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AEP-A AWEPAA, SANCTIONS AND SOUTHERN AFRICA m izz And it happened in the early I 980s that two South African ladies came to see us and discussed the role of this new organisation of politicians in the varied international spectrum of anti-apartheid organisations. After meetings, there was time for relaxation, a bite and a drink and a good laugh: politics was discussed and the struggle and the dilemmas and the fears and life in general and how best to keep plants alive. Whatever happened to those big issues, the plants survived and multiply until this very day, naturally. One of those ladies also survived, now in the role of supreme defender of parliamentary democracy, what else would she be? The other lady, like too many other old friends, is no longer with us and it was not of a natural cause that she died. The author, Peter Sluiter, was AWEPAA Secretary-General from 1984 to 1992. This brochure has been produced on the occasion of the conference: AWEPA 10- YEAR ANNIVERSARY Parliamentary Dialogue on Reconstruction and Democratisation: Focus on European-Southern African Cooperation South African Parliament, Cape Town 6-10 September 1996. © AWEPA/African-European Institute, 1997 Text: Peter Sluiter Photo's: Pieter Boersma unless otherwise stated Design - DTP: Rob van der Doe - Jantine Jimmink Printing: Rob Stolk by Binding: Meeuwis ISBN: 90-72458-63-x European Office Prins Hendrikkade 48 1012 AC Amsterdam The Netherlands Tel. 31.20.5245678 Fax. 31.20.6220130 E-mail [email protected] South African Office Pleinpark Building, 16th Floor Plein Street Cape Town 8001 Tel./Fax 27.21.4621767 E-mail [email protected] Mozambican Office Rua Licenciado Coutinho No. 77 1' andar C.P. 2648 Maputo Tel. 258.1.418603 Fax. 258.1.418604 E-mail [email protected]

Contents I n troduLctiOnl 4 1. Pieparing AWEPAA: parliamentirians and the sanctions campaign 5 2. Broadness and flexibility, based on firn principles 13 3. Impact assessment: AWEPAA's contribution to Western sanctions 43 Annex: Sunlmary of Western Economic Sanctions against Sotith Africa 64 Map of Southern Africa 67 AWEPA and the African- European Insti tue 68 AWEPA/AEI Publications 69

Introduction Now that Nelson Mandela has become the most respected statesman in the world, and the African National Congress (ANC) has proved itself successful as both a liberation movement and a capable governing party, it seems impossible that Just 15 years ago there was no major opposition to apartheid in the international comm unity, there was no more than verbal condemnation, no real action against apartheid. To fill this gap, and to point out the moral duty of the western world, AWEPAA was born as the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid. This publication chronicles the history of AWEPAA's role and involvement in spurring parliamentarians into action, in helping to facilitate the adoption of sanctions legislation, in teaming up with democratic forces, particularly the churches, in South Africa, Namibia and the Frontline States, to force an earl)' end to apartheld, illegal occupation of Namibia, and the destabilisation wars in Southern Africa. No book of this kind can do justice to the real struggle that took place in Europe. In order to do so, it would be necessary to pry open or unshred the secret security archives of the previous regime, to interview dear African friends and colleagues who lost their lives in the struggle, and to rake up the tarnished record of reluctant European politicians who now claim to have never supported apartheid. Instead this work gives an illustration of what it was like on the inside of an effective lobbying machine. International sanctions as a tool of non-violent persuasion have been used in numerous situations and with mixed results. One message which clearly arises from this story is the vitally important role of parliamentarians. By passing effective laws, tightening loopholes, and calling governments and their ministers to account, parliamentarians can make sanctions policies work. As the following pages make clear, AWEPAA members in most western European countries played a key role during a crucial period in the history of Southern Africa. AWEPAA went through a transformation process to become the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), shifting its focus to the consolidation of democracy and human rights, while maintaining an effective lobby mechanism for keeping African concerns high on the political agenda in Europe and improving Furopean-Southern African relations. The central focus on human dignity, seen in development, democracy and respect for human right, remains the prime motivation for AWEPA and its members. I hope this publication will serve as a reminder of the past, and inspire continuing solidarity and partnership for the future. My sincere gratitude goes out to all those AWEPA members who worked with us through these years, and all our African partners who walked with us side by side. Jan Nico Scholten President of AWEPA

Preparing AWEPAA: Parliamentarians and the Sanctions Campaign AWEPAA becomes AWEPA AWEPAA, the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid, has broadened its scope in Europe and its focus in Africa. A new name is therefore being adopted, the Association of European Parliamentarians for (Southern) Africa. For historical reasons, the acronym remains basically the same: AWEPA. AWEPA is still devoted to the total eradication of apartheid. With parliamentarians now from West and Eastern Europe, AWEPA concentrates on human rights, democratisation and (human) development within the present Southern African Development Community and South Africa, its future member. The following issues are of paramount importance for parliamentary attention and action: - dialogue for democratisation and human rights; - support to young multi-party democracies, e.g. Namibia, Mozambique, Zambia; - the sending of electoral observer teams and voter education trainers, e.g. South Africa, Mozambique; - the promotion of socio-economic recovery in all of Southern Africa; - improving development cooperation relations between Europe and Southern Africa; - the promotion of research and policy debate with regard to post-apartheid regional cooperation; - the stimulation of debate and research on the topic of South Africa and the Lomd Convention; - the promotion of human resource development; - the solution of the Southern African refugee problem before the year 2000; - a special focus on the children of apartheid, Southern Africa's future potential. FROM AWEPA BULLETIN, 1993 During most of its existence, campaigning for sanctions against Apartheid South Africa has been one of the core activities of AWl PAA, the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid, as the organisation was baptised more than 10 years ago. Since the mid-1990s, the world has become accustomed to the existence of a non-racial and democratic South Africa and the

Mandela asks AWEPA to continue ANC leader Dr. Nelson Mandela commended AWEPA for its part in mobilising democratic forces against apartheid. He expressed the hope that AWEPA will help strengthening cooperation between the European Community and South Africa. Mandela, who spoke at the crowded opening session of the AWEPA-EC Presidency Conference in Brussels on 7 and 8 October 1993, urged Europe to playa key role in the democratisation in Southern Africa. The ANC leader, who a week earlier at the United Nations had called for an end to sanctions, pleaded for an increase of European trade with South Africa. association has gone full swing in implementing its new tasks in the new configuration. Its full name has been simplified to European Parliamentarians for (Southern) Africa, though the acronym has remained almost unchanged, losing one 'A' at the end which one can only read and not hear: 'AWEPA' still sounds like an African battle cry and why not? That similarity between the old and the new AWEPA(A) is more than just in sounds. In a changed political and social configuration, AWEPA has remained the same organisation that it always was: a network of European politicians promoting the welfare of the people and countries in Southern Africa. In many respects, it shows a continuity in its activities and style since the early 1980s: it brings together European politicians with widely diverging political and geographical backgrounds, across party-political divisions and based on common political aims and positions, it cooperates with relevant departments of the United Nations, it liaises not only with parliamentarians and government representatives, but also with representatives of civil society, in Southern Africa as well as in Europe. Since the formal abolition of apartheid and the installation of a democratically elected parliament and government, one of AWEPAA's key policy objectives has become obsolete, fortunately: introduction of economic sanctions against South Africa by law, effective implementation and preventing their premature lifting.

This brochure describes the history of AWEPAA from that perspective. For AWEPAA 'Action against Apartheid'imostly meant sanctions, generally defined as: restrictions on relations with a country, imposed by the international community as a whole or by one or more individual states. They were not primarily conceived as punishment or for satisfying one's moral indignation, but as a potentially effective policy instrument against a regime whose internal or external policies were considered objectionable by the international community and a violation of international human rights laws and standards. In the words of the first South African Nobel Peace Prize winner Chief Albert Luthuli in 1959: 'Economic boycott is one way in which the world at large can bring home to the South African authorities that they must either mend their ways or suffer from them' And in 1964 it was concluded at an international conference on economic sanctions against South Africa, held under the patronage of 11 African and Asian heads of governments, that 'economic sanctions are the last possible way of defeating apartheid peacefully. 'It took another 15 years or more before this approach, already applied by India at considerable economic cost to itself since 1946, became a serious political option in most Western countries. Nostalgia or learning from experience Describing activities on sanctions against South Africa has a wider relevance than just nostalgia to write about one's own campaigns and personal experiences. It may teach us some lessons on the use of sanctions as an instrument of international politics. South Africa has not been the first, the only or the last country against which international sanctions were implemented or advocated. Fighting state injustice, in the case of South Africa deeply ingrained in society as a whole, has been and will remain, one may fear, a phenomenon of all times. Without explicitly dealing with other cases of actual of recommended sanctions or giving a theoretical analysis of sanctions campaigns, it is hoped that this description of AWEPAA's role in the international campaign for sanctions against apart- heid South Africa will be of some relevance for those individuals, organisations and political institutions who are involved in similar endeavours, now and in the future. Researchers and activists dealing with any sanctions campaign Will always be confronted with two general questions: how to have an impact on the political process, to get sanctions implemented or prevent their premature lifting how to ensure the strategic, economic and thereby political effectiveness of sanctions, once they are put into place. This brochure deals mainly with the first question, which was at the beginning of the involvement of West European parliamentarians in Southern African affairs, which led to AWEPAA's foundation in 1984. While examples, analysis and comments only deal with sanctions against South Africa and AWEPAA's activities in that respect, parallels with other cases are obvious and relevant. On the basis of experiences in anti-apartheid campaigns a long list can be made of critical questions to be expected in any sanctions debate and campaign: a do international legal obligations allow sanctions at all, collectively or by single countries? 0 should we interfere in the internal affairs of other countries (or:) should we judge one country by the standards of another and to what extent should their own culture be taken into account? 0 are sanctions effective at all, even if all countries participate (or a softer version:) should not all or most countries implement sanctions if they are to be effective, neighbouring states of target countries in the first place? M will the common population or neighbouring states not be hurt more than the regime one wishes to replace or force to mend its ways? a is the population of the target country for or against sanctions and can it be reliably consulted? 0 will the regime retrench instead of giving in, in what circumstances is critical or even constructive engagement more effective? * do sanctions contribute to changes which do not come overnight, but have to mature from within? * will sanctions harm our own economic interests more than we can afford (or the variation:) will the target country retaliate and can our country afford the effect? s is the population and the world better off with the alternative to the current regime? Opponents to sanctions will always question the legal possibilities or their economic and political effectiveness as an argument to oppose their implementation at all. One must also anticipate that opponents will always propose other reasons for their objection once a previous argument has been proven invalid or irrelevant. Finally, they may use arguments of convenience, sounding realistic or moralistic as the case may be, but in reality using them as a smokescreen to hide their ulterior motives. Nevertheless, these questions and objections are relevant points of discussion which should be seriously addressed, not only as a reply to opponents who raise them with ulterior motives. Sanctions are not an aim in itself, but a means to an end, in the case of South Africa to be of assistance in the struggle, inside and outside South Africa, for the abolition of apartheid as an entrenched social system, imposed by a minority of the population and backed by laws of their own making and the full apparatus of state repression. In the words of Desmond Tutu: 'punitive measures by the international community are a non-violent method to reach the aim of building a new South Afi'ica, a non-racial, democratic and just society. 'And the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group stated in June 1986, after visitinrg South Africa, that 'sanctions may o/f'r the last op/Wrtuni tj' to alei,0 what could be, the, worst bloodbath since the Second World War'. Iltt'oIm'itl of. pfrliraitnettiiIrium., the, e, trl ),- ers Organised involvement of parliamentarians in the sanctions campaign did not appear out of the blue sky. The plan to write this brochure on AWI PAA's activities on sanctions was inspired by the fact that the legal abolition of apartheid in South Africa coincided almost exactly with AWEPAA's 10th anniversary. That calculation is only correct if one starts counting from the formal founding conference in November 1984. The main players in Western sarnctions campaigns have cooperated for more than 15 years, informally and effectively: solidarity movements and other citizeni- based organisations, elected politicians and their staff, representatives of the United Nations. Many of AWEPA's leading politicians and staff have been involved in Southern African developments since the late 1970s or even before. So if one takes planning, conception and preparation into account, AWFPA is already more than halfway the second decade of its activities. Sanctions had been debated and advocated in international political for a for a long time, with occasional upsurges after dramatic developments in South Africa itself. Commonwealth: Sanctions avert bloodbath On June 12, 1986, the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) reported that the Botha government is "not yet ready to negotiate fundamental change" and that international economic pressure in the form of sanctions "may offer the last opportunity to avert what could be the worst bloodbath since the Second World War." After intensive meetings with the minority regime, the group concluded that Pretoria "is not ready... to countenance the creation of genuine democratic structures, nor to face the prospect of the end of white domination and white power in the foreseeable future. Its program of reform does not end apartheid, but seeks to give it a less inhuman face." The EPG dit not specifically recommend any measures, but concluded: "We are convinced that the South African Government is concerned about the adoption of effective economic measures against it. If it comes to the conclusion that it would always remain protected from such measures, the process of change in South Africa is unlikely to increase in momentum and the descent into violence would be accelerated. In these circumstances, the cost in lives may have to be counted in millions." "The Black leadership has already come to the view that diplomatic persuasion has not and will not move the South African Government sufficiently. If it also comes to believe that the world community will never exercise sufficient effective pressure through other measures in support of their cause, they will have only one option remaining: that of ever-increasing violence." The final reason for such further measures was formulated as follows: "It is not whether such measures will compel change; it is already the case that their absence and Pretoria's belief that they need not be feared, defers change." United Kingdom lags behind The Prime Ministers of six Commonwealth members (United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, India, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the Bahama's) endorsed, early August, the report of the EPG, but the UK refused to go along with the measures, which the other five will implement and urge the rest of the Commonwealth and world to do the same. The six countries will: Cut air links - Prohibit new investment and reinvestment of profits earned in SA; - Ban all imports of agricultural products; - Terminate existing double taxation agreements; - End government assistance to trade with SA; - Cease all government buying from SA; - Stop government contracts for South African controlled companies; - Ban promotion of tourism to SA; Halt all new bank loans to private and public sector borrowers; - Ban imports of uranium, coal, iron and steel; - Withdraw consular facilities in SA, except for their own nationals or those of other countries for which they act. The United Kingdom will only: - Impose a voluntary cessation of new investment; Put a voluntary ban on South African tourism promotion; Accept and implement a European Economic Community decision to place an embargo on imports of coal, iron, steel and gold coins.

The introduction of the mandatory arms embargo, imposed by the UN Security Council in 1978, was a direct result of the suppression of the 1976 Soweto uprising. But imposition of other sanctions was vetoed by Western members of the Security Council and the arms embargo did not even include oil, a commodity which was strategic for the South African repressive apparatus and the economy as a whole. An effective oil embargo against South Africa, whether or not in a mandatory form imposed by the UN Security Council, suddenly appeared to be a realistic option in 1978-9, when South Africa lost its main supplier of crude oil after strikes of Iranian oil workers and the fall of the Shah of Iran. This stimulated the idea of setting up structural cooperation among parliamentarians. In March 1980 the Centre against Apartheid of the United Nations and Dutch anti-apartheid groups co-organised a seminar on the oil embargo in Amsterdam. Participants included parliamentarians as well as Southern African liberation movements, Western solidarity groups, the UN, trade unions, independent experts and press. The ANC, one of the UNrecognised liberation movements, made an additional contribution of its own very soon after, which was more than diplomatic: in June 1980 it blew up installations in Sasolburg where synthetic oil was produced (South Africa has no crude oil deposits of its own). Miles away the smoke column could be seen and the media alerted the world that a new phase in the antiapartheid struggle and the sanctions campaign had been reached.

In January 1981 paIliamnIctarians ',ere the main participants of a follow-p nmccting on the oil embargo in the i russels ACP tHouse, thc scat of the group of dcvcloping countries associated with the FIropean Corninlunities. They came from 8 West European national parliarncr~ts, tle European PaIrliamnnt and rCprcSCntcd a broad range of political parties: Socialist, Christian-lcmocrat, (omtiunist, Liberal, Centre. The final declaration contained detailed analyscs of' the need and potential effect of an oil embargo, on the basis of which par amnutarial,, agreed to: urge their governments ... (followed 5 specific oil demands) .... 1S Part of'the oerall ('aipaiiigin on South Aftiea, urge their governments to sup/)pl increased amounts o/'appro/riate aid to those black Af'liean countries that are economically somewhat lepentdent upon South /iica and which might be ,tf'ected b,' the oil embargo against South Afiiea, commit themse/ves to raise these issues in thir parliaments, remain in contact with the UN, the OA U, to exc/ange intformmation andi to dtevelo/ means fbr co - ordinating fiuture action. In the Southern African region, there was a precedent which inspired anti- apartlieid activists to step op their effotrts foir Aerd,,8 implementation of sanctions against South Africa. An eff'ctive oil embargo against South Africa seemed within reach, CONFERENCE j List after the end of the Rhodesian white WESTEUROPEAN minority regime against which mandatory PARLIAMENTARIANS international sanctions had bncc implcANOILEMBARGOAGAINSTSOUTHAFRICA mented. Discoveries of the involvement of Western oil companies not only led to ACP House, Brussels 30-31 January 1981 campaigns against those firms, but also to demands on governments to 'improve enforcement of the embargo they had themselves installed. The fact that the Rhodesian minority regime had survived worldwide, inandatory and comprehensive sanctions so long was no good argument against similar measures with regard to South Africa, on the contrary: sanctions against Rhodesia were 'shielded off by neighbouring South Africa, but only as long as it suited Centre against Apartheid the government of that country to proDeparte et of Pslit cal ass Secuity Council Affairs tect its smaller neighbour. South Africa had no such neighbouring country which could serve as its lifeline, oil is the main energy source it does not possess and foreign trade, investments and technology were essential to maintain the wealth of the white minority and the income of its whites-only government. So in the UN, among solidarity groups and in the public debate, military, economic and cultural sanctions gradually became the main focus of actions against the apartheid regime and for human rights and socio- economic equity in the whole of the Southern African region. A growing number of parliamentarians was eager to join and reinforce that development. Whereas in 1979-81 the focus was on the oil embargo, in the context of a more general campaign, sanctions as such became the main focus of a conference in , 'West European' was and is an ambiguous term: in the 1980s, before countries of Central and Eastern Europe started joining, it meant all member states of the Council of Europe. So at the time West included South and North, but not Central and East.

