Owning Our Urban Future: Urban-Rural Linkages for Balanced Regional Development in Africa

A Uganda National Academy of Sciences Consensus Study Report

Table of Contents

SUMMARY ...... iv

INTRODUCTION...... 1

PROBLEM STATEMENT ...... 3

CONSENSUS STUDY PROCESS ...... 5

GLOBAL POLICY CONTEXT ...... 6

A FRAMEWORK TO ENABLE MORE VIRTUOUS URBAN-RURAL LINKAGES ...... 9 PART 1: PRODUCTIVITY AND LIVELIHOODS ...... 10 Heterodox African Urbanization ...... 10 The Urban-Rural Continuum ...... 13 Urbanization in Secondary Cities ...... 14 Urbanization and Informality ...... 16 PART 2: SOCIO-CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS ...... 18 Movement Through the Urban-Rural Continuum ...... 18 Perceived Urban and Rural Meanings ...... 20 Of House and Home ...... 22 PART 3: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY ...... 22 Asymmetrical Governance Processes ...... 23 Hierarchy and Responsibility in High-Context Societies ...... 26

ENABLING CONDITIONS TO MOVE FORWARD ...... 28 LAND TENURE SYSTEMS ...... 29 REALISTIC PLANNING ...... 30 HEALTH AND WELLBEING ...... 32

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS...... 34

APPENDICES ...... 37 APPENDIX I: TYPOLOGY OF VIRTUOUS AND VICIOUS RURAL-URBAN LINKAGES ...... 37 APPENDIX II: EXPERT COMMITTEE STATEMENT OF TASK ...... 39

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... 40

WORKS CITED...... 43 List of Acronyms

AAPS Association of African Planning Schools AU African Union CAP Common African Position GSI Global Standard Institutions ILO International Labour Organization NIH National Institutes of Health NUA New Urban Agenda ODA Ofcial Development Assistance SAP Structural Adjustment Program SDGs Sustainable Development Goals SDI Slum/Shack Dwellers International SoT Statement of Task UN United Nations UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Afairs List of Figures, Tables, & Text Boxes

FIGURES

FIGURE 1 When questions of productivity and livelihoods, socio-cultural perceptions, and power and accountability are better incorporated into the policymaking process, it will help to enable virtuous cycles of urban-rural linkages and the more balanced regional development they entail...... 10

FIGURE 2 This fgure shows the relationship between the urbanization rate (%) and the share of manufacturing and services in GDP (%) for 56 non-resource-exporting countries and 60 resource-exporting countries in 2010. The solid line is a linear ft for he data. Source: (Gollin et al., 2016)...... 12

FIGURE 3 Actors and institutions commonly involved in the process of urban governance. Aligning the interests of these various stakeholders around specifc issues is unlikely to follow a linear or easily replicable path (adapted from Devas, 2004, p. 25) ...... 26

TABLE

TABLE 1 Examples of the distinction between institutional function and form and between "pre-modern" and "modern" forms of those institutions ...... 24

TEXT BOXES

SUCCESS STORY 1 Informal-Formal Property Tenure System Linkages in Kampala, Uganda ...... 29

SUCCESS STORY 2 Revitalizing Planning Education in Africa with the Association of African Planning Schools ...... 31

SUCCESS STORY 3 Exchange Visits to Mobilize Community Ownership in Nairobi, Kenya ...... 32

Summary

Sub-Saharan Africa has been slowly urbanizing for many generations. Push factors like confict and rural poverty have sometimes driven the process; other times pull factors like better educational opportunities and higher urban wages have been the primary driver (Jedwab, Christiaensen, & Gindelsky, 2014). Over the past few decades, the rural-to-urban transition has dramatically accelerated. By many estimates, the region is now urbanizing at the fastest rate globally (Saghir & Santoro, 2018). Between 2018 and 2035, all 10 of the fastest growing cities in the world will be located in sub-Saharan Africa (Patel, 2018). As a result, by 2050 most sub-Saharan countries will have surpassed the tipping point where more than 50% of their populations live in urban areas (Ritchie & Roser, 2018). There will inevitably be diferences between countries, but the diferences will be more of degree than of type. Sub-Saharan Africa’s transition to the so-called “urban age” will be unprecedented in its swiftness. To help manage this unprecedented shift, the distinction between rural and urban areas is often a useful policymaking tool. Unfortunately, this distinction can also obscure the deep complexities and interconnections in the demographic, economic, and political shift that is taking place. In every country, urban and rural areas are interdependent to varying degrees, and rely on fows of individuals, capital, and information to sustain distinct ways of life (Mylott, 2009). In sub-Saharan Africa, where development policy has fuctuated between an overriding focus on either one or the other of these two categories, the linkages are particularly relevant for household wellbeing (Djurfeldt, 2012). The Uganda National Academy of Sciences therefore undertook this consensus study on the nature of urban-rural linkages in the sub-Saharan region, and how they can be best leveraged for balanced regional development. Urban-rural linkages can be defned as the economic, social, cultural, and political relationships maintained between individuals and groups in urban and rural environments (Ndabeni, 2016). Importantly, these relationships can often have distributional consequences, leading to a distinction that is frequently made between “virtuous” and “vicious” urban-rural linkages (Djurfeldt, 2012). In general, virtuous linkages refer to those relationship that contribute to a positive cycle of household accumulation and expanding opportunities across both rural and urban spaces (Djurfeldt, 2012). For instance, agricultural intensifcation might lead to increased rural incomes, which is used for some family members to attend school in urban areas, leading them to secure formal employment and remit earnings back to rural areas, leading to further agricultural intensifcation. Vicious linkages, by contrast, lead households to distribute resources too scarcely across urban and rural spaces, to the point that neither can successfully kickstart the process of accumulation and development (Djurfeldt, 2012). For instance, rural to urban migration might result in insufcient available rural labour, while at the same time urban migrants are unable to secure stable, formal employment. As a result, neither rural nor urban dwellers can leverage their comparative locational advantages, and both become trapped in cycles of poverty. Local, national, and regional policy contexts can help determine the type of rural-urban linkages that form, and the degree to which they reinforce vicious or virtuous cycles of development. Urban-rural linkages have received unprecedented attention in recent years with their canonization in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the New Urban Agenda (NUA). This renewed focus is largely the result of the Common African Position (CAP) on the SDGs, which emphasized the importance of moving beyond “siloed” thinking on cities, and embracing their development within the frame of a wide, cohesive vision (Pieterse, Parnell, & Haysom, 2018).

iv This broad vision is refected in the African Union’s (AU) Agenda 2063, which calls for, “Cities and other settlements [that] are hubs of cultural and economic activities, with modernized infrastructure, and people have access to all the basic necessities of life… Economies are structurally transformed to create shared growth, decent jobs and economic opportunities for all (AU, 2015b, pp. 2–3).” Although Agenda 2063 does not explicitly name urban-rural linkages, it’s focus on the cohesive and integrated nature of cities is a clear precursor to a focus on the interactions between rural and urban spaces. Despite such broad pronouncements of support for a cohesive and integrated agenda, the reality on the ground in sub-Saharan cities leaves much to be desired (Pieterse et al., 2018). Diferent sectors, industries, and rural and urban spaces are still largely treated separately, and insights about their complex interconnections do not often enter the policymaking process. To shift the regional dialogue on urbanization towards the connections between sectors, the UNAS Urbanization Expert Committee identifed a basic framework for policymakers at all levels to bring insights from the evidence on urban-rural linkages more closely into their work. The Expert Committee identifed three “streams” of evidence related to urban-rural linkages: (1) productivity and livelihoods, (2) socio-cultural perceptions, and (3) power and accountability. Bringing insights from these three streams of evidence into policy and practice at all levels will help encourage the formation of virtuous urban-rural linkages. To enable policymakers at all levels to bring insights from these three streams more closely into their work, higher levels of government (central and regional) should focus on securing the enabling policy framework, which includes resolving tensions in the property tenure system, establishing realistic planning practices, and ensuring health and wellbeing, specifcally in urban areas. By focusing on these enabling conditions, central and regional governments will empower leaders at lower levels to bring more of the following insights into their daily work:

PRODUCTIVITY AND LIVELIHOODS • Current heterodox patterns of urban development in sub-Saharan Africa do not support the kinds of virtuous urban-rural economic relationships historically observed in Europe, North America, and much of Asia. • The process of urbanization as it is taking place in sub-Saharan Africa is not well analysed through a dualistic urban/rural frame, as has conventionally been the norm. • Secondary cities have a great potential to capitalize on existing urban-rural linkages and stimulate more virtuous cycles of investment in both areas. • Like the urban/rural distinction, the formal/informal distinction is not a particularly useful lens of analysis in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Firms and individuals make a wide range of choices in response to certain constraints and regulations, and may often alter their behaviour along that continuum in response to changing circumstances.

SOCIO-CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS • Individuals do not remain static within the urban-rural continuum. Based on social relationships and the perceived opportunities in diferent locations, individuals engage in complex patterns of movement across the urban-rural continuum, leveraging the advantages of each at diferent stages of their lives. • Perceptions of what it means to be “rural” and “urban” shift over time, help determine migration patterns, and infuence ways of life in both locations.

v • Some qualitative evidence suggests that diferent perceptions of “house” and “home” between rural and urban areas may infuence where investments are prioritized and subsequent housing quality.

POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY • Governance across the rural-urban spatial continuum is a major challenge in sub-Saharan Africa, characterized by institutions that emphasize form over function, and by the manipulation of political identities by elites. • Most African societies are “high-context” in the sense that a great deal of communication happens implicitly. In the presence of governance asymmetries, high-context communication can open further space for multiple ofcial and informal governance mechanisms to operate in parallel.

RECOMMENDATIONS Based on these conclusions, the Expert Committee recommends the following courses of action for central and local governments, public agencies, planning authorities, and NGOs working on the issue. Recommendations are organized roughly into urban-, rural-, peri-urban-, and governance- oriented policies.

Urban-Oriented Recommenations 1. Central and regional governments should continue to encourage industrial value- addition in urban areas, particularly for goods for which there is an existing rural demand. Virtuous rural-urban economic linkages largely rely on the ability of rural areas to absorb the products produced in cities, thereby creating more formal employment opportunities in urban areas. 2. Central planning authorities and land ministries should renew their focus on secondary cities as key locations to help stimulate broad-based economic growth. Secondary cities in sub-Saharan Africa present unique opportunities to encourage value addition, and also to make the necessary public infrastructure investments before urban areas become overpopulated. 3. Central, regional, and local governments should prioritize anchor investments that will help direct future patterns of urban expansion. Investments such as roads and transportation infrastructure, freight truck terminals, ports and export centres, and public parks and squares can help determine the way that urban areas develop. Making those investments now can minimize future planning challenges.

Rural-Oriented Recommendations 4. Governments at all levels should invest in necessary agricultural infrastructure like cold-storage, distribution hubs, and urban markets. Securing the benefts of rural- urban linkages in rural areas requires robust markets in urban centres for agricultural produce produced in rural areas. Governments should therefore act to strengthen those markets.

vi 5. Governments should support businesses that engage in forward and backward linkages to the agricultural sector. The production and sale of agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and other inputs, cold storage, and packaging and processing industries all serve to strengthen rural-urban linkages. Urban-based services such as banking and accounting should also be encouraged to cater to agricultural producers and rural populations. 6. Governments and NGOs should emphasize existing positive economic opportunities in rural areas. High levels of urban unemployment may be partly the result of unrealistic expectations driven by a variety of social processes. Communication campaigns to emphasize the opportunities that also exist in rural areas could help to counteract this imbalance.

Peri-Urban-Oriented Recommendations 7. Central planning authorities should lead the creation of multi-level governance arrangements to coordinate investment in public goods. As urban areas expand into previously rural areas, they will face increasingly complex jurisdictional challenges to coordinating public investment. Multi-level governance arrangements can help to overcome some of these jurisdictional challenges in the short-term. 8. Local governments should emphasize the enforcement of relevant regulations in peri-urban areas. Peri-urban spaces can present unique challenges related to the control of zoonotic and waterborne diseases, as well as the protection of property rights. What today are peri-urban areas will tomorrow be part of the city proper, so planners and local governments should proactively emphasize regulatory enforcement in these areas to avoid negative externalities.

Governance-Oriented Recommendations 9. Statistical and planning agencies and central governments should gather data on circular migration patterns while avoiding simplistic distinctions. Rural-urban migration is a complex phenomenon with people moving for a great variety of reasons. Understanding the dynamics of who is moving where and for what purpose are important for efective policymaking. 10. Public institutions should develop internal mechanisms to reward innovative practice and visionary leadership. The problem of isomorphic mimicry in public institutions is often a strategy of risk mitigation in an environment of scarce resources. Mechanisms to formally recognize and value internal initiatives and leadership that adapts “best practices” to the local context can therefore help to change the risk calculation and break vicious cycles of cut-and-paste policy adoption. 11. Central governments should reform electoral laws to allow easier registration at an individual’s place of residence. Rural-urban migrants without ofcial status in cities often fnd it difcult to register and vote in their primary place of dwelling. Requiring migrants to return to rural areas to vote contributes to perverse incentives that undermine the ability of urban populations to hold politicians accountable for poor service delivery in their place of residence.

vii 12. Governments at all levels should open more opportunities for collaboration and synergy between ofcial and informal mechanisms of governance. Many African countries experience legal pluralism, with both ofcial and informal mechanisms operating in parallel. This situation contributes both to poor outcomes and undermines the legitimacy of the state in the long-term. Acknowledging the way that governance decisions are actually made—even if through informal channels—and engaging with those processes in a transparent manner can help to improve both the efectiveness and perceived legitimacy of governance systems. 13. Central and regional governments should emphasize the enabling conditions to move forward. By focusing on resolving tensions in the land tenure system, reforming the purpose and techniques of planning, and investing in population health and wellbeing, central governments can empower leaders at other levels to better leverage rural-urban linkages.

