Surveillance Programs/Leaks Crush/Change the Safe-Harbor Agreement

Safe Harbor Advantage 1ac – internal link Surveillance programs/leaks crush/change the Safe-Harbor agreement Donohue 15 – Professor of Law, Georgetown Law and Director, Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown Law (Lauren, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, CONSUMER PRIVACY, AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY, Symposium Articles, 4 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 11 p.45-46, 2015, Hein Online)//JJ 3. Safe Harbor Considerations In the wake of the Snowden revelations , the EU Commission issued a report recommending the retention of Safe Harbor, but recommending significant changes, including required disclosure of cloud computing and other service provider contracts used by Safe Harbor members.16' The Safe Harbor provisions, developed from 1999 to 2000 by the U.S. Commerce Department, the Article 31 Committee on Data Privacy, and the European Union, created a narrow bridge between the United States and EU. At the time, the European Parliament, which did not bind the European Commission, rejected the Safe Harbor provisions by a vote of 279 to 259, with twenty-two abstentions. Chief amongst European concerns was the failure of the agreement to provide adequate protections . In light of the massive data breaches over the past five years in the United States, the practices of a largely unregulated high technology industry, and the ubiquitous nature of NSA surveillance , Europeans are now even less supportive of the Safe Harbor provisions .' They amount to a self-regulated scheme in which the U.S. Federal Trade Commission looks at whether a company, which has voluntarily opted-in to the program, fails to do what it has stated it will do, within the bounds of its own privacy policy. Stronger measures are necessary to restore European confidence in U.S. high technology companies.

Current US surveillance threatens to undermine US-EU Safe Harbor provisions— applying PPD-28 to US corporations is key to restoring trust in US corporations and passing TTIP Hancock 14 – Managing Editor at Inside U.S. Trade, contributor at CSM and the Yonhap News Agency (Ben Hancock, 6/13/14, “U.S.-EU 'Safe Harbor' Talks Snag Over National Security Exception Limits,” Inside US Trade 32.24, ProQuest)//twemchen The top U.S. and European Union officials in charge of negotiating reforms to the "Safe Harbor" framework governing trans-Atlantic data transfers on June 10 signaled their talks are hung up over an EU demand for new U.S. assurances that it will invoke the arrangement's national security exception only in limited circumstances. Paul Nemitz, director for fundamental rights and citizenship at the European Commission's Directorate-General for Justice, said securing U.S. commitments on this issue is at least "50 percent" of what the EU hopes to achieve overall through the negotiations to renew Safe Harbor. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Commerce Ted Dean, Nemitz's U.S. counterpart, hinted the U.S. believes it has already having given sufficient assurances to the EU in this regard -- albeit indirectly -- through a speech made by President Obama on Jan. 17 and corresponding Presidential Policy Directive, known as "PPD-28," issued after revelations about National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance. The ability of both sides to bridge their differences on how to update Safe Harbor will have a direct bearing on the ability of the European Commission in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) to agree to U.S. demands for provisions permitting the free flow of data across the Atlantic. The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor framework provides a legal basis for companies to conduct transfers of EU personal data to the U.S. that would otherwise breach EU law, provided they adhere to certain safeguards for privacy protections. Both Nemitz and Dean spoke at an event hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Nemitz said the national security issue is the "elephant in the room" in the talks, which are being held this week in Washington on June 11-12. This is the case even though a November report by the European Commission identifies the national security exception as only one of 13 total recommendations to strengthen Safe Harbor, he added. Late last week, EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding said the Safe Harbor negotiations have progressed well on all EU recommendations with the exception of the demand that the national security exception foreseen by the Safe Harbor decision is used "only to an extent that is strictly necessary or proportionate." "And for me it is very clear: I have made it clear to my counterparts that the 13th point must be clarified for the European Commission to finally say that Safe Harbor is 'safe,'" Reding said on June 6. Dean said his office is working to address EU fears that U.S. authorities use the exception to conduct bulk surveillance. But he also noted the Department of Commerce has no authority by itself to offer any assurances with regard to the scope of U.S. law enforcement or intelligence-gathering activities. That authority rests with the Justice Department and