Parl iament it o'lhe Hague I n 1982. Subject ( 'sanctons against South AfJica), list of participants, political aims and conclusions of that meeting contain the nuocleus of what was to become specific for AWEPAA: a group of members and former members of national parliaments and the European Parliament, with a geographically and politically broad composition, sharing their support for sanctions against South Africa. No less attention was paid to the illegal South African occupation of Namibia and the position of the [rontline States, a broad approach which has remained typical for AWE ipAA throughout its existence. The concluding declaration included: 'Participants in the eonference agree to maintain liaison amongst themselves and with the UN Special Committee against Apartheid in their eff[rts to promote the implementation of this Declaration. Participants request the preparatory Committee of the Conference to ecourage initiatives on sanctions bY West European parliamentarians, and to assist in the exchange of intbrmation among them. The conclusions at the The Hague conference served as the political and organisational basis for AWEPAA, which was founded at a conference, hosted by the Parliament of Denmark in November 1984 and facilitated bv the UN Special Committee against Apartheid and the Program to Combat Racism of the World Council Of Churches. During the following decade, AWEPAA's aims were formulated as described in the first issue of the AWEPAA News Bulletin: This is the first issue of the News Bulletin of AWEPAA, the Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid. AWEPAA was founded in November 1984 and organises members of all national West European Parliaments and of the European Parliament, from various political backgrounds. The aim of AWEPAA is the promotion of freedom and justice in South Africa by: - encouraging sanctions against South Africa; - promotion of support to the oppressed people of South Africa and Namibia and their national liberation movements; - promotion of support to the Frontline States - practical support to activities of Members of Parliament against the Apartheid system. In its News Bulletin AWEPAA will inform its members, interested organisations and individuals about governmental and parliamentary action regarding Southern Africa and other relevant developments. In this issue the main developments of the first half of 1985 regarding economic sanctions against South Arica are summarised. More information, such as full texts of documents. can be obtained from the AWEPAA office: c/o Parliament of the Netherlands, Second Chamber, Binnenhof la, 2513 AA The Hague, Netherlands. Phone (020)-266639 / (070)-614911, ext. 2443-2444. Telex 17125. oBroadness and flexibility, based on firm principles AT THE END OF AWEPAA'S EC PRESIDENCY CONFERENCE, DUBLIN 1990: JAN NICO SCHOLTEN WITH KATHARINE BULBULIA AND NORA OWEN Membership and political positions One basic characteristic, which has been typical for AWEPAA throughout its activities, is that of broadness: on the basis of certain political principles, AWEPAA has tried to organise politicians from the broadest political spectrum and with success: reflecting the situation in most European parliaments, many AWEPAA members have a social-democratic, christian-democratic or liberal background, but there have always been active members from both ends of the spectrum, such as German Greens, French and Italian (ex-)Communists or British Conservatives. This nonparty approach has been our deliberate policy to ensure that AWEPAA could not be identified as belonging to one political camp. It has also ensured that AWEPAA had the liberty of criticising or demanding stronger sanctions policies from governments of any political composition and would still have access to the highest levels of leadership of any European government, for instance on the occasion of our hi-annual conferences in the country with the EC Presidency. To be recognised as a politically broad organisation was indispensable, more than on any other subject, on the question of sanctions against South Africa, where AWEPAA consistently advocated 'strengthening of existing and adoption of new sanctions'. This was less absolute than the 'mandatory and comprehensive sanctions' which some AWEPAA members advocated but did not contradict that position either. At our meetings or in publications we gladly provided a forum for such demands, in particular when advocated by the South African and Namibian liberation movements, Frontline States and European solidarity groups. AWEPAA members, both those in favour of limited sanctions and those supporting more radical demands, were satisfied that AWEPAA as an organisation chose to stick to the common denominator of all its members and neither questioned nor supported either position. The tactical wisdom of this approach was only once seriously debated within AWEPAA, in 1985 or 1986: at one board meeting a debate developed between a German Green MP (duly bearded and long-haired, in jeans and leather jacket) and a British Conservative (every inch a gentleman). It was an interesting debate but very soon the Green MP cut it short and proposed: 'let us not waste the time of this meeting and create divisions which are no good for AWEPAA and even worse for our South African friends. After this meeting I will buy you a beer and explain why you are wrong'. Replied the Conservative colleague: 'I doubt that you will succeed in convincing me, but I will gladly offer you a second beer'. So it happened and after two beers they decided to continue their cooperation - soberly. Most importantly, we felt well supported by our African friends who clearly recognised AWEPAA's contribution to their own cause. While maintaining their own more radical positions they recognised that implementation of limited new sanctions was -at best- a step in the right direction and -at worst- better than none at all. They also recognised that AWEPAA informed and mobilised parliamentarians and liaised with governments who would otherwise have refused to listen constructively to our and their arguments and demands. Most solidarity groups also accepted this 'moderateness' and practised it themselves to a certain extent. We do not know of politicians who did not join AWEPAA because they either saw 'comprehensive and mandatory'sanctions or 'gradual, partial or voluntary measures' as the only acceptable position. Of course there have always been politicians who were strong opponents of sanctions against South Africa, while they equally opposed apartheid (or at least said so). This has never limited the effectiveness of AWEPAA as a broad but principled organisation. In all cases except one, the explanation that the phrase 'action against apartheid'in our full name included sanctions, as one political tool amongst others, served as a mechanism of self-selection against those politicians opposing sanctions. One politician saw his application for membership not accepted. In one of the first meetings of the AWEPAA section in the European Parliament another Conservative British MEP strongly objected to its emphasis on sanctions and demanded that membership should also be open to politicians who do oppose Apartheid ('we all do, don't we?') but expressed hesitations about sanctions as a suitable policy. So he filled in his application form, adding 'some but not all' in handwriting to the standard 'agrees with the aims of AWEPAA'. The form landed in the secretariat's file 'possibly to be dealt with in a later stage' and it may still be there as nobody took it up, including the applicant himself. Meanwhile, those who would endorse limited measures and might have opposed comprehensive sanctions, usually from the centre-right, never felt put off and joined AWEPAA in great numbers. There are typical examples, where AWEPAA's approach was very effective in achieving political results. In 1988 individual members of our Belgian section took AWEPAA's policy recommendations as a common basis for approaching relevant cabinet ministers of their own party or -if they were in opposition- for criticism of government policy. The result was a considerable improvement of government positions on a coal ban and an oil boycott. Had NELSON MANDELA WITH LUC DHOORE, INITIATOR OF THE BELGIAN ALL-PARTY SECTION AWEPAA and its Belgian section not existed, it would have been difficult to bridge the party and linguistic divides that are so dominant in Belgian politics. As a welcome side-effect, it has also helped the ANC representation in Brussels and Belgian anti-apartheid movements to liaise with political circles which had previously been less accessible for them. At a meeting of the EC-ACP Joint Assembly (a consultative body of members of the European Parliament and parliamentarians from associated developing countries) MEPs from opposing parties requested AWEPAA observers to help finding common positions on controversial issues, which could be accepted by a broad majority. Their AWEPAA membership served as an informal common denominator and enabled us to play a mediating and integrating role. We drafted a text with some alternatives for consideration, initiated the discussions on a final, joint proposal but withdrew in the last stage of the negotiations. (A good lobbyist makes sure that his or her views are well known and reflected in a final political compromise without accepting ultimate responsibility for it). In the end the main players managed to find support in their respective political groups, the final text pleased the (Southern) African members of the Assembly and formed the basis for a very similar resolution adopted by the full European Parliament, a few weeks later. In the end no lobbying group can become the determining force in political debates within one country or amongst a number of countries, even if it consists, like AWEPAA, of politicians itself. At best it can stimulate debates and add weight to developments which are emerging anyway, or it can take the initiative to put a certain issue on the political agenda, hoping that it will be picked up and materialise into actual policy at a later stage. Not surprisingly, this was easiest in countries where consensus and cooperation on sanctions and other Southern African policies were best developed. In the Nordic countries, debates and different accents among various parties or between governments and parliamentary majorities were minimal compared to the situation in all other West European countries. AWEPAA's role mainly consisted of supplying information to its members, facilitating contacts with colleagues from other countries and generally using Nordic policies as examples to follow by other European countries. But there were some heated debates in those countries as well and when solidarity movements and parliamentarians asked for furthergoing measures, AWEPAA had to answer to questions, whether we were happy with standing policies by Nordic governments. Our standard and truthful reply was: they are much better than those of most countries but that is not a decisive reason not to do more. It was not always such smooth sailing as in Nordic waters. Not surprisingly, AWEPAA has been least influential in those countries where an anti-sanctions policy of a centre-right government enjoyed broad parliamentary support. The clearest example was the Conservative government in the United Kingdom where supporters in the ruling party of a modIITEDKINGDOM UNITED KINGDOM est increase of presrBLIC DISAGREES WITH THATCHER SANCTIONS SUPPORT IN ALL PARTIES sure on South Britishpublicturnsouttobedtssatisfiedwith Mrs. In the UK Hose eofCom.on, an All Party Group on Africa found thematcher's policy towards South Africa According to an Southern Africa has been formed, which includes nion poll conducted in Britain 45% of those inter- members of the rulingConservative Party who are criti- selves entirely wed (in a representative sample) agreed that the cal of Prime Minister Thatcher's policies on Southern r..es t's policy is not tough enou.gh. Only 28% Africa. Other members are, opposition MPs who a.. ignored by the foreved it to be about right In this opinion poll commis- demand far reaching economic sanctions against South ned by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement on the oc- Africa. mer Prime Minister ion of Mandela's 70th birthday it transpired that 45% The formation of this group follows the founding of Conports the application of economic sanctions against r.vatives for Fundamental Change in South Africa, led ('whose style ofgovuth Africa with only 35% opposed. my the MPs Mssra. Hugh Dykes, Timothy Rathbone and erning is the closest questions were identical to the questions asked in Robert Adley nion polls in previous yeas. The all-party group is chaired by Conservative MP Mr. thing to a not-sourns out that despite the imposition of strict censorship Ivor Stanbrook, other officers are Mr. Dykes (Cons), Mr. the South African government which substantially re- Richard Caborn (Lab.), Mr. Robert Hughes (Lab., also en lighteneded media coverage of South African developments, pu- Chairman of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement) and interest in South Africa has not dwindled. Mrs. Mr. Simon Hughes (Lib.) dictatorship co matcher's claim that she has 'won the argument' over ctions is proven to be unwarranted. Despite talk ofthe Mr Stanbrook in a debate of last November introduced nented one Tory lic beingured ofthe discussions about sanctions, pr.c a motion which a o. aly the same number of people agree with sanctions - regretted that the Unted Kingdom appears to be out of politician in priie the opposition to sanctions has decreased from 40% step with all other members of the Commnwealth on vate). 35%. the subject of sanctions against South Africa, and Table I QUESTION- Do you think that the government's policy towards South Africa is too tough, not tough enough or about right? Jne/Jly '88 May '86 Nov. '85 Too tough 9 9 7 Not tough enough 45 46 42 About right 28 21 28 Table 2 QUESTION. Do you think we should or should not apply economic sanctions against South Africa, such as boycotting their goods or withholding finance? Jne/Jly'88July'86 May'86Nov.'85Should 45 46 49 44 Should not 35 40 32 36 Don'tknow 19 15 18 20 The majority of the British public thinks that Mrs. Thatcher is not doing enough to secure the release of Nelson Mandela: 58% Only 26% believe that she should not do more. Among Conservative voters 41% find that the British government should do more in this respect. 70% of the British public supported the call for his release, and only 10% was opposed. - called upon the Government, in consultation with the Commonwealth and the European Community, to take additional measures to persuade the SA Government to initiate a process of dialogue across the lines ofcolour, politics and religion, with a view to the early establisment of a non-racial and representative government In a debate late February he stated once more that opposition to sanctions would be understood by South Africa as support for its policies As concrete examples of additional measures to be taken, he mentioned a ban on direct air links with South Africa and the withdrawal of ambassadors 'The South Africans (..) can he induced to change only by pressure. (. )The Republic ofSouth Africa is an affront to civilisation and no African Commonwealth state worth its salt would tolerate indefinitely British inactivity on this issue. Extra sanctions, measures, persuasions and influences are needed. What is being done at the moment is quite insufficient.' Various opposition MPs, including Labour leader Neill Kinnock and Southern Africa spokesman (and AWEPAA Vice-President) Donald Anderson have of late called on the UK government to implement comprehensive and mandatory sanctions This was refused by Mrs. Thatcher and other Ministers, but SA press reports quoted UK Ambassador Renwick last August as saying that the avoidance of further economic sanctions and further disinvestment will depend on South Africa and not just key Western countries 'We do not believe in your isolation; but we cannot peevent you isolating yourselres', he was quoted FROM AWEPA BULLETIN. SEPTEMBER 1988 UN PU Thi Th opil view goe belt .sio cai sup Soc Th opi It tI by duc bhte pub plal whi to 3

The same Prime Minister opposed sanctions publicly because they would hurt those they were supposed to help, but reportedly lectured her colleagues at a closed European summit: 'after all the situation is very simple: whites are the strongest and the most effective of all South African tribes. We are lucky enough to have closer links and more common interests with them than with the others. We may want to convince them that they have to give up some policies but in principle we should see them SEMINAR IN BRITISH PARLIAMENT, 1992: DONALD 0s our allies and not antagonise ANDERSON MP (LABOUR) WITH PETER PRICE MEP them' (source known to author) (CONSERVATIVE) Without jeopardising its cooperation with Labour and Liberal Mps, indeed stimulated by them, AWEPAA has actively sough contact with Conservative Members of the House of Commons, in spite of the bleak prospects of even a moderately different government policy in the UK. Some were hesitant supporters of at least some sanctions, others never advocated UK sanctions against South Africa, but were embarrassed by the inflexible attitude of their government in the EC and Commonwealth context. They were at the basis of an initiative in 1986, when more than 50 Mps formed 'Conservatives for Fundamental Change in South Africa' and regretted that their party 'tends to be regarded as being represented by those Conservative members who by their words and deeds give succour to the South African government and its apartheid government. 'In 1988 they appealed for full implementation by the UK of the sanctions package adopted by all other Commonwealth members and formalised their cross-party contact by founding an 'all-party group on Southern Africa' headed by an MP, generally considered a conservative amongst Conservatives. Interestingly, the UK public seemed to agree with these critical conservatives and the opposition parties: of those respondents expressing an opinion on UK sanctions, a majority stated that more pressure was needed than exerted by the UK government. In the European Parliament, where many politicians keep a relative political distance from their governments or parties at home, AWEPAA had an excellent cooperation with some of its UK Conservative members, in particular in its efforts to get a strong joint EC sanctions policy implemented. Pro-sanctions resolutions adopted by the Parliament were consistently supported or even jointly introduced by a substantial section of the UK Conservative group of MEPs, which also helped getting the support of Christian Democratic MEPs, the political group to which the UK conservatives were affiliated. This may not have been a decisive factor in joint EC policies, on which the Parliament had and has only advisory powers, but such broadly supported positions had their own political value as statements by the only directly elected body of the population of all EC member states. Again on the level of national politics, the UK situation was very similar to that in Germany (Federal Republic): the parliamentary opposition (Social Democrats and Greens in this case) was AWEPAA's most reliable partners. Meanwhile, we liaised closely with leading politicians of the Liberal Party, junior coalition partners in a government dominated by the Christian Democrats, who were sympathetic to AWEPAA's positions on sanctions and served as the 'opposition within the government'. Among Christian Democrats our contacts were scarce, but even with

AWEPAA Seminar on Human Rights, Bonn GREAT SOUTH AFRICAN EXPECTATIONS On June 5 and 6, 1989 AWEPAA held its parliamentary Seminar on Human Rights in South Africa in the German Bundestag (Parliament) in Bonn, ER. Germany. A broad South African delegation included a 25 representatives of the SA Council of Churches, the ANC and the UDF and other organisations in the Mass Democratic Movement. The participants (German and other Western politicians, church representatives, press) heard indepth reports on various aspects of repression and resistance in all sectors of South African society. These reports stressed that there is no evidence as yet of any intention on the part of the Nationalist government to give up white- minority power. Externally, the regime tries to impress the world and restore political and economic confidence by high-profile, ostensibly enlightened actions. Internally, low-profile repressive actions continue, but are of a more covert nature than thus far. On the basis of the ANC's draft constitutional guidelines for a democratic South Africa, options for a post-apartheid society were discussed. The South African participants stressed that they came with great expectations and on their behalf Dr. Chr. Beyers Naude urgently pleaded for the following measures, to be taken by EC member states: * Prevention of any further loans, any rescheduling of debts or any trade finance to South Africa; * Other measures such as a boycott of SA coal and gold, cessation of direct air links and specific cultural pressures; * Measures regarding other trade with South Africa, (where the F.R.G. is at the top of all western countries); * Massive increase of economic support to the Frontline States to make them economically and politically more independent from South Africa; * Reduction of mutual diplomatic representation of EC countries and South Africa, including measures to counter South Africa's serious restrictions of the press and other media, for instance by preventing South African propaganda countries through the press attachis in SA embassies; tightening visa requirments for South Africans visitors; * Commitment by the SPD and other Social Democratic parties, who are currently in opposition, to take specific political and economic measures against Apartheid when they come to power; " Pressure on the SA government to lift the prohibition of the United Democratic Front and the 32 effectively banned organi- sations, so that they may continue to receive funds. If the SA government continues to refuse, to find other ways and means by which these organisations can be supported; * Public support for the Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa as published by the ANG; * Countering of the South Africa's serious violation of human rights; most urgently: prevent the hanging of the 'Upingron 14' * Application of meaningful pressure on South Africa, not to prohibit the conference of a broad range of political, academic, economic and religious groups, opposing Apartheid, to consider a faure South Africa without legalised Apartheid. FROM AWEPA BULLETIN. OCTOBER 1989 them there were some possibilities, though less on sanctions and more on other issues such as human rights, independence of Namibia and development cooperation with Frontline States. In the end, the Liberals could not tip the balance of German policy towards supporting sanctions, but our broad political basis was necessary, more than anywhere else, to invest in all-party contacts which proved extremely useful at the end of the 'sanctions era', the early 1990s. When the release of Nelson Mandela and the abolition of apartheid as official government policy became imminent, a new debate started in the West: how fast, in which order and on which conditions should existing sanctions be lifted? As Germany had always been one of the main opponents to EC sanctions, it was to be expected that it would be most eager to lift them again. That was one of the reasons why we made sure that high level South African delegations visited Bonn in 1989 and

AWEPAA PRESIDENT JAN NICO SCHOLTEN AND SECRETARY GENERAL PETER SLUITER PLANNING AHEAD 1990 and met with responsible politicians and government officials. We were happy to note that AWEPAA members played a central role in a Bundestag debate on the issue in which the (Liberal) Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that sanctions had contributed to the new positions of the South African government

AWE pA A NEWS BULLETIN Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action Against Apartheid Vol. IV, No. I, January/February 1990 MANDELA RELEASED - END OF APARTHEID IN SIGHT? The most moving event on February 11,1990, was undoubtedly the long awaited release of Nelson Mandela, the most famous prisoner of our days. Politically very important on that historic Sunday was Mandela's first speech in Capetown as this most probably will set the tone for future negotiations. This AWEPAA-Bulletin contains relevant documents pertaining to recent political developments in South Africa. And much attention also for the tenth anniversary of SADCC. AWEPAA welcomes Mandela release, further steps needed In a statement on behalf of the Executive Committee, AWEPAA PresidentJan Nico Scholten, welcomed the release of Nelson Mandela and other measures, as positive steps to create a suitable climate for fruitful negotiations on the abolition of apartheid. But further steps will have to be taken, in accordance with the demands of the South African opposition and the international community. AWEPAA fully agrees with Mr. Mandela's call on the international community to continue the campaign to isolate the apartheid regime because by lifting sanctions now we would run the risk of aborting the process towards the complete eradication of apartheid. AWEPAA therefore appeals to all countries, in particular the European Community and its member states, to maintain their current economic and other sanctions against South Africa, asan instrument of pressure infurther stimulating the process towards profound and irreversible change in South Africa. EC maintains sanctions, UK dissents The European Community has confirmed the position of European Commissioner Manuel Marin and Irish Prime Minister Charles Haughey, that there should be no question of easing sanctions while the main elements of apartheid remain. Thus far, Pretoria has not done enough to remove apartheid to warrant such a move. At their meeting in Dublin on February 20 the EC Foreign Ministers decided, against the opposition of the United Kingdom, not to lift any joint EC sanctions against South Africa. Instead, the Foreign Ministers of France, Ireland and Italy (the previous, current and next EC Presidencies) will visit South Africa to investigate when the EC could start lifting sanctions. The UK will deviate from the common EC line and lift the ban on new investments, which the UK had never implemented in any binding law or regulation. Ever since SA President de Kerk's speech on February 2 and even on the day of Nelson Mandela's release, Mrs. Thatcher has reiterated her view that sanctions should now be lifted, because her policy of dialogue and persuasion had proven to achieve tangible results. Labour Leader Mr. Kinnock supported the exactly opposite position of Nelson Mandela, who said in his Cape Town speech that the lifting of sanctions now would not be conducive to the eradication of apartheid. Mrs. Thatcher's scheduled press conference was thereupon cancelled. US: no sanctions lifting yet US President Bush has stated that current US sanctions against South Africa will only be lifted once the goal of US policy on South Africa will be achieved (as formulated in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986): reforms in the SA system of government leading to the establishment of a nonracial democracy, which implies: - lifting of the State of Emergency; - release of all political prisoners; full freedom of political activity, - a timetable for the elimination of apartheid laws; - negotiations with representatives of all racial groups on the future political system of South Africa; - ending (para-)military activities aimed at the neighboring states. FR Germany Replying to questions of the Green and SPD spokespersons, Mrs. Eid and Mr. Verheugen, German vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Schtfer (Lib) said that the lifting of sanctions should be judged in the context of further measures by South Africa. He confirmed that the EC sanctions have contributed to the new positions of the South African government. The Liberal FDP spokesman stated that lifting of current sanctions can only be considered once a dialogue between all relevant parties in South Africa has achieved results. The Christian Democratic parliamentary spokesman stated that the gradual relaxation of sanctions should be considered in the light of further developments in South Africa. The opposition parties SPD and Greens stated more explicitly that sanctions should be maintained in the current situation. C 0 N T E N T S - Nelson Mandela's speech 2-3 - AWEPAA statement; End of apartheid in sigh 4 -SADCC-: 10 years 5-8 Action required in support of SADOC 8 Resolutions, Conference for a Democratic Future 9-11 Measures, announced byMr. de Klerk 12 WhatMr.deKlerkdidNOTannounce 12 Wslgespruit threatened 12 AWEPAA Office - Prins Hendrikkade 48 - 1012 AC Amsterdam - Netherlands Phone (31) 20 - 26.66.39 - Telex 10236 sanar nl - Fax (31) 20- 22.01.30

Vol. IV, No. 3, May/June 1990 NO PREMATURE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS! Some Western countries are already considering the lifting of sanctions against South Africa with the argument that this prospect can serve as an incentive towards the South African regime to abolish apartheid. Most concretely, the Dutch government has drafted a plan for the gradual reduction of sanctions to the other member states of the European Community. The plan is now being discussed among the EC member states during the preparation of the Summit Meeting of the EC Heads of Government of June 25 and 26, 1990 in Dublin (Rep. Ireland). According to the proposal current sanctions (some implemented nationally, some jointly by the EC or the UN) would be withdrawn In six stages, depending on developments in South Africa with a view to the final abolition of Apartheid. AWEPAA calls for political action: AWEPAA has appealed to all EC governments and to the European Commission, not to lift any sanctions prematurely. Several European politicians have reacted positively to AWEPAA's appeal for political action on this issue. For Instance, replying to parliamentary questions of MPs Mr. Martinez and Mr. Arnau, the Soanish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Ordonez has stated that the moment of lifting existing EC measures has not yet arrived. The President of the French Parliament, Mr. Fabius has ealled for maintaining current sanctions and the parliamentary leader of the (governing) French SociaUst Party, Mr. Mermaz, has stated that the sanctions must be maintained as long as the dialogue in South Africa has not yet achieved significant results. Similarly, the prominent German Liberal MPs Mr. Baum (also party ViceChairman) and Mr. Hirsch are opposing relaxation of existing sanctions in the current situation. Summary of the Dutch proposal: 1. Lifting of the policy on visa to South Africans and revival of the cultural treaty with South Africa. 2. Withdrawal of the EC ban on new investments. Condition: Release of all political prisoners and lifting of the state of emergency. 3. Lifting the EC import ban on iron, steel and gold coins Condition: Actual starting of negotiations between the government and the black opposition movements. 4. and 5. Full lifting of the EC Oil Embargo, of restrictions in the military sphere, resuming the delivery of police equipment. 6. Lifting of the UN Arms Embargo Conditions: Final and official abolition of the apartheid system AWEPAA is of the opinion, that there is some value in such an incentive if it would help to achieve that serious negotiations result in the prospect of the abolition of Apartheid and the establishment of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. It is far too early to say however, that the stage of serious negotiations has already been reached. Much remains to be done by the South African regime to create a favourable climate before these negotiations can even start. These are very clearly listed in the Declaration, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations - adopted unanimously, so with all EC member states in favour, last December: - The unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees; - Lifting all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and persons; - Removal of all troops from the townships; - Ending the State of Emergency and repealing all legislation, such as the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity; - Ceasing all political trials and political executions. Progress in South Africa as a condition for relaxation of sanctions The following survey (of early July 1990) summarises to which extent the South African authorities have met the aims and conditions, as formulated by the United Nations, various parliaments and (groups of) Governments, which are relevant in the discussion on lifting Western sanctions against South Africa. Some of these are 'final aims' and thus part of the process of the abolition of apartheid as a system, others are rather conditions to create the necessary climate for negotiations. - Profound and irreversible changes towards the end of apartheid no - Abolition of key apartheid legislation (e.g. Group Areas Act, Population Registration Act, Land Acts) no Abolition of 'homelands' no Abolition of Separate Amenities Act yes Entering into good faith negotiations with representatives of the majority no Suspension of political trials no Abolition of death penalty at political trials suspended for 6 months Complete lifting of State of Emergency in all aspects * not in Natal Release of all political prisoners and detainees, without imposing any restrictions on them partial Repeal of other legislation, circumscribing political activity (e.g. Internal Security Act *) no Allowing unrestricted political activities by all organisations and persons partial Immunity from prosecution for all returning exiles partial Removal of all troops from the townships partial Abolition of detention without trial partial Abolition of all media restrictions, including TV coverage of 'scenes of unrest' partial Abolition of forced removals to and forced incorporation of people into 'homelands' no Cessation of (para-)military activities aimed at neighbouring states partial ** It has to be pointed out that previous restrictive legislation is again in force now, which in some cases contains stricter regulations than those of the State of Emergency e.g. the Internal Security Act and police legislation. A concrete example is the length of detention without trial (max. 6 months under the State of Emergency, now again indefinite and without access to Court).

