UNIVERSITY OF BUCHAREST

FACULTY OF LAW

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT

(ABSTRACT)

PhD ADVISER

PROF. UNIV. DR. VERGINIA VEDINAȘ

PhD STUDENT

MARIANA OPRICAN

BUCHAREST

2015

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CONTENTS

CONCEPTUAL INSIGHTS 8

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 10

1. The importance and relevance of the research theme 10 2. Research purpose and methods 14

PART I

RELATIONS BETWEEN PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT IN THE ROMANIAN LAW 14

CHAP. I

PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL EXERCISED OVER THE EXECUTIVE POWER 14

Section 1. The principle of separation of powers-evolution and relevance 14

1.1 The principle of separation of powers-concept 14 1.2 The principle of separation of powers-current trends 20 1.3 The principle of separation of powers under the Constitution of Romania, adopted on December 8, 1991 27 1.4 Consideration of the principle of separation of powers in the Constitution, revised 29

Section 2. Dimensions of the parliamentary control function 35

Section 3. Short history of the evolution of parliamentary control function in Romania 43

Section 4. Parliamentary control methods (without sanction) exerted on Government activity, regulated by the Constitution, revised 47

4.1 Parliamentary inquiry 48

4.2 Reporting to Parliament 50

4.3 Constitutional conditions for questions, interpellations and simple motions 54

CHAP. II

CONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS FOR THE VOTE OF CENSURE IN THE ROMANIAN LAW 60

Section 1. The significance of the institution 60

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Section 2. The conduct of the procedure 66

Section 3. Some aspects of governmental stability 71

Section 4. The vote of censure and the vote raised in the parliamentary practice 75

PART II

CONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS FOR GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE ROMANIAN LAW 88

CHAP. I

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY ACCORDING TO ART. 114 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF ROMANIA, REVISED 88

Section 1. The significance of the institution 88

Section 2. Regulation history 94

Section 3. The conduct of the procedure 99

Section 4. Government accountability on a programme or on a general policy statement 101

Section 5. Government accountability for a draft law 104

4.1 Generalities 104

4.2 The right to make amendments 107

4.3 Referral to the Constitutional Court under Art. 146 a) of the Constitution 109

4.4 Review of the law by the Parliament at the request of the President of Romania 111

CHAP. II

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY ON A DRAFT LAW. GOVERNMENTAL PRACTICE DURING 1996-2014 113

Section 1. Generalities 113

Section 2. Evolution of governmental practice during 1996-2014 115

2.1 Governmental practice until the adoption of Law no. 429/2003 on the revision of the Constitution, adopted on December 8, 1991 115 2.2 Governmental practice in the period following the revision of the Constitution, namely the period between 2004 and 2014 122

CHAP. III

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GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY FOR A DRAFT LAW. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT CASE LAW 135

Section 1. Government accountability for complex draft laws 136

Section 2. Government accountability on several draft laws on the same day, and in the same parliamentary session 141

Section 3. Government accountability on a draft law, regardless of the status of the legislative procedure on that draft 142

Section 4. Government accountability for a draft law is a simplified way of putting under the jurisdiction of law, aimed in “extremis” 144

Section 5. Some critical aspects on the Constitutional Court decisions in matters of Government accountability for a draft law 147

5.1 General features of the procedure for Government accountability on a draft law held by the Constitutional Court case law 148

5.2 Some aspects relating to the nature of the draft law that is the subject of Government accountability 150

A. Some critical aspects on the Constitutional Court decisions containing provisions relating to the Government accountability for complex draft laws 150 B. Approval of an emergency ordinance by Government accountability procedure 152 B.1 Legislative delegation and Government accountability in the light of constitutional provisions 152 B.2 Critical comments regarding the Constitutional Court Decision no. 34/1998 regarding the settlement of the objection of unconstitutionality of the Law approving Government Emergency Ordinance no. 88/1997 regarding the privatization of companies 154

5.3 Some critical aspects of Constitutional Court decisions containing provisions regarding this procedure use frequency in governmental practice 156

CHAP. IV

VOTE OF CENSURE PROVIDED BY ART. 113 OF THE CONSTITUTION AND VOTE RAISED, GOVERNED BY ART. 114 OF THE CONSTITUTION- COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 159

Section 1. The meaning of the institutions provided by Art. 113 and Art. 114 of the Constitution-comparative analysis 160

Section 2. Some aspects on certain features of the procedures provided by Art. 113 and Art. 114 of the Constitution 171

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Section 3. The vote of censure provided by Art. 113 of the Constitution and vote raised provided by the Art. 114 of the Constitution-comparative aspects regarding the conduct of the procedure 174

Section 4. The vote of censure and the vote raised in the Constitutional Court case law. Comments on Decision no. 1525/2010 on the constitutional legal conflict between the Government of Romania, on the one hand and the Parliament, on the other hand 179

PART III

RELATIONS BETWEEN PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT IN COMPARATIVE LAW 183

CHAP. I

RELATIONS BETWEEN PARLIAMENT AND GOVERNMENT IN SOME STATES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 183

Section 1. The relationship between Parliament and Government in parliamentary monarchies 183

1.1 Circumstance in which the Parliament withdraws its confidence through a constructive vote 183 1.2 Circumstance in which the Parliament is a political instability factor 189

Section 2. Relations between Parliament and Government in the parliamentary republics 191

Section 3. Relations between Parliament and Government in semi-presidential republics 193

CHAP. II

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS IN OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 199

Section 1. US constitutional regime 199

Section 2. Relations between Parliament and Government in some countries in Latin America 202

CONCLUSIONS 205

LEX FERENDA PROPOSAL 220

ANNEXES 232

REFERENCES 238

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Keywords: Government, Parliament, Constitution, motion of censure, Government’s liability

This Doctoral Dissertation entitled “The Accountability of the Government” covers the research of the institution specified in Art. 114 of the Constitution of Romania, the procedure for Government accountability respectively, in the context of relations between the executive power and the legislative power, against the background of the trends shown by the executive power to dominate the legislature, through aggressive use of this procedure. The importance and relevance of the research theme should be viewed from the perspective of the role held by the institution of Government accountability in the Romanian legal system, of the connections established between this institution (enshrined by the provisions of Art. 114 of the Constitution,1 revised 2 and republished3) and other institutions (also constitutionally enshrined) and of the relations established between Parliament as the supreme representative of the people and country’s sole legislative authority and Government. Also, we cannot exclude from this equation the importance of the parliamentary and governmental practice on the matter, towards understanding connotations this procedure acquires through overuse by the executive power, which is likely to contribute to changing the balance of power between public authorities. The scientific novelty of the dissertation is particularly given by the approach from the perspective of governmental practice on the subject - practice determined mainly by political and economic transformations that have taken place in Romanian society – of the role the Government acquires within power relations between public authorities, by using the accountability procedure for a draft law. The contemporary political scene is dictated by the increasing significance of the executive power, by its dominant trends in relation to the legislature. Not only in Romania, but even in other European countries with democratic tradition, Governments have turned often from performers of legal rules into creators of legal rules, while it is more difficult for

1 Constitution of Romania of 1991 was adopted by nominal vote, by the Constituent Assembly and approved by national referendum on December 8, 1991. The 1991 Constitution came into force on its approval date by referendum. 2 Constitution of Romania of 1991 was amended and supplemented by the Constitution Revision Law no. 429/2003, published in the Official Gazette no. 758 of October 29, 2003 3 Constitution of Romania of 1991 was republished by the Legislative Council under Art. 152 of the Constitution, by updating the names, and texts being renumbered

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the Parliament to exert the control function which, in many experts’ opinion, is considered to be more important than the legislative function. In our constitutional system, the acknowledgement through the Basic Law of some institutions such as the legislative delegation institution and the institution of Government’s accountability for a draft law, led to the creation of a very strong executive power that dominates the political life and “blurs” the activity of the legislature. Undoubtedly, against the background of executive supremacy trends in the work of legislation, strengthening the control function of Parliament appears as a sine qua non condition for strengthening the democratic regime in Romania. By editing this dissertation our concerns were directed towards an interdisciplinary research through combined and comparative analysis of institutions belonging to the constitutional law, or administrative law or both to constitutional law and administrative law (legislative delegation institution) and through analysis of conceptual elements resulting from theories laid down by sociologists and political scientists. Regarding the methodology used in the research, a first method considered was the deductive method. By using this method we proceeded to analyse legal texts and doctrinal discourse which method will be found in all three parts of the dissertation. A comprehensive study aiming to reveal the essence and complexity of the subject cannot be achieved only through an overall analysis of the laws and doctrine, which is precisely why I found it necessary to approach the institution of Government accountability, which is the subject of this dissertation, from the perspective of governmental and parliamentary practice, (and of political realities that have made their mark on it) and of the case-law on the subject. Thus, using this logic method, I presented the circumstances relevant to Romanian political and institutional practice of the two and a half decades that have passed since the Revolution of 1989, namely the circumstances and reasons which led the Government to use the accountability procedure, the large number of commitments the executive power understood to make about the complex draft laws or laws packages, the frequency of vote of no-confidence initiated and their purpose. Another method I pursued to use for the research is rendered through the approach of a comparative study, the relationship between the executive and legislative powers being analysed both in terms of internal and international regulations. Thus, I focused mainly on those constitutional rules governing the role and powers held by the Cabinet in some EU countries, compared with Romanian constitutional regime, by parliamentary control methods

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on the activity of the executive power, taking also into account the legal instruments it has available in achieving its legislative powers.