U.S. intelligence agencies. Dean noted that the U.S. made immediate changes to some its policies after the revelations of NSA surveillance. "Since the commission's report, PPD-28 made announcements about particular things that changed immediately, and set in place several processes that continue now," Dean said. "We still have work to do," he added, "but É the broader context is I think changed" by what the White House has issued. He did not point to any specific provisions in PPD-28 to back up his claims. But Section 4 of that document establishes -- among other things -- that the intelligence community "shall establish policies and procedures reasonably designed to minimize the dissemination and retention of personal information." It also states generally that: "All persons should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, and all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their personal information." Nemitz signaled the European Commission wants a more concrete commitment than that. "People expect to have certainty that the exemption, which is that privacy principles under Safe Harbor can be ignored, they can be set aside, for purposes of national security, does not become the rule," he said in an interview after the CSIS panel. "And on that, we need assurances that only if necessary and proportional for national security these rules can be set aside. This has to be [made concrete]. How it is done remains to be seen," Nemitz added. He held open the possibility that this could be done through new U.S. legislation limiting bulk collection of company data -- something that observers say is a distant prospect. But the EU official was unequivocal in saying that, whatever the U.S. puts forward, it has to be able to pass muster before the European Parliament and the general public. "One thing is clear: we need commitments and certainty in this respect, because otherwise the basic purpose of the Safe Harbor, which is to ensure a higher level of protection of Europeans, is undermined by generalized bulk collection, and that's not going to stand the test before the European Parliament in particular." Safe Harbor was originally negotiated between Commerce and the European Commission in 2000. It provides a way for firms operating in Europe to legally transfer data on EU citizens back to the jurisdiction of the U.S., despite the commission's determination that the U.S. legal regime does not provide "adequate" protections for consumer privacy. Over 3,000 companies participate in the program, including technology giants like Google, but other types of firms also use the framework to be able to transfer human resources data and similar information. Since former NSA contractor Edward Snowden leaked information about the agency's activities last year, however, the agreement has come under fire from Reding and members of the European Parliament as providing a loophole through which U.S. authorities could gather data on EU citizens via online services providers like Google and Skype. One other recommendation having to do with access by U.S. authorities to Safe Harbor participants' data in the commission's report was that companies "should include information on the extent to which U.S. law allows public authorities to collect and process data transferred under the Safe Harbor." Reding's comments on June 6 suggest this has not been a sticking point. The other 11 recommendations put forward by the EU primarily relate to transparency , redress , and enforcement of the Safe Harbor mechanism. Dean said in May remarks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that many of the suggestions -- especially those related to transparency -- are uncontroversial for the U.S. (Inside U.S. Trade, May 23). Dean reiterated his earlier point, made in May, that for other recommendations that may be difficult for the U.S. government and industry to accept, Commerce is trying to find alternate ways to address the underlying worries of the EU. One suggestion that has caused U.S. companies alarm would require Safe Harbor participants to "publish privacy conditions of any contracts they conclude with subcontractors," such as those providing cloud- computing services. Industry experts have said that companies -- especially large firms with dozens of vendors -- would likely be wary of disclosing the terms of private contracts for varying commercial reasons. Nemitz stressed that making sure that subcontractors are not outside the scope of the Safe Harbor obligations is a critical EU demand, but seemed to signal flexibility in terms of how this is implemented. "We have to make sure that [subcontractors] cannot be used ... to evade the Safe Harbor principles. We're talking in that context about an obligation to make things visible, so that people can see that the basic principles are not evaded," he said. "I'm pretty sure that everybody understands this, and we will find a solution on this." 2ac – xt: surveillance kills safe harbor

