Working Paper 1

Working Paper 1 Armed Forces, the State, and Society Series AUTHORITARIAN POLICING AND DEMOCRATIZATION: THE CASE OF THAILAND EUGÉNIE MÉRIEAU Abstract: In this paper, I argue that the post-1970s democratization in Thailand had minimal effects on the entrenched practices of authoritarian policing. Democratization, in fact, did not put an end to these practices but instead correlated with their legalization through the enactment of a set of empowering legislation. This empirical finding invites a reconsid- eration of the hypothesis of covariation between regime type and policing practices. The NYU SCHOOL OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES CENTER FOR GLOBAL AFFAIRS facilitates change by educating and inspiring our community to become global citizens capable of identifying and im- plementing solutions to pressing global challenges. We believe that the development of solutions to global problems must be informed by an understanding that the world’s challenges are not merely challenges for and among states, but among states and non-state actors; urban and rural communities; regional organizations as well as traditional diplomatic outlets. Through rig- orous graduate and non-degree programs and public events we prepare global citizens who will be at home – and thus be effective agents of change – in all of these environments. This working paper does represent the views of NYU, its staff, or faculty. ©The Author 2020 EUGÉNIE MÉRIEAU is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Centre for Asian Legal Studies, National University of Singapore. She previously held positions at Sciences Po (France), Göttingen University (Germany) and Thammasat University (Thailand) and worked as a consultant for the International Commission of Jurists. Her publications on Thailand have appeared in the Journal of Contemporary Asia, Asian Journal of Comparative Law, Southeast Asian Affairs, among others, along more popular ven- ues such as the Atlantic or the New York Times. Her upcoming book, Constitutional Bricolage : Thailand's Sacred King versus the Rule of Law, is forthcoming with Hart Publishing. This paper was written during a residency at Harvard Law School, Institute of Global Law and Policy (IGLP). I would like to thank David Kennedy and all members of the Institute for their support. This is a preliminary version of a chapter commissioned for a book on Authoritarian Policing in Asia edited by Fu Hualing and Weitseng Chen. I would like to thank them both as well as the publisher for allowing me to publish it in preliminary form. The working papers contained in the Armed Forces, the State, and Society series began as presentations at a conference on the same topic held on Decem- ber 6, 2019 that focused on Southeast Asia, a dynamic and varied region with a mix of historic and cultural experiences. Funding for the conference was gen- erously provided by the New York Southeast Asia Network. 2 SERIES EDITOR’S PREFACE It is often the case that the study of civil-military relations focuses on what Peter Feaver calls its central problematique: how to balance military effectiveness with subordination to civil control. And while this concern exists within the political, policy, and academic agenda in and for Southeast Asia, it is not the sole focus. We would do well to recall that militaries are social actors. They may be different than other such actors (as Samuel Finer reminds us, they have guns) but they are not wholly sepa- rable. Accordingly, these papers look at the various impacts that armed forces have in their relationships with the states and societies. We want to examine the ways in which these relations shape and are shaped by identities, authority, legitimacy, and legacies. As such, Michael Mann's quadripartite understanding of social power, consisting of military, political, economic, and normative elements is instructive here. We take it for granted that armed forces have military power, and are cognizant of their ability to wield political power. However, and if not uniquely, then certainly distinctly, Southeast Asia reveals that the patterns of social power experienced in and espoused by the West are not universal. Formal armed forces may not be the only wielders of military power extant within a given state. The exercise of political power by armed forces is not everywhere rare, or even unwelcome, in the region. Moreover, in Southeast Asia armed forces exercise economic power, running commer- cial ventures, and providing a range of public services. While not mainstream amongst the study of civil-military relations in the West, these three aspects are not new to scholars looking at Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, or Southeast Asia. This is where Mann's conceptualization of social power can provide even more assis- tance. In