The AC Is Premised on Individual Rights Protection

the communitarian rights k defenders of justice

The AC is premised on individual rights protection. The NC argues that a good society attends to not only individuals and states, but communities which give meaning to those rights. This is sufficient to negate because the NC: a) serves as a link turn to all AC offense, since the affirmative value can only be achieved by adopting a different social approach b) proves the converse of the resolution by justifying the contrapositive of the affirmative case c) gives comparative reasons why the NC is preferable. Also, NC impacts function before the AC standard because they address the AC worldview, which shapes our approaches to social interaction before fiat. And since the NC is premised on the AC's conceptions of justice, it precedes the AC since it deals with the standards themselves as opposed to case impacts.

PART 1 - LINKS The first link is the AC's endorsement of rights protection. The AC places rights protection as the primary goal of a good society, placing rights as the true manifestations of human worth. This shirks other social goals to the side which may be necessary to complement or constrain rights protection. The second link is the AC's praise of the individual's autonomy. The AC builds autonomy as the ultimate ideal of a good society and life. This focus on autonomy is ultimately the language of rights and of the individual. Andrew Fagan 1 writes, Many of the central themes first expressed within Kant's moral philosophy remain highly prominent in contemporary philosophical justifications of human rights. Foremost amongst these are the ideals of equality and the moral autonomy of rational human beings. Kant bestows upon contemporary human rights' theory the ideal of a potentially universal community of rational individuals autonomously determining the moral principles for securing the conditions for equality and autonomy. Kant provides a means for justifying human rights as the basis for self-determination grounded within the authority of human reason. Kant's moral philosophy is based upon an appeal to the formal principles of ethics, rather than, for example, an appeal to a concept of substantive human goods. For Kant, the determination of any such goods can only proceed from a correct determination of the formal properties of human reason and thus do not provide the ultimate means for determining the correct ends, or object, of human reason. Kant's moral philosophy begins with an attempt to correctly identify those principles of reasoning that can be applied equally to all rational persons, irrespective of their own specific desires or partial interests. In this way, Kant attaches a condition of universality to the correct identification of moral principles. For him, the basis of moral reasoning must rest upon a condition that all rational individuals are bound to assent to. Doing the right thing is thus not determined by acting in pursuit of one's own interests or desires, but acting in accordance with a maxim which all rational individuals are bound to accept. Kant terms this the categorical imperative, which he formulates in the following terms, 'act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.' (1948:84). Kant argues that this basic condition of universality in determining the moral principles for governing human relations is a necessary expression of the moral autonomy and fundamental equality of all rational individuals. The categorical imperative is self-imposed by morally autonomous and formally equal rational persons. It provides the basis for determining the scope and form of those laws which morally autonomous and equally rational individuals will institute in order to secure these very same conditions. For Kant, the capacity for the exercise of reason is the distinguishing characteristic of humanity and the basis for justifying human dignity. As the distinguishing characteristic of humanity, formulating the principles of the exercise of reason must necessarily satisfy a test of universality; they must be capable of being universally recognized by all equally rational agents. Hence, Kant's formulation of the categorical imperative. Kant’s moral philosophy is notoriously abstract and resists easy comprehension. Though often overlooked in accounts of the historical development of human rights, his contribution to human rights has been profound. Kant provides a formulation of fundamental moral principles that, though exceedingly formal and abstract, are based upon the twin ideals of equality and moral autonomy. Human rights are rights we give to ourselves, so to speak, as autonomous and formally equal beings. For Kant, any such rights originate in the formal properties of human reason, and not the will of some super-human being.

1 Andrew Fagan, Human Rights [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy], University of Essex, 2006, http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hum-rts.htm

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PART 2 – IMPACTS

The AC's focus on individual rights reduces social interaction to points of relationship between persons in which both choose based upon those rights to relate to each other and the law via a supposed mutual agreement to respect autonomy. Using this contractual model for an ideal society presupposes an equality of power to act, a problematic assumption which only creates inequities. Fiona Robinson 2 writes,

For example, it has been argued that a conception of moral relations as contractual presupposes both an equality of power and a natural separateness from others. Indeed, it is a typical feature of dominant moral theories that relationships between equals, or those who are deemed equal in some important sense, have been the relations that morality is primarily concerned to regulate. Relationships between those who are clearly unequal in power, including large and small states, parents and children, earlier and later generations, have had to be shunted to the bottom of the agenda and then dealt with by some sort of promotion of the weaker, so that an appearance of virtual equality is achieved. When relations between agents are clearly unequal, however, a moral code designed for those equal in power will be at best nonfunctional, at worst an offensive pretence of equality which actually breeds further inequality. Such criticisms are not meant to minimize the importance of relationships of mutual respect among anonymous, autonomous agents, but rather to question the completeness of a moral philosophy which confines itself to such relations. As Annette Baier suggests, a complete moral philosophy would tell us how and why we should act and feel toward others in relationships of shifting and varying power asymmetry and shifting and varying intimacy.

Thus, insistence on rights betrays their purpose by harming the autonomy and equality rights seek to protect; by relying upon such a system, contractual understandings of society simply reinforces domination and inequity due to bargaining power prior to formulation of those rights. And this mindset creates social division by forcing persons to view one others in terms of potential gains, thereby harming the social body.

