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Semantics II (207): Dynamic Theories More On Semantics II (207): Dynamic theories UCLA, Spring 2011 Jessica Rett, [email protected] where: Bunche 3143 when: Tuesday/Thursday, 11am-1pm office hours: Thursday 2-4pm expectations: do the reading; turn in homework; write a 15-page term paper due at noon on Friday, June 10; discuss your topic with me by May 26th. day topic readings* homework 1 Tuesday, March 29 Introduction Montague (1973) Thursday, March 31 Montague Grammar 1 Gamut (1991) x6.1{6.3.5 Dowty et al. (1981) 2 Tuesday, April 5 Montague Grammar 2 Gamut (1991) x6.3.6{6.3.10 homework 1 due Thursday, April 7 Individual concepts & Drefs Karttunen (1971) 3 Tuesday, April 12 Foundations of DRT Heim (1983); Kamp (1981); Heim (1982) homework 2 due Thursday, April 14 Introduction to DRT Kamp and Reyle (1993) Ch 1 4 Tuesday, April 19 Quantifiers in DRT 1 Kamp and Reyle (1993) Ch 2 homework 3 due Thursday, April 21 Quantifiers in DRT 2 Kamp and Reyle (1993) Ch 3 5 Tuesday, April 26 Tense & Aspect in DRT 1 Kamp and Reyle (1993) x5-5.3 homework 4 due Thursday, April 28 Tense & Aspect in DRT 2 Kamp and Reyle (1993) x5.4-5.6 6 Tuesday, May 3 Anaphora in DRT Beaver (2002) homework 5 due Thursday, May 5 Presupposition in DRT Krahmer and van Deemter (1998) 7 Tuesday, May 10 Foundations of DPL 1 Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) x1-x3 Thursday, May 12 Foundations of DPL 2 Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) x4-x5 8 Tuesday, May 17 Quantifiers in DPL 1 Brasoveanu (2011) Thursday, May 19 Quantifiers in DPL 2 Brasoveanu (2011) 9 Tuesday, May 24 Plurals in DPL Nouwen (2007) Thursday, May 26 Reflexives/Reciprocals in DPL Murray (2008); Murray (2007) 10 Tuesday, May 31 Questions in discourse 1 Asher and Lascarides (1998) Thursday, June 2 Questions in discourse 2 Asher and Lascarides (1998) *Italicized readings are optional but relevant. More on... dynamic theories generally: Bentham (1996), Roberts (2004) attitude reports: Asher (1986, 1989); Kamp (1990) conditionals: Starr (2009) disjunction & negation: Krahmer and Muskens (1995) evidentials: Murray (2010a,b) modals: Roberts (1987); Brasoveanu (2010a) Montagovian DRT: Muskens (1996) plurality: van den Berg (1996) presupposition: Beaver (2001, 2002); Kamp (2001); Kamp and Rossdeutscher (1994) quantifiers: Brasoveanu (2010b) questions: van Rooy (1998); Aloni and van Rooy (2002), Groenendijk (2009) tense/aspect: Bittner (2005, 2007) References Aloni, M. and van Rooy, R. (2002). The dynamics of questions and focus. In Jackson, B., editor, Proceedings of SALT XVII, pages 20{39. Cornell. Asher, N. (1986). Belief in Discourse Representation Theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15:127{189. Asher, N. (1989). Belief, acceptance and belief reports. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 19. 1 Asher, N. and Lascarides, A. (1998). Questions in dialogue. Linguistics and Philosophy, 21:237{309. Beaver, D. (2001). Presupposition and assertion in dynamic semantics. CSLI. Beaver, D. (2002). Presupposition in DRT. In Beaver, D., Casillas-martinez, L., Clark, B., and Kaufmann, S., editors, The construction of meaning. CSLI. Bentham, J. v. (1996). Exploring logical dynamics. CSLI. van den Berg, M. (1996). Some Aspects of the Internal Structure of Discourse. PhD Thesis, ILLC, University of Amsterdam. Bittner, M. (2005). Future discourse in a tenseless language. Journal of semantics, 22. Bittner, M. (2007). Online update: Temporal, modal and de se anaphora in polysynthetic