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Sat. 6 Aug. 2011

FDL  WikiLeaks Cables Reveal US Strategy for Regime Change in Syria as Protesters Are Massacred……..……………………1 SYRIA COMMENT  Should the US Hasten Assad’s Downfall Despite Syria’s Absence of Opposition Leaders? …………...……………….9 HURRIYET  Dubious portrayal of Syrian events…………..…………….15

WASHINGTON POST  Bashar al-Assad must step down……………..…………….17

FRANCE 24  The absolute power of the Assad family……………..…….19

NEW REPUBLIC  Why Turkey’s Alawite Community Thinks Assad Is the Victim………………………………………………………23 DAILY TELEGRAPH  Secretive sect of the rulers of Syria………………………...25

FOX NEWS  Four Things Washington Needs to Do Next With Syria…...28 JERUSALEM POST  Israel mum on Syria, US Jewish groups speak out ………..31 ECONOMIST  Bloodier still………………………………………………..33 HOME PAGE WikiLeaks Cables Reveal US Strategy for Regime Change in Syria as Protesters Are Massacred kevin Gosztola, FDL (Fire Dog Lake: American, It also features regular coverage of the torture scandal and the ongoing US government war on WikiLeaks), 6 Aug. 2011,

In the aftermath of a massacre in Hama, Syria state media broadcasted images of “burnt, buildings, makeshift barricades and deserted streets strewn with rubble,” according to the New York Times and claimed the revolt in Syria has ended. Meanwhile, The Guardian reports tens of thousands have taken to the streets all over the country and are continuing a five-months old uprising against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke at a press conference 2 and said the Syrian government has killed more than 2,000 people in its brutal crackdown on protests in the past months. She told the press the US was extending sanctions against a “prominent businessman and MP,” who allegedly has close ties to Assad. This marked the “fourth round of US sanctions against Syria aimed at pressuring Assad’s government to ease its bloody crackdown against unarmed protesters,” according to The Guardian. However, numerous Syrian protesters and some US senators are dissatisfied, as the sanctions do not target Syria’s oil and gas sector.

As protests continue and the brutal crackdown on protests wears on, US State Embassy cables released by the media organization WikiLeaks provide a greater understanding of the Washington power politics that have led to this moment.

For the past five to six years, the US policy toward Syria has used what could be called a two-pronged strategy to push for regime change. The US has supported “civil society” activists or external opposition organizations. It has also worked to delegitimize, destabilize and isolate the country through the application of

2 sanctions and various other measures, which could be applied to exploit vulnerabilities.

A cable from December 13, 2006, opens with the conclusion that the Syrian government has ended 2006 “in a position much stronger domestically and internationally than it did [in] 2005.” It features a collection of possible actions that could be taken to undermine the Assad regime.

The vulnerabilities listed include: the Rafiq Hariri investigation and tribunal (Hariri was a Lebanese Prime Minister who was assassinated in a major car bombing); the alliance with Tehran; the regime’s “inner circle”; divisions in the military-security services; the corrupt Baathist elites; previous failures of reform; the economy; the Kurds; extremists and the “Khaddam factor” (Abdul Halim Khaddam is an exiled former Syrian Vice President, whose name appears in a number of the cables released thus far.)

3 "ENCOURAGE RUMORS AND SIGNALS OF EXTERNAL PLOTTING:

The regime is intensely sensitive to rumors about coup-plotting and restlessness in the security services and military. Regional allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia should be encouraged to meet with figures like Khaddam and Rifat Asad as a way of sending such signals, with appropriate leaking of the meetings afterwards. This again touches on this insular regime,s paranoia and increases the possibility of a self- defeating over-reaction.

THE KHADDAM FACTOR

… We should continue to encourage the Saudis and others to allow Khaddam access to their media outlets, providing him with venues for airing the SARG,s dirty laundry. We should anticipate an overreaction by the regime that will add to its isolation and alienation from its Arab neighbors…

HIGHLIGHT KURDISH COMPLAINTS: Highlighting Kurdish complaints in public statements, including publicizing human rights abuses will exacerbate regime,s concerns about the Kurdish population. Focus on economic hardship in Kurdish areas and the SARG,s long- standing refusal to offer citizenship to some 200,000 stateless Kurds. 3 This issue would need to be handled carefully, since giving the wrong kind of prominence to Kurdish issues in Syria could be a liability for our efforts at uniting the opposition, given Syrian (mostly Arab) civil society’s skepticism of Kurdish objectives.

PLAY ON SUNNI FEARS OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE: There are fears in Syria that the Iranians are active in both Shia proselytizing and conversion of, mostly poor, Sunnis. Though often exaggerated, such fears reflect an element of the Sunni community in Syria that is increasingly upset by and focused on the spread of Iranian influence in their country through activities ranging from mosque construction to business. Both the local Egyptian and Saudi missions here, (as well as prominent Syrian Sunni religious leaders), are giving increasing attention to the matter and we should coordinate more closely with their governments on ways to better publicize and focus regional attention on the issue.

This is clearly manipulative and underhanded. It shouldn’t be surprising that the Assad regime would want to crack down violently on any protests. The shadiness of US relations with Syria 4 is only amplified if you look at the other aspect of the US push for regime change: the public funding of opposition groups.

The US Doesn’t Undermine Countries, It Transforms Them

In April, the Washington Post reported on the funding of opposition groups revealed in the cables and highlighted a group called the Movement for Justice and Development (MJD). It noted it was closely affiliated with the London-based satellite channel Barada TV, which started broadcasting in April 2009 but “ramped up operations to cover the mass protests in Syria.” The cables showed “as much as $6 million” had been “funneled” to the group “since 2006 to operate the satellite channel and finance other activities inside Syria.”

A cable from March 11, 2009, shows why the US might want to work with the MJD:

“MJD’s effort to expand its base in Syria is noteworthy in that it is a moderate Islamist organization that publicly eschews any ideological agenda aside from ending the Asad regime through democratic reform.

4 XXXXXXXXXXXX That said, we have heard numerous unconfirmed rumors by very nervous democracy-reform advocates that the SARG may have penetrated the MJD. XXXXXXXXXXXX MJD’s role in organizing an opposition television platform for broadcasting into Syria would make it a high priority target for Syria’s security services.”

At the time that the cable was written, the group had been banned from Syria. But, that didn’t hurt the allure of cooperating with such a group to bring “democratic change” to Syria.

According to the cable, the group “doesn’t believe in Sharia law.” Throughout 2008, it “participated in symposiums” in Europe in the United States. It is a member of the Damascus Declaration, a unity statement made by Syrian opposition in 2005 that called the Assad regime, “authoritarian, totalitarian and cliquish,` and called for peaceful reform through dialogue. They did not have a cooperative relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. And they were working with the Middle East Partnership Initiative, run by the US State Department, on a satellite channel that the Ford 5 Foundation was allegedly helping to finance.