2 Fiona Robinson, international relations professor at Carleton University in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, Globalizing Care: Ethics, Feminist Theory, and International Relations, © 1999 by Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, p. 61-2

Also, rights language creates a false dichotomy between individual and state as the sole conflicts which regard human interests; this fails to account for non-state actors which are equally threatening to human dignity, and rules out non-legal methods of solution since they function within the boundaries of rights as political constructs. Daniel A. Bell3 says,

Many critics of the current “international” human rights regime, particularly in the non-Western world, have argued that the language of rights may not always be ideal for protecting the substantive human interests underlying human rights. For one thing, the term “rights” may sometimes have pejorative connotations in some societies, even among dissident intellectuals. Secondly, the language of rights seems to lend itself to the model of an individual exclusively concerned with seeking protection against an intrusive state. In the modern world, however, individuals also need to be concerned about abuses by corporations and other nongovernmental entities. Thirdly, relatively communitarian societies in East Asia and elsewhere often resort to nonjudicial remedies, such as informal negotiations and public education, for the purpose of securing vital human interests. Resorting to legally enforceable rights can sometimes undermine traditional (and effective) modes of conflict resolution.

Thus, using rights as the terminal, universal ethos for a society only betrays the concepts that underlie rights and in so doing maligns the good society and justice. By focusing on legal, individuated models, the things we call rights violations are prevented from solution through methods which do not use the approach of protecting individuals.

There are three implications. First, since the AC's portrayal of justice is based upon individuals and rights instead of communities and values, the AC loses all impacts to the value since rights become self-defeating. This means you negate at any risk of the alternative accruing solvency because only it allows justice to be embraced. Second, this section of the critique has functionally turned the AC because the very idea of a good society has been maligned. In the absence of an alternative, the critique so far is sufficient to negate because affirming would cause more harm to society and the value as a whole by detaching persons from the social body as a whole and lose standing but AC impacts are tailored to very specific and limited settings, meaning that this offense always outweighs the AC. Third, Robinson and Bell serve as internal links to the following impacts which address social fragmentation and individual rights being placed above holistic approaches to community values.

3 Daniel A. Bell, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong, Toward an International Human Rights (and Responsibilities) Regime: Some Obstacles, The Responsive Community: Rights and Responsibilities, Winter 1998/99, Vol 9, Issue 1, p. 76-77

Focuses on individuals and autonomy ignore historical and sociopolitical realities which give birth to attitudes that malign human dignity; by failing to analyze relationships between persons and societies, the rights-based approach prevents responses to oppression by ignoring nuanced relationships and concrete events. Robinson 4 writes,

Pogge distinguishes his institutional [a] human rights-based account of global justice from other contributions to the field, arguing that a conception of human rights is far more suitable than all the theoretical constructs currently discussed by academics. I would argue, however, that Pogge’s account of human flourishing, autonomy and justice has much in common with many other, broadly liberal contributions to the debate on justice from within analytical philosophy. Specifically, his account is procedural, individualistic, universalistic – it focuses on the procedures for arriving at a theory of justice which privileges individuals as autonomous, and seeks to extent this principle to all individuals in the world. Its use of human rights language – albeit in a revised concept of ‘institutional’ rights – still ties his theory to dominant, Western liberal approaches to global ethics. Indeed, one might ask why Pogge is so adamant that his theory must be conceptualized using his idea of institutional human rights, when it seems as if the moral idea of responsibility – specifically, shared responsibility – is more germane. Perhaps most important, however, are the things that are left out of Pogge’s argument. For an argument that is so grounded in political ‘reality’, there is very little discussion of power – save the recurrent mention of the ‘crushing advantage’ that wealthy and powerful states have over poor and weak ones. But in order to understand and address the nature of contemporary inequality, we must understand not only the content of WTO agreements, but also the way in which power, identity and responsibility are tightly woven into patterns of relationship, social practices and institutions, their material conditions and environments and distributions of credibility and authority (Walker 1998, p. 171). This, I would argue, involves using a feminist methodology which can effectively explore both the causes and nature of gender subordination and inequality which are increasingly evident in a globalizing world. Moreover, it requires the application of a moral framework which can address the needs of women, and can more fully take into account aspects of all people’s lives which have been subordinated in male-centered moral and political theories.

Thus, the focus on rights only legitimates oppression, further maligning human dignity and a good society.

4 Fiona Robinson, international relations professor at Carleton University in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, Care, Gender and Global Social Justice: Towards an Moral Framework for Ethical Globalization, pp. 7-8, 2005, accessible at http://www.cpsa- acsp.ca/papers-2005/Robinson.pdf

Additionally, given that the affirmative's portrayal of the human subject is one that appeals to universalized notions of autonomy, it fails to be responsive to specific cultural aspects which paint differing pictures of the human experience. This serves to functionally destroy the borders of states and cultures by removing those aspects that distinguish societies from one another. David Jacobson5 explains how without distinct boundaries of sovereignty, the national community is eroded. He writes,

The role of citizenship in defining the boundaries of the nation is linked to the domestic politics of citizenship. If the distinction between citizen and alien erodes and the boundary defining the national community consequently is blurred, the civil connection between state and society becomes frayed. The state abdicated its role as the political organization of the community because there is less of a community to represent. In such circumstances, civic, economic, and even political associations will decreasingly use the state’s boundaries as a point of reference.

