Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism

Jane's World Insurgency And Terrorism

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)

Key Facts Threat Assessment Targets, tactics and methodology Personnel and recruitment Area of operation Operational preparedness External Assistance Funding Sources of weapons Group Structure and Logistics Organisation Political/Religious representation Information campaigns Background Information Overview of campaign Chronology of major events

Key Facts TOP

 Group name: Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka: GAM). GAM's military wing, the Forces of the Free Aceh Movement (Angkatan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka: AGAM), was renamed the Aceh State Military (Tentara Negara Aceh: TNA) in July 2002. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Indonesian military sometimes referred to GAM as the Security Disturbance Movement (GPK). In the late 1990s, GAM's exiled leadership split and the Free Aceh Movement Government Council (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka Majelis Pemerinthan: MP-GAM) was established. MP-GAM's influence on Aceh is very limited.  Level of threat: The signing of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) on 15 August 2005 following six months of negotiations demonstrated the relatively weak position of the GAM following May 2003 Indonesian counter-insurgency operations and to a lesser extent the December 2004 tsunami, which virtually destroyed GAM's civilian shadow government structure and greatly reduced its military capacity, especially in terms of lower and middle rank military personnel.Despite significant progress in implementing the MoU, the GAM's historical resilience indicates that it will remain a potent medium-term threat in the event that this peacebuilding fails.  Status: Militarily inactive.In line with the terms of the MoU, GAM completed its decommissioning of weapons on 27 December 2005 and demobilised its fighters. By October 2006, there were no reports of any clashes by either the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia: TNI) or the GAM. Since demobilising, GAM has moved toward rebuilding and consolidating its civilian structure to establish a solid network and basis for forming a political party and fight future elections.  Date of founding: 1976.  Group type: National Separatist.  Aims and objectives: There are disparate views within the GAM over its objectives. The majority of its guerrillas espouse independence and and the establishment of a democratic Acehnese state. A minority has favoured the establishment of a government based on Islamic principles.There is also a wide body of support in the province for extensive autonomy. The complaints of most supporters focus on economic and social issues such as a fairer distribution of the area's hydrocarbon wealth, respect for human rights, a reduction in the security presence and greater monitoring of the police, particularly the police mobile brigade (Brimob).

 Leaders: GAM supporters regard the group's founder and symbolic leader, Hasan di Tiro, as national leader (wali negara). The Libyan-trained Muzzakir Manaf became commander-in-chief in January 2002, following the death of Abdullah Sayafi'e, who was killed near the village of Cubo in Pidie district. The relative longevity of the insurgency has given GAM a strong and deep leadership largely impervious to the loss of any individual political or military commanders.

Threat Assessment TOP

Indonesia's counter-insurgency operations launched in May 2003 and the December 2004 tsunami greatly damaged the GAM's infrastructure and depleted its ranks of militants. The signing of the MoU demonstrated the relatively weak position in which the GAM found itself. Military analysts estrimated that GAM was two to three months away from total defeat. The implementation of the MoU has proceeded well, especially in contrast to the 2002/03 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA).Clashes between the TNI and the GAM have been rare. GAM decommissioned 840 weapons in four phases between September and December 2005. GAM also disbanded its military wing on 27 December 205. In parallel, 25,890 TNI and 5,791 police left Aceh.

TNI forces board a troop ship in Lhokseumawe, Aceh during their withdrawal to Medan, Sumatra on 18 September. (EMPICS)

The peace process is now entering its second year and seems firmly on track. In addition to decommissioning of GAM weapons and redeployment of Indonesian security forces, there have been efforts at reintegrating former combatants into society. A new law on the governance of Aceh outlining wide-ranging autonomy was also passed in July 2006. According to GAM, it allowed for too much Jakarta interference and consequently, GAM requested that the law be amended. Elections for governor have also been scheduled for December 2006. This will be the first time for GAM to enter the democratic process. GAM decided to participate in these elections as independents only. Its two candidates are Irwandi Yusuf, who is running as candidate for governor together with Muhamad Nazar from the Aceh Referendum Information Centre (SIRA), and Hasbi Abdullah, who is running as candidate for deputy governor with Acehnese academic Human Hamid as governor. Aspects of the MoU which still require implementation include the establishment of a human rights court and a truth and reconciliation commission. Whether the peace process will hold in the long-term will depend on a successful reintegration of former combatants, GAM's performance not just in the 2006 gubernatorial elections but also the 2009 parliamentary elections, addressing the human rights grievances in a satisfactory manner, and a comprehensive development of the province of Aceh.