In terms of its contents, the PhD dissertation having the “Accountability of the Government” as research subject, is divided into three parts, namely: Part I, entitled “Relations between Parliament and Government in the Romanian law”; Part II, entitled “Constitutional conditions for Government accountability in the Romanian law”; Part III, entitled “Relations between Parliament and Government in comparative law.” Part I, called “Relations between Parliament and Government in the Romanian law”, consists of two chapters, which in turn comprise several sections. Chap. I of Part I, entitled “Parliamentary control over the executive power” is a synthesis of the dimensions, origin and evolution of parliamentary control function in our country, as well as an analysis of legal procedures by which Parliament may intervene in the activities of the executive power, of the Government mainly in order to define its function. In our opinion, the political responsibility of the Government to the legislative body originates in the classical principle of separation and balance of powers. Appeared in the Enlightenment, the theory of separation of powers has come as a natural reaction against the monarchical absolutism amid strong social and political protest movements. In the legal and political context of that historical stage, its role was decisive in “promoting the representative system, respectively in the democratic development of the relationship between power sovereign owner and the state organization of political power”4 in order to ensure full enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms of man and citizen. Grounded by Montesquieu, in his famous work “The Spirit of Laws”, the theory of separation of powers underlay the adoption, on August 26, 1789 by the Constituent Assembly, of the famous French bourgeois revolution document entitled “Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen” which enshrines through Art. 16 the principle of separation of powers, considering it as “a genuine instrument of constitutional democracy.” The changes that occurred during the historical evolution, on political, legal and social level - such as the emergence of political parties, the establishment of public authorities which cannot be classified in any of the three traditional powers (Constitutional Court, Court of Accounts, Ombudsman, Legislative Council, etc.) and trends of power “concentration” by some authorities (concentration largely of state power by the Cabinet, in the British

4 Ioan Muraru, E. S. Tănăsescu in I. Muraru, E. S. Tănăsescu, (coord.), Constitution of Romania. Comment by articles, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2008, p. 13

8 constitutional system), specific to democratic and pluralist states - led to the idea that the theory of separation of powers, as formulated by Montesquieu, is outdated and obsolete, turned into “fiction” with no counterpart in reality. Being developed at a time when political parties had not been set up, and the main problems posed by the power were institutional, naturally the overwhelming role they were to hold subsequently in the very configuration of political and legal institutions of the state, could not be foreseen. The emergence of political parties determines that the balance be no longer achieved between Parliament and Government, but between a majority formed by a party or parties in the coalition and the opposition waiting to come to power. Also, we cannot exclude from this process the role of NGOs, associations, leagues, trade unions, employers - who impose their will on the party in power, causing them to act in a certain way - and mass participation in the government by referendum. Despite the reservations expressed in the doctrine, in relation to the classical principle of separation of powers, it remains the same today, being perceived by the population as a guarantee of fundamental rights and freedoms of man. The principle of separation and balance of powers was expressly enshrined in many Constitutions adopted in the nineteenth century. Gradually the constituent legislators have tended to give up expressly mentioning it in the Basic Law, this principle being rather found suggested through an implicit regulation or by using phrases such as public authority, public office, public power. Thus, the Constitution adopted in 1991, did not contain express provisions on this principle and used the phrase “power of the state” in Art. 80 inclusively, which regulated the role of President of Romania as mediator between the state powers, between the state and society. By Review Law in 2003 Art. 1 was supplemented by paragraph four which expressly enshrines the principle of separation of powers, therefore “state is organized according to the principle of separation and balance of powers - legislative, executive and judiciary - in the constitutional democracy.” The evolution of modern democracies focuses on the relationship between the legislative power and executive power, relations between Parliament and Government being different from country to country, depending on the nature of the constitutional regime, whether it is a presidential or a parliamentary regime. Parliamentary constitutional, mainly, but also semi-presidential systems are characterized by political liability of the Government to Parliament. Parliament may intervene in the activities of the executive power in several legal ways, such as the establishment of committees of inquiry on the activities of the executive 9

power, the adoption of simple motions, by right to ask questions or interpellate members of the Government, including the Prime Minister, by right to information. Regarding the control function of Parliament over the executive power, considered by some authors to be more important than the legislative function5, this is a concrete way of implementing the principle of separation and balance of powers in a democratic state. Parliamentary control is characterized by diversity of forms and means to achieve this function, including activities, state bodies, laws. This control may be exercised either directly by the whole Parliament, or by one of its Chambers (in the bicameral system) or by other means and forms of control, the Constitution containing many provisions to this effect, among them being the duty of the Ombudsman to present reports to the two Chambers of Parliament (Art. 60 of the Constitution), the political responsibility of the Government (Art. 109), the obligation of the Government to present, within the Parliamentary control, information and documents required (Art. 111). Parliament’s control function does not require subordination relations between the legislature and executive body, but only represents a collaboration between these institutions of the democratic state. Parliamentary control over the executive activity is based on the observation of executive power function and contents thereof, the role the executive power holds under the organization of state authorities. Parliamentary control is thus designed in a “wide field”6 that concerns both the activity of the state authorities, and especially of the executive power, and the elaboration of the law, the Government being in this process subject to strong parliamentary action, which covers not only aspects of control, but also of information of lawmakers on the situation that determines the adoption of new legal solutions. In Romania, the development of control function exercised by the Parliament over the executive activity was determined by the development of Romanian society in the context of receiving innovative ideas conveyed by Western philosophical and legal thought. The first attempt to regulate the position and relations between the three powers of the state, was done by Organic Regulations, in the early 19th century. Thus, the legislative power was entrusted to a National Assembly, the executive power was to be exercised by the Ruler, aided by an extraordinary administrative council and the judicial system was organized on modern basis, its res judicata authority being acknowledged. Even if we cannot consider the Organic Regulations as Constitutions, they

5 M. Prelot, Instituions politiques et droit constitutionnel, Dalloz, Paris, 1972, p.820 6 Marian Enache, Parliametary control, Polirom, Iași, 1998, p.69

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were a factor of progress by removing a number of feudal institutions and practices, while establishing the legal framework conducive to creating a modern state apparatus and new institutions. The constitutions subsequently adopted in Romania - the 1866 Constitution respectively, and the 1923 Constitution - enshrine the principle of separation of powers and the existence of parliamentary control over the executive activity. Thus, the 1866 Constitution of Romania approved state organisation by democratic principles, the existence of parliamentary control on the principle of separation of powers, establishing, through Art. 31 that “state powers has nation as sole source, which exerts them by delegation.” Regarding the 1923 Constitution, it preserved the intact distribution of powers as it was governed by the Constitution of 1866, but brings amendments in the exercise of parliamentary control function over the executive power for the first time in the history of Romanian constitutionalism, establishing not only the right of deputies and senators to address interpellations to ministers, but also their obligation to respond within the time prescribed by Regulation. The Constitution of 1938 established the royal dictatorship, separation of powers being removed. All political power belongs to the monarch. The executive power belongs to the King, who exerts it by his Government,7 and legislative power also belongs to the King,8 who exerts it jointly with the National Representation. Analysing the constitutional provisions, we note that, in fact, the National Representation is a simple tool through which the monarch exercises power. With the communist dictatorship in 1944, we find the infringement of the principle of separation of powers, a regime that is based on the uniqueness of state power being instituted. Thus, in the Constitutions adopted after 1948, we cannot speak of an acknowledgement of the principle of parliamentary control but of a “trick picture.” Only in December 1989, when Romanians removed the dictatorial communist regime, the parliamentary democracy was established in Romania, the principle of the uniqueness of the state power being replaced by the principle of separation and balance of powers. Constitution of Romania adopted by the Constituent Assembly on December 8, 1991 was based on an attempt to virtually exploit the parliamentary tradition of certain states

7 Art. 32 of the 1938 Constitution of Romania 8 Art. 31 of the 1938 Constitution of Romania

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and development of local elements of Romanian parliamentarianism between the two world wars. In democratic and pluralistic systems the parliamentary control can be with sanction or without sanction. In terms of parliamentary control methods – without sanction - over the activity of the executive power, they are provided by almost all European Constitutions. The Romanian constitutional system covers them by the Basic Law and by the Chamber of Deputies Regulation and the Senate Regulation. One parliamentary control way of this kind is the control by either permanent or investigation parliamentary committees. These committees perform a parliamentary control directly either by searching the minutes of the Government’s meetings and of some of its documents - Sweden - or by hearing the reports or periodical messages of the executive body - Finland, Switzerland. With the examination of reports, messages, information received from the Government, the committees form their sections - Switzerland - or subcommittees – Sweden, Finland - in order to conduct hearings of members of the executive or to request additional deeds. The role of committees of inquiry in the European Union countries is not as significant as in the US where they are “the most publicized moments of the American parliamentary life”9, the hearings conducted by these committees being mostly public, being able to cite any person to participate in the hearing. In the Romanian constitutional system, parliamentary inquiry is, according to the Regulation of the Chamber of Deputies10, a specific activity a committee of inquiry and one or more of the standing committees of each Chamber or joint committees of the two Chambers11 can perform. The control performed through parliamentary inquiries is not the exclusive prerogative of the committees of inquiry, 12 which are temporarily established by decision of the Chamber of Deputies, of the Senate or of Parliament plenum, this control being most often made by the standing committees which may conduct, in their area of activity, parliamentary inquiries if they receive the approval of the Chamber of Deputies or of the

9 Camelia-Rodica Tomescu, Relations between Government and Parliament, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2012, p. 339 10 It’s about art. 73 par. (1) of the Regulation of the Chamber of Deputies 11 Art. 64 par. (4) of the Constitution of Romania, revised 12 I. Vida în I. Muraru, E. S. Tănăsescu (coord.), Constitution of Romania. Comment by articles, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2008, p. 634