Continued NSA surveillance ruptures EU-US trust Wright and Kreissl, 13 – American writer, holds a B.A. from Carleton College and an M.F.A from the MFA Program for Poets & Writers; sociologist, co-editor of “Surveillance in Europe”, authored several articles on social control, public security, and welfare state theory (David and Reinhard, “European responses to the Snowden revelations: A discussion paper”,Increasing Resilience in Surveillance Societies, December, 2013, http://irissproject.eu/wp- content/uploads/2013/12/IRISS_European-responses-to-the-Snowden-revelations_18-Dec- 2013_Final.pdf)//TT When people became aware of how massive the surveillance of virtually everyone had become, among the reactions was not only outrage and fury, but also of an “enormous loss of trust”, as Elmar Brok, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the European Parliament, put it.36 The theme of trust was repeated by many others. For example, German federal data protection commissioner Peter Schaar was quoted as saying that “If we want to return to a relationship based on trust, it will require serious effort… Officially the Americans said that they respected German law. Now we know that was not the case.”37 The breakdown of trust is often accompanied by embarrassment, but the embarrassment was not just in Washington. The revelations also caused embarrassment in Europe. In the summer of 2013, German Chancellor Angela Merkel defended the US, when it became known that the NSA had the whole of the German population as a target of mass surveillance. But when Merkel discovered that the US had been listening in on even her mobile calls, she rose to anger. However, she also found herself, somewhat embarrassingly, having to fend off criticism within her country that she had failed to react vigorously to the initial disclosures of extensive American eavesdropping on millions of Germans, and really became engaged only after her own personal privacy was violated.38 Merkel demanded that Washington reach a “no-spying” agreement with Berlin and Paris by the end of 2013, even though more than 90 per cent of Germans think that the Americans would breach a no-spying agreement anyway and continue their surveillance activities, according to a survey by public broadcaster ARD and Die Welt. 39 US federal regulators have recognised that the NSA revelations have been damaging to USEurope relations: Federal Trade Commissioner Julie Brill said (in October 2013): “There is no doubt that the revelations about the National Security Agency’s surveillance programs have severely tested the close friendship between the United States and many of our European colleagues.”40

US circumvention in EU-US Safe Harbor agreement undermines EU privacy regime Wright and Kreissl, 13 – American writer, holds a B.A. from Carleton College and an M.F.A from the MFA Program for Poets & Writers; sociologist, co-editor of “Surveillance in Europe”, authored several articles on social control, public security, and welfare state theory (David and Reinhard, “European responses to the Snowden revelations: A discussion paper”,Increasing Resilience in Surveillance Societies, December, 2013, http://irissproject.eu/wp- content/uploads/2013/12/IRISS_European-responses-to-the-Snowden-revelations_18-Dec- 2013_Final.pdf)//TT The Snowden revelations have put the proposed Safe Harbor agreement in trouble – again. The Safe Harbor agreement between the US and EU came into operation in 2000 after the EU determined that US standards were “inadequate” in meeting the data protection principles of the EU’s Data Protection Directive of 1995. The agreement allows US companies that want to handle or store European citizens’ data to self-certify annually with the Department of Commerce that they will abide by the standards. The FTC is tasked with enforcing breaches of that agreement. European regulators became more vocal in their criticism of the framework following the first Snowden revelations, pointing out that Safe Harbor specifically provides for exemptions “to the extent necessary to meet national security, public interest or lawenforcement requirements”. However, such exemptions are a kind of Trojan horse which allow questionable activity not always in the public interest, even though security agencies say it is. Who is going to challenge them if such activities are not subject to public scrutiny or effective oversight? Some EU officials, alarmed by reports of the NSA’s access to Internet companies, say Safe Harbor gives US companies a way to evade the EU’s more stringent privacy regime.66 European Parliament member Jan Philipp Albrecht told US officials in October 2013 that the agreement allows U.S companies to “circumvent” democratically established law. Albrecht said Europe “shouldn’t allow our standards to be undermined by certain loopholes”, which he said the Safe Harbor agreement facilitates.67 German federal data protection commissioner Peter Schaar called the Safe Harbor agreement a “fiction,” given how much technology and the flow of information have changed in the past decade and how many new regulations Washington has drawn up since the treaty was signed. “Consequently, I do not think it is right that we continue to facilitate the transfer of data into the USA,” Schaar said. The agreements “must be renegotiated, and must include reasonable protections against eavesdropping by state and secret services.”68 In addition to their critique of Safe Harbor’s lack of stringency, European regulators and others have attacked the agreement on the grounds that it is poorly enforced. EU