THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO
SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
THE NEXUS BETWEEN DOMESTIC INTERESTS AND FOREIGN AID POLICY:
THE CASE OF THE NORWEGIAN AID AGENDA
BENEDICTE BAKKESKAU
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL
SCIENCE
JUNE 2011
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO
THE NEXUS BETWEEN DOMESTIC INTERESTS AND FOREIGN AID POLICY: THE CASE OF THE NORWEGIAN AID AGENDA
A THESIS SUBMITTED BY BENEDICTE BAKKESKAU
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE JUNE 2011
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
HAS BEEN APPROVED BY
Dr. Ezzedine Choukri Fishere Thesis Committee Advisor------Affiliation: Department of Political Science, American University in Cairo
Dr. Ibrahim Elnur Thesis Committee Reader ------Affiliation: Department of Political Science, American University in Cairo
Dr. Pandeli Glavanis Thesis Committee Reader ------Affiliation: Center for Learning and Teaching, American University in Cairo
------Department Chair Date Dean of HUSS Date
For my mother, Bente Bakkeskau, to whom I owe so much.
Thank you for instilling in me patience, determination and strength.
Thank you for making me more than I can be.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In completing this thesis I have drawn on the support of many people without whom the final result would not have been the same.
First, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Ezzedine Choukri Fishere, for his suggestions and guidance in this process. I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Ibrahim Elnur and Dr. Pandeli Glavanis, for agreeing to be a part of this endeavor and for the constructive criticism and advice they offered.
I am also grateful to my interviewees for their valuable time, knowledge and insights.
My family and friends also deserve thanks for their support and encouragement in seeing this thesis through: my father for his constant emotional backing and love, and his never-ending confidence in me; my sister for her ability to let me escape the academic world, her generous hospitality and love; my friends for their support, help and advice along the way. A special thanks goes to Mouctar Diallo for his inspiration, encouragement and academic input throughout this process.
Though this endeavor has not been one of solitude, any errors and flaws that remain in the final product are mine, and mine alone.
Benedicte Bakkeskau,
Cairo, June 2011
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 2 Research Questions and Hypothesis 4 Structure of the Thesis 7
1 Literature Review, Theoretical Framework and Methodology 8 1.1 Literature Review 8 1.1.1 Altruism and Self-Interest: Norwegian Development Policy 14 1.2 Theoretical Framework 17 1.2.1 Norwegian Politics: A Pluralistic System of Lobbyism and Corporatism 20 1.3 Methodology 23 1.3.1 Primary Data 23 1.3.2 Secondary Data 24 1.3.3 Interviews 25 1.3.4 Language of sources 27
2 Norwegian Aid: The Institutional Setup 28 2.1 The Storting 28 2.1.1 The Storting‘s Rules of Procedure 29 2.1.2 The Storting‘s Power in the Norwegian Policy Process 32 2.2 The Norwegian Government 33 2.3 The Norwegian Foreign Ministry 35 2.3.1 The Organizational Structure of the MFA 36 2.4 The Norwegian Agency for Development and Cooperation 40 2.5 The Development of the Norwegian Aid Administration 41 2.5.1 Additions to the Norwegian Aid Institutions 43
3 The Norwegian Development Agenda and Domestic Channels of Influence 45 3.1 Norwegian Civil Society 46 3.2 Norwegian Business and Development Aid 51
iii 3.3 Relationship with Academia 53 3.4 Domestic Opinion and Public Support 54
4 Sixty Years of Norwegian Development Cooperation 56 4.1 The Norwegian Socio-Economic Make-Up: A Framework for Development 60 4.2 The Political Climate for Development Assistance 66 4.3 The Kerala Fishing Project: Setting the Bar 68 4.4 Norwegian Aid Policy in the Early Years: Goals, Strategies and Principles 71 4.4.1 Concentration and Cooperation 74 4.4.2 Norwegian Partner Countries 76 4.5 Norwegian Aid Allocation: Themes, Sectors and Supply Channels 80 4.6 Norway‘s Development Profile anno 2010 84 4.6.1 Five Pillars of Norwegian Development Cooperation 85 4.7 Development Aid: In Norway‘s Best Interest? 88 4.7.1 The Role of the Private Sector 92
5 Conclusion 98 The Role of Domestic Actors 98 The Role of Institutions 99 The Role of the Individual 101 The Corporative Channels of the Norwegian Aid Agenda 102 Concluding Remarks 106 Further Research 107
Bibliography 109
Appendices 119 Appendix 1. Interview Guide 119 Appendix 2. List of interview respondents 122 Appendix 3. Consent form for interviews 123 Appendix 4. Approval of study from the Institutional Review Board at the American University in Cairo 124
iv ABSTRACT
This thesis looks at the nature of Norwegian aid and how the domestic socio-political realities influence the character of Norwegian development assistance. Norwegian development aid is analyzed as a foreign policy decision, examining the institutional structure and domestic stakeholders and establishing the role and strength of each player within the decision-making process. Understanding how development policies are formed provides a better background for analyzing the interests that lies behind a country‘s aid program. In being aware of these interests, we can better analyze the donor motives of foreign aid and how they impact the development trajectory in the recipient country.
The research yields several findings regarding the formation of Norway‘s development policy: 1) Norway has a corporative system where domestic actors actively take part in the decision-making process; 2) Domestic stakeholders participate when the issue at hand concerns their own agenda or affects them in any way; 3) Their strength within the system depend on whether or not they are aligned with the political agenda of the sitting government. The research further suggests that the individual has some impact on the policy process, though this largely depends on their position within the system.
In conclusion, the research confirms that to a certain extent Norwegian development policy is influenced by domestic socio-political interests.
v
[R]ecognize the importance of policy-makers, the wealthy and others with power, and make it a priority to learn about how they, as well as ourselves, can change and act more for the better. For they are the biggest blind spot in development studies. If we are serious about poverty, we have to be serious about powerful people as people.
Robert Chambers, ―Critical Reflections of a Development Nomad,‖ in Khotari 2005, p. 85.
1
INTRODUCTION
In International Relations (IR) the state has traditionally been the center of attention.
With the introduction of new views and theories, the state has gradually been opened up and other areas of investigation have been added to the equation. Though our focus has been widened, the human agency that lies behind every decision, choice and action, or inaction, are often overlooked and forgotten. This is true for the aid and development discourse as well. Though human agency has been brought into the discussion by theories of stakeholder and participatory development, the focus is usually on those receiving aid, not giving it. And when the focus is directed at the donor, the analysis often concentrate on the state as a unified actor without recognizing the multifaceted landscape of domestic and international factors that influence and shape a country‘s foreign policy. Even if the variety of factors is acknowledged, human agency is left out of the equation. However, the individual is important within this context. More specifically, the individual politician, bureaucrat, lobbyist, idealist, businessman and volunteer all play a role in shaping a country‘s foreign aid policy. As the quote from Robert Chambers on the previous page points out, if we are serious about studying development, trying to understand and make it the best it can be, our analyses should include people in power. Reflecting Chambers‘ call to ―recognize the importance of policy-makers‖, this thesis examines Norwegian development activities as a foreign policy decision, specifically looking at the role of the individual in the decision-making process of Norwegian development policy.
2 Since its beginning, aid has been a tool for donor countries‘ foreign policy. In the years after the Second World War, promoting human betterment was seen as a mean to diplomatic ends concerning national and international security. Aid was viewed as a way to alleviate the troubles of the newly independent and underdeveloped countries of the Third World through economic stabilization, long term growth and poverty reduction (Lancaster 2007:60). Since its origination in the late 1940s, aid has become subject to the moral obligation of wealthier states in their attempts to improve human development in less developed states. What started as a strategic tool for national and international security has become an institutionalized practice characterizing the interaction between rich and poor countries. Political constituencies with interests in the aid agenda have developed in donor countries as well as within the international community and these constituencies promote and campaign for an increase in aid levels (Lancaster 2007:212-215). It is within this context this thesis analyzes the nature of the Norwegian aid agenda and how the domestic socio-political realities influence the character of Norwegian development assistance.
A review of the aid literature reveals a wide variety in themes, methods and approaches when it comes to aid and development writing. One of the recurrent questions is related to the donor countries‘ motivation for giving aid; what is the national rationale behind foreign aid? Is it strictly business (or politics), or are donors driven by more altruistic intentions? Then again, do a country‘s motives for aid matter in terms of its effectiveness and impact on the development trajectory? The aid motivation debate stands out as it combines the narrative of development while adding a more analytical aspect by looking at development aid as a foreign policy decision made by donor countries.
3 Norway is described as a benign donor with humanitarian ideals and altruistic motives
(see Stokke 1989a and Stokke 1995). According to official policy papers (see MFA
2009 and MFA 2004a) the Norwegian development policy seeks to improve the socio- economic conditions of developing countries of the world‘s poor by promoting a rights-based approach to development. Its primary goal is to improve social justice by reducing inequality and stimulate economic growth. Furthermore, Norwegian development policy aims at integrating environmental concerns in its activities, seeking to promote a sustainable development trajectory.
Research Questions and Hypothesis
The following research questions are examined in order to determine the role and impact of domestic actors in the decision-making process of Norwegian aid policy:
1) What are the institutional elements shaping Norwegian development policy?
2) Who are the main actors in the decision-making process of Norwegian development policy?
3) To what extent is the Norwegian development policy influenced and shaped by the socio-political interests of these actors?
In other words, this thesis seeks to examine the role of Norwegian government institutions and the procedures for Norwegian policy-making. The main bureaucratic actors as well as domestic interest groups are identified alongside their role and ability to shape Norwegian development policy. With this backdrop, Norwegian development activities are then examined. As development aid is ultimately a tool of foreign policy,
4 this thesis questions the pure nature of the Norwegian aid agenda. Thus, the following hypothesis is put forward:
Though Norway is recognized to be a humane internationalist that focuses its development aid on the needs of its recipients, Norwegian development assistance is influenced and shaped by the political and economic interests of domestic stake- holders.
Accordingly, this thesis will analyze the Norwegian development policy as a foreign policy decision. The theoretical framework will be taken from the discourse on
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and the focus will be on the decision-making process and the domestic actors influencing this policy process. The role of interest groups are especially important and theories of lobbyism, corporatism and pluralism will be presented as a backdrop for understanding Norwegian development activities and the decision-making process that defines the Norwegian aid agenda. Through the analysis, this thesis demonstrates the impact of Norwegian domestic actors on the formation of
Norwegian aid policy. Furthermore, it shows how a pluralistic system creates the framework for a scattered development policy. The aim of the analysis is to illustrate how domestic actors and their socio-political interests influence the outcome of the decision-making process of the Norwegian aid agenda. In conclusion, the research will explain why there is a need to anchor human agency in FPA.
In June of 2010, I conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with Norwegian aid officials, practitioners, researchers and scholars. These interviews focused on the individual‘s experience with the Norwegian aid agenda and the decision-making process of Norwegian aid policy. Norway‘s official aid policy as well as its
5 distribution and implementation were discussed. The interviews offered insight into the different factors influencing Norwegian aid, both when it came to interests groups and ideological thinking. Moreover, and pertaining to the FPA aspect of this thesis, the interviewees were asked to consider the role of domestic actors as well as that of the individual in the aid bureaucracy. The interviews yielded some interesting answers and views on the role of human agency in the formation of the Norwegian aid agenda that is worth exploring. The research also engaged contact with the business side which provided insight into the corporative side of the development discourse and shed light on one company‘s experience with development.
Through the interviews it became evident that a distinction must be made when talking about domestic interests related to the Norwegian aid agenda; mainly between political interest and its broader political goals vs. the more narrow and selfish objectives that can follow from economic interest alone. Political interest refers to political ambitions and motivation, both on the domestic and the international arena.
Examples can be attracting support from domestic constituencies, international image building or protecting global goods. These interests are often attributed to the state and its functions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Economic interest on the other hand, refers to self-interest as it relates to economic revenue from development programs. The private sector and corporate side are often used as examples of such interests but economic interests are not solely found in the private sector; the state also procures revenues that give it an interest in the economic return of Norway‘s development and aid programs. Economic interest can also be found within civil society as the livelihoods of a large number of individuals rely on the continuation of
6 the aid system. This distinction between political and economic will remain throughout the analysis.
Structure of the Thesis
Chapter one presents a review of the existing aid literature, focusing on the aid motivation debate, aid as a foreign policy and the case of Norway. This chapter also contains the theoretical framework for this research as well as a description of the methodology. Chapter two presents the institutional framework of Norwegian aid before proceeding to chapter three which examines the domestic influences. The chapter includes an analysis of their interest in the aid agenda before examining their ability to shape and influence Norwegian aid policy.
Chapter four then presents Norwegian aid policy in relation to the Norwegian economy and societal values. It further puts Norwegian development efforts in a historical perspective, looking at Norwegian development activities from the early
1950s to the current agenda. The question of interests is raised and the chapter shows the conflict of self-interest and altruistic motives in Norwegian aid policy.
The final chapter summarizes the findings of this research. It specifically looks at the role of socio-political interests in influencing Norwegian aid policy while trying to determine what impact this has on Norwegian aid policy. Furthermore, this chapter will review the role of the individual in influencing Norwegian aid policy.
7
CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
& METHODOLOGY
1.1 Literature Review
Aid has attracted much attention from scholars and practitioners since it first originated in the early years after the Second World War. Because of its wide scope, foreign aid is subject to analysis from a number of research fields. In addition to the two most common fields that focus on foreign aid, namely the development and aid literature and FPA, there is also literature that focuses on the political economy of aid
(see Hopkins 2000, Hattori 2001, Hiscox 2005). The aid discourse touches on a variety of themes. Among them we find the size of foreign aid flows, its distribution to developing countries and its impact on the development trajectory of the recipient country. Scholars are especially interested in the relationship between aid and economic growth. Additionally the literature on foreign aid also includes the most classic of all investigations in IR: why do countries act the way they do; what motivates them in their actions towards other states? Within both development and aid literature and FPA we find numerous works on the motives and purposes of aid.
The analysis of foreign aid can be understood through five stages. First we find the interest stage where different actors, namely the donor state and its domestic constituencies and the recipient country, are identified along with their interests. The second stage focuses on the decision-making process where the interests of the different actors interact and shape the process in which the foreign aid policy is
8 formulated. As an outcome of this process the analysis engages the third stage: the stated objectives which are the donor country‘s official aid policy. The fourth stage is the allocation of aid, i.e. the distribution and implementation of the aid policies.
Finally, the last stage is the outcome stage where the results of the aid policy are brought into question in terms of their impacts. This thesis hopes to shed light on stage two, where domestic interests shape and influence the decision-making process of aid.
Much like the analytical process of foreign aid, the aid discourse and its respective literature can also be divided between the different stages based on research interests.
While development and aid scholars mostly focus on the allocation and outcome of foreign aid (see Carlsson, Somolekae and van de Walle 1997, Joseph and Gillies
2009), the FPA literature are concerned with the initial stages of foreign aid that leads up to the distribution and implementation of aid, i.e. the determinants of foreign aid and the decision-making process (see Breuning 1995, Alesina and Dollar 1998,
Lancaster 2007, Milward 2008).
Of special concern to development analysts is the effectiveness of aid; does foreign aid have the ability to achieve development? Researchers Channing Arndt, Sam Jones and Finn Tarp (2009) examine the existing knowledge on the correlation between aid and economic growth. They draw attention to the methodological difficulties and shortcomings in trying to establish a positive or negative link between aid and growth.
To accurately measure the impact of aid we must have knowledge of all the other factors affecting growth in a given country. In addition, we should ideally observe the same country ‗with aid‘ and ‗without aid‘ as the comparison is the only measure of aid‘s impact on development (Arndt et al. 2009:10). Despite these constraints, Arndt
9 et al. (2009:19, my italics) emphasize that ―[g]rowth is a key long-term [not short term] objective of aid‖ and thus it is important that we focus on its overall effectiveness.
Stemming from the debate on aid effectiveness, we find arguments related to the size of aid. A main figure in favor of increasing aid flows is the American economist
Jeffrey Sachs. In The End of Poverty, Sachs (2005) examines the case of poverty and proposes a number of development interventions that will contribute to ‗end poverty‘ in our time. He argues that if the world is serious about achieving the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), concerted actions must come together in order to increase aid (2005:275-276). Although it may seem like an unmanageable task, Sachs argues that the costs are likely to be small compared to any relevant measure of the envisioned benefits of the interventions (Sachs 2005:288). Supporting Sachs‘ argument of aid as a tool for development and especially the MDGs, Tony Addison,
George Mavrotas and Mark McGillivray (2005) find a positive link between aid and growth. They view aid as a crucial component in reaching these goals and they call for a mobilization of both domestic and external resources, such as aid, in order to manage this task.
Carl-Johan Dalgaard, Henrik Hansen and Finn Tarp (2004) also recognize foreign aid as an important part of halving poverty by 2015. They do, however, point out the limitations of the aid-growth nexus as the positive effects are not evident across all aid recipients. Due to the challenges in evaluating aid at the aggregate level, Arndt et al.
(2009:19) call for the use of evidence from ―a wide range of approaches, both micro and macro, as well as from different disciplines. This should include research into
10 different types of aid and non-growth objectives.‖ Reflecting this call for research within different disciplines, this thesis concerns itself with the determinants and objectives of the Norwegian aid agenda and it suggests Norwegian aid is influenced and shaped by the self-interests of domestic actors rather than the needs and interests of the recipient. This thesis takes on a FPA approach which allows better insight into the domestic factors that influence and shape a country‘s aid agenda. In doing so, it acknowledges that other factors play a role in determining aid policy but for the purpose of this research the main focus will be on domestic sources of pressure.
Dalgaard et al. (2004) re-examine the effectiveness of aid and they find that aid does in fact affect productivity in the long run. Furthermore, Dalgaard et al. argue that the pendulum has swung back in favor of aid and it is now recognized that aid does have a positive impact on growth. On the other side of this debate we find William Easterly, a vocal skeptic when it comes to aid‘s abilities to induce economic growth and development. In his report, Can the West Save Africa?, Easterly (2008) examines the different strategies put forward by the West in its attempts to ‗save Africa‘, aid being one of these strategies. Easterly concludes that there have been a cycling of ideas and that the West have shown little effort in terms of learning from the past (Easterly
2008:65). Though critical towards aid, Easterly does not dismiss the idea of development; he recognizes the existing accomplishments and results but emphasizes that most of the country successes are examples of homegrown advancements rather than the result of foreign interventions such as aid, leaving aid with few successes to show for (Easterly 2008:66).
11 In fact, one of the main arguments against aid is its contribution to corruption and weakening of state power in recipient countries. Ugandan political commentator and activist, Andrew Mwenda is joined by Dambisa Moyo, author of Dead Aid, in calling for a halt in Western aid flows to Africa. They both argue that aid is corroding African societies, weakening the relationship between the state and its citizens and working against progress (Mwenda 2006; Mwenda 2008; Moyo 2009). Mirroring Easterly‘s critique, Mwenda argues that aid is not the answer for lifting Africa out of poverty. On the contrary, good governance and transparent institutions are. Though Moyo argues for more economic solutions for Africa‘s future development, she agrees with Mwenda.
According to Moyo, aid weakens the social capital, ―the invisible glue of relationships[,] that holds business, economy and political life together‖ in the recipient society (Moyo 2009:58). Aid thwarts accountability and weakens the incentive to reform inefficient policies and institutions. As Mwenda argues, the government is the one that makes fiscal and monetary policies; it invests in infrastructure and builds political institutions that foster the relationship between public policies and private economic agents. He argues that good governance is not a matter of altruism, but a result of enlightened self-interest:
If the source of this revenue is the national economy, government would be driven by self-interest to listen to its citizens about policies and it would be necessary to increase the productivity of private enterprises. If this happened, government would be granting a voice in policy-making and policy orientation to those whose wealth it desires to tax – government would be democratic (Mwenda 2008).
These arguments beg the question whether aid is really benefitting the recipients? And if the adverse effects outnumber the positive ones, why do donors continue to pour aid into developing countries? What is the rationale, if one exists, behind donor countries aid allocation? Additionally, what determines how countries distribute their aid?