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Senate.13 More broadly, the committees conduct a check on Government and through approvals and reports they have to draw up in the procedure laid down by the Constitution and by Regulations of the Chambers for the adoption of draft laws initiated by the Government. Analysing the practice on the subject, we note that in this case, parliamentary control made through committees of inquiry is not exclusively related to the analysis of the Government’s activity and its members as it also focused the activity of other public authorities14 or major political events, occurred in the early 90s, before the adoption of the Constitution of Romania. 15 Parliamentary control exercised by the committees of inquiry is an important and useful procedure. In the literature it is considered that this method of parliamentary control is actually a procedure “of institutional and political pressure on the executive authority”16 which is based mainly on media interest about the activities of a minister or some important people in the Government, which can be heard by such committees. Reporting to Parliament is a parliamentary control method regulated in the Constitutions of some European countries. Thus, the Constitution of Spain17 enshrines the right of Chambers of Parliament and their committees to request, through their presidents, information and help they need from the Government and other public bodies or autonomous communities. In other countries such as Switzerland, Sweden or Finland, the principle of compelling the executive power to submit reports or regular briefings was established. From the analysis of the provisions of art. 111 of the Constitution, we find that the obligation to inform the Parliament is incumbent, apart from the Government, on central and local public administration authorities, including of those elected by citizens by vote, namely local autonomous authorities. The exception to this requirement is the President of

13 According to Art. 76 par. (1) of the Regulation of the Senate “Any standing committee may initiate a parliamentary inquiry, within its material jurisdiction, with Senate approval,” and according to Art. 71 par. (1) of the Regulation of the Chamber of Deputies “Any standing committee can start, at the request of one or more members, an inquiry within its jurisdiction, with prior approval of the Chamber of Deputies, regarding the activity carried out by the Government or public administration.” 14 Accordingly, the National Bank of Romania, the State Property Fund, the Romanian Television and Romanian Radio Broadcasting Company, even the President of Romania, in 2007, to suspend him from office. 15 By Parliamentary Assembly Decision no. 11/1990, published in the Official Gazette no. 95 of June 20, 1990 a committee of inquiry was constituted in order to analyse and investigate the events on days June 13 to 15, 1990 in Piața Universității. 16 Bogdan Dima, The conflict between palaces. The relations of power between Parliament, Government and President in post-communist Romania, Hamangiu, Bucharest, 2014, p. 75 17 Art. 109 of the Constitution of Spain

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Romania, relations between him and Parliament being regulated in Chap. II of Title III of the Constitution. Under the provisions of art. 111 of the Basic Law it was also established that reporting to parliamentarians can only be done through presidents of both Chambers and through the chairpersons of the committees. Regarding the boundaries of the object of request for information an author18 considers that “(...) requests made by the Chamber or committees may not exceed the scope of government and public administration activity”; “(...) request for information and documents must concern situations objectively related to the nature of parliamentary control” and regarding the control object, it “(...) is only the information and documents which may be public.” Questions and interpellations are simple ways to control the activity of the executive power by the legislature. In many European parliaments,19 according to British model, there are certain days and hours reserved for submission of questions and interpellations and for response to these requests by the executive power. In some countries it is required that questions be put in writing and mentions whether they are with or without debate (interpellations) be made, and in other countries certain limitations have been set on the exercise of the right of interpellation, limitations determined by the large number of interpellations which would lead to blocking the activity of Parliament.20 In our constitutional system the legal conditions for questions, interpellations and simple motions is enshrined in Art. 111, in conjunction with Art. 112 of the Basic Law. Questions may be oral or written and may be raised to the Government, ministers and other heads of public administration. It is important to note that the debates of questions are not completed by a vote of one of the two Chambers of Parliament, which the parliamentarian belongs to, thus failing to draw immediate political sanction. In the literature it is considered that the questions are “a means of parliamentary control over governmental activity in a broader dialogue between the Chambers and the Government, as the questions are raised not only by lawmakers of opposition groups, but also by those who make up the majority and often, especially by them. To support means to

18 A. Iorgovan, Administrative law treatise, vol. I., All Beck, Bucharest, 2005, p. 418-419 19 For example, in France, at least one meeting a week is reserved for priority questions of the MPs and answers coming from the Government 20 In the Swedish constitutional system to prevent parliamentary debates that occur during an interpellation, the Government must submit a written response to Parliament.

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assume responsibility. Therefore, the support enjoyed by the Government in Parliament, necessarily implies a permanent test to check reliance granted.”21 Comparing legal regime of questions with interpellations regime, we will find, first of all that, unlike questions that can be both written and oral, interpellation is only in written form and consists is a “request to Government or to a member thereof, by one or more parliamentarians or by a parliamentary group, requesting explanations of Government policy in important matters of its national or international activity.”22 Unlike the question, interpellation may be made not only by one deputy but by a parliamentary group or by more deputies jointly also. Questions and interpellations are useful constitutional mechanisms for information and control in parliamentary regimes. In our constitutional system this is marked out by the frequent use of these control modalities over the executive power by parliamentarians, in the 24 years since the Revolution of December 1999 over 11,000 interpellations23 being formulated, for example. The term simple motion was introduced in the Constitution during its review when, by the new wording of Art. 112 par. (2) its content has also widened, meaning that the Chamber which adopts it can express their opinion not only on an issue that has been the subject of an interpellation, but also on other issues of national and international policy. The simple motion is a legal and not a political act - although it is the result of political discussions – which is precisely why the effects it produces do not regard the dismissal of Government or of the minister responsible for the scope that was the subject of that motion. The parliamentary practice on the subject shows that, from 1990 until now, 90 simple motions have been submitted to the Chamber of Deputies, while only 49 motions of this kind to the Senate. Of these, seven were adopted in the Senate and six at the Chamber of Deputies. The issues that were the subject of these motions were varied in areas of high interest for the electorate, such as the economy, education, agriculture, justice and others. Chap. II of the first part of the dissertation is devoted to the institution governed by the provisions of Art. 113 of the Romanian Constitution, republished, namely the vote of censure. We considered necessary, due to the importance this institution has, in our research, to dedicate an entire chapter, divided into four sections, in which we analysed, in order, the legal significance of the institution (Section 1), the parliamentary procedure

21 I. Muraru, M. Constantinescu, Parliamentary law, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2005, p. 266 22 Art. 162 par. (1) of the Senate Regulation and art. 173 par. (2) of the Chamber of Deputies Regulation 23 Study by the “Ovidiu Şincai” Institute available online on the website http://www.fisd.r/PDF/mater_noi/Raport%20Parlamentarism_FINAL-Ianuarie%202011.pdf

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regarding the initiation and adoption of a vote of no-confidence (Section 2), the relation between governmental stability – vote of no-confidence (Section 3), parliamentary practice on the subject in the period 1992-2014 (section 4). Political responsibility of the Government is committed only when introducing a vote of censure. Through the vote of no-confidence some lawmakers express their distrust regarding the Government’s activity and hope it is dismissed with the support of the parliamentary majority. For a government to exist, it must enjoy parliamentary support, which is why the issue of trust by Parliament in Government as a vote of confidence, becomes subject to express constitutional provisions. This institution is expressly governed by almost all constitutions of democratic countries as a loss of confidence to the Government by adopting a vote of censure by the legislature will inevitably lead to dismissal of the Government. Some constitutions govern this procedure thoroughly and in detail, while others with inconsistency and lack of precision. There are also political regimes in which the vote of censure is not possible, and therefore, consequentially, nor the dismissal of the Government, such as the Swiss regime.24 Constitution of Romania, by the provisions of Art. 113, in conjunction with Art. 109 par. (1), enshrines the political responsibility of Government to Parliament for its whole activity. The political responsibility of Government can intervene only in case of wrongful conduct by the Government as a whole, or by a member thereof, for culpable conduct, the Government or the Minister concerned acting with excess of power.25 It is clear that if Parliament resorted to initiate a vote of censure and withdraws its confidence, after a certain period, the fault undoubtedly lies with Government, and not with the legislature. Withdrawal of confidence occurs when most MPs no longer agree with how the Cabinet is governing, therefore the Government loses its legitimacy gained through the investiture vote. The legal procedure for initiating, debating and voting on a motion of censure, and the effects of its approval are expressly stipulated in the Basic Law and in the Regulation of joint meetings of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate, which is likely to provide stability to

24 In Switzerland, if there is an institutional conflict, the Cabinet must submit to the decision of Assemblies; we find therefore the subordination of the Cabinet to the legislative body. In reality, however, the Cabinet enjoys a stability not to be found in other governments and deriving both from its competence and from its political force. 25 A. Iorgovan in M. Constantinescu, A. Iorgovan, I. Muraru, E. S. Tănăsescu, Constitution of Romania revised- Comments and explanations, All Beck, Bucharest, 2004, p. p. 194-195

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the Government and to contribute in limiting the power of the legislature in obstructing the work of the executive power. Most European constitutions, regulating the procedure of withdrawal of confidence in Government through a vote of censure, have also provided by their provisions methods and tools designed to block attempts to dismiss the Government in order to prevent the establishment of political crisis. Among the mechanisms and instruments related to the rationalized parliamentarism, we mention: a) constructive no-confidence that puts in direct equation the no-confidence vote and designation of a new Government by proposing the candidature of a new head of Government or of a government entirely, specific to countries such as Germany, Spain, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia; b) specifying a time interval between the initiative of vote of confidence and the vote per se; c) prohibiting the reiteration of no-confidence vote. However, this way of blocking legislative trends to dismiss the cabinet is not absolute, but restricted. Thus, the constitutional system of Poland and Bulgaria prohibits the reiteration of no- confidence vote sooner than three months in Poland and six months in Bulgaria. In order to avoid instability of the executive power, the Constitution established three types of procedural conditions, one regarding the functioning of Parliament and the other two referring to the parliamentary opposition being expressed at political level. In terms of procedure, votes of censure may only be initiated by at least a quarter of the total number of deputies and senators, as a validity condition. They can be discussed and approved only in joint session of both Chambers of Parliament, both for reasons of legal symmetry with the vote of confidence granted by the legislative power, and as an expression of relationships of confidence that should exist between the executive and legislative authorities. Constitution of Romania limits under Art. 113 par. (4) the number of votes of censure that may be initiated by parliamentarians, meaning that if a vote of censure is rejected, the deputies and senators who signed it may not submit the same vote of censure in the same parliamentary session, unless the Government assumes responsibility under Art. 114 of the Constitution. This constitutional provision protects not only the stability of the