officials released two reports critical of the program’s enforcement in 2002 and 2004. Australian consulting firm Galexia reported hundreds of Safe Harbor violations in a 2008 report that criticised both the EU and the US for not taking enforcement more seriously. Indeed, the FTC did not bring its first enforcement under Safe Harbor rules until 2009, and its batch of seven enforcement actions that year targeted companies for falsely advertising their Safe Harbor certification, not for any failures to protect Europeans’ data. Since then, the FTC has brought three Safe Harbor enforcement actions against Facebook, Google and MySpace.69 Other testimony to the LIBE committee contends that “The Safe Harbor does not (and cannot) cover major categories of data that appear to be the subject of surveillance, including financial records, travel records, and significant portions of voice and data traffic carried by US telecommunications providers.”70 In late November 2013, the European Commission released a Communication which was critical of the Safe Harbor Agreement, but did not completely sink it.71 The Communication concludes that Due to deficiencies in transparency and enforcement of the arrangement, specific problems still persist and should be addressed: a) transparency of privacy policies of Safe Harbour members, b) effective application of Privacy Principles by companies in the US, and c) effectiveness of the enforcement. Furthermore, the large scale access by intelligence agencies to data transferred to the US by Safe Harbour certified companies raises additional serious questions regarding the continuity of data protection rights of Europeans when their data in transferred to the US. 2ac – safe harbor solves privacy

Safe Harbor is key to privacy protection Greer 11 – Safe Harbor Program, US administration (Damon, “Safe Harbor—a framework that works”, International Data Privacy Law, 5/26/11, http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/3/143.full.pdf+html)//DBI Critics also fail to understand the key role the Safe Harbor has played in raising awareness and acceptance of privacy protection in the USA. At the time Safe Harbor was enacted, many such companies in the USA were deeply sceptical that legal regulation of privacy would actually be workable in an increasingly globalized and fast-paced business environment. As the current discussion concerning privacy regulation in the USA demonstrates, many US companies have completely changed their positions, and now accept the need for some regulation as a way to build consumer confidence and deal with cases that self-regulation cannot. In addition, privacy compliance has become widely accepted among globalized US companies as essential to protect personal data and avoid legal liability. Discussions with the chief privacy officers of US companies and anecdotal evidence leave no doubt that the experience of having to implement privacy protections under the Safe Harbor was crucial in leading to greater acceptance of privacy compliance and protection among the US business community over the past ten years. It has instilled into corporations the importance of safeguarding personal data and has contributed to the development, growth, and adoption of strategic information business practices that integrate the corporation’s principal divisions up to the executive level in devising comprehensive codes of conduct to protect personal data. Examples of the commitment to apply Safe Harbor privacy principles to corporate policies include the following observations from executives in the privacy arena: 1ar – xt: safe harbor solves privacy

Safe Harbor effectively protects privacy Greer 11 – Safe Harbor Program, US administration (Damon, “Safe Harbor—a framework that works”, International Data Privacy Law, 5/26/11, http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/3/143.full.pdf+html)//DBI The Safe Harbor Framework’s structure is founded on a self-regulatory regime based on a sector-specific approach and linked with federal enforcement primarily based on the FTC’s section 5 authority under the FTC Act of 1914 governing deceptive and unfair trade practices (enforcement is undertaken instead by the US Department of Transportation in the case of Safe Harbor members who are subject to its jurisdiction rather than that of the FTC). Organizations are under no compulsion to join Safe Harbor and their commitment to adhere to the principles and the fifteen FAQs is voluntary. Furthermore, the FTC has committed to give priority attention to complaints referred to it by the EU data protection authorities’ dispute resolution panel on behalf of EU citizens. In recent years, FTC enforcement has become increasingly involved in privacy disputes, including those involving Safe Harbor (see above), and its enforcement power is much feared among US companies. In the early years of Safe Harbor’s existence, few self- certifications were received from the business community. Perhaps influenced by the lack of predictability of EU member states’ enforcement of national data protection laws, or lack of awareness of the data privacy legal framework in the European Union, Safe Harbor as a tool to promote compliance was underutilized. However, since then the Safe Harbor has continually evolved, and its use is much more sophisticated than it was ten years ago. Companies now routinely spend considerable amounts of money and time complying with the Safe Harbor principles, so that compliance goes much farther than simply ‘checking the box’, a point with critics of Safe Harbor fail to realize. 2ac – at: companies ignore safe harbor

