Sulh :ACrucialPartofIslamicArbitration

AseelAlRamahi LSELaw,SocietyandEconomyWorkingPapers12/2008

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AseelAlRamahiS ulh:ACrucialPartofIslamicArbitration

1 Sulh :ACrucialPartofIslamicArbitration

AseelAlRamahi *

Abstract: Arbitration and amicable settlement ( sulh ) have a long history within Arab and Islamic societies and have their roots in preIslamicArabia.Sulhisthepreferredresultand processinanyformofdisputeresolution.Further,arbitrationisfavouredtoadjudicationin Islamic jurisprudence. In tribal and Islamic cultures, the overarching objective in conflict settlementiscollectivity.Groupsolidarityisexploredinthispaperanditseffectondispute resolutionisexamined.ThepaperlooksatthedifferencesbetweenEastandWestandshows thattheEasternpartyhasanintrinsiccommunityandacollectiveattitudetoconflictwhereas the Western party is individually minded and procedurally orientated, thus causing friction betweenthetwosides.Thedistinctionsbetweenthemrelatetotheperceptionsofconflict,the formationofprocedureandthestatusandfunctionofthethirdpartyintervener.International commercialarbitrationissufficientlyequippedtoaccommodatethosetwonormsifitisused effectively.

INTRODUCTION ‘Topursuealawsuitistogambleonvictory.Toelectconciliationis to seek fairness. Victories undermine relationships. Fairness strengthensthem.Thosewhobuildforthelongtermwoulddowell tochooseconciliation ’ Honourable Eliot Richardson, in a publication of the EuroArab ArbitrationSystem The normative foundations of contractual relationships and dispute resolution mechanisms in the East differ substantially from those underpinning the

*PhDCandidate,LSELawDepartment.Pleasedirectcommentsto:a.al[email protected].Iamindebted toProf.SimonRoberts,DrDavidKershaw,PramodReddyandDavidHicksforcommentsonearlier draftsofthispaper. 1AmicableSettlement.

1 12/2008 international commercial arbitration model. Thus, if the foreign investor and counsel fail to comprehend the religious and cultural underpinnings supporting commercialarbitrationintheIslamicMiddleEast,theymaywellfindthemselves in a dispute resolution system that is partially inaccessible, and laden with ambiguityanduncertainty. Business relations in the Arab world are not matters onlygovernedbythe generalprinciplesoflawandofcontractinaworldapartfromhomeandfamily. They are a segment of the whole web of friendship, kinship obligations, and personalrelationsthatsupportaparticularwayoflife.Dueprocessoflaw,sanctity ofcontract,andfreeenterprisebasedonpurelyindividualrightsneverbecamethe sacred trinities that they became in the West. Whereas, westerners know the primacyoflaw,theArabsknowtheprimacyofinterpersonalrelationships.Arab commercial relationships are “relational” in the same sense that western commercialrelationshipsare“legal.”Thus,leadingtotheparadoxthattheWest hasconceptionsofdiscreetboundednotionsofcontractwhereastheArabshave fluidandmultilayerednotionsofthesame. Dispute resolutions in the Middle East are guided with an overarching principle of collective interests of the family, the tribe, the community and the country. The Arab’s Islamic and tribal history places collective interest as the highestprincipleinahierarchyofvaluesinbothdisputeresolutionandeveryday dealings. The maintenance of relationships and therestoration of harmonyis a dutyonallmembersofthegroupaswellasthethirdpartyintervener,whetherhe beajudge(a qadi ),anarbitrator(a hakam )o raconciliator.Therefore,collective interests and sulh (amicable settlement) are the cores of any dispute resolution system in in order to maintain the ties of family, brotherhood, and community. TheMiddleEastisinfluencedbythetextuallanguageandinterpretationof boththeKoranandthe Sunna .ThisisbecauseIslamisnotjustareligion,itisa way of life. Din —the Arabic word for religion, ‘. . . encompasses theology, scripture,politics,morality,law,justice,andallotheraspectsofliferelatingtothe thoughtsoractionsofmen...itisnotthatreligiondominatesthelifeofafaithful Moslem,butthatreligion...ishislife.’2AdistinctfeatureofIslamisthecodified set of rules and regulations that regulate and control society in its behavioural aspectsaswellasinitsrelationstowardsthestate.Islamincludesajusteconomic order,awellbalancedsocialorganisationandcodesofcivilandcriminallaws.The fundamentalsof (Islamiclaw)containtwoparts;firstrulesgoverning ibadat (devotionofrituals)whicharelegislatedbyGodandexplainedbytheProphet, andsecondruleswhichgovern,forexample,civiltransactionsandstateaffairs. Thefocusofthispaperis‘thedutytoreconcile’imposedonallMuslims.S ulh is a settlement grounded upon compromise negotiated by the disputants themselvesorwiththehelpofathirdparty.InIslam,itisethicallyandreligiously

2 D.S. Roberts, Islam: A Westerner’s GuideFrom Business and the Law to Social Customs and Family Life (London:Hamlyn,1981)6768.

2 AseelAlRamahiS ulh:ACrucialPartofIslamicArbitration the superior way for disputants faced with conflict. Sulh is also a duty on any personwhoisadjudicatingbetweentheconflictingparties,whetherajudge( qadi ) or an arbitrator ( hakam ). Sulh is a legal instrument intended not only for the purposeofprivateconciliationamongindividualsandgroupsinlieuoflitigation;it isalsotheproceduraloptionthatcouldberesortedtobya qadi withinthecontext ofhiscourtroomora hakam inhisconferenceroom.Thus, Sulh ispartofevery disputeresolutionmechanisminIslam. This paper also traces the validity of arbitration in Sharia and clarifies its conciliatorynature.Arbitrationisdefinedin Sharia as‘twopartieschoosingajudge to resolve their dispute and their claim. Traditionally, the differences between arbitration and formal dispute resolution through judiciary... is the parties themselves select the arbitrator and ... the parties themselves must voluntarily acceptandobeythedecisionofthearbitrator’3.Likeajudge,anarbitratorinIslam imposes his will on the parties based on the arguments presented before him, Sharia anditsprinciples. Inthelastsectionofthischapter,theIslamiccollectiveandconciliatoryform ofarbitrationiscontrastedwiththeindividualcultureoftheWestanditsdispute resolution. In many ways, the international commercial arbitration model is distinguishablefromthenormsoftheMiddleEasterndisputeresolution,which willbeexplorelaterinthispaper. PRE-ISLAMIC SULH AND ARBITRATION

The Arabian Peninsula was populated by tribes who claimed descent from a commonancestor.Itwastothetribeasawholethatindividual’sowedallegiance anditwasfromthetribethatprotectionofinterestswasobtained.Thetribewas boundbyabodyofunwrittenrules,whichhadevolvedalongwiththehistorical growthofthetribeitselfasamanifestationofitsspiritandcharacter.Noonehad thelegislativepowertointerferewiththissystemandtherewasanabsenceofany officialorganisationfortheadministrationofthelaw.Enforcementofthelawwas generallytheresponsibilityoftheprivateindividualwhohadsufferedinjury.Tribal justicewasadministeredbythechiefofthetribeinaformadaptedtotheirwayof lifewhichusedarbitrationandconciliationextensively. 4Triballawisbuiltupon two basic principles: (1) the principle of collective responsibility; and (2) the principleofretributionorcompensation.Theobjectiveoftriballawisnotmerely topunishtheoffenderbuttorestoretheequilibriumbetweentheoffendingand theoffendedfamiliesandtribes. 5

3H.Mahassini,‘GeneralPrinciplesofIslamicLawrelatingtoInternationalcommercialarbitration’(1992) 3(1) TheICCInternationalCourtofArbitrationBulletin,SpecialSupplement,21,23. 4ibid 31. 5R.Patai, TheKingdomofJordan (Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1958).