12 These questions underpin the ‗aid motivation debate‘ within development and aid literature as well as traditional FPA discourse. The formulation process of aid policy is of special concern to FPA, especially how different factors and interests impact on the decision-making process and thus the stated objectives as an outcome of this process.
FPA analyzes the underlying interests and motivations for providing aid, what they are and how they influence and shape the decision-making process that leads to the national objectives.
The edited work, Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: Determinants of the
Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, examines how the aid policies of these countries can be ―explained with reference to dominant socio-political norms and overarching interests of the country in question‖ (Stokke
1989a:18). The authors establish how these characteristics would influence aid policy and examine whether the suggested outcome corresponds with the actual performance.
The analytical framework of the book is that of humane internationalism and its offshoots. Based on humanitarian values and ethics, and motivated by compassion, the main principle of humane internationalism is the belief that developed nations have
―moral obligations towards peoples and events beyond their borders‖ (Stokke
1989a:10). In the case of aid it means that developed nations have a responsibility towards developing countries as it regards social and economic advancement. Humane internationalism does not disregard self-interest but recognizes broader national interests in regards to mutual benefit, much like liberal theory in IR. Pursuing development policies in the South is regarded as compatible with national fiscal and social welfare policies (Stokke 1989a:11). Aid policies can also be seen as part of
13 national security interest as fragile and impoverished states are seen as natural havens for terrorists (Moyo 2009:151).
A recent study by Javed Younas shows the existence of a positive relationship between aid flows and nations who import goods in which the donor country have a comparative advantage. The study further argues that donor objectives are dominated by economic and political self-interests and that this correlation between donor interests and aid is a cause of the ineffectiveness of aid in creating growth (Younas
2008:672). Marikje Breuning on the other hand argues that though foreign aid might be influenced by self-interests this is likely to be less damaging to the recipients‘ needs than with other policies (Breuning 1995:236). This statement could be true if one disregards the stagnant socio-political environment of most aid recipients and the worsening conditions of their populations despite the intense activities related to aid provision in these countries. Supporting Younas‘ analysis, this thesis argues that economic and political factors that represent national self-interest cannot be disregarded and that such self-interests are damaging to the development objectives of aid.
1.1.1 Altruism and Self-Interest: Norwegian Development Policy
Though self-interest exists in Norwegian aid it is seldom emphasized in the literature.
Rather, altruistic interests and humanitarian values are highlighted as the main foundation of Norwegian aid policies is apparent in the literature (Stokke 1989b;
Stokke 1995; Tvedt 2009). Even critics of the Norwegian aid model acknowledge the importance of altruism and humanitarian ideals in influencing Norwegian aid policies
(Tvedt 2009). In general, socio-political norms and interests are given predominance
14 in explaining Norwegian aid motivation, as well as Norwegian aid objectives, strategies, policies and volume. The influence of economic interests is recognized to a lesser extent (Stokke 1989b). However, some scholars argue that this donor interest- recipient needs dichotomy is too simplistic; self-interest can take on different forms.
Policies based on altruistic ideals can still serve as a means to a political end, such as image-building in the international community as soft power production. Norwegian researchers Henrik Thune and Torgeir Larsen point out that promoting one‘s own perception of what is right and to act like a moral superpower can be just as much real politik as promoting business or security interests. In Norway‘s case it is not so much that there is a conflict between altruistic motives and self-interest, but rather that the
Norwegian foreign policy has two parallel sets of national interests; promoting
Norway as a humanitarian super power, and promoting Norwegian business and industry interests (Thune and Larsen 2000:75).
In his case study of Norway, Olav Stokke focuses on norms, interests and the economy in analyzing the determinants of Norwegian aid policy. Stokke examines these features in a systemic way and he does not concern himself with ―the social bearers [the human agents] of these values‖ (Stokke 1989b:160). The analysis offers insight into potential determinants of the Norwegian aid agenda and provides a good description of the changes in Norwegian aid policy from its beginning in the 1960s to the end of the 1980s. This broader and more generalized approach to analyzing aid is also found in Carol Lancaster‘s book, Foreign Aid, where Lancaster examines why aid is given. She looks at the purposes governments pursue with their aid, and then asks why they chose these purposes. However, scholars have started to break away from the traditional way of analyzing foreign policy; recently, more academic literature on
15 FPA focus on the role of domestic actors in determining a country‘s foreign policy
(Alaminos 2000; Ball 2010). In an analysis of the European Union‘s foreign policy in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Marie Milward (2008) focuses on the role and leverage of the actors involved in the initiatory and implementation stage of the foreign policy. Her study reflects the shift towards human agency in FPA (Hudson
2007). This thesis will contribute to the field of FPA by offering an actor-specific approach to the study of foreign aid illustrated by the Norwegian model. The proposed analysis will focus on the decision-making process that forms the stated objectives of a country‘s aid policies and sets out the foundation for the allocation and implementation.
Most of the present analyses of Norwegian aid determinants look at the general factors influencing the aid flows such as national values and norms and overarching system and economic interests (Stokke 1989a and 1989b). These examinations of aid determinants reflect the traditional way of analyzing foreign policy. In contrasts, this thesis examines the influence of domestic actors in the decision-making process of aid. This focus on human agency in foreign policy represents a new focus in the literature on aid motivation and determinants. The analysis of the Norwegian aid agenda will include an examination of Norwegian aid distribution based on the above mentioned criteria but this thesis is focused on how these policies are influenced and shaped by the domestic actors and their interests. Contrasting Lancaster and Stokke, but reflecting Milward, this thesis will focus on the domestic actors and their human agency in the decision-making process. Theories on corporatism and lobbyism will be employed in order to better capture the human agency at play in foreign aid practices.
The hopeful objective of this thesis is to be an addition to the existing body of
16 literature on aid and FPA by shedding some light on the socio-political mechanisms that influence the national decision-making process of foreign aid providers, illustrated by the case of Norway.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
Recent works in FPA have refocused the research agenda on human decision-making.
Ultimately, the main concern for all social sciences, including IR, is the
―understanding [of] how humans perceive and react to the world around them, and how humans shape and are shaped by the world around them‖ (Hudson 2007:3). In the pursuit of understanding how humans perceive and react to the world, events in IR are often analyzed through different levels of analysis in order to grasp the many nuances that play into the dynamics of international politics. The traditional breakdown of state behavior in IR is the three images put forward by Kenneth Waltz: the individual level, the state level and the international system level (Waltz 1982). Each level offers a certain lens that influences and shapes the analysis and understanding of state behavior. The system level draws our attention to the interests of the nation state and the structures of the international system; the state level focuses on the multitude of actors within the nation state and the societal and governmental factors shaping their interests; while the individual level concentrates on the individual decision-makers, their roles, perceptions and interests and how they interact with each other.
Not all scholars agree on which of the levels of analysis offers the best insight for understanding state behavior in international relations. This debate is known as the agent-structure problem and it is considered one of the major debates in the field of IR
17 (Neack 2003:177). In a nutshell, it centers on whether events in international relations are dominated by system structures or state actors and their inter-subjective understandings (Hudson 2007:8). Valerie Hudson (2007:10) juxtaposes the works of the neorealist Kenneth Waltz and the social constructivist Alexander Wendt to illuminate the two conflicting sides of the argument: material structures (Waltz) vs. socially constructed ideas (Wendt). Framed within the agent-structure debate, this thesis concerns itself with whether the structure of the international system determines how Norwegian aid policies are formulated, or whether domestic actors, their perceptions and interests, shape the Norwegian aid agenda?
By the nature of the hypothesis and research questions stated above, the state level of analysis seems most appropriate for understanding the domestic factors that influence the decision-making process. The state level of analysis recognizes and incorporates the diversity of actors and offers a deeper understanding of the internal dynamics at play within each country. By opening up the ―black box‖ of the nation state we gain insight into the national characteristics, governmental attributes and domestic pressures that influence the foreign policy of a country and determine how and why some countries act the way they do (Neack 2003:46, 77; Hudson 2007:126-128). This thesis will analyze Norwegian development policy through the state lens which will allow us to explore the dynamics at play within society. Both governmental and societal factors are taken into account. Governmental factors include the political system, division of power and authority between governmental institutions, and the inner dynamics of bureaucracies. Societal factors refer to a nation‘s economic system, its history, size and demography and to civil political activity where political opposition, interest groups and media play central roles. These two categories are not
18 mutually exclusive, however; the relationship between state and society is one where lobbying of government officeholders by interest groups takes place side by side with the mobilization of public opinion by national leaders (Neack 2003:77-78). As aid ultimately represents a tool of the donor country‘s foreign policy, the nature of aid is best analyzed as a foreign policy decision. The unit of analysis is the decision-making process and the objective is to determine the factors which influence the process and shape the outcome. With this in mind, theories on corporatism and pluralism will be utilized alongside a strong focus on the role of interest groups in the decision-making process of Norwegian aid.
FPA recognizes the importance of both Waltz‘ material structures and Wendt‘s ideational constructs in shaping events in IR. However, FPA‘s main critique of both approaches is the lack of human agency in the analysis of IR. Waltz ‗black boxes‘ the state and argues that state behavior is solely shaped by the system structures; Wendt opens up the box with his emphasis on the role of ideational social constructs, but his narrow focus on ideas also leaves his analysis lacking of human agency. Hudson stresses that ―only human beings have ideas‖ and that ―only humans are agents in international relations‖ (Hudson 2007:10). In Hudson‘s opinion, FPA‘s main contribution to IR is the identification of the main ―intersection between the most important determinants of state behavior: material and ideational factors. [This] intersection is not the state, it is human decision-makers‖ (Hudson 2007:7, author‘s italics). This focus on human agency is a main characteristic of FPA as it seeks to explain the ―decisions taken by human decision-makers‖ (Hudson 2007:4). The human component is FPA‘s strength as an analytical framework of IR. FPA links the acts of human agency in IR to the consequences of human actions (Hudson 2007:8).
19 By taking a foreign policy approach to the concept of aid, this thesis aims to give a fuller explanation of the factors that influence and shape Norway‘s aid policies beyond the generalizations of state behavior based on system attributes (Hudson
2007:8). Also, by looking at aid as a foreign policy decision and analyzing how the
Norwegian aid agenda is fashioned through the national decision-making process, this thesis takes a stand on the agent-structure debate in favor of returning to human agency in FPA.
1.2.1 Norwegian Politics: A Pluralistic System of Lobbyism and Corporatism
Traditionally, Norwegian government institutions have been governed by routine and established practices; decisions were based on laws, departmental traditions and standard operating procedures (SOPs). The traditional bureaucrat was a lawyer. After the Second World War, specialists and people with professional backgrounds entered the Norwegian bureaucracy in full, bringing with them new perceptions and operating procedures that can be traced back to their professions. Later, organized interests were brought into the decision-making process. From being an occasional addition to the administrative institutions, government commissions (both permanent and ad hoc) are now common procedure and a frequent addition to the decision-making process. The two latter modes of interaction between civil society and government are corporative channels of influence, a characteristic of corporatism (Nordby 1994, 17, 23-24).
Corporatism refers to a system where specialized interests are linked to the state, aiming to influence the policy process (Grant 2003a, 121). This system opens up for domestic actors playing a role in Norwegian decision-making. Norway can thus be described as a pluralistic society where power is not concentrated with the electorate
20 but is distributed across society (Christophersen 1973, 243). Maurice East points to the ―informal personal contacts across organizational boundaries‖ as a special trait of the Norwegian foreign policy-making; ―university ties, regional ties, professional ties, all working to penetrate organizational barriers‖ (East 1981, 156). According to East, the proliferation of informal connections is derived from the small size of Norwegian bureaucracy.
Informal contacts are important in a pluralistic system that allows for a wide range of channels of influence. From a theoretical viewpoint pluralism is a good thing; it spreads power and gives more actors access to the decision-making system. Looking at how it manifests in real life, however, pluralism actually consolidates power among groups and organizations that already have resources, influence and status in a society
(Christophersen 1973, 243). There have been expressed concerns about the activities of interest groups and the vested interest they represent. In an analysis of the
Norwegian foreign policy decision-making process, Jens A. Christophersen argues that most decisions are made by a small number of people. This is a dynamic process where the selected few shift from case to case and decision to decision. As far as the democratic process goes, Christophersen argues further that this is simply a way of legitimizing decisions that are already made (Christophersen 1973, 255-257). This thesis will further explore this corporative pluralism of Norwegian society and link it to the role of human agency in foreign policy decision-making.
In addition to the bureaucrat being seen as one corporate channel, civil society organizations and interest groups are viewed as another corporative influence (Nordby
1994, 10). By definition, interest groups seek to promote their interests and agendas.
21 This is often referred to as lobbyism when directed at policy makers, but it is also known as advocacy and campaigning. Most common is putting pressure on the authorities in order to raise attention around a cause (Grant 2003b, 266). Lobbyists are
‗professional influencers‘ who work on behalf of interests groups as intermediaries, approaching policy makers and ministries in order to promote a cause. They can be hired in or be a part of the organization itself (Grant 2003, 314).1 Though not at the same level as in the United States, lobbying has become a natural part of the political scene in Norway. These groups are not only referred to as interests groups but
‗pressure groups‘ and ‗lobby groups‘ are common terms and the three are used interchangeably (Grant 2003b, 266).
The attention of the interest groups is directed at the most influential and powerful sections of the political system and this will vary from country to country. For instance, Congress and the Supreme Court are the most powerful centers of policy- making in the United States. In Norway, however, the attention is directed towards the executive branch that controls policy-making. Campaigning and lobby work is directed at the Norwegian Parliament (called the Storting in Norwegian), politicians, the ministries and the civil servants working in the bureaucracy (Grant 2003b, 267).
Contrary to lobbyism where influence only goes one way, namely towards the executive system, corporatism reverses the process and brings the influence back towards its origin. Because groups and organizations are actively taken into consideration it is expected that they, after a policy is decided on, then convince their members that this was the best solution (Grant 2003a, 122).
1 Though they are not recruiting lobbyists per se, job announcements from Norwegian civil society organization call for people with experience in policy development and political advocacy. In other words: people with lobby experience.
22 1.3 Methodology
In order to best answer the stated research questions I use the case study method, with
Norway as my focus. The case study allows for greater insight and better understanding of a process while at the same time limits the applicability of the findings to the specific case. The research is based on analyses of primary source information in the form of archives (formal statements, speeches, official documents, recorded numbers and statistics, etc.) and secondary source information in the form of the existing body of literature written about aid (Norwegian and international), including donor policies, the purposes of aid-giving and motives. I also conducted a series of in-depth interviews with Norwegian development practitioners and aid officials that complement the primary and secondary sources. This triangulation of data contributed to bolster the final answers as well as helped eliminate faulty findings made from any biased source.
1.3.1 Primary Data
The primary data consists of official documents like propositions and reports to the
Storting. As well as official speeches and press statements, mostly from the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter referred to as the MFA) but also from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). Statistical material covering Norwegian development aid in the period 1960–2010 has mostly been found at Norad‘s web pages. In January 2011 they launched their ‗statistics portal‘, making figures of Norway‘s official development assistance since 1960 available to the public. The portal allows the user to specify geographic location, sector, partner (distribution channel) and time period. Additional statistics for Norway and Norwegian society have been found at Norway Statistics, the official statistics
23 bureau in Norway, which also offers access to extensive statistical material on their web pages. The web pages of the Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC) have also been used.
1.3.2 Secondary Data
The secondary sources include a selection of literature written on development aid, focusing on Norway‘s development program. Literature on Norwegian economy and society has also been used as well as reports from Norad and the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). The extensive historic presentation of
Norwegian development assistance from 1952 to 2002 in the form of three volumes under the title Norsk utviklinghjelps historie [The History of Norwegian Development
Assistance] forms the basis for the historical accounts of Norwegian aid activities.2
These books stand out as sources as they are the first to attempt a complete overview of Norwegian development assistance. Though there has been written both historical and political analyses on Norwegian North-South relations, these projects are usually concerned with a specific time period or theme (see Angell 1989; Eriksen 1987;
Hveem 1989; Stokke 1989a and 1995; Tvedt 2009). The three volumes that make up the series do not only engage a 50 year period, they concern themselves with a range of themes and subjects within the history of Norwegian aid.
2 Vol. 1: Jarle Simensen, 1952-1975: Norge møter den tredje verden [Norway Meets the Third World]; Vol. 2: Arild Engelsen Ruud and Kirsten Alsaker Kjerland, 1975-1989: Vekst, velvilje og utfordringer [Growth, Goodwill and Challenges]; Vol. 3: Frode Liland and Kirsten Alsaker Kjerland, 1989-2002: På bred front [On A Broad Front]. This work is currently only in Norwegian; a comprehensive English edition by Helge Pharo is in the works but the finished date is not set. These volumes are a must read for all aid practitioners interested in Norwegian development aid.
24 1.3.3 Interviews
In June of 2010 I carried out a field research in Norway where I interviewed development practitioners and aid officials from a cross-section of the Norwegian development field. I conducted semi-structured interviews with government officials in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, aid officials at Norad, as well as interviews with development professionals from Norwegian civil society and Norwegian scholars and researchers within the field of development, aid and foreign policy. The interviews can be classified as elite- or expert interviews as all of the informants are well- educated and hold high positions in their respective organization or institution. Each interview was based on a fixed set of open-ended questions, with plentiful opportunity for the respondent to elaborate and digress (Johnson 1995:283). See Appendix 1 for the full set of questions.
My goal was to have a representative selection of the Norwegian development community, including official aid authorities and representatives of civil society and academia. The selection of respondents was based on a combination of judgment and snowball sampling (Overton and Diermen 2003:43). I approached a cross-section of
Norwegian NGOs, contacting the General Secretary of the organization who then referred me to a person with more in-depth knowledge of my topic, most often a senior political advisor in the international section of the organization. As for academia, I contacted people directly based on their previous writings and current research interest. I was also introduced to people through academic contacts, a method
I also used for interviewees in the private sector, Norad and the MFA. If someone was unavailable or more information was desired, the person referred me to other people within their organization.
25 At the end of my field trip, 11 official interviews were conducted while another four were classified as unofficial and used as background information (see App. 2 for a list of respondents). The final sample includes two from the MFA, three from Norad (all from different departments), two from civil society, three from academia and one respondent representing the private sector. The four unofficial interviews include another three from the MFA and one from Norwegian development academia. The small number of respondents is a result of a limited time frame, lack of response
(especially from civil society) and cancellations due to unforeseen changes in the hectic work schedule of the respondents. The limited number of respondents does not permit generalizations but they do offer insight on Norwegian development operations from the individual level. In cases where their information corresponds with the written body of literature, they provide a validation of data and strengthen the analysis.
As a matter of ethics, the information from these interviews is not used without the written consent of the interviewee and all interviewees were given the option of remaining anonymous (Stake 2000:447). At the beginning of the interview the respondent was presented with a consent form (see App. 3) that stated the purpose of the research, their role as a respondent and recording methods as well as the anonymity option.3 All interviews were tape recorded and only one person chose to be anonymous. I suspect this was because the person was in-between jobs, going from a
Norwegian NGO to the MFA. This respondent also proved to be the most outspoken respondent, sharing widely from their personal experience and opinion when it comes to Norwegian development policy. It is hard to deduct whether the free speech was a
3 The consent form was approved by the AUC Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRB), see Appendix 4.
26 result of the anonymity or the person‘s personality but as the majority of the respondents were more cautious in their statements it is fair to assume that the respondent‘s direct speech was linked to their anonymity.4
1.3.4 Language of sources
As the bibliography shows, Norwegian sources have been extensively used throughout the thesis. Though there exist valuable literature in English about Norway, Norwegian foreign policy and development aid, the most relevant literature are found in the
Norwegian sources. In some cases, like the data from Norwegian institutions, ministries and organizations, information is found in both Norwegian and English.
However, the English editions are sometimes shortened or summarized and do not always contain the complete body of information. In the case of web pages, the
English versions are often less developed and do not offer the same extent of information as their twin Norwegian pages. Where possible I have used the English data but where shortcomings were obvious the Norwegian data was used instead or in addition. Sometimes Norwegian is the only language available, as it is with Norad‘s statistics portal. In the bibliography, Norwegian titles are followed by an English translation in brackets. As for the interviews, all but one was conducted in Norwegian.