addition to military, political, and economic power, the armed forces across Southeast Asia wield considerable normative power. In turn, though, militaries require legitimacy. In all societies they need to justify their expenditure of treasure and sometimes blood. Some are able to draw on legitimacy gained, for instance, through their role as defenders or builders of the nation. Others are portrayed as special for different reasons, such as being from certain caste or ethnic group. Some must make deals with other holders of social power: partnerships with industrialists, religious figures, or politicians can enable militaries to leverage normative power, enough at least to allow them to operate. Such associations, though, may mean that the 'chain of command' becomes blurry. An engagement with a fuller appreciation of social power, in all its forms, allows us to better understand the real roles—declared and assumed, formal and informal—played by armed forces. It also enables us to see where opportunities for reform might lie, as civil-military relations and security sector reform are often intrinsically linked. Christopher Ankersen, PhD 3 AUTHORITARIAN POLICING AND DEMOCRATIZATION: THE CASE OF THAILAND EUGÉNIE MÉRIEAU s David Bayley remarked in his sem- tially political in that its function was to con- inal study of policing, “Police activi- solidate a specific regime and protect its A ties determine the limits of freedom power-holders; from the 18th to the 20th cen- in organized society, an essential feature in tury, as the police professionalized, it in- determining the character of government creasingly focused on suppressing crime; th (…) A government is recognized as being au- and, from the late 20 century onwards, “communitarian policing”, with its emphasis thoritarian if its police are repressive, dem- on delivery of public goods and trust-build- ocratic if its police are restrained.”1 In other ing, became the new standard in democratic words, the type of policing practiced in a so- states.5 In line with the tenets of moderniza- ciety is indicative of regime type, broadly tion theory, political policing is considered to conceived as either authoritarian or demo- recede along with democratization, thereby cratic. Hence, during democratization pro- acting as one of the key markers of the au- cesses we should observe corresponding thoritarian/democratic dichotomy, which changes in modes of policing, from “author- also maps onto a non-modern/modern di- itarian” to “democratic policing”2. vide.6 A key distinction between “authoritarian” The Thai case is particularly relevant in any and “democratic” policing lies in the differ- testing of the hypothesis that sees policing ence between law-enforcement, service- as a function of regime type in the broader oriented type of policing and the policing of frame of modernization theory. Since the political activities. As societies democratize, overthrow of absolute monarchy in 1932, police undergo a process of “professionali- Thai political history has been dominated by zation” whereby it progressively relin- long periods of military dictatorship punctu- quishes its political activities to focus on law ated by shorter periods of democracy. For enforcement. Derived from the nine princi- the first forty years of its history (1933-1973), ples of “the founder of modern police” Sir Thailand was ruled by military juntas, alt- Robert Peel3, professionalization entails hough elections were sometimes held. The specialization on crime reduction (referred so-called Third Wave of democracy hit the to as “low policing”) as opposed to political Kingdom in 1973, one year before the Portu- policing (“high policing”).4 guese Carnation Revolution7, but it was short-lived. The “democratic parenthesis” Against this background, the literature on lasted only three years, before a coup policing identifies three “historical” stages : plunged the country back into military dicta- prior to the 18th century, policing was essen- torship in 1976. Following the ouster of the 1 David H Bayley, Patterns of Policing (Rutgers University 4 Jean-Paul Brodeur, ‘High Policing and Low Policing: Re- Press 1985) 5, 189. marks about the Policing of Political Activities’ (1983) 30 So- 2 Liqun Cao, Lanying Huang and Ivan Sun, ‘From Authoritarian cial Problems 507. Policing to Democratic Policing: A Case Study of Taiwan’ 5 George L Kelling, ‘The Evolving Strategy of Policing’ (1988) 4 (2016) 26 Policing and Society 642. Perspectives on Policing 1. 3 Keith L Williams, ‘Peel’s Principles and Their Acceptance by 6Peter K Manning, ‘Jean-Paul Brodeur on High and Low Po- American Police: Ending 175 Years of Reinvention’ (2003) 76 licing’ [2012] Champ pénal <http://journals.openedi- The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles

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