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Introduction

In the coming decades, countries across sub-Saharan Africa will experience a profound shift as their societies move from being primarily rural to primarily urban. According to the UN World Urbanization Prospects 2018, most sub-Saharan African countries are expected to have passed this tipping point by 2050 (Ritchie & Roser, 2018).1 Urbanization has been a common facet of African societies for generations—sometimes driven by push factors like confict and environmental degradation, sometimes driven by pull factors like better education opportunities and higher wages in cities (Jedwab et al., 2014). Over the years, however, this rural-to-urban transition has gradually accelerated. By most estimates, sub-Saharan Africa is now urbanizing at a faster rate than any other region globally (Saghir & Santoro, 2018). Between 2018 and 2035, all 10 of the world’s fastest growing cities will be in sub-Saharan Africa (Patel, 2018). The continent’s transition to the “urban age” is thus projected to be without precedent in its swiftness. In pre-colonial Africa, cities arose for a variety of often complementary purposes, including reasons of environmental, political, religious, and economic advantage (Freund, 2007). Cities have always been the nodes for certain social structures and relationships within a region. However, the conditions that shape the emergence of these nodes and their relationship to the environment has changed over time (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991). For example, preindustrial cities could not exist without a relatively close and rich agricultural hinterland to support the subsistence of their populations. Modern cities, by contrast, import huge amounts of food and other supplies from global supply chains, largely unlinking them from a direct reliance on their agricultural hinterlands. Cities are universal, but the conditions of their urbanization have changed. For that reason, the structure of the relationship between city and countryside has also changed over time (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991). As central nodes in a network, cities have often been the seat of political and administrative power within a region. In pre-colonial Uganda, for example, the royal capitals of Buganda, Bunyoro, Ankole, Toro, and Busoga were the only pre-colonial population agglomerations that could be said to have some kind of urban character (Mukwaya, Sengendo, & Lwasa, 2010). With the establishment

1 With the exception of Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Niger, Rwanda, South Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

1 2

of colonialism in many African countries, these nodes of political and administrative power also took on a central commercial role. A robust theoretical literature explains the path dependence of cities that subsequently accrued based on the large investments in physical infrastructure required for resource-based economic growth (Sorensen, 2015). An analysis of Kenya’s colonial railroads, for example, found that they had a strong causal efect on the spatial distribution of early European settler towns (Jedwab, Kerby, & Moradi, 2017). Economic development in the settler towns subsequently determined the location of Kenya’s major cities. Even after the departure of most European settlers following independence, this early spatial pattern of economic development laid down by the colonial railroad persists until today (Jedwab et al., 2017). In this manner, the formation of urban areas across sub-Saharan Africa has often been determined more by the imperatives of resource extraction and export rather than of local political or administrative power. In part because of this historical connection between cities and economic growth, urbanization has been widely used as an indicator of industrialization and modernization in empirical economic analyses (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2002, 2005; Gries & Grundmann, 2018). Sociologists have also connected urbanization with the overarching process of “rationalization”; the replacement of tradition, values, and emotion as motivators for behaviour with concepts based on rationality (Habermas, 1990, p. 2). Closely associated with increased living standards in Europe, where these processes frst took place, rationalization has often been equated with progress (Habermas, 1990). As urbanization is so intertwined with these other concepts, it is often interpreted as a sign that a society is converging towards those economic, social, and political institutions that developed in Western Europe and North America from the 17th to the 19th centuries (Eisenstadt, 1966).2 It remains unclear how closely African urbanization will mirror the historical experiences of Western Europe and North America. More recent experiences of rapid urbanization and economic development—such as in China—have included some of these institutions (e.g. market liberalization), while missing others (e.g. representative government). What is clear, however, is that the coming decades will bring a period of unprecedented economic and social transformation in sub-Saharan Africa. The purpose of this consensus study report is to point to some of the emerging patterns that conform with historical experience, and to those that do not. Armed with this information, policymakers in sub-Saharan Africa can help their countries to navigate the unique challenges that lie ahead. The study report is organized in the following manner. The Introduction provides a general layout of the issue and outlines the purpose of the report. The Problem Statement succinctly articulates the research question that was presented to the study expert committee. The Consensus Study Process discusses some of the existing literature on academy methodologies, and pdescribes the process that was used. Global Policy Context places this study report in context, by outlining the contours of the theoretical and policy conversation that has taken place at a global level over the past 60 years. Parts 1-3 present the expert committee’s answer to the Problem Statement, by summarizing the existing evidence on productivity and livelihoods, socio-cultural perceptions, and power and accountability in relation to the African urbanization experience. Enabling Conditions to Move Forward analyses some of overarching tensions that will need to be resolved for countries in sub-Saharan Africa to fully beneft from the urbanization process, with the recognition that these are long-term challenges. Finally, the Policy Recommendations section summarizes the key conclusions of the study report and points to a series of recommendations that policymakers interested in capitalizing on the potential benefts of positive urban-rural linkages should follow.

2 These institutions typically include the rule of law, representative government, and the primacy of markets, among others (Chang, 2011). Problem Statement

The process of urbanization is conventionally understood as a decrease in the percentage of a population living in rural areas and a corresponding increase in the percentage of the population living in urban areas (Moreno, 2017). There are national diferences between what constitutes rural and urban areas, making a single, objectively applicable defnition challenging (UNDESA, 2017, p. 188). Typically, such classifcations are made along a population density continuum, with each country deciding their own cut-of point to defne rural and urban populations. A country’s urbanization rate then refers to the rate of change between these two categories.3 In many developed countries, the distinction between rural and urban ways of life has blurred. Living standards between the two have converged, and the primary diferentiating characteristic has become population density (UNDESA, 2017, p. 188). In sub-Saharan Africa, where ways of life are still sharply divided between rural, afuent urban, and poor urban areas, population density alone is a less useful metric to understand the character of an area. Other criteria, such as the proportion of the economically active population engaged in agriculture, the general availability of electricity and piped water in living quarters, or the accessibility of schools and transportation services are also necessary to understand the changing dynamics of residents’ ways of life (UNDESA, 2017, p. 188). The emergence of “peri-urban” areas as a topic of study, for instance, refers to areas with relatively high population density that nevertheless display typically rural traits such as poor service access and a high proportion of people engaged in agricultural activities (Douglas, 2006). Understanding the diferences between rural and urban areas in a way that is meaningful to the context is an essential step in efective policymaking. What the analytical distinction between rural and urban areas (however they are defned) obscures, however, is the ways in which they are linked. In every country, urban and rural areas are interdependent to varying degrees, and rely on fows of individuals, capital, and information to sustain distinct ways of life (Mylott, 2009). Urban-rural linkages can then be defned as the economic, social, cultural, and political relationships maintained between individuals and groups in urban and rural environments (Ndabeni, 2016).

3 Following from this defnition, urbanization proceeds either from rural-to-urban migration, or from natural population increase. This defnition is distinct from the physical expansion of urban areas, which can refect either increasing urbanization or declining population density.

3 4

These various relationships can have important distributional consequences, leading to a distinction that is often made in the literature between those that either enhance or undermine household welfare (Bah et al., 2003; Baker, 1995; Djurfeldt, 2012; Tacoli, 2007). These relationships can usefully be thought of as contributing to micro-level virtuous or vicious cycles of urban-rural linkages.4 As a simple example, agricultural intensifcation in rural areas might lead to higher incomes and greater demand for urban-produced consumer products, which in turn stimulates the growth of formal employment in urban areas, and greater household investment in productive assets and education. Conversely, agricultural labour might be lacking due to high levels of rural migration, while at the same time urban-based family members do not secure stable employment and are thus unable to send sufcient cash remittances to rural family members. With household resources stretched too thinly across the spatial divide, neither rural nor urban members are able to kickstart the process of capital accumulation, and the household remains trapped in a cycle of subsistence. Importantly, both of these cycles are self-reinforcing, making the best entry point for change unclear. Depending on local, regional, and national contexts and policies, urban-rural linkages will impact regional development either positively or negatively (Djurfeldt, 2012). Understanding the distributional consequences of such linkages at the household level is thus crucial in the development of efective regional policy. Most development theory and practice, however, continues to rest on an implicit dichotomy between rural and urban areas, populations, and activities (Lynch, 2005, p. 31). This observation applies both to African policymakers and to the programs and priorities of development partners (Tostensen, 2004). For instance, key and relevant sector-based policies and programs, such as those of agriculture, industry, infrastructure, labour markets, human development, private sector development, and so on, often operate in isolation from each other and in an uncoordinated manner (Proctor, 2014). The implicit focus of these diferent sectors lies on either urban or rural areas, which can conceal the often-complex spatial linkages between the two. The problems with this implicit dichotomy have been acknowledged for many years (Tacoli, 1998). However, even when spatial development policies have attempted to integrate rural and urban policymaking in the past they have often failed because they were based on inaccurate generalizations about the relationship between the two (Tacoli, 1998). Part of the persistence of the rural-urban dichotomy may be a result of structural incentives, such as the separation of responsibilities under diferent sectoral ministries and government agencies. Inter-sectoral collaboration is notoriously difcult to initiate, and especially to sustain—not only in sub-Saharan Africa, but everywhere (Graham, Kuruvilla, Hinton, Veitch, & Simpson, 2018; Karaki & Medinilla, 2016; Tangcharoensathien, Srisookwatana, Pinprateep, & Posayanonda, 2017). Part of the persistent dichotomy, however, is also a result of the mindsets of planners and policymakers tasked with stimulating the development of urban and rural areas. To forge more virtuous linkages between rural and urban areas, policymakers and planners will need to overcome the traditional separation that has existed between the two (Tacoli, 1998). To help overcome the rural-urban dichotomy in mindsets and in policy, this consensus study report sets out to answer two interconnected questions. First, how are urban and rural areas connected in the sub-Saharan African context? And second, by embracing and understanding these complex urban-rural linkages, what opportunities can policymakers and planners expect to leverage for improved development?

4 See Appendix I for a more thorough typology of virtuous and vicious urban-rural linkages. Consensus Study Process

Consensus methodologies have emerged in recent years as a powerful tool to establish expert agreement on questions of practice (Bowling, 1997; J. Jones & Hunter, 1995; Murphy et al., 1998). Consensus methodologies respect expert opinion as a product of diverse experience and provide a formal structure for refection on that experience and the identifcation of areas of agreement or disagreement between individuals (Ager, Boothby, & Wessells, 2007). This particular study followed a Consensus Development Panel (CDP) methodology that brought together experts to produce multidisciplinary responses to a specifc Statement of Task (SoT) (see Appendix II for the Expert Committee’s SoT). The most well-developed CDP methodology has been deployed by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the United States, and this study takes its inspiration directly from that methodology (Waggoner, Carline, & Durning, 2016). CDPs are most useful for developing policies and strategic plans to forward-looking problems for which there may not yet be a conclusive volume of empirical evidence (Ager et al., 2007). CDPs bring together multidisciplinary committees to address a specifc SoT in a way that is accessible to both professionals and non-professionals alike (Waggoner et al., 2016). Some advantages of the CDP methodology include its interdisciplinarity, accessibility, evidence-based nature, and ownership by experts. Inviting researchers and practitioners from a wide variety of relevant felds to participate helps ensure the inclusion of a broad range of perspectives (Waggoner et al., 2016). By targeting non-specialist policymakers with its recommendations, the CDP methodology further ensures that the language of the study report remains easily understandable to a lay audience (Halcomb, Davidson, & Hardaker, 2008). The CDP approach also encourages more evidence-based opinions than other consensus study methodologies through its reliance on a published literature review as a grounding document for the in-person committee dialogue (Waggoner et al., 2016). Finally, the CDP methodology is likely to encourage ownership of the study process by participating experts as the material impacts them directly (Waggoner et al., 2016). Thus, participating experts are more likely to take the study process seriously, which Halcomb et al (2008) suggest adds to the validity of the CDP methodology. In sum, the CDP methodology allows for a synthesis of the best available evidence in the feld to provide policy recommendations on topics where conclusive empirical evidence may not exist.