Vol. IV, No. 4, July/August 1990 Nelson Mandela in European Parliament Relaxation of sanctions threatens process of negotiations On June 13, 1990, ANC Vice-President Mr Nelson Mandela addressed the plenary session of the European Parliament. He also bad a meeting with the Executive and the Council of AWEPAA. He stressed the need for a peaceful solution to the problems of South Africa, which should not result In some emerging as winners and others as loosers. He recoguised President de Klerk and his colleagues as men and women of Integrity and said he is willing to work with them to arrive at a just and lasting negotiated solution: the transformation of South Africa Into a united, democratic and non-racial country. Why are they in a hurry? 'But the reality is, that minority rule and all other pillars of apartheid have not yet removed. Significant steps have only been taken towards the removal of the obstacles to the process of negotiations. Therefore the struggle against apartheid must continue and as long as profound and irreversible changes have not been achieved, international sanctions continue to play a significant role. Otherwise why should they be as much in a hurry as we are, to negotiate a solution? And how will we convince our own people, that whites can be trusted, if by removing sanctions you lessen the pressure that we need for successful negotiations? By removing sanctions now you are stabbing the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa in the back, because it is that pressure that has forced De Klerk to come to the negotiating table. Any movement backwards with regard to existing sanctions will threaten the process of negotiations itself.' (Ctd on next page) European Parliament on relaxation of sanctions While Mr. Mandela was still in Strasbourg the European Parliament adopted -with a majority of over 75 %- a strongly worded resolution on the relaxation of sanctions: abolishing the EC sanctions policy is called extremely undesirable prior to the conclusion of an agreement on the establishment of a new constitutional order in South Africa under which all citizens are treated as equals in a non-racial, democratic society. The resolution opposes proposals for partial or phased relaxation of EC sanctions and calls on the EC Council of Ministers to ensure that all sanctions, including economic, cultural and sporting sanctions, by the EC and its Member States are continued and implemented until apartheid is completely and irrevocably abolished. EC Dublin Summit: sanctions not (yet) lifted At the semi-annual summit of Government Leaders of the EC, on June 24 and 25 in Dublin, the decision of December 1989 was reconfirmed that the EC and its member states will keep exerting pressure on South Africa to promote profound and irreversible changes towards the abolition of apartheid. The Council 'will consider a gradual relaxation of pressure when there is clear evidence that the process of change initiated continues.' It is expected that further conclusions will be drawn during an extra summit meeting at the end of October 1990 in Rome, the capital of the then EC Presidency, Italy. Vol. V, No. 5, September/October 1991 ANC: rather a staged process than losing all LIFTING OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ACCELERATED A new phase in the process and debate of maintaining or lifting sanctions against South Africa has been entered since the Group Areas Act, the Land Acts and the Population Registration Act were formally lifted by the South African Parliament. US President Bush decided that the conditions, contained in US legislation, for lifting most US sanctions had been met. Japan followed suit, Finland lifted its trade ban and joined the Danish government, which had given up Nordic unity of policy in April. This was subsequently vetoed by a majority of Danish parliament, which thereby also kept the EC sanctions of 1986 in place for the time being. Meanwhile, the ANC Congress of early July linked the lifting of sanctions to stages in the process of political transformation inside South Africa. Earlier indications that the ANC would not object to a phased lifting of sanctions, if certain conditions were met with regard to the political situation in South Africa, were officially confirmed by the ANC conference of early July 1991. A resolution was adopted which states that the ANC is aware of the tendency among a growing number of countries towards the premature lifting of sanctions and has to find ways and means to arrest the process of the erosion of sanctions. It has to be ensured that the democratic movement will keep this weapon, until a democratic constitution has been adopted. Sanctions should continue to be used as a necessary form of pressure, and specified groups of sanctions should be used to achieve the following strategic objectives: A. the removal of obstacles to negotiations and the implementation of effective measures by Pretoria to end violence; B. the installation of an interim government according to agreed transitional arrangements and modalities on the transition to a democratic order; C. the adoption of a democratic constitution and the holding of free and fair elections for a non-racial parliament and a representative government. (continued on page 3) Nordic unity of policy broken Nordic unity of sanctions policy towards South Africa has been broken, first by the agreement of the Danish government to lift EC sanctions (meanwhile vetoed by Danish parliament), then by the unilateral lifting of trade sanctions by Finland. Sweden and Norway keep their economic sanctions packages in place and -in the light of current developments in South Africa- are not expected to change policies shortly. (continued on page 2) Danish MPs keep EC 1986 sanctions in place The veto of the majority of the parliament of Denmark on the agreement of the Danish government to lift the EC's 1986 sanctions has effectively kept those sanctions in place. Meanwhile, parliament has developed a plan of action with a schedule for the phased lifting of Danish sanctions against South Africa. The implementation of phase-1, which will be discussed in early October, includes the removal of the Danish veto on the lifting of the EC sanctions of 1986. (For details, see section on Nordic countries)

Vol. V, No. 2, March/April 1991 Progress in South Africa and Easing Sanctions LINKAGE: A CONCEPT TO BE FURTHER DEVELOPED At AWEPAA's conference in Luxembourg the February 1 announcement by President de Klerk of the repeal of the Land Acts, the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act was generally considered a welcome development, but intentions must be matched by concrete action before their importance can be assessed. Moreover, the full implementation of commitments by the SA Government, in earlier agreements with the ANC, Is a pre-condition for further progress towards actual negotiations on a new constitutional order in South Africa. Pre-conditions to be fulfilled Only two months before the agreed deadline of April 1991: - less than 10 % of all political prisoners have been released and political trials continue; - only approx. 2000 exiles out of over 20.000 ANC-related exiles (plus many others more) have received indemnity; - no concrete measures have been taken or policy announcements have been made for reviewing the existing political security legislation. The issue was not even addressed by President de Klerk in his speech of February 1. ANC: A linkage to obtain progress A concept of 'linkage' appears to be under consideration, whereby the easing of sanctions is made conditional upon further progress towards the final goal of a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. ANC Representative Mr. Neo Mnumzana stated, during the Luxembourg conference: 'While it is premature to think of lifting sanctions at this stage, we are very concerned that F. W. de Klerk is given too much leeway to determine both the direction and thepace of progress of the process which is underway. We think apossible response for the international community would be to introduce the concept of linkage.' This linkage should be connected, he said, to the phases of political progress in South Africa, outlined in the Harare Declaration of the OAU and of the UN General Assembly Declaration of December 1989. continued on page 8 At the invitation of the Czechoslovakian Government and Parliament, AWEPAA will hold its First Conference in Central/Eastern Europe Prague, June 13-15,1991 The conference will deal with policy developments in response to changing political contexts in both Europe, South and Southern Africa. Report from AWEPAA Conference in Luxembourg, Feb. 13-15 'Europe, SADCC and South Africa From conflict to cooperation' Coming shortly after the ANC Consultative Conference, the speech of President de Klerk, the SADCC Annual Conference, and the signing of a partial cease-fire in Mozambique, the conference was briefed on these recent developments and accordingly focused on appropriate European responses. The meetings were characterised by lively debates of the nearly 100 parliamentarians and experts from Europe and Southern Africa. Mr Jacques Poos, Luxembourg Foreign Minister and President of the EC, in his opening speech presented the position of the European Council regarding South Africa. Welcoming President de Klerk's announcement of changes, Mr Poos stated that much remains to be done and therefore the announcements have to be translated into actual action, before further European steps on easing sanctions can be taken. continued on page 2 Vol. V, No. 6, November/December 1991 The sanctions debate LINKAGE BETWEEN SANCTIONS LIFTING AND POLITICAL PROGRESS SPECIFIED In the past year, the debate on pressure on apartheid South Africa has developed from advocating or rejecting the full maintenance of all existing sanctions to discussing the merits of phased lifting of sanctions, as a mechanism to stimulate specific political developments in South Africa. Early in 1991, ANC leaders mentioned (for instance at AWEPAA's February conference in Luxembourg) such a 'linkage' as a possible response to developments in South Africa by the international community. The Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa introduced the concept of a 'programmed management approach', linking any change in the application of sanctions to the taking of real and practical steps to end apartheid. continuedfrom page 1: Linkage First of all, before any easing of sanctions can be considered, the preconditions as described above must be met. Other important phases would be: a clear statement on the part of the Government and all the parties concerned on the fundamental principles of democracy and agreement on the need for an interim government and a Constituent Assembly, elected by all the people of South Africa on the basis of oneperson-one-vote on a common voters roll, or a similar procedure. 'This thinking is actually emerging, it is under intensive discussion and hopefully will be taken to the OA U andfinally to the United Nations. Until then our position remains: much as there have been statements of good intentions that deserve to be welcomed, there have been insufficient changes on the ground which warrant extending rewards to de Kierk.' No policy changes without consultations AWEPAA agrees with the ANC that policy adjustments by the international community should not be implemented without close consultations with the representatives of the majority of the South African people. It is equally urgent that the international consensus, as reflected in UN General Assembly decisions of December 1989 and December 1990, be upheld and that, for instance, the EC coordinates its policy with that of the Nordic countries. It is urgent to wait The EC Council of Ministers has, at its meeting of 19 February, decided to postpone discussions on the lifting of remaining EC sanctions, implemented in 1986 (bans on import of iron, steel and Krugerrand gold coins) until the South African government has tabled bills to repeal the apartheid laws. The Council also agreed to consultations with ANC Deputy President Nelson Mandela, whom the current EC Council President, Foreign Minister Poos of Luxembourg, has invited to come to Luxembourg. The European Parliament has adopted a resolution, on February 22, reaffirming its support for the UN Consensus Declaration of December 1989, which stresses the need 'to maintain the existing measures aimed at encouraging the South African regime to eradicate apartheid until there is clear evidence of profound and irreversible changes.* The EP calls for strict implementation and monitoring of all officially declared sanctions against the apartheid regime until such change has occurred. The EP also calls for taking into account the demands of the opposition in South Africa, particularly the ANC. Likewise the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa has stated on February 16,1991: '(....) it is crucial to maintain sanctions pressure through all stages of that process, up to and including the adoption of a new constitution. (....) While it is not yet time to lift sanctions, the most effective way of securing these objectives in the crucial months ahead would befor sanctions measures to be maintained by a programmed management approach, relating any change in the application of sanctions not to mere statements of intention but to the adoption of real and practical steps in the destruction of apartheid.' AWEPAA appeal AWEPAA will, in close consultation with the ANC and its other South African friends, follow up and further develop this concept, in order to ensure that premature lifting of EC and other sanctions is avoided and that the announcement of gradual lifting of such sanctions will be instrumental in obtaining further progress In the political process in South Africa Itself. The Implementation of previous agreements, the lifting of apartheid legislation and further developments towards profound and Irreversible changes in South Africa are best stimulated by entering into serious consultations and by keeping all remaining restrictive measures in place meanwhile. AWEPAA has requested its contact persons to take political initiatives In their parliaments, to help ensure that their governments follow these lines.

AW EPAA Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid NEWS BULLETIN No. 15, November 1987 Report to European Parliament: EC SANCTIONS SYMBOLIC ONLY Barbara Simons, MEP, submitted her report on the implementation by the member states of the EC's joint economic sanctions against South Africa, which she was commissioned to write by the Parliament's committee of external economic relations. She describes the package of EC sanctions and their legislative and administrative implementation as symbolic, designed to placate a broad body of public opinion without actually satisfying its demands. The report lists a number of gaps and loopholes which give rise to the suspicion that either effective sanctions were never the intention of the Foreign Ministers or that they could not agree on them. Vol. V, No. 3, May/June 1991 EC Council of Ministers lifts remaining 1986 economic sanctions On Monday April 15 the Council of Foreign Ministers of the European Community has decided to lift the import bans on iron and steel and on gold coins (Krugerrands) from South Africa. These were the remaining economic sanctions introduced in 1986, after the ban on new investments had been lifted in December 1990. The decision came as a surprise and disappointment to many, who had, from public and private information, drawn the conclusion that the issue would not be discussed, let alone be decided by the EC Foreign Ministers on April 15. This decision keeps the joint EC measures of 1985 in place, such as the arms and oil embargoes, restrictions on nuclear relations and the sales of computers to the South African army and police, as well as measures taken by individual EC states. EC to ANC: sanctions lifting not on agenda AWEPAA appeal A high level delegation of the ANC, composed of Secretary - In a letter to the Council of Ministers AWEPAA, after its fact General Mr. Alfred Nzo and Mr. Thabo Mbeki, the head of the finding mission to South Africa earlier that month, stated that such Department of International Relations, visited Luxembourg and lifting at this stage would not be helpful and indeed he Brussels on April 11 and 12, on the invitation of the current counterproductive to the process of peaceful transition towards a President of the EC Council of Foreign Ministers, Mr. Poos of truly democratic South Africa. It was pointed out that a climate Luxembourg. After their meeting with Minister Poos the conducive to negotiations had not been created as the South delegation stated that they had received the assurance that decisions African government had not solved the issues of the release of on lifting the remaining 1986 sanctions would only be taken after a political prisoners, the return of political exiles and the adjustment report on the situation in South Africa had been drawn up and of political security legislation. submitted to the European Council. This would have as a (continued o ,n pae 2) consequence that the issue would be removed from the Council's agenda on the following Monday.X r and that lifting must be judged in the light of further developments. It may have played a role that lobbying to keep established policies in place is generally less difficult than winning over a majority or establishing consensus in favour of policy changes, but having Germany on our side for once and having worked hard to contribute to that position was a comforting feeling. From 1989 onwards, when there began to be positive movement with regard to Namibian independence, the resolving of the Angolan conflict and the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and the unbanning of political parties, several European politicians immediately began advocating the lifting of sanctions. Just as the EC measures of 1985 - 1986 had been 'too little and too late', these appeals could be labelled as 'too much, too soon" As Nelson Mandela said in his first public speech after his release, in Cape Town: 'lifting of sanctions now would not be conducive to the eradication of apartheid' The only acceptable approach to gradual lifting of sanctions, hesitantly accepted by the ANC from early 1991, was a 'linkage' with fulfilment of a list of very specific demands on the abolition of apartheid in the declaration by the UN General Assembly of late 1989, which Western countries had endorsed. But here the unanimity rule, which prevented stronger measures in the mid-1980, came to rescue: on the initiative of AWEPAA members, several governments stated that the time for lifting sanctions had not yet come and in the end it was due to Danish persistence (with heavy AWEPAA involvement at the background) that EC sanctions remained in place a little longer. Individual or colleclie sanltion s Like in the debate on comprehensive or selective sanctions, AWEPAA followed a similar flexible approach the question, how to assess the imposition of sanctions by only one or just a few countries and not by all Western or at least all EC member states. Whereas the latter would of course have been preferable, we welcomed any new measure by any country as one step into the right direction and used it as a tool to stimulate politicians in other countries to advocate similar steps by their governments. This country-by-country, step-by-step approach was very soon endorsed by the Security Council of the United Nations. In June and July 1985 the Council adopted non-mandatory resolutions, supported or at least not vetoed by the USA and the UK governments. The Security Council called for a number of specific sanctions, commended countries which already had adopted measures on a voluntary basis, called on them to adopt new provisions and invited those who had not done so to follow their example. Our preferred method, when dealing with the position of one country, was to look for 'best practice' examples from another country. By not demanding 'everything immediately from all countries' AWEPAA could confront developments in one country with those in another: 'If Denmark does not freeze to death after banning its large imports of South African coal, why can not country X, with a much smaller import from South Africa, do the same?'Or: 'If Belgium includes the export of refined oil products in its oil boycott, why does the Netherlands interpret the common ECpolicy in a minimalist way by only banning the export of crude oil and even excludes crude oil that is kept 'in bonded storage'and has not been formally imported?' (Answer: interests of Rotterdam port and traders?). More than once we were approached by members who had learnt about new measures in other countries and needed full details to advocate the same in their own country. Sometimes it was even a tactical advantage for them to work through AWEPAA: one early morning an MP from a Nordic country phoned the AWEPAA Secretariat for details about recent sanctions propositions in a neighbouring country, which we found most relevant for that country and for common Nordic positions. 'I would rather have this through you because we do not want to be seen as copying whatever our neighbours do, even if we like their policy. And if we use other channels to obtain our documentation it will be too late anyway, so can you do it fast because my parliamentary committee meets this afternoon.' We fortunately had received the original documents before they were even translated into English, so we sweated over the translation of the most relevant sections and hammered out a telex tape without too many typing errors (no computers with faxmodems in those days) only five minutes after the meeting was supposed to start. A few days later we received the resolution passed which showed a remarkable political and linguistic similarity to our selection and translation. To a certain extent the Nordic, US and Commonwealth example did have a positive effect. The fact that individual states had already unilaterally put some measures in place has not only preceded, but stimulated the inclusion of such measures into the joint packages of their own groupings, as well as the European Communities. Examples are bans on new investments, first introduced and strengthened by Norway and Sweden, followed by all Nordic states, France and eventually -though minimally and on a voluntary basis- by the whole EC. In addition to considerably diminishing South Africa's foreign exchange income, Danish and French bans on coal imports from South Africa and substitution by other suppliers helped countering the argument that the West could not afford such a ban and served as a near-successful example for the EC as a whole. There was an unexpected tactical aspect to this approach: some opponents of any sanctions at all used the argument that partial sanctions, imposed by only a few countries were ineffective, to prevent further measures by their own or by just a few countries. We did not disagree with the position of many politicians that sanctions, to be effective, should be as broadly supported as possible. But we maintained that such individual measures, though not ideal, were still be a positive development in the right direction which should not be blocked but used to convince other countries to join. Credible alibis and independent allies Whereas AWEPAA was anxious to reserve its independent judgment of Southern African developments, appropriate Western action and its own most effective tactics, we neither could nor would formulate our goals and opinions in the void. In particular, we carefully took the views of our friends in the Southern African region into account and tried to assess to what extent sanctions against South Africa were supported by those most concerned, the people of South Africa and Namibia itself. We did not accept as credible allies those politicians who had become involved in efforts in the 1980s to achieve credible political "reform" by instating a 'tricameral' system with representatives of the white, Asian and 'coloured' population. The same applied to leaders of the 'independent or self-governing homelands', such as Inkatha in Kwa-Zulu, led by Gatsha Buthelezi. This system maintained white supremacy and excluded the vast majority of the black South Africans. On the one hand this was an effort to accommodate internal resistance and international criticism and pressure, but it was of no avail: elections for the tricameral system were heavily boycotted and protests were equally joined by all 'non-whites', Asians, 'coloured' and black South Africans alike. So we liaised with more credible representatives of the South African people. Leaders of the liberation movements living in exile, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC) in South Africa and SWAPO in Namibia, could speak out freely in favour of sanctions and they did so eloquently and convincingly. Their demands (comprehensive and mandatory sanctions) may have gone beyond AWEPAA's more general approach, but neither side felt this as