It is unclear how much of a role the MJD has had in the current protests in Syria, especially since they were mostly a group of exiles in 2009, however, the National Salvation Front of Syria founded by Khaddam has been organizing support for the Syrian opposition. Through conferences held in Istanbul, Turkey and lobbying efforts, which have been aimed at getting the US to impose greater sanctions on Syria, this group has been working to keep the opposition from being entirely crushed by Assad’s regime.

Syrian Dissident Unhappy with US Foreign Policy

While the Arab Spring has been viewed as a spontaneous moment in history that spurred a domino effect leading multiple populations in the Middle East and North Africa to mount uprisings against repressive dictatorial regimes, the cables show that opposition had been looking for the right moment to topple Assad for at least the past five years. But, US diplomatic efforts to

5 undercut Assad only hurt the opposition the US was claiming to support.

As the Syrian government became aware of US funding of non- governmental organizations and opposition groups, the regime only turned more repressive. A figure in Syria, whose name is redacted from a cable sent out on November 25, 2008, criticized the US policy saying it had “united Islamist nationalists and secular Arab nationalists,” exactly what the US had not planned. And, Syrian opposition chided US foreign policy.

“XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed disappointment that the U.S. has driven Syria in a direction not good for the country, but very good for the regime. The regime senses that the U.S. has played its hand very badly, using its war on terror in a counterproductive way. Instead of isolating the Islamists and creating the kind of dynamic social ferment and gradual upheaval that was evident in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the mid- and late-1980′s, the U.S. has created conditions that have united, in Syria at least, Islamist nationalists and secular Arab 6 nationalists. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX , the U.S. has succeeded in making Syria a hero in the Islamic world. U.S. support for the opposition has not been effective The fact that Ba’ath Party thugs, with some security services support, could beat up a group of opposition activists, intellectuals, and cultural figures peacefully protesting the continuation of Emergency Law was a far more important signal than the USD five million that the U.S. set aside to support the opposition, noted XXXXXXXXXXXX”

It’s Not “Regime Change” But Rather “Behavior Reform”

It is clear the Bush Administration was committed to bringing about regime change. Under President Barack Obama, it appears the US has not fully committed to the same of kind of destabilization efforts. The Obama Administration appears to have instead adopted a policy that is indicative of the sort of American exceptionalism rife within the Washington establishment.

On April 28, 2009, a cable describing a “new policy front” was sent out. US Chargé d’Affaires ad interim to Syria Maura Connelly suggested the “primary Syrian external opposition

6 organization” had completely collapsed. Thus, the suggestion was put forth that the US do less work trying to foster “regime change” and more toward “encouraging ‘behavior reform.’”

“…The U.S. attempt to politically isolate the SARG raised stumbling blocks to direct Embassy involvement in civil society programming. As a result, the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Bureau of Human Rights and Labor (DRL) took the lead in identifying and funding civil society and human rights projects. Though the Embassy has had direct input on a few of these efforts, especially with DRL, most of the programming has proceeded without direct Embassy involvement…”

The cable lists off Freedom House, American Bar Association, American University, Internews and work done by MEPI with the Aspen Strategic Initiative Institute, Democracy Council of California, Regents of the University of New Mexico and the International Republican Institute (IRI). It highlighted how the most sensitive MEPI-sponsored programs are funded and noted 7 the Syria government would “view any US funds going to illegal political groups as tantamount to supporting regime change.”

It suggests concerns Syria could address if it wanted to be seen in a more positive light. This aspect of the US “behavior reform” strategy appears to be rather consistent with the rhetoric of the State Department during the current uprising. Then, Connelly wrote:

"…Action on any one of the following five concerns might shift the SARG’s image into a more positive light. (1) The release of specific imprisoned high-profile civil society and human rights activists; (2) credible movement to resolve the citizenship status of stateless Kurds; (3) loosening media restrictions, including Internet censorship; (4) lifting travel bans on Syrian citizens; and (5) following up on promises to establish a “Senate” that would create a legislative space for opposition politicians to work in…"

Finally, the cable on this Orwellian-sounding policy of “behavior reform” suggests further Americanization or Westernization could

7 possibly help achieve US goals in Syria as well (like exporting more KFCs and Gap stores).

Sanctions Help Regime Control Political Opinion

Publicly, the State Department has claimed it is pressing a “message” both to Assad, his regime and to American partners that “the time for democratic change is already underway in Syria.” They have consistently indicated support for the protesters right to “peacefully assemble” (a phrase that each time uttered by a State Department spokesperson becomes even more meaningless).

They have proposed further sanctions, however, cables released by WikiLeaks indicate opposition groups have seen few benefits from sanctions. A cable from November 25, 2008, featuring the views of a Syrian dissident, suggests sanctions have been an easy justification for stifling political organizing in Syria: 8 "Like many Syrians we have met, XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, and XXXXXXXXXXXXi decried the U.S. sanctions against Syria as hurting the Syrian people more than anyone else. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued the sanctions had become a tool for controlling popular opinion in the SARG’s hands. The Asad regime held up the sanctions as an example of how the West opposed the people of Syria, thereby reinforcing the idea that Asad and the Ba’ath Party alone had the Syrian people’s interests at heart, XXXXXXXXXXXX said.

XXXXXXXXXXXX added that the West demanded reform, but it actually prefered an Asad regime to an alternative government, primarily because the West feared any alternative would be Islamist and/or violent, or simply would not willingly follow the policies of the West. He argued the West was afraid of a fully democratic country anywhere in the Middle East. Both, who spent five years in prison for his role in the Damascus Spring and is now involved with the Damascus Declaration, and XXXXXXXXXXXX, who is XXXXXXXXXXXX’s lawyer and the president of the XXXXXXXXXXXX, echoed XXXXXXXXXXXX’s sentiments in their own comments. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued the “regime always uses this relationship with the West to project an image of importance…It

8 allows him (Asad) to tell people: ‘see, I’m needed and the West isn’t interested in these (human rights) issues.’”"

“We Cannot Stand Idly By When a Tyrant Tells His People That There Will Be No Mercy”

If one reads these cables and draws the conclusion that the US bears some responsibility for egging Assad on, then it appears the US might have an obligation to launch a “humanitarian intervention” into Syria, perhaps, one like the “humanitarian intervention” that continues to wear on Libya.

Recall, the American people were told we had a kind of moral duty to intervene in Libya. President Barack Obama declared on March 19:

"I am deeply aware of the risks of any military action, no matter what limits we place on it. I want the American people to know that the use of force is not our first choice and it’s not a choice that I make lightly. 9 But we cannot stand idly by when a tyrant tells his people that there will be no mercy, and his forces step up their assaults on cities like Benghazi and Misurata, where innocent men and women face brutality and death at the hands of their own government."

More than 2,000 have died as a result of a “tyrant.” It certainly seems like the Assad regime has adopted a policy of “no mercy.” Yet, the Obama administration has yet to forcefullu call for Assad to step down.

