the full.”63 Launched in February 2003, on Civil and Political Rights, signaling a new Thaksin’s War on Drugs lasted three months and caused the death of more than 2,500
58 Both agencies were created by decrees of Prem Tinsul- 61 Glendinning, ‘Police Reform in Thailand Post-2006’ [2013] anond in 1981.Human Rights Watch, No One Is Safe : Insurgent International Journal of Criminology and Sociology 372 Attacks on Civilians in Thailand’s Southern Border Provinces
11 people, most of which were presumably ex- killing seven protesters, as well as the ar- trajudicial killings, with no investigation into rest and humiliation of all remaining pro- the deaths whatsoever.64 Another key testers. Stripped, laid on the ground in the measure of Thaksin was to adopt a more burning sun before being taken to an army “law and order” approach to the conflict in camp in the back of a truck, almost a hun- the South. He dissolved the military-domi- dred of those arrested died of dehydration nated, dialogue-oriented SBPAC to make and suffocation before reaching the deten- room for the police in the Deep South. When tion center.70 This episode tragically exem- in January 2004, southern insurgents raided plifies the violence of authoritarian policing an army compound and seized weaponry in- in times of democratization. cluding assault rifles, grenades and ammu- nition, Thaksin responded by declaring mar- Another technique considered characteris- tial law, which allowed searches, raids and tic of authoritarian policing is the recourse arrests without warrant, as well as admin- to enforced disappearances. In this domain istrative detention for up to seven days. Alt- as well, the coming to power of Thaksin had hough he did empower the army, Thaksin tragic effects. The most prominent case of made sure that the police took the lead of enforced disappearances under the govern- the operations.65 He dispatched teams from ment of Thaksin is that of Somchai the Crime Suppression Division to the Neelapaichit, a human rights lawyer spe- southern areas – and let them engage in cialized in defending Muslims from the Deep acts of torture and extrajudicial killings.66 In South in cases of terrorism. One day, in April 2004, security forces raided a mosque March 2004, he was kidnapped by police of- where suspected insurgents were hiding, ficers in a busy street in Bangkok, and never killing 32 men on the spot.67 In July 2005, reappeared.71 Five police officers were ini- Thaksin enacted an Emergency Decree tially charged for kidnapping but later ac- which empowered the police to conduct quitted for lack of evidence and released.72 searches without warrant and to put alleged Other less prominent cases of enforced dis- offenders under pre-trial detention for up to appearances were recorded during 30 days – more than the 7 days allowed un- Thaksin’s rule. The Thai NGO Justice for der Martial Law.68 Meanwhile, Thaksin Peace Foundation (JPF) documented fifty- Shinawatra issued the 2004 Police Act al- nine disappearances between 2002 and legedly to improve and deepen “community 2012,73 a period of democratic flourishing. policing”, but in fact to reinforce the Prime Minister’s control over the Police.69 In Octo- In 2005-2006, mass anti-Thaksin protests ber of the same year, a protest in front of a erupted in the capital city. Unlike in the Deep police station in the Southern province in South, mass protests in Bangkok were not Narathiwat was met with firing of live shots, met with deaths nor grave injuries. Thaksin
64 Human Rights Watch, Not Enough Graves: The War on 69 Glendinning (n 60) 373.. Drugs, HIV/AIDS, and Violations of Human Rights (Human 70 Eighty-five of them lost their lives. This is referred to as Rights Watch 2004). the “Tak Bai Incident”. 65Human Rights Watch (n 57) 33. 71 See the book authored by his widow Angkhana. Angkhana 66ibid 34. Neelapaichit, Reading between the lines (Working Group on 67 Krue Se mosque raid. General Chavalit’s orders focused on Justice for Peace 2009). negotiation, when Gen. Panlop Pinmanee, deputy director of 72 For a detailed account of the court cases, see International ISOC, ordered the killing of the suspected insurgents. Commission of Jurists, Ten Years Without Truth: Somchai 68 International Commission of Jurists, More Power, Less Ac- Neelapaijit and Enforced Disappearances in Thailand (Inter- countability : Thailand’s New Emergency Decree (Interna- national Commission of Jurists 2014). tional Commission of Jurists 2005) 3. The new law was 73Haberkorn, In Plain Sight: Impunity and Human Rights in passed on July 15, 2005 and enforced four days later in the Thailand (n 46) 167. southernmost provinces of Thailand.