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Government, but also the Government against any political pettifoggery that would prevent it from exercising its duties “by blocking it in sterile debates on the government programme.”26 Another provision established by the provisions of Art. 113 par. (4) of the Constitution of Romania, designed to eliminate any governmental instability, refers to setting a time interval between the confidence vote initiative and the vote per se, a provision that establishes the condition that the vote of censure be debated three days after the date of its submission to the joint session of both Chambers. The Constitution has not enshrined the individual vote of censure to regard separately each of the members of the executive body, and which would result in the loss of capacity as minister of the one held responsible. In our constitutional system, if a minister would be responsible for acts through which Parliament considers that confidence granted to the Government as a whole has been seriously or irreparably damaged, the only solution for the responsibility of the entire governmental team remains triggering a vote of censure against the Government if the Prime Minister fails to initiate the procedure to propose that the minister concerned be dismissed from office by the head of state.27 Another requirement concerns the obligation that the vote of censure be initiated by MPs to be part of the two Chambers of the legislative body, as it is considered that both Chambers have equal power of parliamentary control over the Government. The text of the motion, accompanied by the list of initiators is transmitted to the Standing Bureaus of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate, who will check the list of signatures, political affiliation of signatories and the gathering of the number of MPs signing the motion, provided by the Basic Law and by the Regulation of joint meetings of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate, the requirement to gather the legal number of signatures being a substantive condition to promote the motion. If the list of signatories does not include at least one quarter of the total number of deputies and senators, the motion text shall be returned and the completion of the list or promotion of a new no-confidence vote in the same parliamentary session shall not be allowed, and the initiation of a new motion must only be done in compliance with the provisions of Art. 113 par. (4) of the Constitution.

26 Ioan Muraru, E. S. Tănăsescu in I. Muraru, E. S. Tănăsescu (coord.), Constitution of Romania…..op. cit. 2008, p. 1064 27 Tudor Drăganu, Constitutional law and political institutions. Basic Treatise, vol. II, Lumina Lex, Bucharest, 1998, p. 172 and I. Vida, Executive power and public administration, R. A. ,,Monitorul Oficial”, Bucharest, 1994, p. 103

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The Basic Law does not state the time frame in which the two Chambers of Parliament must be convened in joint session, after filing the vote, but orders on its debate, which cannot take place later than three days of its submission. As regards Regulation of joint meetings of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate, it provides, through Art. 78, that the vote of censure is submitted in the joint session of both Chambers, within five days of its filing. Text refers to a simple reading of the text of the vote of censure without organising a debate on it. The motion shall be debated after three days of its submission, the Government being advised on the date of the debate, 24 hours before it takes place. One of the mandatory stages of the debate of any vote of censure is to present the Government’s position on the issues discussed. Constitution provides in Art. 113 par. (1) that the adoption of the motion occurs in the joint session of the two Chambers of the Parliament by vote of a majority of deputies and senators. This procedure is a solution symmetrical with that of granting of confidence to form a Government, but this time, gathering the majority required by the Basic Law has the effect of dismissing the executive body. Joint and several liability of the Government is a characteristic of the parliamentary regime which, over time, has been taken over by semi-presidential systems. It is one of the causes that generate governmental stability, but at the same time is an expression of the control exercised by Parliament over the executive body. In general, the stability of government is based on parliamentary majority support. Through a comparative analysis, given the two elements, namely government stability - parliamentary majority, we will see that in parliamentary regimes, Cabinet durability is determined, most often, by the existence of a parliamentary majority supporting the actions of the executive body. Also, those cabinets who win more successive elections, get to hardly confront serious challenges from lawmakers. With regard to minority coalitions, they have the shortest lifespan, except in Scandinavian countries.28 Quite different is the situation in countries where the cabinets are unicoloured, which express the existence of a majority party in Parliament. In this case the Government enjoys more stability and tends, through its activity, to dominate the legislature.

28 For example, Denmark had seven minority coalition cabinets, which had an average lifespan of three years each.

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In Romania, after 1989, the practice has shown that we cannot generally speak of a political stability, against the background of fragile coalitions and of a changing electoral decision dictated by government inefficiency and confusion. Governmental instability in our country has been determined by a number of factors that often acted in competition such as the absence of a parliamentary majority based on a dominant party or on a well-established coalition, disagreements between the President and Prime Minister, Government trend to gain supremacy in Parliament by forcing constitutional prerogatives. Against the background of a constant pressure of the executive body, aiming to dominate the Romanian political life, the Parliament still managed to be a stabilizing factor, acting in major political crisis, in order to strengthen democracy, without assuming the risk of its dissolution, either by adopting no-confidence vote, or by decision to suspend the President of Romania. Regarding the institution of no-confidence vote, the Romanian parliamentary practice, analysed over more than two decades that have passed since the adoption of the Constitution of 1991, revealed that more than 23 votes of censure were initiated, of which only two were passed by Parliament, namely the vote of censure “11 against Romania”, against Boc Government, adopted in October 2009, and the one suggestively titled “Stop the blackmailed Government. Never this way!” adopted in Parliament in April 2012, challenging the anti-national measures taken by the Ungureanu Government. We note that, as a characteristic of our country, all votes of censure introduced were initiated in order to discredit the Government and draw people’s attention on its policy mistakes, on corruption and its failure to solve priority problems of the country. Motions were thus regarded both as punitive measures and as the most radical instruments of legislative control available to the opposition. We note that, by 2009, no vote of censure has clearly aimed Government’s fall and early elections be caused, although all motions have urged the resignation of the Government. In general, most no-confidence votes were introduced in the second and third year of legislative term, suggesting that Romanian lawmakers have considered the first year of their office a year of accommodation to new responsibilities, and they dedicated the last year to the preparation of the next round of elections for the renewal of their mandate. Also, the parliamentary practice relieved that votes of censure resulting from over twenty years of rule, were either the fruit of the MPs’ initiative or the result of Government’s accountability before the legislature, in order to promote draft laws by simplified procedure of adoption provided for by Art. 114 of the Constitution.

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Part II of the dissertation entitled “Constitutional conditions for Government accountability in the Romanian law” is divided into four chapters, each of them comprising several sections. Chap. I, entitled “Government accountability according to Art. 114 of the Constitution of Romania, revised”, is an analysis of the Government’s accountability institution in relation to the constitutional text and doctrine, from the perspective of regulation history. With regard to constitutional regulatory developments of the institution of Government’s accountability before Parliament, we identified two stages. The first stage begins with the adoption by the Constituent Assembly of the Basic Law, which entered into force on December 8, 1991 following its approval by national referendum. Thus, the constituent legislator established in 1991 by the provisions of Art. 113 of the Basic Law, Government’s possibility to engage its accountability to the Chambers of Parliament on “a programme, a general policy statement or on a draft law.” Government accountability to Parliament is the consequence of the fact that the investiture of Government is performed by the legislature, and the withdrawal of confidence can only take place through a symmetrical procedure, as, by taking responsibility, the Government assumes the risk of being dismissed, if, according to par. (2) of Art. 113 of the Constitution, a vote of censure, filed within three days of the submission of the programme, of the general policy statement or of draft law, will be voted, under Art. 112 of the Basic Law. However, this institution should not be regarded, in my view, just as a way to exercise parliamentary control over the executive body. It is, above all, the expression of collaboration between the Government and the parliamentary majority, a majority the executive body relies on when deciding to establish, by means of this procedure, some measures it considers urgent and necessary to achieve its objectives. By establishing this institution, the constituent legislator conferred discretionary powers to Government, at the same time establishing “control lever”29 if the executive body turns to this procedure by excess of power. Unfortunately, even at the risk of its dismissal, 30 the Government has acted

29 Dana Apostol Tofan, Discretionary power and excess of power by public authorities, All Beck, Bucharest, 1999, p. 297 30 According to Art. 114 par. (2) of the Constitution “Government shall be dismissed if a vote of censure, filed within three days of the submission of the programme, of the general policy statement, or of the draft law, has been passed in accordance with Art. 113.”

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improperly, aggressively using this procedure for its accountability on a draft law, turning itself from an executant of legal rules into a creator of such rules. From the analysis of the constitutional text we note that the object of Government’s accountability before the legislature can be a programme, a general policy statement or a draft law. According to an opinion31 expressed in the literature, only the accountability of the Government on a programme or a general policy statements is relevant for exercising parliamentary control, while the accountability of the Government for a draft law is an action within the scope of law-making. The programme and the general policy statement are part of exclusively political acts and through its accountability along these lines, the Government seeks to strengthen confidence enjoyed in the Parliament. As regards the accountability of the Government for a draft law, it is, as the doctrine deems, an indirect legislative means for the adoption of a law, namely “not by its debate in the ordinary legislative procedure, but by debating a political issue par excellence, related to staying or dismissing the government.”32 We note that the constituent legislator, establishing Government’s accountability procedure for a draft law, wanted not to impose limits and conditions, either in terms of frequency of commitments, or in terms of the nature of the draft law, the executive body being able to take responsibility anytime and in relation to any draft law it deems important and urgent. Or, from our point of view, it is precisely this “omission” that has led to excess of power manifested by the executive body in the practice of law-making. The second stage is marked by the adoption of Law no. 429/2003, on the review of the Constitution. On the occasion of the general debates on the review of the Basic Law, the institution of Government accountability provided for in Art. 113 of the Constitution, was the object of extensive parliamentary disputes, even proposing that the phrase “draft law” be removed from the constitutional text content on the grounds that the regulation has led, in practice, to the adoption of laws which, not being subject to parliamentary debates, cannot be controlled. Despite reservations expressed on this institution, the Review Law, adopted in 2003, hasn’t brought substantial changes in this regard, the procedure for Government’s

31 I. Deleanu, Institutions and constitutional procedures in the Romanian and comparative law, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2006, p. 655 32 A. Iorgovan în M. Constantinescu, I. Deleanu, A. Iorgovan, I. Muraru, I. Vida, F. Vasilescu, Constitution of Romania commented and annotated, R. A. ,,Monitorul Oficial”, Bucharest, 1992