As with Mubarak and President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, the administration supports “a transition” and hopes the dictator, who is actively brutalizing his people, will relinquish control voluntarily and step down. They seem to think they can through words and sanctions impose “behavior reform.” And so, there has not been, to use another Orwellian-sounding term, any indication that a “kinetic military action” will be launched.

That is not to say that the US should be arming any Syrian rebels. The rebels the US has supported (and possibly armed) are now

9 dealing with “tribal hostilities” within their ranks, meaning they are now assassinating and killing one another.

What this shows is US diplomacy, which has included funding Syrian opposition groups and covertly supporting actions that could advance regime change in Syria, is a toxic elixir that not only has failed to give the opposition the support it needs to topple Assad but has also significantly influenced the regime’s decision to unleash its military and security forces on the Syrian people. In short, efforts to advance American hegemony through the buildup of “civil society” and the so-called advancement of “human rights” have failed and innocent civilians are paying the price.

Kevin Gosztola is a writer and curator of Firedoglake's blog The Dissenter, a blog covering civil liberties in the age of technology. He is an editor for OpEdNews.com and a former intern and videographer for The Nation Magazine

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Should the US Hasten Assad’s Downfall Despite Syria’s Absence of Opposition Leaders? Friday, August 5th, 2011 Joshua Landis Syria Comment, August 5, 2011

The Lack of Leaders Syria’s opposition does not have leaders. Rami Nakhle, a spokesman for the Local Coordination Committees, the most well known of the groups opposing the regime, told Deb Amos of NPR, “there is no national leadership, even behind the scenes.” This is a virtue and intentional he explains, “we are doing our best not really to have leaders.” Why? Because “the Syrian regime has targeted anyone who is seen as an organizer of the protests.” That is the practical reason.

10 A second reason is that Syrians don’t want leaders – “Everybody really feels anger towards leadership and authority on them,” says Nakhle.

Wissam Tarif says that a new leadership for Syria will emerge eventually. It will emerge out of battle. It will emerge from the street. He explains, “There is an internal process, a process that is taking place in the street, which we will have to wait to see what happens there,” he said. “No one can control that. The real show is taking place on the ground with the protesters. And they will decide. No one else.”

How Does Syria’s Lack of Leaders Complicate US Planning? The Syrian opposition’s lack of leaders has many US policy makers scared. They don’t want to bring down the regime before there is some structure or leadership to take its place. Syria’s silent majority is worried about a power vacuum developing in Syria as well. Who wants chaos? Iraq is fresh in everyone’s minds, not 11 least of all in American policy planners’ minds. The quick toppling of the Iraqi regime brought militias and civil war. Much of Iraq that Saddam had failed to destroy was brought down by the waring militias and criminal gangs that took the army’s place. Most devastating, was the flight of Iraq’s upper and middle classes.

Because of this fear, a number of US think tankers, most recently Michael S. Doran and Salman Shaikh of the Saban Center at Brookings, are trying to think their way around the dangers. In an article, entitled Getting Serious in Syria, they argue that the US must play a leadership role in hastening the downfall of the Syrian regime. To avoid chaos and a vacuum they council the US to train, unit, and shape the Syrian opposition. It should also preserve the army. They don’t want an Iraq redux.

The main body of the article is quite smart and nails a number of regime characteristics. It is the recommendations that give pause. The main shortcoming of the article is that it skips any discussion of the opposition’s lack of leadership.

11 They are convinced that the sort of regime-led dialogue that Patrick Seale recommends is fruitless. In this, they are so far correct. But they tip-toe around Seale’s central concern, that Syrians are divided. Without unity, Syria is likely to end up like Iraq and not Egypt. Seale cautions, “a sectarian civil war on the Iraqi or Lebanese model is every Syrian’s nightmare. There must surely be another way out of the crisis.” He councils dialogue because he despairs of unity. He writes:

If the regime has shown itself to be weak, the opposition is weaker still. It wants to challenge the system, but it evidently does not know how to proceed. It is split in a dozen ways between secularists, civil rights activists, democrats — and Islamists; between angry unemployed youths in the street and venerable figures of the opposition, hallowed by years in prison; between the opposition in Syria and the exiles abroad; between those who call for western intervention and those who reject any form of foreign interference. 12 Doran and Shaikh dismiss Seale’s caution and ignore Syria’s leaderlessness. This permits them to advocate speeding up regime- change. They explain that in order to save lives and ensure “the speediest rise of a new order hospitable to the United States,” the US should organize a “contact group” of friendly nations which will help in shaping the environment such that a power vacuum does not emerge in Syria when the regime falls. They advise that “The contact group should take all available steps to starve the regime of cash and other resources, including taking a leadership role on preventing the regime from generating revenue from oil exports.” On economic sanctions, they follow the Tabler and Monajed plan.

Their addition is the notion of an official “contact group” and that idea that the US can help form a transitional government out of Syria’s divisive opposition activists.

The United States must work with other key actors to help turn the Syrian opposition into the nucleus of a transition government. As the experience with the Libyan opposition forces has shown,

12 engagement with the Syrian opposition movement would prove invaluable to increase its effectiveness and professionalize its efforts.

As for the Syrian Army, they write:

The United States must promote defections from the Syrian security services with an eye both to convincing Assad to leave and to preserving the Syrian Armed Forces as a future national institution. In doing so, Washington must warn officers, down to the brigade level, that they are being monitored and that they will be held personally accountable for the atrocities that are committed under their command. (This should not be a bluff.)

Can the US do this? Has it learned enough from its nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq to make the third time a charm? Or should the US pay heed to Wissam Tarif’s warning that the formation of an opposition leadership is an “internal process” that “no one can control?” 13 Randa Slim proposes a Doran lite sanctions scenario, aimed at convincing Syria’s business elite to dump Assad and embrace the revolution. In an article, entitled, “Where’s Syria’s business community?” She insists that Turkey must lead. The US is too tainted to assume dominance in the “contact group.” A close relationship with the Washington will delegitimize Syria’s opposition leaders in the eyes of Syrians. The US and the West in general, she cautions, must leave a “lighter footprint.”

Slim is clear about one thing. Disunity among the opposition may well doom their desire for regime-change. The absence of an opposition leadership is the major stumbling block preventing the Syrian business elite from ditching the Assads. She argues that the key to success for the revolution is getting Aleppo and Damascus to rise up with the people of Deraa and Jisr ash-Shaghour. Syrian businessmen are a conservative and self-interested lot, not to mention that they have a refined disdain for peasants as well as tribesmen. They are not big on leftists, philosophers, religious fanatics, or young zealots of any stripe. Indeed, Syria’s merchants and capitalists see themselves as the true guardians of the Syrian

13 nation. They need a safe alternative before they throw themselves into the arms of the revolution. They are not going to embrace, not to mention, fund a zealous and leaderless bunch of young activists who want to smash everything that smells of Baathist privilege, corruption and cronyism. After all, who are the CEOs of Syria’s crony capitalism if not the business elites of Aleppo and Damascus? They are not known for their suicidal tendencies.