The latter aspect rests heavily on how the post-tsunami reconstruction programme is managed. A well- administered recovery effort, one that demonstrates the government's concern for the majority of Acehnese, could well help undermine support for GAM and help the process. Equally, a poorly managed, venal and manipulative programme could be expected to have the opposite effect, strengthening GAM's position within the community. A combination of inertia and widespread allegations of corruption suggest that the latter outcome is the most probable, although its effects on the MoU are as yet uncertain.

GAM's historical resilience indicates that it will remain a potent medium-term threat should the peace process fail. Even with a successful peace process, the danger of factionalisation within GAM exists and has already become visible. Indeed, the main reason GAM opted to enter the gubernatorial elections as independents was that no candidate could be agreed upon. There have also been repeated reports over infighting with respect to reintegration money. Given the diverse views of GAM members toward the merits of autonomy or independence, the opportunity exists for those disaffected with the terms of the peace process to resume the insurgency. Should such an outcome transpire, other members of the community disenchanted with their level of economic development, corruption, or poor tsunami relief could enhance the movement. Owing to GAM's previously popular support base, well-developed guerrilla tactics, sufficient arms and the often counter-productive behaviour of the Indonesian security forces, such an outcome could rapidly become an embedded insurgency, albeit with a lesser capability than GAM at its height.

GAM also poses an indirect threat to the country, owing to its relative success in its insurgency. Although militarily the group has never been a direct threat to the central government, causing unrest within the small area of Aceh but not beyond the province's borders, GAM's ability to gain concessions from the government owing to its violent resistance remains a challenge to successive governments well aware of the penalties of allowing any region of Indonesia to defy the writ of the centre. Following the example of East Timor, other secessionist provinces or communities could follow the experience of the GAM in taking up arms for their own cause.

Targets, tactics and methodology TOP

In the past, the group's focus has been on political, military and economic targets. GAM began attacks against those companies exploiting the province's natural resources in 1978, with an attack on the Arun natural gas field in which one US worker was killed. In March 2001, GAM attacks in Lhokseumawe forced ExxonMobil to shut down operations for four months. An increased security presence around Arun has deterred any further similar attacks.

Although the overall strategy has been to tie down as much of the Indonesian army in the province as possible through mobile attacks and retreats into the hinterland, the group has claimed responsibility for the murders of community leaders including local parliamentarians who are accused of not supporting Acehnese independence and teachers for teaching the standard Indonesian curriculum.

Since moves to allow East Timor independence resulted in the eventual secession of the province, GAM was believed to have taken the decision to increase its attacks in the hope of causing an overreaction on the part of the Indonesian military, and gain international support for the plight of Aceh. However, since the December 2004 tsunami, the group's ability to function has been severely hampered and GAM has been unable to continue such an offensive, relying instead on political measures to reach its goal.

Although GAM denies accusations of ethnic cleansing, some 125,000 ethnic Javanese were terrorised into leaving Aceh.

Personnel and recruitment TOP

The logistical and intelligence support of the local population has been a crucial asset to GAM, which finds its strongest support in Pidie and North Aceh.

The movement appears to have had little problem attracting volunteers from among the province's four million people. Recruits either share GAM's separatist ideology or are seeking revenge for atrocities committed by the security forces.

In June 2005 TNI commander-in-chief General Endriartono Sutarto claimed that the security forces had killed 3,378 GAM members, arrested a further 5,550 and seized 2,340 weapons at a cost of 213 government soldiers killed and 514 wounded. Human rights groups claim that many of those killed or wounded by the security forces were civilians, which is probable as GAM remains entrenched within the civilian population. Following the signing of the MoU, the Aceh Monitoring Mission requested a list of GAM members to supervise the amnesty and demobilisation process. For this process, the GAM leadership put its membership at 3,000 personnel. However, the numbers subsequently submitted by regional commanders was somewhat greater.

