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Proposed Rules Federal Register Vol 57886 Proposed Rules Federal Register Vol. 82, No. 235 Friday, December 8, 2017 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER All public comments are available emergency the Reserve Bank must have contains notices to the public of the proposed from the Board’s Web site at http:// established the primary credit rate at issuance of rules and regulations. The www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/ that rate.2 Second, the chairman of the purpose of these notices is to give interested foia/ProposedRegs.cfm, as submitted, Board of Governors (or, in the persons an opportunity to participate in the unless modified for technical reasons. chairman’s absence, the chairman’s rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules. Accordingly, your comments will not be designee) must certify that a quorum of edited to remove any identifying or the Board is not available to act on the contact information. Public comments Reserve Bank’s rate establishment.3 FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM may also be viewed electronically or in Finally, Regulation A defines a paper form in Room 3515, 1801 K Street ‘‘financial emergency’’ as ‘‘a significant 12 CFR Part 201 NW. (between 18th and 19th Street disruption to the U.S. money markets resulting from an act of war, military or [Docket No. R–1585; RIN 7100–AE 90] NW.), between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on weekdays. terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other 4 Regulation A: Extensions of Credit by FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: catastrophic event.’’ Federal Reserve Banks Sophia H. Allison, Special Counsel, The Federal Open Market Committee (202–452–3565), Legal Division, or Lyle (FOMC) currently establishes a target AGENCY: Board of Governors of the Kumasaka, Senior Financial Analyst, range for the federal funds rate. Federal Reserve System. 202–452–2382), Division of Accordingly, the Board proposes to ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. Monetary Affairs; for users of amend section 201.51(d)(1) of Regulation A to provide that, in a Telecommunications Device for the Deaf SUMMARY: The Board of Governors of the financial emergency, the primary credit (TDD) only, contact 202/263–4869; Federal Reserve System (‘‘Board’’) is rate is the target federal funds rate or, if Board of Governors of the Federal proposing to amend its Regulation A to; the FOMC has established a target range Reserve System, 20th and C Streets, revise the provisions regarding the for the federal funds rate, a rate NW., Washington, DC 20551. establishment of the primary credit rate corresponding to the top of the target in a financial emergency, and to delete SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The range. the provisions relating to the use of Federal Reserve Banks make primary, credit ratings for collateral for secondary, and seasonal credit available II. Credit Ratings for TALF extensions of credit under the former to depository institutions subject to On November 25, 2008, the Board and Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan rules and regulations prescribed by the Treasury announced the establishment Facility (TALF). The proposed Board. The primary, secondary, and of the TALF. The TALF was intended to amendments are intended to allow the seasonal credit rates are the interest assist financial markets in regulation to address circumstances in rates that the twelve Federal Reserve accommodating the credit needs of which the Federal Open Market Banks charge for extensions of credit consumers and businesses of all sizes Committee has established a target range under these programs. Under the during the financial crisis by facilitating for the federal funds rate rather than a primary credit program, Federal Reserve the issuance of asset-backed securities single target rate, and to reflect the Banks may extend credit on a very (‘‘ABS’’) collateralized by a variety of expiration of the TALF program. short-term basis, typically overnight, to consumer and business loans; it was DATES: Comments must be received no depository institutions that are in also intended to improve market later than January 8, 2018. generally sound condition in the conditions for ABS more generally. The ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, judgment of the Federal Reserve Bank. Board authorized the TALF pursuant to identified by Docket Number R–1585; In accordance with the Federal Reserve the then-current provisions of section RIN 7100 AE–90, by any of the Act, the primary credit rate is 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.5 All following methods: established by the boards of directors of TALF loans were extended by the • Agency Web site: http:// the Federal Reserve Banks, subject to Federal Reserve Bank of New York www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the the review and determination of the (‘‘FRBNY’’).6 instructions for submitting comments at Board. The primary credit rate is set On December 9, 2009, the Board http://www.federalreserve.gov/ forth in section 201.51 of Regulation A. adopted an amendment to Regulation A generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm. to provide a process by which the • Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:// I. Primary Credit Rate in a Financial FRBNY could determine the eligibility www.regulations.gov. Follow the Emergency of credit rating agencies and the ratings instructions for submitting comments. Regulation A currently provides a • Email: regs.comments@ procedure for establishing the primary 2 Section 201.51(d)(1)(i) of Regulation A, 12 CFR federalreserve.gov. Include docket credit rate in a financial emergency. 