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accountability on a draft law being governed, in general, in the same formula, except the establishment by par. (3) of Art. 114 (former art. 113), of the right of deputies and senators to make amendments to the draft law, amendments that are to be accepted by the Government. In our opinion, the introduction of such regulation is not likely to solve the problem of excess of power manifested by the executive body in the practice of law-making; this goal would have been achieved only through the establishment, in the constitutional text, of the limitations and conditions for the exercise of this procedure. By introducing the right to make amendments in the constitutional text, we believe in full agreement with other authors33 that the issues resulting from the use of this procedure have sharpened. First, the amendments made by deputies and senators to the draft law that is the subject of commitment must be accepted by the Government, however, we will see from practice that in most cases, the executive body rejects these amendments, particularly those concerning the content of the draft laws. Another problem is raised in this context – i.e. of making amendments - in relation to the time frame available to deputies and senators to file these amendments, taking into account that the time limit for filing a vote of censure is very short, i.e. of only three days from the date of the submission of draft law in the joint session of the two Chambers. On this aspect, neither the Basic Law, nor the Regulation of joint sessions of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate contain any specification. In this regard, we propose supplementing the Regulation of joint sessions of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate, in the sense of comprising an article containing clear and precise rules on the period in which amendments may be submitted and on the period in which the Government communicates amendments accepted to the Parliament. Chap. II of Part II of the dissertation, entitled “Government accountability on a draft law. Governmental practice during 1996-2014”, is a study on governmental practice in matters of Government’s accountability for a draft law, considering two stages, namely: the first stage covers the period 1996-2003, i.e. the period prior to review of the Constitution; the second stage is marked by the Law no. 429/2003 on the revision of the Constitution and covers the period 2003-2014. The institution of Government’s accountability for a draft law, not being subject to any limitations or conditions, caused the governmental practice be characterized by excess of power.

33 Dana Apostol Tofan in I. Muraru, E. S. Tănăsescu (coord.), Constitution of Romania...op. cit. 2008, p. p. 1078- 1079

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Offices that have succeeded in government in the 20 years since the adoption of the Constitution in 1991, undertook responsibility in areas of activity of utmost importance for the country such as economics (budget, privatization, business environment), education, health, employment, labour code, civil code, penal code. In this context, the parliamentary opposition reacted to the practice of the executive body by initiating vote of censure (in nine cases the opposition initiated a vote of censure but so far no Government was dismissed as a result of the adoption of no-confidence vote initiated in the procedure laid down in Art. 114 of the Constitution). Statistics show that the largest and most important regulations of social relations result by promoting draft laws initiated by the executive body under this procedure, to the detriment of legislative proposals initiated by parliamentarians. Thus, prior to revision of the Constitution, the Government took responsibility for seven draft laws, most containing several items of regulation which aimed different areas of social life. In this period also, the executive body understood to take responsibility for a labour code also - and for an emergency ordinance, which, in our opinion, cannot be the fruit of executive body’s accountability.34 If we make a statistical analysis in relation to governments in this period, we find that: - for the period 1992-1996 - Văcăroiu government – no commitment was conducted. This government is characterized by stability as opposed to subsequent governments, resisting to four no-confidence votes initiated by the opposition and to seven government reshuffles, which have changed its composition in proportion of 50%; - in the period between 1996 and 1998, the Government took responsibility for a single draft law; - in the period between 1998 and 2000, the Government took responsibility for two draft laws at an interval of six months; - in the period between 2000 and 2004, the Government took responsibility for a number of four draft laws, of which the first at an interval of about six months after the investiture, the following two at intervals of nine months from each other, and the last one at an interval of three months compared to the third. After revision of the Constitution, the number of draft laws for which the Government took responsibility increased and the interval between two commitments decreased:

34 See, in this regard, Chap. I and II, Part II of the dissertation, devoted to governmental practice and Constitutional Court case law

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- the 2004-2008 government, three commitments were conducted, the first two being carried out at intervals of eight months from each other, and the third at an interval of one year and 8 months compared to the second; -in the period between 2008 and 2012, the Government took responsibility on a total of 16 draft laws, all filed between June 2009 and December 2011. In the period between 2009 and 2012, the procedure of Government’s accountability was used aggressively by the Government in office at the time, aiming to promote this way different draft laws, and even law packages, at short time intervals or even the same day; - in the period between 2012 and 2014, the Government took responsibility to Parliament for the two draft laws, and the period between the two commitments is eight months. The cabinet ruling in 2009-2012 is characterized by abuse of power, being the Cabinet which has assumed responsibility before Parliament and often for complex draft laws or packages of such drafts, possessing a varied, atypical regulatory object. Also, the Government in office during this period took responsibility for the draft Laws on the Civil Code and the Penal Code. According to an opinion35 expressed in the doctrine, which we consider fully justified, it is unacceptable, legally and logically, that all these draft laws be adopted by accountability of the Government. Chap. III of Part II has been entitled “Government accountability for a draft law. Constitutional Court case law.” Relating to certain criteria and conditions that the Constitutional Litigation Court itself has judicially established, on the procedure of Government’s accountability for a draft law, we found it necessary to make, in this chapter, a critical analysis of some decisions made by it, decisions through which, in my opinion, the Constitutional Court tolerated the executive body acting with abuse of power, thereby violating the constitutional provisions. Thus, the absence of a constitutional and legal framework to govern concisely and by leaving no room for varying interpretations, the institution provided by Art. 114 of the Constitution of Romania has caused the Constitutional Court establish, as constitutional litigation court and as a guarantor of the supremacy of the Constitution – through the interpretation of the Basic Law and following numerous complaints regarding the unconstitutionality of draft laws adopted through Government’s accountability - the rules governing this procedure. Analysing these rules, we will notice that they do not restrict in

35 Verginia Vedinaș, Procedural orgies, Universul Juridic, Bucharest, 2011, p. 85

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any way the discretion of the executive body, but, on the contrary, tolerate the practice of governments in this matter, as follows: 1. with reference to the nature of draft laws for which the Government took responsibility: - the Court enabled through decisions the Government to take responsibility for complex draft laws and law packages that had a heterogeneous regulatory object, sometimes even formal, subsumed to the title and which aimed at amending and supplementing a large number of laws;36 - also the constitutional litigation court allowed the executive body to take responsibility for a code which, due to its complexity, must be the fruit of parliamentary debates, in committees and plenary;37 - enabled the Government to take responsibility for an emergency ordinance,38 which, in our opinion, is a violation of both the provisions of Art. 114 of the Constitution - governing the procedure of Government’s accountability - and of the provisions of Art. 115 on legislative delegation.

2. regarding the frequency of use of the procedure, the Court allowed the Government to take responsibility on a draft law several times in the same day,39 which, in our opinion, is tolerance for abusive tendencies of the executive body; 3. the Court allowed the Government to take responsibility on a draft law in parliamentary debate at the Senate,40 being adopted with modifications by the Chamber of Deputies. Through a detailed analysis of the case-law on the subject, however we cannot lose sight of some concerns expressed by the constitutional litigation court to establish certain limitations concerning use by the executive body of accountability procedure for a draft law. Thus, during the settlement of different objection of unconstitutionality, the Court held that this law-making must be reached in extremis, only “when the adoption of the draft law in ordinary procedure or in emergency procedure is no longer possible or when Parliament’s political structure does not allow adoption of the draft law in the usual or

36 We consider, in particular, C.C.D. no. 298/2006, published in the Official Gazette no. 372 of April 28, 2006; C.C.D. no. 1557/2009, published in the Official Gazette no. 40 of January 19, 2010. 37 C.C.D. no. 24/2003, published in the Official Gazette no. 72 of February 5, 2003, which was passed by the Constitutional Court following the complaint of unconstitutionality of some articles of the Labour Code, made by 54 deputies, by letter no. 51/635 of December 13, 2002 38 C.C.D. no. 34/1998, published in the Official Gazette no. 88 of February 25, 1998 39 C.C.D. no. 1655/2010, published in the Official Gazette no. 40 of January 19, 2010 40 Draft law on national education

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emergency procedure.”41 Also, by the same decision, the Court held that “the accountability of the Government on a draft law intended it to be adopted with maximum celerity, the content of regulation aiming at establishing urgent actions in an area of maximum importance and their application must be prompt.” In this respect there is also the Decision no. 1431/2010,42 passed following the request for settlement of the constitutional legal conflict between the Romanian Parliament and Government, filed by the President of the Senate, a conflict generated by the Government’s accountability on the draft law on national education, in which the Court held that accepting the idea that the executive body may take responsibility at its discretion at any time and under any circumstances, would be tantamount to turning it into legislative public authority. In our opinion, the limitations the Constitutional Court has introduced in its case law are too general and permissive, and it thereby failed to determine a significant change in the Government’s optics for using this procedure, the abusive trend of the executive body being maintained. The misuse of this exceptional procedure may create a serious imbalance between the executive and legislative bodies, likely to affect the legislative function of Parliament. Currently the executive body increasingly tends - either by taking responsibility for a draft law, or by adopting a large number of emergency ordinances - to replace the legislature in the law-making activity. In our opinion, the revision of the Constitution must be intended to diminish the discretionary power of the Government and to strengthen the stability and supremacy of Parliament, as the sole legislative authority of the country. Chap. IV Part II, entitled “Vote of censure provided by Art. 113 of the Constitution and vote raised, governed by Art. 114 of the Constitution - comparative analysis” is a comparative study between the two constitutionally regulated procedures. Analysing the provisions of Art. 114 par. (2) of the Constitution of Romania, revised, we find that this paragraph governs the procedure for Government’s dismissal by a vote of censure - motion which, in theory, is called vote raised or forced – whose object is the programme, the general policy statement or the draft law for which the Government took responsibility. In making a comparative analysis of the constitutional conditions applicable to the two procedures that can lead to dismissal of the Cabinet – namely the vote of censure

41 C.C.D. no. 1557/2009, published in the Official Gazette no. 40 of January 19, 2010 42 C.C.D. no. 1431/2010, published in the Official Gazette no. 758 of November 12, 2010