GAM does not enjoy the patronage of any foreign government, although Sweden and Norway have offered asylum for the movement's exiled leadership. Malaysia also absorbed a large number of Acehnese migrants and refugees and, in the 1990s, did not oppose the relocation of the GAM military command structure from Aceh to Malaysia. However, that does not mean that Malaysia supported Acehnese independence. On the contrary, virtually all regional governments view the prospect of Acehnese independence and the fragmentation of Indonesia as undesirable. A GAM member stands in front of the Acehnese flag in August 2005. (EMPICS)

Area of operation TOP

While attempting to operate across the Aceh province, GAM has been most influential on the East coast, particularly in the rural areas and its traditional areas of support are Pidie and North Aceh. In 1999, GAM expanded its area of operations to the West coast.

Operational preparedness TOP

Equipment

The military claim to have seized satellite phones and weapons from guerrillas. GAM also utilised radios and couriers, many of whom were civilians living in villages supporting the rebels.

Training

Between 1986 and 1989, GAM received training in Libya. This comprised guerrilla training by Libyans during the day and ideological training by Hasan di Tiro, who had joined his fighters in Libya, in the evening Since then, the Libyan-trained have been training subsequent generations.

The Indonesian government has sought to show that a number of GAM members were trained in Libyan and Afghan training camps during the 1980s and that there were contacts with Al-Qaeda. These reports are almost certainly untrue.

Weaponry

Under the terms of the MoU of 15 August 2005, GAM pledged to decommission all of its arms (providing a figure of 840). However, it is unlikely that either side would have accepted the terms of the peace accord if the military option did not remain open. In reality therefore, the group is likely to retain a larger number of weapons than stated. This fact was demonstrated during the final weapons handover on 19 December 2005, when GAM replaced within hours two weapons that had been judged inadequate by international decommissioning monitors. Given GAM's disparate nature, effective monitoring of the prevalence of small arms will prove near impossible. Prior to the decommissioning process, GAM is known to have been well armed with AK-47 and M-16 rifles, FN and Colt pistols and various explosives.

Representatives of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), the Indonesian military and the Free Aceh Movement inspect assault rifles surrendered by the rebels to be destroyed as part of a peace deal between Indonesian government and the insurgents during a ceremony in the provincial capital of Banda Aceh, Indonesia, on 19 December 2005. (EMPICS)

External Assistance TOP

Funding TOP

AGAM claims to have an annual budget of USD500,000 which is raised through revolutionary taxes, extortion rackets which target local businesses, civil servants and middle-class families. Small levies are raised on civilians living in guerrilla strongholds. The group is believed by the Indonesian authorities to have been involved in piracy in Aceh's coastal waters and through the Strait of Malacca. Following the Asian tsunami, piracy in the Strait was non-existent for three months, but attacks, particularly kidnapping, resumed in April 2005. Although such criminal actions could severely compromise the delicate position of the exiled leadership in Sweden, the possibility remains of GAM members undertaking piracy without central control for personal financial gain. An attack on a vessel flagged to an EU nation by GAM fighters could create a complex diplomatic problem for Stockholm and it should be assumed the Swedish authorities have made this clear to the group's leadership. Claims in the past by the Indonesian authorities that the group received funding from outside sources including Al-Qaeda have not been substantiated. GAM did not rely extensively on organised crime to raise funds (apart from extorting commercial enterprises), but may have raised additional revenue from smuggling marijuana.

Sources of weapons TOP

Weapons have largely been obtained by capture in combat, theft from military and police units and purchase on the regional arms market. Thailand has been considered the most likely external source of arms, ammunition and other equipment, much of it probably originally sourced in Cambodia and Vietnam. There may also have been links to corrupt officials in southern Myanmar. Despite the deployment of much of the Indonesian Navy's operational patrol force, sufficient qualities of arms, ammunition and other supplies entered Aceh to ensure GAM could continue its campaign.

Group Structure and Logistics TOP

Organisation TOP

GAM's top leadership is in exile in Sweden. Its president Hassan di Tiro, prime minister and defence minister (operational) Malik Mahmud, foreign minister and health minister Zaini Abdullah, and information minister Bakhtiar Abdullah, reside in the Stockholm suburb of Norsborg. The organisation's education minister, Musanna Abdul Wahab, is based in the United States and its defence minister (procurement and intelligence), Zakaria Zaman, until recently operated out of Thailand. By contrast, its mid-level leadership, troops, and members are in Aceh. Modelling itself on the historical governance structures of the independent Sultanate, GAM divides Aceh into 17 administrative regions (wilayah), each headed by a governor. GAM's civilian functions include 'tax collecting' as well as the issuing of birth and marriage certificates.