12 refrained from declaring a state of emer- was a state of emergency declared. Demo- gency under the 2005 Executive Decree on cratic policing seemed to be entrenched and Public Administration in Emergency Situa- the police to be bound to the rule of law. Yet tions. It seemed that Thaksin was intent on the 2008 Internal Security Act reinstating embracing the policy of de-escalation of ISOC was passed, although after intense de- street protests, a key pillar of democratic bate, it was placed under the supervision of policing. He did not deploy the army to quell the Prime Minister rather than the Army the protests, which self-dispersed when Commander in Chief.78 From 2009 to early Thaksin dissolved the House of Representa- 2010, “Red-shirt” protests against the resili- tives. Thaksin was later that year removed ent role of the military in Thai politics were in a military coup. Under Martial Law, de- met with “de-escalation” techniques by the clared as part of the coup, gatherings of police. But in May 2010, the military-backed more than five people were banned and civilian government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, us- street politics wound down. The military ing the new Internal Security Act, sent the government established two new police di- army to crack down on the protests. Scenes visions: the Protection and Crowd Control of urban guerrillas unfolded, leaving 90 peo- Division attached to the Metropolitan Bureau ple dead and more than 2,000 injured.79 Un- and the Technology Crime Suppression Divi- der the following civilian government of sion attached to the Central Investigation Yingluck Shinawatra, elected in 2011, mass Bureau.74 Head of the junta General Surayud protests were not handled by the army but Chulanont attempted to reform the police by the police. The 2013 mass protests were organization, aiming to withdraw it from the also “de-escalated” by the police80 - until the Prime Minister’s control, but it failed due to military seized power in yet another coup in police resistance.75 Surayud reenacted mar- 2014, promulgating martial law and putting a tial law in the South76. The military drafted a durable end to the street politics to which new security legislation, the Internal Secu- Thailand is so familiar. rity Act (ISA), reintroducing a military-dom- inated and powerful ISOC empowering the During this time, the practice of enforced military to indulge in renewed “political po- disappearances continued unabated. In April licing” activities.77 2014, environmental activist Porlajee "Billy" Rakchongcharoen reported to the police – The 2007 Constitution reestablished civil lib- and never reappeared. Continually harassed erties, prompting another wave of political by the police, he was well-known for his protests. In 2008, “Yellow-shirts” protested struggle for justice for Karen families living against the elected government – up to the in national parks.81 As in the case of Som- point of closing down the airport entirely for chai, some police officers were charged for several weeks. Notwithstanding the scale of the murder but released on lack of evidence. the protests, the army was not deployed nor In 2012, Thailand had signed the Convention
74Arisa Ratanapinsiri, ‘A History of Police Reform in Thailand’’ 79 Tyrell Haberkorn, ‘Truth and Justice When Fear and Re- in Paul Chambers (ed), Knights of the Realm: Thailand’s Mili- pression Remain’ in Michael J Montesano, Pavin Chacha- tary and Police, Then and Now (White Lotus Press 2013) 523. valpongpun and Aekapol Chongvilaivan (eds), Bangkok, May 75ibid 500. 2010: Perspectives on a Divided Thailand (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak 76 International Commission of Jurists, Implementation of Institute 2012). Thailand’s Emergency Decree, July 2007 (International Com- 80 Sombatpoonsiri (n 11). mission of Jurists 2010) 3. 81 International Commission of Jurists, “Thailand: at fourth 77 International Commission of Jurists, Thailand’s Internal anniversary of enforced disappearance of “Billy”, still no res- Security Act: Risking the Rule of Law? (International Com- olution”, 2018, available at https://www.icj.org/wp-con- mission of Jurists 2010) v. tent/uploads/2018/04/Thailand-Billy-disappearance-4th- 78 ibid vi. year-News-web-story-2018-ENG.pdf (accessed 30 October 2019).