LUSAKA, 1988 VISIT TO ANC FARM WITH THE LATE ANC PRESIDENT, OLIVER TAMBO BONN 1995: ARCHBISHOP DESMOND TUTU ADDRESSES AWEPA SEMINAR IN THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT a contradiction. Our attitude may have made AWEPAA acceptable to politicians who did not share the posiNEWS BULLETIN No.13, August 1987 tions of the liberation movements, but at the same time and more importantly, AWEPAA served as a channel SW APO President speaks in between those two sides who otherwise might have kept much greater disStrasbourg tne On 13 May 1987 the President of SWAPO, Sam Nujo- In order to establish the views of ma, addressed the AWEPAA conference held in the South African opinion leaders and the European Parliament. The following are some extracts population at large, liberation movefrom his speech: ments were not the only organisations "..Namibia is not free and our country continues to be to be consulted. In the absence of brutalised and devastated by the actions of racist South Africa's military occupation. The independence of Na- freely operating political parties, propmibia has been prolonged for too long. Whenever there er elections for the whole population is an attempt to force South Africa to leave Namibia, and unfettered freedom of organisathe Reagan Administration and the Thatcher Govern- tion and expression, other organisament have always vetoed any resolution in the U.N. Security Council thereby encouraging the regime to conti- tio ns functioned as 'party-substitutes', nue its illegal occupation of our country. The Bonn Go- to the extent that they could still, vernment has now rejoined this unholy coalition of though with considerable difficulty, South Africa's friends in the Security Council. exist legally and aboveground inside "We would like to know from the Western Govern- g y g ments collaborating with Pretoria as to what they pro- South Africa: churches, trade unions, pose to do about South Africa's intransigience? These human rights organisations. The leadcountries say they do not support armed struggle or ers of a broad range of such organisasanctions. What is the alternative they propose to end tions cooperated in the 1980s in the the evil apartheid system and illegal occupation in Na- UDF (United Democratic Front), mibia? "..Today, virtually all sections of the Namibian popu- which soon became the closest to a lation have come to realise that there will be no political real political party. Publicly speaking solution in Namibia without SWAPO's full participa- out in favour of sanctions has for tion: many years been a hazardous affair, endangering even their personal safety. For that reason they found it easier to share their real views with parliamentarians behind closed doors. This may have been interesting and convincing for those present at such confidential briefings, but it was difficult to quote such statements in public afterwards. In the mid-1980s, when the threat of Western sanctions became imminent as a reaction to increased internal repression, the issue could no longer be avoided in South African parliamentary debate and in the press. The restriction was more and more challenged but the 'S-word' still had to be avoided. So the South African Council of Churches in 1984 spoke out in favour of 'economicpressure',a message clear enough for anyone willing to listen. And Nobel Peace Prize winner Desmond Tutu, for many years hard to ignore as an advocate of sanctions, in early 1986 stated that 'punitive measures by the international community are a non-violent method to reach the aim of building a new South Africa, a nonracial, democratic and just society'' And public opinion? In an atmosphere of repression and absence of freedom of speech, would any respondent dare to speak out in favour of sanctions, when President Botha in May 1986 declared that it was his first priority to stop boycotts? In that same period, a newspaper survey found that 70 % of the black population were in favour of sanctions, which reconfirmed the conclusions of a poll in early 1985, when more than three quarter of the respondents supported the implementation of sanctions if apartheid were not abolished. Interestingly, the same percentage of employed blacks held the same opinion, in spite of the recognised effect on South African employment in some sectors. More important than the confirmation of AWEPAA's position was the fact that this attitude was reflected in the positions of the South African trade unions, the international bodies of which they were members and the national trade unions in Western countries. Being supported by South African organisations and public opinion is indispensable, but no reason to ignore the complexity of the debate on the economic, social and political consequences of sanctions. AWEPAA did take these issues seriously, on the basis of a similar attitude of its South African friends. This was clearly and constructively phrased in May 1986 by the usually cautious SACBC, the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference: '... economic pressure is the most effective non-violent form of pressure against the apartheid regime. 'The bishops showed concern about the suffering that some forms of economic pressure might cause, but 'against this we have to balance the enormity of the present suffering and rate of unemployment and the prospect for the future if the system of apartheid is not dismantled soon. The aim and purpose of economic pressure is to change our society so that the present sufferings may be removed together with the obstacles to unemployment deriving from the apartheid system.' In addition to the liberation movements, recognised by the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, we therefore liaised closely with these organisations, who managed to combine active opposition against apartheid with a legal existence inside South Africa and had a credible following amongst the majority of South Africans, both in their own right and as 'substitute political parties'. At the founding meeting of the AWEPAA section, in 1985 in the European Parliament, our main guest was Dr. Allan Boesak, patron of the UDF, who visited Europe on the invitation of the World Council of Churches and the Brusselsbased European Commission on Church and Society in the EC. Leaders of the South African Council of Churches and the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference like Dr. Beyers Naud , Dr. Frank Chikane and Br. Jude Pieterse became regular guests at our meetings; they organised broadly composed delegations to our events and hosted and co-organised AWEPAA visits to South Africa once such visits were allowed and politically acceptable to ourselves from 1989. NAMIBIA 1991: PRESIDENT NUJOMA, HON. SPEAKER TJITENDERO AND AWEPA PRESIDENT SCHOLTEN AT AWEPA CONFERENCE IN NAMIBIAN PARLIAMENT

ANC SANCTIONS SPECIALIST (NOW: SPEAKER OF SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENT) DR. FRENE GINWALA WITH DR. BEYERS NAUDE, SOUTH AFRICAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES FROM* AWEPA BULLETIN, APRIL/MAY 1986 PFP leader Van Zyl Slabbert: Botha wants to reform, not abolish apartheid At a meeting early April, called by the United Democratic Front in Johannesburg and attended by a predominantly white audience, former PFP opposition leader Van Zyl Slabbert accused the ruling National Party that it had no intention to scrap apartheid. He declared that pressure for change would not come from inside the present parliamentary structure with its racially segregated chambers, which are based on apartheid and make the inclusion of blacks constitutionally impossible. He said that the pressure for change was being generated outside parliament: black students and workers and anxious businessmen. He urged whites to abolish apartheid, including current legislation, which divides South Africans into distinct racial groups. On the question of black violence he said: "Historically there was apartheid before there was this violence. The violence of apartheid generated the violence of the resistance against this system. The only way of breaking through this cycle of violence is the destruction of apartheid." In February, Dr Slabbert had resigned as the leader of the Progressive Federal Party, the opposition in the white chamber of parliament, because "the government has no serious plans to implement fundamental changes and because a peaceful future is impossible without immediate and direct negotiations with the -still banned- ANC. AWEPAA did not only liaise with South African organisations which had a similar position on sanctions. For some, it was an issue outside the scope of their activity, such as the Human Rights Council and the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in South Africa (IDASA), whose leader Dr. Frederik van Zyl Slabbert had left parliament and played a crucial role in bringing the National Party and the ANC together at the same negotiation table. His former party, the Democratic Party, was relevant for AWEPAA because it functioned as the white, anti- apartheid opposition inside the apartheid parliament and was a sincere and recognised advocate of democratic government. This party had never supported the call for sanctions but at a visit by a small AWEPAA delegation to its leaders in 1989 there proved to be enough common ground on other issues. It was the period in which debates on sanctions mostly centred around the question whether, for which aim and on which conditions they should be lifted. To our positive AWEPAA APPEAL TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY On request of the Greek Minister in charge of European Affairs, Mr. Pangalos, AWEPAA has submitted a memorandum on EC policies on Southern Africa to the EC Presidency, currently held by Greece. Main points of the memorandum are: SANCTIONS NAMIBIA Coordination with USA, Commonwealth and Nordic countries The European Parliament has repeatedly demanded that EC sanctions should reach the levels adopted by the USA, the Commonwealth and the Nordic countries and should be coordinated with them. The rapid evolution in the USA regarding sanctions has profound implications for European countries and companies. This makes coordination even more important, primarily through adopting further joint measures by the EC member states. Equally urgent are comprehensive implementation -and intensification where necessary- of the current joint EC measures. Extension of the current EC sanctions package Banning the importation of COAL OF SA ORIGIN has the highest priority. This was the most substantial measure considered in 1986, but finally opposed by a small minority of member states. Furthermore, the EC and its member states should a.o. - Ban RESCHEDULING OF OLD LOANS AND EXTENSION OF NEW LOANS to the SA government, - Oppose NEW IMF LOANS to South Africa, - Ban the import of AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS and of - MINERAL PRODUCTS of South African origin, - Suspend all AIR TRAFFIC with South Africa, -Downgrade bilateral DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION, - Terminate existing no-VISA agreements with South Africa. Making current EC sanctions more effective: The report by Mrs. Barbara Simons, adopted by the European Parliament, gives examples how the scope and implementation of the current EC measures should be widened and improved, in order to obtain a more effective implementation: -the OIL EMBARGO, to be widened to a ban on ENERGY SUPPLY, the ban on NUCLEAR COOPERATION, the ban on IRON and STEEL imports, the ban on new INVESTMENTS, the ARMS embargo, measures to prevent EVASION of current sanctions, implementation through Community LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, - application of all measures to NAMIBIA. Implementation of current EC positions on Namibia implies a.o. An active EC policy to secure Namibia's immediate INDEPENDENCE in accordance with UNSC resolution 435 (1978), -Close cooperation with the UN COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA Application to Namibia of all SANCTIONS against South Africa, - Measures against exploitation of Namibian natural resources, as laid down in DECREE NO 1 of the UN Council for Namibia. COOPERATION WITH SADCC AND THE FRONTLINE STATES Both in the context of development cooperation with SADCC and of sanctions against South Africa, the EC and its member states should broaden their cooperation to accommodate new needs as well as improve the implementation of existing programs: - Appropriate forms of ASSISTANCE TO SECURITY forces, -Destabilisation relief measures, a.o. compensatory funds and assistance to REFUGEES and DISPLACED PERSONS, -Participation in the Regional FOOD RESERVE Fund, - Promotion of European private INVESTMENTS and SADCC EXPORTS, -Support to improvement of TRANSPORT and COMMUNICATIONS and increased use of SADCC ports and railways, - Innovative DEBT RELIEF measures, - Inclusion of appropriate provisions in the ACP-EEC CONVENTION (Lome-4). surprise, DP leader Zach de Beer stated in autumn 1991, according to press reports: 'We oppose boycotts, but now that they are there, Europe must be careful in choosing the moment of lifting.' AWEPAA's objections to premature lifting of existing sanctions found support from an even more unexpected side, from within a company which had been the main target of the European and North American campaign for an oil embargo. According to press reports, Shell-SA director Mr. Kilroe stated that the Western world should not immediately lift all sanctions against South Africa. He was more in favour of a 'carrot and stick approach' with gradual lifting of sanctions and said that he understood the appeal of Nelson Mandela to maintain sanctions: 'He is afraid that the process of full abolition of apartheid will otherwise be stopped, we must take that fear seriously.' And Philips' Bruce MacKenzie stated in 1992: '1 opposed sanctions initially but have changed my mind. They were necessary to make the Afrikaner think. Nothing has been more effective in doing so than the economic and sports sanctions.' That was an encouraging statement for all those, including AWEPAA, who had maintained all along that implementing sanctions is a positive contribution to the abolition of apartheid, though it may be farfetched to conclude that Shell and Philips were now agreeing with their year-long opponents in retrospect. Sanclions, Vanibia and the Frontline States In itself, the situation inside South Africa supplied more than sufficient arguments in favour of strengthening economic sanctions but AWEPAA has from its very beginning derived them equally from the illegal South African occupation of Namibia. Our May 1985 seminar in Washington, supported by the UN Council for Namibia and co-organised with US Congress (Senator Edward Kennedy and the Subcommittee on Africa of the House of Representatives), equally dealt with Namibia and South Africa. The continued illegal occupation of Namibia was the immediate background of a resolution by the UN Security Council in June, which was not mandatory but called for stopping new investments in South Africa, re-examining maritime and aerial relations, the prohibition of the Krugerrand and other gold coins and restrictions in the field of sports and cultural relations. Only one month later the Security Council adopted a resolution with furthergoing recommendations, as a reaction to the imposition of the state of emergency in South Africa. Our first European conference focusing on Namibia, in 1986 in Rome, based itself on the June 1985 Security Council resolution and AWEPAA has been active on the issue of Namibian independence ever since. With regard to sanctions, this implied that sanctions against South Africa should not only be advocated because of the situation inside South Africa itself, but equally because of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. For that very same reason, sanctions should also be applied to Namibia itself as long as South Africa maintained its occupation of that country. This was an addition to the demand for implementation of Decree no 1 of the UN Council for Namibia, which prohibited trade of Namibian natural resources (mainly uranium and Karakul wool) As an issue, interrelated to South African apartheid and the occupation of Namibia, support to the Frontline States, South Africa's immediate and nearby neighbours, was the third main point on AWEPAA's agenda. In the debates around sanctions, the position of the Frontline States was another relevant consideration, parallel to the discussion around the economic effect on the population of South Africa itself. Opponents of sanctions usually stressed their economic dependence and vulnerability. Sanctions advocates, including AWEPAA, maintained that

BRUSSELS 1995: PROF. PINHEIRO (LEFT), EU COMMISSIONER, AT AWEPA COLLOQUIUM ON MOZAMBIQUE IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, WITH AWEPA VICE-PRESIDENT MS. GLENYS KINNOCK, MEP (RIGHT) anything that would negatively affect the strength of the South African government was good for the neighbouring countries. Indeed, frequent South African aggression against its neighbours, directly or through South African- supported internal rebellion, was often invoked as an additional reason to impose sanctions. This attitude was supported by the governments of the Frontline States themselves, though they requested our understanding that they were less than any other country capable of cutting off their own economic relations with South Africa. In their regular contact with the European Communities the Frontline States supported a firm EC sanctions policy and openly expressed their disappointment about the very limited EC packages adopted in 1985 and 1986. A very concrete contribution to AWEPAA's sanctions campaign was the initiative by the Speaker of the Parliament of Zimbabwe, Didymus Mutasa, who in 1987 collected signatures of his colleagues from all over Southern Africa in support of a European coal boycott against South Africa, which the EC had not included in its 1986 sanctions packages in spite of earlier indications that it might do so. AWEPAA took care of the European side of this joint action and in the end hundreds of signatures were collected. Whereas any Western politician, including those who opposed sanctions against South Africa, would easily agree to support to the Frontline States, it was more difficult to develop a common line as to whether the Frontline States should be supplied with the means which would enable them to defend themselves better against South African aggression and destabilisation. In their contacts with AWEPAA, their representatives raised this issue on the first possible occasion, a conference in Amsterdam in autumn 1985, when the first AWEPAA Board meeting since the founding conference was held. The debate flared up again in 1986, after new South African actions across its borders. At an AWEPAA working session in the European Parliament, the military

PARLIAMENT OF ZIMBABWE P.O. BOX 8055 CAUSEWAY Mr Jan Nico Szholten President of AWEPAA P 0 Box 402 2501 CK The Hague Netherlands 16 June 1987 Dear Mr President, Enclosed is a petition calling for an EEC boycott of South African coal. This comes as a result of the growing concern among parliamentarians over the lack of positive policies by the EEC on sanctions against South Africa. The petition has been signed by presiding officers from Botswana, Gambia, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. I kindly request you, on behalf of my colleagues, to forward this petition to the EEC authorities. With best wishes. Yours sincerely, D N E Mutasa SPEAKER Enc Call for EC boycott of South African coal The undersigned, members of parliament in ...... Express their concern about the deteriorating situation in South Africa. Welcome the broad range of economic sanctions imposed by the USA, the Common. wealth and the Nordic countries, one of which is a boycott of South African coal, Express their concern that the European Communities lags far behind other countries of the Western world in their sanctions policies, thus defacto undermining the effectiveness of these politices, Note that coal is among the main earners of foreign exchange for South Africa, only second to gold, CALL UPON THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE EC TO DECLARE AND IMPLEMENT A BOYCOTT OF COAL ORIGINATING IN SOUTH %FRICA...... °°o°°* ...... , ame: Party: AWEPAA Association of West Euwopn Psdianentariin for Action against Apartheid CALL FOR AN EBC BOYCOT OF SOUTH AFRICAN COAL The undersiened, members of parliament in Express their concern about the deteriorating situation in South Africa. Welcome the broad range of economic sanct-ons imposed by the USA, the Comnonwealth and the Nordic countries, one of which ir a boycott of South African coal, Express their concern that the Europea Economic Comunity laos far behind other countrios of the Western world ir their svJ:-t-ons oclices. thius ft 11 underoiring the effectiveness of then. Fou':ces, Note that coal is ameng the main earnere of fore-ip excannge for South Africa. only second to gold. CALL UPON' THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF 3"E EE 1l DECLRE AIM THPLVEXT A BOiCOrT OF COAL ORIGINATING IN SOLIH A;TNIA. N d ame. Ph tj Sin re: 2)AcJ) oe2 0 AWEPAAOe: P.O. ftx4 2 01 CK The Hge. NathsO Anf. Phone 1020| 6..639wf 0M0) 1.49.1t Mr SPEAKER