Only a five weeks ago, the head of Aleppo’s Chamber of Commerce, decried the re-emergence of socialist thinking that the uprising was responsible for.

That would be suicide. The business elites of Aleppo and Damascus sustained the regime and

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is correct in pointing out that change is up to the Syrians, and that the Syrian opposition must start laying out a credible transitional plan. The traditional 14 Syrian business community must be convinced that there is a credible and viable political alternative to Assad. All they see now is an opposition that is either too old and disorganized and has tried to effect change and failed in the past or an opposition that is too young in the form of the Local Coordinating Committees whose faces and names are unknown to most and who are organizing and documenting the street protests. Different opposition groupings including the National Democratic Grouping, the Damascus Declaration signatories, the National Salvation Council, and the local Coordinating Committee have declared themselves, solidifying the image among this community of a disjointed opposition.

The formation of a transitional political council composed of the different groups now making up the Syrian opposition, Islamists and secular, old and young, groups based in Syria and exiles, will go a long way in promoting a shift in the Syrian businessman’s calculus. This council should elect a leadership, outline a detailed transition plan, and spell out a clear vision about the new social contract for how they want Syrians to live together and the type of economic system they want to see established. The lighter the

14 footprint the international community has in this process, the more credible the outcome will be to the majority of Syrians and especially to the traditional merchant class, a nationalistic group that is suspicious of foreign, and especially U.S., intervention. There are many skilled Syrian political scientists, lawyers, and economists to do this job well without any outside assistance. Syrians Must Win the Revolution on Their Own

Perhaps the US would be wiser to allow Syria to fill its own power vacuum? Once a united leadership emerges in Syria, it will be able to win the confidence of the majority and topple the regime on its own. There are dangers to short-circuiting that painful process. Doran and Shaikh argue that the US should hasten both the destruction of the old regime and construction of a new one – in short that it can nation build and help guide the emergence of a new Syria. This will save Syrian lives, they project, because it will prevent a drawn out battle. By helping to “fast forward” the Syrian revolution, however, the US could be creating a Frankenstein. If 15 the opposition doesn’t have time to produce a leadership that emerges organically out of struggle and wins the confidence of the people by its own intelligence, organization, canniness, and most importantly, its own successes, Syria may never become united. As Haytham al-Maleh, the dean of Syria’s opposition leaders, said in urging Syrians to eschew foreign intervention: “If we want to own Syria after the revolution, we must win this struggle on our own.”

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Dubious portrayal of Syrian events Bahad?r Dincer Hurriyet, Friday, August 5, 2011

15 The biased media coverage of the events in Syria seems to intentionally downplay the real issues at stake by focusing on the claims of conflict between the Shiite and Sunni population.

The military and regime are depicted as the saviors of the people. On the other hand, the Syrian people who have deployed peaceful means of protest with no reference to sectarian ideology are shown as armed gangs. However, the current situation is actually an issue of “victimization.” In reality, the scenario of “sectarian conflict” reflects the attempts to legitimize certain interests rooted in the status quo. The winners and rewards of such a scenario must be analyzed. First and foremost, if a sectarian conflict erupts, the center of the struggle will shift. This will allow time for the Syrian regime to relax.

Moreover, the possibility of a sectarian conflict doesn’t only serve the regional powers, but also certain global ones. When their 16 inaction is questioned, they can justify it by saying “they are struggling with primordial religious problems, they have no legitimate demands.” Furthermore, the rhetoric of “sectarian conflict” that fragments the Middle East can also please those that don’t want the Muslim world to unite. In this sense, the expansionary policies of the Iranian regime can indirectly aid those that have certain interests in the region.

The latest coverage of the situation is trying to build the grounds for the intensification of a sectarian conflict. Those that aren’t comfortable with the regime’s current situation are trying to change the agenda and spark an actual sectarian conflict.

Time is not on Turkey’s side

A stronger Turkish position seems to be blocked intentionally. Certain factors are influencing the Turkish decision-making process: the indecisiveness of the international community, the negative scenarios about the future of change in Syria and expectations that Bashar al-Assad’s regime can survive the current crisis.

16 The situation in Syria is at a critical point for Turkey. The international community has remained silent to this day, giving tacit consent to Assad’s actions, thus increasing the possibility of sectarian conflict. As each day passes, the risks of taking firm action are increasing immensely. Now, our attempts to sympathize with the Syrian victims may be interpreted as a preference for a certain sect. This increases our possibility of being isolated from the international community in regards to the Syrian issue, and thus increases the vulnerability of our foreign relations. For example, we may face a direct conflict with Iran. It must be asked whether the United States had anticipated this while it remained uninvolved by saying “there is nothing to do; we do not know what to do” which also puzzled Turkey.

We must also remember that the events in Hama are not new. There have been similar operations in and attacks on many other cities, thought they haven’t received such attention in the media. 17 Yet, the events in Hama have found large coverage in the international media. It is not difficult to understand that the Baath Party’s main aim in Hama is to spark further sectarian conflict. The fact that they have tried to provoke the Sunnis on the eve of Ramadan is in accordance with such a policy.

At this point, we can only hope that Turkey increases its efforts in bringing the “real” issues to the world’s agenda, and that the people of Syria don’t fall for the ugly games of the Baath regime.

*Bahad?r Dinçer is currently a researcher in International Strategic Research Organization, or USAK, Center for Middle East Studies. HOME PAGE

Bashar al-Assad must step down Robert P. Casey Jr., Washington Post, Saturday, August 6,

17 Scores have been killed in Hama, Syria, in recent days. Despite a sustained assault by government forces, Syrians continue to demonstrate in the thousands — a testament to their courage, their cause, and their desire for the most basic elements of human rights and human dignity. The horror taking place in Syria has led me and others in the Senate to conclude that this regime is not capable of real reform. It has lost all legitimacy. We must be direct and unequivocal in our message to the dictator of Damascus: Bashar al-Assad must step down. The Syrian people should not have to bear the brutality of this regime any longer.

Nor should Syrians outside that country suffer from the terrible reach of this regime. Sakher Hallak visited the United States in May to attend a medical conference. Sakher, the brother of a naturalized American citizen from Syria who is a respected oncology researcher, disappeared upon his return. His wife contacted authorities, who confirmed that he was in their custody and said that he would be released shortly. The next day, Sakher’s 18 wife and daughter were interviewed by authorities, who again said that he would be released.

Two days later, Sakher’s mutilated body was discovered in a village about 12 miles south of Aleppo, the city in northern Syria where he was from. Several bones were broken. Syrian authorities have denied Sakher was ever in their custody and said they found his body in a ditch by the side of a road.

Sakher was not a political activist. He was not involved in the demonstrations. His sole “offense” appears to be that he attended a conference and visited his brother in the United States.