13 on the Protection of All Persons from En- they want autonomously, without instruction forced Disappearances, five years after its and with impunity. Even with elections, au- ratification of the Convention on Torture, tocratic rule is the norm, not the excep- then under the military dictatorship of Su- tion.”85 Among these entities, the military rayud Chulanont. Under the military dicta- and the Santiban police are two power cen- torship of Prayuth Chan-Ocha, a draft Act on ters, both highly autonomous from the gov- the Prevention and Suppression of Torture ernment. The Thai bureaucracy is also frag- and Enforced Disappearances was submit- mented along the lines of what Ernst ted to the National Legislative Assembly in Fraenkel calls a dual state.86 In a dual state, 2015 – but no progress has been made since. two autonomous systems coexist, one sys- tem governed by the “rule of law” and an- EXPLAINING THE RESILIENCE OF AUTHORITAR- other by arbitrary power, the former being IAN POLICING IN TIMES OF DEMOCRATIZATION: subservient to the latter. Fraenkel built on THAILAND’S DUAL STATE STRUCTURE John Locke’s analysis of the royal preroga- tive—characterized by discretion—to call Why are security forces not responsive to the realm of arbitrary rule the “prerogative democratization? Why are practices of tor- state”, while referring to the legalistic one as ture, enforced disappearances, and extraju- the “normative state.” In his account, “the dicial killings so resilient during times of de- Normative and the Prerogative State” are mocracy? The answer lies in the nature of competitive. the Thai State: Thailand’s security apparatus remains autonomous from elected politi- In the case of Thailand, the normative State cians, therefore irresponsive to democrati- can be identified as taking its orders from zation. The Weberian ideal-type, according the elected government of the day, and the to which the bureaucracy comes under gov- Prerogative State from the Palace. As then ernment control, does not hold for Thailand President of the King’s Privy Council General where the bureaucracy is the principal and Prem Tinsulanond once famously explained, the government the agent.82 Thailand has in Thai politics, the military is like a horse, been analyzed as a “bureaucratic polity” owned by the king: the jockey-government characterized by a bureaucracy autono- comes and rides the horse during the race, mous from politics and endowed with veto but it does not own the horse. The Thai Pre- powers over the sphere of the political.83 rogative State is a type of “Deep State” com- posed of state agents who oppose the rise The Thai bureaucracy can be described as a of electoral politics and eventually the very compound of several competing power cen- idea of electoral democracy, from low-rank- ters tied together in complex non-hierar- ing civil servants to highest-ranking offi- 87 chical relations or networks.84 As Craig J. cials, including security forces. They re- Reynolds puts it, “what prevails most of the fuse to take their orders from elected gov- time is a multi-centred autocracy with many ernments as they see them unfit for admin- centres of power that sometimes do what istering the country. Civilian governments
82 Max Weber, “Bureaucracy” in Tony Waters and Dagmar Wa- 85 Craig Reynolds calls the Thai State an “un-State”. Craig ters (eds), Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society: New Reynolds, ‘Time’s Arrow and the Burden of the Past’ 4. translations on Politics, Bureaucracy, and Social Stratifica- 86 The book, initially published in 1941, analyzed the case of tion (Palgrave 2015). Jacob I Ricks, ‘Agents, Principals, or Nazi Germany. Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State : A Contribu- Something in between? Bureaucrats and Policy Control in tion to the Theory of Dictatorship (Oxford Univ Press 2018). Thailand’ (2018) 18 Journal of East Asian Studies 321. 87 Eugénie Mérieau, ‘Thailand’s Deep State, Royal Power and 83 Fred Riggs, Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic the Constitutional Court (1997–2015)’ (2016) 46 Journal of Polity (East-West Center 1966). Contemporary Asia 445. 84 Duncan McCargo, ‘Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Cri- ses in Thailand’ (2005) 18 The Pacific Review 499.