3 12/2008 Sulh , or conciliation and peacemaking, is a practice that predated Islam. WithintheframeworkoftribalArabsociety,chieftains( sheikh s),soothsayersand healers( kuhhān ),andinfluentialnoblemenplayedanindispensableroleasarbiters inalldisputeswithinthetribeorbetweenrivaltribes.Theauthorityandstatureof thosemenservedassanctionsfortheirverdicts. 6Thedecisionofthe hakam was finalbutnotlegallyenforceable.Itwasanauthoritativestatementastowhatthe customarylawwasorshouldbeandlaterofIslamicprinciples.Infact,Schacht referstoa hakam insuchsituationsas‘alawmaker,anauthoritativeexpounderof thenormativelegalcustomorsunna.’7Themainobjectiveofthesethirdparties wasconciliationandthemaintenanceofharmony.Somearbitratorswouldgotoa greatextenttoproducethenecessarycompensationorinducementoutoftheir ownpocketsinordertopersuadethefeudingpartiestoagreetoa sulh .8 Thesonsofthetribesweresocialisedtorefertotheirleadersinordertohelp themresolvedisputes.Thiswasbuiltintotheirattitudesfromanearlyage.The youngsterreferredtohisfathertoresolveproblemsbetweenhimandhisfamilyor relatives.Thus,thefatherwashis wasta 9ormediatorbetweenhimandhisrelatives. Asthechildgotolder,hestartstoreferalsototheeldersinhisfamilywhether theyareunclesorcousins,thuseveryoneisusedtohelpingeachother.Attimesof crisis,everyoneralliesroundtheirtribalson.Tribesmenarefamiliarwithwhatis considered to be arbitration wasta ;thearbitrationofthefatherforhissons,in additiontherelativesandalsothe sheikh forthemembersofhistribe.Usually,only whendisputesarecomplexandseriousdothetribalmembersrefertotheir sheikh . “Wasta ”means,literally themiddle andisassociatedwiththeverb yatawassat ,to steerpartiestowardsamiddlepointorcompromise. Wasta referstoboththeact andthepersonwhomediatesorintercedes. 10 Wasta isaninstitutionandapartof Arabsocietysinceitscreation.Itstribaloriginscenteredaroundanintermediary role that is associated with prevention of retaliation in interpersonal or inter groupconflict. 11 The effectiveness of tribal mechanisms in containing disputes can be attributed to a ‘complex system of special customs and regulatory procedures withineachgroup’12 .Theconceptofcollectiveresponsibility,extendingeitherto thetribeasawholeortothetribesman’sextendedfamilyuptofivegenerations removed( khamsa ),whichofferedallindividualsameasureofprotection.However, collective responsibility is a two edged sword. On the one hand, it could

6M.Hamidullah,‘AdministrationofJusticeinEarlyIslam’(1937)11 IslamicCulture 163. 7J.Schacht, AnIntroductionToIslamicLaw (Oxford:TheClarendonPress,1964)8. 8A.ElTayib,‘TheOde(Qasidah)’,in TheCambridgeHistoryofArabicLiterature:ArabicliteraturetotheEndof theUmayyadPeriod (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1983). 9 Both the wellconnected, personal intermediaryintervener and the process of intermediation intervention. 10 R.B.Cunningham&Y.K.Sarayrah, Wasta:TheHiddenForcesinMiddleEasternSociety (London:Praeger, 1993)1. 11 A.AlRamahi,‘WastainJordan:ADistinctFeatureof(andBenefitfor)MiddleEasternSociety’(2008) ArabLawQuarterly22(1)35 12 A.S.S.Owidi,‘BedouinJusticeinJordan:TheCustomaryLegalSystemoftheTribesanditsIntegration intotheFrameworkofStatePolityfrom1921onwards’,Ph.D.,UniversityofCambridge,1982,40.

4 AseelAlRamahiS ulh:ACrucialPartofIslamicArbitration potentiallyturnaconflictbetweentwoindividualsintoawarbetweentwofamilies ortribesandontheotherhand,theknowledgethataperson’sactionsmightdrag thewholetribeintoabloodyconflictcouldalsorestrainindividuals.Whenacrime iscommitted,collectiveresponsibilityfacilitatesquicksettlement,astheculprit’s entiretribeareliabletopaycompensationtothevictim’sfamily.Compensation,in cashorinkind,isthechiefmeansofsettlingdisputes, hence the existence of elaborateprotocolsofcompensation.Thirdpartiesstoodtogainmuchintermsof prestigeiftheirinterventionand wasta ledtothesettlementofadispute. Anindividual’slifeisconsideredtobeanelementofthecollectivelife;thus, theindividualandthecollectiveareconsideredtobeoneofthesame.Therefore, anyattackontheindividualisconsideredtobeanattackonthegroupandvice versa. If an individual injures another then the offender’s whole tribe is held responsible.Whentheoffendedtribesclaimtheircompensationorrevengethey directtheirclaimsagainsttheoffender’stribeasawhole,notjusttheindividual. Thepaymentofcompensationistreatedasiffromthewholeoftheoffender’s tribeandisusuallypaidfromtheresourcesoftherelativesoftheoffender.This responsibility parallels the responsibility of the offended tribe to seek revenge. Hence, any member of the offended tribe can discharge this responsibility by killinganymemberoftheoffender’stribenotjusttheoffenderhimself.Allare collectively responsible for the punishment, revenge or compensation of any member of the tribe. All are jointly and severally liable for the compensation, punishmentorrevenge. A hakam wouldbechosenforhispersonalqualities,forhisreputation,for example if he belonged to a family famous for their competence in deciding disputesorforhissupernaturalpowers.Apopularchoicebeingthe kahin ,apriest ofapagancultwhoclaimedsupernaturalpowersofdivination. This claim was oftentestedbythepartiesbeforehandbymakinghimdivineasecret.Theparties agreedonthechoiceofarbitrator,thecauseofaction,andthequestion,which theyweretosubmittohim.Allofwhichwillberecorded.Ifthe hakam agreedto act, each party had to provide a security, in the form of either property or hostages,asaguaranteethattheywouldabidebyhisdecisions.Thedecisionof the hakam, which was final, was not an enforceable judgement but rather a statement of right on a disputed point. 13 Hence, the need for execution to be guaranteedbysecurity.Theenforcementofanarbitralawarddependsentirelyon the arbitrator’s respectability and stature within society. Arbitrators used persuasive means to ensure that an award was complied with by the parties, includingmakinganawardeasytofollowandconvincingtheoffenderthathehad committedawrong. 14 The arbitral proceedingswere an effective means of resolvingdisputes and ensuring harmony between conflicting parties. The arbitrators insisted that the partiesattendthehearingwhichwasanecessaryconditionforthevalidityofthe

13 A.Ahdab, ArbitrationwiththeArabCountries (Boston:KluwerLawInternational,1999)11. 14 KitabalAghani ,Bulaq,1285,vols.II,164.

5 12/2008 arbitration.Theprocessofarbitrationreliedupontheclaimantprovinghiscase andtherespondentbasinghisdefenceonhisoath. 15 Ifaclaimantdidnotprove hiscasethenhecouldasktherespondenttoswearanoathdenyingtheclaim.If therespondentdidsothentheclaimwouldfail.ThetribesbeforeIslamdeclared theiroathbeforethestatuteofHobel(anidol)thatstoodinthe Kabeh in. The Prophet Mohammad was chosen as an arbitrator before he became a prophetduetohishonestyandtrustworthinessandsometimeshewasreferredto asa kahin .Oneofthemostfamousdisputesduringthattimewasinrelationtothe blackstone.Thiswasadisputebetweenthe sheikhs ofMeccaovertheplacingofa holyblackstone 16 .Therewasfiercedisagreementbetweenthetribesastowhowill havethehonourofchoosingthepositionofthestone.Theycouldnotresolvethis sotheyaskedMohammadtofindthemasolution.Hetookhis abaeh (robe)and placedtheblackstoneinthemiddleofit.Then,askedeach sheikh toholdasideof his abaeh andtoldthemtogethertheycanallplacetheholystoneinwhateverplace theyagreeoncollectivelywhichresolvedthedispute. InsomeareasoftheArabworld,disputeresolutionwasrelativelystructured andpermanent.AccordingtoCoulson,‘thegeneralpictureofprimitivecustomary triballawofArabiainthesixthcenturyrequiressomequalification’17 .Mecca,for example,wasaflourishingcentreoftradewhichhadarudimentarysystemoflegal administration with public arbitrators appointed that applied some sort of commerciallaw.Whilethewasanagriculturalareawithsomeelementary formsoflandtenurewhichalsohadabasicjusticeadministration.However,in both these cities, the sole basis of law lay in its recognition of established customarypractice. 18 TheadherencetocustomscontinuedwithinIslam.A lwal adah isarulethatallowsthereferencetocustomsandestablishedpracticesasa legitimatesourceoflaw,aslongas,theydonotcontradict with Sharia . Urf or custom is of particular significance in our context as many of the rules of internationalcommercialarbitrationhaveevolvedtothelevelofcustomandsome nowformpartofthelaw. 19 Many of the rules of conduct practiced before Islam continued to be honouredaftertheriseofIslamespeciallycustomsrelatingtopersonalhonour, hospitality and courage. The Prophet also encouraged such values as kindness, mercyandjustice,whichdevelopedtheearliercustomsandpracticesoftheregion. TheProphet’smoralteachingsaresummedupinaTraditionascribedtohim,in whichhedeclaredthathewas‘senttofurthertheprinciplesofgoodcharacter’20 . Thus,manyofthepositivetribalcustomswereincorporatedintoIslamicteaching andjurisprudence.