As I speak Norwegian there was no need for a third party translator, thus minimizing information getting lost in translation. Additionally, the interview guide was prepared in both English and Norwegian. Afterwards, all interviews were transcribed in the language the interview was conducted.
4 Some referred to their position and said it was not appropriate to give an opinion.
27
CHAPTER 2
NORWEGIAN AID: THE INSTITUTIONAL SETUP
In Norway the aid agenda is operated by a handful of government agencies as well as some non-governmental influences. The most important political institutions that shape Norwegian aid policy are the Storting, the government, the Foreign Ministry and Norad. In addition to these government institutions, Norwegian aid and development policy is influenced by domestic groups and interest organizations from civil society and the private sector. The following section will look at the institutional setup of Norwegian aid and the role of political institutions in the decision-making process.
2.1 The Storting
The Norwegian Parliament, the Storting, sets out the goals of Norway‘s aid engagements. Through the state budget, the Storting also decides which countries and regions should be prioritized and how much money should be allocated (Norad
2011f). The Storting works closely with the Norwegian government and rather than being a control organ its primary role is to support the government‘s foreign policy and maintain stability and consensus in Norwegian foreign policy (Sjaastad 2006, 19).
A united foreign policy is seen as a strategic strength in international relations, a sentiment that is shared by all Members of Parliament (MPs) and the government. The principle of unity is traced back to the early years of Norway‘s Foreign Ministry.
Norway viewed itself as a small nation without much power in the international
28 system and it was believed that a united foreign policy was one way of securing a minimum of leverage in dealing with other states. Norway could not afford to be divided (Sjaastad 2006, 20). This mentality is still very much present in Norwegian foreign policy thinking and consequently in Norway‘s development agenda. Though the Storting has traditionally been concerned with upholding a unified Norwegian foreign policy, the parliamentary debates are a place of discussion and interaction between the MFA and Norway‘s elected representatives and thus represent an important part of the policy decision-making process.
2.1.1 The Storting’s Rules of Procedure
Figure 1 on the following page gives an outline of the general parliamentary procedures, regardless of issue. The right column indicates the different written material that is accumulated throughout the process while the left column shows how the issue moves down, or up, in the system. We see that the process can start with either the government, or with the motion of a Private Member put forward by an MP.
Prior to presenting an issue, the government usually establishes an expert commission that investigates the issue further and presents an Official Norwegian Report (NOU), also known as a green paper. The relevant ministries look into the case and draw up a
Proposition or a Report to the Storting, the latter known as a white paper. This document is presented to the government who takes the issue to the Council of State before presenting it to the Storting. In this instance, the Proposition is simply a proposal for a resolution while the Report is considered a policy document. When the
Storting receives a proposal they send it to one of the 15 standing committees depending on the expertise required. After further discussion, the standing committee gives their recommendation to the Storting. Proposed bills end with a legislative act
29 while other issues end up as a resolution in the Storting with a following official report (Storting 2010).
Figure 1. The Storting‘s Rules of Procedure
Source: Storting 2010.
30 The parliamentary debates concerning Norwegian foreign policy usually originates in the government but they are also initiated by the Storting and sometimes even as a response to the debate entry of the Foreign Minister in the Council of State5 (Sjaastad
2006, 23). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the natural ministry for further debate and their role in the formation of essential policy documents like resolutions and white papers puts the MFA at the center point in the foreign policy decision-making process.
When the proposal reaches the Storting it is delegated to the Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and Defense (FAD) who deals with development and aid issues.6
Though it has already been decided which issues are a matter of concern when the
Standing Committee on FAD starts their work in the parliamentary procedures, the role of their findings and the framework they operate in gives the Standing Committee on FAD a certain degree of importance in the policy process. As tradition has it, all standing committees conduct their operations behind closed doors. The thought behind this is that their members can speak freely and let all ideas out. Protocols of the committee meetings are published but not exact minutes; only the general development of the committee‘s work is noted (Storting 2009a). As the standing committees are expected to present an extensive analysis of the issue at hand, they often turn outside the committee itself for information. Relevant departments are consulted, in the case of development and aid it is usually the MFA, and public hearings are organized. Some even use excursions and ‗field trips‘ to gather the necessary information. The public hearings are of special interest as these allow
5 The government assembled as the King‘s Council (Government 2011a). 6 From 2010 the Committee on Defense and the Committee on Foreign Affairs operated as one under the name of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense (FAD). The Standing Committee on FAD concerns itself with issues of foreign policy, military defense, development cooperation, Norwegian interests in Svalbard and the polar areas and Norwegian relationship with other states and organizations.
31 access to civil society and the private sector. It is not open access however, and organizations and institutions must have an invitation. These hearings are considered to be strictly information meetings and there is no debate. However, due to the relatively short distance between organizations and the decision-making process during these meetings, hearings are considered important channels for outside actors to influence the process (Storting 2011).
2.1.2 The Storting’s Power in the Norwegian Policy Process
It is claimed that the Storting plays a great role in Norwegian development policy
(Norad 2011e). However, it can be argued that the parliamentary debates have a small impact on the decision-making process as only a handful of MPs participate. A major critique of the Storting debates is the insufficient insight and knowledge level of the
MPs as far as foreign policy and development issues are concerned. Though MPs have incorporated international questions into their political agenda, the increased interest has not resulted in participation on these issues in the parliamentary debates and it is argued that they are more concerned with domestic issues (Christophersen 1973, 213;
Sjaastad 2006, 24). The low status of the Storting as a political player in the decision- making process of Norwegian aid policy has also been contributed to the seemingly small knowledge base the Storting and its MPs hold on matters concerning development and aid.7 In theory, the Storting holds a great deal of power as Norway has a political system where the government receives its democratic legitimacy from the parliament. This system is called parliamentarism. According to the principle of parliamentarism, the executive branch, the government, is held accountable for its actions by the legislative, the parliament. In other words, if the Storting is not satisfied
7 Interview with Arvinn Gadgil, Political Advisor to the Minister of Environment and International Development, June 28th 2010.
32 with the work of the Norwegian government, they can ask the government to step down (Storting 2009b). As such, the government is reliant on the support of the
Storting in order to stay in power. This gives the Storting the opportunity to challenge and question the acts of the government (Christophersen 1973, 212). But when the
Storting does not us this power it weakens their legitimacy as a political actor. It also means more power to the other actors in the Norwegian development policy decision- making process, namely the government and the Foreign Ministry.
2.2 The Norwegian Government
As the parliamentary procedures indicate, the Norwegian government plays a dominant role in the decision-making process as they decide which issues should be further analyzed and debated in the Storting. In their authority, guidelines for
Norwegian development cooperation are proposed through white papers, resolutions and bills to the Parliament. The government is also the drafter of the annual aid budget which denotes how much, to whom what and by whom the development assistance should be distributed (Norad 2011f). The government also has the authority to keep issues outside the eyes of the public where they deem it necessary (Sjaastad 2006, 26).
Furthermore, the Norwegian Prime Minister and his office are seen as the last point of executive power in Norway. Though much of the daily responsibilities of the Prime
Minister‘s Office (PMO) lies in the coordination of the ministries, the Prime Minister has the authority to intervene in any process, at any time if he or she so wishes
(Udgaard 2006, 48-49). But for the most part the PMO only oversees the work of the ministries and their respective ministers. In a study from 1973, Jens A. Christophersen argues that while in most other countries international questions and issues are handles
33 by the head of state, be it the president or the prime minister, in Norway these issues are handled by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Development
(Christophersen 1973, 207; Norad 2011f).8
Norwegian governments are often formed as a coalition between a main party and a few minority parties in order to ensure the correct presentation based on the electoral votes. This is the situation with the current government, Stoltenberg‘s second government, which is a coalition between Det Norske Arbeiderpartiet, (the Norwegian
Labor Party), Sosialistisk Venstreparti (the Socialist Left) and Senterpartiet (the
Centre Party) (Government 2011a). As these situations require a lot of bargaining on the part of the governing parties, the minority groups have the opportunity to advocate for and promote their niche issues as compensation for joining the coalition or having to step aside on other issues (Lancaster 2007:20). Theoretically, the political coalition of three parties will inevitably introduce more issues to the political agenda of foreign policy and development then a majority government of just one political party.
However, it must be kept in mind that the Norwegian foreign policy has developed over time into a long-term strategy and its fundamental characteristics will not change just because the composition of the government changes. There have been few political fights about the general strategy for Norwegian development cooperation and the level of coherence and continuation in Norwegian aid policy is rare among donors.
Details have certainly been adjusted and tweaked when needed but the main elements have remained.9
8 The post of Minister of Development was first established in 1983 (Norad 2011c). 9 Interview with Lena Hasle, Senior Advisor in the Section for International Development Policy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 28th 2010.
34 Also illustrated by the parliamentary procedures, neither the Storting nor the government acts in a vacuum; they both rely on the Norwegian bureaucracy to provide relevant and up-to-date information on international development issues (Norad
2011f). As controllers of information, both the MFA and Norad hold significant power in the decision-making process of Norwegian development policy.
2.3 The Norwegian Foreign Ministry
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerns itself with traditional foreign policy issues as well as those of an economic and development nature. The MFA both prepares and executes Norwegian policy decisions, as well as offer advice and coordination in relation to other ministries. As the author of Propositions and Reports to the Storting, the MFA must be considered an essential part in the decision-making process of
Norwegian development policy. After the policy is set, the MFA is responsible for adopting strategies for the individual development schemes with the recipient countries as well as the long-term government-to-government cooperation with countries. They also manage Norway‘s multi-lateral aid and humanitarian assistance as well as being politically responsible for the Norwegian aid policy(Norad 2011f).
When the MFA additionally plays a key role as an information provider on foreign affairs, aid and development, and thus are consulted on these issues by other ministers, the PMO and the standing committees, the role of the MFA as an agenda setter when it comes to Norwegian development policy is clear.
35 2.3.1 The Organizational Structure of the MFA
The MFA is the largest ministry in Norway‘s government administration with a total of eight departments, each with a number of specialized subunits, or sections, under its administration (MFA 2010b; MFA 2011f). The MFA is also the only ministry with two minister posts: the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Environment and International Development (MFA 2011e). Figure 2 shows the internal structure of the MFA.
Figure 2. Organizational chart of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs per March 1st 2010
Source: MFA 2010b.
As we can see, the two minister posts of Foreign Affairs and Development each have their own political staff10 with the subsequent secretariat and public contact unit (MFA
2010b; MFA 2011e). The Secretary General and the Deputy General is seen as the administrative leaders, responsible for the general management of the MFA (MFA
2010b). Together with these two, the Political Director and Director for Development
Policy and the eight departmental heads, the Director Generals, are seen as the senior
10 The political staff for both ministers per June 2011 consists of four State Secretaries (i.e. Deputy Ministers) and two political advisors.
36 administrative staff. From the outside, the MFA is regarded as the specialist on foreign affairs. Scratching the surface just a bit shows that underneath the unified surface that is projected as Norwegian foreign policy there are many different units and sections, and consequently concerns, to consider. When it is said that the MFA submits a proposal or play an important part of the decision-making process it must be understood that the many different sections of the MFA play a role as well.
The day to day work is managed by the civil servants of the MFA. They can be referred to as the institutional memory of the organization as this is where the history and culture of an institution is found. These bureaucrats are what make up the stability and continuity of the state administration. While the political leadership, in this case the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Environment and International
Development and their respective political staff, are connected to the sitting government and leaves when the government leaves, the people working in the bureaucracy of the MFA remain despite political changes. Thus the ideal bureaucrat should be neutral, loyal, independent and egalitarian (Christensen et al. 2002, 121-
125). In other terms, ready for whatever political shifts may come.
Representing apolitical knowledge it is the civil servants that are the key authors of central documents like Propositions and Reports (Christensen et al. 2002, 127). The administrative leaders and the Ministers will, of course, lead the process but the final formulations lie in the administration. That is not to say that the individual leaders do not exert their influence on the drafting process of these documents. The theme of the
Report no. 13 to the Storting, Climate, Conflict and Capital, is said to have been a direct instruction from Erik Solheim, the Minister of Environment and International
37 Development. Lena Hasle, a Senior Advisor in the Section for Development Policy in the MFA, remarked that the report would most likely have taken a different direction and form if it had been less controlled by Solheim and more by the bureaucrats in the
Foreign Ministry.11
When issues of special concern are put on the agenda it has usually gone through a process of analysis and debate within the MFA itself before being presented to the
Storting. Both civil servants and higher administrative staff can initiate this process but the bureaucrat will always be involved as it is most often they who are in charge of exploring the matter further. If seen as significant enough the case is presented to a selected number of leaders who then circulate it among themselves. Meetings take place, adjustments are made, summaries written and as the final part of the process a strategy note is composed. Sometimes the process goes via one of the established expert commissions or maybe an ad hoc work group is established to discuss the matter at hand. Meetings in the MFA are often a combination of official and unofficial as ‗coffee talk‘ and ‗morning meetings‘12 are widespread throughout the Foreign
Ministry (Neumann and Leira 2005, 409-410). Seen from the view point of a
Secretary General in the mid 1970s, the weekly morning meetings were the most important forum of discussion; it is the only ―institutionalized connection between the political administration on one side and the Secretary General and the departmental heads on the other‖ (Neumann and Leira 2005, 413). Their vital role continued until the early 1990s when the MFA merged with the Department of Trade, introducing a new leader group that would devaluate the role of the departmental heads, leaving
11 Interview with Hasle, June 28th 2010. 12 By ‘coffee talk‘ and ‗morning meetings‘ I mean informal conversations taking place within the MFA, often during just that, morning meetings. The point is not when the meetings take place, or what beverages are served, but that these meetings are often closed off except for the few selected.
38 them out of the loop. Though the meetings have become institutionalized and considered a part of the modus operandi of the MFA, their procedures are still very informal and leave little room for outsiders. No minutes are kept and there is no system of checks and balances besides the ministers themselves (Neumann and Leira
2005, 414).
As a body that has the power to propose a new direction for Norwegian development policy, the MFA and its ways of operating must be considered when looking at possible actions of influence on the policy process. If and when actors of civil society and the private sector link up with the MFA‘s political leadership they have direct access to the decision-making process when the policy is in the making. This is a much more vulnerable stage than after the draft of the policy has been finalized and it is not without reason pressure groups direct their efforts towards this stage of the decision-making process. By now, lobbyism is an established feature of the
Norwegian policy-making process and organizations and interest groups often have their own units of policy analysis and awareness work, aimed at the executive branch of the Norwegian aid bureaucracy. Arvinn Gadgil, Political Advisor to the current
Minister of Environment and International Development, marks that lobbyism is certainly a trait of Norwegian authorities‘ interaction with civil society and private sector actors; judged by the many emails that flood his inbox every week there is definitive campaigning from private actors towards the MFA and the Secretariat of the
Development Minister.13
13 Interview with Gadgil, June 28th 2010.
39 With globalization and increasing interdependence, the MFA has had to struggle with the proliferation of issues that are of concern to Norwegian foreign policy. This was a concern as early as the late 1970s when Keohane and Nye first coined the issue of
‗interdependence‘. In a study of Norway‘s reaction to the growing interdependence,
Maurice East predicted that the expansion of the foreign policy agenda would become a problem for the traditional structure of the MFA (East 1981, 139). At the time, he found that the Norwegian MFA had adapted quite well, incorporating the new issues as well as expanding its organization. However, few changes were made to the structure of the MFA, a weak point according to East. He did however argue that the prevalence of informal ties that cut across the central administration counterbalanced the lack of necessary coordination (East 1981, 159).
2.4 The Norwegian Agency for Development and Cooperation
The Norwegian Agency for Development and Cooperation is an independent directorate within the MFA whose role is to serve as an advisor to the MFA, the government and the Storting on issues concerning development. This includes cooperating with the many committees and working groups that function within the government administration. Away from Norad‘s role as an information unit on development cooperation and aid, the agency‘s main task is to evaluate Norwegian aid and to ensure a high level of quality throughout the distribution of Norwegian aid. As a part of their information work, an annual report on Norwegian bilateral aid is published at the beginning of each year. Norad also manages grants for development in guidance with the MFA (MFA 2004b; Norad 2011f). As Norad‘s role is mainly of an implementing and advisory nature, the directorate has to present and consult with
40 the MFA on issues that are of a political nature or raises questions about sensitive matters, like organizational rearrangements, budget and accounting matters and other instances that fall outside Norad‘s jurisdiction (MFA 2004b). Though Norad was merged into the MFA in 2004, the proponents of development aid do not appear to have been weakened within the Norwegian government (Norad 2011b).
2.5 The Development of the Norwegian Aid Administration
In the 1950s, the Norwegian Foreign Ministry was divided into different departments.
There was high level of mobility between MFA and the Ministry of Trade and
Commerce on issues regarding trade policy and people working on security policy frequently consulted the Ministry of Defense (Neumann and Leira 2005, 317). In the late 1950s the MFA started to lose some of its monopoly on foreign affairs. With development assistance becoming a growing budget post for Norway, a special commission was established to investigate the role and direction of Norwegian aid.
The commission recommended that development activities should have its own administration and in 1962 Norsk utviklingshjelp (NUH), a government institution focusing on managing Norwegian development assistance, was established (Eriksen
1987, 11; Neumann and Leira 2005, 318). From the MFA‘s side, NUH was intended to be under the control of the MFA, acting solely as an executive body concerned with the implementation of Norwegian aid. However, the leadership of NUH wanted more power and in the years that followed NUH struggled with the blurred lines of its jurisdiction (Simensen 2003, 112-113). The Norwegian Agency for Development
Cooperation, Norad, was established in 1968. Norad‘s responsibilities and duties increased significantly in this transition, establishing Norad as an independent
41 directorate under the supervision of the MFA. Norad was given control over the technical implementation and oversight of both bilateral and multilateral aid. Norad was also in charge of traditional bureaucratic work as well as planning Norway‘s aid budget (Neumann and Leira 2005, 376; Simensen 2003, 114). Simultaneously, the
MFA expanded its case load; in 1969 a separate unit for international economic and social development was established in the MFA in addition to the existing trade policy unit (Neumann and Leira 2005, 313, 317). In the mid 1970s the MFA‘s role on development issues was strengthened and some of Norad‘s responsibilities was transferred back to the Foreign Ministry. The policy process was kept in the MFA while Norad still stood as the main body of implementation. The practice of administering development aid under the Foreign Ministry was seen throughout
Europe and this was viewed as the best way of structuring the relationship between development issues and foreign policy (Neumann and Leira 2005, 376-377).
However, in 1984 the Ministry of Development Cooperation was established, separating out tasks of a development nature from the MFA. The new department came with its own Minister and Deputy Minister and the supervision of Norad was consequently transferred to the new department. The separation of foreign affairs and development issues was not positively welcomed in the MFA and it was argued that
Norad would suffer from a middle position between a directorate and a department unit. The Ministry of Development Cooperation only lasted five years before it was ended in 1990 (Neumann and Leira 2005, 378; MFA 2006d). Though development and aid was once again under the control of the MFA, the post of Minister of
Development Cooperation was continued. In the following years, the middle position
Norad had taken on during the years of the Ministry of Development Cooperation
42 continued to haunt the institution and a report from 2003 describes Norad as fragmented and without a strategic focus (Neumann and Leira 2005, 378). In the same year, parts of Norad‘s responsibilities as well as the management was transferred back to the MFA while the evaluation section was transferred from the MFA to Norad
(Neumann and Leira 2005, 379, 535).
2.5.1 Additions to the Norwegian Aid Institutions
In addition to the Foreign Ministry and Norad, we find that government organizations like the Norwegian Peace Corps, Fredskorpset (FK Norway), and the state-owned investment fund Norfund are seen as important instruments of Norwegian development policy. These bodies act as implementers of policy decisions, alongside
Norad‘s activities (Norad 2011f).
Established by the MFA in 1997, the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing
Countries, Norfund, is the most recent addition to Norwegian aid management. Its mission has been to promote sustainable business activities (especially those with high risk as these would normally not see the light of day) by contributing with equity and/or risk capital that is needed in the start up process of a business project. Norfund also offers loans and guaranties. Guidelines for the fund say that their activities have to work in compliance with Norwegian development policy and only projects in countries classified by the OECD to be Lower Middle Income Countries, Low Income
Countries and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), or those cleared by the Storting through the aid budget, are eligible for funding (MFA 2004c). The contribution to private sector development is considered intrinsic to the successful development of a
43 country. ―The objective is to promote business development and contribute to economic growth and poverty alleviation‖ (Norfund 2011).
