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Bank of Japan's Monetary Policy in the 1980S: a View Perceived From IMES DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES Bank of Japan’s Monetary Policy in the 1980s: a View Perceived from Archived and Other Materials Masanao Itoh, Ryoji Koike, and Masato Shizume Discussion Paper No. 2015-E-12 INSTITUTE FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES BANK OF JAPAN 2-1-1 NIHONBASHI-HONGOKUCHO CHUO-KU, TOKYO 103-8660 JAPAN You can download this and other papers at the IMES Web site: http://www.imes.boj.or.jp Do not reprint or reproduce without permission. NOTE: IMES Discussion Paper Series is circulated in order to stimulate discussion and comments. Views expressed in Discussion Paper Series are those of authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Japan or the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies. IMES Discussion Paper Series 2015-E-12 August 2015 Bank of Japan’s Monetary Policy in the 1980s: a View Perceived from Archived and Other Materials Masanao Itoh*, Ryoji Koike**, and Masato Shizume*** Abstract This monographic paper summarizes views held by the Bank of Japan (hereafter BOJ or the Bank) in the 1980s regarding economic conditions and monetary policy formulation, perceived from the BOJ archives and other materials from the period. From a historical viewpoint, the authors see the 1980s as a watershed time for the Bank’s policy formulation, because the Bank acquired lessons for monetary policy formulation under a large fluctuation in economic and financial conditions and innovated new approaches for monetary policy formulation and money market management as stated below. First, during the 1980s the BOJ had to largely consider the external imbalance in formulating policy, and attention began to shift towards price stability in the medium or long term by the end of the decade. Second, the large fluctuations in asset prices, money supply, and commercial bank lending were closely monitored during this period, but the Bank’s assessment about their impacts on macroeconomic consequences in the medium to long term was insufficient. A reflection of these lessons appears to evolve into a perspective on the Bank’s monetary policy formulation that financial imbalances should be examined as a risk for achieving price stability in the medium to long term. Third, in light of ongoing financial deregulation during this period, the Bank started to change monetary policy measures from those based on a regulated interest rate framework to those based on market operation with good use of money markets and flexible interest rates. Keywords: Monetary policy management; Price stability in the medium and long term; Financial imbalance; External imbalance; Financial deregulation JEL Classification: E52, N15 * Professor, Otsuma Women’s University and IMES, Bank of Japan (E-mail:[email protected]) ** Director and Deputy Head of Monetary History Studies Group, IMES, Bank of Japan (E-mail: [email protected]) *** Professor, Waseda University and IMES, Bank of Japan (E-mail: [email protected]) This paper is an English version of IMES discussion paper 2014-J-14. An earlier Japanese version was presented at the workshop titled “Research in History Field with usage of the Bank of Japan Archive” held by the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (IMES), Bank of Japan, on April 28, 2014. The authors are grateful to Professor Kazuo Ueda (Tokyo University) as the chair, Professor Tetsuji Okazaki (Tokyo University) as the discussant, and the other participants of the workshop for their helpful comments and discussions. The authors also would like to thank the staff of the Bank of Japan for their helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Bank of Japan. Contents Summary .............................................................................................................................. 1 I. Response to the Second Oil Crisis (from Late 1978 to Summer 1980) ............................. 7 A. Advent of the Second Oil Crisis and the Bank’s Reaction (from Late 1978 to Mid-1980) ........................................................................................................................ 7 1. Economic conditions before the second oil crisis (1978) ............................................ 7 2. The role of money supply in the latter half of the 1970s .............................................. 8 3. Advent of the second oil crisis (late 1978) ................................................................... 9 4. Economic conditions after the second oil crisis (from 1979 to mid-1980) ................... 9 5. BOJ’s policy stance and actions ............................................................................... 10 6. Differences in the situation between the first and second oil crises .......................... 10 II. Reduction of the Official Discount Rate with Consideration of Exchange Rates (from Summer 1980 to the First Half of 1981) ........................................................................... 12 A. Economic Conditions and Policy Stance of Major Countries ....................................... 12 1. The U.S. high interest rate policy and appreciation of the dollar ............................... 12 2. Stagflation in Europe ................................................................................................. 14 B. Economic Conditions in Japan .................................................................................... 14 C. Lowering the Official Discount Rate Three Times (from Summer 1980 to Spring 1981) ............................................................................................................................. 15 1. The assessment of economic conditions and policy stance at the time .................... 15 2. Policy responses ....................................................................................................... 15 3. Interest rate reduction and exchange rates ............................................................... 16 Column 1. A Framework of Determining Deposit and Savings Rates under Interest Rate Control and Postal Savings ............................................................................................. 17 III. Cautious Monetary Easing with Consideration of Trade Conflicts (from the Second Half of 1981 to Fall 1983) ................................................................................................. 18 A. Economic Conditions and Policy Stance of Major Countries ....................................... 19 1. Situation in the U.S. .................................................................................................. 19 2. Situation in Europe .................................................................................................... 20 3. Comparison between Japan and major European countries ..................................... 20 B. Economic Conditions in Japan and Policy Responses (from the Second Half of 1981 to October 1983) .................................................................................................. 21 1. Situation in the second half of 1981 and the interest rate cut in December 1981 ..... 21 2. Economic conditions in 1982 and the monetary operation to increase short-term interest rates .............................................................................................................. 22 3. Situation from early 1983 to fall 1983 and the rate reduction in October 1983 ......... 23 C. Issues Behind the Policy Stance During This Time ..................................................... 24 1. Escalation of trade conflicts with the U.S. and European countries .......................... 24 2. Long-term interest rates remained at a high level with large-scale government bond issuance ............................................................................................................ 25 D. Debate over Monetary Policy with a Greater Consideration of the Exchange Rates ... 26 IV. Greater Trade Conflicts, Monetary Policy, and the Japan-U.S. Yen-Dollar Committee (from Fall 1983 to Summer 1985) .................................................................................... 27 A. Economic Conditions and Policy Stance of Major Countries ....................................... 28 1. Expansion of the U.S. economy and the strong dollar .............................................. 28 2. Modest economic recovery and remaining high unemployment in Europe .............. 29 B. Economic Conditions in Japan from Fall 1983 to Summer 1985 ................................. 30 1. Economic conditions from fall 1983 to mid-1984 ....................................................... 30 2. Economic conditions from mid-1984 to summer 1985 .............................................. 30 C. Monetary Policy from Fall 1983 to Summer 1985 ....................................................... 31 D. Establishment of the Japan-U.S. Yen-Dollar Committee and Its Achievements .......... 31 1. Establishment of the Japan-U.S. Yen-Dollar Committee and its report ..................... 31 2. The Bank’s recognition .............................................................................................. 32 3. Progress of liberalization after the U.S.-Japan Yen-Dollar Committee’s report ......... 33 V. Development of International Policy Coordination and Monetary Policy (from the Plaza Accord to the Louvre Accord) ................................................................................. 34 A. The Plaza Accord and Market Operations to Leave the Short-Term Interest
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