15TheMedjellaofLegalProvisions,s.76. 16TheblackstonehavebecomeaholystoneinIslam. 17N.J.Coulson, AHistoryofIslamicLaw (Edinburgh:UniversityPress,1964)10. 18 ibid . 19 M.C.BassiouniandG.M.Badr,‘TheShari’ah:Sources,Interpretation,andRuleMaking’1UCLAJ. Islamic&NearE.L . 135. 20 J.A.Bellamy,‘TheMakarimalAkhlaqbyIbnAbiDunya’(1963)LIII MuslimWorld 100,119.

6 AseelAlRamahiS ulh:ACrucialPartofIslamicArbitration THE ISLAMIC RELIGION AftertheadventofIslaminthesixthcentury,theArabianPeninsulabecamethe geographicalbasefortheIslamicstate,ruledbytheProphetMohammadandhis successors,the Rashdeen 21 .TherearetwomainsourcesofIslamiclaw Sharia :KoranthatGodrevealedtoMohammadwhoisconsideredtobeGod’s finalProphetand Sunna whichisthewordsanddeedsofMohammad.Thereare also three secondary sources of Sharia ; , and which will be explainedindetailbelow. IslamisareligionoriginatingfromtheteachingsofMohammadoftheKoran andtheSunna .TheKorancontains114 suwar (chapters)and6616 ayat (verses)and 77,934wordswhichcovervirtuallyallaspectsoflifeandsociety.Mohammadas theProphetbecametherulerandlawgiverofanewIslamicsocietyfirstinMecca andthenintheMedinainA.D.622.WhenMohammadactedasajudgeinhis community, he acted in the function of hakam . Mohammad attached great importancetobeingappointedbythebelieversasa hakam intheirdisputesasit renewedtheirbeliefinhimasaprophetandasaperson.Therefore,aslongas Mohammad was alive he was regarded as the ideal person to settle disputes betweenbelieversthroughconciliation. The Sunna is thetermusedtorefertothenormativebehaviour,decisions, actions,andtacitapprovalsanddisapprovalsoftheProphet.The Sunna washeard, witnessed, memorized, recorded, and transmitted from generation to generation (as the Arabs had a great oral tradition). 22 The Sunna is the second source of IslamiclawaftertheKoran.TheMuslimnationfollowstheProphetandlearns fromhimuntiltoday.The Sunna wascompliedintocollectionsaccordingtothe recordersnameandreferredtoas . 23 Bythethirdcentury,thereweresix recognised groups of hadith which are considered to be accurate among the Muslims: al Bukhari (256/870), Muslim (251/865), Abu Daúd (275/888), al Tirmidhi(279/892),alNasa’i(303/915),IbnMajah(273/886),withthefirsttwo collectionsbeingmorerespected. 24Theauthenticityattributedtothesecollections wasbasedonthescrutinyofreferencesandcrosscheckingofwitnessesemployed by the respective collectors as well as the isnad (credibility of the chain of authoritiesattestingtotheaccuracyofaparticulartradition). 25 These arean importantpartof Sharia andthusMuslimslives. ThecompanionsoftheProphetwouldfirstconsulttheKoran , andthenthe Sunna beforedecidingonanyproblemorissueinaccordancewiththis aye :

21 Rashidmeans“wise”:thosewhoimmediatelysucceededtheProphet. 22 n16above,141. 23 I.FaruqiandL.Faruqi, TheCulturalAtlasofIslam (NewYork:MacMillanPublishing,1986)114. 24n16above,141. 25 F. Kutty, ‘The Shari' a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration’ Osgoode Hall Law School, UniversityofYork,17April2006.

7 12/2008 ‘Oyouwhobelieve!obeyandobeytheApostleandthoseinauthority fromamongyou;thenifyouquarrelaboutanything,referittoAllahandthe Apostle,ifyoubelieveinAllahandthelastday;thisisbetterandverygoodin theend.’26 ThisprocessisfollowedbyMuslimsuntilourpresenttimes.Ifthesetwoprimary sourcesweresilentthentheyresorttoextrapolatinganddeducingfromthefirst principlesgleanedfromthetwodivinelyinspiredsourcesofKoranand Sunna .In aidofMuslimsofthetimeandthefuture,thesecond ofIslam,Umaribn alKhatt’ab,institutedthebodyoflegalopinionsoftheProphet’scompanionsasa tertiary source that could be consulted by later jurists fuqaha .27 It is clear that Islamiclawhasthreedistinguishablefacets,namelyrevelation(theKoranandthe Sunna whichisalsoconsideredinspired),interpretationandapplication.Theearly MuslimjuristsandscholarssetouttocanonizetheSunna anddevelopthe to systematize the development of the law. 28 Thus, a distinction must be made between Sharia andmanyofthetechnicallegalrulesderivedfromtheKoran and Sunna through fiqh. 29 A faqih 30 , orjuristderivetheserulesandthushisdecisionis not eternal but open to reinterpretation in the light of, inter alia new social, economic,educationalandpoliticalcircumstancesandneeds. 31

IJMA , QIYAS AND IJTIHAD The doctrines of the different sects of Islam produced an immense wealth of differingopinionsrangingfromextremeconservativeopinionstothemostliberal ones,however,noneofthoseopinionscouldcontradictwiththeKoranandthe Sunna .Muslimscouldadhereandapplyanyoftheseopinionstotheirdailylives. Thefieldofsettlementofdisputesisoneoftherichestfieldsofdifferingopinions betweenthesectsofIslamiclaw. Itisimportanttonotethattheareasgovernedbystrict,detailedandclear rulesinIslamarerelativelylimitedandaremostlyrelated to religious practices such as praying and fasting. The relationship between members of society in different fields including dispute resolution is governed by general principles interpreted and explained by the three secondary sources of Islamic law; Ijma , Qiyas and Ijtihad . The qiyas isreasoningbyanalogytosolveanewlegalproblem.The Ijtihad is definedastheintellectualeffortbya mujtahid (onewhoisqualifiedtodo ijtihad ,a

26Verse59in SuraNisa (Women). 27 n20above,275. 28 M.H.Kamali,‘Source,NatureandObjectivesofShariah’33 IslamicQuarterly 211,212. 29 ibid ,212. 30 ‘A Faqih meansajurist;anexpertinthefieldoflaw,whopossessesoutstandingknowledgeofrevealed sources and methodology, and the intelligence to make use of the basic sources through independent reasoningandtheprinciplesprovidedbytheShari’a.’ 31 A.G.Muslim,‘IslamicLawsinHistoricalPerspective:AnInvestigationIntoProblemsandPrinciples intheFieldofIslamization’31 IslamicQuarterly 69.

8 AseelAlRamahiS ulh:ACrucialPartofIslamicArbitration juristconsult)inderivingrulesconsistentwiththefirstprinciplesofIslam. Ijtihad couldrefertotheuseof qiyas toextendaruleorindependentlytakingaccountof the maqasidalshariah (thehigherpurposesorobjectivesofthe Sharia ).Tocarryout thesetechniquesitwasimperativethatjurists,‘befamiliarwiththebroadpurposes of the Law, so that when choices are to be madethey will be able to choose interpretationswhichaccordwiththespiritoftheLaw.’32 In Sharia ,alkhayral‘am (generalgood)isanoverarchingprinciplewhichis impliedintheKoran.Itisintendedtopromotethepublicwelfareofbelievers; andguidementodogoodandtoavoidevil.Morespecifically, Sharia isdesigned toprotectthe (publicinterest),sincemanisnotalwaysawareofwhatis goodforhimandhispeople, 33 onlyGodknowsthatwhichisinthebestinterest ofall.Consequently,anotherprincipleof Sharia isthecollectiveinterestsofthe believersasawhole;theinterestsoftheindividualareprotectedonlyinsofaras they do not come into conflict with the general interest. Another principle of Sharia is makarimalakhlaq (goodcharacter)andbelieversarecommandedbyGod toobservetheseprinciplesingoodfaith. 34 Andtoeducateindividualstoinspire faithandinstilthequalitiesoftrustworthinessandrighteousnessandestablish adl (justice ) whichisoneofthemajorthemesoftheKoran 35 In principle, the Sharia permits legal rules to be changed and modified in accordancewithchangingcircumstances.Thejustification for qiyas and ijtihad is foundintheKoranandthe Sunna .Asevidenceofhissupportfor Ijma ,Akaddaf citestheProphetMohammad,‘[m]ynationwillnotagreeunanimouslyinerror.’36 Ijma orconsensusofthecommunityisathirdsourceofIslamiclaw.Onceafresh ijtihad or qiyas hasbeenreachedandaconsensusdevelopsaroundit(ratificationby thecommunity)thenitbecomespartofthecorpusjuristofIslamiclaw.Khaliq describesthatq iyas areoftenusedtoapplyIslamicprinciplestothemodernera. 37 THE FOUR MAJOR SCHOOLS OF SHARIA The major schools of Islamic jurisprudence represent various regional and doctorialapproachestosolvinglegalquestionsatthebeginningofthefirsttwo