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provided by Art. 113 of the Constitution and the vote raised governed by par. (2) of Art. 114 of the Constitution - we note that the general regulation of the vote of censure is found in Art. 113 of the Constitution, while some particular aspects of the legal institution are regulated by Art. 114 par. (2) and (3) of the Basic Law. These constitutional provisions qualify the vote of censure filed in the procedure for Government’s accountability as a motion “raised” without being distinguished in terms of legal nature and objective pursued from the vote of censure regulated by Art. 113 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court held, by Decision no. 1525/2010, that “the Constitution does not regulate two types of votes of censure, on the contrary, the vote of censure is, as a legal institution, a single one, regulated by Art. 113 of the Constitution (...).” We will also find, in this context, the existence of differences between the two constitutionally regulated institutions, differences that may derive both from the initiation context and from particularities of substantial nature, resulting from the adoption of the programme, of the general policy statement or of the draft law that are subject to Government’s accountability, if the vote of censure was rejected. In terms of initiation context, the differences between the two procedures may concern: 1. compared with the institution governed by Art. 113 of the Constitution, an article which does not contain stated reasons for which a no-confidence vote may be initiated, being considering, by analogy, that they may cover the whole activity of the executive body, Art. 114 of the Basic Law accurately establishes in par. (1) the object on which the Government may take responsibility and, consequently, the reasons to initiate a vote of censure; 2. while the motion provided by Art. 113 of the Constitution is a motion that comes from the will of MPs, the motion provided by Art. 114 par. (2) of the Basic Law is a vote raised by the Government to overcome an exceptional political or legislative situation; 3. the motion provided by Art. 113 of the Constitution is a motion that comes from the will of MPs, if it is rejected, the senators and deputies who signed it may not initiate, in the same session, another no-confidence vote. For the motion referred to in Art. 114 par. (2) of the Basic Law no limitations in terms of initiating a vote of censure were established; the motion may be initiated whenever the Government takes responsibility, namely several times every parliamentary session. Regarding certain features of substantial nature the difference between the two institutions is that the motion raised, in addition to maintaining the office of or dismissing 28

the Government – an effect of the vote of censure provided by Art. 113 - has also resulted in the acceptance or rejection by deputies and senators of a programme, a general policy statement or a draft law, as the parliamentary procedure regulated by Art. 114 of the Constitution is a complex parliamentary procedure which, although it is an act of the Government through its contents, either causes a law-making act through its effects, or entails the dismissal of the executive body. Part III of the PhD dissertation entitled “Relations between Parliament and Government in comparative law” is divided into two chapters and is a comparative study of political – parliamentary, semi-presidential and presidential – regimes, made in terms of relations established between the executive and the legislature bodies, under constitutional provisions. In Chap. I, entitled “Relations between Parliament and Government in some states in the European Union”, we particularly analysed, using the comparative method, political accountability of the executive body to the legislature. Thus, we find that there are political regimes which enshrine, besides the Cabinet’s collective responsibility, the individual responsibility which engages the responsibility of a minister for his acts and deeds.43 As regards the dismissal of the Government through a vote of censure, the Constitutions of some European states - Germany, Spain, Hungary - enshrine the constructive vote of no confidence, which consists in the obligation of the Parliament to indicate the successor of the undesirable Prime Minister to take the executive office of the state immediately and following the dismissal of the minister who lost confidence of the legislature. Government’s accountability procedure on a programme or on a general policy statement is also regulated in the Constitutions of some EU countries, irrespective of the form of the regime, be it parliamentary or semi-presidential. Thus, the Constitution of Spain regulates in Art. 112, the Prime Minister’s right to request the Chamber of Representatives, following the deliberations of the Council of Ministers, a vote of confidence on his programme or on a general policy statement, while in Portugal, art. 196 of the Constitution enshrines Government’s right to ask the Parliament for a vote of confidence on a general policy statement or on any issue of national interest.

43 For example, in the UK if a minister loses the confidence of House of Commons for political reasons, he is forced to resign.

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As regards the accountability of the Government for a draft law the French Constitution regulates in Art. 49 par. (3) the procedure for Government’s accountability on a draft law, but in a manner different from how it is regulated by Art. 114 of the Romanian Constitution, the French constituent limiting the scope of the areas that may be subject of Government’s accountability for a draft law (it is circumscribed only to draft laws in public finance or social security system financing) and in the period of time during which one can use such a procedure, namely in a single parliamentary session, for only one draft law of the Government or of a member of the Government. Also in Italy, the Constitution enshrines the right of the Government to take responsibility before either Chamber of Parliament for a draft law, an amendment or a government decision, requiring a vote of confidence from the legislative body. Chap. II of Part III entitled “Relations between the executive and the legislative powers in other countries of the world” is an analysis of presidential constitutional regimes, in relation to the US constitutional system which is a clear example in this respect. The characteristic of the US system is the absence of a collective body, like European governments, as the prerogatives of the executive power are entrusted to the President of the Republic, who performs them using the ministers, heads of ministerial departments and presidential advisers. The presidential regimes are characterized by strict and by no means flexible separation, between the three traditional powers. In this type of system, the legislative and executive bodies relate less and accountability of ministers is individually taken before the President of the Republic who is also the one to appoint them. In the presidential regimes the executive body is not politically accountable to the legislature. This doctoral dissertation comprises a section of Conclusions and Proposals of lex ferenda, proposals which regard both the review of the Basic Law and the amendment and supplementation of certain legal acts governing the relations between Parliament and Government. The proposals to review the Constitution we formulated are considering the constitutional provisions which govern the institutions subject of our research, as follows: I. on the institution of President of Romania our proposal is mainly; 1. to change the method for the election of the President of Romania, in the sense of regulating his election either directly by the Parliament or by his election by a Representative Assembly which would include representatives of the citizens of the administrative - territorial units and members of Parliament. We therefore 30

propose converting the semi-presidential regime currently established by constitutional provisions in a parliamentary regime; 2. to return to the 4 years mandate, the current trend at European level being to reduce the term of office of the head of state; 3. regarding the conditions of dissolution of Parliament provided for in Art. 89 of the Constitution, we believe that the dissolution of Parliament must still remain President’s responsibility he can exercise as a head of state. Related to this article, we propose the amendment of the provisions relating to the dissolution of Parliament, in order to reduce the period of 60 days, during which the President of Romania may dissolve the legislature, to half term, i.e. 30 days; 4. regarding the Government’s investiture procedure provided for in Art. 85 of the Constitution we propose the amendment of the constitutional provisions, for the purpose of introducing regulations which establish the obligation to the President of Romania to appoint as Prime Minister the nominee of the majority party or, in the absence of a majority party, of the coalition of parties represented in Parliament: II. on the provisions of Art. 113 of the Constitution, governing the institution of the vote of censure, our proposal is to amend it for the purpose of streamlining the relationships between Parliament and Government, by introducing provisions to govern the constructive vote of no confidence; III. on Government’s accountability institution we propose the supplementation of the constitutional text in the sense of introducing provisions likely to set limitations and conditions on the accountability of the Government for a draft law.

Relating to the amendment and supplementation of some legal acts containing provisions on relations between Parliament and Government, we considered the Law no. 90/2001 on the organization and functioning of the Government and ministries, republished and the Regulation of joint meetings of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate. In this regard, we propose that Law no. 90/2001 contain an entire chapter to be devoted to jurisdiction in “issue laws” granted to Government by the Basic Law, a chapter covering two sections, one reserved for ordinances - to expressly define the phrase “extraordinary situations” - and the second to refer to the adoption by the Government of draft laws, by the procedure of its accountability to the legislature. This requires a 31

specific regulation relating to how this procedure is exercised, limitations of its exercise, limitations which may be related to the frequency of use of the procedure and the nature of the draft law which is subject of commitment. Regarding the Regulation of joint meetings of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate, our proposal is to supplement it, namely to introduce explicit regulations on the period in which the deputies and senators may submit amendments to draft laws for which the Government takes responsibility.

REFERENCES

1. Treaties, courses, monographs 1.1 Romanian authors

Alexandru Ioan, Ivanov I. V, Gillia C, European political and administrative systems, Bibliotheca, Târgoviște, 2007 Alexandru Ioan, Cărăușan Mihaela, Bucur Sorin, Administrative law, 3rd edition revised and enlarged, Universul Juridic, Bucharest, 2009 Alexandru Ioan, European administrative law, Universul Juridic, Bucharest, 2008 Almaș Dumitru, The fall of the Bastille, Pages of world history, Tineretului, Bucharest, 1959 Apostol Tofan Dana, Discretionary power and excess of power by public authorities, All Beck, Bucharest, 1999 Apostol Tofan Dana, Administrative law, vol. I, 3rd edition, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2014 Constantinescu M, Iorgovan A, Muraru I, Deleanu I, Vasilescu F, Vida I, Constitution of Romania, commented and annotated, R. A. „ Monitorul Oficial”, Bucharest, 1992 Călinoiu Constanța, Duculescu V, Comparative constitutional law, Lumina Lex, Bucharest, 2006 Călinoiu Constanța, Duculescu V, Parliamentary law, Lumina Lex, Bucharest, 2006 Dănișor D. C, Constitution of Romania commented. Title I. General principles, Universul Juridic, Bucharest, 2009 Deleanu I, Institutions and constitutional procedures in the Romanian and comparative law, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2006