GAM's civilian structure until its demobilisation in December 2005 was shadowed by the parallel structure of AGAM, renamed Aceh State Military (Tentara Negara Aceh: TNA) in July 2002. The TNA was headed by the commander (panglima TNA), a position held by Muzzakir Manaf. Under his command were the 17 regional military commanders (panglima wilayah), who in turn were responsible for four district commanders (panglima daerah). Below the panglima daerah were the sub-district commanders panglima sagoë. The troops under the latter's command were believed to be organised in cell-structure. It is at this level where the TNA's command structure was highly factionalised and the troops were the most undisciplined. It has not been uncommon for actions carried out for hardline ideological reasons or personal economic gain to be at odds with directives of the top leadership.

Hasan di Tiro during an interview in Stockholm in June 2005. (EMPICS)

In 1999, MP-GAM was formed with Don Zulfahri as its general secretary. He was assassinated in Malaysia in 2000 and replaced by Dr Zaini Abdullah. This faction is more Islamist whereas the mainstream group is nationalist.

Villagers carry the body of GAM commander Abdullah Sayafi'e at Blang Sukon, Pidie district, Aceh on 24 January 2002. (EMPICS)

Political/Religious representation TOP

GAM seeks independence from Indonesia, drawing its support from Aceh's overwhelmingly Muslim community. The group ascribes to traditional and orthodox Muslim values, but cannot be classified as an 'Islamist' movement.

Information campaigns TOP The Aceh Referendum Information Centre (SIRA) has issued statements on behalf of the GAM. The Swedish- based exiled GAM leadership which uses the name Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front, and GAM spokesmen Sofyan Ibrahim Tiba, attempt to raise the international profile of the Aceh issue. One means is through their website, http://www.asnlf.net/topint.htm.

Background Information TOP

Overview of campaign TOP

Aceh is traditionally seen as the location where Islam first entered Indonesia, a factor that continues to feed the province's 'exceptionalism'. The British and Dutch empires competed for influence in the area over the valuable spice trade from the mid-17th century. In 1824 the London Treaty placed the sultanate within the Dutch sphere of influence. This process was completed under the 1871 Treaty of Sumatra that gave the Netherlands carte blanche in Aceh in return for recognition of British rights in northeast Africa.

In 1873 the Netherlands declared war on the sultanate, ostensibly in response to a sustained period of piracy by the Acehnese. The conflict continued intermittently until the Japanese invasion in 1942, with the Dutch colonial authorities managing to control only a small area around the capital, Banda Aceh.

Although Acehnese guerrillas fought the Japanese occupiers, the Second World War gave them access to large numbers of arms while weakening the Dutch. Efforts by the Netherlands to reclaim its Indonesian empire after the war was both costly and futile. Aceh played a key role in the independence struggle, notably by both the effectiveness of its fighters and its proximity to sources of supplies but above all because the Dutch never even attempted to re-occupy its territory.Aceh's support for the independent Indonesian state however, was also conditional on receiving a high degree of autonomy within the newly emerging nation. Upon obtaining Indonesian independence in 1949, Aceh received autonomous status only to have it removed in early 1951 when Aceh was amalgamated with the neighbouring province of North Sumatra.

This loss of autonomy prompted the former Aceh Governor Daud Beureueh to lead Aceh into joining the Darul Islam rebellions in September 1953. These rebellions had erupted across Indonesia in 1949 and aimed at turning Indonesia into an Islamic state.The rebellion did not end until a 1959 agreement provided Aceh with special territory status, granting autonomy over religion, education and culture. This status, however, was effectively removed when Major-General Suharto came to power in 1967 and proceeded to centralise the whole country politically and economically. Acehnese dissatisfaction was on the rise again and grew with the discovery of natural gas in 1971 and the lack of revenue Aceh received from its exploitation.

Formation and repression of GAM (1976-1998)

Owing to the growing discontent, GAM was established as a hardline independence movement in 1976 by Hasan Di Tiro, a descendent of the hero of the war against the Dutch, Teungku Chik di Tiro. GAM at this time comprised around 70 members, most of whom were veterans of the Darul Islam insurgency.

The response from Indonesia to its formation was a series of intelligence operations, with a number of suspected rebels rounded up and killed, arrested, or forced to flee Aceh.In the mid-1980s they formed a government in exile in Sweden.