32 B.Weiss,‘InterpretationinIslamicLaw:TheTheoryofIjtihad’(1978)26 AmericanJournalofComparative Law 210,212. 33 ‘Fightingisenjoinedonyou,andhisanobjectofdisliketoyou;anditmaybethatyoudislikeathing whileitisgoodforyou,anditmaybethatyouloveathingwhileitisevilforyou,andAllahknows,while youdonotknow.’Verse216inSuraAlbaraa(Cow). 34‘Omyson!keepupprayerandenjointhegoodandforbidtheevil,andbearpatientlythatwhichbefalls you;surelytheseactsrequirecourage’Verse17inSuraLokman(NameofProphet) and‘Oyouwho believe!avoidmostofsuspicion,forsurelysuspicioninsomecasesisasin,anddonotspynorletsome ofyoubackbiteothers.Doesoneofyouliketoeatthefleshofhisdeadbrother?Butyouabhorit;andbe careful of (your duty to) Allah, surely Allah is Oftreturning (to mercy), Merciful.’ Verse 11 in Sura Alhojrat(TheChambers). 35Thereareatleast53instanceswheretheKorancommands adl . 36F.Akaddaf,‘ApplicationOfTheUnitedNationsConventiononContractsForTheInternationalSale of Goods (CISG) to Arab Islamic Countries: Is the CISG Compatible with Islamic Law Principles?’ (2001)13PaceInt’LL.Rev.1,18. 37U.Khaliq,‘BeyondtheVeil?:AnAnalysisoftheProvisionsoftheWomen’sConventionintheLawas StipulatedbytheShari’ah‘(1995)2Buff.Jour.Int’LL.18.

9 12/2008 centuriesofIslam.AllIslamicscholarsacceptthattheKoranandthe Sunna are the main sources of Sharia and thus, whatever is stated within them must be followed by Muslims. The primary differences between the schools lie in the circumstancesinwhichtheirdoctrinesusethethreetechniquesofinterpretation describedabove. ‘The great jurists of Islam Shafi'i, Abu Hanifah, Malik and Ahmad ibn Hanbalallunderstoodthecompoundterm usulalfiqh notasthegeneral principlesofIslamiclaw,butthefirstprinciplesofIslamicunderstandingof life and reality ...The faqihs of the classicalperiod were real encyclopedists, mastersofpracticallyallthedisciplinesfromliteratureandlawtoastronomy andmedicine.TheywerethemselvesprofessionalmenwhoknewIslamnot onlyaslaw...’38 Numerousschoolsofjurisprudencedevelopedandbeganalonggeographicallines, inMedinaandKufa(Iraq),butlaterevolvedaroundindividualscholarsorjurists. 39 Thefourschoolsof Sunna jurisprudencearenamedaftertherespectivefounders: the School (Abu Hanifah. d.767), the School (Malik ibn Anas, d.795), the Shafi'i School (d.819), and the School (d.855). 40 Each developeditsownscholarshipbyinterpretingtheKoran and Sunna using three techniques; ijtihad , ijma and qiyas inrelationtomanyareasofMuslimlifeincluding disputeresolution. DUTY TO RECONCILE ( SULH ) IN ISLAM

Collectivity‘hasaspecialsanctityattachedtoitinIslam’41 thatresultedinaduty beingimposedonanypersonwhohasbeenchosentoresolveadisputebetween partiestotrytoreconcilethemfirstandforemost.TheKoranencouragesparties to use sulh in order to resolve their disputes: ‘reconciliation between them, and reconciliationisbetter’42 andinanotheraye‘IftwopartiesamongtheBelieversfall intoaquarrel,makeyepeacebetweenthem...makepeacebetweenthemwith justice,andbefair:ForGodlovesthosewhoarefair and just .’43 The Prophet Mohammad also insisted on sulh and said it was more rewarding than fasting, prayingandofferingcharity.TheProphetencouragedcompromiseandmediated

38 I.Faruqi,‘IslamizationofKnowledge:Problems,PrinciplesandProspective’in Islam:SourcesandPurpose ofKnowledge (Herndon,Virginia:InternationalInstituteofIslamicThough,1988)34. 39 ibid 62. 40 G. Makdisi, ‘Legal History of Islamic Law and The English Common Law: Origins and Metamorphoses’34 ClevelandStateLawReview 3,6. 41A.K.Brohi,‘TheNatureofIslamicLawandtheConceptofHumanRights’inHumanRightsinIslam, ReportofaSeminarorganizedbytheInternationalCommissionofJurists,UniversityofKuwaitandthe UnionofArabLawyers(Geneva:InternationalCommissionofJurists,1980)48. 42Verse128 SuraNisa(Women) . 43 Verse9in SuraAlHujurat (TheChambers).

10 AseelAlRamahiS ulh:ACrucialPartofIslamicArbitration bothpublicdisputes,suchasthosebetweenfightingclanmembers,andprivate ones,includingthosebetweenhisCompanionsandtheircreditors.Further,awell known hadith oftheProphetwarns: Youbringmelawsuitstodecide,andperhapsoneofyouismoreskilledin presentinghispleathantheotherandsoIjudgeinhisfavouraccordingto whatIhear.HetowhomIgiveinjudgmentsomethingthatishisbrother’s right,lethimnottakeit,forIbutgivehimapieceoftheFire.44 Sulh wasthemethodpreferredbytheProphet,whomadeitplain that he was scepticalofjudicialproceedings,whichweredevisedbymanandthereforefallible. Partieswhowontheircasesbydentofeloquenceat theexpenseoftruthwere threatened with direst sanctions. 45 Thus,thetrialprocessisnotregardedasan ultimate truthfinding mechanism thatwill lead to substantive justice. It can be tainted and subverted by the imperfect nature of man, therefore, it should be avoidedwhenpossible. AreportintheMusannafofalSan’aniattributedtoUmar ibn alKhatt ’ab, thesecond caliphate ofIslam,tobeunequivocallycriticalofadjudication:‘Dispel the disputants until they settle amicably with one another ( yastalatu ); for truly adjudicationleadstorancor.’46 .MollaKhusrew(d.885/1480),theauthorofthe DuraralHukkāmfiSharḥ GhuraralAḥ kāṃ ,animportantlegaltreatiseforscholars andjudgessincethefifteenthcentury,statesinhisintroductiontohischapteron adjudicationthatitfollowsthechapteron sulh because‘[Adjudication]isneeded [only]whenthereisnosulh betweentwolitigants’ 47 . However, an arbitratoror judgecannotturnthepartiesawayiftheycannotbereconciled.Thiswasdealtby theUmaribnalKhatt’abwhowasreportedtohavedirectedinhisletterstohis representatives in the different parts of the Muslim Empire: ‘And strive for conciliation so long as the rendering of judgmentdoes not become evident to you.’48 AlShafistatesthatheprefersitifajudgecommandsdisputantstoattempt sulh andextricateshimselffromhisjudicialdutiesforoneortwodaystofacilitate theirconciliation.However,iftheydisagree,hecannotturnthemawayandshould instead proceed to adjudicate between them. AlShafi warns the judge against judgingifthedecisionisnotplaintohim,foritamountstooppression.Thejudge hastheburdenofascertainingexactlywherejudgmentshouldlie,nomatterhow

44 M.ibnAnas(d.179/795),alMuwattā(Beirut:DāralGharbalIslāmī,1996)vol.2underKitābal Aqd iya[BookofJudgments](2103). 45 A.Othman,‘AndAmicableSettlementIsBest’:SulhandDisputeResolutioninIslamicLaw’(2007)21 ArabLawQuarterly 64. 46‘Raddūlkhus ūmhattāyast alahū,fainnalqad āyūrithaldaghā ʾin’,8(15304):3034;IbnAbīShayba, alMus annaf7(2938):21314. 47 ‘Awradahubadalsulh liannahuinnamāyu‾htājilayhiidhālamyakun baynalmutakhās imayn Sulh ,MehmedibnFarāmurzibn(Egypt:alMatb aaalWahabiyya,1264/1877)497. 48n42above.