Companies have incentives to adhere to Safe Harbor—economics and trust Greer 11 – Safe Harbor Program, US administration (Damon, “Safe Harbor—a framework that works”, International Data Privacy Law, 5/26/11, http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/3/143.full.pdf+html)//DBI Critics of Safe Harbor also fail to take into account the costs of complying with it, and those of failing to comply with the law. In February 2011, the Ponemon Institute issued a study entitled ‘Cost of Compliance: Benchmark Study of Multinational Organizations’ (the text of the study is available at ,http://www.tripwire. com/ponemon-cost-of-compliance/pressKit/ True_Cost_of_Compliance_Report.pdf . , accessed 27 April 2011; see also ,http://www.ponemon.org.). The study examined the compliance practices of 46 multinational organizations and sought to quantify the costs associated with both compliance and non- compliance with selected data protection and privacy regulatory requirements (compliance with the EU Directive was covered in the study). The findings indicated that average compliance costs were US$3.5 million, and the costs for non-compliance with laws was nearly three times higher ($9.4 million), with a range from $1.4 million to $28 million. The per capita compliance cost was $222 per employee, and the per capita non-compliance cost was $820 per employee. Clearly, it is in the interest of the organization to comply with data protection laws wherever they may be encountered. In addition, the harm done to trust and reputation by failing to comply with data protection regimes (as noted by UK Information Commissioner Christopher Graham in his presentation at the ‘23rd Annual Inter- national Conference 2010 Privacy Practices on Trial’ conference in Cambridge, UK) is, in many ways, incalculable and ultimately erodes an organization’s presence in the global marketplace and imperils its competitiveness. Today, any organization that builds a solid compliance regime irrespective of the legal framework under which it functions will gain a competitive edge as new technologies, applications, and processes emerge. To do otherwise would, as the Ponemon study clearly points out, cause the business greater, long-term harm. 2ac – safe harbor solves terror Resolving NSA-based Safe Harbor disputes is crucial to combatting terrorism – opens global data flows Archick, 14 – specialist in European affairs (Kristin, Congressional Research Service, “U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism”, 12/1/14, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf, //11) Although the United States and the EU both recognize the importance of sharing information in an effort to track and disrupt terrorist activity, data privacy has been and continues to be a key U.S.-EU sticking point. As noted previously, the EU considers the privacy of personal data a basic right; EU data privacy regulations set out common rules for public and private entities in the EU that hold or transmit personal data, and prohibit the transfer of such data to countries where legal protections are not deemed “adequate.” In the negotiation of several U.S.-EU information sharing agreements, some EU officials have been concerned about whether the United States could guarantee a sufficient level of protection for European citizens’ personal data. In particular, some Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and many European civil liberty groups have long argued that elements of U.S.-EU information-sharing agreements violate the privacy rights of EU citizens. The unauthorized disclosures since June 2013 of U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance programs and the spate of subsequent allegations of U.S. collection activities in Europe (including reports that U.S. intelligence agencies have monitored EU diplomatic offices and computer networks, as well as German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s mobile phone) have strained transatlantic trust and exacerbated EU worries about U.S. data protection safeguards. surv hurts trade agreements

Crushes global trade agreements – TTIP and TPP Donohue 15 – Professor of Law, Georgetown Law and Director, Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown Law (Lauren, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, CONSUMER PRIVACY, AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY, Symposium Articles, 4 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 11 p.18-20, 2015, Hein Online)//JJ B. Trade Agreements The NSA programs, and media coverage of them, have further impacted bi- and multi-lateral trade negotiations , undermining U.S. economic security. Consider two of the most important talks currently underway: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ( TTIP ) and the Trans- Pacific Partnership ( TPP). TTIP is a trade and investment negotiation that is being conducted between the European Commission and the United