Assad has ruled Syria by force and repression since 2000, following the precedent set by his father. Syrians have been protesting the regime since March, when government authorities arrested 15 schoolchildren in the city of Daraa for spray painting anti-government slogans. These children were reportedly tortured while in custody, and authorities resorted to force when their parents and others in their community called for their release. Within a week, police had killed 55 people.

18 The world has watched as the violence has mounted through the spring and summer, as Assad’s government tries to hold on to power by force.

Amid Assad’s campaign of terror, we cannot forget his support for terrorism abroad. Assad’s fall could have significant ramifications across the region: It would weaken Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, which would no longer have a foothold in Damascus. It would reduce the strength of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which continues to stockpile weapons that it receives from Syria. And it would limit Hamas’s ability to conduct terrorist operations in Gaza.

Our allies in the Arab League and in Turkey could play a critical role in pressuring Assad — they have economic and diplomatic ties with Syria that the United States does not. Congress and the administration should make efforts to leverage these relationships 19 for a comprehensive regional approach to the crisis in Syria. We should also applaud our allies who have rejected the Assad regime.

Meanwhile, the United States should continue to pursue a resolution at the U.N. Security Council condemning the Syrian government’s behavior. Last week’s statement by the council was a positive step but should be bolstered by a strong resolution.

We must also continue to pursue efforts that constrict the regime’s ability to conduct business abroad. The European Union announced a freeze on Syrian assets last week and travel bans on five more military and government officials. The international community must also be willing to examine expanded sanctions on the banking and energy sectors.

Our diplomats, led by Ambassador Robert Ford, have pursued American interests and values abroad. Ford’s recent trip to Hama, in which he met with Syrian citizens and expressed support for their right to peacefully demonstrate, underscored that the most

19 basic American value, the right of democratic representation, is at stake in Syria.

The number of Syrians killed in pursuit of democratic government and basic human dignities since this spring has by some estimates reached 2,000. This does not include those who have been tortured and survived. We honor the memory of Sakher Hallek and hundreds of others by supporting democratic change in Syria.

The writer, a Democrat from Pennsylvania, is chair of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian affairs.

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The absolute power of the Assad family FRANCE 24 05/08/2011, 20 Syrian President Bashar al-Assad gained control of Syria when his father Hafez died in 2000, but his leadership relies on the support of this close-knit family. Facing unprecedented opposition from the streets and growing isolation on the international front, Syrian President Bashar al- Assad can still rely on his family. The Assad clan, which comes from the minority Alawi community (around 12% of the Syrian population), has been at the helm of the country since 1970. Bashar took over from his father Hafez al-Assad, who died in 2000, but his leadership relies on the unflinching support of his next-of-kin.

Maher al-Assad, the soldier Born in 1968, the younger brother of Syria’s president is the head of the Republican Guard, an elite troop composed of 12,000 soldiers, as well as the army’s 4th Armoured Division. These two posts make Maher a major figure on both the domestic and international fronts, particularly in relation to Syria’s alliance with Iran. According to Bassam Jaara, a London-based Syrian journalist and critic of Bashar, Maher’s influence cannot be

20 overstated: "He is the commander of the army’s two most powerful units. It is normal if he has the last word.”

If Bashar had, until recently, been considered the reformer within the family, Maher is by all accounts its hardliner. He is the “the ruthless face of power”, in the words of Ignatius Leverrier, a former diplomat and author of a blog about Syria on the French daily Le Monde's website. Maher also oversees the commanders of the Shabiha militia. This armed group is made up almost exclusively of Alawites and is charged with defending the interests of the Assad clan.

When the European Union imposed sanctions against Maher in 2011, it did not hesitate to single him out as the “principal overseer of violence against demonstrators.” This has been highlighted by the fact that Syrian protesters often target Bashar’s younger brother directly in their slogans. Maher is described as angry, moody and cruel in several biographies. It has been 21 reported that in November 1999, he shot his brother-in-law Asef Shawkat (see below) in the presidential palace during an argument.

He has also been mentioned as a suspect in an international investigation’s preliminary report into the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri.

Anisa and Buchra al-Assad, the regime's leading ladies The widow of the late Hafez al-Assad and the mother of Bashar, Anisa Makhlouf has kept a low profile, but is the final judge on all matters. "Decisions are made collectively in the family’s inner circle… but Anisa has the last say," Wael al-Hafez, a member of the Syrian opposition in exile has been quoted as saying by the feminist blog Les Martiennes.

Born in 1960, Buchra al-Assad is Bashar’s only sister and a pharmacist by training. Like brother Maher, she is considered a hawk within the regime and reportedly wields influence from her key role as Bashar’s secretary. She married Asef Shawkat (see below) in the mid-1990s.

21 According to Mohammed Daoud, a former Syrian diplomat, Buchra has had a tense relationship with President Bashar al- Assad’s wife, Asma. "Bouchra long prevented Asma from using the title of Syria’s “First Lady”, a title she prefers to remain with her mother Anisa,” Daoud said.

Asma al-Assad, the image of reform Born to a Syrian diplomat family in London in 1975, Asma al- Assad, née Asma Fawaz al-Akhras, married the current president of Syria in December 2000. The couple has three sons: Hafez, Zein and Karim. Asma holds degrees in computer science and French literature from King's College London, and worked in investment banking before marrying Bashar.

The manicured and media savvy wife helped Bashar build an image of a moderate reformer and, ironically, launched an organisation in 2005 to encourage Syrian youth to embrace “active 22 citizenship”. According to a rumour relayed by several media organisations, Asma has exiled herself in London with her three children since the uprising began.

Rami Makhlouf, the financier A first cousin of Bashar on his mother Anisa’s side, Rami Makhlouf has used family influence to gain control of an estimated 60% of the country’s business. Born in 1965 to an Alawite family and businessman father, he has been dubbed the “king of Syria.” According to the respected French weekly Jeune Afrique, he is thought to be Syria’s richest man, with an economic empire that stretches from “telecommunications to retail, but also includes energy, banking, and transportation industries.” The US Treasury imposed sanctions on Makhlouf in 2008 for his improper use of political influence in business dealings. He is part of the list of Syrian officials who were slapped with economic sanctions by the EU in May. Brussels accuses him of bankrolling the crackdown on pro-democracy protesters.

Reviled by protesters who have long accused him of corruption, Makhlouf announced in June that part of his fortune would be

22 given over to charity. His brother Hafez Makhlouf, 36, is the chief of the Damascus branch of the General Security Directorate, the country’s civilian intelligence service.

Asef Shawkat, the brother-in-law A career military man and Alawite, General Asef Shawkat fate changed completely when he married Buchra al-Assad in 1995. At first he was rejected by the family, but he was eventually accepted into the Assad clan. He is reported to have built a strong relationship with Bashar.

