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Louisiana Constitutional Law John Devlin Louisiana State University Law Center
Louisiana Law Review Volume 48 | Number 2 Developments in the Law, 1986-1987: A Faculty Symposium November 1987 Louisiana Constitutional Law John Devlin Louisiana State University Law Center Repository Citation John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 48 La. L. Rev. (1987) Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol48/iss2/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW John Devlin* OF REVENUE ANTICIPATION NOTES, MINERAL RIGHTS AND MAXIMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION In this bicentennial year of constitutional celebration and controversial judicial nominations, fundamental questions concerning how courts should go about the task of construing constitutions are much in the air. Such issues of theory and method are as salient, and often as difficult and controversial, when disputed provisions of a state constitution must be construed as they are in the federal context. In two "hard cases" from last term,' State Bond Commissioner v. All Taxpayers,2 and American Lung Association, Inc. v. State Mineral Board,3 the Louisiana Supreme Court wrestled with similar issues of interpre- tation of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. In both cases, the consti- tutional provisions at issue operated to limit the otherwise plenary powers of the political branches of the state government. In neither case did the plain meaning of the provision's specific terms-"debt" in the former case, "sold" in the latter-necessarily apply to the particular facts at bar, nor in either case did the records of the 1973 constitutional con- vention indicate that the framers ever considered the specific issue pre- sented. -
Supreme Court of Louisiana No. 2000-Ob-1360 Alfreda Tillman Bester Versus Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions Or
2/21/01 SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA NO. 2000-OB-1360 ALFREDA TILLMAN BESTER VERSUS LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON BAR ADMISSIONS ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DECLARATORY RELIEF TRAYLOR, J.* The petitioner, Alfreda Tillman Bester, seeks to compel the Committee on Bar Admissions, a body of lawyers created to assist this Court in its constitutionally mandated function of deciding who should be admitted to the practice of law in Louisiana, to produce her “conditionally failed” February, 2000 Bar Examination, as well as “model answers” or “grading guidelines” prepared by the members of the Committee on Bar Admissions. This demand squarely implicates our inherent authority to regulate all facets of the practice of law in Louisiana, including the admission of persons to the Bar. Because we exercise plenary, inherent authority in the area of bar admissions, and because at the time the subject bar examination was administered, bar applicants had no right to review their bar examinations, or any right to review the grading guidelines or model answers prepared by Committee Examiners, we deny relief. Facts The petitioner was notified by the Committee on Bar Admissions that she had conditionally failed the February, 2000 Louisiana State Bar Examination. * James Gulotta, Associate Justice Pro Tempore, sitting for Lemmon, J. The petitioner then forwarded a written public records request, asking to view her own bar examination, together with the Committee’s model answers/grading guidelines. The Committee on Bar Admissions, acting through counsel, denied the petitioner’s request. Petitioner then invoked the original jurisdiction of this Court by filing a “Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Relief . -
Signed Opinions, Concurrences, Dissents, and Vote Counts in the U.S
Akron Law Review Volume 53 Issue 3 Federal Appellate Issue Article 2 2019 Signed Opinions, Concurrences, Dissents, and Vote Counts in the U.S. Supreme Court: Boon or Bane? (A Response to Professors Penrose and Sherry) Joan Steinman Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview Part of the Courts Commons, Judges Commons, and the Litigation Commons Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be important as we plan further development of our repository. Recommended Citation Steinman, Joan (2019) "Signed Opinions, Concurrences, Dissents, and Vote Counts in the U.S. Supreme Court: Boon or Bane? (A Response to Professors Penrose and Sherry)," Akron Law Review: Vol. 53 : Iss. 3 , Article 2. Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Steinman: Response to Penrose and Sherry SIGNED OPINIONS, CONCURRENCES, DISSENTS, AND VOTE COUNTS IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: BOON OR BANE? (A RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS PENROSE AND SHERRY) Joan Steinman* I. Response to Professor Penrose .................................. 526 II. Response to Professor Sherry .................................... 543 A. A Summary of Professor Sherry’s Arguments, and Preliminary Responses ........................................ 543 B. Rejoinders to Professor Sherry’s Arguments ...... 548 1. With Respect to the First Amendment ......... -
Statutory Interpretation--In the Classroom and in the Courtroom