5 Global Policy Context

The attention of development partners and African states has fuctuated between a focus on urban and rural areas over the past 70 years. Following independence, dual-sector development models, like the Lewis Labour Surplus Model, encouraged a modernist view of cities as centres of industrialization and economic growth (Djurfeldt, 2012; Lewis, 1955). Persistent under- employment and poverty in Africa’s expanding cities, however, challenged these traditional models and thus contributed to a growing negative view of the role of cities in development. These negative associations were cemented by Lipton’s 1977 notion of “urban bias,” which argued that since power continued to reside in cities, policymakers systematically under-allocated and over-extracted resources from rural areas (Lipton, 1977). Since the 1970s, urban bias theory has come under heavy criticism on both theoretical and methodological grounds, and little conclusive empirical evidence has been established to support the position (Byres, 1979; G. A. Jones & Corbridge, 2010; Mitra, 1977; Varshney, 2014). Partly as a result of the controversy generated over theories of urban bias, policy and research has gradually turned towards an interest in linking rural and urban areas with integrated spatial development strategies. Stemming primarily from the discipline of geography, research on these linkages has analysed the fuctuating movement of goods, capital, and labour between urban and rural areas. It has also examined more abstract interactions like the transfer of knowledge and ideas, the difusion of technology and process innovations, and implicit or explicit participation in various social networks (Djurfeldt, 2012). To emphasize individual agency, much of the literature on urban-rural linkages focuses on “survival strategies” that households use to mitigate perceived risks by engaging in many spatially- dispersed economic activities (Bigsten & Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1992). Migrants, the urban poor, and other marginalized groups often engage in multiple economic activities across a rural-urban spatial continuum, sometimes in both the formal and informal sectors, to meet their basic needs (O’Reilly & Gordon, 1995) . The either explicit or implicit goal of many government policies and development partner interventions is to create the so-called “enabling environment” for these survival strategies (Baker, 1995; Djurfeldt, 2012).

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Since the early 1990s, a small but growing number of studies suggest that it’s not only the poor who engage in multiple, spatially-dispersed economic activities (Bigsten & Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1992; Mustapha, 1992; Owusu, 2001). Such strategies have increasingly become key means of capital accumulation for not-so-poor segments of the population as well, including public sector employees (Owusu, 2007). The concept of urban-rural linkages is thus now widely acknowledged as essential to a full understanding of contemporary changes in African urban economies. More recent global development agendas, such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the New Urban Agenda (NUA), now incorporate the concept of urban-rural linkages as an important framework to achieve more balanced and inclusive regional development. The global campaign to include an “urban SDG” prevailed with the ratifcation of SDG 11, “make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable,” in September 2015. While the UN’s broad endorsement of a global urban future created new entry points to development through cities, it was the New Urban Agenda, crafted as part of the preparations for Habitat III, that provided a more detailed articulation of the global urban agenda. According to Pieterse, Parnell, and Haysom (2018), “The 2016 lead-up to Habitat III thus presented an important opportunity to make claims around the conditions for realizing an urban African dream (Pieterse et al., 2018).” This opportunity was not left unrealized. Africa’s urban dialogue began before ratifcation of SDG 11 or the New Urban Agenda under the leadership of the African Union. In Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, leaders endorsed an urban vision that included, “Cities and other settlements are hubs of cultural and economic activities, with modernized infrastructure, and people have access to all the basic necessities of life including shelter, water, sanitation, energy, public transport and ICT [information and communication technology]; Economies are structurally transformed to create shared growth, decent jobs and economic opportunities for all… (AU, 2015b)” The breadth of the Agenda 2063 vision implies the need to embrace cities as a whole and not just address housing or services like water and power in isolation (Pieterse et al., 2018). The task of the common African agenda was then to position this aspirational thinking about the future of the continent in global forums like Habitat III, where binding commitments are made by all nations (AU, 2015a). African delegates to Habitat III achieved this positioning by pushing to foreground the political importance of issues like informality, urban-rural linkages, the deep poverty of many in African cities, and the aspirations of the continent’s youth (Siba, 2019; UN-Habitat & UNECA, 2015). Coming out of the NUA process, much of the reality of African urbanization is broadly refected in international documents. The most notable example, perhaps, is the production of a UN-Habitat report on Implementing the New Urban Agenda by Strengthening Urban-Rural Linkages, that was initiated at Habitat III. The report identifes 10 “entry points” to urban-rural linkages that emphasize diferent lenses of analysis to understand territorial development policies (UN-Habitat, 2017). UN- Habitat emphasizes the crucial importance of breaking away from so-called “silo thinking,” and thereby creates methodological space for the often-eclectic study of urbanization that has emerged in recent years from the African academic community (UN-Habitat, 2017). These approaches are frequently grounded in engineering, economics, or planning, but also draw from insights generated by anthropology, geography, and history (Pieterse et al., 2018). UN-Habitat’s focus on a broad and integrative topic like “urban-rural linkages” as key to achieving the NUA points to the relative success of African delegates in incorporating the continent’s vision into the global development agenda. Despite evidence of this success, there is a major and important disconnect between the optimism—even euphoria—of these global and regional policy agendas, and the reality on the 8

ground. A positive and inspirational vision of the role that urban Africa will play in the continent’s future is no doubt important. But major governance and infrastructural defcits, along with inherited legacies and looming demographic and economic crisis, create a serious risk that these visions do not advance into practice (Pieterse et al., 2018). The core challenge of translating this vision into practice lies in a paradox: while it is important for Africa to speak with one voice during global policy dialogues, overgeneralizations may serve to reduce, rather than reinforce, the efectiveness of urban-rural governance. It is true that there is an absolute crisis in urban governance across the continent; but there is no single explanation for why African cities are so poorly run (Pieterse et al., 2018). Shifting towards a more inward-focused and refexive position that seeks to understand the nature of urban-rural linkages and governance challenges within a specifc context is therefore necessary to ensure that these aspirational global agendas do not remain just rhetoric. The remainder of this report highlights some of the key points of evidence and questions that policymakers are likely to encounter in this process.

UN-Habitat’s 10 “Entry Points” to Urban-Rural Linkages

i. Spatial fow of products, services and information/expertise between urban and rural areas; ii. Mobility and migration between urban and rural areas; iii. Food security systems and a “sustainability chain” for all; iv. Rural urbanization: the development of small and intermediate towns; v. Te urban-rural continuum in the face of confict and disasters; vi. Reducing environmental impacts in urban-rural convergences; vii. Regional and territorial planning for integrated urban and rural development; viii. Enhancing legislation, governance and capacity for urban-rural partnerships; ix. Partnerships between urban and rural areas; and x. Inclusive investment and fnance in both urban and rural areas. A Framework to Enable More Virtuous Urban-Rural Linkages

Understanding the complex linkages across the urban, peri-urban, and rural continuum requires a transdisciplinary approach that considers perspectives from economics, sociology, political science, history, public health, anthropology, psychology, geography, business administration, and public policy, among others. Using a CDP process, the expert committee sought to synthesize evidence from across these disciplines into a framework that can assist policymakers and planners to incorporate the reality of urban-rural linkages into their work. While not exhaustive, this framework can help decision-makers to answer some key questions that will outline the characteristics of the urban-rural linkages in their specifc context. Figure 1 below demonstrates the theory of change for this consensus study: certain enabling policy conditions will help planners to incorporate insights from three disciplinary categories (“productivity and livelihoods,” “power and accountability,” and “socio-cultural perceptions”) into their work, which will in turn contribute to more virtuous micro-cycles of urban-rural linkages. More virtuous urban-rural linkages will expand the survival strategies available to households and communities, and will contribute to more balanced regional socio-economic development.

9 10

FIGURE 1 When questions of productivity and livelihoods, socio-cultural perceptions, and power and accountability are better incorporated into the policymaking process, it will help to enable virtuous cycles of urban-rural linkages and the more balanced regional development they entail.

PART 1: PRODUCTIVITY AND LIVELIHOODS

Urban-rural linkages have conventionally been approached from the disciplines of development economics and food studies. Traditional dual sector development models, for instance, predicted the movement of labour from rural to urban spaces as productivity within the manufacturing sector grew. More recently, researchers studying food systems have become interested in rural-urban linkages because of the role that they play in household survival strategies. Some scholars have also sought to explore the ways that “rural” activities take place in urban settlements (such as urban agriculture), and the way that activities usually classifed as “urban” take place in rural settlements (such as manufacturing and services). In general, productivity and livelihoods refer to the various ways that individuals, households, communities, and nations use the linkages between rural and urban spaces to increase their productivity and secure dignifed livelihoods.

Heterodox African Urbanization

Based on the evidence in this section, the Expert Committee concludes that: Current heterodox patterns of urban development in sub-Saharan Africa do not support the kinds of virtuous urban-rural economic relationships historically observed in Europe, North America, and much of Asia. 11

Urbanization has long been associated with increasing income per capita, largely based on observed historical patterns. The increases to per capita income associated with urbanization are typically the result of industrialization (Gollin, Jedwab, & Vollrath, 2016). Europe and the Neo- Europes, 5 for example, urbanized at the same time they industrialized. The processes were closely linked; with the cities came the factories, and with the factories came higher per capita incomes (Gollin et al., 2016). As a result of these close associations, many governments and development organizations have shifted their perspective to emphasize the positive role that urbanization plays in development (Turok & McGranahan, 2013). The urbanization-development nexus is often portrayed as automatic and inevitable, like it is governed by some universal law directing an immutable historical process (Turok & McGranahan, 2013). For example, the launch of the 2017 Economic Report on Africa was accompanied by a press release that proclaimed “Africa’s rapid urbanization can drive industrialization, says new UN report (UN, 2017).” Similarly, the World Bank’s 2009 World Development Report states, “No country has grown to middle income without industrializing and urbanizing. None has grown to high income without vibrant cities (World Bank, 2008).” It’s clear that these processes have often been linked in the past, but the causal relationship between the two is far from clear. Broad-brush statements about the role of urbanization as a driver of development gloss over the fact that the supporting evidence is rather thin (Turok & McGranahan, 2013). In fact, urbanization patterns observed in sub-Saharan Africa in recent decades have diverged signifcantly from global trends. Today, many African countries, though highly urbanized, lack large industrial sectors. Shanghai and Lagos, for example, are cities in countries with similar levels of urbanization, although it seems unlikely that Lagos currently has the same productive industrial capacity as Shanghai (Gollin et al., 2016). Orthodox economic wisdom holds that densely populated, nucleated settlements provide an environment conducive to innovation and economies of scale, thus attracting industry and stimulating employment growth (Potts, 2012b, p. 201). Reasonable, sustained incomes in the formal industrial sector fuel demand for mass consumer goods and planned housing, generating virtuous cycles of development and attracting labour from rural areas to take part in the process (Potts, 2012b). Despite the growth of densely population urban settlements across sub-Saharan Africa, these virtuous economic linkages remain weak. Part of the weakness of these virtuous economic relationships may be attributed to global competition. Many sub-Saharan African countries had liberalization foisted upon them through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) before governments had moved beyond the earliest stages of establishing an industrial and manufacturing base (Potts, 2012b). This pre-emptive liberalization, coupled with acute economic crisis because of resource price fuctuations, rendered sub-Saharan Africa unable to compete for industrial investment (Potts, 2012b). In comparison to Asian competitors, few sub-Saharan African countries had the human capital or public infrastructure required to entice global capital to make industrial investments in growing urban areas. Today, globalization in general, and the rise of China specifcally, has greatly increased competition in world markets and made it increasingly difcult for newcomers to industrialize by carving a niche for themselves (Rodrik, 2012). Another key reason for sub-Saharan Africa’s divergence from historical patterns is likely the region’s high reliance on natural resource exports for economic growth. Recent global research has shown that while non-resource exporting countries maintain a relatively tight positive relationship between urbanization and industrialization, no such relationship exists for those countries that 5 A term coined by the historian Alfred Crosby to describe the biological and ecological processes whereby people of European descent colonized and settled certain temperate zones including today’s United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Crosby, 2004). 12

rely more heavily on resource exports for growth (Gollin et al., 2016). In other words, a reliance on natural resource exports for economic growth uncouples the processes of urbanization from industrialization (see Figure 2). Of the 46 sub-Saharan African countries included in Gollin et al’s (2016) analysis, at least 19 fall into the “resource exporters” category (Gollin et al., 2016). Today, the continent’s most urbanized countries all export natural resources: oil (e.g., Angola, Gabon, and Nigeria), diamonds and/or gold (e.g., Botswana, Liberia, and South Africa), copper (e.g., Zambia), or cocoa (e.g., Ivory Coast) (Gollin et al., 2016). Cities that grew because of resource exports seem to have a fundamentally diferent character than those that grew because of industrialization. Resource-driven urbanization tends to be characterized by a higher percentage of workers in non-tradeable services (e.g. personal, government, and transportation services; hotel accommodation; restaurants; construction; and commerce) than industry-driven urbanization (Gollin et al., 2016). Gollin et al. (2016) characterize resource-exporting urban centres as “consumption cities” to contrast them with urban centres in China or historical examples from Europe that are best characterized as “production cities” where more workers are engaged in tradeable goods and services like manufacturing and fnance. It is certainly possible that sub-Saharan cities will industrialize in the long-run and transition into production cities. Many global examples exist of cities that began as resource boom-towns, but eventually transitioned to centres of production and innovation (e.g. Denver, San Francisco, Seattle). It is also possible that so-called “consumption cities” become more welfare-enhancing in the long-run. Currently, however, the heterodox patterns of urbanization observed in sub-Saharan Africa do not support the types of virtuous urban-rural economic relationships seen historically in Europe and much of Asia.