He rose quickly to fill some of the army’s most important posts. Head of intelligence in the army until 2001, he became deputy Military Intelligence Chief from 2001 to 2005, and then replaced his boss at the top post. However, a few international incidents that shed a negative light on Syria led to his replacement in 2008. However, he was quickly given another strategic position as deputy chief-of-staff of the armed forces. 23 Along with Maher, Shawkat is named as a suspected plotter of the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri in 2005.

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Why Turkey’s Alawite Community Thinks Assad Is the Victim Afsin Yurdakul The New Republic (American newspaper founded in 1914), August 6, 2011

In a bustling park in the Turkish city of Antakya, Metin, a local merchant, is having a picnic with his family. His hazel eyes fixated on a large, turquoise pool by a grove of pines, he takes a

23 sip from his raki and whispers as if he’s revealing a secret. “It breaks my heart to hear about it in the news,” he says, referring to the brutal government crackdown taking place across the border in Syria’s predominantly Sunni districts. “But, how can an Alawite be cruel like that?”

Like the ruling Assad family in Damascus, Metin is an Alawite of Arab origin. He holds a Turkish passport, yet he has relatives who live in Syria. Torn between devotion to his sect and disgust over what he calls the “alleged reports of violence,” he has a hard time making up his mind about the Assad regime. Indeed, having maintained a strong bond with the Syrian Alawite heartland of Latakia ever since Antakya’s annexation to Turkey in 1939, most Arab Alawites living in Turkey are distrustful of the news coming out of Syria, and they believe that President Assad is falling victim to an international smear campaign.

A sect with ties to Shia Islam, Alawites constitute about 12 24 percent of Syria’s 22 million people but hold a vastly outsized portion of the high-ranking positions in the government and the military. Due to their syncretic religion that blends Islam with other local traditions, the Alawites have long been considered heretics and were historically persecuted as such by Sunni Muslims. When Syria fell under French rule in the early 20th century, the Alawites were granted their own state, based in the port city of Latakia, and enjoyed relative autonomy until Syria gained its independence in 1946. Many religious minorities, including the Alawites, were split over the issue of union with the newly-established Sunni-dominated country. In the 1930s, a group of activists including Sulayman Al Assad, one of the prominent patriarchs of the country’s ruling clan, appealed the union with Syria to French officials. But the French rejected the Alawites’ demand to maintain their autonomy and, since then, the Assad family has been involved in the Alawite political movement in Syria, gradually assuming a guardianship role for the group and securing their loyal support in return. When Hafez Al Assad seized power in an intra-party coup in 1970, most of the Alawite community lined up behind him.

24 Since the outbreak of protests earlier this year, Syria’s burgeoning opposition has been striving to win the loyalties of the Alawite community, which constitutes the backbone of the regime in Damascus. Sondos Soleiman, one of the few Alawite opposition members, told me that her people have “also suffered from the suppression of the regime,” and, likewise, also aspire for a “democratic state and freedom of expression.” Last month, anti- regime protestors dedicated a Friday demonstration to Saleh Al Ali, a prominent Syrian Alawite who rose up against the French occupation in Syria in 1918. And the Change in Syria conference, which brought together a diverse group of Syrian dissidents in the Turkish city of Antalya in June, also emphasized that the opposition aimed to embrace all of Syria’s ethnic and religious groups. Molham Al Drobi, a member of the Islamic Brotherhood and an executive committee member at the conference, told me that Alawites “will lose a historic opportunity” if they don’t side with the Syrian revolution.

25 But in Antakya’s Alawite neighborhoods, I found that most residents were still more likely to take their cues from Syria’s embattled dictator Bashar Al Assad, who in a June televised address blamed the unrest on “saboteurs” and urged his nation to ruminate on the motivations driving the protests. “What is happening to our country, and why?” he asked. “It doesn’t require much analysis, based on what we heard from others and witnessed in the media, to prove that there is indeed a conspiracy.”

Sure enough, such conspiracy theories run rampant throughout Antakya’s Alawite neighborhoods. Metin told me that members of “fundamentalist groups” might be providing incentives for Sunni refugees who have crossed the border into Turkey to draw a grim picture of the situation in Syria. Repeating an oft-heard rumor, he says that “provocateurs pay each [refugee] two hundred dollars to cross to the Turkish side.” Nurettin, a local Alawite retailer who also believes the international media is exaggerating, argued instead that “Western meddlers who want to bring the end of Assad” are manipulating thousands of Syrians refugees—or “lobbyists” as he calls them—to hurt Assad’s reputation. “The refugees in the camps here [in Turkey] are mostly Palestinians

25 who ran away from the camps in Deraa expecting jobs in Turkey” he told me. “I think there’s nothing going on in Syria,” a third local official who refused to give his name told me, implying that the media reports of regime violence are largely fabricated.

With such feelings, hundreds of Alawite Turks turned out in June to voice their opposition to the influx of mostly Sunni refugees from Syria into Samandagi, another Alawite neighborhood in Turkey. With the gap between Syria’s two critical religious groups widening, it seems unlikely in the near future for President Assad to lose support of his fellow Alawite clansmen in the region. Despite his stained record, many continue to see him as the most reliable anchor for their safety, and they ascribe symbolic importance to his leadership. So far, at least, the Alawites in Antakya appear unwilling to think otherwise, even it if means suspending their disbelief.

Afsin Yurdakul writes about Turkish politics. Her work has appeared in Foreign Policy and The Daily Beast, among others. 26

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Secretive sect of the rulers of Syria Sacred Mysteries: the strange religion of the Assad family Christopher Howse, Daily Telegraph, 05 Aug 2011,

Many people have been killed in Syria. Its president, Bashar al- Assad comes from a family that is Alawi by religion, even if the Baath party, which he leads, is secular. So, what do Alawis believe in?

Some say that the Alawis, one in 12 of the Syrian population, worship Ali (Mohammed’s son-in-law) as God; that they believe in reincarnation; that they deny women have souls.

A reputable work like the Oxford Cyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (1995) explains that they are “extremist Shi’is” whose “religious system separates them from Sunni Muslims”. On

26 the next page it suddenly says that they “also celebrate Mass, including consecration of bread and wine”.

The one certain thing is that, like the Shia, who have also gone through repeated persecution, they follow the practice of taqiyya, usually translated as “dissimulation”. The Alawis keep their central beliefs secret and verbally profess beliefs they do not hold.

One must be careful here, because an esoteric religion like that of the Alawis often uses strongly metaphorical terms. Indeed, their enemies (whose accounts are the fullest) complain of just that. So Ibn Taymiyya, a fierce jurist of the 14th century, much loved by Wahhabi activists today, called the Alawis “greater disbelievers than the Jews, Christians, and Indian idol-worshipping Brahmans”, since they used the pillars of Islam to cloak their own beliefs, meaning by “fasting” keeping their secrets or by “pilgrimage” visiting their sheikhs.

27 Ibn Battuta, the wonderful traveller who lived a little later in the 14th century, wrote that they believed Ali was God, that they did not pray ritually, or practise circumcision or fast. They did not attend mosque or keep in repair mosques built for them, he said.