5 David Jacobson. Rights Across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship. 1997, pg. 8.

Thus, societies lose their cohesive nature upon affirming, only magnifying aforementioned impacts insofar as people begin to internalize increasingly incompatible norms for social interaction. This in itself undermines the concept of a good society insofar as persons no longer refer to boundaries for actions; however, this gives us additionally reason to avoid affirming. As societies become fragmented and persons cease to refer to communities as valuable, people derive their normative orientations from themselves instead of the the social body at large. This sort of normative vacuum destroys informal social desires to follow norms and creates undemocratic action with tangible harms upon the social body. Amitai Etzioni6 writes,

Above all, a normative vacuum invites fundamentalist responses. This is most evident in all of the societies in which totalitarian regimes, whether secularly (as in former Soviet republics) or religious (e.g., the Taliban in Afghanistan) collapsed. Upon collapse, each of these societies suffered from an explosive growth in anti-social behavior of many kinds including crime, drug abuse, spread of AIDS, and abandonment of children. This high level of social disorder in turn is inviting undemocratic responses. Hence, in replacing the police state with moderate, informal social controls, of the kind that play such a crucial role in free civil societies, is obviously needed. To form these informal social controls, shared moral understandings are essential. These in turn are formed through moral dialogues. The same holds true, although in a less pronounced way for free societies whose moral order has weakened for one reason or other.

Thus, supporting the notion of rights as the ultimate goal separates the individual from her society, preventing any pursuit of justice or ethics insofar as persons no longer have any incentives to follow moral norms.

6 Amitai Etzioni, “Transnational Moral Dialogues,” Social Science and Modern Society (March/April 2006), p. 49

PART 3 - ALTERNATIVE

We must reject the rights-based approach in favor of a centrist communitarian approach. Only by creating a balance between these approaches instead of glorifying one can a good society and real understandings of humanity be reached. Etzioni7 writes,

The good society balances the state, the market, and the community. Much has already been made of the fact that the best way to proceed is to view government as neither the problem nor the solution but as one partner of the good society. Similarly, the good society views the market not as a source of all that is either good or evil but as a powerful engine that must be accorded sufficient space to do its work while also being carefully guarded. And the government and the private sector tend to focus on our instrumental needs and thus foster I-It relationships. The community focuses on the social and moral needs and thus favors I-Thou relationships. Hence, moving toward a good society requires that these three sectors work together and keep each other in check. From this viewpoint, the question of whether we ought to have a free market is just as off the mark as the question of whether we should have a big government or – as Marx envisioned – a community without either. All are needed, but only in good measure. Although the three partners differ in their views as to what their respective roles are and ought to be, it is essential for a good society that these three sectors seek to cooperate with and contain one another. Each partner can best help contain the other two, ensuring that none usurps the missions best accomplished by the other two and, in the process, maintaining the three-way balance that is at the essence of the good society.

7 Amitai Etzioni, prof @ George Washington U, “Next: the road to the good society,” 2001, p. 2-3, Basic Books, New York, NY

By utilizing a centrist approach, societies maintain their cohesive nature as well as a fuller understanding of norms and values. By focusing on the community and the individual's participation therein, instead of the lone person, social norms regain their efficacy as well as respect the worth of all persons. Jurgen Habermas8 writes,

But when the participants can no longer rely on a transcendental preunderstanding grounded in more or less homogeneous conditions of life and interests, the moral point of view can only be realised under conditions of communication that ensure that everyone tests the acceptability of a norm, implemented in a general practice, also from the perspective of his own understanding of himself and the world.

The missing “transcendent good” can be replaced in an “immanent” fashion only by appeal to the intrinsic constitution of the practice of deliberation. In the absence of such a substantive agreement on particular norms, the participants much now rely on the “neutral” fact that each of them participates in some communicative form of life which is structured by linguistically mediated understanding.

There are three unique implications to the alternative: First, the alternative solves for the impacts above because it regards both rights and an understanding of society as relational instead of abstracted notions of individuality and autonomy. Second, the NC uniquely solves for the AC standard and value since the AC rules communities out of the question, which, as Etzioni writes, is to “usurp the missions best accomplished” by other social spheres. Only the critique can engage us in a functional and just society. Third, the AC is turned because the AC value is grounded in ethics and a good society. The AC debases all ethical concepts by lacking an understanding of persons as relational and failing to provide a grounding for a good society that is both ideologically and sociologically sound; therefore, the alternative is an independent reason to negate as it immediately makes 1AC impacts irrelevant to the value.

8 Jürgen Habermas. The inclusion of the Other. Studies in Political Theory. MIT Press, 1998, parts VIII and IX of Chapter 1 only, transcribed by Andy Blunden. Available: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/habermas/1998/communicative-ethics.htm