Following three years of training in Libya from 1986-89, GAM reorganised its forces in Aceh and embarked upon a series of attacks on security forces targets. In 1990, after attacking some Javanese transmigrants, the Indonesian military launched its Red Net Operations, sending into Aceh some 6,000 non-organic troops to support the 6,000 organic troops already there.Between 1989 and 1996 an estimated 2,000 people were killed in the operation, a period considered by the separatists to be one of the bleakest of the insurgency. During this time, Jakarta's forces were accused of widespread human rights violations.

Post-Suharto developments (May 1998-December 2002)

The fall of the Suharto regime in May 1998 heightened separatist sentiment within Aceh, fuelled by intensifying insurgencies in East Timor and Papua (then Irian Jaya). Fears in Jakarta of a disintegrating Indonesia seemed to usher in an immediate policy shift towards conciliation with the insurgents (mirrored in East Timor with announcements that a referendum would be held to determine the province's status). The withdrawal of non- organic troops in August 1998 was followed by an announcement that Aceh was no longer an area of military operations and an apology by Armed Forces Commander General Wiranto.

However, a resurgence in GAM activity prompted an almost immediate redeployment. In 1999, large-scale rioting in support of the GAM was reported and the Indonesian government responded with series of police operations. However, once GAM started to target economic facilities, including the ExxonMobil operation at Lhokseumawe in March 2001, the military was redeployed to aid the police in a new Operation to Restore Law and Security.

In parallel with renewed security operations, the government also pursued peace talks. These talks had started in January 2000 and resulted in the May 2000 humanitarian pause which was ignored on the ground by both sides. In the four weeks following the agreement, at least 22 people died in separatist unrest in the province. Progress in negotiations was made in 2001, with the passing of special autonomy legislation. This legislation was implemented in January 2002 but there were complaints at the lack of local consultation and the endemic corruption which ensured that any finances devolved to Aceh did not reach the local population.

Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (December 2002-May 2003)

GAM and the Indonesian government signed a Cessation Of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) on 9 December 2002 under the threat of a major escalation in security operations in Aceh from the Indonesian government. The agreement provided for international monitors to join with representatives of the Indonesian security forces and the GAM to form a Joint Security Committee to oversee ceasefire agreement provisions.

The agreement was fragile from the start, with both sides repeatedly violating the terms of the accord. GAM continued to call for independence from Indonesia and claimed the COHA was a sign of weakness on the part of the government. GAM used the COHA interregnum to increase its arms acquisition and recruitment operations. Both sides also stepped up extortion and other pressures on the general population. The agreement lasted for five months, during which time casualties on all sides fell by around 90 per cent to around 12 people a month, despite the inability of the Joint Security Committee (JSC) to police the ceasefire adequately or to impose sanctions on violators.

Hostilities Resume (May 2003)

The COHA collapsed as violence intensified in April and May 2003, despite intense international pressure on both sides to abide by the agreement. Last-minute negotiations in Japan failed, and on 18 May 2003 Indonesia abrogated the COHA. The government immediately declared martial law in Aceh and resumed operations against GAM.

Supported by the presidential declaration of martial law, the offensive was the largest operation by the TNI since the 1975 invasion of East Timor. Indonesia reinforced its military and police forces, with some 40,000 security forces deployed in Aceh, committed aircraft and artillery against GAM camps and forces, and naval patrols sought to sever GAM supply lines from the other side of the Strait of Malacca.

Despite initial claims that the offensive would be short lived, in November 2003 the Indonesian government extended martial law for an additional six-month period, making it effective through the April 2004 parliamentary elections. Martial law was downgraded to a civil emergency in May 2004 for an additional six-month period, before being extended once again in November 2004 by new President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The civil emergency eventually ended at midnight on 18 May 2005, although the TNI remained in control of much of the area and until the ceasefire no security forces were withdrawn.

Between May 2003 and May 2005, the military claimed to have killed some 3,400 GAM fighters and captured a further 5,550. GAM disputes these numbers, almost certainly with reason given the size of the organisation. More than 200 government personnel died during the same period. It is not known how many civilians were killed or wounded in the two-year period but conservative estimates place the number in the low thousands. Aside from military operations, Jakarta's efforts to apply pressure on the GAM through diplomatic and legal channels until 2005 proved abortive. In June 2004 the Swedish authorities briefly detained self-styled Aceh Prime Minister Malik Mahmud, Foreign Minister Zaini Abdullah and Hasan di Tiro after Indonesia provided documentation indicating GAM's leadership in the country had violated international law by ordering insurgent forces in the province to carry out military operations. They were released within a few days after a Swedish court found the evidence was insufficient to continue detaining them.