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Dima Bogdan, The conflict between Palaces. Relations between Parliament, Government and President in post-communist Romania, Hamangiu, Bucharest, 2014 Drăganu Tudor, Constitutional law and political institutions, Basic Treatise, Lumina Lex, Bucharest, 1998 Duculescu V, Călinoiu C, Duculescu G, Comparative law; vol. I, Lumina Lex, Bucharest, 2007 Enache Marian, Parliamentary control, Polirom, Iași, 1998 Fuerea Augustin, European Community law, All Beck, Bucharest, 2003 Ionescu Cristian, Constitutional law and political institutions, summary course, Hamangiu, Bucharest, 2012 Ionescu Cristian, Constitution of Romania commented and annotated with parliamentary debates and Constitutional Court case law, Universul Juridic, Bucharest, 2012 Ionescu Cristian, Contemporary constitutional law treatise, 2nd edition, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2008 Iorgovan Antonie, Administrative law treatise, vol. I and II, 4th edition, All Beck, Bucharest, 2005 Iorgovan Antonie, Constitutional law and political institutions. General theory, Galeriile J. L. Calderon, Bucharest, 1994 Iorgovan Antonie, Odyssey of Constitution drafting, Ed. Uniunii Vatra Românească, Târgu Mureș, 1998 Iancu Gheorghe, Constitutional law and political institutions, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2010 Muraru Ioan, Tănăsescu E. Simina, (coordinators), Constitution of Romania, Comment by articles, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2008 Muraru Ioan, Tănăsescu E. S, Constitutional law and political institutions, 10th edition revised and supplemented, Lumina Lex, Bucharest, 2002 Muraru Ioan, Constantinescu M, Tănăsescu Simina, Enache Marian, Iancu Gheorghe, Interpretation of the Constitution. Doctrine and practice, Lumina Lex, Bucharest, 2002 Muraru Ioan, Constantinescu M, Romanian parliamentary law, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2005 Muraru Ioan, Tănăsescu E. S, Constitutional law and political institutions, 13th edition, vol. II, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2009 Negulescu Paul, Romanian constitutional law course, edited by Th. Doicescu, Bucharest, 1927 33

Negulescu Paul, Alexianu George, Public law treatise, vol. I, Casa Școalelor, Bucharest, 1942 Preda Mircea, Vasilescu Benonica, Administrative law. Special part, updated edition, Lumina Lex, Bucharest, 2007 Prisăcaru Valentin, Romanian administrative law treatise. General Part, 3rd edition revised and enlarged by author, Lumina Lex, Bucharest, 2002 Santai I, Administrative law and administration science, vol. I, Risoprint, Cluj-Napoca, 2002 Tomescu Camelia-Rodica, Relations between Government and Parliament, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2012 Trăilescu Anton, Administrative law, 4th edition, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2010 Vida I, Executive power and public administration, R. A. ,,Monitorul Oficial”, Bucharest, 1994 Vedinaș Verginia, Administrative law, 8th edition revised and updated, Universul Juridic, Bucharest, 2014 Vedinaș Verginia, Procedural orgies, Universul Juridic, Bucharest, 2011 Vedinaș Verginia, Civil service regulations (Law no. 188/1999, as amended and supplemented). Comments, doctrine, legislation, case law, Universul Juridic, Bucharest, 2009 Vrabie Genoveva, Constitutional law and political institutions, 5th edition, revised and complemented, vol. I, Cugetarea, Iași, 1999 Vrabie Genoveva, The political and state-driven organization of Romania. Constitutional law and political institutions, vol. II, 3rd edition, revised and re-complemented, “Moldova” Culture and Science Foundation, Iași, Cugetarea, Bucharest, 1999 Vrabie Genoveva, The political and state-driven organization of Romania, European Institute, Iași, 2004

1.2 Foreign authors

Andrews Cf. Robert, The Concise Columbia Dictionary of Quotations, Columbia University Press, New York, 1989 Avril Pierre, Giquel Jean, Droit parlamentaire, 3-ed Edition, Ed. Montchrestien, Paris, 2004 Avril Pierre, Giquel Jean, Droit parlamentaire, 2 edition, Ed. Montchrestien, Paris, 1996

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Abscarian Gilbert, Massant S. George, Contemporary Political System. An Introduction to Government, Charles Scribner’Sons, New York, 1970 Birch H. Anthony, The British of Government, Allen and vewin, London, 1987 Cadoux Charles, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques, vol. I, Cujas, Paris, 1973 Chalvidan Henri Pierre, Droit constitutionnel. Institutions et regimes politiques, Nouvelle edition, Ed. Nathan Universite, Paris, 1996 Carey J. M, Shugart M. S, (coord), Calling out the tanks fillingout the forms? in Executive Decree, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1998 et Duez, Barthelemy, Precis elementaire de droit constitutionnel, Paris, 1926 Duhamels Oliver, Meny Yves, Dictionnaire constitutionnel, P.U.F. Paris, 1992 Duhamels Oliver, Les democraties, Seuil, Paris, 1995 Duguit L, Lecons de droit politique general, Paris, 1926 Debbasch Charles, Bourdon Jaques, Pontier Jean-Marie, Ricci Jean-Claude, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politique, 4-e edition, Ed. Economica, Paris, 2001 Fischer L, Constitutionnal Conflicts betwen Congress and the President, Princeton University, New Jersey, 1985 Fornet M. F, Le sistem politique des Etats Unis, P.U.F, Paris, 1987 Godechot J, Les constitutions de la France depuis 1789, Flammarion, Paris, 1995 Haurion A, Droit constitutionnel et institutions politique, Ed. Montchrestien, Paris, 1968 Harris R. Fred, Haim L. Paul, America’s Legislative Process; Congress and the State, Scott, Foresman and Co, Glenview, Illinois, 1983 Killian H. Johnny (editor), The Constitution of Washington D. C, New York, 1987 Locke J, Second Treatise on Government, Nemira, Bucharest, 1999 Montesquieu, The spirit of the laws, vol. I, Ed. Științifică, Bucharest, 1964 Mill J. S, On liberty, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1994 Pactet Pierre, Institutions politiques. Droit constitutionnel, 22-ed, Armand Colin, Paris, 2003 Pactet Pierre, Institutions politique. Droit constitutionnel, Paris, Armand Colin, 16-ed, 1997 Pactet Pierre, Institutions politiques. Droit constitutionnel, Mason, Paris, 1983 Prelot M, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, Dalloz, Paris, 1972 Rials S, Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, Polirom, Iași, 2002 Russell Bertrand, Political Ideals, Barns and Noble, New York, 1963

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Smith S. Steven, Deering J. Cristhopher, Commitees in Congress, Congresional Quarterly Inc. Washington D.C, 1990 Toinet M. F, Le systeme politique des Etats-Unis, P.U.F. Paris, 1987 Trevelyan G. M, Illustrated History of England, Științifică, Bucharest, 1975 Troper M, La separation des pouvoirs et L’histoire constitutionnelle francaise, L.G.D.J. Paris, 1980 Touchard, J, Histoire des idees politique, vol. I, Paris, 1978 de la Villeneuve, Marcel, La fin du principe de separation du pouvoire, Sirey, Paris. 1934

2. Studies, articles

Apostol Tofan Dana, Constitutional relations between public authorities, article published in SDR no. 1-2 / 2003, p. 83 Apostol Tofan Dana, Reviews and solutions on Government regulation in view of the revision of the Basic Law, article published in the RDP no. 1/2013 p. 72 Apostol Tofan Dana, Government accountability in RDP no. 1/2001, pp. 4-21 Apostol Tofan Dana, Implications of revision of the Constitution on the relations between Parliament and Government in SDR no. 3-4/2004, pp. 355-372 Apostol Tofan Dana, Case law commented. Constitutional Court, Decision no. 871/2010, Decision no. 872/2010, Decision no. 873/2010, Decision no. 874/2010, in Curierul Judiciar no. 7/2010, p. 391-396 Apostol Tofan Dana, Case law commented: Education law. Constitutional legal conflict between the Romanian Parliament and Government. Constitutional Court Decisions no. 1431/2010; no. 1525/2010, in Curierul Judiciar no. 1/2011, p. 27-35 Apostol Tofan Dana, Tănăsescu Elena Simina, Government Emergency Ordinance. Legislative delegation. Exceptional situations. Law approving the emergency ordinance. Decisional Chamber. The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Preventive control. Extrinsic control, in Curierul Judiciar no. 10/2005, p. 25-33 Brad Ion Inadmissibility of promoting by Government Emergency Ordinance provisions of the content of draft laws adopted by Government’s accountability in Dreptul no. 7/2006, p. 100 Cârstea V, Conditions set out in Art. 115 par. (4) of the Constitution for the adoption of emergency ordinances of the Government, in RDP no. 1/2005, p. 48-50. 36

Deleanu Ion, Revision of the Constitution. Themes of review, RDP no. 2/2003, p. 35-53 Drilea M, Balance of powers, keystone in social and state organization, in Legea și viața no. 1/2008 Duţu Mircea, Revision of the Constitution; tradition, integration, modernization, in RDP no. 1/2013, p. 33 Enache Marian, Vote of censure, in SDR no. 1-2 / 1998, p. 71-82 Guţan Manuel, Relations between President, Government and Parliament in view of the revision of the Constitution of Romania, in RDP no. 1/2013 Ionescu Cristian, Foundations and essence of political relations between Parliament and Government in the Romanian constitutional system, in Curierul Judiciar no. 3, 2012, p. 159- 160 Ionescu Cristian, Analysis of theoretical and political foundation of parliamentary control. Comparative law study in RDP no. 3/2 2006, p. 8-26 Ionescu Cristian, Some reflections on art. 111 of the Constitution of Romania, republished in Curierul Judiciar no. 2/2011, p. 95-98 Iorgovan Antonie, Apostol Tofan Dana, Legislative delegation in Romania, article in RDP no. 1/2001, p. 70-71 Massot Jean, Le presidence de la Republique en France, Notes et Etudes Documentaires, no. 4343-4347 1976 Mironescu G. G, Innovations of Constitution of 1938, in the Annals of the Faculty of Law, University of Bucharest, no. 2-3/1939, p. 23-24 Nica C, Political and legal perspective of the Constitution of Romania. On the fundamental institutions of power in Revista de Științe Politice și Relații Internaționale no. 2/2009, p. 18- 20 Oprican Mariana, Principle of separation of powers - evolution and relevance, in the Magazine of “Titu Maiorescu” University, Faculty of Law, entitled Legislative policy between European, national and international regulation. New perspectives of law, published on the occasion of the International Conference on Law, European Studies and International Relations, Bucharest May 24-25, 2013, Hamangiu, Bucharest, 2013, p. 676-687 Oprican Mariana, Vote of censure in parliamentary practice, article published in the Magazine of “Titu Maiorescu” University, Faculty of Law, entitled The role of Europe in a polarized society, published on the occasion of the International Conference on Law, European Studies and International Relations, Bucharest May 9-10, 2014 organized by the