The Norwegian Peace Corps is another tool in the Norwegian government‘s coordination of aid. FK Norway is a public body responsible to the MFA and their job is to contribute to partnerships between individuals, organizations and institutions in
Norway and in developing countries (Norad 2011f; FK Norway 2011). FK Norway was first established in 1963 as a unit of Norwegian Development Aid (later Norad).
Back then the main mission of FK Norway was to provide technical assistance on a middle-management level. A majority of the implemented programs focused on education, health care and agriculture (Simensen 2003, 177-183). FK Norway was dismantled in 1997 but re-established in 2000, under the supervision of the MFA, as a part of the Norwegian aid administration. The mission of FK Norway is still to work as an exchange channel between Norway and its recipients, ensuring transfer of expertise, experience and skills to developing countries as well as Norwegian institutions and organizations. Similar to Norad, FK Norway has to consult with the
MFA on issues of a political or sensitive matter (MFA 2010a).
The examination of the institutional setup of Norwegian aid shows that the decision- making process is mainly influenced and shaped by the MFA, the government and the
Parliament. Norad, Norfund and FK Norway are simply implementing the final policy.
However, as they do represent a pool of information on development and aid, these institutions can play a role in influencing the decision-making process.
44
CHAPTER 3
THE NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
& DOMESTIC CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE
Having looked at the Norwegian institutional arrangements for aid, this chapter will focus on the domestic channels of influence. As the previous chapter indicated, the decision-making process for Norwegian development policy allows for interaction with and influence from non-governmental actors. The appointment of both permanent and ad hoc committees and working groups ensures a relationship between the Norwegian aid bureaucracy and actors from civil society and the private sector.
Hearings and open parliamentary debates also allow for insight into the policy process. But the most important channel of influence is perhaps the one that goes directly to the Foreign Ministry. So who are the domestic players influencing the decision-making process of Norwegian development policy?
Beside the government institutions and institutional arrangements, there are many factors affecting a country‘s foreign policy (Hudson 2007:127). Not all actors will have the same influence on the decision-making process; their role in it being limited by the proximity to the foreign policy decision-making position, the size and cohesiveness of an actor and level of interest and participation on the issue.
Corresponding views with the leadership and bureaucracy are another important factor in determining the impact of an actor. Take out any of these factors and the influence is likely to drop significantly; they are interdependent and reinforce each other. A domestic actor that has a large membership base, is close to the decision-making
45 center and is active in domestic politics will not necessarily be an effective source of influence if the actor itself does not agree on the agenda they want to persuade to the government, nor if the interests they pursue are of less importance to the government
(Hudson 2007:128-131). What political system a country has will also influence the outcome of decision-making. In a parliamentary system, coalitions among political parties can cause constraints on the decision-making process and the political game of bargaining is evident; the different parties have to negotiate and come to a consensus among themselves. Sometimes the smaller party will have a disproportional weight on important issues because they are the party that ‗makes or breaks‘ the government.
This bargaining game can be elevated to the inner dynamics of a party as well
(Hudson 2007:126; Neack 2003:98).
This chapter will take a closer look at the three most important domestic actors outside the bureaucratic governance of Norwegian aid. These are civil society organizations, the private sector and their respective interest groups as well as research bodies and academia. Pressure groups with commercial purposes linked to self-interest are traditionally separated from those with humanitarian and idealistic motives. Public opinion and domestic support are also considered to be a factor in Norway‘s development activities and will be given attention in brief.
3.1 Norwegian Civil Society
When answering the question of which domestic players influence the decision- making process of Norwegian development policy, it is natural to first ask which domestic groups are affected by Norwegian aid policies. Naturally the humanitarian
46 and idealistic organizations and groups in Norwegian civil society come to mind.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) receive the majority of their funding from the MFA and their budgets are intrinsically linked to the Norwegian development aid budget. Norwegian civil society is thus directly affected by any changes to Norwegian development policy which offers reason and motivation to actively engage the policy process in order to shape it according to their respective agendas. NGOs are also seen as important sources of information and their expertise is frequently used by the MFA and the Storting (Neumann and Leira 2005, 409; MFA 2009, 11). NGOs take part in public hearings when invited and participate in committees and working groups when asked to bring their knowledge to the table. In this, Norwegian civil society makes up an important part of the policy process.
Based on their funding over the Norwegian aid budget, the most important development actors within Norwegian civil society are considered to be the
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Red Cross Norway (RCN), Norwegian Church
Aid (NCA), Norwegian People‘s Aid (NPA) and Save the Children Norway (SCN).
These five actors are usually referred to as the ―Big Five‖ and together they receive
56.3% of the aid funding that is directed through Norwegian civil society (Norad
2011g). Smaller organizations that do not engage in development and humanitarian work per se, but focus their attention on campaigning and advocacy, are also considered important voices within Norwegian civil society. Examples are
Changemaker, the youth organization of NCA, Attac Norway and Slett u-landsgjelda
(SLUG), a Norwegian umbrella organization working solely for debt cancellation.
These organizations may not have the budget size or member count as the Big Five can boost of, but they are still considered important actors in the decision-making
47 process as their programs and political causes are aligned with the interests and political agenda of the current government. Gadgil points to the NCA and
Changemaker as examples of civil society actors that have figured out the formula on how to access the decision-making process and successfully advocate their program.
According to Gadgil, these organizations understand that the development focus of
Stoltenberg‘s 2nd government is not on aid in its narrow sense but rather how aid can be used within the broader frame. And because they understand what is important to the decision-makers, they have been able to take on a more active role in the policy process of Norwegian aid. In regards to the other four organizations that make up the
Big Five, Gadgil points out that they are not nearly as active in using the corporative channels of influence.14
Before ‗development‘ or ‗aid policy‘ became a part of the Norwegian vocabulary Det
Norske Misjonsselskap (the Norwegian Mission Society, NMS) had established activities in Asia and Africa. They promoted education, better health and new skills among the local population (SMT 2011). Naturally, when ‗development‘ and ‗aid‘ gained ground in the Norwegian public and political circles alike, the first development-oriented NGOs grew out of the Christian mission communities. The communities already had experience not only with volunteer work but with the cultures and regions in which they would be working (Simensen 2003, 216).
However, the existing presence of Norwegian missionary activities was regarded as negative in the early years of Norwegian development cooperation (Simensen 2003,
111). Neutrality was seen as an advantage by Norwegian politicians to the extent that they actively steered clear of those areas with a heavy presence of Norwegian
14 Interview with Gadgil, June 28th 2010.
48 missionary activities, more specifically Ethiopia, Madagascar, South Africa and the northern regions of India (Simensen 2003, 118).
After a decade of trying and failing on its own, the Norwegian government welcomed the Norwegian NGOs into their ‗circle of trust‘ as advisors and partners in their development activities (Simensen 2003, 114). Starting in the 1960s, the Norwegian
NGOs took on a strong role in the development sector. 1963 marks the first year where Norwegian NGOs received state funding. In the years that followed their importance grew alongside their share of the annual development budget (Tvedt 2010,
480). In 1975 funding through the civil sector channel amounted to 25 million NOK15; in 1987 it had reached about NOK 400 million. This jump in funding reflects the rapid growth of Norwegian civil society and NGOs involved with development. The growth in Norwegian development NGOs also meant that Norway was involved, in some way or another, in a growing number of countries as well as sectors. This weakened the principle of concentration but it was inevitable as the Norwegian authorities did not want to intervene with the mandates and projects of the NGOs in order to maintain their non-governmentality and independence (Simensen 2003, 218). The sector focus reflects the official Norwegian line of health care, education, agriculture and industrial infrastructure. Additionally, Norwegian civil society have been used as a main partner in the distribution of Norwegian humanitarian assistance as certain conflicts and areas are regarded as politically sensitive; the Norwegian NGOs are viewed as detached from the Norwegian official image and thus they have seemingly more room to operate within. This was seen in the Biafra crisis at the end of the 1960s, in Eritrea in the 1980s as well as in the current Darfur conflict. The NCA was a prominent actor in
15 NOK is the international currency code for the Norwegian krone. Per June 1st 2011, 1 USD equals 5.45 NOK.
49 all three situations and they acted as an unofficial agent in order for Norwegian officials to remain neutral in the conflict (Simensen 2003, 237-239, 241; Tvedt 2009,
60, 166). This ‗neutrality‘ can be questioned as the recipients may not recognize this separation of Norwegian NGOs from Norwegian state actors or agencies.
By the end of the 1980s the Norwegian civil sector administrated one quarter of
Norwegian bilateral aid (Ruud og Kjerland 2003, 201). Today Norwegian NGOs hold
13 per cent of all state funds allocated to development activities. A significant outcome of the growing importance of civil society was the proliferation of the number of NGOs operating in the development field: seven civil organizations received state funding in 1963 while the number had reached over 200 in 2005 (Tvedt
2010, 480). This is in line with both the increasing numbers and role of NGOs on the international scene (Ruud and Kjerland 2003, 200). Some say this has given the NGO sector autonomy from the state and their operations, making it an equal partner and driver in how aid and development is handled. Others argue that the Norwegian civil society may not be so independent. In fact, most of their funding comes from the state.
When the cooperation between the Norwegian government and civil society was initiated in the 1960s, guidelines were drawn up in order to regulate the process. In order to keep the NGOs independent and anchored in the people, the Norwegian government demanded that the NGOs were able to ensure at least 50 per cent of the finances needed for their activities. The rest could come from the state, but not more.
Today the minimum requirement is 10 per cent (Tvedt 2009, 63-64). With 90% of their budget being financed by the government, can Norwegian non-governmental organizations really be considered independent? Additionally, there has been a growing number of both permanent and ad hoc committees since the 1970s related to
50 the increasing role of civil society in foreign policy as well as the influx of new policy issues. This has given cause to the argument that Norwegian NGOs are simply implementing Norwegian development policy and should be considered ―an informal extension of the MFA‖ instead of an independent driver of the Norwegian development agenda (Neumann and Leira 2005, 409).
3.2 Norwegian Business and Development Aid
The private sector is seen as a vital partner in the Norwegian efforts to promote sustainable economic growth in developing countries (Norad 2011a). This gives
Norwegian business and industry an important role in the implementation of
Norwegian development policy. Even when private actors are not involved in the execution of Norwegian strategies, private sector actors are still affected by
Norwegian development policy. To exaggerate a bit, aid policies can either be good for business or bad for business. Good because growth and development have the possibility of creating new markets for export industries but also as a means of gaining access to raw materials. Export-oriented companies and Norwegian companies operating in the developing world, such as Telenor, Statoil and Jotun, are possible actors within this category. If activities have already been established then aid can promote more growth and better socio-economic conditions in the country of operation, which can ease production and possibly lead to higher profits. Reducing corruption and increasing bureaucratic efficiency is undoubtedly positive for business at the same time as they benefit a country‘s development. If no business plans are in place yet, improving the business environment can help reduce the startup risks
51 associated with new ventures, as well as open up new markets for Norwegian companies.
Norwegian development policy can also have negative impacts on domestic business and industry. Thus influencing the policy process can be question of protecting domestic economy and Norwegian workers. Traditionally Norway has been very protective of the agricultural sector. Trade unions and sector organizations like
Landsorganisasjonen (the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, LO) and
Bondelaget (the Norwegian Farmer Society) are typical examples of pressure groups that have an interest in keeping an eye on Norwegian development policy, ensuring that it does not harm Norwegian interests as they define them. Lena Hasle, Senior
Advisor at the MFA pointed out that the closer Norwegian development policy gets to domestic concerns, the higher the political debate will be.16 As such, if the development policy is seen as threatening Norwegian workers and their rights it is likely that this side of Norwegian society will organize itself and engage in the debate.
There has always been an ambiguity in using private sector actors in the development process. Business and industry are often seen as cynical partners only in it for the benefits they can reap. Civil society and development NGOs on the other hand are most often stripped of self-interest and their motives are seen as altruistic and ‗good‘.
As mentioned earlier, this dichotomy is found too naive; it is often forgotten that self- interest operates in different ways. I would argue that civil society also has motives operated by self-interest: they have an interest in maintaining the Norwegian development agenda as their operations would be seriously undermined if Norwegian
16 Interview with Hasle, June 28th 2010.
52 decision-makers suddenly decided to make dramatic cutbacks to the development budget or if cuts were made to the funding that goes through civil society. It is also in their best interest if the Norwegian development agenda corresponds to their development vision and programs. Most organizations have staff working with development policy and advocacy. Part of their job description is to raise awareness of development and aid issues through direct contact with politicians and people working on development policy in Norway, i.e. the MFA and Storting. In other words, they are hired to be lobbyists, promoting their respective organization and its program.
3.3 Relationship with Academia
Similar to civil society, research bodies act as advisors during the decision-making process (MFA 2009, 11). They are invited to hearings and participate in committees.
Norwegian development authorities consider them to be important partners, especially when it comes to evaluation and follow-up of Norwegian development cooperation with individual recipients. They also contribute as advisors and partners for Norway‘s cooperating partners (Norad 2011f). They do not try to influence the MFA and the decision-making process as much as their expertise is sought after and desired.
However, by being a part of the policy process, they do exert some influence on the final policies and though they do not actively seek to impose their opinions it does not mean that their influence is worth any less.
53 3.4 Domestic Opinion and Public Support
In 2010 Norway allocated over NOK 27 billion to development projects and activities all over the world. This makes out over 1 per cent of the Norwegian Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). Norway‘s development commitments and high levels of aid are often attributed to the strong support Norway‘s development profile holds in the Norwegian public. This support goes back to the beginning of Norwegian development cooperation. When aid and development first surfaced on the political agendas of
Western countries in the late 1940s and early 1950s, development cooperation was seen as ―something great‖ and the Norwegian public welcomed the idea with a genuine feeling of excitement (Simensen 2003, 48). To this day the Norwegian public is supportive of Norway‘s development profile and the high public spending on development aid and humanitarian activities (Lagerstrøm, Nadim and Roll-Hansen
2007, 35).
In an ideal democracy, voters have a great influence on politics as the government is elected to represent the people. However, the foreign policy of a country is rarely directly influenced by the people through votes (Christophersen 1973, 227). Public perception on the other hand can play a part in the policy process, and domestic opinion and public support of development aid have been a recurrent topic in the parliamentary debates in Norway. In the political circles there is an acknowledgement of the importance of public opinion for the level of Norway‘s development engagement; if support drops then so will the size of the aid budget. However, the government has not been forced to consider this reality. Since the beginning, opinion polls have shown a strong support of development activities in the Norwegian public, even during times when Norwegian aid and development efforts have been under
54 attack (Ringdal 1987, 184). Looking at statistics from 1972 up until 2006 we see that public support has grown steadily, with some periods of reduced support, relatively speaking. The overall support is still considered high, at about 72% in 1972 and at
88% in 2006 (Lagerstrøm, Nadim and Roll-Hansen 2007, 35). Norwegian researchers,
Ivar B. Neumann and Halvard Leira, argue that it was not until the 1990s that social groups mobilized to form a significant factor in Norwegian policy-making (Neumann and Leira 2005, 383). Direct campaigns were especially effective and examples can be found in SLUGs campaigning against illegal debt and Attac Norway‘s work on the closure of tax havens and instating a global tax on financial transactions, also known as the Tobin tax (Attac Norway 2011).
In a recent Report to the Storting, the MFA established an electronic portal where the public could send their thoughts and ideas on the topic of the report (MFA 2009, 11).
This shows a more active use of the Norwegian people in the decision-making process. However, the suggestions that were offered by the Norwegian public only served as possible guidelines and would not have the same effect as when interest groups engage the political system with the intent of influencing its direction. Though individuals may have power to influence, this very much depends on their position within the system and relative closeness to the process. In these cases there is no secret that ‗the group‘ has more of an impact than ‗the individual‘.17
17 Interview with Gadgil, June 28th 2011.
55
CHAPTER 4
SIXTY YEARS OF NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
From the beginning of Norway‘s development activities there has been a conflict between altruistic ideals and self-interest, between official rhetoric and actual implementation. The idea of development was heavily promoted by politicians as a way of legitimizing the Norwegian NATO membership. Initial projects in India and
Korea reflect the pragmatism of Cold War fears. Norway needed to find their place in the world and development and humanitarian work became an arena where Norway stood out among its fellow practitioners. The developing countries were also seen as new markets for Norwegian business and industry. Though Norwegian authorities were an outspoken supporter of the international system, channeling a substantial amount of its annual aid through multilateral institutions, Norway was reluctant to fully commit to the international initiatives.
In this chapter, Norwegian development policy is placed in context to the traditional structure and values of Norwegian society. The Norwegian economy and societal ideals are examined in an attempt to understand the large support for aid in both
Norwegian political circles as well as among the Norwegian people. It is also helpful in explaining some of the hesitance in Norwegian aid programs, for example the strong protection of Norwegian agriculture. The first Norwegian development program, the Kerala Fishing Project, is then presented as an example of the complex nature of Norwegian development aid. Consequently the key features of Norway‘s development policy in its early years are presented. Geographic concentration was
56 especially important at the onset of Norwegian aid but as the field expanded and more actors and interests were brought to the table, this principle would ultimately be hard to follow. An examination of the Norwegian aid allocation then follows before the current development policy is laid out. The analysis is completed by looking at
Norwegian interests in providing aid and engaging in development efforts. The intent of this chapter is to illustrate how Norwegian aid policy has derailed from its original purpose, becoming fragmented and spread thin; a cake made bigger so that everyone can have a bite.
Although development aid may seem like a new phenomenon, its foundation lies in centuries of missionary activities, merchant trade and colonial rule. And in the humanitarian assistance that emerged towards the end of the 19th century (Lancaster
2007, 25-27; Simensen 2003, 13). However, the political situation following the end of the Second World War created a ―frame for development aid‖ in the years that followed (Simensen 2003, 14). The world was polarized between East and West, between communism and democratic ideals. Colonial rule was facing its end while the newly independent countries faced their beginning. International institutions working for peace, stability, reconstruction and development was formed. Economic assistance was first seen in war-torn Europe with the American Marshall Plan but soon development assistance was used as a strategy in the political game of the Cold War, with the newly independent countries as its playground. The new states were seen as underdeveloped, fragile and unstable (Lancaster 2007, 28). The general perception was that it was only a matter of time before the communists would get a hold in these countries. And so the countries of the First World took it upon themselves to intervene in the advancement of the Third World, in order to protect their own.
57 The establishment of the Aid Fund for Underdeveloped Countries on June 26th 1952 marks the start of Norwegian development cooperation. Prior to this, Norway contributed to the United Nations‘ Expanded Technical Assistance Program (EPTA)18.
In 1961 the total Norwegian assistance for the two projects was NOK 120 million.
Norway spent 0.14 per cent of its gross domestic product on development assistance compared to the OECD average of 0.54 per cent (Eriksen 1987, 11, 243). Today
Norway spends 1.1 per cent of GDP on foreign aid while the average for OECD countries is 0.32 per cent (Norad 2011d; OECD 2011). How did Norway become the biggest donor relative to the size of its economy?
For Norway, international events and trends would play a significant role in shaping
Norwegian foreign policy after the war. As a close ally of the United States, Norway adopted the Cold War rhetoric that pushed for development assistance as a preventative measure to halt the spread of communism. This fear of an expanding
Soviet presence around the world found its way into the Norwegian public opinion as well as into Norwegian policy circles. The newly independent countries were seen as unstable, weak and easy targets for communist ideology (Simensen 2003, 42;
Lancaster 2007, 28). In addition to decolonization creating new grounds where communism could get a stronghold, the colonial era was regarded as a dark chapter in history and many in the West saw development assistance as their opportunity to correct some of the wrongs that had been committed during colonial rule and pay their dues to the developing world (Simensen 2003, 46). Norway also partnered up with the other Nordic countries; they were seen as having the same outlook on development and how to go about it. It would also increase their resource pool, both in
18 In 1966 EPTA merged with the Special United Nations Fund for Development (SUNFED) to form the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
58 terms of finance and in terms of knowledge. As a small country with a limited development administration and a limited aid budget coupled with limited experience, teaming up with its neighboring countries was a natural choice (Simensen 2003, 119).