11 12/2008 longittakes. 49 HisfolloweralQass (d.335/946947)claimsthatifthereisan ijma thatajudgecandelayjudgingifhedesires sulh ,butthismustbewiththeconsent oftheparties.AlShirazi(d.476/1063)goesalittlefurtherandsaysthatevenif thejudgeknowswhichwayjudgmentshouldbegiven, it is still recommended (mustaha )thathecommandthemtoattempta sulh .Oncetheyfail,heisnottotry againtopersuadethem,forjudgmentisobligatory( alhukmlāzim )insuchcases, andpostponingitwithouttheconsentoftheentitledpartyisnotallowed.Ibn HajaralAsqalānī(d.852/1449)agrees,sayingthatthe majority of jurists prefer thatajudgesteerpartiesinthedirectionof sulh evenifitisclearhowheshould judgethecase. 50 IbnFarhūnemphasisedthatjudgesshouldapply sulh whenfacedwithcertain typesofdisputantsandcases,namelywhen(1)thepartieshaveakinshipwithone another,(2)theyarepeopleofvirtueandgoodstandinginsociety,(3)thereisrisk ofincreasedhostilitybetweenthem,and(4)thenatureofthecaseissuchthatitis difficultforthejudgetodecide.Theimplicationisthatthejudgeneednotfeel compelledtoconsider sulh otherwise.Ingeneral,thesourcesofIslamiclawreveal that sulh iscentraltoanIslamiclegalsystem,andthatjudgmentbyjudicialfiatis notthesuperiormethodfordisputeresolutionand sulh shouldbeattemptedand encouragedwheneverreasonabletodoso. SULH IN ARBITRATION Sharia has not completely separated sulh and arbitration. Many of the Koranic authorityand hadiths supportingarbitrationcouldalsobeusedasauthorityfor sulh . TheKoranandthe Sunna haveapprovedarbitrationintheformofathirdperson chosen by the parties to resolve their disputes either through conciliation or adjudication. However, the differences between the two are also recognised. Arbitration,inIslam,differsfrom sulh inthreerespects:namely,first,in sulh an amicable settlement may be reached between the parties with or without the involvementofothers,whereasinarbitrationtheappointmentofathirdpartyis indispensable.However,thedisputingpartiesin sulh ,alsohavetheoptiontouse anarbitratorinordertoworktowardsasettlement.Thus,arbitrationcanbeone ofthemeansof sulh .Second,theagreementof sulh isnotbindingunlessithas taken place before the court, whereas arbitration, according to the majority of jurists,isbindingwithoutcourtintervention.Andthird, sulh canonlyberesorted to if the dispute has already occurred, i.e., sulh cannot address a prospective dispute,whereasarbitrationcanaddressbothexistingandprospectivedisputes.

49ibnalShafi,alUmm(Beirut:DāralKutubalʾIlmiyya,1993)6:312. 50IbrāhimibnAlīalShirāzī,alMuhadhdhab(Beirut:DāralKutubalIlmiyya,1995)3:404;IbnH ajaral Asqalānī,Fath alBārīfiSharh S ah īh alBukhārī(Riyadh:DāralSalām,2000)vol.5(270 6)378.

12 AseelAlRamahiS ulh:ACrucialPartofIslamicArbitration

KORAN

Arbitration was approved by the Koran and referred to in a number of ayat (verses)asanacceptabledisputeresolutionmechanism.Forexample, andifyefearabreachbetweenthemtwain(themanandwife),appointan arbiterfromhisfolkandanarbiterfromherfolk.Iftheydesireamendment Allahwillmakethemofonemind.Lo!AllahiseverKnower,Aware .51 Also,this aye, Surely Allah commands you to make over trusts to their owners and that when you judge between people you judge with justice; surely Allah admonishesyouwithwhatisexcellent;surelyAllahisSeeing,Hearing .52 The first aya confirms that arbitration must beused to resolve dispute between marriedcouplesbeforedivorceisgranted.Itoutlinestheneedfortwoarbitrators (one from each side). The second aya from the Koran imposes a duty on any personwhojudgesacaseandapportionsblamebetweenpartiestodosofairlyand justly.This aye authorisesthosewhojudgetomakedecisionsthatarebinding. 53 These ayat could also beinterpreted to impose sulh between conflicting parties. Eitherway,themainaimofarbitrationistoensurethatdisputesbetweenMuslims areresolvedamicablyandjustly. Therearetwoschoolsofthoughtregardingthenatureofarbitrationwhich willbedealtwithindetailbelow.Thefirstoneisarbitrationthroughconciliation (sulh ) and the second is binding arbitration. The ayat have been interpreted to supportbothschools,leavingthechoicetothepartiesandmakingarbitrationa voluntary process, unlike other obligatory rules in the Koran. This shows the flexibleandevolutionarynatureof Sharia whichallowsthepartiestochooseand adapttheprocesstosuitthemandtheirdispute. SUNNA ProphetMohammaddevelopedthe Sunna throughteachingpeopleandtribesof the Arabian Peninsula. He tried to develop a climate where the Islamic nation resolved their disputes peacefully and without resorting to violence. Prophet Mohammad recognised that any case that could be resolved by conciliatory arbitration should be as this is better for the community. 54 Schacht contended ‘[t]he arbitrators applied and at the same time developed the sunna; it was the

51 Verse35in SuraNisa (Women). 52Verse58in SuraNisa (Women). 53 n10above,17. 54 n20above,114.

13 12/2008 sunna with the force of public opinion behind it, which had in the first place insistedontheprocedureofnegotiationandarbitration.’55 Arbitrationcontinuedas adisputeresolutionpracticeintheMohammadandpostMohammaderas.Infact, foraMuslim,‘arbitrationcarrieswithitnobetterimprimaturthanthatgiventoit bytheProphethimself’.56 MohammadadvisedbothMuslimsandnonMuslimstorefertheirdisputesto arbitration.OneofthefirstnonMuslimsthatfollowedthisadvicewasthetribeof Bani Kornata. 57 Mohammad acted both as an arbitrator and as a party who acceptedthedecisionofanarbitrator.Anotherexampleoftheuseofarbitration duringtheProphet’stimewasaclauseintheTreatyofMedina,thefirsttreaty enteredbytheMuslimcommunity,signedin622A.D.betweenMuslims,Non Muslim,ArabsandJewswhichcalledfordisputestoberesolvedbyarbitration. 58 TheSunnischoolsof fiqh havefoundthe hakam’s decisiontobebindinglikea contract or akin to a judgement of the court. Even though the arbitral award maybeweakerincomparisontoajudgement,accordingtosomeschoolsof fiqh , thisdoesnotreleasethepartiesfromfollowingit,accordingtotherulesof Sharia . Thus,anarbitralawardisbindinginthesamewayas a contract. Accordingto Sharia ,acontractisdivineinnature,andthereisasacreddutytoupholdone’s agreements: Oyouwhobelievefulfilanycontracts[thatyoumake]…FulfilGod’s agreementonceyouhavepledgedtodoso,anddonotbreakanyoathsonce theyhavebeenswornto.YouhavesetGodupasaSuretyforyourselves .59 ThisspecialpositionofcontractsisbestsummedupbytheIslamicmaxim AlAqd Shari’at al muta’aqqidin which essentially states, ‘[t]he contract is the Shari’a or sacred law of the parties.’60 This makes it abundantly clear that contractual relationships are viewed strictly under Sharia. Indeed, all contractual obligations must be specifically performed, unless they contravene S haria , including arbitral awardsor sulh duringthearbitrationprocessorotherwise.61 The Koran and the Sunna confirmed the validity of arbitration but the difficultythatarosewasinthecharacteristicsofimplementation.Therefore,the four schools of Sharia explained the process of arbitration which obliges each Muslimwithineachschooltofollowitsteachings.