AWEPAA Plan of Action in support of SADCC and the Frontline States The following outlines AWEPAA's Plan of Action in support of SADCC and the Frontline States. This was adopted after a year of preparation, including extensive consultation with SADCC authorities and a debate on key sectors of SADOC at the seminar for parliamentarians held in Strasbourg in May 1987. While the following steps have been called for by the SADCC states, their fundamental request remains an urgent need for international pressure to remove the system of Apartheid. Objective The basic objective of the Plan of Action is to promote development and progress for the peoples of the SADCC region. The SADCC states not only face conditions common to Third World nations, but have also fallen victim to South Africa's policy of regional destabilisation: a policy which has systematically undermined regional development programmes; caused immense human suffering and kept the majority-ruled states dependent on the Apartheid regime. The Guidelines for Action set out below aim to mobilise the AWEPAA membership around this central objective. Guidelines for Action A AID AND TRADE * SADCC states are in urgent need of increased aid from Western states. Aid should be granted under conditions more favourable to the SADCC region. * The EC should be pressed to increase allocations to the SADCC region, since funds under Lome-Ill have already been fully allocated up to 1990, and are unable to address currently arising needs. " All committed funds should be disbursed as rapidly as possible. Parliamentary vehicles for monitoring disbursement of funds should be established. " In response to the present situation in the SADCC region, key projects have been put forward for special attention. In particular, support is urged for the Regional Food Reserve Fund, and the rehabilitation of major transport routes. Use of SADCC products and services " Donor funded imports should make use of SADCC ports and railways, not South African transport links. " Aid-funded projects should purchase SADCC commodities and services wherever possible. Promotion of SADCC trade and industry " SADCC products should be given better access to European markets. " Specific support should be provided for the proposed SADCC Export Credit Facility and Export PreFinancing Revolving Fund. B GOVERNMENT POLICY WITH REGARD TO SADCC " Western governments should develop clear regional Southern Africa programmes, reviewed annually in consultation with SADCC. Such policy programmes could base themselved on the model provided by the EC/SADCC regional indicative programmes, or the NORDIC/SADCC cooperation. " Governments need to streamline their procedures of cooperation and align them more with those of SADCC. Western embassy and aid staff should be adequately briefed on SADCC procedures and priorities. C SECURITY " Western governments should provide more help in reinforcing the defensive capabilities of the Frontline States, in order to protect SADCC countries against South African aggression. (The UK government, for example, is among the few Western countries which currently do so, by training Mozambican officers). " Western governments should make available special funding to compensate SADCC states for the costs of South African destabilisation and other retaliatory measures. D PARLIAMENTARY ACTION AWEPAA members are urged to: * raise the above matters within their parliaments, * establish the means to monitor progress on the disbursement of funds to the SADCC states, and press for action if delays occur, " urge the formation of parliamentary sub-committees to monitor government policy on aid to the SADCC states (as a follow-up to data gathered in AWEPAA's 'Notes on Western Aid to the SADCC states' - see May bulletin), * meet informally on a regular basis with SADOC Ambassadors to review ongoing cooperation programmes and to obtain up-to-date information. * AWEPAA delegations should request meetings with the EC commissioner for Development, Mr Lorenzo Natali, as well as the current chairperson of the Council of Development Cooperation of the Twelve, to present their concerns regarding the urgency of support to SADCC. Conference in SADCC Region In close cooperation with parliaments of the SADCC states, preparations are underway for a parliamentarians' working seminar to be held in the SADOC region early in 1988. Parliamentarians attending from Western countries will have a unique opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge of SADCC's own Programme of Action, and further assess the role for Europe in the development of the SADCC region. and security situation in the whole region was reviewed: what was needed was strengthening and improved implementation of the existing mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, economic self-sufficiency and reduced dependence on South Africa of neighbouring countries. 'Contingency planning for further South African destabilisation is needed as well as political commitment to the safety of these countries, where Western donors have so FROM. AWEPA BULLETIN, FEBRUARY 1988 Mozambique: NORWAY CONSIDERS SEMI-MILITARY SUPPORT In Norwegian Parliament the Spokesman on Southern Africa of the ruling Labour Party, Mr. Thor-Eirik Gulbrandsen this month raised the issue of support to Mozambique in the light of the growing destabilisation of that country. He mentioned that Norway, compared to other countries, is in the forefront in supplying general development aid to the Frontline States, but with regard to semi-military support to Mozambique lags far behind countries like Spain, the United Kingdom and the European Community. He suggested that Norway should supply such civil-military aid as communications equipment, uniforms and the like to defend Norwegian interests and investments in Mozambique. The Minister of Development Cooperation, Ms. Vesla Vetlesen stated that Mozambique had, in the light of the deteriorating situation, approached Norway and other Western countries to obtain support for its security and defence equipment, with the exclusion of arms. She will investigate the possibilities for such support in cooperation with the other Nordic countries. Security assistance: A BREAKTHROUGH The issue of security around development projects has now moved to the centre stage of discussions. For over a year already, the United Kingdom is training Mozambican army cadres, first in Zimbabwe but now also in Mozambique. Assistance is also rendered to Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana and Lesotho. The French government was also reported to be prepared to supply military hardware to Mozambique. Portugal has agreed to support Mozambique in the military field, e.g. upgrading its military infrastructure (barracks, bunkers etc.) which still dates from the time of Portuguese colonial rule. A high-level military delegation visited Mozambique in January of this year. In the fall of 1987 a breakthrough occurred. First Spain announced in October that its Guardia Civil will train Mozambican village guards. Shortly afterwards the European Community signed an agreement with Mozambique about the use of Lom6III funds, in which one article allows part of the funds to be used on 'defense expenditure of as civil nature', e.g. food, clothing, shelter and fuel for the security personnel guarding rural projects. Significantly, none of the EC member states has raised objections to this. It will be interesting to see, what policy individual EC members will adopt on this issue. Sweden already announced early in January 1988 that it is drawing up criteria and guidelines for civil (nonlethal) defense support. The Development Minister of Denmark was reported to have expressed his reluctance. His colleague from the Netherlands did the same but did not explicitly exclude military support to the Frontline States: If the whole donor community moves in that direction, the Netherlands possibly can not stay behind after all. many development projects, which are directly threatened.' The complex interrelationship between sanctions against South Africa, development cooperation with and strategic support to the Frontline States was thoroughly addressed in another seminar in the European Parliament, in May 1987. Speakers included Foreign Minister (now: Prime Minister) Pascoal Mocumbi of Mozambique who called for help to reinforce the defensive capability of the Frontline States in order to reduce their vulnerability to the aggression carried out by South Africa. This demand was included in AWEPAA's action plan in support of SADCC and the Frontline states, which also referred to their fundamental demand for international pressure to remove the apartheid system. Another recommendation was special funding by Western governments to compensate SADCC states for the costs of South African destabilisation and other retaliatory measures. Considering that the United Kingdom was one of the staunchest opponents to sanctions against South Africa, one of AWEPAA's key policy aims, it was ironical that the UK was an early ally with regard to military support to the Frontline States. The UK was the first European country to extend such support, by training first Zimbabwean and then Mozambican officers. Convincing Western politicians, who were our best supporters on other issues, of the need to include military aspects in support to the Frontline States, usually was a delicate mission. This was especially the case in the Nordic countries, which otherwise were Southern Africa's best friends in the fields of sanctions against South Africa and support to liberation movements and neighbouring countries. AWEPAA sections played a crucial role in Nordic parliamentary debates, especially in Norway and Sweden. The breakthrough came in autumn 1987 when more countries followed the UK example and started supplying strategic support of some kind. The EC allowed Mozambique to use part of its funds 'on defense expenditure of a civil nature' such as food, clothing, shelter and fuel for the security personnel, guarding rural projects. But Angola, which suffered more from South African aggression than any other country, was explicitly excluded from these developments. No less ironically, developments in that country ultimately proved the effectiveness of sanctions against South Africa as a means to reduce its ability to undermine frontline states, in combination with military support to them. In 1989 the South African army suffered defeat in the air war over Angola, partly because it did not dispose of sophisticated modern equipment to match the equipment of the Angolan - Cuban forces. This defeat proved decisive for enforcing a breakthrough in the process of Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. South African war fatigue in Angola and Namibia, resilience of the Frontline States, international diplomatic and economic pressure thus added to the growing awareness in South Africa among leading political and economic circles that the tide of internal opposition to apartheid could no longer be stemmed. I ired .'ation s The power of the United Nations in implementing sanctions was limited in the direct sense of the word, as there was no agreement among the five permanent members of the Security Council on the mandatory implementation of sanctions. Only the arms embargo was mandatory since 1977. The adoption of furthergoing mandatory sanctions would be vetoed in the Security Council by one or more Western permanent members. Other resolutions adopted by the Security Council or the General Assembly were not legally binding to any national government, even if it had voted in favour, but they had considerable political and moral potential. Every year the General Assembly at its autumn session adopted a set of resolutions on South Africa with usually a consensus resolution with rather general wordings on sanctions in order to win the vote of most Western countries. Other resolutions, asking for more specific and stronger sanctions, were adopted with large majorities but without the support of many Western countries. In several instances, Nordic and some other countries like Commonwealth members Canada, Australia and New Zealand were notable exceptions to this reluctance. For AWEPAA these UN positions were a useful tool in its contacts with governments and parliamentarians so we made a great effort in distributing resolutions and declarations and in producing summaries and comments of General Assembly votes. Parliamentarians referred to these documents in dealings with their own governments. The most interesting resolutions were those supported by their governments but subsequently not implemented on a voluntary basis or when they could question why a government had not supported a certain resolution. The most blatant case of divergence between voting behaviour in the UN and actual policy occurred in 1990, when EC member states had agreed to support a General Assembly resolution, which called for keeping sanctions in place until profound and irreversible changes in South Africa had taken place. A few days before the vote, when diplomatic agreement on the final text had already been reached, they had done exactly the opposite and lifted some EC sanctions. Special Committee against Apartheid With regard to sanctions and South African in general, the most important UN agency was the Special Committee against Apartheid and its executive office, the Centre against Apartheid. In fact, the Special Committee has more or less been at the cradle of AWEPAA. In the early 1980s it had supported and co-organised sev- eral international meetings where Western parliamentarians were present and which can, in retrospect, be considered as the early versions of organised international involvement of Western parliamentarians. The Special Committee was coorganiser of the 1982 conference in The Hague where the basis for setting up AWEPAA was laid and it facilitated its founding conference in 1984. AWEPAA and the Special Committee usefully cooperated in strengthening contacts with various governments and parliaments, especially through visits by its Chairman to Southern Europe and the European Parliament. Many AWEPAA events have been attended and co-sponsored by the Special Committee, which was well aware of the urgency to mobilise Western parliamentarians to stimulate or oppose their governments. In New York, the UN Centre against Apartheid became a rich source of information, advice and practical help. Documentation on the state of sanctions implementation was exchanged and AWEPAA's comprehensive summaries were reprinted and distributed by the Centre. Concil for .Nmibia AWEPAA's cooperation with the UN Council of Namibia has been equally constructive, obviously on their specific subject but also generally in our founding phase. Though the public sanctions debate usually remained limited to application to South Africa, is was an equally important aspect with regard to South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia, as was repeatedly stressed by the Namibian liberation movement SWAPO. The Council's support has been particularly important in AWEPAA's efforts to develop its relations with the US Senate and House of Representatives at the Washington Seminar on Namibia and Apartheid in 1985. The seminar served as a background for participating members of the Council for their input into the debate in the UN Security Council, resulting in the adoption of resolution 566 on Namibia, which recommended bans on new investment in South Africa and other measures, which paved the way, one month later, for resolution 569 on South Africa, in which further sanctions were recommended. The Council also supported AWEPAA's first main event in Southern Europe, the 1986 conference on Namibia in Rome, which laid the basis for our multi-party section in the Italian parliament and intensification of our contacts in other Mediterranean countries. V " liaison offices AWEPAA developed a very CENTRE DES NATIONS UNIES special relationship with -- CORTRE t'APARTHIDr~ the UN representation in COl IE ULAPARTEIDI L Brussels, which co-organNOTES ET DOCUMENTS' ised visits of UN dignitaries Oto.... and generally helped us to .....J.DIO M SD ...... co. open doors, especially in D., uD. our early days. The Brussels ...... du-,, t .ir- 6-1aedimpil.....t.,. d, office also facilitated the ...... Idistribution of the English Dote~~~~~~~ 1,Dn dcmn s pbs ~ deomde di Comiti spmoiol ctrean l.eiott., d. iA Co 4- : ...... p l r es i... d.. ppi.-e . and French versions of a ocidentoun, pour Do'l$ plonent des senctilo unuhatirole$ co,,t~oe *fliue i du.. en.ttod ..t qu C il d.A. - d d. d,. . .. .tio. U.n.. study by experts in impose des mletIlo qencrale et 00bliqotoinee. Jusqu'b prdmeot, le C~neiI de m doui .. P .,Vt. t .e te.. C e, ...... , . . o d...... te .... International Law on the occudettum metbees pDrmanento de net oone. .d... - ....ee...... to .. t a ... ct.... . legal admissibility of ecotd -0. Dtt..6m oquoot uidsque. IA r-eett d .... nt i DO nomic sanctions against o no au.tD lAsentle per u. 1rtu*e d'u.n.e.oit.t eonui.and.e no.mic against gpdnsO, ...... do.d ...t t .. u.. D ...... South Africa. Sanctions o...... o eaprinq q- e, ou.eu.. .; supporters who were faced with the argument that existing obligations under international law (EC treaty, GATT etc.) made it impossible for individual countries to impose sanctions which were non- mandatory in the UN context, thus had an authoritative analysis to defend their case.

MS. GRACA MACHEL, AWEPA FACT-FINDING MISSION TO MOZAMBIQUE REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZIMBABWE, APRIL 1990 AWEPAA staff once signed the umpteenth telex on the ever-changing travel requests of the Chairman of the Special Committee a little self-cynically with 'AWEPAA travel department'. The Brussels UN staff understood the hidden message that the secretary-general was totally engaged to get things in order. Her diplomat-boss interpreted the text differently: he said how impressed he was that apparently the AWEPAA office had already set up several specialised departments, only a few months after its foundation. Nobody questioned or denied that, no doubts were raised, most capitals were visited, governments and parliaments were met as planned and travel arrangements have remained a mixed blessing for the AWEPAA secretariat ever since. Commonwealth For an organisation of West European parliamentarians dealing with Third World issues, the most interesting aspect of the Commonwealth is its mixed composition. In addition to the former colonial power United Kingdom its members include both independent countries in (Southern) Africa and 'Western' countries Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The latter three countries turned out, even under centre-right governments, to be much more supportive of sanctions and other forms of firm pressure on South Africa than the UK. The Southern African Commonwealth members were a driving force behind the efforts to reach joint Commonwealth positions and policies beyond the very limited measures which the UK would really prefer. The Commonwealth also became an authoritative voice through their high level fact-finding missions to South Africa and expert studies on the actual implementation and potential for sanctions. This gave an added value to the participation of Commonwealth representatives at our meetings and contacts in European coun- tries, especially with centre-right governments and parliamentarians. A very fruitful aspect of AWEPAA - Commonwealth cooperation was the Commonwealth Expert Group in which AWEPAA was represented. Documentation on sanctions implementation was fully shared, exchanged and analyzed, drafts of conclusions and recommendations were thoroughly disUJnfinished cussed at meetings with the Commonwealth Secretariat. This very Business effective and practical project was at the basis of the decisions of Commonwealth governments which in turn had their impact on debates in the EC. Whatever limited sanctions the United Kingdom has ever implemented, they were mostly embattled in the context of the Commonwealth, rather than the European Communities where the UK could be much more effective in blocking common measures or simply not apply what was agreed. Western support groups Organised Western solidarity with South Africa's anti-apartheid struggle, APARTHEID AFTER APARTHEID Namibian independence and South Africa's neighbouring countries has been a multi-faceted phenomenon, in african which varied sectors of society had :5european AWEPAA their role to play. Most anti-apartheid and Southern African solidarity groups were founded in the 1960s or 70s, when other parts of what is now often called 'civil society' such as development organisations, churches, human rights groups and trade unions also became increasingly involved in the subject. That was well before, it is fair to say, AWEPAA was founded as a specific organisation of parliamentarians, whose primary target group were their colleagues and governments. Whereas AWEPAA as a permanent structure was a relative newcomer in the field, its leading members, staff and external experts were not: many of them had their own political and professional record of close cooperation with and involvement in either of these organisations. Rightly or wrongly it was only in the late 1970s and early 1980s that Southern Africa and sanctions against South Africa became hot issues on the agenda of most governments and parliaments. This was reflected in the involvement of parliamentarians in various aspects of anti-apartheid activities. So the involvement of politicians was a natural development in the broadening international solidarity with Southern Africa. Instead of monopolising contacts with parliamentarians and governments or even taking over these contacts from other organisations, AWEPAA has been functional in broadening and deepening this political interplay. Against the initial suspicion of a few old hands in the field, AWEPAA's cooperation and consultation with other organisations, each of them with their particular identity, priorities and style, has proven to be mutually useful and a contribution to the common goal. They mostly appreciated the value of a 'single target group' organisation, which could effectively contribute to the common cause by being broad and moderate in style and political positions. This applied both to countries with a long time and strong tradition of Southern

African solidarity movements and to countries where this was less developed, mostly in Southern European countries. Exchange of information on government policies, identification of politicians worth contacting and potentially fruitful political initiatives were the common denominator of good working relations with AWEPAA and most solidarity movements. The political broadness of AWEPAA's positions and style was the basis of the involvement and cooperation of politicians from varied backgrounds, which enabled some other organisations to establish their own contacts with political circles, which otherwise would have been more difficult to approach. Throughout its existence AWEPAA has constructively cooperated with a number of like-minded organisations in Western Europe and North America: anti- apartheid and other 'civil society' organisations. The following list is a selection of organisations with whom we worked in particular in our initial years: a The Danish Association for International Cooperation: the local co-organiser of our founding conference in Danish Parliament. m SIDA - Swedish International Development Authority: gave initial financial support, after mediation of Swedish parliamentarians. This enabled AWEPAA to set up a small permanent office and broke the ground for support by numerous other (para-)statal agencies or parliaments. a The Program to Combat Racism of the World Council of Churches (Geneva): gave initial financial support and supplied expertise on investments in and financial relations with South Africa. m Holland Committee on Southern Africa: sanctions seminar at their autumn 1985 conference 'Apartheid and Southern Africa: the West European Response'. m Shipping Research Bureau (Netherlands): research on oil supplies to and (with Kairos - Christians against Apartheid) coal imports from South Africa. m CIIR - Catholic Institute for International Relations (United Kingdom): joint EC-funded information programme on SADCC. m Norwegian Committee on Southern Africa: its contact group in Parliament became the nucleus of the Norwegian AWEPAA section. m World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa (Norway): research and political advise on military-nuclear matters and general political developments in Southern Africa. m ELTSA - End Loans to South Africa (United Kingdom): research on Western investments in and general financial relations with South Africa.

* Impact assessment: AWEPAA's contribution to western sanctions How effective have AWEPAA's campaigns for sanctions against South Africa been, as a contribution to the abolition of apartheid? Effectiveness is a broad concept which needs to be analyzed on at least three distinct levels: a. AWEPAA's contribution to the introduction of sanctions by West European countries b. the effect of sanctions on the economy of South Africa c. the political impact of this economic effect and of the prospect of further sanctions in South Africa. Here one should distinguish between several sections of South African society, such as the ruling, mostly Afrikaner political elite and their electorate or the black, disenfranchised majority. European and other 11estern parliamentarians and gov'ernenlts The participants list of AWEPAA's 1984 founding conference has disappeared, what we do have is the 18 names of the members of the board, then called 'working group' from 14 West European countries and parliaments, including the European Parliament. No less relevant for what AWEPAA wanted to become, is the width of political opinion represented. By September 1985 AWEPAA had active contact persons and dozens of members in 16 national parliaments and the European Parliament. Within two years of its foundation, membership had grown to more than a 1000. It soon surpassed the 1,500 mark where it has stabilised until the early 1990s with members from all member states of the Council of Europe (in its composition, before Central European countries started to join). More significantly, the substantial and increasing number of members from the centre-right side of the political spectrum illustrated the growing European consensus on the need of more pressure on South Africa and AWEPAA's ability to give political and organisational shape to this tendency. In the early years, members mostly came from national parliaments in the EC member states and the European Parliament, plus the non-EC, Nordic states Sweden, Norway and Finland. The choice of Copenhagen to hold the founding conference was deliberate, as Denmark was both an EC and a Nordic country. In Northern Europe, there was already a great interest in Southern Africa among politicians, NGOs and the population in general and there was (and remained) a greater receptiveness of governments for stronger sanctions policies than anywhere else in Europe. It was our hope that Denmark would serve as a transmission belt of some kind of Nordic policy developments towards the European Communities. We also anticipated that the relative consensus across the full political spectrum in most Nordic countries would be helpful in assuring active participation by an equally broad range of politicians from other European countries. In most Southern European countries it was not such plain sailing to broaden the AWEPAA membership in numbers and political range and to establish a regular pattern of working relations with contact persons in an AWEPAA section. It is FROM. AWEPA BULLETIN, NOVEMBER 1985 West Europeans, Americans join forces On May 22-23, 1985 AWEPAA organised, in cooperation with US Senator Kennedy and with the Subcommittee on Africa of the US House of Representatives, the Atlantic Seminar on Namibia and Apartheid. Parliamentarians from the European Parliament and the West European and Canadian national parliaments met in Washington DC, USA, held consultations with their US counterparts and exchanged information on the positions of their governments and parliaments. To help coordinate parliamentary action for the liberation of Southern Africa, an Atlantic Contact Group for Action again.t Apartheid was formed. Regarding Namibia, the participants welcomed the legal action in national courts by the UN Council for Namibia against persons and organisations, involved in the illegal exploitation of Namibia's natural resources. They call for recognition by all governments of the Council as Namibia's legal authority, for implementation of the Council's Decree no. I on the protection of the natural resources of Namibia and they welcome initiatives in the US Congress towards such implementation. An end should be put to all imports, transport and processing of Namibian uranium. As a reaction to the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa and the installation of a so-called interim government, the participants call for and will assist in bringing meaningful economic pressure to bear on South Africa. They will further assist in obtaining aid and assistance for the Namibian people and their liberation struggle, under the leadership of SWAPO. Regarding South Africa, the participants note that it is caught in a double crisis: Apartheid is proving to be too expensive and the government failed to end black urban unrest. South Africa therefore is more vulnerable than ever to sanctions, both psychologically and economically. They will therefore attempt to enforce sanctions as a contribution to the struggle against Apartheid, such as: strengthening the arms embargo and ending all nuclear collaboration tightening the existing oil embargo by national legislation and working for a UN imposed, mandatory oil embargo bans on investments in and loans to South Africa and on the import of Krugerrands and coal from South Africa ending of sports and cultural links, limiting visas to South Africans and granting asylum to those refusing to serve in the South African army. The participants particularly appealed on the US Congress to get the US government to take concrete steps, to force South Africa to abandon Apartheid by implementing extensive economic sanctions. difficult to generalise on the causes of this phenomenon, but the following come to mind: there is no political consensus with regard to sanctions, political primacy lays mostly with governments rather than with parliaments, certainly on foreign affairs, there is a stronger tradition of not crossing party lines, especially between parties in opposition and those in government. From a very early stage of AWEPAA's activities, Italy has been the surprising exception to this general Southern European pattern. Crossing government- opposition barriers in Parliament, AWEPAA members from most parties were actively cooperating politically with excellent staff support. Slight linguistic problems of communication were easily overcome, with a little rivalry between some staff members on either side of the phone line, as to who was worst in speaking the working language of the other. The result was that AWEPAA organised its first full-fledged parliamentary conference in Rome in June 1986, with substantial support by the Italian parliament and government, which set a very useful precedent for material and practical support in various forms whenever AWEPAA organised a conference or seminar in a European capital. I'S, Though not a European country, the USA was of particular importance for European sanctions policy in 1985 1986 because of the good prospects that the majority of both houses of Congress would overrule President Reagan's opposition to far reaching sanctions against South Africa. One of the first visits after founding AWEPAA was to members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in March 1985, which paved the way for a seminar on Namibia and Apartheid in May

NEWS from The Subcommittee on Africa CONGRESSMAN HOWARD WOLPE CHAIRMAN 705 Houe Annex I U.S. House of Represeltatives WasNgloe. D.C. 20515 Conhct Sah Booker: 228-707 EUR'opE CAN AND U.N. DELEGATION ARRIVE IN UASSINCIU Following this Tuesday's historic debate on sanctions legislation against South Africa (HR 1460 - The Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985), Members of Congress will have an opportunity to discuss the possibilities of similar measures being adopted by U.S. allies when they meet with a delegation of prominent West European and Canadian Parliamentarians, representatives of the U.N. Council for Nsamibia, and Hr. Andimba Tolvo la Toivo, the patriarch of the Namibian independence struggle and Secretary General of SWAPO, recently released from 16 years in South African prison on Robben Island. MEETING TO DISCUSS SANCTIONS, 3:30 PM, RM. 2200 RAYBURN Members of Congress and the visiting delegation will discuss possible joint actions that Western Democraciea could pursue vis-a-via apartheid and South Africa!s illegal occupation of Namibia. Members of the European delegation are extremely interested in the current efforts in the U.S. Congress to impose a variety of economic restrictions on South Africa. Sweden has already adopted a policy of no new investments in South Africa. THE EUROPEAN. CANADIAN,.U.N. AND SWAPO DELEGATION MILL INCLUDE: Jan Nico SCIIOLfEN, Netherlands (Christian Democrat); Donald ANDERSON, United Kingdom (Labour Party); Par GRANSTET, Sweden (Centre Party); Hans- Goran FRANCK, Swedem (social-democratic party); Lars-Olof LINDGREN, Sweden (Advisor to the Minister of Commerce); Ulla STRQEM, Sweden (Representative for the Minister of Foreign Affairs); Gunther VERHEUGEN, Federal Republic of Germany (Social-Democratic Party); Walter SCHWENNINGER, Federal Republic of Germany (Green Party); Jean-Pierre Le COADIC, France (Socialist Party); Giuliano SILVESTRI, Italy (Christian- Democratic Party); Jacques WALLAGE, Netherlands (Labour Party); Thor-Eirik CULBRANDSEN, Norway (Labour Party); llkka KANERVA, Finland (Conservative Party); Pirtti PAASIO, Finland (Social-Democratic Party); Giovanni BERSANI, Italy (Christian Democratic Party European Parliament); Ernest GLINNE, Belgium (Socialist Party - European Parliament); John HUME, Noithern Ireland (Social-Democratic Labour Party - European Parliament); TJJl De CLERQC, Belgium (Chrlstian-Demoratic Party); Modesto FRAILE Poujade, Spain (Popular bemocraiic Party); Warren ALLMAND, Canada (Liberal Party); Dan HEAP, Canada (New Democratic Party); Andinba TOIVO1 YA TOIVO, South Meat Africa People's Organization (SWAPO); Ambassador Michael ONONAIYE, Nigeria (Representing the U.N. Council for Namibia); Ambassador ALLEYNE, Trinidad and Tobago (Representing the U.N. Centre Against Apartheid) and lqbal AKHUND, Director Centre Against Apartheid.