University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 1983 Statutory Interpretation--in the Classroom and in the Courtroom Richard A. Posner Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Richard A. Posner, "Statutory Interpretation--in the Classroom and in the Courtroom," 50 University of Chicago Law Review 800 (1983). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom Richard A. Posnerf This paper continues a discussion begun in an earlier paper in this journal.1 That paper dealt primarily with the implications for statutory interpretation of the interest-group theory of legislation, recently revivified by economists; it also dealt with constitutional interpretation. This paper focuses on two topics omitted in the earlier one: the need for better instruction in legislation in the law schools and the vacuity of the standard guideposts to reading stat- utes-the "canons of construction." The topics turn out to be re- lated. The last part of the paper contains a positive proposal on how to interpret statutes. I. THE ACADEMIC STUDY OF LEGISLATION It has been almost fifty years since James Landis complained that academic lawyers did not study legislation in a scientific (i.e., rigorous, systematic) spirit,' and the situation is unchanged. There are countless studies, many of high distinction, of particular stat- utes, but they are not guided by any overall theory of legislation, and most academic lawyers, like most judges and practicing law- yers, would consider it otiose, impractical, and pretentious to try to develop one. -
May 17, 2021 Sent Via Email House and Governmental Affairs Committee Louisiana House of Representatives Box 94062 Baton Rouge, L
New York Office Washington, D.C. Office th 40 Rector Street, 5th Floor 700 14 Street, NW, Suite 600 Washington, D.C. 20005 New York, NY 10006-1738 T. (212) 965 2200 F. (212) 226 7592 T. (202) 682 1300 F. (202) 682 1312 www.naacpldf.org May 17, 2021 Sent via email House and Governmental Affairs Committee Louisiana House of Representatives Box 94062 Baton Rouge, LA 70804 Re: Support for Expansion in Louisiana Supreme Court from Seven Single-Member Districts to Nine Single-Member Districts in SB 163 Dear Chairman Stefanski, Vice Chair Duplessis, and Members of the House Governmental Affairs Committee: The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (“LDF”) writes to express our support for the proposal in Senate Bill (“SB”) 1631 to place a constitutional amendment on the October 9, 2021 ballot to expand the size of the Louisiana Supreme Court from seven members to nine members, each elected from one district (“single-member district”).2 However, we believe that implementation of this expansion should not be delayed until 2025, as currently proposed in SB 163. It is critical that Louisiana’s communities of color are fairly represented on the Louisiana Supreme Court. The Louisiana Supreme Court has expansive jurisdiction to review judgments of the courts of appeal in every civil and criminal action filed in state court in Louisiana, which is where the vast majority of cases are heard.3 In civil cases, the Supreme Court has plenary authority to review not only legal conclusions, but also may review factual conclusions.4 The decisions made by the Louisiana Supreme Court have profound consequences for all Louisianans and have the potential to affect every aspect of life. -
Supreme Court of Louisiana Office of the Judicial Administrator 400 Royal Street, Suite 1190 New Orleans, La 70130-8101
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA OFFICE OF THE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR 400 ROYAL STREET, SUITE 1190 NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130-8101 RFP LASC-2018-03 REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS FOR TRAINING CONSULTANT FOR THE LOUISIANA PROTECTIVE ORDER REGISTRY ___________________________________________________________________________ I. PURPOSE The Supreme Court of Louisiana, Office of the Judicial Administrator (“Court”) invites qualified Court and Community Liaison in Louisiana to submit proposals to serve as an independent training consultant to the Louisiana Protective Order Registry (“LPOR”). II. SUBMISSION OF PROPOSALS Proposals must be received no later than 4:00 p.m. (CST) on Monday, November 12, 2018. Proposals may be submitted electronically via e-mail or secure file upload or may be submitted in paper format (with one original and three copies required). Proposals should be sent to the following address: The Supreme Court of Louisiana Office of the Judicial Administrator 400 Royal Street, Suite 1190 New Orleans, Louisiana 70130-8101 Attn: Caitlin Morgenstern Email: [email protected] Any proposals received after this deadline will not be considered. All envelopes containing a paper proposal must bear the name of the entity making the proposal, and must have the following clearly written or typed on the face of the envelope: 2018 Proposals for Training Consultant for the Louisiana Protective Order Registry. All questions relative to this request for proposals (“RFP”) should be directed to Caitlin Morgenstern who may be reached via telephone at (504) 310-2550 or via e-mail at [email protected]. All questions should be submitted by 4:00 p.m. (CST), on Thursday, October 25, 2018. The preferred method of receiving questions is via e-mail. -