FIGURE 2 This fgure shows the relationship between the urbanization rate (% and the share of manufactureing and services in GDP (%) for 56 non-resource-exporting countries and 60 resources exporting countries in 2019. The Solid line is a linear ft for the Data. SOURCE: Gollin et al., 2016. 13

The Urban-Rural Continuum

Based on the evidence in this section, the Expert Committee concludes that: The process of urbanization as it is taking place in sub-Saharan Africa is not well analysed through a dualistic urban/rural frame, as has conventionally been the norm.

In traditional economic frameworks, urban and rural areas are typically analysed as separate but connected entities. A wide body of research now demonstrates that, particularly in developing regions like Africa, this distinction is largely inappropriate (Förster & Ammann, 2018; Myers, 2018; Simon, McGregor, & Nsiah-Gyabaah, 2004). It is undeniable that urban and rural dwellers lead hugely divergent lifestyles. The city is more associated with “modern” ways of life, while the village is the repository of “traditional” values and practices (Förster & Ammann, 2018). However, a clear- cut binary distinction between the two is impossible. The impact of the city is visible in rural areas, just as rural lifestyles shape the urban experience. The inadequacy of the rural-urban duality as a lens of analysis stems from three main observations. First, the process of urbanization in Africa creates major governance and planning challenges that afect livelihoods and standards of living in both rural and urban areas. Second, the process leads to the formation of novel “peri-urban” areas that display both rural and urban characteristics and do not ft well into traditional frames of analyses. And third, because the process of urbanization in Africa entails major livelihood changes in both urban and rural spaces. African urbanization is largely characterized by the horizontal as opposed to vertical expansion of urban space (Kassa, 2013; van Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 2018). This rapid horizontal expansion of urban space often outstrips the planning and enforcement capacity of governments, resulting in sprawling settlements with limited public amenities (Nwaka, 2005, p. 134). Part of the reason for these sprawling settlements with limited public amenities comes down to the governance challenges of providing public services in a rapidly changing environment. As urban sprawl leads to the agglomeration of previously separate towns, many metropolitan areas now face serious jurisdictional challenges to managing the urbanization process (Smit, 2018). In Lomé, Togo, for instance, the city’s growth beyond its administrative borders has made coordinating service delivery between diferent local authorities exceptionally challenging (Ronderos, 2016). Central government can lead the planning process to address housing, transport, and social service needs at the agglomeration level; but implementation often falls to a variety of stakeholder authorities with potentially conficting interests. To manage the spill-over efects—both positive and negative—of urban growth that does not correspond to sub-national political and administrative boundaries, some have called for a “4th level of governance or governance competency (Ronderos, 2016).” This 4th level entails multi-level governance arrangements to help coordinate pooled resources to address common problems and to help manage competition between localities. In South Africa, for example, the Gauteng region coordinates the urban area around Johannesburg to work in a coordinated way on projects like the Gauteng Rapid Rail Link (Ronderos, 2016). Additionally, despite concerted programs of political decentralization in much of sub-Saharan Africa, central governments have tended to maintain signifcant fnancial, legal, and regulatory control, leaving limited room for local government innovation (Cheru, 2005). Such centre-local tensions can further complicate the need to coordinate investments between multiple administrative jurisdictions. In addition to the governance and planning challenges of horizontal urban expansion, the process also leads to the formation of “peri-urban areas” that further confuse the distinction between 14

rural and urban as they demonstrate characteristics of both. For example, peri-urban areas are often an important source of food for city residents, and are also residential areas for urban poor service workers (Dodman, Leck, Rusca, & Colenbrander, 2017). Enforcing regulations to minimize the negative externalities of both urban sprawl as well as the economically more desirable density become especially challenging in peri-urban areas. Pei-urban areas are also not homogenous. As well as providing residential areas for urban poor workers, they can present attractive investment opportunities for the moneyed classes (Chirisa, 2010). Largely because of their unregulated nature, peri-urban areas can attract housing and commercial investment, contributing to the low density “suburbanization” of the countryside (Güneralp, Lwasa, Masundire, Parnell, & Seto, 2017). Peri- urban areas thus present both unique challenges and opportunities for planners and policymakers. They can introduce or exacerbate the risk of water-born and zoonotic disease transfer; they also present opportunities for greater revenue capture improved property taxes or other mechanisms (Chirisa, 2010b; Güneralp et al., 2017). Efective planning and policy therefore need to incorporate the possibility for distinct spatial confgurations beyond the dualistic categories of rural and urban. Finally, the process of urbanization in Africa does not only imply livelihood changes for those who move to cities—rural areas also face profound transformations. First, rural areas in Africa are not homogenous, although they are frequently treated as such by policymakers and development organizations. For example, an increasing number of rural households in Africa rely on non-farm economic activities for their livelihoods (Nagler & Naudé, 2017) . Rural non-farm economic activities typically have low barriers to entry, such as sales and trade. Increasing levels of urbanization—especially in the region’s secondary and smaller cities—are likely to increase the importance of non-farm economic activities to household survival strategies. Strategies that synonymize rural areas with agricultural activity are therefore likely to miss a great deal of these strategies. Second, urban growth can theoretically contribute to rural development by increasing demand for the produce of farmers in the city’s hinterland. Empirical evidence does show that farmers located closer to urban areas receive higher prices for their produce, and thus have greater incentives to intensify production (Vandercasteelen, Beyene, Minten, & Swinnen, 2018). However, farmers in closer proximity to cities also face higher input prices, including land rents and wages for labour. Therefore, if access to productive inputs (fertilizer, machinery etc.), formal markets, and better information is limited then they may not be able to internalise the potential of higher urban prices for their produce (Vandercasteelen et al., 2018). Ultimately, frames of analysis that are able to understand urbanization and its impacts on livelihoods and wellbeing across an urban-rural continuum are increasingly important for sound decision-making.

Urbanization in Secondary Cities

Based on the evidence in this section, the Expert Committee concludes that: Secondary cities have a great potential to capitalize on existing urban-rural linkages and stimulate more virtuous cycles of investment in both areas.

The potential of secondary cities to stimulate broad-based economic growth and poverty reduction has been recognized in the literature since at least the 1980s (Mushi, 2003; Rondinelli, 1982; Satterthwaite, 2016; van der Merwe, 1992; Yacoob & Kelly, 1999). In the past, cities were 15 typically classifed in a hierarchy based on population size (Roberts, 2014). Secondary cities were portrayed as the “bridge” between overcrowded primary cities and sparsely populated rural areas where it was not cost efective to deliver services (Nwaka, 2004). With the renewed focus on cities as “engines of growth” that has come from the SDGs and the NUA, many scholars and development partners have begun revisiting the role of secondary cities in regional development (Satterthwaite, 2016). Today, however, functionality and connectivity with global and regional networks of cities plays a signifcant role in the way secondary cities are defned (Roberts, 2014). The role that secondary cities can play to attract investment, create jobs, and develop sub- regional economies is an increasingly important area of focus for both scholars and policymakers. For instance, rapid population growth in primay cities often outstrips the ability of governments to plan efectively and to provide public services. Secondary cities, however, generally tend to have access to more land, to have invested less in existing infrastructure, and are often supported by one anchor business or industry (Foster, 2016). As a result, they can support their current populations, and, with the right planning and investment, they could ofer opportunities for their expected future population growth. In addition, many of these cities do not have the same historical legacy as primary cities, which were often designed as colonial capitals and never intended for the population they now host.6 Secondary cities are also demographically important. In sub-Saharan Africa, most urban centres have less than 50,000 inhabitants, and in many countries these smaller7 cities account for more than 15 percent of the national population (Satterthwaite, 2016). In the context of encouraging virtuous urban-rural linkages, the topic of secondary cities is relevant for two main reasons. First, secondary cities are usually closer to agricultural production and are thus more likely to help stimulate agro-processing investments. Second, secondary are often the frst point of call for migrants from the countryside, and thus tend to maintain stronger linkages to rural areas and their growth appears to have greater potential for poverty reduction than the further growth of primary cities. While the continent’s megacities are often the focus of international attention and scholarship, it is these smaller secondary cities that may play a more decisive role in defning an alternative African urban future (Cassiman & De Boeck, 2009). It is difcult to generalize about the economic foundation of small urban centres. In many countries, the majority will be “market towns” that concentrate markets for agricultural produce along with services and retail for agricultural producers (Satterthwaite, 2016). Many may be “administrative towns” in that a large percentage of the workforce derives their income from the concentration of government or NGO services there (Satterthwaite, 2016). Small urban centres can also rely on the close proximity of a valuable resource, with their economies underpinned by mining enterprises, tourism, or river ports (Satterthwaite, 2016). Within this wide range of possibilities, however, there are often opportunities to strengthen the economic linkages between rural areas and their nearest secondary city hub. Economists often emphasize the fact that all countries with growing economies have decreasing proportions of their GDP derived from agriculture, and increasing proportions of their labour force engaged in services and industry (Anderson, 1987). Figures that show the decreasing importance of agriculture to the economy can be misleading, however, in that a considerable part of the growth in industry and services can be from forward and backward linkages with agriculture (Satterthwaite, 2016). For instance, the production and sale of agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and other inputs,

6 See the UNAS report Owning Our Urban Future: The Case of Kampala City for an in-depth case study. 7 There is ongoing international debate about the defnition of “secondary cities.” It is unclear, for instance, where the lower and upper population thresholds should be set, and how these should difer by context. A single global benchmark would exclude some urban centers that are small within their national context, and would classify the largest urban centers in some small population nations as small. 16

cold storage, and packaging and processing industries. A signifcant part of the growth in urban services can also be attributed to growing demand from agricultural producers and rural populations (Satterthwaite & Tacoli, 2003). As secondary cities are more likely to exist closer to agricultural production, they can serve as attractive sites for investment in these industrial and service linkages between urban and rural economies (Siba, 2018). A growing body of empirical evidence also points to the especially great potential of secondary city growth for poverty reduction (Christiaensen & Todo, 2014; Dorosh & Thurlow, 2013, 2014). Given that up to 90% of the poor in eastern and southern Africa live in rural areas, this connection may not be surprising (Faurès & Santini, 2008) . Christiaensen, De Weerdt, and Todo (2013) show that moving to a large city is signifcantly more lucrative in the long-term for individuals. However, despite these larger gains from moving to the big city, more than twice as many people move to closer secondary cities. As a result, migration to secondary cities contributes more to overall income growth and poverty reduction than migration to capital or primary cities. Qualitative research from Tanzania fnds that although migrants do view Dar es Salaam as ofering the most opportunities, at least at frst few can aford to relocate there (Ingelaere, Christiaensen, De Weerdt, & Kanbur, 2018). The original purpose of leaving the village is usually to fnd employment outside of agriculture, and to make social connections and open doors. Secondary cities therefore provide an attractive frst step, with the potential to open more lucrative migration opportunities in the future (Ingelaere et al., 2018). However, the cumulative inertia of life, as family and work responsibilities accrue, mean that many of these migrants end up settling down and remaining in secondary cities (Ingelaere et al., 2018). With further investments in things like agro-processing, administration and tourism hubs, or ports and export centres, the role of secondary cities as a useful “landing pad” for rural migrants could be enhanced (Siba, 2018).

Urbanization and Informality

Based on the evidence in this section, the Expert Committee concludes that: Like the urban/rural distinction, the formal/informal distinction is not a particularly useful lens of analysis in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Firms and individuals make a wide range of choices in response to certain constraints and regulations, and may often alter their behaviour along that continuum in response to changing circumstances.