1985, when the US and European sanctions debates had become particularly acute. We raised the argument that European indecisiveness should not be accepted as an argument to delay US sanctions. Many US politicians and staff members were not aware of the peculiarities of the EC (non-)decision making in foreign affairs, so we explained that the governments of EC member states have to reach full unanimity and the European Parliament does not have the decisive power in foreign affairs of overruling the veto of even one EC member state, whereas US Congress could overrule a Presidential veto. They understood that following our recommendation to 'act firm and fast over here' would greatly stimulate a similar decision in Europe, which also appealed to their sense of leadership over a divided Europe. Political discussions were not the only AWEPAA activity in Washington DC, participation in the weekly demonstration, co-organised by members of Congress and the 'Free South Africa Movement' even landed AWEPAA President Scholten in jail! In order to keep up public attention, the organisers had a deliberate tactic of letting one prominent demonstrator trespass a police line in front of the South African Embassy, who was then promptly arrested. And gently treated and released the next day, we were assured. And so it happened: encouraged by an enthusiastic 'Amandla' from across the street by the Secretary General, he was led away and had to spend the night with other offenders of the law, without getting much sleep. His cellmates hardly understood or believed the story: how can a white politician be put in a jail like this and why does he read the bible and sing hymns? So he must be a preacher. Which was not entirely untrue either. After our visits to Washington, AWEPAA sent an appeal to US Congress when US sanctions were debated in 1985 and we received a similar message from the Subcommittee on Africa of the US House of Representative, which we could put to good use in similar debates in Europe. Central Europe AWEPAA's contacts in Central and Eastern Europe, were only established from 1989-1990, when initial democratic reforms were taking shape in most countries. Their general desire to establish closer PRAGUE. 1991: WESTERN EUROPE, SOUTHERN AFRICA links with Western Europe, the European Communities in particular, was a suitable basis for identifying parliamentarians with an interest in human rights and development issues. But it was not easy to convince parliaments and governments of our positions on maintaining sanctions against South Africa, which had been installed I by the previous regimes. On the contrary, the tendency to oppose all policies of the previous regimes made it difficult for AWEPAA or the United Nations to find a willing ear for our arguments, not to lift sanctions and

Central Europe it was a lost battle from the very beginning. So without remaining silent about our pro-sanctions position we rather gave priority to general human rights and development issues as an investment in future cooperation. A successful conference in Prague in 1991 marked the beginning of this process. Visits to Southern Africa Visits by AWEPAA delegations to Southern Africa were more indirect and involved smaller numbers than European conferences or mailings from the AWEPAA central office, but they turned out a very effective 'in-depth' investment. In more than 10 years a few hundred parliamentarians have visited one or more countries in Southern Africa through AWEPAA. For many of them, these visits were an experience which deepened both their insight and personal commitment to Southern Africa, which had a direct effect on their continued involvement after their return to Europe. These visits also enabled us to bring European politicians into contact with a far broader range of organisations and knowledgeable individuals in the region than we could ever have brought to Europe to meet politicians in their own countries or at international conferences. Our first exercise in this field HARARE, 1998: OPENING OF CONFERENCE IN PARLIAMENT OF ZIMBABWE, WITH PRESIDENT ROBERT MUGABE AND SPEAKER DIDYMUS MUTASA was the twin conference in Lusaka and Harare in 1988, with a varied South African delegation, organised by the South African Council. Most South African participants from 'inside the country' had to remain anonymous, in order to ensure their own safety after their return. In a much freer atmosphere, AWEPAA delegations could visit South Africa regularly from 1990. Discussions on the political transition, conditions and timing of the lifting of sanctions were part of a larger agenda, which included the prospects of 'post-apartheid' socio-economic development. During these visits, AWEPAA not only met its traditional friends, but also representatives of the South African government and parties in the 'apartheid establishment', the National Party, Inkatha and the Conservative Party.

VENTERSDORP, SOUTH AFRICA, 1990: AWEPAA DELEGATION TO ISOLATED BLACK COMMUNITY

The ultra-Afrikaner AWB refused to receive an AWEPAA delegation but we got an excellent impression of their attitude towards black South Africans during a visit to their home base of Ventersdorp, in the Transvaal countryside, where a black community refused to be deported and was cut off from the outside world by local authorities and land owners. On a trivial, but no less complicated level, the Lusaka-Harare conference was AWEPAA's first exercise in taking a large number of European politicians to Southern Africa. Piles of conference documents had to be taken along as (overweight) hand luggage, it was improvised on the spot who was to share a room with whom and an Air Zimbabwe flight from London to Harare was supposed to make an unscheduled intermediate stop in West Africa to pick up ten members of the European Parliament after an EC-ACP Joint Assembly meeting. Even after departure from London nobody was sure whether the exercise would work, least of all the parliamentarians in a dark departure hall who saw the tarmac lights being turned off as well because the last scheduled flight had been handled. To cut a long African story short: the flight arrived in Harare, on schedule even, and with our EP participants. Some things African we did not want to understand how they worked if we needed not to, as long as they did work. This one did. Political level For an organisation of politicians, the near-exclusive and immediate target group and potential allies are their colleagues in parliament and government. Ideally, active AWEPAA members in any parliament include committed politicians, with central positions in or direct access to the decision making process and with an established position and reputation with regard to Southern Africa, in the governing and opposition party or parties. Even more ideally, their positions or status allow them to act relatively independently, taking some distance from immediate concerns of intra-party or -parliamentarian concerns. In the basic sense of the word AWEPAA was and is a lobbying organisation like any other 'special interest group': it has an interest to defend and an aim to achieve, it has opinions and arguments on what government policy should be, it tries to ensure that policy makers and their staff know these opinions and arguments and it mobilises allies to add weight to its own actions and arguments. AWEPAA and all other actors in the field of Southern African policy aim at influencing government decision making, but actions and methods of solidarity movements, trade unions, corporate interest, churches, etc. necessarily vary. AWEPAA's successes in this respect vary from country to country, but on balance it has been able to recruit members among such politicians in key positions in most West European parliaments and work effectively with them. The element of political trust and factual reliability was crucial to maintain such working relationships: proposals must be well defended and documented, supported by relevant and recognised organisations and personalities from Southern Africa. An important and effective vehicle for gaining access both to decision makers and a broad parliamentary audience were our 'EC Presidency Conferences', in a different EC capital every 6 months. In addition to presenting AWEPAA's own positions and political demands, our Southern African guests were introduced to the ministers and high officials, directly in charge of joint EC policies. The strength of our Belgian section was its cross-party composition, with respected, former cabinet ministers, parliamentary spokespersons from government and opposition parties and others, with direct access to the leaders of the main coalition partners. The Italian section had a similar cross-party character with parliamentary spokespersons on Southern Africa and a member of the presidium of Parliament.

LUXEMBURG, EC PRESIDENCY CONFERENCE, 1991, WITH SMANGALISO MKHATSHWA (SOUTHERN AFRICAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS' CONFERENCE) AND DR. WIM BLONK, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (DG VIII, DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION) AND MR. PAR GRANDSTEDT, MP, SWEDEN (LEFT) The AWEPAA section in the European Parliament was cross-party and multinational alike. More than in other parliaments, there has been direct AWEPAA involvement in the positions taken by the European Parliament. Several members have played a pivotal role as 'rapporteur' on EC sanctions, Namibia or other Southern African issues. A rapporteur writes and introduces proposals for parliamentary resolutions and their explanatory notes. In addition to the reports mentioned, AWEPAA had its impact on resolutions adopted by the EC-ACP Joint Assembly, which are traditionally followed by very similar resolutions adopted by Desmond Tutu in European Parliament: SANCTIONS LIFTING DEPENDS ON DE KLERK On November 19, Nobel Prize winner Desmond Tutu, Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, visited the European Parliament during its plenary session in Strasbourg, where he was received by EP President Mr. Enrique Baron, by the two main political groups (Socialists and Christian Democrats) and by the Mayor of Strasbourg, Mrs. Catherine Trautmann. He addressed and held discussions with representatives of all political groups represented in the EP (except the extreme right). Apartheid is the problem, not sanctions Archbishop Tutu said that he would very much like to call for the lifting of sanctions, but that he could not give a timetable for that. Sanctions have been crucial in getting South Africa to the verge of a new dispensation and are still needed in the present situation. Like before, the main problem is not sanctions, but apartheid. When people ask us 'when do you want sanctions to be lifted' we say 'well, ask Mr. de Klerk. When he dismantles apartheid there will be no justification to maintain sanctions. "It depends on Mr. de Klerk when meaningful negotiations are getting under way and the process of dismantling apartheid will have become irreversible by: - the removal of the Population Registration Act, the Group Areas Act and the Land Act, - the removal of the repressive security legislation, - the establishment of a common education system for all South Africans. In Western legislation, the US law contains 5 very clear conditions Mr. Rcholtn. M- SimonsMEP. Mr Olinne MEP &r W which must be met before the US sanctions will be lifted.

ACP - EEC JOINT ASSEMBLY Working Documents 1986-1987 25 September 1986 Doc. ACP-EEC 132/86 COMPROMISE AMENDMENT to motions for resolution Documents 109/86, 116/86, 120/86 and 124/86 tabled by the ACP Group, by Mrs SIMONS, Mrs BUCHAN, Mr CAMPINOS, on behalf of the Socialist Group; Mr VERGEER, Mrs RABBETHGE, Mrs DE BACKER-VAN-OCKEN Mrs CASSANMAGNAGO CERRETTI, Mr DE GUCHT, Mr ANDREWS, Mr PRICE, Mrs DALY, Mr DURAN, Mr TURNER, Mr TOKSVIG; Mrs CASTELLINA, Mr WURTZ, Mr VERGES, on behalf of the Communist and Allies Group on. the situation in South Africa and southern Africa the European Parliament itself. As explained earlier, things were not so easy in Germany and the United Kingdom, given the specific political configuration and government policy on (or rather: against) sanctions. Political debate on Southern Africa was more polarised than in most countries and this was reflected in AWEPAA's action potential and limitations. While it was easy to maintain excellent working relations with the (pro-sanctions) opposition parties, we were eager to establish a permanent contact with relevant politicians on the government side, without diluting or hiding our positions on issues where they might disagree. If we could not cooperate well on sanctions then we gave priority to other aspects of Southern African policies such as development and human rights. In Germany a little more could be done on sanctions than in the United Kingdom, especially through our regular conversations with respected former Liberal ministers and the parliamentary spokesperson. Thus we secured direct access to the liberal deputy-minister of foreign affairs, in charge of Southern African policy, who received delegations from South Africa, organised by AWEPAA in 1989 and 1990. On balance we may not have been any more successful than other pro-sanctions lobbyists in getting German sanctions installed, our friendly and frequent contacts with the Liberals did contribute to German reluctance to lift sanctions quickly once Nelson Mandela was released. Sanctions were a much more controversial a: d S7s1 BONN, 1989: MR. HEINZ WESTPHAL VICE- BONN, 1995 DR. RITA SUSSMUTH PRESIDENT OF PRESIDENT OF PARLIAMENT ADDRESSES AWEPAA PARLIAMENT ADDRESSES AWEPA SEMINAR CONFERENCE issue among the German Christian-Democrats, the senior governing party, but by concentrating on other Southern African issues, such as Namibia, refugees and development cooperation, we managed to keep doors open in the 'anti-sanctions camp Christian Democrats and to a lesser extent Liberals may have been their staunch opponents in the Bundestag, our friends among the Social-democratic and Green opposition always saw the importance of AWEPAA's cross-party approach and encouraged our contacts with all politicians who were willing to listen to us. In the United Kingdom we had excellent and close cooperation with the Labour and Liberal opposition parties, but it was more rather than less difficult than in Germany to have access to those politicians determining government policy on sanctions, let alone to have effective influence on them. But all was not hopeless: through mediation of our best Conservative friends in the European Parliament we found some Tory members of the House of Commons who played a similar role in their party as the German Liberals in their government. AWEPAA could not do much more than watching these intra-Conservative processes from sideline, not as an active participant. But it was useful to supply 'our best friends among our opponents' with documentation and arguments, enabling them to liaise with centre-right colleagues in other European countries and include them in our delegations to Africa. Like in Germany, support to Frontline States and development cooperation were less controversial subjects and it was easier to liaise with the UK minister in charge of that subject than with some other cabinet members. Not much needs to be said about most Nordic countries in the context of this paragraph on 'political level'. Because of the good cooperation within national AWEPAA sections and the relatively strong joint Nordic sanctions policy the Executive Committee and Amsterdam staff could give priority to spend their energy on other countries. The notable and successful exception was our behind- the-scenes contribution to parliamentary developments on the position of Denmark in the EC

South African delegation to Europe, October 11 - 22, 1990 KEEP UP PRESSURE UNTIL CHANGES ARE PROFOUND AND IRREVERSIBLE From October 11 - 22, 1990 AWEPAA organised an extensive visit to various European capitals by a broad South African delegation, which was composed by the South African Council of Churches (SACC). The delegation presented its analysis of - The process of negotiations on the transition to a unitary, democratic and non- racial South Africa; - The current violence in South Africa and the role of the government, elements in the administration and Inkatha; - The most constructive contribution by the international community. Initial steps taken only While important changes have taken place in South Africa since February 1990, the process of change is neither irreversible nor sufficiently profound (in the terms of the Declaration of the UN General Assembly, unanimously adopted in December 1989 and reaffirmed in September 1990) to warrant any change in Western policy with regard to sanctions and other pressure on the South African government. The delegation considered 'rewarding' or 'encouraging' the South African government by easing pressure as premature. They are worried that outsiders (such as the British Prime Minister and the US President) have already declared developments in South Africa 'irreversible'. Even if one accepts that de Klerk can not easily undo what has been achieved thus far, only initial steps have been taken and there is still a long way to go before all obstacles for real negotiations have been removed and substantial results have been achieved in these negotiations. The delegation urged that changes in the present EC (and general Western) policy should not be made as long as those opposing apartheid within South Africa do not state that such 'encouragement' of the negotiation process is appropriate. Composition and program of the delegation The delegation was led by Dr. Chr. Beyers Naud and Br. Jude Pieterse (Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference, SACBC) and consisted of representatives of the SACC and SACBC, the ANC, UDF, AZAPO and PAC, the Human Rights Commission, Black Sash and the Institute for Contextual Theology. The delegation had a three-day programme in Italy (the current EC President) and the Vatican, then visited Madrid, Paris, London, Dublin, The Hague, Brussels, Luxembourg and finally paid an extensive visit to Bonn and Berlin. In all countries, the delegation met with Governments, the European Commission, Parliaments, church representatives, anti-apartheid movements, other non- governmental organisations and the press. The German programme was co- organised with the Protestant Commission for Southern Africa (EKSA) and the German Commission JUSTITIA ET PAX. The FRIEDRICH EBERT FOUNDATION supported the project and held its own Seminar with the delegation. UN Guidelines The UN Declaration gives clear guidelines for assessment whether the obstacles for negotiations have been removed and whether these negotiations are bearing fruit. The process will only be ultimately irreversible once: a. A Constituent Assembly, elected on the basis of universal suffrage (I person, I vote), has been constituted; b. Sovereign power has been removed from existing apartheid legislative structures and invested either in the Constituent Assembly or another agreed interim structure; c. A white minority is no longer able legally to reverse or to veto the process through the present unrepresentative legislative structures: 'The government cannot be one of the players and the referee at the same time.' Thus far, President de Klerk or the National Party have not yet unequivocally and publicly accepted the principle of equal voting rights for all South Africans. The influential Afrikaner 'Broederbond' accepts the need for fundamental change, but still thinks in terms of separate groupings when it speaks of the need for 'the survival of the Afrikaners'. The fears and worries of whites for their future have to be ackowledged and a Bill of Rights, based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will have to be included in the new constitution. But the inclusion of group rights so that the whites keep their privileged position, is unacceptable. Apartheid pillars still intact Since February, 1990 commitments have been made by the government to abolish apartheid and to enter into negotiations about a new constitution. But after the initial optimism and euphoria there has been much backtracking and delay by the government. The main pillars of the old apartheid structure remain fully intact and agreements with the ANC have been far from implemented by the government: - The Population Registration Act, crucially determining the life of all South Africans from birth to death, is still in place; - Repressive legislation has only been partially suspended, not removed, while the Public Safety Act and the Internal Security Act are still fully intact. The government can declare 'unrest areas', thus creating a 'mini State of Emergency'. The repressive apparatus keeps many of the extensive powers it had under the State of Emergency; - Outdoor political meetings and demonstrations are still subject to licence and local authorities, especially in the countryside, often simply prohibit indoor gatherings which are fully legal; - People are still detained without trial; only 156 political prisoners out of between 2,000 and 3,000 have been released; political trials continue; new arrests are being made and capital punishment has not been abolished. debate on lifting sanctions. From our conversations with Danish government during their EC Presidency we had first hand insight into the permanent tension between the Danish government and parliament, which exercised much stricter control on government action in the European Communities than any other European Parliament (it still does, on any European policy issue). It was surprising to notice the lack of detailed and comprehensive documentation in the files of some government ministries. When one West European government published, on request of its parliament, an overview of sanctions policies of its EC and other Western allies, this list looked like a summary of what must be rich, comprehensive and well organised archives. The AWEPAA office was organising its own files as resource material for the sanctions overviews in its Bulletin and hoped to make good use of the documentation of what after all was a professional, well equipped bureaucracy. What does one do to get something: offer something in return, without admitting that you expect to get much more than you can supply. It worked beyond expectation: the official in charge agreed to meet us that very same week and it soon became clear why: he had had to base his draft report mainly on short summaries of a few lines supplied by embassies which had not bothered to send copies of original texts or make longer summaries, which reflected the complexity of some legislation. The main exception was a barely readable copy in Italian of a measure banning new investments - and only the second page of it! So the gains were unevenly divided: the ministry got much more documentation out of the transaction than the AWEPAA office. But one old experience of lobbyists also applied: supplying useful documentation to friendly or even not so friendly contacts creates a basis for further exchange and every new piece of factual information supplied is gratefully received, including the comments and analysis of the supplier. In one Western member of the Commonwealth the Southern African desk of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were more serious in getting their files in order but they had just started summarising them, which proved more time consuming than anticipated. This we could confirm. So the two-page overview we had just published ourselves saved him a lot of work and meanwhile we were free to give a copy to his minister during our meeting. EC sanetions 19S5 - 19S6: too little, too late? The EC sanctions adopted in 1985 and 1986 were part of the world-wide trend to increase pressure on South Africa, and in that sense a positive phenomenon. But in comparison with US and Commonwealth policy, the EC performance should be judged as minimal and lagging behind. The first issues of the AWEPAA bulletin, in 1985 and 1986 encouragingly carried headlines such as 'sanctions - a rising tide' and 'the movement broadens', first in the Nordic countries and France, then in the EC as a whole. But in November 1986 we had to report 'Third World and European parliamentarians condemn weak sanctions.' Reports adopted by the European Parliament with great majorities repeatedly concluded that EC sanctions were symbolic only and that EC foreign ministers were only forced by public pressure to apply some sanctions. Sanctions should not be defined as 'negative measures' (the term used by the EC and several national governments) but 'should be regarded as positive as humanitarian aid.' Three EC member states, the UK, Germany and Portugal first delayed common measures and then ensured that they were limited to a bare minimum: only direct investments, through transfers from outside South Africa, were prohibited and it was left to national governments how to implement this measure. The United Kingdom and Germany, main foreign investors in South Africa, never put any laws of legally binding regulations in place;