discourse. In Direct compositionality, pages 363{404. Oxford. Brasoveanu, A. (2010a). Decomposing modal quantification. Journal of Semantics, 27:437{527. Brasoveanu, A. (2010b). Modified numerals as post-suppositions. In Proceedings of the 17th Annual Amsterdam Colloquium. Brasoveanu, A. (2011). Decomposing quantification. UCSC. Dowty, D., Wall, R., and Peters, S. (1981). Introduction to Montague Semantics. D. Reidel. Gamut, L. (1991). Logic, Language and Meaning, Volume 2: Intensional Logic and Logical Grammar. The University of Chicago Press. Groenendijk, J. (2009). Inquisitive semantics: two possibilities for disjunction. In Bosch, P., Gabelaia, D., and Lang, J., editors, Proceedings of Tbilisi 2007: Seventh International Tsibilisi Symposium on Language. Springer-Verlag. Groenendijk, J. and Stokhof, M. (1991). Dynamic predicate logic. Linguistics and Philosophy, 14:39{100. Heim, I. (1982). The semantics of definite and indefinite noun phrases. Heim, I. (1983). File change semantics and the Familiarity Theory of definiteness. In B¨auerle,R., Schwartze, C., and von Stechow, A., editors, Meaning, Use and Interpretation of Language, pages 164{189. De Gruyter. Kamp, H. (1981). A theory of truth and semantic representation. In Groenendijk, J., Janssen, T., and Stokhof, M., editors, Formal Methods in the study of language, Part 1, pages 277{322. Mathematical Center. Kamp, H. (1990). Prolegomena to a structural account of belief and other attitudes. In Anderson, C. and Owens, J., editors, Propositional attitudes: the role of content in logic, pages 27{90. CSLI. Kamp, H. (2001). The importance of presupposition. In Rohrer, C., Rossdeutscher, A., and Kamp, H., editors, Linguistic form and its computation. CSLI. Kamp, H. and Reyle, U. (1993). From discourse to logic. Springer. Kamp, H. and Rossdeutscher, A. (1994). DRS-construction and lexically driven inference. Theoretical linguistics, 20:165{235. Karttunen, L. (1971). Discourse referents. In Proceedings of Coling 1969. Krahmer, E. and Muskens, R. (1995). Negation and disjunction in Discourse Representation Theory. Journal of Semantics, 12:357{376. Krahmer, E. and van Deemter, K. (1998). On the interpretation of anaphoric Noun Phrases: towards a full understanding of partial matches. Journal of Semantics, 15:355{392. Montague, R. (1973). The proper treatment of quantification in ordinary English. In Hintikka, J., Moravcsik, J., and Suppes, P., editors, Approaches to Natural Language, pages 221{242. Dordrecht. Murray, S. (2007). Dynamics of reflexivity and reciprocity. In Proceedings of the 16th Annual Amsterdam Colloquium. Murray, S. (2008). Reflexivity and reciprocity with(out) underspecification. In Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 12. Murray, S. (2010a). Evidentiality and the structure of speech acts. Murray, S. (2010b). A Hamblin semantics for evidentials. In Proceedings of SALT XIX. Muskens, R. (1996). Combining Montague Semantics and Discourse Representation. Linguistics and Philosophy, pages 143{186. Nouwen, R. (2007). On dependent pronouns and dynamic semantics. Journal of philosophical logic, 36:123{154. Roberts, C. (1987). Modal subordination, anaphora and distributivity. Roberts, C. (2004). Context in dynamic interpretation. In Horn, L. and Ward, G., editors, The Handbook of pragmatics, pages 197{220. Blackwell. Starr, W. (2009). Conditionals and questions. Ms., Rutgers University. van Rooy, R. A. M. (1998). Modal subordination in questions. Twendial, 98:237{248. 2.
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