The issue of informality has been a persistent point of discussion in literature on African cities and urban development since at least the 1970s. Informality is often equated to illegality, but it can be more usefully thought of as indicating a gap where formal structures are not an ideal ft for the context (Chiodelli & Moroni, 2014). Instead of criminalizing informal economic activity, governments can encourage more virtuous urban-rural linkages by shifting formal structures to better address these gaps. Long referred to as the “traditional” or “subsistence” sector, development economists argued that growth would absorb activities like petty trade and small-scale production into the modern capitalist economy (Kanbur, 2017; Lewis, 1955). Instead, throughout the 1970s, rates of under- and unemployment continued to grow in sub-Saharan Africa, even among countries that posted large economic growth fgures (Singer, 1970). Refecting this concern, the International Labour Organization (ILO) organized a series of high-profle “employment missions” to a variety of 17 developing countries. The frst, in 1972, went to Kenya and found that in reality the informal sector included a number of highly productive and proftable enterprises, as well as marginal activities (ILO, 1972). Since then, researchers, policymakers, and development partners have argued about the preferred role of the informal sector in urban development, and how it should be approached by government. Depending on who you speak to, informality means many diferent things—but almost all of them negative. Unprotected workers, low productivity, unfair competition, evasion of the rule of law, regulatory avoidance, under- or non-payment of taxes, and dangerous or unhealthy housing are all included in discussions of informality (Maloney & Saavedra-Chanduvi, 2007). Keith Hart, who originally coined the term “informality,” contends that the nature of the sector—lack of documentation—contributes to it being a kind of blank slate onto which analysts project their own particular concerns (Hart, 1973). Due to its very nature, the concept of informality is therefore contested, and the various branches of the literature don’t help much in clearly defning what falls into the category. Informality is often taken to apply to labour, micro-frms, frms, and housing. Labour informality might refer to workers, particularly the old and young, who would prefer a job with standard labour protections but are unable to secure one. Alternatively, labour informality might refer to workers dropping out of the formal sector and starting their own micro-enterprise to make more money, to avoid paying social protection or other taxes, or to better balance home and income-generating responsibilities (Maloney & Saavedra-Chanduvi, 2007). Micro-frm informality, similarly, might refer to frms with no intention or potential for growth, or it might refer to frms whose growth has been obstructed by government regulation (Maloney & Saavedra-Chanduvi, 2007). At the frm level, informality might refer to those organizations that avoid taxation and regulation because enforcement is weak, or alternatively it might refer to organizations that register only part of their workforce or sales to avoid an excessive regulatory burden (Maloney & Saavedra-Chanduvi, 2007). Similarly, when it comes to housing and construction informality can refer to a wide range of activities and circumstances, from the formation of slum neighbourhoods to high-end hotels that fout ofcial planning guidelines or building regulations (Goodfellow, 2013). The above options are not exhaustive, but they give some indication of the scale and dimensions of the informal sector concept. Additionally, it is important to note that the literature has long recognized the extensive linkages between the formal and informal sectors. Formal businesses often use inputs produced by the informal sector, and are frequently involved in complex sub- contracting relationships with them, including by advancing credit in the form of materials (Hays- Mitchell, 1993). In sub-Saharan Africa, many informal traders operate on behalf of formal frms, for example by taking the products of larger retailers to the street for sale (Joshi, Prichard, & Heady, 2014). Addressing the various incentives at play in the above scenarios call for very diferent policy responses, and it is therefore crucial to defne exactly what we mean when we talk about the informal sector. Kanbur (2009), suggests that to clarify this hazy concept, informality and formality should be understood as an activity in the presence of specifc regulations (Kanbur, 2009). Four conceptual categories result from this analysis. If we imagine an intervention, say a fat percentage direct tax on turnover above a certain level, into a model world without intervention, then economic agents will face four possible situations: 1. stay within the scope of the intervention and comply; 2. stay within the scope of the intervention and do not comply; 18

3. adjust their activity to move beyond the scope of the intervention; 4. they are already outside the scope of the regulation and there is no need to comply.

Thus, while the informal sector is often discussed as a duality in opposition to the formal sector, this simple description is misleading. More accurately, economic agents in urban sub-Saharan Africa exist along a spectrum of types from the most formal (tax-paying, law-abiding), to the most informal (subsistence-level activities) (Joshi et al., 2014). Additionally, depending on the type of intervention under discussion, economic actors may appear at a diferent point along the formal- informal spectrum (Kanbur, 2009). A small business, for instance, may fully pay their taxes at the same time that they add a second foor to their establishment without a permit from the planning department. As the cost-beneft analyses of economic agents change, they may seek to move along this spectrum in relation to various interventions, either seeking greater formalization and regulatory compliance, or sinking into informality to avoid compliance costs (Joshi et al., 2014). As informality is tied so closely to the livelihood strategies of both urban and rural residents, it is an unavoidable consideration for policymakers seeking to leverage urban-rural linkages for development. Simple distinctions between formal and informal activities, however, are unlikely to provide many useful answers for how to proceed. Informality is typically a response to a given set of constraints, and therefore may be best understood as a gap where formal structures are not an ideal ft for the context. Approaching the issue of informality in this way—and being careful and meticulous in defning exactly what is meant by the term—can help policymakers to limit the worst externalities of informal economic activity, while allowing productive livelihood strategies to persist.

PART 2: SOCIO-CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS

Humans are not always rational actors, and do not only make decisions based on a risk-beneft analysis of the facts. The decisions of individuals and households are frequently infuenced by the perceived meanings of diferent categories like “urban” and “rural.” Additionally, individuals exist within complex webs of social obligations and expectations that may infuence their behaviour in ways that common economic assumptions often miss. Socio-cultural perceptions, in general, refer to the way that individuals, households, communities, and nations understand rural and urban spaces and the linkages between them, and how that understanding infuences their behaviour.

Movement Through the Urban-Rural Continuum

Based on the evidence in this section, the Expert Committee concludes that: Individuals do not remain static within the urban-rural continuum. Based on social relationships and the perceived opportunities in diferent locations, individuals engage in complex patterns of movement across the urban-rural continuum, leveraging the advantages of each at diferent stages of their lives. 19

The urban-rural continuum can be thought of spatially, as the transition from rural areas with widely disbursed infrastructure to urban areas characterized by a much denser built environment. The urban-rural continuum can also be thought of socially, and largely defned by the movement of individuals across this space and the activities they engage in at diferent points in their lives. For instance, contrary to the common perception, many people do not migrate permanently to cities. They instead engage in a pattern of circular migration, whereby they enter urban space in search of of-farm employment during the growing season, and return to rural areas to work in the felds during harvest season (Potts, 2013). Understanding the dynamics of this movement across the urban- rural continuum—and how these dynamics may interact with demographic change—is important to efective policymaking. Social and cultural networks and gender relationships may infuence which individuals are most likely to engage in circular rural-urban migration patterns. For example, strong ethnic communities in cities may encourage refugee populations to seek opportunities in cities rather than staying in camps (Pavanello, Elhawary, & Pantuliano, 2010). Additionally, women may be more likely to remain as the caretakers of rural properties8 while men seek employment in urban areas (Reed, Andrzejewski, & White, 2010). Sometimes these moves are permanent, but often they are not, with refugees returning to camps periodically and men returning to assist with necessary rural tasks. The ethnic and gender dimensions of rural-urban migration are likely to infuence the types of opportunities that are available to migrants, and whether migration leads to a process of capital accumulation. The core debate that scholars have engaged in on the topic of circular migration relates to the question of whether it will inevitably disappear as countries develop (Prothero & Chapman, 1985). In other words, is circular migration a transitory phase that will gradually fade as further change happens? Typical modernization theory suggests that this type of movement across the rural-urban continuum should transition into more permanent patterns of migration as economies progress and labour is transferred from “traditional” to industrial sectors (Nelson, 1976). Other perspectives, particularly those of Marxist scholars, have argued that circular migration is actually an active part of underdevelopment, but that it nevertheless should dwindle with the strengthening of wage labour, and will eventually become unnecessary in a socialist future (Potts, 2010, p. 6). Reality, however, is difcult to ft neatly into any of these theories, and empirical evidence on the role of cyclical migration has therefore been mixed (Potts, 2012a). Part of the confusion over analyses of circular migration lies in widely divergent understandings over its nature and defnition. For example, some migrants may come to urban areas for short periods, while still being regarded as core members of the rural household. Others may come to the city to spend their full working life there, but nevertheless with the intention of returning to the village in retirement. Still others might have brought their immediate family to town and may no longer be usefully regarded as members of the rural household, although they maintain various social and economic linkages to their area of origin and may travel there frequently (Potts, 2010, p. 7). O’Connor nicely summed up the difculty of aligning policy with a clear analysis of circular rural-urban migration: In every city some migrants have come for only a few months to acquire cash for a particular purpose, some have come for a year or two as part of a labour circulation process—and some may do so for a second and third time, some have come intending to stay for most or all of their working lives but then to return to their rural homeland, and some regard the move as permanent. The uncertainties relate to the relative size of each group, and also to how far reality matches intentions (O’Connor, 2007, p. 67). 8 Although this may be changing in some instances—see Pickbourn (2018). 20

In short, circular migration is a defning aspect of the rural-urban linkages between many cities, towns, and villages in sub-Saharan Africa. Interpreting empirical data on the phenomenon or ftting it neatly into existing models, however, is challenging because categories are not clearly defned and migrants may intend one course of action but ultimately act diferently because of various constraints. Simplifed assumptions about the scale and direction of migration fows can in turn distract from the real landscape of developmental opportunities.

Perceived Urban and Rural Meanings

Based on the evidence in this section, the Expert Committee concludes that: Perceptions of what it means to be “rural” and “urban” shift over time, help determine migration patterns, and infuence ways of life in both locations.

People shift across the urban-rural continuum in search of economic opportunities. In a world of asymmetrical information, however, those opportunities do not always accurately refect reality. The movement of individuals across this continuum is rather more accurately understood as being driven by the perceptions and meanings that societies give to each spatial category. Importantly, these perceptions and meanings may change over the course of an individual’s lifecycle. They may also difer along class and gender lines (Tvedten, 2018). For instance, younger individuals may perceive urban areas as sites of material acquisition, while older individuals may perceive rural areas as a desired place for retirement. These perceptions can shape migration and investment patterns across the urban-rural continuum as much as objective economic opportunities. Traditional dualistic models of development understand high levels of unemployment among recent rural-to-urban migrants as the result of unrealistic perceptions. As long as migrants expect better job opportunities and higher wages in urban areas, migration will continue (Harris & Todaro, 1970). Theoretically, once accurate information on the urban job market flters back to rural areas, migration levels equalize at the efcient level. However, evidence suggests that there are many other perceptual drivers of migration across the rural-urban continuum beyond information on wages and employment opportunities. Since colonial times in Africa, urbanization has been closely associated with the idea of modernization. The image of modern Europe still represents the benchmark for what development looks like for many Africans (Yahia, 2016). Concepts of modernity that equate success with material gain likely contribute to migration patterns, and to the perception of urban areas as the only place that one can achieve success (Tvedten, 2018). Furthermore, increasing technology access and media exposure—which do ofer better economic opportunities in both rural and urban areas—also contributes to unrealistic expectations and frustrations (Seo & Hyun, 2018; Stoll, 2018; Tetteh, 2016). Those who cannot meet the expectations of rural family members in terms of increased income and upward mobility may choose to stay in urban areas out of a sense of embarrassment and the hope of doing better in the future (Lohnert, 2017, p. 45). This perceived “failure” and the desire to keep it private contributes to a discourse about urban life in rural areas that emphasizes the positive aspects and the opportunities, while burying the immense challenges (Lohnert, 2017, p. 45). Beyond the “bright lights” of the city and the imagined prosperity they entail, young people may choose to relocate to urban areas simply out of boredom (O’Connor, 2011). In many countries, the village is more associated with grandparents and village elders and a static way of life. In this case, the transition from a rural to an urban area involves both the pursuit of perceived opportunity, and a fight from a dull life. 21

Recent anthropological urban scholarship fnds that the respective meanings given to rural and urban spaces are largely shaped by one’s position on the scale of social (dis)advantage (Tvedten, 2018). Among urban residents, the best of—those able to live up to the expectations of urban life that exist in the popular imagination—see rural areas as having little to ofer. Similarly, for the most destitute of the urban poor (those who can’t, for example, aford a bus ticket) rural areas are perceived as completely out of reach, and therefore go largely unheeded. For all of those urban residents in the middle, however, rural areas continue to form an important part of their cosmologies and livelihood strategies, albeit without losing their urban base and identity (Tvedten, 2018). Across the income spectrum, the harshness of the city and the struggle to maintain a better life seems to have reinvigorated shared notions of rural values. For example, research from Maputo, Mozambique, found the perception that “honesty is a rural virtue” was widespread across all urban residents. Such residents may look down on rural dwellers (who “always seem confused” and “don’t understand trafc”) but nevertheless concede that they are trustworthy (Tvedten, 2018). This perception of rural areas as honest is largely contrasted with a growing sense of crime and instability in the city. Common understandings about rural values are also present when it comes to mitigating vulnerability, in the form of witchcraft, and when it comes to the afterlife, in the form of funerals. Although churches and mosques are a highly visible way that urban residents build social networks to counteract vulnerability in urban areas, witchcraft practices and beliefs also thrive in urban areas, albeit in more subtle and hidden forms. Interviewees in Maputo, for instance, conveyed the importance of “traditional” and “rural” remedies to sudden external shocks—and the thriving informal businesses that supply the necessary materiel (Tvedten, 2018). Perceptions about the afterlife and funerals are also a common linkage that urban residents perceive with rural areas. Especially among the afuent and middle-class, the city is perceived as an inappropriate place to be buried, in part because rural areas are understood to be more “peaceful,” and in part out of a concern to be close to the ancestors. Many urban residents also express a moral concern for taking care of the dead, and consequently return to their rural origins frequently to visit and tend to graves (Tvedten, 2018). It is not uncommon to fnd both nostalgic and sceptical perceptions of rural areas among urban population. In Maputo, a middle-aged woman opined to interviewers that, “People from the countryside show respect. When you meet people from the villages they greet you and tell you everything about them, their family, and even the neighbors. But here in the city people only say ‘good day”’ and that’s it (Tvedten, 2018, p. 10).” In contrast, a 25-year-old man, also from Maputo, told interviewers that he doesn’t generally visit his relatives in rural areas because, “they don’t develop. They are very backwards… They don’t have anything (Tvedten, 2018, p. 11).” These fndings cannot be extrapolated to all of sub-Saharan Africa. They do, however, ofer a window into a society grappling with transitions that are common across the continent. Ultimately, this research highlights the fact that the reinvigoration of “the rural” at particular times in the life of an urban dweller may be as much a sign of the stress of urban living as it is a sign of longing for rurality and tradition (Tvedten, 2018). 22

Of House and Home

Based on the evidence in this section, the Expert Committee concludes that: Some qualitative evidence suggests that diferent perceptions of “house” and “home” between rural and urban areas may infuence where investments are prioritized and subsequent housing quality.