AW EPAA Association of West European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid NEWS BULLETIN, No. 3, February/March 1986 EEC-Front Line States Summit: Poor Results European governments delay further sanctions The Foreign Ministers of the EEC member States and of the Front Line States have met on February 3 and 4 in Lusaka (Zambia). The points on which agreement could be reached fell far short of what the Front Line States had requested from the European states, both before and during the conference. Whereas the Africans stressed the need for further economic sanctions against South Africa, the Europeans would only agree that further measures should be considered, if the measures, announced earlier by the EC, the Commonwealth, the Nordic countries, the USA and other governments and organisations would fail to achieve the desired results. In the economic field, newspaper reports quote an African source that the main result is, that the European Code of Conduct for companies in South Africa was not mentioned as a 'positive measure'. Association of West European Parliamentarians AW EPAA for Action against Apartheid NEWS BULLETIN, No. 8, Nov. 1986 Third World & European parliamentarians condemn weak EC sanctions On two occasions, parliamentarians from the third world and the European Parliament have adopted resolutions, critisizing the European Community's sanctions policy. The ACP-EEC Joint Assembly, which consists of parliamentarians from the developing countries associated with the EEC under the Lom6 Convention and from the European Parliament, called the joint EC sanctions of Sept. 1985 and Sept. 1986 'inadequate' and urged the acceptance of a coal ban. They demanded the immediate implementation of the resolution of the European Parliament of July 1986, which called for stronger sanctions in the fields of investments, loans, coal, agricultural products, strategic minerals, uranium and all aspects of South Africa's oil supply. The European Parliament debated the EC decisions of last September during its October session and adopted one resolution, which was similarly phrased on economic sanctions, and another one which also urges the governments of the Twelve to add measures to those jointly adopted: bans of new investments, new bank loans and other loans to the South African government, import bans on steel, iron, uranium, coal, gold and gold coins, diamonds, textiles and agricultural products, purchases from government-owned South African companies, on exports of computers and oil and suspension of SAA landing rights in Europe. The oil embargo only covered delivery of crude oil, produced in or previously imported in the EC. Europe' s main involvement in South African oil supply was not included: involvement in crude oil transport, delivery of oil products (often of great strategic importance) and crude oil deliveries from bonded storage (= physically present in EC ports but not legally imported yet). Purchase of South African coal was long expected to be included in any EC sanctions package, but in the end the good example of Denmark and France was finally not followed by the EC as a whole. Economically speaking one could say with some realistic cynicism: what the EC included in the boycott was not important, what was important was not included. The most reluctant of all EC countries to implement common policies was the UK: 'Britannia waives the rules' wrote the Shipping Research Bureau, commenting the UK (non-)implementation of common EC and Commonwealth policy. AWEPAA strongly emphasised that European countries, implementing weaker policies than the Nordic countries, the USA and the Commonwealth (minus UK), were de facto preventing a coordinated, credible and effective Western response to the Southern African challenge. Sanclions and their impact in Soulh Africa An academic researcher of the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands stated in 1995 (on his personal account) that the South African economy may not OIL SUPPLIES TO SOUTH AFRICA Latest Report Shipping Research Bureau The Amsterdam-based Shipping Research Bureau, which since 1979 has been tracing companies and countries, involved in oil supplies to South Africa, on Sept. 13 published its latest report 'Oil to South Africa, Apartheid's Friends and Partners', in Brussels, London and Athens. The report lists 68 deliveries of crude oil to South Africa in 1985 and 1986, covering almost half of its estimated import needs in that period. Western Oil and Shipping Companies In 62 of these 68 cases, EC-based companies were involved in various ways. The main oil companies, found to be involved, were Marc Rich (Switzerland) and Marimpex (FR Germany). Appr. half of the shipping companies responsible for the deliveries were Norwegian, others involved were Greek/UK and Singapore companies. Other nations, whose oil or shipping companies were involved, were Liberia, the UK, the USA and Hong Kong. Deliveries by Norwegian tankers apparently have stopped since July 1987, when the Norwegian ban on oil transport to South Africa came into force. Origin: Persian Gulf, Brunei Two-thirds of the tankers sailed to South Africa from the Persian Gulf area (United Arab Emirates, Oman, Iran and Saudi Arabia), thirteen others from Brunei and a few from Egypt, South Yemen, the Netherlands and the UK. Virtually all calls to South Africa were kept secret, and none reported their actual destination at departure. Some cases of forged documents were found by the SRB. The full report can be obtained from the Shipping Research Bureau, PO. Box t1898 1001 GW Amsterdam. Netherlands AWEPAA Comment: Stop Western Involvement AWEPAA President Jan Nico Scholten gave the following comment on the findings of the SRB This report clearly indicates, like earlier reports by the Bureau, the heavy involvement of Western interests in the vital supplies to South Africa. The report shows the urgency of strengthening current bans on involvement by EC-based companies in procurement of crude oil a.o. by implementing them by law and including involvement in deliveries from non-EC countries. Effective Norwegian, Danish measures The example of Norway shows that an effective ban on transport is possible, as the Bureau has not (yet) found any shipments by Norwegian tankers since the adoption of such a ban, in force sinceJuly 1987. Another example is Denmark, which has taken measures since 1984 and does not feature in this current report. The cases of the deliveries of crude oil from bonded storage and of oil products from Rotterdam show that current EC measures are too limited, as they still allow such deliveries. The case of delivery of UK North Sea oil illustrates the urgency of legal implementation of the ban on supply of European crude oil and of closer monitoring. AWEPAA renews its call on the European Community as a whole and on the individual member states to implement by law, to monitor and effectively enforce bans on all forms of involvement in the supply of oil and oil products to South Africa, mentioned in the detailed, well documented and convincing report by the Shipping Research Bureau.

OIL EMBARGO: new findings on VIOLATIONS On September 16, the Shipping Research Bureau presented its most recent research findings on companies and countries, involved in the continuation of the oil flow to South Africa. The Bureau found 83 tankers, which apparently delivered crude oil to South Africa in 1983 and 1984, supplying more than half of South Africa's need of imported crude oil. Norwegian shipowners In most cases, the oil companies involved effectively hid their identity, except for Netherlands/Bermuda-based Transworld Oil/John Deuss and Fed. Rep. of Germanybased Marimpex. Over half of the shipping companies were Norwegian, other countries where considerable numbers of involved (directly or indirectly) companies are based or whose flags were used, are: Greece, Liberia, Panama, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States. Involved to a lesser extent are: the Bahama's, Cyprus, Denmark, Hong Kong, Japan, Malta, Switzerland. Origin of oil: Gulf, Brunei The origin of the crude oil was in 64 cases the Persian Gulf (Saudi-Arabia: 14 cases, Oman: 13, United Arab Emirates: 11, Iran: 7, Qatar: 3, Kuwait: 2, unknown: 24), in 18 cases the Far East (Brunei: 17, Malaysia: 1) and in I case the Netherlands transshipment port of Rotterdam. In its comment, the Bureau points out that the companies involved have broken the stated embargo policies of these oil exporting countries and have tried to hide this fact by never reporting South Africa as the destination of the oil. However, 4 or 5 countries have not or ineffectively acted against ships or oil/transport companies, whose identities were all reported to them by the Bureau before publication. Other oil exporting countries, in the Gulf and elsewhere, have been far more committed and effective in implementing their oil embargoes against South Africa. The involvement of the home countries of ships/companies is even greater, as no formal or informal restrictions on involvement in oil supplies from third countries were in force at all. Costs of embargo for SA In spite of the deficiencies of present embargoes, South Africa annually has to spend more than US $ 2,300 to overcome the effects of the embargo in addition to its regular oil bill of US $ 3,000 million. [Shppng Reah B- , PO B.. 11398. 1001 W Ams ta, Nthlands) AWEPAA: EC should tighten oil embargo In a political comment, AWEPAA President J.N. Scholhen and E. Glinne, Chairman of AWEPAA's branch in the European Parliament, stated that the regrettably heavy involvement of some oil-exporting countries does not diminish the need for tighter embargo policies of the European Community. The scope of the current common embargo, agreed upon in september 1985, is generally narrow (if determined at all) and should include measures on crude oil from any origin, not only from the EC itself, whether it is kept in bonded storage (entrepot) or put into free circulation inside the EC. Transshipment in ports like Rotterdam, the supply of(often technologically or strategically sophisticated) oilproducts should also be included in the national measures to implement the common EC embargo. There is also the need to tackle Europe's main involvement as the home base of oil and shipping companies, which transport crude oil directly from elsewhere to South Africa. The European Community collectively even lags behind the position of the U.S. Congress, which adopted a bill prohibiting the supply of both crude oil and oil products. EC should not do less than US Congress Mr. Scholten and Mr. Glinne stated that the current EC policy on oil and on sanctions in general not only supports US President Reagan in his opposition to sanctions, but also alineates Europe from the Developing Countries, officially associated with the EC under the Lom6-treaty. They called for a strengthened EC policy, which would include no less measures than those of the bill, adopted by the US Congress (summarised on front page of this bulletin). AWEPAA INFORMS ITS MEMBERS ON VIOLATIONS OF THE OIL EMBARGO (1986 AND 1988) have been crippled by existing sanctions, but that financial and qualitative data indicate that their impact was substantial. For instance, he found the fact that South Africa has obtained all crude oil and oil products it needed, in spite of great obstacles, of lesser importance than the fact that 'the direct costs of the oil embargo in the 1980s equalled South Africa's gross foreign debt, which by the end of the decade was estimated at between $ 15 and 20 billion. Indeed, had the oil embargo not been imposed, the 1985 South African debt crisis would probably not have emerged.' There were considerable indirect costs too: fewer new technologies became available which had a negative effect on the cost - benefit ratio of projects to increase South Africa's energy autarky and costly investments tied large parts of the capital stock to unproductive ends, such as synthetic oil production facilities and the strategic oil stock. Intensification of economic pressure in the second half of the 1980s added to this: 'both banks and multinational corporations considered the political risks of lending to and investing in South Africa too large. Consequently, substantial amounts of capital were withdrawn from the country in the wake of the South African debt crisis. '

He concludes that 'all thesefactors helped to put economic pressure on Pretoria. At the end of the 1980s, the economic impact of economic sanctions was substantial. It is quite likely that this pressure contributed to the policy changes that led to the end of apartheid in the early 1990s, thus contradicting the views which economists have held on this topic for several decades.' It is not only with academical hindsight that the point can be made. What more does a sanctions campaigner need to persevere than confirmation by his or her opponent of the relevance of the action? The key statement in a speech in Parliament by the South African Minister of Internal Affairs in 1983 on oil supplies was 'Secrecy is essential. The struggle against boycotts is by no means over. UN attempts to prevent crude oil deliveries to South Africa continue. Any relaxation in respect to secrecy can help to spotlight the target and enable our enemies to identify our friends and partners who deliver to us'. Three years later it was not just the United Nations (i.e. the vast majority of the General Assembly without the support of most of Western countries) that attempted to have sanctions applied. South Africa's international environment had changed considerably and in May 1986 President Botha told Parliament that his first priority was to stop boycotts. He would never have believed three years earlier that the focus of the 'most serious threat to the country's trade' would have shifted from the United Nations to the West. Neither the UN nor any other opponent of the South African government has succeeded in finally cutting off oil deliveries, but does that mean that their efforts have not been effective? This is what President Botha had to say a little earlier, in April 1986: 'Between 1973 and 1984 the Republic of South Africa had to pay R22 billion morefor oil than it would normally have spent. There were times when it was reported to me that we had enough oilfor only one week. Just think what we could have done if we had that R22 billion today ... 'What he did not say but most listeners knew was that that was almost exactly the amount over which South Africa's first foreign debt crisis had just broken out. In the 1989 election campaign the 5 year plan of the ruling National Party confirmed that boycotts, sanctions and disinvestment had cost the utmost of the economy of the country and of each household. In June 1989, when South Africa was negotiating the rescheduling of its outstanding debt, the AWEPAA office summarised the combined economic effects of sanctions and market developments, based to a large extent on joint research in the Commonwealth Expert Group. This analysis was presented during our parliamentary seminar in Bonn, where experts in the South African delegation confirmed our findings and political conclusions. These included: Lack of business confidence in the security and profitability of new investments, Western bans on new investment and public pressure for disinvestment (withdrawal of existing investments) had jointly caused a reduction of economic growth and affected South Africa's balance of payment situation. As it has become a net capital exporter instead of an importer, it needs a surplus on its foreign trade balance to finance these capital exports. In addition to extra expenses in securing oil supplies mentioned earlier, South OCTOBER 1989 NR. 25 SA minority elections: WHITES WIN AGAIN Did white South Africans on September 6 vote in favour of change or did they speak out against change? According to president F. W. de Kilerk the majority of the white voters in South Africa did indeed vote for change. According to spokesmen of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), on the contrary, the majority of the white voters voted against change. In the view of the MDM it is only the Democratic Party (DP) that is in favour of change; therefore only 20% of the white South African electorate spoke out in favour of change. According to the MDM the term 'change' in the verbiage of the ruling National Party (NP) does not go beyond superficial 'cosmetic' alterations; whereas to the left of the political spectrum the DP certainly wants far more than merely cosmetic changes, in the eyes of the MDM however the DP does not go far enough towards the necessary 'meaningful' change.

Africa increasingly had a foreign trade problem. 9 Western countries (USA, 5 Nordic countries, France, Australia and New Zealand) had halved their trade with South Africa since 1985, which diminished South Africa's foreign trade by 7 %, mostly on the export side. In combination with market price fluctuations in 1988, this resulted in an estimated decrease of South Africa's foreign trade by 13 % compared to the pre-sanctions years 1983 - 1985. One economic analyst had already concluded in 1986 that 50 % of South Africa's export was easy to boycott as substitute suppliers were easily available for coal, fruit and maize. Reduced exports had their effect on the trade balance, which needed to be positive as South Africa had become a capital exporting country and had to reschedule and repay its $ 25 billion foreign debt by 1990. They also resulted in diminished income (royalties and taxes) for the South African government, which was faced with increasing expenses for the military, police and maintaining apartheid structures in general. The potential of the failed all-EC coal ban was illustrated by the effect of the ban on South African coal by two European countries (France and Denmark) alone. This had reduced South Africa's coal export volume by 10 million tonnes p.a., a loss of at least 20 %. South African income from its remaining 45m tonnes coal exports diminished even further, as it had to dump its remaining sales by 5 US $ per tonne in a world market with prices which were decreasing anyway. In spite of developing its own arms industry and partly succeeding in undermining the mandatory UN arms embargo, South Africa had been unable to develop or buy some top-level military equipment such as: submarines, coastal patrol vessels, jet fighters, armed helicopters, surveillance aircraft, radars, tanks and racked vehicles, anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles. Its willingness to reach agreements on Namibia and Angola was caused by a mixture of circumstances: costs of maintaining its occupation - aggression, partial military inferiority (air defeat in Cuito Canavale in 1989!), casualties and internal public opinion (South Africa's home made Viet Nam syndrome), international diplomatic pressure and the threat of further sanctions. Frout econonjC to political iipal' of .ia'tiois Then what are the political backgrounds and effects of these economic developments of the late 1980s? There are examples, though rare, where such impact is immediate, clearcut and easily discernable, especially at times of acute crisis. The relationship should never be described in a simplistic, mechanical manner, but some cases are worth mentioning, allowing for the complexity of such processes. The background of decisions by corporate interests to limit or end their South African ties was always a mixture of political and economic elements. The clearest example is the decision by one of the largest US banks to yield to political pressure of one of its main clients, the city of New York. The bank's refusal in July 1985 to renew its short time loans to South Africa was followed by other banks involved and triggered off South Africa's first debt crisis. Their decision was as much an economic decision as a reaction to the resistance by the South African population, the repression by the government and the lack of prospect for the abolition of apartheid. Similarly, the refusal of financial support to South Africa by the IMF was both a political decision and caused by a lack of economic confidence. AWEPAA took up the issue of the rescheduling of the South African debt again in 1989 and - exceptionally- did not limit itself to action in the political field: we approached both the main banks as well as governments, who were also asked to take measures in related fields such as trade credits. The increase of the internal repression and the installation of the state of emergency in South Africa in 1985 coincided and were interrelated with the debt repayment crisis and the implementation of sanctions packages by the USA, the Commonwealth and the European Communities.

AWEPAA Appeal: NO RESCHEDULING OF SOUTH AFRICAN DEBT During the political and financial crisis of 1984-1985 South Africa declared a moratorium on the repayment of a large part of its foreign debt. Interim arrangements gave South Africa some political and economic breathing space until June 1990. Currently, negotiations are taking place on more definite arrangements, which are led by the main British banks who have a stake in this foreign debt, on behalf of the other Western creditor banks, mainly from the Fed. Rep. of Germany, Switzerland, France, the United States and Japan. To a lesser extent banks from many other Western countries are also involved in loans to South Africa: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden. The South African churches, liberation movement, trade unions and other anti- apartheid organisations unequivocally demand that Western banks and governments do not allow the rescheduling of South Africa's foreign debt. They state that combination of internal resistance against Apartheid and external economic and financial pressure are most effective in compelling the South African regime to enter into negotiations with the true leaders of the whole South African population on the peaceful transition to a democratic and nonracial society. AWEPAA therefore calls for parliamentary and government action to achieve the following: * &qo rescheduling of current South African debt has been sent to the main banks involved in this * A ban on new short-, medium- and long-term matter. loans, During the coming months, similar actions will be * Termination of state credit guarantees, taken by the Commonwealth and by churches and * Prohibition of trade credits, solidarity groups in various West European * Measures against the import of South African countries and in the USA. coal and gold, the earnings from which add to its Full documentation on this issue is available from ability to repay its foreign debt. the AWEPAA Office. A letter with similar demands on loans and credits FROM AWEPA BULLETIN, OCTOBER 1989 Within one day of the moratorium on debt repayment by the South African government, South African business leaders flew to Lusaka to meet with representatives of the African National Congress. At the same time, foreign and national business interests made it clear to the government that more was needed than internal repression and cosmetic political reform which ultimately kept all power in the hands of the white minority and excluded the majority of South Africans. The initial reaction of the South African authorities was defensive, going as far as trying to prevent contacts with the ANC, but in retrospect these meetings were the beginning of the negotiations between the South African economic and political establishment and the liberation movements and other anti-apartheid forces, ending in the release of Nelson Mandela and democratic elections. Politicians will not admit at the time that external influence caused them to implement political changes or make proposals that they would otherwise not have accepted. Indeed, this would only solicit further pressure and be counterproductive for a government trying not to deviate from a course which is condemned by those implementing such sanctions. But that does not mean that this influence did not exist, as illustrated by the developments sketched above. In the final analysis, the most convincing witnesses are those South African politicians who were directly involved in government decision making at the time. President De Klerk stated in June 1990 that 'we cannot live in isolation from the rest of the world. We need foreign investments, technological, cultural and sports exchange with other countries. 'It was not the first warning of a South African minister against the effects of sanctions on the South African economy. And in September 1991 Minister of Justice Kobie Coetzee stated that sanctions had forced the NP and the government to give up their policy of apartheid and to accept a policy of power sharing and negotiations. Much more useful research can be done, now that government and corporate archives may be opened and, more importantly, key persons in government and business may feel more free to talk about behind-the-scenes debates and considerations as to how to react on (the threat of) sanctions, now that it is not a current political and economic issue in South Africa anymore. This will not only be relevant for a realistic analysis of South Africa's own recent past, but also for a deeper general understanding of the circumstances and mechanisms in which economic sanctions do work in other cases (or not). Overal o.sessinent 'What difference did it make that economic sanctions against South Africa were installed, however late and limited, and what difference did AWEPAA's activities make to that process'? These are crucial questions while looking back at developments in South Africa and the whole Southern African region in the 1980s and early 1990s. Politics is not a chemical laboratory and the effect of any political action is not always easy to measure, certainly before or during the event and mostly not even with hindsight. There is not one simple answer and one answer does not necessarily exclude the other. For instance: 'Much more in-depth research, analysis and interpretation is needed on the positive effect of international economic sanctions on the abolition of apartheid and on the contribution by specific actors, such as AWEPAA, to the adoption and full implementation of these sanctions.' The following is equally defendable, and not necessarily a contradiction to the previous statement: 'Economic sanctions have had a measurable and substantial impact on the South African economy and thereby politically contributed to profound and irreversible changes in South Africa. They were one factor in this complex process, together with primary factors such as internal political and economic developments inside South Africa and the Southern African region. AWEPAA has made a significant contribution to this process by informing and mobilising West European parliamentarians and governments. Without a specialised organisation like AWEPAA, politicians would have been involved both in far lower numbers and in informative and personal commitment; national and cross-party divisions would have been more of a barrier towards coordinated international policy and specific cases of having an impact on government policies would not have been achieved.' Many examples have been given above which illustrate why AWEPAA felt confident at the time and still feels confident in retrospect that is has 'made a difference': a positive and effective contribution to Western sanctions policies which have played a significant role in the abolition of apartheid. We have collected these examples from memory, archives and conversations with politicians, directly involved. No single actor or organisation brought apartheid to an end and certainly not AWEPAA. But we played our role in the interplay between various actors in the process and in some cases its specific contribution can be identified. To resume a few of the most significant points: The intra-EC debate on lifting sanctions in the early 1990s gave AWEPAA an unique - and thereby exceptional - opportunity to 'determine history' - as long as it lasted: together with a very limited number of key players in Danish politics, inside and outside parliament, we succeeded in keeping EC sanctions in place at least some more months. Had these few people not effectively cooperated, conspired almost, then the very small majority in Danish Parliament for maintaining national and EC sanctions would have been lost, the Danish government would have been allowed to give up its veto on the lifting of EC sanctions, which would otherwise have been lifted months earlier than they actually were. In some countries, in Southern Europe in particular, AWEPAA's existence ensured that more attention for Southern African issues was called and more politicians were informed and involved, than would have been the case otherwise. In other national parliaments and the European Parliament, AWEPAA served as a vehicle for constructive consultations and cooperation across party lines and even

Parliament Denmark maintains position EC 1986 SANCTIONS TO STAY INTO 1992 After the return from South Africa of a Danish All 6 parties committed to the plan of phased parliamentary mission, last September, the majority sanctions lifting, who range from the centre-right of parliament decided that all Danish sanctions parties in the government coalition to the progressive should remain in place for the time being. The parties in opposition, reaffirmed their support for Danish veto on lifting the common EC bans on the the plan (details in the September-October 1991 issue import of iron, steel and gold coins, introduced in of the AWEPAA Bulletin). 1986, was also maintained. The main factors, which apparently prevent the implementation of phase I (out of the 3 phases of lifting Danish sanctions, adopted by parliament) are: - the continued imprisonment of political prisioners, - the existence, after the lifting of national apartheid legislation, of a large amount of apartheid legislation on the regional and local level. It is not expected that parliament will, on the basis of developments in South Africa, reopen the debate on the first stage of sanctions lifting before the end of 1991. FROM AWEPA BULLETIN NOVEMBER/DECEMBER, 1991 across government - opposition division. In the Nordic countries, where there was broader support or even consensus on sanctions than anywhere else, AWEPAA added to this process by stressing the positive impact this would have for policies of other European countries: using Nordic policies as positive examples for other countries and establishing contact between Nordic and other European politicians has helped paving the way for joint, though far more limited EC sanctions packages in 1985 and 1986. The delicate issue of support to the ability of frontline states to defend themselves against South African (-supported) destabilisation was carefully but systematically raised by AWEPAA, which has been instrumental in raising awareness and broadening support among parliamentarians and governments. As the director of one renowned Nordic research institute stated to this author: 'When I last returned from Southern Africa, I happened to travel in the same plane as some members of our parliament from different parties who had participated in an AWEPA visit. I'm not sure they would ever have gone there or even would have been involved in Southern African issues if AWEPA had never existed or ceased to exist by now. And they would certainly have found it more difficult to seek common ground if they would have made the trip on behalf of our national parliament or their respective parties.' Political processes are never quiet, undisturbed or untroubled rivers, there are always currents and counter- currents. All that individuals and organisations can do is choosing, which currents they want to support, ignore or counteract. Developments in Southern Africa, the reaction of the world community and Western politics in particular unavoidably formed the context, the general framework within which AWEPAA has had to work and which it never pretended it could fundamentally determine or change. We were more than satisfied that we could add weight, modestly but unmistakably, to policies which we considered a positive contribution to the peaceful transition from a basically unjust socio- political system to one in which the principle of superiority and domination by one social group over others is abolished.