Those historical sources give them the name Nusayris, after a follower (in the ninth century) of the 11th Imam of the Shia. The name Alawis is regarded as politer. When, in 1925, the French set up an Alawi state, they overprinted Syrian stamps (pictured) “ALAOUITES”. To English readers they became familiar as Ansaireehs, through a popular book by the Rev Samuel Lyde, a Church of England missionary who lived among them in the 1850s. His book The Asian Mystery came out in 1860, the year of his death, aged 35.

Lyde tried to bring Christianity to the Alawis. Life among them convinced him that they resembled the heathen of whom St Paul wrote: “filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness” etc. It was no frame of mind to win converts, even if they had been amenable to his message. Lyde very much disliked their brigandage, feuds, lying and divorce.

27 On their secret practices, such as their “Mass”, he is unreliable, depending on written sources. Even by his own account its ritual was a consecration of wine relating to Ali and God, not to the life and death of Jesus. But at least Lyde had seen their mountain life of poverty (which he found less hungry than in many an English city) and harsh treatment by officials of the Ottoman empire.

I mention Lyde because his colourful account still exerts a strong influence, being widely referred to on the internet. Just as false an idea of Alawi belief is to be had by claiming it as a survival of Zoroastrianism or making it an Ismaili sect.

If, as is claimed, it sees Ali as the meaning (mana) of God; Mohammed as the name (ism) of God and Salman al-Farisi (a Persian companion of Mohammed’s) as the door (bab) to God, then the Sunni are right to think that the Alawis are not Muslims.

28 No one foresaw that this mountain sect would one day produce the rulers of Syria. But the crimes of the Assads can no more be blamed on its teachings than those of Saddam Hussein on Sunni Islam.

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Four Things Washington Needs to Do Next With Syria Christian Whiton Fox News, August 05, 2011

A body count now numbering in the thousands and a tank assault on unarmed civilians that would make even the Chinese government blanche are just two of the indications that President Obama’s Syria policy has failed. But the White House is still missing easy steps to help those seeking a civilized order in Syria. Doing so would not merely be a humanitarian gesture. It would help end the Damascus regime that serves as Iran’s deputy in spreading tyranny and killing Americans.

28 Washington has only recently changed its tune and replaced adoration of Syria’s dictator with outreach to protestors. As with every other major repressive government, Damascus was courted and embraced by the Obama administration as it began its tenure in the White House. A full-level ambassador was sent. Summer love would lead to a reformed Syria that peeled away from Iran— or so went the theory from the Washington foreign policy establishment and its groupies.

In February, Vogue magazine published a fawning piece about Syrian dictator Assad’s wife, calling her “a rose in the desert.” An academic earlier wrote a hagiography of the dictator himself titled the “The New Lion of Damascus.”

Senator John Kerry visited Assad at least six times and insisted until quite recently that he was a reformer.

29 Even after Assad had killed hundreds of Syrians seeking basic unalienable rights, language from President Obama and his aides suggested Assad lead reform rather than leave power.

One would think Washington would relish an opportunity to perturb or topple the Damascus regime, given its penchant for sponsoring and using terrorists, subverting democracies and helping kill U.S. troops abroad. But as with every step of the Arab Spring, the ponderous Obama White House started slowly, doubted the appeal of freedom, and only belatedly came to see things from the point of view of those seeking accountable government.

Now the administration is doing much better. Secretary of State Clinton recently pointed out publicly that Assad has had at least 2,000 people killed by his army and security forces. She met this week with Syrian democracy activists in Washington.

More importantly, the State Department’s man in Damascus, Ambassador Robert Ford, demonstrated where the U.S. stood by

29 going to the brutalized city of Hama and meeting with the protestors.

The regime was incensed.

But symbolic acts like these are important to dissidents and protestors.

Now that there is some progress from Washington, more can be done that still falls well short of going to war. The White House that likes to talk about “smart power” should lay some on:

First, we should bring to bear military and civilian broadcast tools to hand dissident leaders inside Syria an open mic to talk to their compatriots. Information is often the most important tool in the success of a resistance movement.

Second, we should get the CIA back in the business of influencing 30 foreign political outcomes. Its officers should liaise clandestinely with the dissidents and provide them with intelligence and resources. The Syrian opposition may not want this, but the door could always be left open for them.

Third, the Treasury Department should peel away Assad’s elite supporters by chasing bank accounts they hold outside of Syria. Their accounts should be frozen or misplaced until they leave Syria. Military direct messaging—known as psychological operations—should be focused upon this group of regime enablers.

Fourth, President Obama should use his charm to do real diplomacy with Turkey. The Ankara government has wavered between good and bad responses throughout Arab Spring. The NATO member, which borders Syria, could be encouraged down the path of helping Assad’s opponents politically and logistically. The president should travel to Ankara, not to preen for cameras, but to conduct private and effective diplomacy.

30 Congress could also do the cause of freedom a favor by getting serious about foreign policy for the first time in years. This week, when our ambassador to Syria dutifully responded as summoned to a hearing, only one senator bothered to show up. Neither party on Capitol Hill has cared much about foreign policy since the Iraq surge, since there have been few foreign-related options since then for political opportunism and grandstanding. Perhaps Congress could lend some attention nonetheless.

None of the suggestions I've mentioned involve America going to war. It does involve using a combination of levers available to government to advance U.S. national interests and help those who share our values against those who do not—something many thought of as “diplomacy” in an earlier time.

Christian Whiton is a former U.S. State Department senior adviser and is a principal at DC International Advisory.

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Israel mum on Syria, US Jewish groups speak out American Jewish Committee says resolution not enough, more measures targeting Syrian government, country’s energy sector should be passed. Gil Shefler, Jerusalem Post, 08/05/2011,

NEW YORK – Condemnation of Syria in the wake of the crackdown on anti-government movement in Hama that started last weekend has been vocal and near universal.

Israel has been one of the few exceptions.

Jerusalem has remained mute on the subject, perhaps because it has been preoccupied by protests at home over the cost of housing.

31 More likely, however, because it does not want to be seen as supporting the movement that Syrian President Bashar Assad has accused of being orchestrated by Israel, in a bid to delegitimize it.

Jewish-American organizations, however, have no such qualms and have been more outspoken in their condemnation of Israel’s northeastern neighbor.

The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the American Jewish Committee and the Anti- Defamation League on Wednesday all issued statements criticizing Damascus.

“ The people in Syria have been looking to the West and saying ‘your silence is killing us,’” said Malcolm Hoenlein, the executive vice chairman of the Conference of Presidents.

Hoenlein said the protracted talks at the United Nation’s Security 32 Council over how to respond to violence in Syria, compared with the relative ease with which condemnations of Israel are passed through the General Assembly, exposed the hypocrisy of some UN members.

“ They attack Israel, but when it came to Syria, where the violations are so blatant, they did not and it highlighted the double standard or quadruple standard found in the United Nations,” he said.