President Susilo paid a brief visit to the province in December 2004. Shortly afterwards, Aceh's Governor Abdullah Puteh was arrested on suspicion of embezzling at least USD463,000 in state funds. Puteh's arrest was widely seen as Susilo emphasising his pledge to tackle high-level corruption while seeking to improve the security situation in the province. Puteh's trial commenced on 27 December 2004 and despite continually denying charges of corruption levelled against him, a Jakarta court delivered a guilty verdict on 11 April 2005, sentencing him to 10 years in prison.

Asian Tsunami (December 2004)

On 26 December 2004, a tsunami triggered by a powerful earthquake devastated much of Aceh's western coast, including the capital Banda Aceh, the towns of Calang and Meulaboh and numerous smaller communities.

An aerial view of the devastated Darussalam area in Banda Aceh on 26 February 2005. (EMPICS)

The short-term impact on the insurgency was to force a de facto ceasefire. Both GAM and the Indonesian security forces lost personnel in the disaster. The TNI has admitted to losing some 350 personnel in the disaster, around 280 of whom were posted as missing. Some reports put police casualties at around 1,500 dead.

GAM's losses were unknown, though National Police Chief Da'i Bachtiar claimed the group lost around two thirds of its militant network in the catastrophe. While GAM was affected badly in Banda Aceh and in coastal villages, this figure is almost certainly incorrect given that GAM's fighters had been pushed into the mountains during the counter-insurgency operations, out of reach of the tsunami.

Nevertheless, the disaster severely damaged GAM's ability to operate, and thus its image as a credible alternative source of authority. The disaster also curtailed access to a large number of people displaced by the tsunami and now living in government-controlled camps, preventing the level of public support previousy enjoyed by the group.

As a result of its weakened position, GAM was keen to prevent further losses through ongoing military operations and attempted to instigate an informal ceasefire. Both the insurgents and the TNI announced unilateral ceasefires in January 2005, but violence continued on the ground. The TNI attempted to capitalise on the favourable position in which it found itself, deploying a further 14,000 Mobile Brigade (Brigade Mobil: Brimob) police personnel to the region in January, almost tripling the previous level of 7,600, and pursuing GAM militants in "defensive operations". An announcement was made in April 2005 that a further 3,000 TNI troops had been deployed within the province. Most of these, however, were combat engineers.There were reports of GAM attacks on Indonesian or foreign personnel involved in the aid, recovery and rehabilitation process. Some of these reports were indeed substantiated, but attacks were few and far between as GAM sought to draw the international community onto its side.

Indonesian soldiers hold their rifles at the ready as they patrol shortly after clashes with GAM in February 2005 (EMPICS)

Peace negotiations (January 2005-August 2005)

The tsunami provided a face-saving opportunity for GAM and the Indonesian government to return to the negotiating table.The first round of talks were held for two days in Helsinki at the end of January 2005, with the aim of easing the environment for the incoming tsunami aid.A second and third round of talks were held in April and May 2005 in the Finnish capital, with indications following the negotiations that the GAM was willing to set aside its claim to independence in return for the status of self-government, a term later dropped because of Indonesian government objections.

Prime minister of the Acehnese government-in-exile Malik Mahmud (centre), speaks at a press conference, in Espoo, Finland on Wednesday 23 February 2005, following peace talks while Information Officer Bakhtiar Abdullah (left), and the foreign minister Zaimi Abdullah (right), listen. (EMPICS)

Prior to the fifth round of talks in July 2005 there was sharp disagreement over the possibility of the GAM forming a political party following any peace agreement. Eventually the issue was resolved, with Jakarta agreeing to allow the formation of a post-GAM party, with the proviso that GAM as an organisation would cease to exist. As a result, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in Helsinki on 15 August 2005.

Indonesian Justice and Human Rights Minister and chief negotiator Hamid Awaluddin, left, former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, centre, and self-appointer Acehnese Prime Minister in exile Malik Mahmud, right, sign a peace treaty in Helsinki on 15 August 2005. (EMPICS)

Peace process (August 2005-present)

The MoU outlined the economic, political and military basis for the autonomous province of Aceh. The province gained authority over all civil and judicial administration save for foreign affairs, external defence, national security, monetary and fiscal matters (aside from the setting of interest rates and external loans), justice (although an independent court system will be established) and freedom of religion.