A common concern of governments, NGOs, and international partners focused on urban development is the low quality of housing that proliferates in African cities. In most studies, housing quality is assessed based on physical characteristics such as materials used for the foor, walls, and roof, the main sources of drinking water, light and energy, the availability of toilet facilities, and the number of rooms available for sleeping in a house (Mberu, 2006). Houses that don’t meet a certain minimum threshold in these physical criteria may be deemed slums. There are many explanations for the spread and persistence of slums in sub-Saharan cities, and multiple strategies to encourage their upgrading. There is evidence, in some specifc circumstances, that the subjective meaning residents give to their urban dwelling may infuence investment and subsequent housing quality. A sociological analysis from South Africa, for instance, found that in some cases the urban poor might perceive their urban house as a temporary shelter used when seeking cash income, and that they continue to perceive their rural residence as their “true” home (Smit, 1998). These relative perceptions of where the “house” and “home” exist, respectively, will therefore determine where investments fow for upgrades. When resources are scarce, the urban poor may choose to live in sub-standard conditions while remitting any extra cash they earn back to their rural home. This phenomenon, however, is unlikely to be universal across the continent. A research project from Ghana, for instance, found no signifcant diferences in housing quality between urban indigenes and migrants (Tanle, 2014). Furthermore, in many cases households might rely on informal, home-based enterprises as a cash-generating strategy in the urban environment (Mukiibi, 2011). When those home-based enterprises include activities like small-scale manufacturing, automobile repairs, or collecting and sorting recyclables, then the home environment may become contaminated. Thus, even when the urban house is perceived as a home, specifc survival strategies themselves may contributes to low- quality urban living environments.

PART 3: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY

In sub-Saharan Africa, ofcial governance structures have often been adapted from global best- practice examples. As a result, they may not be well integrated with social expectations about the ways that power and accountability are exercised in practice, and many informal parallel governance channels continue to operate. As a result of this governance pluralism, the exercise of power is often opaque (it is not clear who is responsible for making decisions), and mechanisms to hold those exercising power accountable may not function correctly. In general, power and accountability refer to the governance structures that allow certain groups to control the behaviour of individuals across the urban-rural continuum, and the mechanisms that exist to ensure such ability is exercised responsibly. 23

Asymmetrical Governance Processes

Based on the evidence in this section, the Expert Committee concludes that: Governance across the rural-urban spatial continuum is a major challenge in sub- Saharan Africa, characterized by institutions that emphasize form over function, and by the manipulation of political identities by elites.

Governance is a multidimensional concept, and as a result may have slightly diferent meanings to diferent people and groups. At a very high level, governance refers to how societies, or groups within it, organize themselves to make decisions (IOG, 2019). Governments play a particularly important role as the lead or catalysing agents within governance processes, but the concept extends to many other stakeholders. Based on this defnition, governance processes can become unbalanced or “asymmetrical” when certain groups are excluded, or when a certain stakeholder with more money or political infuence is able to dominate the process. The complexities of urban-rural governance in the African context that are outlined below can make processes particularly vulnerable to developing chronic asymmetries. Local governments, both in rural and urban areas, play an especially important role in promoting a sense mutual accountability between citizens and the state. Through efective service delivery, governments gain the trust and confdence of communities, who then take ownership of the sustainability of service delivery (Sikhakane & Reddy, 2011). Urban governance then refers to the process whereby local governments interact and work alongside a range of other stakeholders to deliver the services and infrastructure required for a city to function (Middleton, 2016). See Figure 3 for an illustration of these stakeholders and how they ft together. These same governance processes are also required for linkages between urban and rural areas to function efciently. Across the rural-urban continuum, however, a variety of historical and structural incentives conspire to limit the efectiveness of urban governance. When governance processes don’t function—or function to provide services inequitably across the spatial continuum—it infuences the movement of people and goods, and also undermines the broader state-society relationships that are essential for development. Clearly understanding these governance dynamics, that are recurrent across the continent, is therefore important to efectively managing urban-rural linkages for the greatest beneft. One common way that governance processes can undermine service delivery comes down to implementation. Based on a largely implicit theory of change that “modernization” could be accelerated in African countries by transplanting “best practice” institutions, a great deal of ofcial development assistance (ODA) over the past half century has gone to creating institutions that mimic the form of those found in developed Western states (Pritchett & de Weijer, 2010). Table 1 provides a few heuristic examples of the historical transition from traditional to modern institutional forms, showing that the functional goal can be articulated separately from the particular institutional form. For example, the desired functionality of a police force could be understood as keeping the peace. But because there is no systematic way to evaluate this functionality, police forces have for decades defned their goals in terms of (a) compliance with accepted organizational structures of hiring and promotion (b) compliance with norms of behaviour (e.g. chain of command), and (c) inputs, like the possession of new and attractive equipment (Pritchett & de Weijer, 2010). The core idea being that if these best practice institutional forms are adopted, it will result in better keeping of the peace. However, these is no way to evaluate this assumption. In some countries, implementing best-practice institutional forms seem to have resulted in the desired functionality; in many others it has obviously not. The real danger of adopting the form of institutions that have proven successful 24

elsewhere (and thus in diferent conditions) comes from what organizational sociologists refer to as “isomorphic mimicry (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).” The basic idea of isomorphic mimicry is that organizations will attempt to gain legitimacy by adopting best practice reforms that give them the appearance of functionality, whether or not those reforms lead to any meaningful improvements in service delivery or changes in the behaviour of frontline agents (Pritchett & de Weijer, 2010). Furthermore, the tendency to emphasize form over function becomes self-perpetuating. When faced with situations of resource scarcity—as exist in most African cities—institutions often emphasize the form of public policy over its function, in an efort to minimize risk and maintain organizational survival (Andrews, Pritchett, & Woolcock, 2012). In essence, institutions engage in widespread “cut-and-paste” policymaking without refection on unique contextual circumstances and challenges. The relevance of these processes to urban-rural linkages is that they can close of opportunities for organizational innovation, or for leadership with strong vision that attempts to take an organization in a new direction. As the process of urbanization progresses, the linkages between cities and their hinterlands will also change in a dynamic process. Responding to those demographic, economic, and social changes requires space for innovation and fresh thinking. Conforming to established institutional forms to minimize risk, whether or not those institutions are functionally performing, can in the long-term do more harm than good.

TABLE 1 Examples of the Distinction between Institutional Function and Form and between “Pre-Modern” and “Modern” Forms of Those Institutions

Desired Functionality/Capability Historical Antecedent Modern Form Wage war Volunteer, locally recruited, Centralized armies with fghting units led by local chain of command and notables in loose coalition professionalized ofcer corps Safe means of payment for Private banks, loosely Central banks regulating depositors, stable price levels organized, multiple means unique national currency of payment Preparing children for their roles Private (e.g. religious, Large-scale formal schooling as adults elite) and community-run systems schools and educational institutions Raising revenues for public Dispersed systems of Revenue agencies with purposes with low administrative revenue collection and consolidated scope cost and economic disruption. private tax farming

Most theories about urbanization processes, and the movement of individuals across the urban- rural continuum assume a “…fairly stable political environment in which economic and social factors infuence the nature and growth of cities (Potts, 2010, p. 18).” Few theories suggest that migration through the urban-rural continuum actually alters political institutions themselves or the individual political circumstances of migrants. An ongoing debate largely presumes that as urbanization progresses, the focus and attention of political institutions will necessarily shift to urban areas to ensure service delivery and economic growth to placate a growing population (Raleigh, 2014). However, this assumption neglects the ways in which manipulations of the political process through democracy can actually sustain a rural focus. 25

The transition to multi-party democracy across much of the continent by default positions demographically strong rural areas as the primary constituency (Raleigh, 2014). Simple political demography demands more eforts in rural areas, because they are more populated. In sub-Saharan Africa, however, many political tensions continue to break along ethno-political-territorial identities (Harding, 2010; Norris & Mattes, 2003; Salih, 2003). As a result of the politicization of ethnicity and spatial considerations, ethnic pandering remains a largely successful political strategy across the continent. Such pandering may not always be clear to external observers. Since African ethno- regional groups are strongly associated with specifc territories, politicians can cater a message of “service delivery” to specifc locations without needing to emphasize an ethnic dimension (Raleigh, 2014). While in power, politicians use state resources to consolidate key constituencies into party alliances, and to elevate their standing across specifc communities. For example, H.E. President Yoweri Museveni’s 2011 re-election campaign in Uganda was characterized by massive government spending both before and during the election with the intention of raising support for the ruling regime (Raleigh, 2014). Some estimates suggest this spending reached up to 85% of the annual state budget (Conroy-Krutz & Logan, 2012). All of these factors help to explain the persistence of rural political agendas across many rapidly urbanizing African states. To maintain these rural-focused political strategies, specifc manipulations within the democratic system are used to encourage urban migrants to vote against their immediate self-interest, and limit the formation of distinct urban political identities. The urban-rural power divide might, for instance, be reinforced by regulations stipulating where voters can register to vote. Migrants to urban areas are often not legally registered and thus—regardless of how much time they have spent in an urban area—are ineligible to vote there (Raleigh, 2014). These migrants will usually return to their sending communities for elections and censuses. The result of these regulations is not only administrative; it also helps to entrench existing ethno-spatial political loyalties and patronage relationships. This political reality is emphasised by the strongly “ethnicized” experience of many rural-urban migrants through the social networks that provide support, opportunities, and access to services in cities (Raleigh, 2014). In many cases, urban residents are thus more likely to engage in patronage voting behaviour based on ethnic markers, even if it runs against their direct self-interest as urban dwellers (Desai, 2010). In cases where these political patterns are particularly entrenched, the urban poor will fnd it challenging to hold governments accountable for improving urban conditions, even as their demographic importance continues to grow. The end result of all these governance asymmetries is often a crisis in terms of how institutions are ofcially authorized to work, and their actual delivery of those limited functions. This crisis is refected in the often-poor devolution of functions and curtailed fscal freedoms of local governments; and the multiplicity of legislative instruments, and agencies with overlapping mandates for management of infrastructure, assets, services and planning in urban areas (Cities Alliance, 2017). It tends to result in a substantial defcit of investment in public infrastructure, including networks for water supply and transportation (Cities Alliance, 2017). Many of these asymmetries, in short, limit opportunities for healthy and productive lives in cities, and in turn undermine the potential of urban-rural linkages to stimulate regional development. 26

FIGURE 3 Actors and institutionws commonly involved in the process of urban governance. Aligning the interests of these various stakeholders around specifc issues is unlikely to follow a linear or easily replicable path. SOURCE: Figure adapted from Devas, 2004, p. 25.

Hierarchy and Responsibility in High-Context Societies

Based on the evidence in this section, the Expert Committee concludes that: Most African societies are “high-context” in the sense that a great deal of communication happens implicitly. In the presence of governance asymmetries, high-context communication can open further space for multiple ofcial and informal governance mechanisms to operate in parallel. 27

In Rwandan history, everyone obeys authority. People revere power, and there isn’t enough education… [T]he people of infuence, or the big fnanciers, are often the big men in the genocide. They may think that they didn’t kill, because they didn’t take life with their own hands, but the people were looking to them for their orders. And in Rwanda an order can be given very quietly. François-Xavier Nkurunziza, as quoted in Gourevitch, 2015.