States. The purpose of the agreement is to create better trade relations between the two region, enabling companies on both sides of the Atlantic to thrive. The revelations about NSA activities have had a profound impact on the negotiations. In March 2014 the European Parliament passed a resolution noting "the impact of mass surveillance." It stated, "the revelations based on documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden put political leaders under the obligation to address the challenges of overseeing and controlling intelligence agencies in surveillance activities and assessing the impact of their activities on fundamental rights and the rule of law in a democratic society.'' It recognized that the programs had undermined "trust between the EU and the US as transatlantic partners ." Not least were concerns that the information could be used for "economic and industrial espionage"-and not merely for the purpose of heading off potentially violent threats. Parliament strongly emphasized, "given the importance of the digital economy in the relationship and in the cause of rebuilding EU- US trust," that its "consent to the final TTIP agreement could be endangered as long as the blanket mass surveillance activities and the interception of communications in EU institutions and diplomatic representations are not completely abandoned and an adequate solution is found for the data privacy rights of EU citizens." The resolution underscored that any agreement to TTIP would hinge on the protection of the data privacy rights as reflected in the protection of fundamental rights in the EU Charter. Even if the surveillance programs do not entirely derail TTIP, they have the potential to significantly retard negotiations. Much is at stake. The Center for Economic Policy Research in London, for instance, estimates that a successful TTIP could improve U.S. workers' wages, provide new jobs, and increase the country's GDP by $100 billion per year. Another study, conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation, suggests that TTIP "could increase GDP per capita in the United States by 13 percent over the long term. To the extent that the programs weaken the U.S. position in the negotiations, the impact could be significant . Although the United States Trade Representative is trying to counter the political fallout from the NSA debacle by putting local data protection initiatives on the table in the TTIP negotiations, the EU has steadfastly resisted any expansion into this realm. TPP, in turn, is a trade agreement that the United States is negotiating with 11 countries in the Asia-Pacific region (Australia, Brunei Darussalam,Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam). TPP (with participation of Japan), accounts for nearly 40% of global GDP, about 1/3 of world trade. Two of the United States' objectives in these negotiations are directly implicated by the Snowden releases : e-commerce / telecommunications, and intellectual property rights. The NSA programs relate to a number of categories under e- commerce -such as rules preventing discrimination based on the country of origin, and efforts to construct a single, global Internet. Nevertheless, as discussed below, some of the countries involved in TPP have already adopted data localization laws. The NSA programs have thus weakened the United States' negotiation position in these discussions, by making it more difficult to reach agreement in key areas. In addition to e-commerce considerations, as part of the TPP negotiations, the United States has prioritized intellectual property rights. Some 40 million American jobs are directly or indirectly tied to "IP- intensive" industries. These jobs tend to be high-paying and stimulate approximately 60% of U.S. merchandise exports, as well as a significant portion of services. Efforts to make progress in TPP by developing stronger protections for patents, trademarks copyrights, and trade secrets- including safeguards against cyber theft of trade secrets-is made more perilous by the existence of the NSA programs . 2ac – ttip kt us-eu relations

TTIP is key to US-EU relations Hamilton and Quinlan 15 - Director and Senior Fellow, respectively, at the Johns Hopkins University Center for Transatlantic Relations, and co-authors of The Transatlantic Economy 2015 (Daniel and Joseph, “More than trade, TTIP leads to confident Atlanticism”, EurActiv.com, 3/18/15, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-society/more-trade-ttip-leads-confident- atlanticism-313006)//DBI The US-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is generating more heat than light when it comes to most European debates, which tend to cast TTIP as yet another free trade agreement. Yet TTIP is about more than trade. It is about creating a more strategic, dynamic and holistic US-EU relationship that is more confident, more effective at engaging third countries and addressing regional and global challenges, and better able to strengthen the ground rules of the international order. To the extent that TTIP can help generate jobs, spark growth and reinvigorate the US and European economies, it promises to renew confidence among publics and elites and ameliorate some of the political dysfunction afflicting many Western societies. Greater confidence and economic vigor at home, in turn, has the potential to increase the magnetic pull of Western values elsewhere, underwrites US and EU diplomatic capacity, and enhances possibilities for strategic outreach. TTIP can also reassure each side of the Atlantic about each other. Europeans are more likely to have greater faith in America's security commitments if they are anchored by strong trade and investment links . TTIP would be an important US validation of EU legitimacy, while reassuring Americans that the EU is looking outward rather than inward. 2ac – ttip kt deter rising powers