201.51(d)(1)(i). number in the subject line of the 3 Section 201.51(d)(1)(ii) of Regulation A, 12 CFR Section 201.51(d) of Regulation A 201.51(d)(1)(ii). message. currently provides that the primary 4 • Section 201.51(d)(2) of Regulation A, 12 CFR Fax: (202) 452–3819 or (202) 452– credit rate at a Federal Reserve Bank is 201.51(d)(2). 3102. ‘‘the target federal funds rate of the 5 Former 12 U.S.C. 343. • 6 Mail: Ann E. Misback, Secretary, Federal Open Market Committee’’ if two The U.S. Treasury Department—under the Board of Governors of the Federal conditions are met.1 First, in a financial Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) of the Reserve System, 20th Street and Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008— provided $20 billion of credit protection to the Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, 1 Section 201.51(d)(1) of Regulation A, 12 CFR FRBNY in connection with the TALF. See https:// DC 20551. 201.51(d)(1). www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/talf.htm. VerDate Sep<11>2014 18:45 Dec 07, 2017 Jkt 244001 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 4702 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\08DEP1.SGM 08DEP1 sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 235 / Friday, December 8, 2017 / Proposed Rules 57887 they issue for use in the TALF, for 1,567 depository institutions that are believes that a reasonable basis exists which the Board had expressly set a able to request primary credit that meet for assuming costs would be de minimis particular credit rating requirement for the definition of ‘‘small’’ business or insignificant for small entities collateral offered by the borrower.7 The entity, out of a total of 2,808 institutions affected by the proposed amendment. purpose of the amendment was to that are able to request primary credit. B. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis provide the FRBNY with a consistent Section 201.3(d) of Regulation A. The framework for determining the proposed amendment to section Office of Management and Budget eligibility of ratings issued by 201.3(d) of Regulation A, relates to use (OMB) regulations implementing the individual credit rating agencies when of credit ratings for borrowers under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) state used in conjunction with a separate TALF program. A small credit rating that agencies must submit ‘‘collections asset-level risk assessment process. agency is one with $15.0 million or less of information’’ contained in proposed Pursuant to this process, FRBNY in assets.10 rules published for public comment in determined that ratings from five credit 2. Economic Impacts on Small Entities the Federal Register in accordance with ratings agencies became eligible for use OMB regulations. OMB regulations in TALF. The Board certifies that the proposed define a ‘‘collection of information’’ as On June 30, 2010, the TALF was amendments will have no economic obtaining, causing to be obtained, closed for new loan extensions, and the impacts on any small entities. soliciting, or requiring the disclosure to final outstanding TALF loan was repaid Section 201.51(d) of Regulation A. an agency, third parties or the public of 8 in full in October 2014. Accordingly, The proposed amendments to section information by or for an agency ‘‘by the Board proposes to delete current 201.51(d) of Regulation A relate to the means of identical questions posed to, section 201.3(d) of Regulation A as its establishment of a rate for primary or identical reporting, recordkeeping, or provisions are no longer necessary. credit in a financial emergency. The disclosure requirements imposed on, proposed amendments make a III. Administrative Law Matters ten or more persons, whether such ministerial amendment to conform the collection of information is mandatory, A. Regulatory Flexibility Act provision to the current operating voluntary, or required to obtain or retain Congress enacted the Regulatory framework of the FOMC in establishing a benefit.’’ Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601 et a target range for the federal funds rate. The provision subject to the proposed In accordance with the PRA, the seq.) to address concerns related to the Board reviewed the proposed rule under effects of agency rules on small entities amendments affects the actions of the Federal Reserve Banks and the Board, the authority delegated to the Board by and the Board is sensitive to the impact OMB.
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