55 n6above,8. 56 A.J. Gemmell, ‘Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East’ (2006) 5 Santa Clara Journal of Internationallaw 169,173. 57LibyanAm.OilCo.(LIAMCO) v LibyanArabRepublic (Apr.12,1977),20I.L.M.,1(1981). 58 n10above,12. 59TheFatawaofIbnTaymiya,III,326. 60 M.C.Bassiouni, TheIslamicCriminalJusticeSystem (London:OceanaPublications,1982)10. 61 S.H.Amin, CommercialLawof (Tehran:VahidPublications,1986).

14 AseelAlRamahiS ulh:ACrucialPartofIslamicArbitration

HANAFI SCHOOL TheHanafiSchoolconfirmedthataccordingtotheKoran, Sunna , Ijma and Qiyas , arbitrationisalegitimatedisputeresolutionprocessbecauseitservesanimportant socialneedanditsimplifiesdisputes.Itisalsolesscomplexthanthecourts. 62 The scholarsinthisschoolemphasisedthecontractualnatureofarbitrationandstated thatitisbindinglikeanyothercontract.Somescholarsarguedthatanarbitrator hasthesamedutiesasajudgebutothersconsideredthearbitratortobecloserto anagentorconciliator. 63 SHAFI SCHOOL According to this school, it is permitted for the parties to choose an ordinary personthatdoesnotpossessanyofthejudge’squalitiestoresolvethedispute, whetherornotthereisajudgeavailableintheplacewherethedisputearose. 64 Thescholarswithinthisschoolconfirmedthevalidityofarbitrationbygivingan examplefromhistorythatshowsMuslimsreferringdisputestothe Caliphate Umar ibnalKhatt ’abwhoactedasanarbitratoronmanyoccasions.Iti spointedout thatanarbitratorisinferiortoajudgeasthearbitratorcouldberemovedatany timebythepartiesbeforeanawardisrendered. 65 MALIKI SCHOOL Thisschoolplacedarbitrationasoneofthehighestformsofdisputeresolution.It contendedthatanarbitratordecidesacasebasedonhisconsciencetherefore,it allowedoneofthedisputingpartiestobeappointed as an arbitrator if he was chosenbytheotherparty. 66 Unliketheotherthreeschools,thisSchoolstresses that an arbitrator cannot be revoked after the commencement of arbitration proceedings. An arbitration award is binding on the parties except if a judge declaresittobeflagrantlyunjust. HANIBALI SCHOOL Thescholarsofthisdoctrineholdthatthedecisionofthearbitratorhasthesame bindingnatureasacourtjudgment.Therefore,anarbitratormusthavethesame qualificationasajudgeandmustbechosenbytheparties. 67

62n22above. 63 ibid . 64AlMawardi,AlKadi,T.II,382. 65ibid ,385. 66n10above,19. 67 ibid ,20.

15 12/2008 THE MEDJELLA OF LEGAL PROVISIONS The “Medjella” of the Legal Provisions’ (the Medjella), the first codification of Sharia under the Ottoman Empire, confirmed the conciliatory nature of arbitration.Itsarticlesweredraftedandderivedfromthescienceof fiqh (academic writings and case law) relating to civil acts and the prevailing opinion of the Hanafi 68 doctrine. There was a whole section in the Medjella dedicated to arbitration. The main provisions reflected the contractual nature of arbitration whichisclosertoconciliationandcompromisethantocourtjudgements.Juriesof theMedjellaexplainedthatanarbitralawardisinferiortoacourtjudgment,thus,a judgeisauthorisedtoinvalidateanawardifitisagainsthisprincipleswhereasheis obligedtoenforceajudgmentgivenbyanotherjudge.69 However,thisdoesnot refrain the parties from enforcing sulh between them, thus making it binding betweenthepartiesjustlikeacontract. Thedutyofanarbitratorcloselyresemblesanagentauthorisedbytheparties toobtainaconciliationorder.Thisprinciplewasoutlinedbytwoprovisionsinthe Medjella.Accordingtothefirstprovision 70 ,‘shouldthepartieshaveauthorisedthe arbitrators…toconciliatethem,theagreementofthearbitratorsisdeemedtobea compromise…which the parties must accept’ as if they had compromised themselves’.Accordingtothesecondprovision 71 ‘ifathirdpartysettlesadispute withouthavingbeenentrustedwiththismissionbytheparties,andifthelatter accepthissettlement,theawardshallbeenforcedbyapplicationofArticle1453’ according to which ‘ratification equivalent to agency’. 72 Consequently, unlike a judgement,anawardrequirestheagreementofthepartiesandthus,ajudgecould annulanarbitrationawardifhesawfitbutcannotannulajudgement. AccordingtotheMedjella,theconceptofarbitrationcouldbeusedtosettle disputesinawaythatresemblesconciliation.Article1850oftheMedjellastated ‘legally appointed arbitrators may validly reconcile the parties if the latter have conferredonthemthatpower’.Therefore,ifeachofthepartieshasgivenpowers tooneofthearbitratorstoreconcilethemandthearbitratorsterminatethecase by a settlement, the parties may not reject the arrangement. 73 The technique proposedbyArticle1850enableseachpartytoappointits“arbitrator”andthe two arbitrators thus appointed are in turn authorised to settle the dispute by meansofconciliationsulh . Muslim scholars have all agreed upon the legal principle of arbitration, althoughtheyhaveformulateddifferentopinionsinrelationtothedefinitionof arbitrationandthescopeofitsapplication.Accordingtothefirstview,arbitration is a type of noncompulsory conciliation, however, the second thesis sees

68ASunnischoolofjurisprudence. 69A.Haedar, DorarAlhokamfeSharahMajaletAlhokam ,JudgementswithintheProvisionsoftheMedjella. 70TheMedjellaofLegalProvisions,s.1844. 71TheMedjellaofLegalProvisions,s.1847. 72 TheMedjellaofLegalProvisions,s.1853. 73 CodeCivilOttomanTrad.DémétriusNocolaides1881.

16 AseelAlRamahiS ulh:ACrucialPartofIslamicArbitration arbitrationassimilartojudgments,fairandbindingontheparties.Eitherway,the validityofarbitrationisunequivocalinIslamandthedutytoreconciletheparties isimposedonanyoneresolvingdisputesbetweenMuslims. A Muslim arbitrator has a duty of conciliation and a moral obligation to clarifythefacts,establishthetruthandfindtheappropriateprinciplesof Sharia to beapplied.Islamiclawallowsthepartiestoconferuponthearbitratorsthepower tosettletheirdisputesbyabindingdecisionaccordingtorulesagreeduponor whatthearbitratorsconsiderjustandfair. Consequently,theword hakam hasbeengivendifferentmeanings.Theword canbeusedinitsbroadsensetorefertoanauthorisedpersontodisposeofrights, tosettledifferencesbetweendifferentpersonsbysuggestingsettlementorhelping them to reach it, or by issuing a binding decision to settle the dispute. The agreement of the parties defines the type of authorization in each case’74 . It is noteworthythateventhoughtheword hakam mayrefertotheconciliatororthe arbitrator,Islamiclawrecognisedthedifferencebetweenthetwo.Theword hakam refers in its strict sense to a person who is ‘authorised’ in a specific mission. 75 Islamic law commands an arbitrator to try to reconcile the parties first before makingadecisionontheirdispute.Islamicpartiesplacethemselvesentirelyinthe handsofapersonwhomtheyknow,respectandbelievetobecapableofhelping them out of the deadlock. 76 The overarching characteristic of any arbitrator whetherheistryingtoreconcilethepartiesormakeadecisionistodosowith neutralityandjustice. EAST COLLECTIVISM v WEST INDIVIDUALISM Despite the rapid social and cultural changes wrought by modernisation, the cultural profiles of ArabIslamic societies still differ profoundly from those of Westernsocieties.Although,pastoralnomadismhasdeclinedrapidlyinfavourof villageandcitybasedmodesofsociallife,nomadicpeoplesandtheirtraditions have nonetheless left a deep imprint on Middle Eastern culture, society, and politics. 77 Urbanprofessionalclasseshaveindeedemerged,yetthepeoplesofthe MiddleEasthavenotyetdisposedofloyalattachmenttofamiliesanddistinctive ritualsofhospitalityandconflictmediation.Norhavetheydispensedwiththeir flexible and effective kinbased collectivities, such as the lineage and the tribe,

74 M.I.M. AboulEnein, ‘Liberal Trends in Islamic Law (Sharia) on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes’ (2000)2J.ArabArb.3. 75 ibid . 76 G. E. Irani and N.C. Funk, ‘Rituals of Reconciliation: ArabIslamic Perspectives’ (1998) 20(4) Arab StudiesQuarterly 1,4. 77 D.Eickelman, TheMiddleEastandCentralAsia:AnAnthropologicalApproach (NewYork:PrenticeHall, 1997).