14 have limited or no control over such “state Phao and Sarit had together established a within the state”. Neither a mafia nor a shad- strong dictatorship founded on police-mili- owy set of connections, Thailand’s Deep tary cooperation, until Phao was ultimately State is grounded in law, especially in a set defeated by Sarit in 1957. By eliminating of emergency legislations. Fraenkel traces Phao, Sarit did in fact expel the police from the origin of the Prerogative State to Martial the Deep State. As Ben Anderson puts it, “By Law. Martial Law indeed creates a parallel the coups of 1957 and 1958, Sarit destroyed state, with its own rules, its own executive the power of the police, and made the army, and its own judiciary. While democratization which he controlled, the undisputed master affects the Normative State, it does not af- of Thai political life.”90 Since then, whenever fect the Deep or Prerogative State which the police threatens to become more pow- continues to function according to full- erful than the army, the latter stages a mili- fledged authoritarianism and to its own set tary coup.91 By gaining and maintaining con- of norms and hierarchies. trol over the Deep State, the military has displaced the police to the periphery of the The history of the Thai Police is one of shift- bureaucratic polity, potentially putting it un- ing trajectories between the Prerogative der the orders of the elected government – and the Normative State, between the realm a move the police resists by continuing to of the highly militarized Deep State and that practice, in a rather autonomous fashion, of the traditional civilian sphere under gov- authoritarian policing of political activities. ernment control. Since the 1950 Naresuan This rivalry best accounts for the evolution meeting of Army strongman Sarit Thanarat of practices and norms of policing in con- and Police chief Phao Sriyanond with US of- temporary Thailand, as exemplified in the ficials88 - a meeting which can, in many proliferation of competing emergency legis- ways, be understood as the birth moment of lations (Martial Law versus Emergency De- Thailand’s Deep State - the police and the crees). army have been in a relationship of compe- tition for the control of the State’s security Therefore, current efforts at exporting apparatus. In this political competition, au- “democratic policing” by introducing more thoritarian policing of political activities is a decentralization in the Thai police structure key instrument of control. As Paul Cham- might be, in their current form, misguided. bers puts it : “Civil - military relations in As Bayley puts it “Police structures should terms of Thailand's internal security turn on not be read as a symptom of governmental the question of who - civilians or soldiers - character, because identical command exerts more authority over the maintenance structures can accommodate regimes of of order in emergency situations, counter- vastly different types.92” Moreover, if the Thai insurgency and counter-terror programs, Police is at present highly centralized, with domestic intelligence gathering, daily polic- a Police chief reporting directly to the Prime ing and border control.”89 Minister, it is de facto highly autonomous – decentralizing it might make it even more autonomous.
88 Hyun, ‘Integrating a Nation from the Margins: The Remote against Police Chief Prasert Ruchirawong, the 2006 coup Area Security Development of the Border Patrol Police in against elected politician Thaksin Shinawatra, and the 2014 Northern Thailand 1’ (n 39). coup against his sister Yingluck Shinawatra. Paul Chambers 89Paul Chambers, ‘In the Shadow of the Soldier’s Boot: As- identifies the following coups as being at least partly moti- sessing Civil-Military Relations in Thailand’ in Marc Askew vated by the need to constrain police powers : 1957, 1958, 1971, (ed), Legitimacy crisis in Thailand (Silkworm 2010) 204. 1991, 2006 and 2014. Chambers, Securing an alternative army 90 Anderson (n 49) 26. 110. 91 This rationale explains in part the Sarit Thanarat coup 92 Bayley Patterns of Policing 73. against Phao Sriyanond in 1957 and 1958, the 1971 coup
15
CONCLUSION: ON MODERNIZATION, REGIME blurred. In the words of the Royal Thai Police TYPE AND POLICING Reform Commission in the early 2010s, “the RTP is vaguely regarded as “the fourth Thailand’s history of policing is one of conti- branch of the armed forces,”96 along with the nuity rather than discontinuity. From the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. 97 The Thai early 1950s until today, methods of authori- Police was and remains an “alternative mil- tarian policing have flourished on the back- itary,”98 a political actor engaged in power drop of anti-communist/pro-royalist acts.93 struggles with the military to which “political They have empowered security forces to policing” is instrumental to survival. conduct extrajudicial killings, arbitrary ar- rests, torture and enforced disappearances In the context of Thailand, regime type, ei- of key enemies of the State while shielding ther civilian or military, democratic or au- them from prosecution by granting them full thoritarian, and any combination thereof, judicial immunity. Tyrell Haberkorn consid- does not significantly impact the level of vi- ers the number of unresolved cases of en- olence being used to quell dissent (protest- forced disappearances since 1952 to amount ers, activists) nor crime (drug users). This is to roughly 5,00094 - even if some police of- explained by the fact that the authoritarian ficers were prosecuted, no one has ever