As a result of governance asymmetries, many African countries fnd that the reality of managing urban-rural linkages difers from ofcially sanctioned pathways. Many citizens, both in rural and urban areas, experience the state as a distant entity, with minimal day-to-day impact on their lives. In some cases, “modern” state structures may be perceived as commercialised, distant (both physically and in terms of the values they represent), alien (for instance in terms of language and procedures), and incapable of delivering fairness and justice (CCFU, 2010). As a result, these state structures lose their credibility and citizens are pulled towards “informal,” “traditional,” or “cultural” structures for securing things like justice, land rights, and accountability for public service delivery (CCFU, 2010). In this context, communities exist within a great deal of uncertainty as legal systems are mixed and a single act or actor can be regulated by multiple legal or quasi-legal regimes. Communities and networks of individuals then seek (and create) a wide variety of institutions and practices to manage this mix. Furthermore, many African societies are what some scholars have termed “high-context cultures,” in which implicit communication and non-verbal cues are more important than explicit communication (Hall, 1976). A high-context communication, for instance, is one in which very little has to be said or written because the information is either in the physical environment, or meant to be known by the persons involved, while very little is in the explicit part of the message (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010, p. 109). As such, high-context cultures also tend to rely less on ofcial systems of documentation in organizations, as there are many other subtler clues to fnd out about the health of the organization and the performance of individuals within (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 319). In such environments, relationships build slowly and depend on trust, and productive governance processes depend on relationships (Neese, 2016). High-context cultures do not necessarily make governing urban-rural linkages more difcult. But in the context of the multiple governance asymmetries described above it is possible that they open further space for multiple ofcial and informal governance processes to operate in parallel. Ultimately, efectively managing urban-rural linkages in a high-context culture with multiple governance asymmetries is likely to require a great deal of gradual institution building along with a mindset of openness and honesty about the way that systems are operating in reality. Enabling Conditions to Move Forward

The above discussions on productivity and livelihoods, socio-cultural perceptions, and governance and accountability cover a wide disciplinary range of insights into the nature of rural- urban linkages in sub-Saharan Africa. While the evidence above may give policymakers some insight into the unique challenges they face, it cannot provide a one-size-fts-all, “best practice” solution to managing virtuous rural-urban linkages. By their very nature, however, changing many of the patterns outlined above is extremely challenging because of historical path dependence, structural incentives, pre-existing norms and values, and political tensions. To move forward, and enable some of these insights to become more integrated into policymaking at a local level, the expert committee identifed the following three enabling conditions: land tenure systems, realistic planning, and health and wellbeing. Each of these enabling conditions represent long-term and incremental changes in policy, practice, and mindsets that need to occur to allow rural-urban linkages to become more efective. Resolving tensions in land tenure systems, for example, can strengthen real estate markets and generate capital for further investment in both urban and rural areas. Realistic planning can maximize public goods in urban areas, while simultaneously strengthening a positive relationship between citizens and the state that contributes to further efectiveness of governance processes. Health and wellbeing, in turn, is a necessary pre-condition for economic activity, and a necessary pre- condition for cities to be generators of cash remittances back to rural homes. None of these enabling conditions have easy or quick solutions, and all represent signifcant challenges that policymakers have struggled with for decades. By positioning these factors as enabling conditions, however, the Expert Committee recommends the continuation of eforts to resolve tensions and questions around each of these factors. By strengthening the enabling conditions to move forward, African countries can create a favourable environment for leaders at all levels to incorporate the disciplinary insights in the above sections into their work.

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LAND TENURE SYSTEMS

Many African countries experience legal pluralism and overlapping systems of land tenure. This overlap can particularly complicate the efective management of urban-rural linkages as cities expand into their rural hinterland, much of which may be governed under more traditional systems of land tenure (Boamah & Walker, 2016). Resolving tensions in the land tenure system is essential to efective governance of urban-rural linkages. It is, however, also a long-term process that cannot be achieved simply or quickly (Busingye, 2002). As some scholars have noted, the desired function of a land tenure system is to generate the perception that property is secure from unpredictable or unlawful seizure (Chang, 2011). This perception of security then allows individuals, communities, and businesses to invest in that land, or carry out land transactions. While many countries have achieved this perception of security by adopting Global Standard Institutions (GSI) such as freehold tenure and an independent judiciary, such institutions are not the only way to achieve the perception of secure property rights (Chang, 2011). Therefore, working incrementally within the existing system to increase land tenure security for individuals and to limit illegal land encroachments may be more politically feasible as it can help build trust in existing institutions and contribute to the long-term management of urban-rural linkages.

SUCCESS STORY 1: INFORMAL-FORMAL PROPERTY TENURE SYSTEM LINKAGES IN KAMPALA, UGANDA Across sub-Saharan Africa, land tenure is becoming more insecure for low-income city dwellers, pastoralists, smallholder farmers, and other marginalized groups. Land rights are becoming concentrated in the hands of a few, and there are fewer opportunities to acquire land because of greater commercialization. Conventional solutions such as formal land tenure registration systems, especially titling, tend to be expensive, poorly adjusted to local contexts, and inaccessible to lower quartiles of the socio-economic spectrum. In a study drawing data from three informal settlement in Kampala, Uganda, researchers found that close to 90% of landholders in the surveyed area had some form of documentary evidence, although it was rarely an ofcial title. The most commonly used type of evidence is a “letter of agreement,” referred to locally as endagaano (literally translated as “pact”). Members of the local council often act as witnesses and apply their signatures, as do between two and fve other witnesses. The endagaano includes a sketch of the property in question and a written description of its boundaries. In some cases, these agreements can be used as the basis for upgrading to full title once an ofcial cadastral survey is conducted. A widespread perception exists that informal agreements such as endagaano are only valid while both parties are alive, and residents are thus motivated to upgrade to full title to ensure tenure security for their children. Potential benefts of full title, such as its use as collateral against a loan, are rarely considered by residents. In sum, this example from Kampala shows that the institutions that regulate access to secure tenure rights in practice may not be formal, but have very practical, socially evolved rules. They also draw on a variety of evidence sources, including state rules, customary practice, and the market. Because courts in Uganda recognize such land transactions, strong linkages now exist between the formal and informal systems.

SOURCE: IIED, 2006. 30

REALISTIC PLANNING The founding fathers of the urban planning discipline in Europe and North America imagined their profession being used to constitute and control available urban land to ensure that cities developed in ways that would minimize negative externalities and maximize the public good (Berrisford, 2013). When those same practices were brought to Africa, they were used unashamedly by colonial regimes to assert the interests of a small minority over the majority (Berrisford, 2013). This same system has largely endured since independence, albeit with a diferent minority group now receiving most of the benefts. When the fundamentals of planning practice are applied to African cities, they seem to only partially address the problems created by rapid urbanization. Partial at the territorial level, in the sense that they tend to only cover certain parts of the city and often exclude illegal and periphery settlements (Bolay, 2015). And also partial at the socio-economic level, in that planning tends to focus on areas primarily inhabited by privileged members of society. The specifed standards in infrastructure, equipment, and building materials, for example, may be wildly out of reach for the poor—although they are perfectly acceptable to more afuent members of society (Silva, 2012). The result, in many countries, is the creation of detailed master plans that have little-to-no chance of ever being implemented. Implementation of plans usually founders when exposed to one or more of the following: • Misguided Assumptions. Planners may have overambitious expectations about the ofcials who will implement their plans. They assume away the complex and sometimes- opaque political and economic motivations of politicians, businesses, and citizens that must coordinate activity to implement their plans (Berrisford, 2013). • Inadequate Appraisal of Costs and Consequences. Disregard for the true costs of implementation is self-defeating. In Uganda, for example, only when a draft planning law was nearing completion did it emerge that its implementation would require hiring up to 20,000 new public servants (Berrisford, 2013; McAuslan, 2013, p. 89). • Unrealistic Expectations of Reform. Realistic planning must consider the existing constraints in a system. For instance, simply assuming complete implementation of land tenure reform is still a common frst step when drafting master plans (Berrisford, 2013). • Reality Gap. A gap exists between what planners would like to see implemented and the reality of people’s lives in a modern African city. Planning visions are aspirational— which can, under the right circumstances, be a motivating force—but inevitably impossible to achieve on the scale proposed. For example, the desire to bring informal settlements into conformity with ofcial standards places a huge administrative burden on those least equipped to bear it. At the same time, negligible attention is given to powerful players like developers, politicians, and wealthy citizens who fout planning laws (Berrisford, 2013; Goodfellow, 2010).

Ultimately, the most important change that needs to happen to avoid these planning pitfalls is a mental shift away from the conception of planning as “control” to the conception of planning as “enabler.” This process has begun in urban planning schools across the continent, spearheaded by the Association of African Planning Schools (Odendaal, 2012). However, outdated concepts about the purpose and techniques of urban planning remain entrenched throughout many country policy frameworks and bureaucracies (Jafe, 2011). Building functional cities rests on the choices and actions of individuals and businesses. Without guidance, their choices and actions inevitably lead to 31 sub-optimal public outcomes. But those same individuals and businesses also create the dynamism and innovation that defnes urban lie (Berrisford, 2013). Urban planners, therefore, need to fnd ways of helping to coordinate those activities and choices without stifing the dynamism and innovation of urban life. While capital cities remain important, the emergence of secondary cities in Africa provides an intriguing opportunity for proactive and realistic planning. Evidence shows that it is signifcantly cheaper to get infrastructure investments right the frst time, instead of relying on retroftting once the process of urban settlement has progressed substantially (Foster, 2016). Although the initial cost may be high, these proactive investments are still more cost-efective over the long-term. They can also help to guide the urban future of emerging secondary cities. For example, public anchor investments such as roads and transit infrastructure, public spaces, parking, and freight truck terminals, all help to shape the future urban form of emerging cities (Siba, 2018). Even when resources are not currently available, proactive steps can be taken to reserve the space for necessary public goods.

SUCCESS STORY 2: REVITALIZING PLANNING EDUCATION IN AFRICA WITH THE ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN PLANNING SCHOOLS Shifting the mindset of planners across the continent begins with education. In a long-term project supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Association of African Planning Schools (AAPS) has sought to address curricular concerns, resource constraints, and to advocate for policy reform. To address the frst issue, the AAPS has focused on fve thematic areas with particular relevance to sub-Saharan Africa: informality, spatial planning and delivery, climate change, access to land, and actor collaboration. AAPS members have incorporated these themes into their curriculums in various ways, for instance by addressing informal housing as part of settlement upgrading in studio courses. Resource constraints have been addressed in part through a model that makes case study-based lesson plans drawn from the fve thematic areas available online. The initiative also saw the creation of a network to share pedagogically-informed case studies, course modules, and teaching tools relevant to the African planning context. In some cases, planning schools have expressed reluctance to engage in curricular reforms because national policies remain unchanged. Teachers argue that students should be trained to conform to and operate within existing legislation, even if it is outdated and strongly infuenced by previous colonial relationships. To help address this issue, AAPS commissioned a series of evidence-informed working papers on the problems of outdated planning law in sub-Saharan Africa. To assist with instructional, resource sharing, and lobbying eforts, AAPSA has also formalized a relationship with Shack/ Slum Dwellers International (SDI). Through the partnership with SDI, planning students will be exposed to “experiential learning” opportunities that will allow them to work directly on problems with communities.

SOURCE: Odendaal, 2012; Watson, 2011. 32

HEALTH AND WELLBEING

Health and wellbeing are both the consequences and necessary inputs to virtuous urban- rural linkages. And yet fnance ministries in many countries are still reluctant to place health as a development priority at the same level as agriculture or infrastructure investment (Marquez, 2012). A great volume of research has explored the correlations between population health and economic growth (Bloom & Canning, 2009). Cross-country data, for instance, shows that malnutrition and ill-health contribute to decreased enrolment and increased absenteeism from school (Madsen, 2012). Illness also contributes to poorer concentration and cognitive impairment in the classroom, leading to worse educational outcomes (Madsen, 2012). By limiting the benefts of education, ill health subsequently limits the productivity of workers when they enter the labour force (Bloom & Canning, 2009). In a similar vein, chronic health conditions have been shown to impair “ideas production”—measured by the growth in patents, entrepreneurship, and lateral thinking to solve problems through creative approaches (Marquez, 2012). In other words, ill health undermines human capital accumulation and knowledge generation—which are two of the oft-cited benefts of the urbanization process (Arouri, Youssef, Nguyen-Viet, & Soucat, 2014; Buckley, Clarke Annez, & Spence, 2008). Urbanization is usually associated with improved health in the aggregate, but that improvement often hides great intra-urban inequalities. Poor women and children in Africa’s urban areas, or instance, are the least likely socio-economic group to have access to preventive health services (Taylor, Finkle, Kolb, & Beguy, 2015). Child mortality among the urban poor is double the rate of the wealthiest urban residents (Taylor et al., 2015). Not only does poor health undermine the potential to develop virtuous urban-rural linkages, but it is also more likely to impact those populations most in need of leveraging those virtuous linkages. For households to efectively engage in virtuous cycles of regional development, then a move to the city cannot be synonymous with poor health.9

SUCCESS STORY 3: EXCHANGE VISITS TO MOBILIZE COMMUNITY OWNERSHIP IN NAIROBI, KENYA In slum communities characterized by high population density, underdeveloped infrastructure, and weak governance, simple improving service quality at health facilities is not enough to meaningfully improve resident’s lives. To make a real impact on the health of slum residents, projects need to incorporate community input, ownership, and the development of trust. The Nairobi Urban Health Equity Gauge (NUHEG) Project, under the leadership of the African Population Health Research Centre (APHRC), used a strategy of exchange visits to help mobilize communities into action. APHRC worked with two slum communities in Nairobi, Korogocho and Viwandani, both of which sufered widespread diarrhoea, scabies, malaria, and other infections because of poor sanitation services. Residents were aware of these health risks, but relied entirely on the government to implement improvements—when the state failed to step in, they became resigned to their situation. To mobilize community action in these two neighbourhoods, APHRC organized visits for residents and community leaders to two other neighbourhoods, Kiambio and Pumwani, that had begun with similar sanitation problems but had successfully lobbied their local governments for

9 See the UNAS report “Owning Our Urban Future: The Case of Healthy Cities in Eastern Africa” for a com- prehensive discussion of health in urban areas, and possible pathways to improvement. 33 action. Kiambio and Pumwani had successfully demanded that local ofcials organize regular garbage collection and road repair services. Community leaders had also established a school, an ambulance service, and a mobile health clinic all maintained with the collection of a small fee from neighbourhood residents. Following the exchange visits, leaders in Korogocho and Viwandani organized themselves to improve their communities as well, including by sweeping, unblocking drainage systems, and cleaning up garbage. Providing a structured way for communities to learn from each other thus encouraged the type of local ownership and action that is necessary to tackle health challenges in low-income urban areas.