State Supreme Court Sits at University of Louisiana at Monroe
A Newsletter of the Judiciary of the State of Louisiana Volume 6, No. 1 Spring 2003 State Supreme Court Sits at University of Louisiana at Monroe The Louisiana Supreme Court heard oral ar- guments on four pending cases on April 7 at the University of Louisiana at Monroe (ULM). Six jus- tices held proceedings at ULM as part of an ongo- ing effort by the Court to educate and to inform students and the general public about the work of the Court. “For over 15 years, holding court in venues other than the Supreme Court courthouse has been a tra- dition of the Court. The goal is to provide citizens with a snapshot of the volume, variety and com- plexity of the Court's caseload by bringing the Loui- siana Supreme Court to them,” said Chief Justice Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. Prior to oral arguments, Justice Chet D. Traylor, a 1969 graduate of Northeast Louisiana State Uni- versity, now known as ULM, welcomed the high school and university students in attendance in ULM's Brown Auditorium. Justice Traylor was Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Chet D. Traylor, elected in 1996 to the Fourth Supreme Court Dis- a ULM alumnus and a native of nearby Colum- trict which includes Monroe. bia, La., announces the Court’s sitting at ULM. According to Justice Traylor, “The Supreme Photo courtesy of ULM Court's decision to hold court at ULM is an historic and momentous event for the people of northeast Louisiana. The last time the Supreme Court sat in Monroe was June 1894. The people of Louisiana need to know that this is their Supreme Court. -
Weimer Elected to Supreme Court
A Newsletter of the Judiciary of the State of Louisiana Volume 4, No. 4 Fall/Winter 2001 Weimer Elected to Supreme Court On December 17, 2001, Judge John L. Weimer was sworn-in as Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, Sixth District, at an induction ceremony at Nicholls State University, Talbot Auditorium, in Thibodaux, Louisiana. The oath of office was administered by Daniel A. Cavell, his brother-in-law and an attorney from Thibodaux. Louisiana Supreme Court Chief Justice Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. and Retired Sixth District Justice Harry T. Lemmon, Justice Weimer’s predecessor, provided remarks welcoming Weimer to the Supreme Court bench. Justice Weimer, 47, was born in Thibodaux and graduated from Thibodaux High School. He received a B.S. degree in 1976 from Nicholls State Univer- sity, graduating with academic honors, and his Juris Doctor degree from Louisiana State University in Justice John L. Weimer 1980. Prior to his election to the Supreme Court, th Justice Weimer served as Judge of the 17 Judicial th st sity 50 Anniversary Golden Graduate Award; Who’s District Court 1995-1998, and Judge of the 1 Cir- Who Among American Teachers, and the Nicholls cuit Court of Appeal, District 1, Division B from State University Presidential Award for Teaching Ex- 1998 to the present. cellence. In 2000 Justice Weimer was recognized For fifteen years, 1980-1995, Justice Weimer was for the significant assistance he provided in estab- an attorney in the private practice of law. He was lishing the Lafourche Parish Drug Treatment Court. also both an Adjunct Professor of Law and a Profes- Justice Weimer is completing the unexpired sor of Law at Nicholls State University during the term due to the early retirement of Justice Lemmon. -
SUPREME COURT of LOUISIANA 2017 ANNUAL REPORT of the Judicial Council of the Supreme Court the SUPREME COURT of LOUISIANA from Left: Justice Scott J
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA 2017 ANNUAL REPORT of the Judicial Council of the Supreme Court THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA From left: Justice Scott J. Crichton, Justice Marcus R. Clark, Justice John L. Weimer, Chief Justice Bernette Joshua Johnson, Justice Greg G. Guidry, Justice Jefferson D. Hughes III, Justice James T. Genovese. CHIEF JUSTICE BERNETTE JUSTICE GREG G. GUIDRY JUSTICE MARCUS R. CLARK JOSHUA JOHNSON First Supreme Court District Fourth Supreme Court District Seventh Supreme Court District Jefferson, Orleans, St. Helena, St. Tam- Bienville, Caldwell, Catahoula, Jefferson and Orleans Parishes.* many, Tangipahoa, and Washington Claiborne, Concordia, East Carroll, Parishes.* Franklin, Grant, Jackson, LaSalle, Lin- coln, Madison, Morehouse, Ouachita, JUSTICE SCOTT J. Rapides, Richland, Tensas, Union, CRICHTON West Carroll, and Winn Parishes.* Second Supreme Court District Allen, Beauregard, Bossier, Caddo, JUSTICE JEFFERSON D. DeSoto, Evangeline, Natchitoches, Red HUGHES III River, Sabine, Vernon, and Webster Fifth Supreme Court District Parishes.* Ascension, East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Iberville, Livingston, Pointe JUSTICE JAMES T. Coupee, West Baton Rouge, and West GENOVESE Feliciana Parishes.* Third Supreme Court District Acadia, Avoyelles, Calcasieu, Cam- JUSTICE JOHN L. WEIMER eron, Jefferson Davis, Lafayette, St. Sixth Supreme Court District Landry, and Vermilion.* Assumption, Iberia, Jefferson, La- Took office January 1, 2017. fourche, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John the Baptist, St. Martin, St. Mary, and * See Court District Maps on pages 12-13. Terrebonne Parishes.* ABOUT THIS REPORT RESOURCES ON THE WEB AT WWW.LASC.ORG The Supreme Court Annual Report is a useful guide to judicial personnel The STATISTICAL DATA section summarizes two-year activity trends and contacts throughout the state, as well as an overview of the Court’s in juvenile, civil, criminal and traffic categories for courts at all levels in progress in 2017 and includes maps of electoral districts for the Supreme the state. -