Moreover, Norway was committed to development cooperation through their membership in international institutions and organization such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the OECD. The establishment of the OECD Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1959 constitutes the beginning of an international regime that would shape how aid and development assistance were conducted in the member states (Simensen 2003, 103-104). The act of giving became established in the international community and it was expected of richer countries to share their resources and wealth with less fortunate, less developed countries (Lancaster 2007, 5).
International politics and trends, as well as the institutionalized setting that was created around development activities and aid in the 1950s, were important drivers in establishing Norway‘s development activities. However, the most important structures underlying the Norwegian efforts for development are found in the domestic environment. The economic development of Norway was especially important as it provided the financial framework for a stable society, and in turn for the Norwegian commitment to development. Additionally, the Norwegian social democracy and the national ideals of justice, equality and solidarity produced a frame around development aid. Missionary traditions and a humanitarian heritage also created a familiar setting for development aid.
59 4.1 The Norwegian Socio-Economic Make-Up: A Framework for Development
In the period since the end of the Second World War, the Norwegian economy has seen an unprecedented growth (Bergh et al. 1991, 21). Though Norway escaped the war with minor economic setbacks, Norwegian society needed to restore and rebuild.
To bolster growth, Norway received USD 450 million from the American Marshall
Plan in the period 1948-1952 (Simensen 2003, 37). The economy saw significant growth in the immediate post-war years, increasing by 50 per cent in only three years
(Berg et al. 1991, 21). Growth was slow throughout the 1950s however, but picked up by the turn of the decade and continued well into the 1970s with a growth rate of over five per cent in the last half of the decade (Bergh et al. 1991, 21). The sixties and seventies also marked the beginning of the Norwegian oil adventure with the opening of the Norwegian continental shelf in 1965 and the first major oil discovery in 1969.
Two years later oil was being produced and in 1974 the largest oil field on the
Norwegian continental shelf was discovered (Schiefloe 2010, 21-22, 26). The
Norwegian petroleum industry continued to grow and expand, adding gas to its production and export portfolio. Today Norway is the second largest gas exporter in the world and the fifth largest producer. Norwegian oil exports rank at sixth place while the oil production is the eleventh largest in the world. In total, Norwegian petroleum industry has created values of over NOK 8 000 billion since it first started over 40 years ago. Over half of this wealth has gone into the State Treasury (Nordvik,
Verlo and Zenker 2010, 14). In addition to the petroleum sector, the Norwegian economy is based on export oriented industries such as machinery and equipment, minerals and metals and seafood (MTI 2000b).
60 Despite the large contribution of the petroleum sector in today‘s economy, the
Norwegian economy has traditionally been anchored in rural Norway with agriculture, fishing and forestry as the main branches alongside mining and shipping in Norway‘s economic structure (Bergh et al. 1991, 14). Hydroelectric power was added to the portfolio in the early 1900s, an industry that soon grew to be one of the most dominant economic activities in Norway alongside the Norwegian merchant fleet and shipping industry (Bergh et al. 1991, 19). These industries would later experience a reduced role as a result of the fast-growing petroleum sector in the 1970s and 1980s. Coupled with increased wages and the strengthening of the Norwegian currency, this created a disadvantage for the traditional export industries (MTI 2000a).
Table 1. Gross Domestic Product by Industry
Source: Statistics Norway 1966, 2009 and 2010.
61 Table 1 on the previous page presents the Norwegian economy by industry and their respective contribution to the GDP. Looking at the distribution between the sectors, it is clear that the Norwegian economy has undergone dramatic changes since the beginning of the 20th century.19 In 1910, the agricultural and industrial sector each contributed with approximately 25 per cent. While agriculture steadily declined, the industry sector remained in the twenties, give or take a few percentage points.
However, the introduction of oil marked a shift in Norway‘s economy. In 1980, the petroleum sector made its first significant contribution to Norwegian economy with
13.4% of GDP. By 2000 the oil sector had doubled and in today‘s economy it is contributing to the economic production at a steady 21-23 per cent. Contrastingly, the industrial sector now stands for around 15% of the Norwegian economic output while agriculture has dropped to a marginal 0.9%. The service sector has all along been an important part of Norwegian economy, representing half of the country‘s GDP.
The introduction of oil in the Norwegian economy would have a significant impact on
Norway‘s development program in two ways. First, high revenues from oil translated into a rising GDP, which in turn resulted in larger sums being allocated to development and aid projects as Norway was committed to spending 1% of its GDP on aid (Pharo 2003, 527). In other words, the development budget saw continued increases which allowed Norwegian authorities to diversify their development portfolio. Second, the increasing role of oil meant that Norway grew less dependent on the traditional sectors of the economy, such as shipping, fishing and agriculture which gave Norwegian authorities more leeway in their development policies. With fewer considerations to make in terms of national economic interests, the political
19 The following section is based on statistics from Statistics Norway (1966, 2009 and 2010), the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics.
62 leadership has been allowed to follow a more altruistic line in their development policy (Pharo 2003, 546).
Though there have been dramatic shifts in the Norwegian economic structure, sectors like agriculture and fishing are still subject to protection from outside influences. This is a result of the strong heritage from Norwegian rural subsistence activities20 and shipping industry. Since universal suffrage was introduced, Norwegian farmers have been considered an important constituency alongside the industrial proletariat and so their interests have been important in policy-making (Arter 1999, 54). Additionally, the rural countryside has been weakened as urban cities in Norway have experienced a large influx of people. This has been a concern to Norwegian authorities, both security wise and in terms of national heritage21, and policies to prevent and even counteract urbanization have been put in place (MLGRD 2006, 6; MLGDR 2009). This has also meant a strong support of rural subsistence activities, resulting in special protection in the forms of trade barriers.
The unprecedented growth in the post-war years created the perfect frame for the political elite and their project of building a social democracy with a nation-wide welfare system.22 The ideals of social integration and stability emerged in late 19th century Europe and in Norway the growing labor movement introduced thoughts about equality, solidarity and social justice. The egalitarian ideals continued to spur ideas about what Norwegian society should look like as Norway stepped into the 20th
20 ‗Rural subsistence activities‘ is defined to include traditional activities such as agriculture, forestry and fishing. 21 Unpopulated areas translated into unprotected areas for Norwegian authorities during the Cold War. More concretely they were concerned about a Russian invasion of the northern areas, like Finnmark. In terms of national heritage, a romanticized version of the traditional peasant life has heavily influenced Norwegian national identity. 22 Norwegian economy grew by over 350% in the period 1946 to 1980 (Berg et al. 1991, 20).
63 century. The big stand, however, came about in the aftermath of the Second World
War when Norway was rebuilding itself. Since then, the Norwegian state has played a strong and prominent role in Norwegian society. Its primary goal, besides traditional objectives like territorial protection and economic security, has been higher welfare and greater equality among its people. This has been a priority for every government in office during the post-war period; an ambition that is reflected in the extensive social services available to all Norwegian citizens by the Norwegian state, such as parental benefits after birth, universal health care, free and universal primary education, unemployment benefits, pay during sickness and pension benefits
(Kjølsrød 2010, 214-215). The social security services offered are so extensive that they are often referred to as stretching from ‗the cradle to the grave‘, and it is virtually impossible to go through life in Norway without benefitting from these services.
While the financial stability Norway experienced in the post-war years gave the authorities great economic freedom and contributed to the development of the
Norwegian welfare system, it also provided the foundation for Norway‘s development program (Angell 1989, 136). The growth of Norwegian welfare and social security contributed to popular support as the ‗noble‘ idea of development assistance – helping those less fortunate – echoed the ideals of the welfare state (Simensen 2003, 37). With similar ideas and values it is easy to draw parallels between the national welfare schemes and the global development programs. However, there is one major difference: foreign vs. national control. While the Norwegian national welfare model was constructed, planned and implemented by Norwegians for Norwegians, global development plans are most often constructed, planned and implemented by foreign governments for the people of the developing world. Moreover, in addition to being outsiders coming in trying to erect what they defined as ‗underdevelopment‘, the
64 foreign governments also came with interests and agendas of their own. In many cases, political and commercial interest trumped the altruistic motives (Lancaster
2007).
Another factor that contributed to development assistance finding resonance in
Norwegian society was the long history and strong position of Norwegian labor unions. The Norwegian labor movement has a large presence in Norwegian civil society as well as in Norwegian politics. The Labor Party was imperative to the development of the welfare state as they held power for twenty consecutive years23 after Nazi-occupation ended in 1945. When the issue of development assistance was raised it found support in Norwegian labor movements and its main causes: improvement of working conditions and solidarity among workers (Simensen 2003,
42-43). Today, the term ‗solidarity‘ is used by most actors in civil society that work with development issues, reflecting mutual support between people across the globe.
LO uses ‗international solidarity‘ to refer to solidarity between workers regardless of geographical location while civil society adopted the phrase as they believe the term represents more equality between people than the term ‗charity‘ (LO 2011; NPA
2011b).24 The Norwegian government also uses ‗solidarity‘ when describing development activities in Norwegian civil society (MC 2007, 84)
In addition to ideals of social equality and international solidarity, the Norwegian tradition of humanitarian assistance and the Christian heritage of charity and missionary activities added legitimacy to the development trend (Simensen 2003, 46).
23 With the exception of 29 days when John Lyng‘s government was in power from August 28th 1963 to September 25th 1963 (Government 2011b). 24 On the Norwegian version of Norwegian People‘s Aid‘s web pages, the term ‗solidarity‘ is used to describe their mission while in the English pages ‗solidarity‘ was not directly translated. However, the expression is found when doing a search of the English version of their web pages (NPA 2011a).
65 Christianity in Norway dates back to around 1000 AD and the establishment of the
Christian Church in Norway in the late 12th century. The Constitution of 1814 states the Evangelical-Lutheran faith as the official religion of Norway and introduced the
State Church to Norwegian society. Though there has been debate on the validity of a state church, and even political action to moderate the ties between the Norwegian
Church and the state, the Norwegian Church remains as Norway‘s official religious authority (Church of Norway 2011; MCC 2008; Aasrud 2011). With Norway moving towards a secular society, at least at the institutional and organizational level (Repstad
2010, 387), this goes to show the continuing role and underlying importance of
Christianity in Norwegian society.
4.2 The Political Climate for Development Assistance
For the political elite of Norway, the development hymn came as a solution to the
Norwegian identity crisis that emerged after the Second World War. Prior to Hitler‘s occupation in 1940 Norway had established itself as a neutral country dedicated to international peace and with no desire to participate in the unrest and wars that were ravaging the European continent (Leira 2003, 5). After the fall of Nazi-Germany in
1945 Norway had to rethink their neutrality principle. The government opted for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a precaution towards Soviet influence in the High North. However, NATO membership caused stirs in the domestic opinion and the political left was strongly opposed to breaking with the Norwegian pacifist tradition (Lancaster 2007, 30; Simensen 2003, 42-43).
Development assistance thus became the answer to how Norway could combine its
NATO engagement with a long standing peace tradition; commitment to the
66 international system, and especially the UN, was emphasized alongside extensive development operations as Norway‘s commitment to peace in the years to come (Leira et al. 2007, 12-13). The pragmatic line of NATO membership was masked by the altruistic policies of development assistance and peace efforts; a clear example of the double-layered motives of Norwegian development cooperation.
Thus ‗development‘ fell neatly into the image Norwegian officials were trying to maintain and enforce, both abroad and at home. Norway was, and still is, seen as a small country with no colonial past. Together with its tradition of neutrality and peacekeeping Norway was described as a perfect partner for development cooperation
(Simensen 2003, 48; Leira et al 2007, 16-17). However, as Norwegian Sociologist
Knut G. Nustad notes, Norway is not without colonial history. Nustad especially points to the central positions of Norwegians in the Danish-Norwegian colony of
Trankebar on the Southeastern coast of India as well as in Belgian Congo (Nustad
2007, 17). Nustad further remarks that ―a failed effort to establish oneself as a
European colonial power does not translate into a lack of desire to take part in the
European expansion‖ (Nustad 2007, 21, my translation). In fact, the involvement of
Norwegians in other nations‘ colonial projects may reflect their eagerness to be involved. Simply ignoring any Norwegian participation in Europe‘s colonial history rather than acknowledging Norway‘s involvement could in fact be more damaging to the relationship between Norway and its recipients. Colonial past or not aside, with more than fifty years of development operations under its belt Norway can hardly claim to be ‗neutral‘ in its interaction with developing countries.
67 Though Norwegian colonial activities are frequently underplayed, Norwegian missionary and shipping traditions are remembered well in Norway‘s international history. Norwegian missionary activities date back to the 19th century and the establishment of mission stations in Zululand in South Africa (1843), off the coast of
Southeastern Africa in Madagascar (1867) and among the Santals in the North East of
India (1867) (NMS 2007; Simensen 2003, 29). Norwegian business and shipping was also familiar with interaction across Norwegian borders. These interests on the other hand had mostly settled in Latin America and Asia but also had operations along the coast of West Africa and in Ethiopia in East Africa (Simensen 2003, 118). Compared to mission organizations, Norwegian business actors would be much more apprehensive in the early years of Norwegian development cooperation.
4.3 The Kerala Fishing Project: Setting the Bar
As mentioned, Norwegian development assistance started with the establishment of the Aid Fund for Underdeveloped Countries in 1952. This fund was more commonly referred to as the India Fund due to the concentration on India and what would be known as the Kerala Fishing Project. The fund of NOK 10 million was first established without a clear idea of where the money would go; this would be discussed with the UN and Indian authorities (Simensen 2003, 45). UN involvement was seen as important and the parties met at the UN head quarters in New York to sign the initial agreement. As ‗cooperation‘ was emphasized in the wording of the agreement, Norwegian officials set out for India where they met with Indian negotiators to decide on the specific project. Though the UN was considered to be an important partner, they were forced to take a back seat and were later pushed out of
68 the picture (Simensen 2003, 51-52, 54). The Indians would later find themselves on the sideline too as the Norwegian negotiators had very specific ideas of what kind of project they wanted and who it should benefit. ‗Rural development‘ was the leading term as far as the Norwegians were concerned. After rejecting the preferred Indian suggestion of a project focusing on developing the fisheries in and around Bombay, the Norwegian delegation settled on a more general fishing project in the state of
Kerala on the south coast of India. The choice of a fishing project in rural Kerala was a clear result of Norwegian political needs; the idea was that a focus on the ‗ordinary fisherman‘ would be better received by the Norwegian public compared to an urban development project in the global city of Bombay (Simensen 2003, 53-55). The disregard of Indian wishes stands in contrast to Norway‘s official rhetoric of
‗cooperation‘ and ‗local ownership‘.
The main points in the final agreement from 1953 were first and foremost an increased return on the fishermen‘s activity by motorizing the traditional canoes. The second point was the introduction of cooperative organizations. Improving the sanitary conditions of the village was seen as a third issue. Mainly this would include a water facility and the introduction of latrines as well as a small health center. The fourth goal was a broader goal that aimed at raising the overall standard of living in the area
(Simensen 2003, 54). The health section of the agreement was included on the demands of the Norwegians as it was reasoned that it would create trust in the local population (Simensen 2003, 60). The health projects would prove a mix of successes and failures though. The water facility and the health station both had great results while the latrine project was not received well by the local population (Simensen
2003, 62). The initial phase of the fishing project included motorizing the traditional
69 fishing boats. The introduction of motors did not go over well with the traditional boats and so the next step involved the local construction of a boat with a new and improved design. This was a success and a third type was introduced, the Indo-
Norwegian Project (INP) boat. The introduction of the INP-boat in 1959-60 soon improved the efficiency and productivity of the fishing. However, the local fishermen seemed apprehensive and did not purchase any of the boats until the new manager,
Johan Hareide, broke away from the original arrangement of renting in 1961. The local ownership served as a boost in the project together with new developments of the INP-boats (Simensen 2003, 63-65). In addition to the boats, the project invested in an ice factory, a receiving hall and a cooling storage at the beginning of the 1960s
(Simensen 2003, 69). Sea research was also on the project‘s agenda and was used to improve local knowledge about the sea and how to maximize the fishing (Simensen
2003, 70). Between 1967 and 1972 vocational training of Indian captains, deck men and motormen as well as technical personnel on land was introduced. About 250 people completed such courses (Simensen 2003, 70).
The Kerala Project had a rough start and suffered from a lot of criticism and bad publicity in Norwegian media. It is hard to say whether the hype prior to the launch of the Kerala Project had created false expectations to what would be achieved, whether
Norwegian efforts were misplaced, or whether the cultural differences created misunderstandings and bumps in the road for the Indo-Norwegian project. Whatever it was, the individual failures and slow progress of the 1950s was the image that stuck to the minds of the average Norwegians as well as the political elite when thinking of the
India Fund (Simensen 2003, 72-73). The results on the ground stood in contrast to the negative image in the Norwegian public. By the time Norwegian assistance was
70 coming to an end the effects of the project were visible throughout the society. The fishing industry had seen a massive increase in production and income. By 1972
Kerala had about 4000-5000 motorized boats, 70-80 freezer facilities and about 50 factories that produced tinned foods for domestic consumption and international export (Simensen 2003, 71). Moreover, the overall health seemed improved as a result of better access to clean water and a more nutritious diet as a result of the increased fishing. The processing industry was also employing about three times of what it had in 1953, which increased access to capital as well as provided a workplace for women
(Simensen 2003, 72). However, by then the domestic opinion had lost interest. The negative perception of the Kerala Project in the Norwegian public at the beginning of the 1960s was important in the continued efforts of Norwegian development assistance. When NUH was founded in 1962, Norway wanted to shift focus and thus turned their eyes towards Africa, more specifically East Africa (Simensen 2003, 78).
4.4 Norwegian Aid Policy in the Early Years: Goals, Strategies and Principles
The baseline for Norwegian development policy was also established in 1962, ten years after the India Fund had been created. As with any policy target, the official line was wide and vague, with ―economic, social and cultural growth‖ as the primary aim of Norwegian development cooperation. In 1972 Norwegian development policy was expanded to include a fair distribution of growth and wealth with the hope of reducing inequality. Cooperation based on equality and mutual exchange between countries was also emphasized. A few years later, the Norwegian government stated that development assistance should contribute to ‗leveling the playing field‘ between the developed and developing countries (Stokke 1987, 40). There are clear lines between
71 this rhetoric and the developing countries call for a new economic world order, however. The 1980s echoed much of the original development thinking but it also added four new dimensions. In addition to economic, social and cultural growth, the strategic goals of Norwegian development aid were: 1) to reduce inequality and increase social justice in developing countries; 2) to foster economic independence in the recipient country; 3) to support democratic development; and 4) to promote human rights with its development activities. There was also an increased focus on the poor as a target group for Norwegian aid (Stokke 1987, 41).
Based on over thirty years of experience, the first strategies of Norwegian development policy were formulated in 1984. The Welfare Strategy was aimed at improving basic human needs and living conditions, focusing on education, health and sanitary conditions. Social justice and poverty orientation are key words in this strategy as well as a strong focus on the primary sectors like agriculture and fishing
(Stokke 1987, 41-42). The Industry and Trade Strategy focused on infrastructure and export with the intention of expanding the economic foundation of the recipient, increasing their export and necessarily their access to the markets of the developed world as well as creating a market for Norwegian export. As Norwegian business actors were hesitant to engage in development projects, this strategy has been regarded as having most success in terms of Norwegian export opportunities and not in creating economic prospects for the recipients (Stokke 1987, 43-44).
Besides the overarching goals and policy strategies, Norwegian development assistance was further guided by a number of principles and guidelines. One important guideline concerned the distribution of Norwegian development aid. While the first
72 projects in India and Korea had been purely bilateral, Norway was strongly committed to international institutions and there was strong debate on which channel was the best in terms of distribution. A compromise was made and it was decided that funding should be equally distributed through multilateral and bilateral channels (Stokke 1987,
47). However, as we will see later, until the beginning of the 1970s multilateral aid made up over 50% of Norway‘s total funding. In 1975 this had decreased to 44.6% and would continue to decrease as bilateral aid grew more important (Stokke 1987,
11). An argument for bilateral aid was that it was easier to control the money flow back to Norway in terms of contracts, purchases etc., and this was an issue of increasing interest towards the end of the 1970s. Though untied aid had been a principle when Norway first started its development programs, a considerable amount of Norwegian financial assistance returned to the Norwegian economy through salaries, supply deals and other Norwegian services bought with Norwegian aid money (Stokke 1987, 51; Eriksen 1987, 180).