TTIP is key to deter rising powers from challenging the global order— specifically, China and Russia Hamilton and Quinlan 15 - Director and Senior Fellow, respectively, at the Johns Hopkins University Center for Transatlantic Relations, and co-authors of The Transatlantic Economy 2015 (Daniel and Joseph, “More than trade, TTIP leads to confident Atlanticism”, EurActiv.com, 3/18/15, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-society/more-trade-ttip-leads-confident- atlanticism-313006)//DBI Second, TTIP is important in terms of how the transatlantic partners together might best relate to rising powers. Whether those powers choose to challenge the current international order and its rules or promote themselves within it depends significantly on how the US and Europe engage, not only with them but also with each other. The stronger the bonds among core democratic market economies, the better their chances of being able to engage rising partners as responsible stakeholders in the international system. The looser or weaker those bonds are, the greater the likelihood that rising powers will challenge this order . TTIP has particular meaning for US and EU relations with China. TTIP is lazily portrayed as an effort to confront and isolate China. Yet is less about containing China than about the terms and principles guiding China's integration and participation in the global order. China's burgeoning trade with both the United States and Europe attests to US and EU interest in engaging China, not isolating it. Yet Beijing has yet to embrace some basic tenets of the international rules-based order. TTIP, TPP and related initiatives are important instruments to help frame Beijing's choices -- by underscoring China's own interests in an open, stable international system as well as the types of norms and standards necessary for such a system to be sustained. TTIP is also important with regard to US and EU relations with Russia and Eurasia. TTIP is a values-based, rules-based initiative that is likely to strengthen Western economic and social cohesion , reinforce US commitment to Europe , strengthen transatlantic energy ties , and contribute to greater attractiveness of the Western model. TTIP would also bolster the resilience of central and east European economies, stimulate US investment and enable such countries to more easily resist Russian encroachment . These changes are likely to resonate across Wider Europe, especially Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and even Belarus. This is anathema to the current leadership in the Kremlin. TTIP presents a huge challenge to the Kremlin's efforts to divide Europeans from Americans. It offers something that the Kremlin cannot match: a transparent, mutually beneficial agreement that creates a rules-based framework for international cooperation . A reinvigorated transatlantic marketplace among highly-connected, highly-competitive democracies, whose people enjoy greater economic growth and rising standards of living, would challenge the Kremlin's version of ''managed democracy'' and render Russia’s own one-dimensional natural-resource-based economic model unattractive. Greater US-EU energy cooperation would blunt Russia's monopolistic approach to European energy markets. And if such benefits extended to non-EU neighbors, particularly Ukraine, Russians themselves are likely to ask why their own country can't be better run. 2ac – ttip kt international order

TTIP is key to sustain the international rules-based order Hamilton and Quinlan 15 - Director and Senior Fellow, respectively, at the Johns Hopkins University Center for Transatlantic Relations, and co-authors of The Transatlantic Economy 2015 (Daniel and Joseph, “More than trade, TTIP leads to confident Atlanticism”, EurActiv.com, 3/18/15, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-society/more-trade-ttip-leads-confident- atlanticism-313006)//DBI Third, TTIP can help strengthen the international rules-based order. Europeans and Americans share an interest in extending prosperity through multilateral trade liberalization. But the Doha Round is stuck and the WTO system is under challenge. EU and US officials are using TTIP to unblock the WTO Doha negotiations, jumpstart multilateral negotiations, and extend the multilateral system it to new areas. TTIP could result in clearer, transparent rules of origin that could facilitate global trade and serve as a common public good. It could pioneer new ways to ensure high standards for consumers, workers, companies and the environment while sustaining the benefits of an open global economy. Without TTIP, Americans and Europeans could become standard-takers rather than standard-makers. 