The Road to Bush V. Gore: the History of the Supreme Court's Use of the Per Curiam Opinion, 79 Neb
Nebraska Law Review Volume 79 | Issue 3 Article 2 2000 The Road to Bush v. Gore: The iH story of the Supreme Court's Use of the Per Curiam Opinion Laura K. Ray Widener Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr Recommended Citation Laura K. Ray, The Road to Bush v. Gore: The History of the Supreme Court's Use of the Per Curiam Opinion, 79 Neb. L. Rev. (2000) Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol79/iss3/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Laura Krugman Ray* The Road to Bush v. Gore:' The History of the Supreme Court's Use of the Per Curiam Opinion TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction .......................................... 518 II. The History of the Per Curiam Opinion as a Form of Judicial Expression ................................... 521 A. The Background: An Instrument of Consensus ..... 521 B. The Transformation: The Decline of Consensus .... 524 III. The Per Curiam and the Idea of Individualism ........ 530 A. The Emergence of the Separate Voice .............. 530 B. The Pursuit of Consensus ..................... 533 IV. The Per Curiam as a Strategic Device ................. 536 A. Achieving Efficiency ............................... 537 B. Working by Indirection ............................ 538 C. Creating New Law ................................ 541 D. Using Procedure as a Screen ...................... 548 E. Disciplining Courts and Litigants .................. 549 V. The Per Curiam and Individual Expression ............ 550 A. The Minimalist Opinion and Efficiency: New York Times Co. -
What's an Opinion For? James Boyd Whitet
JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING What's an Opinion For? James Boyd Whitet The question the papers in this Special Issue address is whether it matters how judicial opinions are written, and if so why. My hope here is to suggest a way of elaborating the ques- tion that may provide the reader with a useful point of departure for reading the more extensive papers that follow. It might help, to begin with, if we were to imagine a legal world without the judicial opinion at all. Suppose that we had a system designed by one who truly believed that the law really "is what officials do about disputes," as Karl Llewellyn used to say, and nothing else. We might have statutes and a constitution and judges appointed to resolve disputes arising under them, but the judges would never explain themselves, for it would be irrelevant for them to do so: the law would be what they did, not what they said. They would simply decide the cases, issuing orders reflect- ing their judgment. Their judgments might be appealed, but an appellate court would simply affirm or reverse, in the latter case substituting its judgment for that of the lower court, but never issuing an opinion explaining or justifying its decision. What would life in such a regime be like? One's first reaction might be to think that in such a system there would be no precedent, no argument from precedent, and in this sense no law: every question would be argued as an original matter, without the advantage of the collective experience over time that the judicial opinion provides. -
The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability Cynthia Gray
Hofstra Law Review Volume 32 | Issue 4 Article 11 2004 The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability Cynthia Gray Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Gray, Cynthia (2004) "The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 32: Iss. 4, Article 11. Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss4/11 This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Gray: The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing J THE LINE BETWEEN LEGAL ERROR AND JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT: BALANCING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY Cynthia Gray* Most of the complaints filed with state judicial conduct commissions-generally more than ninety percent-are dismissed every year.' Some dismissed complaints do not allege a violation of the code of judicial conduct. For example, litigants sometimes complain that a judge did not return telephone calls because they do not understand that a judge is required to avoid such ex parte communications. Others are dismissed because the evidence does not support the complaint. For example, a Texas prison inmate alleged that the judge who had presided in his trial had been prejudiced against him because they had once been married; the State Commission on Judicial Conduct dismissed his complaint after its investigation revealed that the judge had never been' married to the complainant .