17 12/2008 whichuntilquiterecentlyperformedmostofthesocial,economic,andpolitical functionsofcommunitiesintheabsenceofcentralizedstategovernments. 78 Eventoday,theinstitutionsofthestatedonotalwayspenetratedeeplyinto society,and“private”justiceisoftenadministeredthroughinformalnetworksin which local political and/or religious leaders determine the outcome of feuds between clans or conflicts between individuals. Communal religious and ethnic identityremainsstrongforcesinsociallife,asdopatronclientrelationshipsand patternsofpatriarchalauthority. 79 Groupsolidarity,traditionalreligiousprecepts, and norms concerning honour and shame retain their place in Middle Eastern society. Antaki 80 distinguishes two models of dispute resolution mechanisms. The firstisintuitiveandinformalandthesecondiscognitiveandformal.Heargues that East subscribes to the former and the West to the later model. Western approachestoreconciliationconcentratesontheindividual.Theindividualinthe Eastisenmeshedwithinhisowngrouportribe.Itisnotjustbusinessrelations thatneedtobemaintainedintheArabworld,familyandsocietyconnectionsasa wholeneedtobepromotedandprotectedwhichismorelikelytooccurthrough sulh ratherthanadjudication. The penetration of this tribal heritage and religious underpinning into the commercialworldwithintheMiddleEasthascreateda gapbetweentheArabs wayofdoingbusinessandthatintheWest.Itisquiteclearthatthecoexistence ofthesetworationalitiesispotentiallyproblematic.Thedifferencesarenotjustin the general landscape but in the detail and perceptions in relation to specific matters. For example, Irani argues that conflict from a western perspective is considered to have a positive dimension, ‘acting as a catharsis to redefine relationshipsbetweenindividuals,groupsandnationsandmakesiteasiertofind adequate settlement or possible solutions’.81 Whereas conflict in the East is consideredtobenegative,threateninganddestructivetothenormativeorderand needs to be settled quickly or be avoided. These two views of conflict are sufficiently dissimilar to substantiate the argument that each side has a very differentstartingpointwhenitcomestounderstandingconflictandconsequently, conflictresolution. Westernsocietiestodaystronglyprivilegeindividualism,thus,socialpressures andrelationshipsdonotoperateasinfluentialfactorsindisputeresolution.Parties arecommittedtotheprocessasaresultoflegallybindingproceduresorbecause theprocessservestheirindividualinterests.Conflictisnotnecessarilyseenasa

78 L.E. KingIrani, ‘Kinship, Class and Ethnicity: Strategies for Survival in the Contemporary Middle East’inD.Grener,(ed.) UnderstandingtheContemporaryMiddlesEast (Boulder:LynneRienner,1999). 79 H.Sharabi, Neopatriarchy:AtheoryofDistortedChangeinArabSociety (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress, 1988). 80 N. Antaki, ‘Cultural Diversity and ADR Practices in the World’ in Goldsmith, IngenHousz and Pointon(eds.), ADRinBusiness:PracticeandIssuesAcrossCountriesandCultures (TheNetherlands:Kluwer LawInternational,2006)266. 81 G.E.Irani,‘IslamicMediation:TechniquesforMiddleEastConflicts’ MiddleEastReviewofInternational Affairs 3(2)(June)1.

18 AseelAlRamahiS ulh:ACrucialPartofIslamicArbitration negativeinteractionthatshouldbeavoided.Thewesternmodelcallsforadirect method of interaction and communication. Also, in the western model any intrusion of emotions and values is perceived as an obstacle to reaching an agreement. Bycontrast,conflictresolutionintheMiddleEastaimstorestoreorder.Even though a dispute might begin between two individuals or two families, it soon involvestheentirecommunityorclan.Theinitiationandimplementationofany interventionisbasedonthesocialnormsandcustomsofthesociety.Thesesocial codesoperateasapressuringtooltoreachandimplementanagreementbetween twoparties.Bargainingmovesareconductedonthebasisofpreservingthesocial values, norms and customs. Future relationships are very crucial elements in settling disputes in the ArabIslamic context. Priority is given to people and relationshipsovertaskandstructures.Facetofacebargainingornegotiationcould beperceivedbythepartiesasantagonisingthesituationorasahumiliatingactfor thevictim. OneofthedeepestcontrastsbetweenwesternandMiddle Eastern dispute resolutionliesinthenatureofthethirdpartyintervener.IntheMiddleEast,the thirdpartyisaleaderwholivesinthecommunityandhashighstatusandbrings considerableknowledgeofevents,thecharacterofthedisputeandthedisputants. Inthewesterncase,thirdpartiesareusuallystrangerstothedispute.Theylackthe closeness and connectivity to the disputants. Such distance is appreciated and encouraged in a western context. The Middle Eastern intervener advocates settlementthataccordsnotionsofjusticeasacceptedinthesocietyandenforces socialnorms.Westernsettlementaimsatachievinglastingagreements. ThecreditabilityofthethirdpartyintheArabIslamiccontextisbasedon kinshipconnections,religiousmeritsandknowledgeofcustomsandcommunity. In the western case credibility is based on training, professional degrees and experience.IntheArabcontext,emotionsarerelevant in dispute resolution, in contrasttothewesternintervenerwhoisexpectedto detach himself from the disputantsandbecommittedpurelytotheprocessitself. ThereisnodenyingthattheEastandWestdisputinglandscapesaredifferent. The very concept of conflict as well as resolution is unaligned. The striking collective nature of the eastern world when contrasted with the purely individualistic phenomena of the West sets these two worlds apart. This is explainedbytheculturalheritageoftheMiddleEast,whichistribalandIslamicin nature. While the western third party relies on a secular idiom, guidelines from a specialised field and personal experience, the ArabIslamic process depends on explicitreferencestoreligiousideals,sacredtexts,stories,andmoralexemplars,as well as to local history and custom. Western conflict resolution aims to satisfy individuals, interests and needs through a fair deal that is sealed by a formal, written agreement. In contrast, the ArabIslamic process prioritises relational issues, such as restoring harmony and solidarity and restoring the dignity and prestige of individuals and groups. Far more is at stake than the interests of

19 12/2008 individuals; disputing families and lineage groups solicit the intervention of prominentindividualstopreventtheescalationoftheconflictandthedisruption ofcommunalsymbiosis.Theprocessisthereforecompletedwithapowerfulritual thatsealsasettlementandreconciliationwithhandshakesandacollectivemeal. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST ‘Arbitration will become the natural justice in business communities insideandoutsidetheArabworld.Nowadays,complicatedtransactions take place and there is substantial inward and outward investment, whichmeansthatweneedtofindagoodforumforresolvingdisputes’ ProfessorA.S.ElKosheri 82 The Middle East is both a major area for foreign investment in the current economicenvironmentandhasbecomerecentlyaninvestorinforeignmarkets. TheUSaloneinvestsintheexcessof120billionUSDollarsintheregionandat theendof2007,GulfCooperationCouncilSovereignWealthFundshadover1 trillionUSDollarstoinvestinternationally. 83 Duetogrowingtradeandanincrease ininternationaltransactions,arbitrationhasbecomethechosenforumfordispute resolution for the world’s trading nations as well as the Arab countries in international commerce. Ahdab agrees, ‘[a]rbitration...can serve, as well as possible,theeconomyofourworld,whichhasbecomeasmallvillage’.84 ItisnoteworthythatarbitrationintheMiddleEastisinfluencedbyIslamic traditions. 85 Consequently,giventhegrowingcallsforareturntothe Sharia 86 and increaseinglobalinterdependence,religiousconsiderations,playavitalroleinthe acceptanceandsuccessfulfunctioningofinternational commercial arbitration in thisregion. Sharia isnotonlyasourceoflawintheMiddleEastbutitalsoinforms cultural, economic and political life there. As Professor Ballantyne notes, ‘even wheretheshari’aisnotappliedincurrentpractice,therecouldbeareversiontoit in any particular case…Without doubt, a knowledge of the shari’a will become

82 ‘ArbitrationintheArabWorld’(2008)25(2) JournalofInternationalArbitration 203,209. 83 McKinseysuggeststhatGCCprivateforeignassetsarebetween$735880billion,withSaudiArabia accounting for half of this total. Petrodollars: Fuelling Global Capital Markets. http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/The_New_Power_Brokers/MGI_New_Power_Brokers_ chapter_2.pdf. 84 n10above,5. 85 C.Mallat,‘CommercialLawintheMiddleEast:BetweenClassicalTransactionsandModernBusiness’ (2000)48(1) AmericanJournalofComparativeLaw 81. 86 N. Majeed, ‘Good Faith and Due Process: Lessons from the Shari’ ah’ (2004) 20(1) Arbitration International ,97.