Who would have thought, in 1984, that an AWEPAA delegation would visit its 'friend in enemy country', the Democratic Party, in the South African Parliament in 1990? And who would have betted that in 1996 AWEPA(A)'s first full-fledged conference in South Africa would be held in that very same parliament, now representative of the whole South African population, co-chaired by its old friend Frene Ginwala, who in 1984 came to visit us in Amsterdam with her late friend and colleague Dulcie September, to discuss (and check?) the viability of this new organisation of 'Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid'. HON. SPEAKER DR. FRENE GINWALA PRESENTS THE SOUTH AFRICAN FLAG TO PRESIDENT SCHOLTEN FOLLOWING THE OPENING DAY OF THE SEPTEMBER 1992 CONFERENCE

SUMMARY OF WESTERN ECONOMIC INVESTMENTS NEW LOANS TRADE CREDITS MISCELLANEOUS Withdrawal Replacement New Profitreinv. via3dcoun- toSA to SA govt. Supply Reinsurance Double SAinvestm. Trade, general + other investments try, lic, pat, company by own taxation to own commercial relations leasing government agreement country EUROPEAN COMMUNITY BELGIUM - - (p) (5 + yi( p No sale nuclear fuel DENMARK TOT us TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT Ban incl. services FRANCE p 5 yr - - FR GERMANY (p) ( + yr) GREECE - p - 5+yr IRELAND p - - + yr - - No trade + promot. bygovt. ITALY p 5+y p TOT No lt-SAchamberofcomm. No sale civil aircrafi LUXEMB'G () (S + yr) NETHERL. - - (p) -5 + yr) - TOT PORTUGAL - p - (5 + yr) - Trade missions funding limited SPAIN p - 5+ yr - TOT UNKINGDOM ban lifted - ban lifted - No govt. funding trade missions fairs NORDIC COUNTRIES DENMARK - TOT n TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT Ban mc. services FINLAND TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT Ban incl. serices, trade via 3d c'ies, marit + telecomm. ICELAND no investments existing TOT TOT TOT TOT NORWAY TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT Ban incl. services SWEDEN TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT No export via 3d countries No maritime relations COMMONWEALTH AUSTRALIA - (nt) (ot) (TOT) TOT (TOT) TOT TOT nt No trade supp., govt. sales, contracts to SA firms CANADA - (n) (ntl (TOT) (TOT) (p) TOT TOT - No trade supp., govt. sales, contrats to SA firms NEW ZEAL'D - - (pI - (TOT) (TOT) (TOT) TOT TOT - No trade supp. govt. ses, couracts to SA firms UN.KINGDOM ban lifted - ban lifted No govt. funding trade missions + fairs OTHERS AUSTRIA - (p) - pJAPAN p W() (p) - No off. trade info to SAfrians No govt. pets. on SA Airways SWITZERL'D - (p) (p) UNITED p y nti - TOT TOT No trade supp., use US banks lim STATES ted, no impor from SA govt (exc strat. minerals) Withdrawal Replacement New Profit rinv, via 3d cour- to SA to SA govt Supply Reinsurance Double SA invesrm. Trade, general + other investments try, ic, pat, company by own taxation in own commercial relations leasing government agreement country INVESTMENTS LOANS TRADE CREDITS MISCELLANEOUS Explanation of symbols (more on page 4) TOT = Total ban at = Near-total ban p - Partial ban () Unofficialor voluntary ? = Unclear or unknown 5 + yts = Loans with maturity of 5 years and longer - = no ban in force

SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA (JULY 1990) IMPORTS EXPORTS NUCLEAI R LINKS1 TOURISM Coal Iron + Goldcooras Aviculr Strategic Uranium O_: Compur;m Coopt- SA Airww Promarrou, steel iool. ore + min Crude 0i From . Tnpa loSAarmY tion. + own advertisin, fm0-o prOdlut de I*Fora rl aon + police goods + crrier 0 uet¢. a oys' EUROPEAN at - o TOT TOT ? - TOT p BELGIUM TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT p DENMARK at or - nr TOT TOT (TOT) n t FRANCE or nt TOT (TOT) TOT GERMANY n no- TOT ? ? TOT TOT TOT GREECE or no t ot TOT TOT ? (TOT) TOT TOT I) IRELAND of oa - TOT TOT ? - (TOT) TOT ITALY - or n- TOT - (TOT) TOT LUXEMB'G poc.eL no - ot p TOT - (TOT TOT NETIERL. lats) nt nt - TOT - ['TOT) p PORTUGAL at n t - p TOT TOT . - (TOT) p or p SPAIN oc.l. no o - p - - - a p (p) UN.KINGDOM plun's NORDIC COUNTIES T0TAL TRADE BAN TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT p DENMARK T0TAL TRADE BAN TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT FINLAND T0TAL TRADE BAN - - TOT TOT TOT I ICELAND T0TAL TRADE BAN TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT nt NORWAY T 0 T A L T R A D E B A N TOT - TOT TOT TOT p SWEDEN cOMMONWEALTH TOT no - TOT TOT TOT TOT TOT - - TOT TOT TOT (at) AUSTRALIA TOT nTo (TOT) TOT - (TOT) (TOT) (ro) (P) TOT TOT TOT (at) CANADA TOT ot ore only TOT TOT - TOT GOT) (ot) - - TOT TOT TOT (no) NEW ZEAL'D (lel. 0at - at p - - (TOT) p _ (p) UN. KINGDOM plants) 5t ? 0 - p - - TOT p - AUSTRIA (p) or (oreonly)(or) p (P) p - p TOT TOT (p) JAPAN (TOT) - - TOT p SWITZERL'D TOT at ore only TOT TOTind. p or TOT o TOT - TOT TOT TOT p UNITEDSTATES tetiles Co Iron + stee Goldcoins Agricultural Strategic Uraum 00: Cmputm Cantata SAAirmys Pfrootin, indore + rlerals Crude Oil fo roo- Transport toSAarmy tio, + own dig, fero-alloys oil products dedstorage ownflag or'n flag +lloce gooe carrnier aat. IMPORTS EXPORTS NUCLEAR AIR LINKS rOURISM Quotatios or ful copying of this chart allowed, iflefereac i arode to tht soace tad ifsmpl are st to the AeWEP Offi. MardocumearanogisIa&* from riou anhidna Ed (Sdected addlrsss on page 5) o from theAWEPAA OFFICE, PRINS HENDRIKKADE4, 10,2 AC AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS, p n(Sl. .663a, fo (31.20 e.01.30, iea I2uwema

LLL EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA AWEPA Anniversary Conference Opened Deputy President Thabo Mbeki gives "Progress Report" I welcome in particular Jan Nico Scholten, the members of AWEPA and the people who have come from Europe. A welcome to a new South Africa which is the product of your work. The Speaker here, myself and lots of people in this room sit in positions which we believe are important (they may not be important at all, but we believe they are), thanks to what you did. To help us to rid our country of apartheid, of white minority domination. So you have come home and we are glad you are here. We owe you a progress report. You left us in charge of this particular product and you are entitled to know what we have done with what you thought to create. It would be my view that we have not disappointed your expectations. That is not a boast, but a reflec- tion of the commitment of ourpeople generally to pursue a common purpose. The elections in 1994 have been preceded by negotiations to provide South Africa for the first time with a Constitution that would be non-racial, non-sexist and democratic, which we did produce. I would like to believe that the South Africans who have been loyal to the perspective, which AWEPA had when it got formed as an Association of West European Parliamentarians for No m Cape id for Olypics a Deputy President Mbeki Reports Progress N Proramnme ofAcion: Wom1oen's Conference a Speke Gitiwala on Negoiatons wtthe EI, a Two-way Street apprach of Jan-No Soktolten m EU policy towardsw South Africa by Steffen Smielt m Regional Concerti on PTA n AEPA Peae Mission to N~ortherne Ieland n AWEPA's Angola Programme nPrimentr Workshops in Mzambiu AWEPA Prmi H~.,eu,ada 48 - 1012 ACAAmtrdm -Nth~lam1nds Nvn() O a66.6 Fix il) 20e622 01,3 -mai APAantonm d, A

ZAIRE Lobito ANGOLA *\LEOTI ATLANTIC.... SOUTH AFRICA OCEAN ." C ",East London CapeTown Por Elizabeth . South n r.i. . Southern Africa INDIAN OCEAN km 200 400 600 ms 200 40

AWE PA and the African-European Institute The work of AWEPA and the African-European Institute is focused on support to rehabilitation programmes in Southern Africa, directed toward the consolidation of democracy and human rights, the promotion of closer regional economic relations, and meeting the needs of people adversely affected by regional conflicts and the legacy of apartheid and destabilisation. Attention is given to the following priorities: the strengthening of multi-party democracies and the democratisation of political processes; the mobilisation of support for peace processes, respect for human rights, and the ending of political violence; the facilitation of reconciliation projects in which Southern Africans of various backgrounds seek to find joint solutions to underlying social conflicts; the mobilisation of support for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its regional integration and development programmes; the promotion of rehabilitation in Southern Africa and recovery from destabilisation and war; the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and reintegration of displaced persons and demobilised soldiers; the promotion of child survival and welfare in Southern Africa, and the basic rights of women and children; dialogue and discussion of future relations in Southern Africa and between the region and European countries; attention to informational needs on Southern Africa in Central and Eastern Europe, and the promotion of East-West-South cooperation; media activities to improve coverage of developments in Southern Africa; and the total eradication of apartheid as a socio-economic system. .t 11ETVI E.recutie ('omnmittee: Mr. J.N. Scholten, Netherlands, Pres. Ms. G. Kinnock, Eur. Parl., Vice Pres. Mr. W. Martens, Eur. Parl., Vice Pres. Dr. L. Dhoore, Belgium, Vice President Mr. T. Kitt, Ireland, Vice President Mr. P. Granstedt, Sweden, Treasurer Mr. D. Anderson, United Kingdom Mr. F. Arnau, Spain Mr. V. Calzolaio, Italy Mr. J. Cunha, Portugal Ms. U. Eid, Germany Ms. Z. Kuratowska, Poland Ms. T. Pykildinen, Finland Mr. J. Tappe, Germany .II Board of Trustees: Archbishop D. Tutu, South Africa Mr. J.N. Scholten, Netherlands Dr. M. Tjitendero, Speaker, Namibia Mr. P. Grandstedt, Treasurer, Sweden Ms. S. Moiane, MP, Mozambique Mr. B. McKeown, Ireland Dr. L. Dhoore, MP, Belgium Bishop M.P. Nkhumishe, South Africa Rev. R. Hinz, LWF, Switzerland Ms. E. Sowazi, Swaziland Prof. Z. Kuratowska, Senate, Poland Mr. D. Mutasa, Zimbabwe Mr. G. Silvestri, Italy Justice Ms. A.S.E. Msosa, Malawi

AWEPA/AEI Publications SonIlhrn .lfriea - RegiotIal Southern Africa's Future, Europe's Role, Conference in Harare, Zimbabwe, March 1988 Frontline States: How to Counter South African Destabilization, Conference in Athens, Greece, October 1988 Southern Africa: European Cooperation and Action against Destabilisation, Conference in Madrid, Spain, March 1989 The European Community and Southern Africa: Lomi IV, 1989 SADCC in the 1990s: A Common Responsibility, 1990 A SADCC nos anos 90: Una Responsabilidade Colectiva, 1990 Child Survival on the Frontline: How to Counter the Effrcts on Children of Destabilisation, Conference in Harare, Zimbabwe, April 1990 Southern Africa in the 1990s: Europe's Role, Conference in Paris, France, May 1990 Southern Africa at the Crossroads: New Priorities for European Cooperation, Conference in Dublin, Ireland, June 1990 Europe, SADCC and South Africa: From Conflict to Cooperation, Conference in Luxembourg, February 1991 Eastern Europe and Southern Africa: Supporting Democracy and Development, Conference in Prague, Czechoslovakia, June 1991 Reconciliation in Southern Africa, Conference in Harare, Zimbabwe, October 1991 Post-Apartheid Regional Cooperation: International Support for Transforming Southern Africa, Conference in Gaborone, Botswana, April 1992 Central Europe and Southern Africa in Transition, Conference in Vienna, Austria, October 1992 Balanced Regional Development: Southern Africa and Europe's Role, Conference in London, United Kingdom, November 1992 Democratic Change in Southern Africa: European Support for Governance and Human Rights, Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, March 1993 Children of Apartheid: International Action for Southern Africa's Youth, Conference in Stockholm, Sweden, June 1993 Development and Democratisation: European-Southern African Partnership, Conference in Brussels, Belgium, October 1993 SADC Parliamentary Forum, Windhoek, Namibia, October 1993 Transcending the Legacy: Children in the New Southern Africa, August 1995 SADC Parliamentary Forum: The Constitution, 1995 European-Southern African Relations to the Year 2000: Carrying the Berlin Ministerial Initiative Forward, Bonn, Germany, 1995 SADC Parliamentary Forum: Building a Development Community, 1996 Re-Thinking European-Southern African Relations to 2000, Midrand South Africa, April 1996 European Presidency Seminar on Southern Africa: Current developments in Mozambique, Angola and South Africa, Rome, Italy, July 1996 A WEPA Bulletin (quarterly) Women in Decision-Making: Empowerment for Action, Seminar Report, Cape Town, South Africa, September 1996 S111gol Account from Angola: UNITA as described by ex-participants and foreign visitors Development and Democracy in Angola: New Opportunities for Southern Africa and

Europe, Conference in Lisbon, February 1992 Dossier: The September 1992 Elections in Angola, Briefing Manual for Parliamentary Electoral Observers Report of an Observer Mission at the Angola Elections, 29-30 September 1992 Relat6rio: Missdo de Observa5o das Eleiq6es Gerais em Angola, 29-30 Setembro 1992 Lusaka Protocol, Angola Peace Accord, Portuguese/English and Portuguese/French, 1996 Lusaka Protocol in Popular Version: In cooperation between ADRA, an Angolan NGO, and AWEPA a popular version of the Lusaka Protocol has been published in the form of a banda desenhada (cartoon). The first issue has a Portuguese text. Versions in the six major Angolan languages are forthcoming. The brochures constitute tools in the civic education work among soldiers to be demobilised, police, and the population at large. Angola Peace Process Bulletin of information and analysis Report of an observer mission at the Malawi Election, May 1994 The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi 1995, June 1995 .1Iozati lbique Mozambique's Unnatural Disaster Persists, Fact-finding Mission to Mozambique and Zimbabwe Mozambique - A Tale of Terror, told by ex-participants of Renamo and refugees Children on the Run, Samsam Magazine, in English, Dutch, German and Portuguese Constitution of Mozambique, 1990, in English and Portuguese General Peace Agreement of Mozambique/Acordo Geral de Paz de Mocambique, 1992, in English and Portuguese Repatriation, Demobilisation and Reintegration, Conference in Maputo, Mozambique, April 1993 Electoral Law of Mozambique/Lei Eleitoral de Mofambique 1993, in English and Portuguese Lei Eleitoral de Mo~ambique 1993, in Portuguese, 1994 Electoral Law of Mozambique 1993, in English, 1994 Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin, from January 1993 to December 1994 Comissdo Nacional de Eleifoes, relat6rio final, 1994 AWEPA's Observation of the Mozambique Electoral Process 1992-1994 Relat6rio da observaqdo pela AWEPA do processo eleitoral em Moqambique 1992-1994 National Elections Commission, final report, 1995 E Muitos Participaram! Um estudo sobre a Educagao Civica por ocasiao das primeiras Elei 6es Gerais e Multipartidirias em Moqambique, Obede Suarte Baloi, 1996 Quem / Quem na Assembleia da Reptiblica, Maputo, Mozambique, 1996 Regimento da Assembleia da Reptiblica, Maputo, Mozambique, 1996 Estatuto do Deputado da Assembleia da Repzblica, Maputo, Mozambique, 1996 .X'.thbii Namibia: The Last Steps to Genuine Independence?, Background document for the Conference in Harare, Zimbabwe, April 1989 Support to Independent Namibia, Conference in Harare, Zimbabwe, April 1989 From Colony to Democracy: The Independence Process in Namibia, Observer Missions to Namibia for the election process, 1989 Namibia's Constitution: Framework for Democracy, 1990 Walvis Bay: South Africa's Hostage, with CIIR and CAN

Europe and Namibia: European Cooperation frr Southern Afr-ica's Future, Conference in Rome, Italy, November 1990 Europa e Namibia: Cooperazione Europea per il fi'turo dell'A.1rica del Sud, Conferenza, Roma, Italia, Novembre 1990 Development Jbr the Namibian People: Neu, Challenges fbr SADCC and the International Community, Conference in Windhoek, Namibia, April 1991 Namibia: A Future for All, Samsam Magazine, in English, Dutch, German and Afrikaans Reconciliation and Denocratisation, Conference in Windhoek, Namibia, October 1992 Consolidation of Democracy in Namibia, AWEPA Electoral Observer Mission, December 1994 South Ifricea Human Rights in South Africa, Conference in Bonn, Germany, 5-6 June 1989 Unfinished Business: Apartheid after Apartheid, plus Supplements Violent Stalemate: Media Perspectives on the South African Negotiations, Media Workshop in Frankfurt, Germany, November 1990 Jabulani/ Freedom of the Airwaves: Toward Democratic Broadcasting in South Africa, Conference in Doom, Netherlands, August 1991 Changing South Africa, Challenge for Europe, Conference in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, January 1992 "Van Gesprekke na Onderhandelinge" (From Talks to Negotiations): Media in South Africa and in Belgium, Media Workshop in Brussels, Belgium, February 1992 Bias and Bigotry: Media and Elections in South Africa, Media Workshop in London, UK, November 1993 South Africa between Yesterday and Tomorrow, A WEPA Electoral Observing in South Africa, April 1993, May 1994 South Africa Economy in Transition, Conference in Athens, Greece, June 1994 Report of an observer mission at the Tanzania Election from 29 October to 19 November 1995 Oea.sionaI Paper ,Series: Sust.in able Democracy and IIunan Rights #1: Consolidation of Democracy and Human Rights in Emerging Democracies: Focus on Newly-Elected Politicians, 1996 #2: Standardisation of Practice in the Selection, Training and Deployment of International Election Observers, 1997

PETER SLUITER Amsterdam, May 1997 INTERNATONAL LOBBYING POLICY RESEARCH 0 R CAN ISATION Dear friend, During the many years that I have worked for AWEPA, from its founding conference in 1984 until 1992, there was a double A at the end of the acronym which stood for 'Action against Apartheid', referring to an activity at the heart of our activities: the world-wide campaign for sanctions against Apartheid South Africa. In one way or another, you have contributed to that campaign. Jan Nico Scholten asked me to write this 'insider's history' because I was primarily responsible for this subject within the AWEPAA secretariat and would best be able to find and interpret the documents. More relevant even: 'what is not in the archives will be in your head' he said. That turned out to be very true and there was a lot to tell: successes and failures, tricks and strategies, joy and anger, high politics and close, personal friendships. Instead of dedicating this book to the 10th anniversary of AWEPA(A) in 1994, it should rather serve to commemorate the 15th anniversary of structured cooperation amongst European parliamentarians who wish to contribute to the abolition of apartheid: since 1982 I have worked with Jan Nico Scholten in preparing the foundation of AWEPAA, when he organised, in the Dutch Parliament in The Hague, the first conference of its kind where European parliamentarians discussed the full range of sanctions against South Africa and decided to set up structured cooperation. We did not produce this book just for ourselves and out of nostalgia, but as a contribution to the historiography of international cooperation against apartheid. The campaign for sanctions against South Africa has not been and will not be, one may fear, the last call for sanctions against a regime that violates basic human rights in a systematic way. Activists and strategists in similar campaigns may want to learn from successes and problems described in this book. 'With pride and modesty' was my original working title for one of the chapters. Many recipients of this book will have good reason to be proud of their contribution to the international anti-apartheid campaign. Most of us also recognise that we must be modest too: by far the main burden of the struggle has been borne by the peoples of South and Southern Africa. They achieved their liberty and independence at a greater cost than most supporters from outside. For them the formal end of apartheid and the cessation of South African occupation or aggression are only the beginning of a process of reconciliation, reconstruction, the emergence of democracy, economic and social justice. It is good to know that developments allowed AWEPA to change its last two A's of 'Action against Apartheid' into the one A of 'for Africa'. It symbolises its continued dedication to give modest, but necessary support from outside to this difficult but achievable process. Peter Sluiter NL-1074 )A AMSTERDAM AMSTELDIJK 78 NETHERLANDS PH (00.31.20)675.0550 FAX 675.8556 E-MAIL [email protected] 8-1040 BRUSSELS 6tRARDSTRAAT 68 BELCIUM PH (00.32.2)736.7645