In 1976, ‗Least Developed Countries‘ (LDCs) was introduced as a primary target group. The guiding principle was that there should be a need for Norwegian aid and development assistance should be directed at the poorest nations.
The recipient‘s role and participation in development operations was from the beginning considered an important element of development projects by the Norwegian government. In the early years of Norwegian development cooperation, this focus was referred to as ‗recipient orientation‘ and development projects were to be based on the developing country‘s plans and priorities. The idea was that successful development was ultimately the responsibility of the recipient in addition to the recipient having
73 more knowledge and better insight of their own situation. It was also thought to ensure continuity in the activities and strengthen the administration and independence of the local authorities (Stokke 1987, 51). An assumption was also made as to the recipients‘ development goals and priorities, thinking they were similar to those of the
Norwegian government (Selbervik 2004). However, as the Kerala projects shows, the goals and priorities of the donor vs. the recipient does not always align with one another. When discrepancies between donor and recipient views occurred, the official rhetoric of local ownership was not always easily implemented in practice and good intentions were overpowered by the need for progress.25 The balance between
Norwegian and Indian officials improved once the implementation of the project started; the project actually ended up with two administrations, one Indian and one
Norwegian. However, cooperation between them was scarce (Simensen 2003, 59).
Though the name might have changed, the fundamental principle of recipient-oriented development has remained an essential part of Norwegian development policy to this day.
With that said, the most important guideline for Norwegian development cooperation was the geographic concentration principle. Coupled with the Nordic development cooperation, Norway‘s first recipients were quickly established.
4.4.1 Concentration and Cooperation
Concentrating the Norwegian efforts within a geographical area was considered logical as it was thought to keep administrative and operating costs down (Eriksen
1987, 12). Furthermore, joining forces with like-minded donors, like the Nordic
25 Interview with Helge Pharo, Professor of International History, June 17th 2010.
74 countries also made sense as this would increase their resource pool. Though followed since the beginning, the principle of geographical concentration was officially established in 1967 while Nordic cooperation was initiated with the Korean Teaching
Hospital in 1956 (Simensen 2003, 119). The partnership would naturally influence and shape Norwegian development operations in the years that followed, especially when it came to the geographic locations of Norwegian development projects. The preferences of Denmark and Sweden would ultimately weigh heavily in on the initial selection of countries, which again set the tone for the choice of future recipients because of Norway‘s desire to concentrate their efforts within a geographic area
(Simensen 2003, 118).
The choice of Norway‘s first recipients may seem random at first. In fact, based on the development activities of the other European countries one would think that Norway‘s efforts would be concentrated in the areas where Norwegian missionaries, sailors and traders had gone before but the official line was to stay clear of such areas. If they had not then the first map of Norwegian recipients might have looked different; mainly it would have showed development activities in the North Eastern parts of India where the Norwegian Mission Society had been active since the 19th century, not on the
Southern coast (NMS 2007; Simensen 2003, 29). The coast of West Africa would show signs of Norwegian development activities as well as Ethiopia due to long- standing commercial and shipping activities. Some of these countries would later become Norwegian aid recipients but for the initial projects they were kept off limit
(Simensen 2003, 118). One reason was to maintain Norway‘s image as a neutral country with no history that could color its activities in development. Independence from political, economic or religious interests was stressed from the outset.
75 Development aid was to be most efficient if given on ―neutral‖ grounds. Self-interest was considered to sidetrack and obstruct the process. This was especially expressed in concern to the missionary activities and their role in Norwegian development cooperation. Business interests were also thought to be a negative influence (Simensen
2003, 110-111).
4.4.2 Norwegian Partner Countries
The Nordic cooperation was very important in directing Norwegian aid in the early years of Norway‘s development efforts. Five countries were initially evaluated for development cooperation in Africa: Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and
Tanganyika (which, in union with Zanzibar, became Tanzania in 1964). In 1966
Tanzania was made a Norwegian cooperation country, largely due to strong connections between the political elites of Sweden and Tanzania.26 With the geographical concentration principle in mind Uganda was a natural choice as a neighbor of Tanzania. Uganda was also as a former British colony and it has been expressed that the administrative legacy left behind was favorable, as well as English being the modus of operandi (Simensen 2003, 118).27 Additionally, the views of the political elites of the recipient countries, mainly social democratic in nature, were highly favored among the Nordic countries with their welfare state and social democratic ideals. Other neighboring countries such as Zambia (1967) and Botswana
(1973) followed suit. Uganda however, was dropped in 1971-72 due to the ―despotic military rule‖ of Idi Amin. The country was taken back as a partner country in the
26 Olof Palme, then advisor to Sweden‘s Prime Minister and later engaged in the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), had connections to Tanzania‘s President Nyerere; Barbro Johanson, a Swedish missionary with ties to both the Swedish and Tanzanian governments, also took part in tipping the scale in favor of Tanzania (Simensen 2003, 118). 27 Interview with Eli Moen, Senior Advisor in the Peace, Gender and Democracy Department at Norad, June 11th 2010.
76 1980s after Idi Amin‘s rule was overturned in 1979. Mozambique was added in 1977
(Simensen 2003, 140-142).
Though the Kerala project had been a factor in Norway shifting its focus to East
Africa, the Norwegian presence in India made South Asia a natural region to explore further due to the geographical concentration principle. Pakistan was included as a cooperation country in 1969 and so was the new state of Bangladesh in 1975, after
Pakistan split into East and West Pakistan. A new deal between Norwegian and Indian authorities was negotiated towards the end of the 1960s and in 1972 India was made a cooperation country. Sri Lanka was taken as a cooperation country in 1977 after Sri
Lankan authorities expressed a feeling of being forgotten among the other South
Asian countries (Simensen 2003, 119). Sri Lanka has later become a more natural partner for Norwegian development operations, with Norway being actively engaged in the Sri Lankan peace process since 2000 (MFA 2006c; RNE Sri Lanka 2011).
And so the Norwegian development assistance was established with a total of nine cooperation countries. Five countries in East Africa. Four countries in South Asia. The
Latin American countries as well as the countries of South East Asia, North Africa and the Middle East were left alone for now. Keeping away from areas with
Norwegian presence would prove difficult as the Norwegian agenda for development expanded in the years that followed. Though the established principles were suppose to set the tone for who was eligible for Norwegian development aid, especially the poverty focus and concentration principle, exceptions were not rare and the principle of concentration did not go as planned. First it was the family planning programs, then shipping and port construction followed. Projects that used Norwegian expertise were
77 also exempted as well as business projects and educational stipends. Humanitarian relief was of course not bound by these principles (Stokke 1987, 46-47). Funds increased, needs arose and the themes of development expanded. The marked participation and involvement of Norwegian civil society also expanded the recipient list as the private organizations followed their own agendas and partnerships. As the following section will show, new countries would constantly be added to Norway‘s list of recipients and over the years Norway would come to have a development presence in over one hundred countries.
In addition to the nine main partner countries in 1977, another 10 were added in the
1980s as ‗other partner countries‘. Among these were Nicaragua, Ethiopia and
Zimbabwe. Another 36 countries received development assistance through other channels, making the total number of recipients 55 (Ruud and Kjerland 2003, 230).
Table 2 shows the development of Norwegian recipients in the period from 1960 to
2010. By 1990 the number of countries receiving assistance was 85; in 2000 it had increased to 115. Today Norway has a development presence in 114 countries (Norad
2011g).
Table 2. Norwegian Aid Recipients 1960–2010
Year Countries Primary Recipient(s) 1960 2 India 1965 16 India 1970 31 India, Pakistan, Kenya 1975 52 Tanzania, Vietnam, Bangladesh 1980 81 Tanzania, Bangladesh, India, Kenya 1985 96 Tanzania, India, Bangladesh, Kenya 1990 85 Tanzania, Zambia, Mosambique 1995 99 Mozambique, Tanzania, Bangladesh 2000 115 Mozambique, Tanzania, Bosnia-Hercegovina 2005 114 Sudan, Pakistan, Tanzania, Afghanistan 2010 114 Brazil, Afghanistan, Tanzania, Sudan Source: Norad 2011g
78 Since Norway‘s first development project was initiated with Indian governments in the 1950s, Norway has been involved in development activities almost all over the
Global South28. In fact, if all Norwegian recipients from 195229 to 2010 were colored in on a map, the Global South would be completely filled in.30 Figure 3 shows the overwhelming presence of Norwegian development aid at some point during the last
60 years. One thing is clear: the concentration principle has slipped. Norway has at some point been involved with development activities in most countries considered a part of the developing world.
Figure 3. Norwegian Development Cooperation 1952–2010
Countries in green are, or have been, recipients of Norwegian aid in the period from 1952 to 2010. The darker the color, the more aid has been received. The intent of the map is not to show the individual recipients but to show the extent of Norwegian development cooperation since 1952.
Source: Norad 2011g
28 ‗Global South‘ refers to a more inclusive term than the constructed line between North and South, often used as a divide between ‗developed‘ and ‗developing‘ countries. As with East-West, the North- South divide is a constructed dichotomy made to categorize and understand the World. However, not all countries in the South fall into the latter category while a number of countries in the North often are grouped with countries in the South as they do not fully meet the ‗criteria‘ of a developed country. 29 The statistics from Norad starts in 1960 but as India and Korea were the only recipients prior to this, this map can be said to cover the period from 1952 to 2010. 30 The exceptions are Puerto Rico, French Guiana, most of the Caribbean Islands, miscellaneous island groups in the Pacific and Western Sahara (Western Sahara is a disputed territory, claimed by Moroccan authorities since 1975. This claim is not recognized by the Norwegian government).
79 As the remaining chapter will show, the influx in recipients resulted from a number of reasons. As the Norwegian commitment to development grew, the aid funds increased alongside the expansion of themes and diversification of sector focus. Civil society, both Norwegian and international, was drawn into the process, bringing with them their own development profiles and interests. Norwegian aid commitments often came up during diplomatic trips and Norad complained that it would often be asked to consider new countries for development assistance every time a minister returned from an official trip. Cooperation between Portugal and Jamaica are said to be examples of Norwegian ministers‘ personal meetings with the respective countries‘ political elites. Then again, both Portugal and Jamaica were newly established democracies at the time they started to receive Norwegian funding (Ruud and
Kjerland 2003, 231-232).31 The growing awareness of the foreign policy aspect of aid also resulted in new additions and a more politicized profile of Norwegian aid.
4.5 Norwegian Aid Allocation: Themes, Sectors and Supply Channels
As the Kerala fishing project has shown, the initial focus of Norwegian bilateral cooperation was on technical assistance and performance enhancement in sectors like fishing, agriculture, and industrial production. Education and health as well as infrastructure were also prioritized. The Nordic Teaching Hospital in Korea and the
Nordic Teaching Center in Kibaha outside of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania are examples of such projects (Simensen 2003, 132). Some development programs also focused on the university sector. Existing programs and degrees were expanded and built on while new degrees were introduced within areas requiring specialized skills (Simensen
31 Interview with Pharo, June 17th 2010.
80 2003, 148). An exchange program for students of developing countries was also established alongside contributions to research on development and aid in Norwegian academic circles, which brought the development efforts ‗home‘ (Simensen 2003,
128). These bilateral programs made up 37 per cent of Norway‘s total aid in 1970. As the numbers indicate, the preferred channel of development aid was the multilateral channel with over half of the funding directed through international organizations. The
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank‘s International
Development Association (IDA) received the highest contributions with the World
Food Program (WFP) and the United Nations Children‘s Fund (UNICEF) at a good third and fourth place (Simensen 2003, 133). The strong focus on the multilateral channel was, and still is, a clear result of Norway‘s wish to strengthen international cooperation.
By the mid 1970s, Norwegian development assistance had found its place within the international aid system. The main partner countries were established and so were large scale development projects. The vision of Norwegian development policy was clear: economic development had to be assisted by improvements in health care, education, housing etc. The Norwegian line was that a general development of society was needed in order to create or sustain economic development in the long run (Ruud and Kjerland 2003, 18-20). Levels of aid increased heavily in the 1970s; while foreign aid only amounted to NOK 26.4 million in 1965, it increased to NOK 262.3 million in
1970 while reaching a total of NOK 493.3 million in 1973 (Simensen 2003, 132;
Norad 2011g). The increases were made prior to the Norwegian oil revenues but the expectations of oil seemed to contribute to the higher levels of assistance.32 The
32 Interview with Pharo, June 17th 2010.
81 increases are linked to new additions on the recipients list, with 50 more countries being added in the time span of 1970 to 1980 (Norad 2011g). The Norwegian development agenda expanded and would come to include ‗soft‘ development goals such as political climate and human rights (read ‗good governance‘), women‘s role in development and environmental questions (Ruud and Kjerland 2003, 13, 153-154).
Starting in the mid 1970s the ties between Norwegian development aid and foreign policy became clearer. The implementation and ‗field work‘ remained with Norad but the Foreign Ministry became more dominant in the aid allocation through planning and budgeting. The new policies were more focused on improving the domestic political environment of developing countries, marking a clear political turn in development thinking. In 1974 Cuba and Vietnam were made partner countries and funds were increased to Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia (Simensen 2003, 255,
257). Development funds to these countries were considered a silent protest against the United States as the increases largely went to the countries‘ liberation movements who were fighting against American troops or allies (Stokke 1987, 47).
Furthermore, environmental issues reached the development agenda after the severe droughts in Africa in the beginning of the 1980s as well as the introduction of
‗sustainable development‘ into the development discourse with the Brundtland report in 1987. The focus on ‗basic needs‘ also became a buzz word and a Report to the
Storting from 1984-85 introduced it as a main principle for Norwegian development assistance. ‗The poorest of the poor‘ was reintroduced as the main target group (Ruud and Kjerland 2003, 155). The late 1980s also witnessed the horrible failures of the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) introduced by the World Bank and IMF as a
82 response to the debt crisis in the developing world. This was also when conditionalities gained ground in donor countries‘ aid policies. In the 1990s conditionalities on aid would translate into concepts such as ‗good governance‘ and the promotion of democracy and human rights (Lancaster 2007, 43; Visnes 2000, 92-
93). Although critical to begin with, Norwegian development assistance would follow suit and introduced conditionalities as a measure to ensure aid effectiveness (Visnes
2000, 94-95).
The civil wars of the 1990s introduced a new focus on post-conflict situations and humanitarian needs. Peace was reintroduced to the agenda, especially negotiations and peace talks, and has been a key focus of the Norwegian government since the mid
1990s. These issues further complicated the relationship between development assistance and foreign policy. The new focus is reflected in new recipients, or high peaks in the funds of old recipients. The Palestinian Territories were added in 1992, right after the Oslo accord had begun its secret negotiations in 1991, while Bosnia and
Herzegovina started to receive financial assistance soon after the Bosnian civil war had come to a halt in 1995. And though Afghanistan had received the occasional aid transfers starting in the 1980s, it was not until 9/11 and the following American invasion in October 2001 that the country became a significant recipient of Norwegian aid, standing as number one in 2002 and staying in the top ten since. We also see a large increase in Norway‘s aid to Sudan following the 2005 peace agreement where
Norway actively participated in the negotiations (Norad 2011g; RNE Sudan 2011).
These countries reflect the growing difficulties in separating development from humanitarian needs in post-conflict situations, as well as the politicized agenda of development assistance. The same peaks can be seen for Thailand after the 2004
83 tsunami, for Pakistan after the earthquake in 2005 and the 2010 flooding and for Haiti following its devastating earthquake in January 2010. As for 2011, countries like
Libya and Ivory Coast are sure to climb the list of recipients. Before the popular uprising in February of 2011 and the following fighting between Libyan rebels and
Gaddafi-troops, Norwegian aid to Libya amounted to NOK 2.2 million. On March 3rd
2011 the Norwegian government granted NOK 50 million directed at humanitarian assistance in Libya (MFA 2011a). The precarious situation in Ivory Coast also led to an immediate increase in funding, NOK 100 million in total (MFA 2011b, 2011c and
2011d). In these situations we see that it is neither a political game nor traditional principles at work, but the immediate concern and severity of the situation pushing for assistance.
4.6 Norway’s Development Policy Profile anno 2010
Based on recent policy papers, the Norwegian development policy anno 2010 is aimed at improving the economic, social and political conditions of the people in developing countries. The objective is to create a better framework for the individual, and the state, that will enable them to take part in and create their own development. Rights and control are important key words and the goal is to ensure a certain level of economic and human security for the world‘s poor (MFA 2009, 13; MFA 2004a, 10-
11). A key principle of Norwegian development policy is the focus on the recipient‘s responsibility for shaping their own development path. Countries must take ownership of their future and this cannot happen without active participation and control on the part of the recipient. The trinity of a functioning state, a dynamic civil society and a vibrant private sector is seen as fundamental to development while Norwegian
84 involvement should be one of facilitation, contributing with financial means and knowledge (MFA 2009, 5).
4.6.1 Five Pillars of Norwegian Development Cooperation
Going from an overarching policy to actual activities needs a more precise definition of goals and objectives. As for the Norwegian development policy there are five main components: 1) strengthen the position of the poor; 2) promote sustainable development; 3) safeguard global goods and strengthen global rules; 4) make domestic policies more coherent with development policy; and 5) focus on areas where Norwegian expertise and knowledge are in demand and will add value (MFA
2009, 15-16). The first component represents the more traditional development orientation while the second introduces sustainability to the equation. The main focus areas are securing individual rights and promoting equality, with a special attention on women‘s rights. A rights-based approach is seen as the best way to secure the development process. The overall hope is to challenge established power structures on the international, national and local level. Stimulating economic growth is of course also an important factor, and herein lays control of international financial flows.
Environmental degradation is seen as an impediment to the development process and
Norwegian development policy seeks to coordinate environmental and development efforts. The third component on global goods and rules reflects the interdependence between nations as well as the Norwegian commitment to international institutions.
Links between the national and the global level are seen as important as well as international norms and global conventions.
85 The last two components are directed at Norway‘s specific development efforts; the fourth component targets Norwegian decision-making while the fifth brings attention to where Norwegian development aid should focus its efforts. There is an increasing realization among Norwegian development authorities that the Norwegian development policy does not act in a vacuum and neither does Norway‘s other domestic policies. They all influence each other and should be made more in tone with one another. The NOU (2008:14), Coherent for Development, brought attention to this issue and made several recommendations to where Norway should adapt its domestic policies in accordance with Norwegian development policy (MFA 2008). The fifth pillar is also directly linked to Norwegian development efforts as it looks at how
Norwegian aid can best be utilized, recommending that Norway focuses its attention on programs where Norway has experience and expertise.
Figure 4 on the following page shows the composition of the Norwegian development policy, going from the overarching philosophy to the five main components and their underlying focus areas. The figure shows the complex web of overarching goals, strategies and action plans. It also shows the wide span in Norwegian development cooperation. The last pillar, the one on the right side, shows which areas the
Norwegian government believe Norwegian development efforts will be most effective. These are areas where Norway is considered to have extra expertise and experience; where Norwegian development aid can actually make a difference.
86 Figure 4. Norwegian Development Policy anno 2010
Norwegian Development Policy
Improve economic, social and political conditions of the people in developing countries
↓ ↑
Strengthen Promote Safeguard global Development Utilize the position of sustainable goods and policy Norwegian the poor development strengthen coherent with expertise and global rules domestic knowledge policies
Focus areas: Focus areas: Focus areas: Focus areas: Focus areas: Challenge Integrate Use a holistic Improve Climate power development approach to domestic change, structures and development policies to environment environment consider and Secure policy Identify links development sustainable individual between issues development rights Reduce national and environmental global problems Reduce Peace Promote costs of conflicts in building, equality development areas like human rights Promote and Stimulate Contribute to trade, international humanitarian economic global investment norms and the assistance growth environment and UN Oil and clean policy knowledge International energy transfers financial Promote flows implementation Women and of global gender Rights-based conventions in equality development national approach legislation Good governance and corruption
Source: Report no. 13 (2008-2009) to the Storting, Climate, Conflict and Capital (MFA 2009) and NOU (2008:14), Coherent for Development (MFA 2008).
