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Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months After the Earthquake

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Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months After the Earthquake Inter‐agency real‐time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake François Grünewald (Groupe URD) Andrea Binder (GPPi) With the support of Yvio Georges (National Consultant) August 31, 2010 FINAL REPORT 1 Map of Haiti and sites visited 2 Acknowledgements The evaluation team would like to thank all those who provided support and input during the research process and the field visit to Haiti. We are thankful to the representatives of the Haitian authorities who received us in Port‐au‐Prince, Lêogane, Jacmel and Gonaïves. We are also particularly grateful for the support of the OCHA office in Port‐au‐Prince who provided us with input and a work space and helped us organize the debriefing workshop. Thank you to CARE Haiti for hosting two of our workshops, the NGO Coordination Support Office in Haiti for helping us organize the workshop with international NGOs and the Haiti Response Coalition for organizing and hosting the workshop with Haitian NGOs. We would also like to thank Vincent Grammont for helping us travel to Bristout‐Bobin, Ravine Pintade and other areas in Port‐au‐Prince where access is difficult. Photos Camp Corail, Andrea Binder Destroyed settlements in Canapé Vert, François Grünewald 3 Acronyms ACF Action Contre la Faim ACAPS Assessment Capacities Project ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance CCCM Camp Coordination Camp Management CDAC Communication with Disaster Affected Communities CSC Coordination Support Committee DART Disaster Assessment and Relief Team DINEPA Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement DPC Direction Nationale de la Protection Civile DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Assistance Office ERC Emergency Relief Coordinator ERRF Emergency Response Relief Fund ERU Emergency Relief Unit GACI Groupe d’Appui de la Coopération Internationale GII Group of Eleven GoH Government of Haiti GPPi Global Public Policy Institute Groupe URD Groupe Urgence, Réhabilitation, Développement HC Humanitarian Coordinator HCT Humanitarian Country team HLCC High‐Level Coordination Committee IASC Inter‐Agency Standing Committee ICC Inter‐Cluster Coordination ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IADB Inter‐American Development Bank IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross IOM International Organization for Migration IRC The International Rescue Committee JTF‐H United States Joint Task Force Haiti MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti NGO Non‐governmental organization OMA Office of Military Affairs (USAID) PDNA Post‐Disaster Needs Assessment and Recovery Framework PDSRSG Political Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary‐General PSEA Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse RC Resident Coordinator RINAH Rapid Initial Needs Assessment for Haiti SMS Short Message Service SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary‐General UN United Nations UNCT United Nations Country Team UNDAC United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development USAR Urban Search and Rescue WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organization 4 Contents Map of Haiti and sites visited .................................................................................................................... 2 Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................... 3 Acronyms................................................................................................................................................... 4 Contents .................................................................................................................................................... 5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................................................... 7 Background, scope and method................................................................................................................ 7 Key findings and lessons for future large‐scale disaster response ........................................................... 8 Key recommendations for the operations in Haiti.................................................................................. 11 MAIN REPORT ......................................................................................................................................... 13 1. Introduction......................................................................................................................................... 13 1.1 Background and aim of the evaluation ......................................................................................... 13 1.2 Scope, method and limits of the evaluation ................................................................................. 14 1.3 Real‐time input to country operations.......................................................................................... 17 1.4 Organization of the evaluation...................................................................................................... 19 2. Specificities and characteristics of the context, the disaster and the response ................................. 20 2.1 Country context............................................................................................................................. 20 2.2 The Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010: exceptional event, constrained response.................. 22 2.3 Chronology of the response .......................................................................................................... 25 3. What works, what does not and why?................................................................................................ 29 3.1 The first part of the response........................................................................................................ 30 3.2 Key areas for improvement of the response................................................................................. 38 4. Challenges to come ............................................................................................................................. 51 5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 53 An overwhelming situation matched with extraordinary generosity ................................................. 53 An incredible mobilization with a price............................................................................................... 53 Did the aid system save lives?............................................................................................................. 54 Did the aid system alleviate suffering? ............................................................................................... 54 Is the aid system ready to cope with the challenges ahead?.............................................................. 55 Is the aid system a learning system?................................................................................................... 55 5 6. Recommendations............................................................................................................................... 56 6.1 Recommendations for immediate use in Haiti.............................................................................. 56 6.2 Recommendations for another large‐scale disaster ..................................................................... 59 ANNEXES...................................................................................................................................................... 64 Annex 1: Terms of reference................................................................................................................... 65 Annex 2: Overview of findings and their sources.................................................................................... 75 Annex 3: Itinerary of the RTE .................................................................................................................. 79 Annex 4: List of people consulted ........................................................................................................... 82 Annex 5: Literature and Documents consulted (selection).................................................................... 86 Annex 6: Coordination structure according to the Humanitarian Reform ............................................. 89 Annex 7: Mapping of natural disaster risks in Haiti ................................................................................ 90 Annex 9: Map of natural disaster risks in Haiti ....................................................................................... 91 Annex 9: History of earthquakes in Haiti................................................................................................. 93 6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Background, scope and method On January 12th 2010, an earthquake of magnitude 7.0 on the Richter scale struck Haiti’s capital Port‐au‐ Prince and its surrounding areas. The earthquake had devastating effects: an estimated 230,0001 people were killed, with many left injured and homeless. Material loss is reported to be equivalent to more than
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