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CNS Fifth Italian National Report

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CNS Fifth Italian National Report Convention on Nuclear Safety Sixth Italian National Report 2013 Convention on Nuclear Safety Sixth Italian National Report 2013 This National Report has been prepared on behalf of the Italian Government by the Institute for Environmental Protection and Research (ISPRA) TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................5 SECTION B. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................11 Introductory Remarks .................................................................................................................... 11 Italy’s Nuclear Activities Policy .................................................................................................... 11 Policy Developments ..................................................................................................................... 14 Decommissioning policy .................................................................................................................................. 14 Spent fuel management policy......................................................................................................................... 14 Radioactive waste management policy............................................................................................................ 15 List of Nuclear Installations in Italy.............................................................................................. 18 Italian Participation in International Activities to Enhance Nuclear Safety ............................. 18 Regulatory Body .............................................................................................................................................. 18 International support programmes ................................................................................................................... 20 SECTION C. COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLES 4 TO 19 ...............................................................23 ARTICLE 4. IMPLEMENTING MEASURES ................................................................................................ 25 ARTICLE 5. REPORTING ...................................................................................................................... 26 ARTICLE 6. EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS .................................................................................. 27 6.1 Overview of major events since the last Report ..................................................... 27 ARTICLE 7. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ................................................................... 28 7.1 Nuclear safety legislation and regulatory framework............................................. 28 7.1.1 Legislation and ministerial decrees. ........................................................................................... 28 7.1.2 Technical guides ........................................................................................................................ 31 7.1.3 Technical standards ................................................................................................................... 32 7.2 National safety requirements and regulations for radiation safety ...................... 32 7.3 Licensing System....................................................................................................... 32 7.3.1 Licensing process for decommissioning..................................................................................... 33 7.4 Regulatory Inspection and Assessment.................................................................. 35 7.5 Enforcement................................................................................................................ 36 7.6 Assessment of Compliance ...................................................................................... 36 ARTICLE 8. REGULATORY BODY ......................................................................................................... 38 8.1 Authorities responsible for the application of the legislative framework ............ 38 8.2 Independence of the regulatory function................................................................. 39 8.3 Assessment of Compliance ...................................................................................... 40 ARTICLE 9. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENCE HOLDER ......................................................................... 41 9.1 Responsibility of the licence holder......................................................................... 41 9.2 Ensuring that the license holder meets its responsibility for safety.................... 41 9.3 Assessment of compliance ....................................................................................... 42 ARTICLE 10. PRIORITY TO SAFETY....................................................................................................... 43 10.1 Assessment of compliance ....................................................................................... 44 ARTICLE 11. FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES ................................................................................ 45 11.1 Financial resources.................................................................................................... 45 11.2 Human Resources ...................................................................................................... 46 11.3 Assessment of compliance ....................................................................................... 47 ARTICLE 12. HUMAN FACTORS ............................................................................................................ 48 12.1 Methods to prevent, detect and correct human errors........................................... 48 12.2 Managerial and organizational issues...................................................................... 48 12.3 Safety culture and Safety Management System (SMS) and associated surveillance roles ......................49 12.4 Role of the Regulatory Body and of the Operator regarding Human Performances issues ..................................................................................................................... 50 12.5 Assessment of compliance ....................................................................................... 51 ARTICLE 13. QUALITY ASSURANCE...................................................................................................... 53 13.1 Regulatory control...................................................................................................... 54 13.2 Assessment of compliance ....................................................................................... 54 ARTICLE 14. ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY .................................................................... 55 14.1 Assessment of compliance ....................................................................................... 57 ARTICLE 15. RADIATION PROTECTION.................................................................................................. 58 15.1 Laws and Regulations................................................................................................ 58 15.2 Assessment of compliance ....................................................................................... 58 ARTICLE 16. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS .......................................................................................... 59 16.1 On-site and off-site emergency plans ...................................................................... 59 16.2 National Plan against Radiological Emergency ...................................................... 60 16.3 Bilateral Cooperation ................................................................................................. 64 16.4 Assessment of compliance ....................................................................................... 68 ARTICLE 17. SITING ............................................................................................................................ 69 ARTICLE 18. DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION ........................................................................................... 70 ARTICLE 19. OPERATION .................................................................................................................... 71 SECTION D. TOPICS OF INTEREST FROM THE 5TH REVIEW MEETING ........................................ 73 SECTION E. PLANNED ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE SAFETY ........................................................ 77 SECTION F. LIST OF ACRONYMS .......................................................................................... 83 SECTION G. ANNEXES......................................................................................................... 87 Annex 1 – List and status of nuclear installations in Italy ......................................................... 89 A.1.1 Garigliano NPP...........................................................................................................................89 A.1.2 Trino NPP ...................................................................................................................................91 A.1.3 Caorso NPP...............................................................................................................................93 A.1.4 Latina NPP.................................................................................................................................93
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