87 4.7 Development Aid: In Norway’s Best Interest?
In the early years of international development cooperation Norway tried to be supportive in the demands of the developing nations and supported the establishment of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED). The
Norwegian government had been hesitant at first but support was given in the end, knowing that a fund like SUNFED would only see the light of day with the support of main donors such as the U.S. who was negative to the idea. This way Norway seemed like a positive team player without having to deal with the consequences.
Additionally, Norway was reluctant to consider large contributions to the UN developing programs and IDA. However, the Director General at the Trade Ministry,
Thomas Løvold, encouraged higher Norwegian support on the grounds that it was in
Norway‘s best interest to be on good terms with the World Bank, which still provided support to Norway. Norway was not only a donor in the bank but still received loans.
In fact, ―[i]n the period between 1954 and 1963 Norway received 6 loans of a total of
145 million dollars‖ while in the same period contributed just a little over one million each year to the World Bank. That equals an input of 7 million for an output of 145 million (Simensen 2003, 83-84). This is an interesting paradox and takes away from the altruistic side of Norwegian development cooperation that is so often promoted.
Similarly, as a recipient of the Marshall Plan after the Second World War Norway received UDS 450 million in the period between 1948 and 1952. In the same period,
Norwegian development assistance accumulated to NOK 135 million, which equals around USD 24 million based on today‘s conversion rate (Simensen 2003, 37). Again the discrepancy in giving and receiving is stark. It is an example of the conflict between idealism and realism in Norwegian development aid. On the other hand it can be argued that as a recipient of financial assistance itself, Norway knew a thing or two
88 about the importance and value that can be drawn from foreign capital. Additionally,
Norway felt indebted to the American Marshall Plan and the government saw development assistance as their way of paying back to the world community once the
Norwegian economy was on the rise (Simensen 2003, 43).
The reluctance and double-layered reality of Norwegian aid continued to follow
Norway‘s development policies; however, the conflicts of interest were especially clear when Norwegian authorities found themselves between a rock and a hard place.
The biggest conflicts are found between Norway‘s trade policies on one hand and the
Norwegian commitment to development on the other. More often than not these policies would be inconsistent and difficult to reconcile. In the years prior to 1970, the
Norwegian shipping industry made up over half of Norway‘s export and the
Norwegian shipping industry was considered to have played a crucial part in the restoration of Norway after the Second World War (Simensen 2003, 92). As such, development policies were forced to take a back seat to the trade and shipping issues that were seen as crucial for Norwegian welfare levels. Norway‘s double game was even clearer as the developing countries called for a New International Economic
Order (NIEO) in the 1974. Norway took a leading role as a proponent in international negotiations but when Norwegian interests were threatened, Norway immediately stepped back (Ruud and Kjerland 2003, 31). In addition to the shipping industry being affected, the call for ‗trade, not aid‘ would mean lowering trade barriers for imports from developing countries and this was seen as a threat to Norwegian agriculture and textile production (Ruud and Kjerland 2003, 25).
89 Confronted with the demands of NIEO, it is clear that Norway continued to put its self-interest over the developing countries‘ demands. On issues where development efforts collided with Norwegian interests, Norway generally voted against such reforms or policies, for instance in the case where it was suggested that import from developing countries would receive special preference. At the United Nations‘
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 Norway also voted against a fund that would help developing countries with the volatile prices of raw materials (Simensen 2003, 90).
The tough stance to defend Norwegian trading and shipping interests gradually softened towards the end of the 1970s as income from Norwegian shipping decreased in importance and the expectation of large oil revenues become more real (Simensen
2003, 95-96). The decreased role of Norwegian shipping coupled with the emergence of a Norwegian oil economy gave Norwegian authorities more independence when it came to its development policy (Simensen 2003, 95-96; Pharo 2003, 546). However, this shift should not be attributed to idealistic and altruistic motives; it is likely that had Norway continued its high dependency on shipping the government would not have loosened its policies. This can be derived by the high level of protection still in place for Norwegian agriculture (Simensen 2003, 81-82). Here it is not the income generated from Norwegian farmers that maintains the trade barriers but the previously mentioned influence of Bondelaget, an agrarian pressure group, as well as the
Norwegian government‘s policy to promote rural settlements and stimulate economic activity in the Norwegian countryside (MLGRD 2006, 6; MLGDR 2009).
90 Though the shipping industry was declining and oil was seen as the new up-and- coming resource, Norwegian authorities did make an attempt to rescue Norwegian shipping at its time of crisis. The global recession in the 1970s hit the Norwegian shipping industry hard and in 1976 a national support program was established through the Norwegian Guarantee Institute for Export Credits (GIEK) (Ruud and
Kjerland 2003, 32; MFA 2006b). This program ensured a guarantee scheme for projects aimed at exporting Norwegian ships and vessels, making the Norwegian government the creditor if the project proved economically unviable (Eriksen 1987,
171; MFA 2006b). And most of them did, leaving developing countries in debt to the
Norwegian state (Ruud and Kjerland 2003, 33). The Ship Export Campaign lacked the traditional development focus and the Norwegian government even stated that the campaign‘s main target was to sustain the ship building industry. In the time period of
1976 to 1981, when the program was ended, Norway had passed 68 projects; 156 vessels and various ship equipment were exported and a total of NOK 3.7 billion had been guaranteed for (MFA 2006b). Norway would later become a creditor for most of this. Though the Norwegian authorities have gone to great lengths in trying to correct the wrongs that were done during the Ship Export Campaign, this event is an example of the strong and noticeable influence of Norwegian economic interests on Norway‘s development policy. It also stands as an example of what can happen when the donor‘s interest trumps the best interest of the recipient.
On the other hand, the cancellation of the Ship Export Campaign debt is also a great example of civil society‘s influence on Norwegian decision-makers. The campaign was heavily critiqued in the late 1980s and remains as an embarrassing moment in
Norway‘s development history. It is considered a ―policy failure‖ and Norwegian
91 authorities have focused on debt relief and cancellations for over a decade. In October
2006, the Norwegian government announced that it would propose to cancel the debt of the Ship Export Campaign in the national budget for the fiscal year of 2007 (MFA
2006a). On March 2nd 2007 the last remains of the debt were officially cancelled
(MFA 2007).33 The credit for this debt relief focus can largely be attributed to SLUG, the Norwegian umbrella organization advocating for the cancellation of illegitimate debt, focusing on the debts from the Ship Export Campaign. The organization originates with a few local groups in the mid 1990s, growing to be a coalition of more than 50 Norwegian NGOs. As their primary target is unconditional cancellation of illegitimate debt, the coalition primarily works with campaigning and lobbying, trying to influence Norwegian politicians and the decision-making process (SLUG 2011).
4.7.1 The Role of the Private Sector
The role of the private sector in development has been a hot topic in the Norwegian development debate ever since Norway‘s first projects in the 1950s. Mostly because it is a grey area where self-interests are hard to hide and common ground tough to find.
The conflict is not whether Norwegian business and industry has valuable expertise to offer in the development process but whether it is appropriate to classify such operations as aid (Eriksen 1987, 166). Before the 1970s, the Norwegian private sector had shown little interest in Norwegian development cooperation. The domestic market was good, with investment opportunities and growth. Beside the shipping sector, most
Norwegian industries were inexperienced in global trade and preferred to stay at home
(Eriksen 1987, 168).34 Rather, it was the Norwegian government that actively had to
33 Some countries still have debt with the Norwegian government but this is from other projects. 34 Interview with Øivind Lund, current Chairman of the Board at Yara International ASA (2004-), former President of ABB Norway (1998-2001) and a professional in the Norwegian hydroelectric industry since 1973, June 29th 2010.
92 engage Norwegian business. A few projects between the private sector and the government were initiated, such as the Ghanaian fishing project in 1963. The project aimed at higher return but was said to have failed due to bad governance and negligence on the recipient side. However, there was an expressed concern about the potential competition to the Norwegian dry fish exports from the Ghanaian project
(Simensen 2003, 203-204).
Despite the lack of interest from the private sector, the Norwegian economy surely benefitted from Norway‘s development activities. On paper Norwegian aid was to be untied in order to ensure best value. However, Norwegian aid money was increasingly linked back to Norwegian supply deals and contracts. It is estimated that in 1970 around 60 per cent of Norwegian bilateral aid was in fact going back to Norway via supply deals and salaries of Norwegian experts and technical staff (Simensen 2003,
133). One of the most prominent deals was a fertilizer contract between Pakistan and the Norwegian company Norsk Hydro, financed by Norwegian aid transfers.
Fertilizers had also become a large component of Norwegian aid going to India while
Nigeria was on the top ten recipients‘ list solely due to an export deal for Norwegian dry fish (Simensen 2003, 132). The Norwegian shipping industry was in addition cashing in about NOK 147 million on transporting aid-financed goods from the North to the South in 1968. In comparison the Norwegian aid budget was NOK 95 million
(Simensen 2003, 133). Based on this alone Norway was actually making a NOK 52 million profit from its aid activities, illustrating the paradox in the altruistic image of
Norwegian aid. Estimates from the period 1974-1980 suggest that 30-40 per cent of
Norwegian multilateral aid was returning to Norwegian economy while as much as
50-60 per cent of the bilateral aid was benefitting Norway (Eriksen 1987, 180).
93 The growth in tied aid was a result of the global recession in the 1970s. As the
Norwegian economy slowed down and domestic business and industry were increasingly struggling, the private sector turned to Norwegian aid officials. Their plea was clear: use Norwegian contractors, industry and business in the design of the development schemes. Pressure also came from trade unions and sections of the government. The main target of the programs that were put in place was to alleviate the effects of the recession and hopefully get Norwegian industry and business back on its feet. The recipients‘ development was set aside and it was even admitted that such donor-oriented programs would reduce the probability of reaching those who needed it the most (Eriksen 1987, 174). The Ship Export Campaign is an example of such a program. It was ultimately heavily critiqued and made the Norwegian government rethink the relationship between private sector interests and aid and how it affects the development trajectory. Despite the debate, the Norwegian government continued to promote the importance of private sector development programs. Mixed credit schemes were established in order to promote Norwegian export and nurture business relations between Norway and future markets (Ruud and Kjerland 2003, 44).
Private sector development continued to be stressed but the focus shifted towards the end of the 1980s; trade, export and access to international markets were stressed.
There was a growing realization of how detrimental high trade barriers, protectionism and closed markets were to a country‘s development. A report presented by the OECD estimated the total loss at twice the amount of what countries would get in official development assistance (Ruud and Kjerland 2003, 44-45). Though Norway agreed with this realization, they did not act on it. First, certain economic sectors remained protected by import control and trade protection. Second, Norwegian private sector
94 actors did not see the developing countries as interesting markets or potential trade partners (Ruud and Kjerland 2003, 45). The government did however increase the role of business in Norway‘s development projects. In the early 1990s funding programs were increased, forums for dialogue were established and an active ‗recruitment process‘ took place in order to increase Norwegian private sector involvement (Liland and Kjerland 2003, 221-223).
The strong promotion of Norwegian business came to a sudden halt in the late 1990s when Hilde Frafjord Johnsen stepped into the role as Minister of Development. She was very critical towards mixing business interests with development activities. Her priority was reducing export schemes that seemingly did more for Norwegian private actors than for the recipient. Frafjord Johnsen also launched a campaign for untying aid, both in Norway and internationally. In 2002, 95 per cent of Norwegian aid was declared untied (Liland and Kjerland 2003, 225-227). Frafjord Johnsen had a strong political figure and was not afraid to attack head on. She came with her opinion and arguments and pushed through the established agenda. Her ministry stands as an example of the power of the individual in the decision-making process. Although one person cannot change the entire process, or system, a person in this kind of high position can most definitely help set the agenda. In 2006 the official amount of tied aid had dropped to 0.13%. This is not to say that Norwegian development assistance is not still benefitting Norwegian development actors or the private sector. Certain activities and programs, especially related to sectors where Norway is considered to have expertise, use Norwegian experts (Clay et al. 2008, 22). Furthermore, the 23 per cent that goes to NGOs (20%) and private actors (3%) is not controlled and these actors are free to choose contractors and partners as they see fit (Clay et al. 2008, 23).
95 The Private Sector in Today’s Development Process
Today, the Norwegian government still stresses the value of a solid private sector in a country‘s development process. They also promote public-private partnerships in sectors where Norway is regarded to have in-depth knowledge and expertise, such as petroleum, clean energy and fishing (MFA 2009,10, 16). Erik Solheim, the minister that followed Frafjord Johnsen has brought the private sector back into the development scene. Solheim has promoted the role of business and private sector in developing countries. He has also talked about the role of the middle class and how support for this part of the population can actually benefit long-term development more than just focusing on the poor. This is a clear stand against the official line of pro-poor development. Nevertheless, Solheim have been clear in his speech and he has proven himself to be a very robust politician with a firm sense of how Norway‘s development policy should look like. He has also brought with him a strong commitment to the global environment issues. In fact, in the second term of the
Stoltenberg government, his post as Minister of Development was changed to
‗Minister of the Environment and International Development‘. This inclusion of the environment in the title of his minister post reflects the growing role of international environmental questions in Norwegian development cooperation. Though the environment has been a concern in relation to development since the 1980s, the extent of commitment is new. An example is the roughly NOK 1.5 billion given to Brazil under the 2010 development budget (Norad 2011g).
Solheim too is an example of the influence and importance an individual can have on the decision-making process. During his ministry, the Norwegian development agenda has taken on a broader view of development and aid. Especially climate and
96 environment have been given a much larger role in relation to development than during previous ministers. Report no. 13 (2008-2009) to the Storting, Climate,
Conflict and Capital outlines Norwegian development policy anno 2009 (MFA 2009).
It maps out the most important challenges for the future development path of the
Global South and as indicated by the title of the report, the three areas of climate, conflict and capital are considered the most crucial areas for Norwegian development efforts. The report argues that climate change will worsen the already difficult conditions of developing countries. Furthermore, while conflict not only destroys the social capital of a country and perpetuates poverty, poverty in itself contributes to weak states and conflict over resources. Capital transfers across national boundaries are also made a priority due to its increased mobility; both because of corruption and capital flight but also because migrants remittances and access to markets can contribute greatly to development if handled correctly (MFA 2009, 9-10).
97
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The main goal of this thesis was to determine to what extent the decision-making process of Norwegian development policy is influenced and shaped by the socio- political interests of Norwegian domestic actors. As such, this thesis examined the institutional structure that frames the policy process as well as the domestic stakeholders that have access to it, establishing the role and strength of each player within the decision-making process. In doing so, this research has yielded several interesting findings regarding the formation of Norway‘s development policy.
The Role of Domestic Actors
As the analysis has shown, the main political constituencies of Norwegian aid are civil society organizations, business and industry actors, academia and in general the
Norwegian population translated into public opinion. Out of these, civil society organizations stand out as the key actors in the decision-making process of Norwegian development policy, both in terms of relevance, influence and level of activity. NGOs that work with development and aid activities are the most active users of the corporative channels in the decision-making process of Norwegian aid. This is not surprising as they are the ones with the longest history as well as being the group that has the closest connection to the government in terms of funding. With 90% of their budget being supported by the national development budget, Norwegian NGOs are not only reliant on Norwegian aid but they also have an interest in shaping the aid agenda so that it matches their development programs, making them more attractive as
98 distributors of Norwegian aid and possibly increasing their funding. Other actors like those from the private sector, as well as from academia, are not nearly as active in the decision-making process of Norwegian aid policy. Their participation is more of a request-based one from the government‘s side, through hearings and ad-hoc committees and the like. Through the research, it is evident that cases where specific business actors lobby for their interests to be incorporated into the Norwegian aid agenda are few and far between. However, like the example of the Ship Export
Campaign shows, cases where economic interests are prioritized over development priorities do exist. Norway‘s reluctance to loosen its trade policies in regards to produce from developing countries also illustrates how Norwegian economic interests are chosen over the needs and interests of developing countries.
The Role of Institutions
In terms of the Norwegian aid administration, the analysis indicates that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Storting, alongside the government who decides on
Norway‘s foreign aid policy, are the most important institutional elements in the policy process of Norwegian aid. In respect to the decision-making process, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as both an agenda-setter and as an advisor to the
Storting on issues concerning development and aid. In controlling what information to present, or omit, the bureaucracy of the MFA controls this chain in the decision- making process. As policies are open to interpretation, the nuances of language can be important when the implementation process begins.
The Storting is also an important institution that shapes Norwegian development policy. Through parliamentary debates, committee work and public hearings, the
99 political agenda of Norwegian aid is discussed, revised and shaped by the Storting. As the legislative power, the Storting is where Norwegian laws and policies are made. In and of itself this gives the Storting quite a bit of power in the policy process of
Norwegian aid. Within this process, the Standing Committee on FAD holds a special role in the policy process as an advisor to the Storting on all issues concerning development and aid.
The government‘s main function is to set the tone for the political agenda, hereunder the official line of development policy. In this, the government also acts as an agenda- setter in the decision-making process. Though there is not much conflict around
Norwegian development policy, changes in government can alter the focus of
Norwegian development policy as a new government can ultimately replace the political leadership and bring with it a new political agenda. Changes to the
Development Minister post will often shift the focus of Norwegian development policy one way or the other, though the main elements stay the same. This can be illustrated by the ministry of Hilde Frafjord Johnsen (1997–2000 and 2001–2005) and
Erik Solheim, the current Development Minister (2005–). Frafjord Johnsen was dedicated to the abolishment of tied aid as well as fighting corruption and implemented this into the Norwegian development agenda. She was also apprehensive in using Norwegian business actors in development cooperations while
Solheim has stressed the importance of business activities and encouraged Norwegian private sector to get involved in development. Furthermore, Solheim is highly concerned with the environment and climate change and how it all relates to development, a focus that is now incorporated into Norwegian development policy.
100 The Role of the Individual
The role of the individual and their agency in the decision-making process are often overshadowed by the collective group, organization or even state. Though we all know the importance of people in our everyday life, this factor is often bypassed in
IR. The research suggests that human agency does play a role in the decision-making process of Norwegian aid. The historical examination indicated that strong individuals have meant a lot to specific processes and that a person has the ability to affect the
Norwegian aid agenda. However, not all people have the same level of impact. The in- depth interviews with development professionals indicated that in order for a person to have an impact on the decision-making process the person had to hold a high-level position like that of the Development Minister or the Director General for one of the departments in the MFA. Though perhaps not recognized to the same extent by the civil servants themselves, I would argue that the individual bureaucrat is an important contributor to the decision-making process. The influence exerted by the people working in the Foreign Ministry is done through their everyday work; they research issues and gather information, draft and edit, produce and present final reports and proposals used by the political leadership. As the link between the bureaucracy and the political leadership, the civil servant holds power. Furthermore and as mentioned by Hudson, individuals bring with them a specific set of life experiences and skills that affects how they see the world, and thus how they relate to and do their work.
This is true for all the individuals that are a part of the decision-making process and this is why human agency must be anchored in the analysis of foreign policy.
101 The Corporative Channels of the Norwegian Aid Agenda
In examining the main domestic actors and the institutional elements of the
Norwegian aid administration, the analysis revealed some interesting characteristics pertaining to the domestic actors‘ interaction with the decision-making process.
First, Norwegian development policy is produced in a corporative system where actors outside the formal institutions are not only allowed to take part in the process of shaping Norwegian aid but are actually invited in. As such, Norwegian development policy is indeed a product of different interests coming together.
Second, the domestic stakeholders participate in the decision-making process when the issue at hand concerns their own agenda or affects them in any way. For instance, the Norwegian shipping industry was active in the run-up to the Ship Export
Campaign in the 1970s while civil society actors like Changemaker and the NCA have been active in shaping Norwegian development policy through in their campaign for debt relief and cancellation of illegal debt in the 1990s and first decade of 2000. In general, organizations and interest groups will be active when they see a case that is close to their own political agenda.