The message that human rights violations were unacceptable should be extended to Iran, which “provides weapons and manpower to suppress the popular expressions [in Syria],” Hoenlein said.

The American Jewish Committee said the resolution was not enough and that more measures including targeting of individuals in the Syrian government and the country’s energy sector should be passed.

32 “ As the UN Security Council met over the past three days, the Assad regime has significantly increased its violent repression of the Syrian people,” AJC Executive Director David Harris said. “The extent of the carnage wrought by Assad in Hama, Homs, Daraa and other cities over the past four months demands stronger international condemnation and action.”

Russia, China and others were “complicit in obstructing global efforts to support the courageous Syrian protesters and to convince Assad to stop the ruthless campaign of violence against his own people. The Syrian people deserve more empathy and firmer action by the UN. Regrettably, several of the Security Council members have chosen to ignore their anguish,” the AJC said.

The Anti-Defamation League also said the resolution approved by the Security Council was insufficient and urged the council pass sanctions against the government in Damascus.

33 “While it is appropriate for the Security Council to be dealing with the ongoing crisis in Syria, the council’s presidential statement condemning the Assad regime’s human rights violations and ruthless use of force against Syrian civilians is a wholly inadequate response,” ADL National Director Abraham Foxman said. “In light of the regime’s brutality in recent months, particularly its current actions in the town of Hama, we urge the council to adopt a resolution that will make it unambiguously clear to President Assad that unless he reverses course, the international community will impose immediate consequences on his repressive regime.”

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Bloodier still President Bashar Assad is stopping at nothing to crush the protests against his regime. But the protesters have still not been deterred The Economist, Aug 6th 2011 | DAMASCUS

33 AT DAWN on the eve of Ramadan, the month of fasting that began on August 1st, President Bashar Assad sent tanks into Hama, the fourth-biggest city in the country. They fired at buildings from at least four directions. Soldiers and security forces with automatic rifles mowed down protesters carrying iron bars and rocks. They cut off electricity and communications. Amateur video footage showed columns of black smoke rising from the city of 800,000 as gunfire reverberated in the background. Pictures displayed mangled bodies, including one of a man run over by a tank. At least 100 civilians are reported to have been killed since the assault began.

It was the bloodiest episode since Syrians rose up five months ago. Since then, at least 2,000 people are reckoned to have been killed across the country, including 300 or so members of the security forces, some of whom were shot for defecting. At least 12,000 protesters are behind bars. The unrest shows no sign of dying 34 down. Yet no one can say for sure how it will end.

Hama is not alone. The army and security forces have locked down Homs, the country’s third-biggest city, and Deir ez-Zor in the east, its fifth-biggest. Deraa, in the south, where the uprising began, is still under siege. Protests, albeit generally not on a big scale, continue to erupt in Damascus, including central districts such as Midan, just south of the old city, and in most of the surrounding suburbs and villages. Of Syria’s big cities, only Aleppo has been relatively quiet. Influential merchants there are watching and waiting.

The ferocity of the all-out assault on Hama has stirred particular outrage. The city has a special resonance because Mr Assad’s father, Hafez, who ruled from 1970 until his death in 2000, shelled whole districts while crushing an Islamist revolt in 1982, leaving some 20,000 civilians dead. In today’s upheaval, however, Hama has been a model of peaceful protest. Except for one bloody Friday in early June, government forces had stayed on the city’s outskirts, while protesters virtually ran the city, protecting it with a

34 ring of barricades. The hope was that, in the age of YouTube and Facebook, the regime would avoid repeating the horrors of 1982.

That can no longer be guaranteed. The regime now seems determined to crush the street protests at all costs, while rallying support among its most loyal constituents: the Alawite minority of 10% to which Mr Assad belongs; the Christians (another 10%); the army; and the business class of Damascus and Aleppo, which has done quite well out of the Assad regime.

Western and Arab governments have plainly failed to persuade Mr Assad to change his ways or open meaningful talks with the protesters, though he held a fruitless “dialogue” which no genuine opposition figures attended. The Russians have altered their tone since the assault on Hama, calling Mr Assad’s use of force “unacceptable”. The European Union has increased the number of Syrians under sanctions. Turkey, a vital trading partner, has been increasingly critical. President Barack Obama is expected to call 35 for Mr Assad to step down. Italy withdrew its ambassador. The UN Security Council finally issued a “presidential statement” which condemned the Syrian regime. All such gestures have so far been in vain.

That can no longer be guaranteed. The regime now seems determined to crush the street protests at all costs, while rallying support among its most loyal constituents: the Alawite minority of 10% to which Mr Assad belongs; the Christians (another 10%); the army; and the business class of Damascus and Aleppo, which has done quite well out of the Assad regime.

Western and Arab governments have plainly failed to persuade Mr Assad to change his ways or open meaningful talks with the protesters, though he held a fruitless “dialogue” which no genuine opposition figures attended. The Russians have altered their tone since the assault on Hama, calling Mr Assad’s use of force “unacceptable”. The European Union has increased the number of Syrians under sanctions. Turkey, a vital trading partner, has been increasingly critical. President Barack Obama is expected to call for Mr Assad to step down. Italy withdrew its ambassador. The

35 UN Security Council finally issued a “presidential statement” which condemned the Syrian regime. All such gestures have so far been in vain.

International options are limited. No one is seriously recommending military intervention. Arab governments have generally been silent, though the Saudis are keen to get rid of Mr Assad, since he is the closest Arab ally of Iran, whose power the Gulf Arabs would like to trim. The Americans want to boost the Syrian opposition, some of whose members recently met Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state, in Washington, DC. Economic sanctions may start to bite, but there is no hint yet that the regime is running short of cash to pay the army and security forces.

Some protesters say they should resort to violence. In towns such as Tel Kalakh, Jisr al-Shughour, Idleb and Deir ez-Zor, which are near the border, weapons are being smuggled in. But rifles and Molotov cocktails are no match for tanks and artillery. Other 36 protesters hope that, if the regime becomes even more brutal, chunks of the army may defect, as they did in Libya. But so far the Alawite-led army, with its array of privileges, has remained loyal to the defiant Mr Assad. HOME PAGE  HOME PAGE

Haaretz: Syrian defector: I was ordered to commit genocide’..

Washington Post: 'Protests erupt across Syria in defiance of crackdown'..

Daily Telegraph: 'Syria: Dmitry Medvedev warns Bashar al-Assad to prepare for 'sad fate''..

Catholic News Agency: 'Arab expert [Naman Tarcha, Director of the Bocca della Verita Cultural Center in Rome]: Regime change in Syria will be bad for Christians'..

NYTIMES: 'Syrian FM Pledges Elections by Year's End'..

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NYTIMES: 'In Tunisian Town of Arab Spring Martyr, Disillusionment Seeps In'..

Deutsch Welle: ‘Subtle shift in Russian relations with Syria’..

MSNBS: ‘Showing Hama in ruins, Syria says revolt quelled’..

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