Perhaps most significantly, under the MoU Aceh is entitled to 70 per cent of revenue from all present and future hydrocarbon resources, a measure which could alleviate resentment over the disparity between Aceh's resource-rich status and its low level of economic development. Effective distribution of these funds may lead to other problems, such as corruption and mismanagement, but criticism would then be levelled at the Acehnese autonomous government rather than Jakarta.

Moreover, concessions were granted over the issue of political representation, with Jakarta agreeing to facilitate the establishment of political parties in the province. Although no party is likely to be able to compete in national elections, since according to the MoU they must "meet national criteria," involving representation in half of the country's 32 provinces, the parties will be able to compete in the December 2006 Aceh elections for the autonomous government.

To ensure good will during the peace process, Jakarta granted an amnesty to all GAM members, including those imprisoned and pledged to release them within 15 days of the signing of the MoU. As such, approximately 1,350 GAM prisoners were released on 30 August, following the release of another 500 on 17 August, in the tradition of granting prisoners remission on independence day.

GAM members pray after their release from Salemba prison in Jakarta, 17 August 2005. (EMPICS)

The GAM undertook a commitment to demobilise its 3,000 troops and decommission its declared arsenal of 840 weapons in a four-phased process beginning on 15 September. All phases of the decommissioning process took place in full transparency under the supervision of the European Union-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). Weapons surrendered by the GAM were checked, registered and destroyed by AMM monitors on weapon collection sites in full view of the media. The final handover of GAM weapons was declared on 21 December. Concurrently, the Indonesian government agreed to withdraw all elements of non-organic military forces from Aceh. Total TNI presence in Aceh prior to the MOU stood at approximately 40,000. After four rounds of withdrawal (completed on 27 September, 24 October, 22 November and 29 December), a total of approximately 25,890 non-organic troops had been removed. The number of non-organic police was reduced by 5,791 during the same period. The final phase of withdrawal of non-organic police was completed on 6 January 2006, leaving in place 9,100 local police forces. The AMM was established on 15 September 2005 to oversee weapons decommissioning and troop withdrawals. The initial 266-member AMM deployment included 130 EU staff as well as employees from Norway and Switzerland, and 96 further staff from Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

A member of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) registers weapons handed over by GAM rebels in Aceh, Indonesia, on 17 September 2005. (EMPICS)

Chronology of major events TOP

1945 Indonesia declared its independence under Sukarno.

1949 The Netherlands formally transferred sovereignty to Indonesia.

1950 Indonesia was divided into ten provinces by the Council of Ministers.Aceh became part of North Sumatra in January 1951.

1953 Daud Beureueh, former Aceh governor and leader of the All-Aceh Ulama Association (PUSA), declared that Aceh was joining the Darul Islam rebellion aimed at transforming Indonesia into an Islamic State.

1959 In an effort to end the rebellion, Aceh was granted "special territory" status allowing for autonomy in religious, educational and cultural matters.

1976 In October, Hasan di Tiro founded Gerakan Aceh Merdeka.He declared Aceh's independence in December but in 1979 was forced to flee to Europe after heavy military pressure.

1989- Aceh became known as Military Operations Zone (Daerah Operasi Militer: DOM). During this 1998 period, a heavy military presence and accusations of mass human rights abuses were widespread. President B.J. Habibie ended DOM status in August 1998.

2000 In May, the first 'humanitarian pause' agreement was signed in Geneva; several extensions followed, but failed to end the violence.

2001 In March, GAM activity against ExxonMobil targets in Lhokseumawe led to the closure of three of the five gas fields in the area, at a loss of USD100 million per month in revenue.

In April, a security recovery operation was launched and succeeded in opening the Banda Aceh-Medan road, restoring security to the Lhokseumawe industrial area, facilitating the functioning of local government and weakening the guerrillas' command, intelligence and logistics operations. Critics charged that the operation failed to restore local confidence in the Jakarta administration.

In July, guerrilla activity increased at the same time as the impeachment process of President Abdurrahman Wahid diverted international attention. Indonesia responded by installing a new military command (Kodam) under the leadership of Major General Djali Yusuf.