20 AseelAlRamahiS ulh:ACrucialPartofIslamicArbitration increasinglyimportantforpractitioners...’87 asitanimportantpartofthehearts andmindsoftheArabsandtheMuslimsgenerally. In the mind of an Arab party, counsel or arbitrator, lies a rich layer of Sharia .88 Saleharguesthat‘thereisstillabodyofuncodifiedshari’atenetsthatmay remaininfluential,mainlywithregardtobehaviourofthepartiesandarbitrators, eventhoughtheyarenotembodiedinamodernpieceoflegislation’89 .Thelawyer scholarmustacceptandinternalisethefactthathistoryandreligionarethekeysto understanding commercial arbitration in this part of the world. Islamic law pervadesthecommercialworld,aswellasaMuslim’swayoflife. Cultural difference and the long present hierarchies of the colonial world engenderageneralisedsuspiciontowardswesterncontractors–whomayappear tochargetoomuchortohavedonetoolittle–onthepartofMiddleEastern parties. Somehow, such conflict brings with it feelings of colonisation, victimisationandinferiority.Thereissometimesafeelingofrevenge.Thenegative feelingsseemtobeworstwhenthearbitrationisconductedunderInternational ChamberofCommerce(ICC)ArbitrationRuleswithitshugefeesthatmayeasily cripplesomeoftherichestbusinessesintheMiddleEast. Certain Arab economic operators advocate that renunciation of national courtscannotsignifyacceptinganewallegiancetoanarbitrationboardcomposed in the majority of foreigners. ‘Although certain Arab parties consent, although unwillingly, to insert an arbitration clause in contracts binding them to foreign parties,itisintheconvictionthatarbitrationcannotbeterminatedbysentencesin termstheywouldnotaccept.Whentheydiscoverthatsuchisnotthecase,they areextremelydisappointed’90 .However,itisnotdifficulttoseefromthehistory of the region that the use of arbitration for settlement of disputes, particularly commercialdisputes,aredeeplyrootedinArabcustomsandtraditionsandhave long been implemented in practice. 91 As it was outlined above, Islamic jurisprudenceprefersconciliationandarbitrationtoadjudication. Commercialarbitrationwasbornfromthewisdomoftradingpeopleinorder tomaximiseefficiencyandminimiserisksandcosts.Disputesareunavoidablein anyhumansociety.Anddisputeresolutionisaninstinctivefunctionofthesociety itself.Everysocietyonearth,pastandpresenthasdevisedavarietyofmechanisms fordisputeresolution.Today’slitigationandconciliationculturearetheproducts ofsuchhumanactivity.Therehavebeenmanyfactors whichhaveaffectedthe formation of a particular mechanism of dispute resolution, they are tangible, intangible, historical, social, economic, political and religious. International

87 M.Ballantyne,‘BookReviewofCommercialArbitrationintheArabMiddleEast:AStudyinShari’a andStatuteLaw’(1989)4(3) ArbitrationInternational 269. 88 S.Saleh, CommercialArbitrationintheArabMiddleEast:Shari’a,Lebanon,SyriaandEgypt (Oxford:Hart publishing,2006). 89 ibid ,5. 90 F. Kemicha, ‘The Approach to Mediation in the Arab World’, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Centre,http://arbiter.wipo.int/events/conferences/1996/kemicha.html. 91 S.AlHejailan,‘MediationasaMeansforAmicableSettlementofDisputesinArabCountries’,WIPO Conference on Mediation, Geneva, 29 March 1996, online: WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Centre, http://arbiter.wipo.int/events/conferences/1996/jailan.html.

21 12/2008 commercialarbitrationisalsoundertheinfluenceofallthesefactorsbutsome morethanothers. Arbitrationisaproductofculture.Allparticipantsbringwiththemtheirown cultural understanding of many concepts such as party appointed arbitrator neutrality,procedure–civilvcommonlaw.Ononesidearepartieswho,coming fromareasoftheworldwithdifferentsocioculturalbackgrounds,assistedoften bycounselofdiverselegalformation,havedivergingviewsastotheconductof theproceedingandthepowersreservedtothemascomparedtothosereservedto the arbitrator. On the other side, there is the presence of one or more personalities, the arbitrators, each having his or her own background and legal formation and who may not always be subsumed in the somewhat abused distinctionbetween‘commonlaw’and‘civillaw’jurists. 92 Thismeansthatstyle andsoulofarbitrationisdirectlyreliantuponitsactors. International commercial arbitration finds itself at the very centre of conflictingunderstandingsandhistoricbitternessengenderedinacolonialcontext. This situation is compounded by the contrast between western commercial interests’questforcertaintyandpredictabilityofoutcomesandtheArabicfocus onsustainingrelationsandacultureofseekingpragmaticsolutionstoconflict. The institution of international arbitration originally was designed purposefullytoavoidanypreordainednotionofhowdifferencesbetweenparties fromdifferentnationsorlegaltraditionsshouldbeaddressedandresolved.This design seems not to work well in practice. Also, the New York Convention provides a legal framework for international commercial arbitration that offers threefeaturescriticaltothepotentialaccommodationofnonwesterntraditions andexpectationsininternationalcommercialrelationships.Thefirst,thevirtually completeautonomyofpartiestointernationalcommercialtransactionstodesign disputeresolutionproceduresandmechanismsunconstrainedbythepeculiarities of national laws and practices. The second, the assurance that arbitral awards renderedpursuanttothoseproceduresandmechanismswillbereliablyrecognised andenforcedinvirtuallyalloftheworld’smajortradingnations.Thethirdfeature, iscriticaltotheaccommodationofnonWesterntraditionsandexpectations,isthe increasingly unfettered autonomy of parties to international commercial transactionstofreelydesignatewhateverlawordecisionalruletheywishtoapply to their dispute, to the exclusion of otherwise applicable law. In combination, thesethreefeaturesofinternationalcommerciallegalpracticeofferthepotential ofnewparadigmsofdisputeresolutioncapableofrespectingandaccommodating the traditions and practices of nonwestern participants in international commercial transactions, consistent with the success of the transactions for all parties.

92P.Bernardini‘TheRoleoftheInternationalArbitrator’(2004)20(2) ArbitrationInternational 113,113.

22 AseelAlRamahiS ulh:ACrucialPartofIslamicArbitration Arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute resolutions is viewed by manyintheEast 93 asafalsewesternpanacea,aprogrammeimposedfromoutside andthusinsensitivetoindigenousproblems,needsandpoliticalprocessesofthe region.GeorgeIranicontends, Thereisaneedtofathomthedeepcultural,socialandreligiousrootsthat underlie the way Arabs behave when it comes to conflict reduction and reconciliation… Issues such as the importance of patrilineal families; the questionofethnicity;therelevanceofidentity;thenatureoftribalandclan solidarity; the key role of patronclient relationships; and the salience of norms concerning honour and shame need to be explored in their geographicalandsocioculturalcontext 94 . Antakipromotesaformofdisputeresolutionthathesaysisahybridsystemthat combines the best of arbitration and conciliation, serving the international commercial community most effectively. He describes the person that is conductingtheprocedureas‘aneutralthirdparty,actssometimesasamediator and sometimes as an arbitrator without being overly concerned with the traditionallynarrowlegaldescriptions.Here,thethirdparty’spersonalqualitiesare moreimportantthantheformalnatureofhisactions.’95 TheAinADR,Antaki argues,hasbecomeappropriatedisputeresolutiondisregardingthepurityofthe procedurebutconcentratingmoreontheeffectivenessoftheresultswhichmaybe the solution to the hostility between East and West and a more effective and efficientdisputeresolutionmechanismforthewholeworld.Bothpartiesfromthe WestandEastneedtorecogniseandrespectthefactthattheystarttheirdispute resolution processes from different points and have differing objectives. The eastern culture is based on relationships and the western culture is based on individuals.Themiddlegroundbetweenthetwoisaviableoptionintherealmof international commercial arbitration as it is a mechanism designed with parties’ autonomy at its core. Unfortunately, what is missing is the willingness to compromiseonbothsides.

93 M.AbuNimer,‘ConflictResolutioninanIslamicContext:SomeConceptualQuestions’(1996)21(1) PeaceandChange 22. 94n78above. 95 n77above,271.

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