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“Titu Maiorescu” University, Romanian Association of Law and European Affairs, Hamangiu, Bucharest, 2014, p. 899-908 Oprican Mariana, Some aspects of the general features of Government’s accountability procedure resulting from the Constitutional Court case law, in Revista de Drept Public no. 3/2014, p. 93-100 Riteș Laura, Motion, a Parliament control instrument over Government’s activity in Studii și Cercetări Juridice no. 1/2012, p. 79-87 Safta Marieta, Benke Karoly, The compulsoriness of considerations of Constitutional Court decisions, in Dreptul no. 9/2010, p. 10-14 Stan Valeriu, A brief history of Senate, study, Parliamentary Studies Center, Information and documentation, The Senate. A fundamental institution of the modern Romanian state, Government Business Enterprise “Official Gazette”, coordinator Alexandru Dumitrescu, Bucharest, 2000 Varga A, Assumption of responsibility by the Government, a special procedure for law- making and control in On Constitution and constitutionalism, Liber amicorum Ioan Muraru, Hamangiu, Bucharest, 2006, p. 221-237 Vasilescu F, Considerations on the current political regime of Romania, in Revue Francais de Droit Constitutional no. 23/1995, p. 480 Vasilescu F, Considerations on parliamentary control in comparative law, in Studii de Drept Românesc no. 1-2 / 1996, p. 115-124 Vedinaş Verginia, Priorities of Constitution revision in terms of public administration regulation, in RDP no. 1/2013 Vedinaş Verginia, A critical approach on the GEO no. 77/2013 regarding some measures for ensuring the functioning of local public administration, the number of posts and reduction of expenses in public institutions and authorities subordinated, under the authority or coordination of the Government or ministries, article published in volume Rule of law between reality and goal, volume published in honorem prof. univ. dr. Momcilo Luburici, Universul Juridic, Bucharest, 2014 Verginia Vedinaş Lazăr Rozalia Ana, Constitutionality control of administrative acts in Juridica no. 8/2000, p. 300-303 Vida Ioan The compulsoriness of Constitutional Court decisions for courts – a stability factor of the Constitution and of judicial practice in Pendectele Române no. 3/2004, p. 198

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Vrabie Genoveva, Interpretation of constitutional texts governing relations between President of Romania and Government and the practical consequences of absence of a unified concept in this area in RDP no. 2/2008 Vrabie Genoveva, Renaissance of separation of powers theory in Romania, in SDR no. 3- 4/1991 Vrabie Genoveva, Criticism on the constitutional texts by some European structures and possible objectives of a future constitutional reform, article in RDP no. 1/2013, p. 55 Vrabie Genoveva, The case law of the Constitutional Court of Romania and diversity of positions taken by professionals in law to some solutions adopted by it in Curierul Judiciar no. 1/2012, p. 39-43 Warwick Paul, Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies, articles, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 182

1. Legislation

Law no. 90/2001 on the organization and functioning of the Romanian Government and ministries, republished, with subsequent amendments and supplements Regulation of joint meetings of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate, approved by Parliament Decision no. 4/1992, published in the Official Gazette no. 34 of March 4, 1992 Parliament Decision no. 55/2013 amending and supplementing the Regulation of joint meetings of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate, approved by Resolution no. 4/1992, published in the Official Gazette no. 394-396 of July 1, 2013 Constitution of Romania adopted on December 8, 1991 and revised by Law no. 429/2003, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 758 of October 29, 2003 Constitution of the French Republic, adopted on October 4, 1958, which underwent 17 amendments and which was recently revised by Law no. 2008-724 of July 23, 2008 Constitution of Spain adopted by the Constituent Assembly on December 27, 1978 Constitution of Italy, adopted on December 22, 1947 by the Constituent Assembly, which entered into force on January 1, 1948 Constitution of Belgium, adopted in 1831 and revised, with its last review in 1994 Constitution of Turkey, adopted on November 7, 1982 39

Constitution of Germany, adopted by the Parliamentary Council on May 23, 1949 Documents of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Irelant - Magna Charta (1215), The Petition of Rights (1628), Habeas Corpus Act (1679), Bill of Rights (1689) Act of Settlement (1701), Parliament Act (1911) US Constitution adopted in 1787 by the United States Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and which entered into force on March 4, 1789 Constitution of Romania of 1866, published in the Official Journal of Romania no. 142 of July 1/13, 1866 Constitution of Romania of 1923, published in the Official Gazette no. 282 of March 29, 1923 Constitution of Romania of 1938, published in the Official Gazette Part I, no. 48 of February 27, 1938 Constitution of Romania of 1948, published in the Official Gazette Part I, no. 87 bis of April 13, 1948 Constitution of Romanian People’s Republic of 1952 published in the Official Gazette of the Grand National Assembly of the Romanian People’s Republic no. 1 of September 27, 1952 Constitution of Romania of 1965, republished by Official Bulletin no. 65 of October 29, 1986 Parliament Decision no. 36/2009, published in the Official Gazette no. 692 of October 14, 2009

2. Case law of the Constitutional Court of Romania

C.C.D. no. 6/1992, published in the Official Gazette no. 48 of March 4, 1992 C.C.D. no. 271/1993, published in the Official Gazette no. 163 of July 15, 1993 C.C.D. no. 9/1994, published in the Official Gazette no. 326 of November 25, 1994 C.C.D. no. 46/1994, published in the Official Gazette no. 131 of May 27, 1994 C.C.D. no. 45/1994, published in the Official Gazette no. 131 of May 27, 1994 C.C.D. no. 65/1994, published in the Official Gazette no. 156 of June, 22 1994 C.C.D. no. 102/1995, published in the Official Gazette no. 287 of 1995 C.C.D. no. 34/1998, published in the Official Gazette no. 88 of February 25, 1998 C.C.D. no. 95/1998, published in the Official Gazette no. 260 of July 13, 1998 40

C.C.D. no. 28/1999, published in the Official Gazette no. 178 of April 26, 1999 C.C.D. no. 233/1999, published in the Official Gazette no. 638 of December 28, 1999 C.C.D. no. 55/2001, published in the Official Gazette no. 128 of March 14, 2001 C.C.D. no. 24/2003, published in the Official Gazette no. 72 of February 5, 2003 C.C.D. no. 147/2003, published in the Official Gazette no. 279 of April 21, 2003 C.C.D. no. 463/2003, published in the Official Gazette no. 43 of January 19, 2004 C.C.D. no. 317/2006, published in the Official Gazette no. 446 of May 23, 2006 C.C.D. no. 664/2005, published in the Official Gazette no. 1149 of December 19, 2005 C.C.D. no. 225/2005, published in the Official Gazette no. 511 of January 16, 2005 C.C.D. no. 375/2005, published in the Official Gazette no. 591 of July 8, 2005 C.C.D. no. 419/2005, published in the Official Gazette no. 653 of July 22, 2005 C.C.D. no. 44/2006, published in the Official Gazette no. 178 of February 24, 2006 C.C.D. no. 637/2006, published in the Official Gazette no. 914 of November 9, 2006 C.C.D. no. 258/2006, published in the Official Gazette no. 341 of April 17, 2006 C.C.D. no. 286/2006, published in the Official Gazette no. 372 of April 22, 2006 C.C.D. no. 298/2006, published in the Official Gazette no. 372 of April 28, 2006 C.C.D. no. 148/2007, published in the Official Gazette no. 162 of March 7, 2007 C.C.D. no. 1177/2007, published in the Official Gazette no. 871 of December 20, 2007 C.C.D. no. 1205/2009, published in the Official Gazette no. 689 din October 13, 2009 C.C.D. no. 1008/2009, published in the Official Gazette no. 507 of July 23, 2009 C.C.D. no. 1415/2009, published in the Official Gazette no. 796 of November 23, 2009 C.C.D. no. 1295/2009, published in the Official Gazette no. 689 of October 13, 2009 C.C.D. no. 1451/2009, published in the Official Gazette no. 796 of November 23, 2009 C.C.D. no. 871/2010, published in the Official Gazette no. 433 of June 28, 2010 C.C.D. no. 872/2010, published in the Official Gazette no. 433 of June 28, 2010 C.C.D. no. 873/2010, published in the Official Gazette no. 433 of June 28, 2010 C.C.D. no. 874/2010, published in the Official Gazette no. 433 of June 28, 2010

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C.C.D. no. 1431/2010, published in the Official Gazette no. 758 of November 12, 2010 C.C.D. no. 1525/2010, published in the Official Gazette no. 818 of December 7, 2010 C.C.D. 1557/2009, published in the Official Gazette no. 40 of January 19, 2010 C.C.D. no. 1655/2010, published in the Official Gazette no. 5 of January 20, 2011 C.C.D. no. 2/2011, published in the Official Gazette no. 136 of February 23, 2011 C.C.D. no. 1665/2010, published in the Official Gazette no. 51 of January 20, 2011 C.C.D. no. 799/2011, published in the Official Gazette no. 440 of June 23, 2011 C.C.D. no. 51/2012, published in the Official Gazette no. 90 of February 3, 2012 C.C.D. no. 1/2014, published in the Official Gazette no. 123 of February 19, 2014 C.C.D. no. 80/2014, published in the Official Gazette no. 246 of April 7, 2014

3. Internet sources http://wwwcdep.ro/motiuni/2007/1005.pdf wwwmonitoruloficial.ro http://studia.law.ubbcluj.ro/articol.php?articolld=242,ArticoleStudia

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