Third, the research also shows that domestic actors‘ influence depends on their alignment with the political agenda of the sitting government. In using the word
‗alignment‘ it may seem like domestic actors adapt and mold themselves to fit the political agenda rather than trying to influence and shape it. In some instances that may be true, but for the most part this ‗alignment‘ implies that the domestic actors find a balance between their own development programs and the government‘s
102 political agenda. As Arvinn Gadgil pointed out, the domestic actors he finds the most influential are the ones who have understood the government‘s position. Gadgil further remarked that the size and relative importance of an organization did not necessarily result in influence on the decision-making process.
A more general finding, pertaining to the effects of having a pluralistic society where corporative channels of influence allow for a high level of access to the decision- making process, is that Norway‘s development program has become fragmented and to some extent diluted. Geographic concentration was a high priority in the early years of Norwegian aid, and though the government continued to advocate this principle, the list of recipients saw additions after additions. Per 2010, Norway has an aid relationship with 114 countries. Without examining the issue further, it can be argued that this is counterproductive in terms of Norwegian development goals and policy ambitions. To this day concentration is emphasized as a guiding principle but it is only visible, perhaps, in the thematic focus of Norwegian aid. Norwegian development policy specifies selected areas where Norwegian aid should focus its attention, such as democracy and human rights, clean energy, oil and petroleum, the environment and climate change. However, though they look like a narrow selection, these categories are in fact mere categories for what is seen as key components of sustainable development. This is the curse of policy; it is broad, vague and leaves room for interpretation. Coupled with the corporative system of the Norwegian decision- making process and the growing number of domestic actors, this has led to a development agenda that is stretched in every possible direction. It can be argued that this has diluted the Norwegian aid agenda.
103 Another important point in explaining the ever-expanding Norwegian development policy is the continued growth in Norwegian economy that has allowed for Norwegian aid to increase without being scrutinized and criticized. As the Norwegian government is committed to contributing 1% of its GDP to development, the Norwegian aid budget has not had much of a choice but to increase. The continued increase in aid has made it even easier to add new issues to the aid agenda without having to question the relevance and existence of old issues. As Norwegian researcher Helge Hveem pointed out in the late 1980s, ―[t]he cake is made bigger so that all the tendencies that demand a bite are able to have one‖ (Hveem 1989, 106). This is true in 2011 as well. The latest addition of ‗environment and climate change‘ to the Norwegian aid profile being an example of how new themes are included while old issues remain. However, when the day comes where the Norwegian economy slows down and the 1% of GDP equals far less than the 27 billion NOK it does do today, Norwegian authorities will ultimately have to re-think their aid priorities. Questions of aid cuts and down-sizing Norway‘s development programs will challenge the current nature of Norwegian aid where there is seemingly a place for everyone. It is at this point the real conflicts and political interests will be visible. How domestic stakeholders will react and act in defending their programs will certainly be interesting. It would provide a unique opportunity to analyze the different interest groups that are affected by, and affect, the Norwegian aid agenda. Though there are disagreements and debates concerning Norwegian development aid, a political conflict of this dimension will truly crystallize the role and influence of the various fractions of Norwegian society. Within such an analysis, a closer look at the individual‘s role in shaping the process and outcome would be especially interesting.
104 Back to the issue of fragmentation, it is argued that concentrating aid on a small(er) number of recipients would most likely prove more effective than spreading the money thin. A more concentrated approach would allow the donor to focus better on each aid recipient as well as provide a better framework for long-term development goals. On the other hand, the argument can be made that a heavy donor-presence conflicts with the idea of recipient-based development initiatives. Also, if aid really was to be concentrated, international efforts to coordinate global aid would have to be installed. And this would not be a straightforward process; countries would argue and fight over the recipients, leaving some as ‗favorite pets‘ while others would always be the last choice, or even left out. However, if an agreement could be figured out, more concentration would be better for both donors and recipients. There is recognition within the Norwegian government that Norway‘s concentration principle has slipped and that a reduction in the list of recipients would be beneficial to Norway‘s development program. As the scope of this research does not allow for more than a generalized notion on the benefits of concentration, further research should be made on the issue of aid concentration and its implications on development programs.
Lastly, the introduction of oil in the late 1970s and its increasing importance in
Norwegian economy allowed altruistic motives to gain ground compared to economic interests as Norway lessened its dependence on traditional economic sectors that needed protection. This has contributed to Norway‘s reputation as a humane internationalist, focusing on the recipient‘s needs rather than self-interest.
105 Concluding Remarks
Though Norwegian development policy is said to only focus on the interests of developing countries, there exists a complex symbiosis between Norwegian economic interests, political goals and altruistic motives in the formation of Norwegian development policy. This is not a shocking statement as aid and development programs are aspects of a country‘s foreign policy, which is there to protect national interests. Though Norway‘s development policy is regarded by Norwegian authorities to promote the interests of the recipients (and not those of Norway), it is also admitted that aid is used as a way of establishing contact on a more benign level before proceeding to core issues such as democracy, human rights, corruption and the like.
This double layered reasoning has been emphasized as an explanation for Norway‘s involvement in countries like Sudan and Sri Lanka where Norway have been active in peace processes and political dialogue. The same explanation is given when Norway is criticized for being involved in countries with poor human right records, such as
Saudi Arabia, or where widespread corruption is known to exist. The rational that is put forward is that without contributing with aid or supporting business activities,
Norway would not have much to say about the political conditions in these countries; there would be no dialogue and the possibility of changing the state of affairs would be close to null. Thus Norwegian aid, and business ventures, is repeatedly used as an entry point for Norwegian political interests.
After almost sixty years as a donor, Norway has become a recognizable actor in the field of international development. Development activities and humanitarian aid has become an important part of Norway‘s international profile and a domestic development community of civil society organizations, research institutions and
106 interest groups has been established in juxtaposition to the Norwegian development administration. They all have become embedded in development and are consequently a part of the symbiotic relationship that shapes and influences Norwegian development policy.
Further Research
In completing this thesis, I realize that the scope of the research has been too wide.
Though the analysis offers insight into the institutional elements and domestic actors of the decision-making process of Norwegian aid, its findings cannot be inferred to specific events or speak to the particular processes that go on within the decision- making process. The historical perspective is great for examining the development of the Norwegian aid agenda but it cannot speak about the intricacies of the corporative channels of influence that characterize the Norwegian decision-making process.
However, it provides an oversight of Norwegian development policy and this birds- eye-perspective is helpful in suggesting areas of further research.
To truly capture the essence of the decision-making process of Norwegian foreign policy in general, or Norwegian aid in particular, an interesting study would be to follow an issue from start to finish, looking at every component of the policy process.
From the government first initiates business and appoints an expert commission, to the ministries considering the issue and proposing a way forward, to the discussion in the standing committee(s) and in the parliamentary debates, to the final resolution in the
Storting is made. It would not only be interesting to look at the bureaucratic processes that go on within the decision-making process but to examine the individuals that are involved. More specifically it would be interesting to look at their personal
107 preferences, views and perceptions as well as professional backgrounds and cultural values. This would be a true research into the role of human agency in foreign policy.
However, this would be a grandeur project, almost to the level of a utopian idea.
Nevertheless, it would most certainly yield interesting results and insights into the decision-making process of foreign policy and the role of the individual.
108
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116 Schiefloe, Per Morten. 2010. ―Oljelandet [The Oil Country],‖ ch. 1 in Frønes and Kjølsrød 2010. Selbervik, Hilde. 2004. Mottakeransvar: Et særnorsk, verneverdig prinsipp? [Recipient Responsibility: A Unique Norwegian Principle to Protect? Report from the Christian Michelsen‘s Institute. Bergen: CMI. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs online. [10.03.2010]. URL: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/rapporter_planer/rapporter/2004/mot takeransvar-et-sarnorsk-verneverdig- p.html?showdetailedtableofcontents=true&id=278418 Simensen, Jarle. 2003. Norsk utviklingshjelps historie 1 1952–1975: Norge møter den tredje verden. [The History of Norwegian Development Cooperation 1 1952– 1975: Norway meets the Third World]. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget. Sjaastad, Anders C. 2006. ―Stortinget som utenrikspolitisk organ [The Storting As a Foreign Policy Body],‖ ch. 2 in Fonn, Neumann and Sending, ed., Norsk utenrikspolitisk praksis: aktører og prosesser [Norwegian Foreign Policy Praxis: Actors and Processes]. Oslo: J.W. Cappelens Forlag AS. SLUG. 2011. SLUG: The Norwegian Coalition for Debt Cancellation. SLUG online. [05.29.2011]. URL: http://www.slettgjelda.no/no/english/SLUG+- +The+Norwegian+Coalition+for+Debt+Cancellation.9UFRHY25.ips Stake, Robert. 2000. ―Case Studies,‖ ch. 16 in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, eds., Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publication. Statistics Norway. 1966. Langtidslinjer i norsk økonomi 1865–1960 [Trends in Norwegian Economy 1865–1960]. Samfunnsøkonomiske studier nr. 16, Central Bureau of Statistics, February 15th 1966. Statistics Norway online. [01.17.2011]. URL: http://www.ssb.no/histstat/sos/sos_016.pdf ———. 2009. ‖1. Bruttonosjonalprodukt, etter næring. Løpende priser. 1946–2006. Mill. Kroner. [Gross Domestic Product, by industry. Current prices. 1946– 2006. Mill. NOK],‖ Historisk statistikk [Historical Statistics]. Statistics Norway online. [01.17.2011]. URL: http://www.ssb.no/histstat/aarbok/1946- 2006-bnp.html ———. 2010. ―286. Gross domestic product, by main activity. At basic values. NOK million,‖ Statistical Yearbook of Norway 2010. Statistics Norway online. [05.29.2011].URL: http://www.ssb.no/english/yearbook/tab/tab-286.html Stokke, Olav. 1987. ‖Hovedlinjer i bistandspolitikken: Mål, strategier og prinsipper [Main Lines in Aid Policy: Goals, Strategies and Principles],‖ ch. 2 in Eriksen 1987. ———, ed. 1989a. Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, in cooperation with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs [Norwegian Foreign Policy Studies no. 64]. ———. 1989b.‖The Determinants of Norwegian Aid Policy,‖ ch. 5 in Stokke 1989a. ———. 1995. Aid and Political Conditionality. London: Frank Cass, in association with the European Association of Development Research and Training Institute and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs [Norwegian Foreign Policy Series, no. 82].
117 Storting. 2009a. Komitéarbeidet [The Work of the Committees], ―Arbeidet [The Work],‖ Stortinget og demokratiet [The Storting and Democracy]. The Storting online, last updated October 1st 2009. [04.26.2011]. URL: http://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og- demokratiet/Arbeidet/Saksbehandlingen-i-komiteene/ ———. 2009b. Parliamentarismen i dag[Parliamentarism Today], ‖Storting og regjering [Storting and Government],‖ Stortinget og demokratiet [The Storting and Democracy]. The Storting online, last updated October 1st 2009. [06.01.2011]. URL: http://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og- demokratiet/Storting-og-regjering/Parlamentarismen-i-dag/ ———. 2010. ―Parliamentary Procedure‖, About the Storting. The Storting online, September 22nd 2010. [04.26.2011]. URL: http://www.stortinget.no/en/In- English/About-the-Storting/Parliamentary-procedure/ ———. 2011. Høringer [Hearings], ―Arbeidet [The Work],‖ Stortinget og demokratiet [The Storting and Democracy]. The Storting online, last updated February 14th 2011. [05.29.2011]. URL: http://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Arbeidet/Horinger/ Thune, Henrik and Torgeir Larsen. 2000. ‖Utenrikspolitikk uten software: en teori on omdømme, populisme og andre trekkrefter i små staters utenrikspolitikk [Foreign Policy Without Software: A Theory on Reputation, Populism and Other Forces in Small States‘ Foreign Policy],‖ pp. 70-89 in Dale 2000. Tvedt, Terje. 2009. Utviklingshjelp, Utenrikspolitikk og Makt: Den Norske Modellen, [Development Aid, Foreign Policy and Power: The Norwegian Model], 2nd edition. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk. ———. 2010. ―Det nasjonale godhetsregime: Om utviklingshjelp, fredspolitikk og det norske samfunn [The National Regime of Good: On Development Aid, Peace Politics and the Norwegian Society],‖ ch. 21 in Frønes and Kjølsrød 2010. Visnes, Kjetil. 2000. ‖Skaff folket et talerør. Suverenitet og stat i norsk bistandsdiskurs [Get the People a Communication Channel: Sovereignty and State in Norwegian Aid Discourse],‖ pp. 90-118 in Dale 2000. Waltz, Kenneth. 1982. ―Explaining War,‖ originally in John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm eds., American Defense Policy, 5th edition. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Reprinted in Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond, 3rd edition. 1999. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Longman Publishers. Younas, Javed. 2008. ―Motivation for Bilateral Aid Allocation: Altruism or Trade benefits,‖ in European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 24, Issue 3 (September 2008), pp. 661–674. [03.26.2010]. URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.05.003, access through AUC.
118 Appendix 1. Interview guide
Generell norsk utenrikspolitikk [General Norwegian Aid Policy] 1. I din erfaring, hvem er de viktigste aktørene innenfor den norske bistandssektoren? [In your experience, who are the main actors in the Norwegian aid sector?]
2. Etter din mening, hva er hovedmålene for norsk bistand? [In your opinion, what are the objectives of Norwegian aid policy?]
3. I hvilken grad reflekterer norsk bistandspolitikk utviklingsbehovene til mottakerlandene? Hvordan blir disse behovene fastslått/vurdert? [To what extent do you think that Norwegian aid policy is reflective of the development needs of the recipient countries? How are these ‘needs’ determined?]
4. Basert på dine erfaringer, gjenspeiler distribusjonen (dvs. utformingen og implementeringen) av norsk bistand Norges offisielle bistandsmål? [Based on your experiences, are the objectives of Norway’s official development policy reflected in the character of Norwegian aid flows, policies and implemented programs, i.e. the distribution of the aid?]
Norsk bistand: drivkrefter og påvirkninger [Norwegian Aid: Determinants and Influences] 5. Reflekterer utvelgelsen av mottakerland historiske eller nåværende bånd mellom Norge og mottakerne? [Does the selection of recipients reflect historic ties or contemporary links between Norway and the recipient countries?]
6. I din mening, finnes det en sammenheng mellom norsk bistand og andre komponenter av norsk utenrikspolitikk? [In your opinion, are there any links between Norway’s development aid and other parts of Norway’s foreign policy?]
119 7. Hva tjener Norge på å bidra med utviklingshjelp? Er det fordeler for norsk industri og næringsliv (i.e. økonomiske interesser)? [What does Norway stand to gain from offering development aid (i.e. soft power)? Are there benefits linked to Norwegian business and industry (i.e. economic interests)?]
8. Etter din kunnskap, hvordan brukes og involveres norsk industri og næringsliv i Norges utviklingsaktiviteter utenlands? [To your knowledge, how are Norwegian industry and business utilized or involved in Norway’s developmental activities abroad?]
9. Basert på din erfaring, er beslutningsprosessen for norsk bistand åpen for eksterne eller interne påvirkninger (dvs. fra samfunnet eller innenfra regjerningen og byråkratiet)? Hvordan påvirker man denne beslutningsprosessen om man ønsker? [Based on your experience, is the decision-making process of Norwegian aid policy open for external (i.e. society at large) or internal (i.e. within government) influences? How does one influence this process if one wants to?]
a. I hvilken grad påvirker sivilsamfunnet beslutningsprosessen for norsk bistand? [To what extent does civil society influence the decision-making process of Norwegian aid?]
10. Etter din mening, hva er hovedkreftene i prosessen der norsk utviklings- og bistandspolitikk formes og artikuleres? [In your opinion, what are the main determinants in the process of shaping and articulating Norwegian aid policy?]
a. Tror du det norske selvbilde av Norge som en humanitær fredsnasjon påvirker den norske bistandsagendaen? [Do you think that Norway’s national identity of promoting human rights and peace shapes the Norwegian aid agenda?]
120 b. Etter din mening, hvordan påvirker den byråkratiske strukturen skillet mellom utvikling og utenrikspolitikk? Gjør den skillet utydelig? [In your opinion, how does the bureaucratic structure affect the division between development and political interests? Does it blur the line?]
c. I din erfaring, i hvilken grad påvirker det norske parlamentariske systemet den norske bistandsagendaen, særlig med tanke på koalisjons- og mindretallsregjeringer? [In your experience, to what extent does the Norwegian parliamentary system, especially the presence of coalition and minority governments, influence the Norwegian aid agenda?]
11. Etter din mening, og erfaring, i hvilken grad spiller den individuelle aktøren (eller byråkraten?) en merkbar og viktig rolle i beslutningsprosessen for norsk bistand? [In your opinion, and experience, to what extent does the individual actor play a significant role in determining Norwegian aid policy?]
Sluttspørsmål [End-of-the-session questions] 12. Etter din mening, synes du norsk bistand er effektiv målt opp mot norske bistandsmål samt mottakernes behov og interesser? [In your opinion, do you believe that Norwegian aid is effective measured towards Norwegian development objectives and the needs and interests of the recipients?]
13. Hvis du kunne endre norsk bistand, hvilke reformer ville du foreslått? [If you were in the position to change Norwegian aid, what kind of reforms would you propose?]
121 Appendix 2. List of interview respondents
Official Anonymous, Development Practitioner35, June 16th 2010, Oslo, Norway. Eriksen, Stein Sundstøl. Research Fellow and Head of the Department of Development Studies, NUPI, June 22nd 2010, Oslo, Norway. Gadgil, Arvinn. Political Advisor to the Minister of the Environment and International Development, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 28th 2010, Oslo, Norway. Hasle, Lena. Senior Advisor, Section for International Development Policy, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 28th 2010, Oslo, Norway. Loe, Lars. Senior Advisor, Department of Economics and Public Administration, Norad, June 22nd 2010, Oslo, Norway. Lund, Øivind. Current Chairman of the Board at Yara International ASA (2004-), former President of ABB Norway (1998-2001) and a professional in the Norwegian hydroelectric industry since 1973, June 29th 2010, Oslo, Norway. Moen, Eli. Senior Advisor, Peace, Gender and Democracy Department, Norad, June 11th 2010, Oslo, Norway. Pharo, Helge. Professor of International History, the University of Oslo, June 17th 2010, Oslo, Norway. Sending, Ole Jacob. Senior Researcher at NUPI and former Senior Advisor to the Minister of International Development‘s Policy Analysis Unit (2006-2008), June 24th 2010, Oslo, Norway. Thoresen, Beate. Senior Political and Organizational Advisor, International Program Department, Norwegian People‘s Aid, June 24th 2010, Oslo, Norway. Vatnar, John Tore. Head of the Oil for Development Unit, Norad, June 28th 2010, Oslo, Norway.
Unofficial Langsholt, Kristin Hoem. Senior Advisor, Section for Humanitarian Affairs, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 2nd 2010, Oslo, Norway. Pedersen, Geir O. Director General, Department of UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 1st 2010, Oslo, Norway. Sevje, Svein. Norway‘s Ambassador to Sudan (2008-2010), phone interview June 30th 2010, Oslo, Norway/Khartoum, Sudan. Tvedt, Terje. Professor of Development at the University of Bergen/Oslo and Research Director at Unifob Global, the University of Bergen, phone interview June 30th 2010, Oslo/ Bergen, Norway.
35 The respondent has over 20 years experience with Norwegian development cooperation, working for various Norwegian NGOs as well as in the MFA.
122 Appendix 3. Consent form for interviews
Political Science Department Benedicte Bakkeskau American University in Cairo 800-08-0464 IRB Board
Consent Form
I am a graduate student from the American University in Cairo. My research examines the nature of the Norwegian aid agenda and how the domestic socio-political realities influence the character of Norwegian development assistance. Our conversation will focus on the nature of the Norwegian aid agenda as well as the character of the aid distribution. Moreover, the discussion will focus on the determinants of Norwegian aid policy.
I will record your responses through note taking and recording. All notes gathered will be accessible to me alone. Your name will be used in the written work of the thesis, unless confidentiality is requested (see statement below).
If you at any moment during the interview would like to end it, I will respect your decision. Consequently, either part or the whole of the interview will be destroyed based on your wish on how to proceed.
Thank you for your understanding and contribution to this research.
____ I wish to remain anonymous.
Date Signature
_____/_____/______
123 Appendix 4. Approval of study from the Institutional Review Board at the American University in Cairo
124