Memorandum for General Handy;

#5-128 Memorandum for General Handy; General Eaker; General Hull May 11, 1945 [Washington, D.C.] Top Secret

SUBJECT: Venezia-Giulia area.1

I have just had a conference with the President on the subject of Alexander’s last message regarding his negotiations with Tito, followed by a discussion conducted by the President with the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Phillips, and Admiral Leahy.2 It was the decision that a draft of a dispatch to our diplomatic representative in Belgrade should be prepared for presentation to Tito’s Government, stating in forcible terms the situation, the Allied rights and the Allied intentions (not implying shooting) and indicating the effect of the loss to Tito of the support in many ways of the British and American Governments. This draft to be proposed to Mr. Churchill for similar action by the British Government and when that decision is reached that Russia be informed.3 Meanwhile, Admiral Leahy stated, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would prepare a proposed instruction to Field Marshal Alexander stating the transfer of pressure from military to a high governmental level and giving him any instructions that seem appropriate. It is on this last that I request action.4

Document Copy Text Source: George C. Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office Collection, Selected Materials, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia. Document Format: Typed memorandum.

1. Venezia Giulia was the four-province region of northeastern Italy that lay between the 1914 border with Austria-Hungary and the 1939 boundary with Yugoslavia. Except for Italian majorities in the coastal region facing the Italian peninsula (including the key port of Trieste), the population was largely Slavic. The Allies in Italy were aware by July 1944 that Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito’s forces were already in the area and intended to seize Venezia Giulia when the Germans surrendered. In late April and early May 1945, the issue of who would occupy this disputed region came to a head. The British and American governments insisted that, pending a peace settlement, only their forces occupy the region within Italy’s 1939 borders. Tito would not agree to this, but Field Marshal Alexander (Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean) sought a compromise that would protect Allied communications and supply lines through the region to Austria.

On May 2 Tito announced that his forces would occupy the area up to the Isonzo River. The following day British forces seized the port and old town Trieste; Tito’s troops already occupied the rest of the city and most of the disputed area. On May 7 the Combined Chiefs of Staff permitted Alexander to seek a local military compromise regarding occupation areas that would protect his supply lines and avoid an armed confrontation between Allied and Yugoslav forces. (Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, a volume in the United States Army in World War II [Washington: GPO, 1964], pp. 587–98; Foreign Relations, 1945, 4: 1103–45.)

2. In his memorandum on the White House meeting, Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew noted: “General Marshall felt the importance of a strong joint communication to the Yugoslav Government by the American and British diplomatic representatives in Belgrade before General Alexander was given any definite instructions with regard to action.” (Foreign Relations, 1945, 4: 1155.) William Phillips was special assistant to the secretary of state.

3. For the communications between Truman and Churchill and the agreed final text— delivered to the Yugoslav government on May 14—see ibid., pp. 1156–62.

4. In a subsequent memorandum for Admiral Leahy, Marshall said that militarily the United States had “no interest in the Venezia-Giulia area,” but “for political reasons the U.S. has now committed themselves to a joint occupation force in the Trieste-Isonzo area and hence will be militarily involved in any difficulties in that area.” Nevertheless, “from the military standpoint, it is vital that no hostilities should break out in this area. Even minor shooting might grow into a conflagration which would spread open the whole area of contact between the Yugoslavs and ourselves at the head of the Adriatic and might reasonably gravely involve us with the Russians. The next step appears to be to stand our ground militarily, with our forces disposed much as they are, while the U.S. and British governments bring the strongest political pressure on Tito.” (Marshall Memorandum for Admiral Leahy, May 11, 1945, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Pentagon Office, Selected].) For further developments, see Marshall to Eisenhower, May 16, 1945, Papers of George Catlett Marshall, #5-139 [5: 193–94].

Recommended Citation: The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 5, “The Finest Soldier,” January 1, 1945–January 7, 1947 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 182–183.