SOURCE: (Merkel & Otai, 2007) Policy Recommendations

Enabling more virtuous rural-urban linkages in sub-Saharan Africa is not a simple prospect, as perspectives from economics, sociology, and political science all introduce aspects that must be considered. Additionally, the economic, social, and political linkages across the rural-urban continuum are likely to difer from country to country, and even between regions. The framework laid out in this consensus study report suggests that by considering the evidence from three disciplinary streams—productivity and livelihoods, socio-cultural perceptions, and power and accountability—policymakers will be able to gain insight into how rural-urban linkages function in their own context. Rural-urban linkages do provide a point of leverage to help stimulate broad and equitable development, but ultimately achieving this goal comes down to the mindset of leaders at all levels. Only by refecting on the actual conditions that African cities and their hinterlands fnd themselves in will leaders be able to successfully devise appropriate solutions—rather than importing foreign best-practice models without adjustment, as has happened so many times in the past. While not exhaustive, policymakers can consider the following suggestions as a place to begin. Recommendations are organized roughly into urban-, rural-, peri-urban-, and governance-oriented policy suggestions. Based on the conclusions of this study report, the Expert Committee recommends the following:

Urban-Oriented Recommendations

1. Central governments should continue to encourage industrial value-addition in urban areas, particularly for goods for which there is an existing rural demand. Virtuous rural-urban economic linkages largely rely on the ability of rural areas to absorb the products produced in cities, thereby creating more formal employment opportunities in urban areas.

34 35

2. Central planning authorities and land ministries should renew their focus on secondary cities as key locations to help stimulate broad-based economic growth. Secondary cities in sub-Saharan Africa present unique opportunities to encourage value addition, and also to make the necessary public infrastructure investments before urban areas become overpopulated.

3. Central, regional, and local governments should prioritize anchor investments that will help direct future patterns of urban expansion. Investments such as roads and transportation infrastructure, freight truck terminals, ports and export centres, and public parks and squares can help determine the way that urban areas develop. Making those investments now can minimize future planning challenges.

Rural-Oriented Recommendations:

4. Governments at all levels should invest in necessary agricultural infrastructure like cold-storage, distribution hubs, and urban markets. Securing the benefts of rural-urban linkages in rural areas requires robust markets in urban centres for agricultural produce produced in rural areas. Governments should therefore act to strengthen those markets.

5. Governments should support businesses that engage in forward and backward linkages to the agricultural sector. The production and sale of agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and other inputs, cold storage, and packaging and processing industries all serve to strengthen rural-urban linkages. Urban-based services such as banking and accounting should also be encouraged to cater to agricultural producers and rural populations.

6. Governments and NGOs should emphasize existing positive economic opportunities in rural areas. High levels of urban unemployment may be partly the result of unrealistic expectations driven by a variety of social processes. Communication campaigns to emphasize the opportunities that also exist in rural areas could help to counteract this imbalance.

Peri-Urban-Oriented Recommendations

7. Central planning authorities should lead the creation of multi-level governance arrangements to coordinate investment in public goods. As urban areas expand into previously rural areas, they will face increasingly complex jurisdictional challenges to coordinating public investment. Multi-level governance arrangements can help to overcome some of these jurisdictional challenges in the short-term. 36

8. Local governments should emphasize the enforcement of relevant regulations in peri- urban areas. Peri-urban spaces can present unique challenges related to the control of zoonotic and waterborne diseases, as well as the protection of property rights. What today are peri-urban areas will tomorrow be part of the city proper, so planners and local governments should proactively emphasize regulatory enforcement in these areas to avoid negative externalities.

Governance-Oriented Recommendations

9. Statistical and planning agencies and central governments should gather data on circular migration patterns while avoiding simplistic distinctions. Rural-urban migration is a complex phenomenon with people moving for a great variety of reasons. Understanding the dynamics of who is moving where and for what purpose are important for efective policymaking.

10. Public institutions should develop internal mechanisms to reward innovative practice and visionary leadership. The problem of isomorphic mimicry in public institutions is often a strategy of risk mitigation in an environment of scarce resources. Mechanisms to formally recognize and value internal initiatives and leadership that adapts “best practices” to the local context can therefore help to change the risk calculation and break vicious cycles of cut-and- paste policy adoption.

11. Central governments should reform electoral laws to allow easier registration at an individual’s place of residence. Rural-urban migrants without ofcial status in cities often fnd it difcult to register and vote in their primary place of dwelling. Requiring migrants to return to rural areas to vote contributes to perverse incentives that undermine the ability of urban populations to hold politicians accountable for poor service delivery in their place of residence.

12. Governments at all levels should open more opportunities for collaboration and synergy between ofcial and informal mechanisms of governance. Many African countries experience legal pluralism, with both ofcial and informal mechanisms operating in parallel. This situation contributes both to poor outcomes and undermines the legitimacy of the state in the long-term. Acknowledging the way that governance decisions are actually made—even if through informal channels—and engaging with those processes in a transparent manner can help to improve both the efectiveness and perceived legitimacy of governance systems.

13. Central and regional governments should emphasize the enabling conditions to move forward. By focusing on resolving tensions in the land tenure system, reforming the purpose and techniques of planning, and investing in population health and wellbeing, central governments can empower leaders at other levels to better leverage rural-urban linkages Appendix I: Typology of Virtuous and Vicious Rural-urban linkages

VIRTUOUS CYCLES OF URBAN-RURAL VICIOUS CYCLES OF URBAN-RURAL LINKAGES LINKAGES Rural Survival Strategies: Rural Survival Strategies: • Agricultural intensifcation and • Agricultural capital and inputs lacking, diversifcation natural resource base exhausted, household • Accumulation of productive/non-productive fails to produce marketable surplus assets • Household diversifes into low value-add • Diversifcation of rural income sources non-farm activities with low barriers to • Social investments in education and entry and saturated markets healthcare • Low prices and low productivity forces rural household members to migrate seasonally to supplement income Rural Area Characteristics: • Agricultural labour lacking during high • Broad-based rural demand for urban season due to migration consumer items and services • Inability to invest in education and • Favourable natural resource endowments challenges meeting healthcare expenses • Land tenure system favourable to agricultural investments that raise productivity Rural Area Characteristics: • Access to storage facilities • Inequitable land distribution, high land • Accessibility (roads and ICT) fragmentation • Low demand for urban-manufactured consumer goods and services Urban-rural Linkages: • Unfavourable natural resource endowments Market-Mediated • Lack of capital for productive farm inputs • Rural households sell produce in urban • Land tenure system discourages investment markets • Lack of storage facilities • Rural household’s consumer products, • Poor accessibility (roads and ICT) services, and farm inputs manufactured in urban areas • Rural household members fnd employment Urban-Rural Linkages: in urban labour markets Market-Mediated • Agricultural diversifcation and • Rural household does not participate in intensifcation encourage investment in urban markets urban property markets

37 38

Intra-Household • Rural household members participate on • Cash remittances to rural household seasonal/informal basis in urban labour members from urban rents or employment market income • In-kind remittances of farm input and Intra-Household consumer goods from urban to rural areas • Cash remittances low due to intermittent (for consumption or resale at a mark-up) urban employment • Information, market knowledge, and • Urban household members unable to remit technology in-kind goods and services, or farm inputs, • Sending children between spatial units for to rural members childcare purposes • Rural members fail to remit food in-kind to • Rural children live with urban relatives for urban household members access to better quality urban schools • In-kind food remittances from urban to rural areas Urban Survival Strategies: • Urban migrants engage in informal, piece-rate employment; female migrants Urban Accumulation: especially vulnerable • Formal employment opportunities • High urban rent and food expenses prevent • Investment in diversifed informal income- remittances, savings, and investment in generating opportunities (property, micro- either rural or urban areas business, boda boda etc.) • Urban farming to supplement income not • Investment in urban property and land that possible due to land/capital/regulatory increases in value constraints • Social investments in education and • Failure to meet education and healthcare healthcare costs

Urban Area Characteristics: Urban Area Characteristics: • Manufacturing and processing industries • Existing manufacturing/processing linked to regional agricultural production industries linked higher-level urban centre, • Broad-based demand for agricultural producing without local inputs produce from surrounding areas • Alternatively, manufacturing/processing • Accessible housing market, wide variety of base missing entirely tenancy options (long- and short-term) • Local regulation discourages trading of • Land tenure system that encourages agricultural and non-agricultural goods and property investment services • Local regulation that encourages trading • Low urban incomes contribute to low urban and small-scale business demand for produce from surrounding areas • Inaccessible urban housing and land markets SOURCE: Table adapted from Djurfeldt, 2012. Appendix II: Expert Committee Statement of Task

The Statement of Task to the UNAS Expert Committee on African Urbanization was as follows:

Identify and elaborate on the key guiding principles to strengthen rural-urban linkages in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. Review the most important relevant academic literature on the subject, and identify key points of evidence that policymakers should consider. Based on this evidence, develop key conclusions and take-away points. Based on these conclusions, develop actor- and action- oriented policy recommendations to strengthen rural-urban linkages in sub-Saharan Africa.

39 Acknowledgements

The Uganda National Academy of Sciences (UNAS) thanks the InterAcademy Partnership (IAP), through the Network of African Science Academies (NASAC), for their generous support towards the realization of this project. UNAS would also like to thank the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) and the Institute of International Education (IIE) for their support to the inception meeting of the consensus study committee for this work at the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center. That meeting, as with past engagements with RF, was key to the success of this project.

All UNAS publications beneft from the strategic oversight of the Academy’s Council: President Prof. Nelson Sewankambo Vice-President Prof. Frederick Kayanja Secretary-General Prof. David Bakibinga Treasurer Prof. John Muyonga Member Prof. Christine Dranzoa Member Prof. Denis Byarugaba Member Prof. Harriet Mayanja-Kizza Member Prof. John Tabuti Member Prof. Joseph Obua Member Prof. Maria Musoke Member Prof. Peter Mugyenyi

EXPERT COMMITTEE ON URBAN-RURAL LINKAGES IN AFRICA As mentioned earlier, this report received considerable input from experts from diverse felds with a bearing on urbanization and development in Africa. UNAS wishes to express its gratitude to the following committee members:

Co-Chair – Nelson Sewankambo, President, Uganda National Academy of Sciences and Professor of Medicine, Makerere University College of Health Sciences, Uganda Co-Chair – Suki Kaloo Kathuka Mwendwa, Fellow, Kenya National Academy of Sciences and Professor of Design and Creative Media, The Technical University of Kenya, Kenya

40 MEMBERS

Aldo Stroebel, Executive Director of Strategic Partnerships, National Research Foundation, South Africa Andrew Kitaka, Acting Executive Director and Director of Engineering and Technical Services, Kampala Capital City Authority, Uganda Astrid Haas, Senior Country Economist (Cities), International Growth Centre and Manager, Cities that Work Initiative, Uganda Blaise Nguendo Yongsi, President (incoming), International Society for Urban Health and Associate Professor, Institute for Training and Demographic Research (IFORD), University of Yaoundé II, Cameroon Carlos Dora, Coordinator of Interventions for Healthy Environment, World Health Organization, Switzerland Declan Okpalaeke, President, African Health Journalists Association and CEO, InterPares Media Limited, Nigeria Frans Swanepoel, Research Fellow in Residence at the Centre for the Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria, South Africa Geofrey So, Head of Partnerships, Novartis Foundation, Switzerland Jo Ivey Bouford, Clinical Professor of Global Health at New York University and President, International Society for Urban Health, USA Mandivamba Rukuni, Director of BEAT Doctoral Academy and Professor Extraordinaire, National University of Science and Technology, Zimbabwe Marcel Mballa Ekobena, Managing Director, Tomagro Coop and Career Investment Banker, Cameroon and United Kingdom Maureen Kahangire Babu, Environment and Urban Management Practitioner, Uganda Oladoyin Odubanjo, Executive Secretary, Nigerian Academy of Science, Nigeria Sally Stansfeld, Managing Director, Social Impact Practice, Deloitte, USA Ted Mugisa, Head of Global Sales and Partnerships, TOTAL Access to Energy Solutions, Gas Renewables, and Power Branch, TOTAL S.A., France Wilson Kayom, Urban Planning Specialist, Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, Uganda

41 This report was reviewed in draft form by independent reviewers chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise. UNAS thanks the following reviewers:

Charles Ebikeme, Science Ofcer, Urban Health & Wellbeing Program, International Science Council, France Edwin Oyaro Ondieki, Lecturer in the Department of Architecture and Building Science, University of Nairobi, and Partner at Strasa Architects, Kenya

Special thanks to the staf members of the Academy in their diferent capacities:

Study Director – Graeme Stewart-Wilson, Research and Development Ofcer Operations Team – Lucy Ampumuza, Administrative Ofcer, and William Bigambwensi, Accounts Assistant Overall Secretariat Leadership and Strategy – Christian N. Acemah, Executive Secretary and Special Advisor to Council

Suggested Citation: UNAS (2019) Owning Our Urban Future: Urban-Rural Linkages for Balanced Regional Development in Africa, Kampala, Uganda: The Uganda National Academy of Sciences

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