nature of the state is largely autonomous been convicted, let alone punished. Mean- from electoral politics – therefore, so far, while, as of today, Martial law remains in democratization of electoral politics has not permanent force in about half of the total led to a democratization of the state appa- number of provinces of Thailand.95 Authori- ratus nor to “democratic policing”. Brodeur tarian methods of policing experimented argued in the 1980s that policing, whether with and developed during periods of dicta- democratic or authoritarian, is always a po- torship are remarkably resilient. One of the litical means of maintaining a preferred so- key variables pertains to the military versus ciopolitical order.99 Authoritarian as op- civilian control of policing at large – even posed to democratic policing might rather though the line between military and civilian be a function of perceived threats to the so- security forces appears at best rather ciopolitical order than to regime type. Then,
93 Tyrell, quoting Jaran Kosanan, provides a full list : “Act on Sight at 250. See Jaran Kosanan, Law, Rights, and Liberties Communism of 2476 [1933], Amended Act on Communism of in Thai Society: Parallel Lines from 1932 to the Present 2478 [1935], Anti-Communist Activities Act of 2495 [1952], (Bangkok: Coordinating Group for Religion in Society, 2528 Junta Announcement No. 12 (issued on 22 October 2501 [1985]), 71–75. [1958]), Junta Announcement No. 15 (issued on 27 October 94 “By conservative, partial estimates of the scattered cases 2501 [1958]), Act on the Control of Anti-Communist Activities of disappearance from 1952 to the present that I mentioned Defendants of 2505 [1962], Act Amending Junta Announce- at the beginning of this chapter, there are at least 179 unre- ment No. 12 of 2506 [1963], Act (version 2) on the Control of solved cases of disappearance, and this number grows to Anti-Communist Activities Defendants of 2506 [1963], Act over 5,000 if one adds the suspected deaths that occurred (version 3) on the Control of Anti-Communist Activities De- during the thang daeng killings in 1972 and the “War on Drugs” fendants of 2511 [1968], Anti-Communist Activities Act of 2512 in 2002.”Haberkorn, In Plain Sight: Impunity and Human [1969], Junta Announcement No. 12 (issued on 22 November Rights in Thailand (n 46) 186.. 2514 [1971]), Junta Announcement No. 78 (issued on 16 Febru- 95 Martial law is in force in 31 provinces and 185 districts of ary 2515 [1972]), Junta Announcement No. 199 (issued on 10 Thailand’s 77 provinces, including most of the provinces August 2515 [1972]), NARC Order No. 5 (issued on 6 October along Thailand’s border with Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and 2519 [1976]), NARC Order No. 8 (issued on 6 October 2519 Malaysia. Martial Law is in force in almost all border areas [1976]), NARC Order No. 14 (issued on 6 October 2519 [1976]), as well as the Deep South. NARC Order No. 25 (issued on 17 October 2519 [1976]), NARC 96 Quoted in Glendinning (n 60) 372. Order No. 43 (issued on 21 October 2519 [1976]), Ministry of 97Chambers (n 38). This is exemplified by the Democracy Interior Announcement on the Restriction of Printed Material Monument erected in the heart of the old Bangkok: the mon- (issued on 6 October 2520 [1977]), Anti-Communist Activities ument features a statue of the Constitution on its golden tray Act of 2522 [1979]), Ministry of Interior Announcement on the surrounded by four obelisks representing the three branches Restriction of Printed Material (issued on 6 June 2523 [1980]), of the Thai Armed Forces and the Police. and Ministry of Interior Announcement on the Restriction of 98ibid. Printed Materials (6 November 2523 [1980]).” Tyrell In Plain 99 Brodeur (n 4).
16 authoritarian practices of policing can in some circumstances inversely correlate with levels of democracy.
This claim finds some support in the pattern of lèse-majesté cases filed from the 1950s until now. One of the first cases of lèse- majesté occurred in 1946, at a time of great democratization and parliamentarization of Thai political life – but also of fading monar- chism.100 The number of cases soared from the 2000s onwards, a time of democratiza- tion – but also of rising anti-monarchism.101 Benedict Anderson took notice of this para- dox in the late 1970s: “not long after liberal democratic government was installed and censorship abolished, prosecutions for lese majeste began to be inaugurated.”102 By con- trast, at present, as the military is firmly in power, lèse-majesté prosecutions have ceased entirely.103 Besides lèse-majesté, cases of enforced disappearances have also dramatically increased during the “demo- cratic parenthesis” of the 1970s, while con- tinuing to pile up under the elected govern- ments of Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra. There lies a prima facie puzzle, which can be solved by thinking not in terms of regime type but of regime stability and consolida- tion – whether in authoritarian or demo- cratic settings.
100 Prominent jurist Yut Saeng U-Thai was prosecuted for ex- 102 Anderson (n 49) 23. plaining on radio the meaning and scope of the King’s pow- 103 Eugénie Mérieau, ‘Thailand in 2018: Military Dictatorship ers. The case was later dismissed. under Royal Command’ in Daljit Singh and Malcolm Cook 101 Serhat Ünaldi, ‘Working Towards the Monarchy and Its Dis- (eds), Southeast Asian Affairs 2019 (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Insti- contents: Anti-Royal Graffiti in Downtown Bangkok’ (2014) 44 tute Singapore 2019) 333 Journal of Contemporary Asia 377.
17