2ac – eu-us rels impact filter A strong US-European alliance serves as a global stabilizing power NSS, 15 – National Security Strategy (White House, “National Security Strategy”, February 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf, //1 1) Strengthen Our Enduring Alliance with Europe The United States maintains a profound commitment to a Europe that is free, whole, and at peace. A strong Europe is our indispensable partner, including for tackling global security challenges , promoting prosperity , and upholding international norms . Our work with Europe leverages our strong and historic bilateral relationships throughout the continent . We will steadfastly support the aspirations of countries in the Balkans and Eastern Europe toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration, continue to transform our relationship with Turkey, and enhance ties with countries in the Caucasus while encouraging resolution of regional conflict. NATO is the strongest alliance the world has ever known and is the hub of an expanding global security network. Our Article 5 commitment to the collective defense of all NATO Members is ironclad, as is our commitment to ensuring the Alliance remains ready and capable for crisis response and cooperative security. We will continue to deepen our relationship with the European Union (EU), which has helped to promote peace and prosperity across the region, and deepen NATO-EU ties to enhance transatlantic security. To build on the millions of jobs supported by transatlantic trade, we support a pro-growth agenda in Europe to strengthen and broaden the region’s recovery, and we seek an ambitious T-TIP to boost exports, support jobs, and raise global standards for trade. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine makes clear that European security and the international rules and norms against territorial aggression cannot be taken for granted. In response, we have led an international effort to support the Ukrainian people as they choose their own future and develop their democracy and economy. We are reassuring our allies by backing our security commitments and increasing responsiveness through training and exercises, as well as a dynamic presence in Central and Eastern Europe to deter further Russian aggression. This will include working with Europe to improve its energy security in both the short and long term. We will support partners such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine so they can better work alongside the United States and NATO, as well as provide for their own defense. And we will continue to impose significant costs on Russia through sanctions and other means while countering Moscow’s deceptive propaganda with the unvarnished truth. We will deter Russian aggression , remain alert to its strategic capabilities, and help our allies and partners resist Russian coercion over the long term, if necessary. At the same time, we will keep the door open to greater collaboration with Russia in areas of common interests, should it choose a different path—a path of peaceful cooperation that respects the sovereignty and democratic development of neighboring states. 2ac – at: safe harbor bad Safe Harbor is good to go – their authors have a flawed understanding of the program FPF, 13 – Future of Privacy Forum (“The US-EU Safe Harbor: An Analysis of the Framework’s Effectiveness in Protecting Personal Privacy”, December 2013, http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/FPF-Safe-Harbor-Report.pdf, //11) As this report will show, these criticisms of the Safe Harbor program are largely unfounded.40 While the Safe Harbor program surely could be strengthened, as is the case with nearly every privacy regime, a close look at the experience that companies have had with the Safe Harbor reveals that the program has been largely successful in achieving its stated twin goals of protecting privacy while promoting international data transfer.41 The success of the Safe Harbor can be seen in three distinct areas. First, the program has grown significantly since its inception, underlying the importance of trans-Atlantic data flows. Second, US companies have increased privacy protections for individuals by making modifications to their privacy practices in order to comply with the Safe Harbor’s requirements. Third, there are strong enforcement mechanisms in place – in the form of both the FTC and third-party dispute resolution providers – to ensure that when individuals complain that a Safe Harbor participant is failing to live up to its obligations, such complaints are satisfactorily addressed. Many critics have unfairly attacked the Safe Harbor based on a misunderstanding of the program and its goals, and many of the recent criticisms reflect a misunderstanding of the relationship between the program and the NSA’s surveillance practices. In fact, suspending the Safe Harbor’s protections would negatively impact both the personal privacy of EU citizens and international trade. The Future of Privacy Forum (FPF) therefore suggests that rather than dismantling the Safe Harbor, the US and EU make specific reforms to the program to increase transparency and enhance efforts on both sides of the Atlantic to police compliance.