2002 In January, the military commander of the main faction of the GAM was killed by the Indonesian military in the Jiem Jiem forest. In the same month, Aceh was granted special autonomy status, but there were complaints at the lack of local consultation.

In August, retired US Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni, under auspices of the Henry Dunant Centre, conferred with both GAM and Indonesian security officials and political leaders.

In October, the government introduced a new Anti-Terrorism Decree, which resulted in a widespread crackdown on separatist political activities and threatened to bring further protest from Acehnese.

In November, the GAM leadership issued a statement from exile in Sweden saying that no political agreement had yet been reached with the government and no date set for the signing, despite international mediators indicating that both sides were prepared to sign the agreement on 9 December in Geneva.

In December, GAM signed a ceasefire agreement (Cessation of Hostilities Agreement: COHA) with the Indonesian government.

2003 In March-April, violations by both sides threatened to derail the COHA.

In May, the peace agreement collapsed, martial law was declared in Aceh, and the TNI launched a major military operation.

In November, martial law was extended until May 2004.

2004 In May, the status of Aceh was downgraded from martial law to civil emergency for six months until November 2004. In practice, despite the reinstatement of civilian politicians, including Governor Abdullah Puteh, the military presence remained in force and there was little autonomy for the region's government.

In June, Swedish authorities briefly detained self-styled Aceh Prime Minister Malik Mahmud, Foreign Minister Zaini Abdullah and Hasan di Tiro following Indonesian claims that they had ordered GAM forces to carry out military operations in Aceh. All three men were released within a few days after a court found insufficient evidence to detain them.

In November, newly elected president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono extended the status of civil emergency in Aceh for a further six months until May 2004.

In December, Aceh Governor Abdullah Puteh was arrested for allegedly siphoning funds from the provincial budget to purchase a helicopter and for other personal gain.

2005 In January, both the TNI and GAM announced unilateral and informal ceasefires; clashes continued on the ground.

In January, the first round of peace talks were held between the two sides in Helsinki. No agreements were concluded and little progress was made other than tentatively agreeing to further talks, held in April and May.

On 11 April, Abdullah Puteh was found guilty of corruption and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Negotiations in July led to agreement on the possibility of political representation for GAM following any peace agreement.

On 15 August, the Memorandum of Understanding was signed, heralding a new peace process.

On 24 August, a GAM member was shot dead by the TNI by unidentified gunmen. The GAM claimed it may have been a factional disagreement.

On 1 September, TNI spokesman Lt Col Erie Sutiko alleged that GAM members were still carrying out pirate attacks in Indonesian waters.

By 15 September, the GAM finished handing in 278 weapons, which were publicly destroyed. Concurrently, the TNI withdrew over 5,700 troops.

On 14 October, two GAM separatists were shot and wounded by government soldiers near a military post in Puedada district, 12 km from Idie in East Aceh regency. The AMM launched an investigation into the shootings. Two days earlier on 12 October, police shot dead an alleged GAM member and wounded another in Jeuram district, Nagan Raya district. Both incidents occurred as GAM separatists began the second phase of decommissiong across North Aceh.

On 3 December, GAM cancelled its anniversary celebrations (due to be held the following day) amid concerns that it might encourage violence from dissident elements within the organisation and undermine the goodwill of the peace process.

On 27 December, the GAM announced the dissolution of its military wing.

By 31 December, both the GAM and the Indonesian Government were judged by AMM observers to have completed all the terms regarding weapons decommissioning and the withdrawal of military personnel stipulated in the peace accord.

2006 On 6 January, the last Indonesian police forces were withdrawn from Aceh in accordance with the terms of the 15 August 2005 agreement.

On 19 January, the EU agreed to extend its tour of duty in Aceh to assist with the reintegration process of former GAM members and to monitor the continued implementation of the Helsinki MoU until June 2006.

On 15 March, 125 AMM personnel departed from Aceh in the second phase of AMM withdrawal, leaving 85 observers on duty until 15 June. The AMM subsequently closed its offices in Subussalam (Aceh Singkil), Lamno (Aceh Jaya) and Blangkejeren (Gayo Lues). A farewell ceremony was held on 11 March in Banda Aceh.

On 19 April, nine GAM leaders returned to Aceh after 30 years' exile in Sweden.

On 11 July, the Indonesian parliament passed the Law on the Governance of Aceh, providing Aceh with wide-ranging autonomy including a 70 per cent share of the province's resource revenue and a comprehensive system of Islamic Law.