Joint Force Interdependence
Issue 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Joint Force Quarterly
I ssue S eventy-six, 1 Joint Force Interdependence
st Strength Through Diversity Quarter 2015 Nonlethal Weapons Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 76, 1st Quarter 2015 http://ndupress.ndu.edu
GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA, Publisher MajGen Frederick M. Padilla, USMC, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Printing Office
Advisory Committee COL Michael S. Bell, USA (Ret.), Ph.D./College of International Security Affairs; Maj Gen Brian T. Bishop, USAF/Air War College; LTG Robert B. Brown, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; BG Guy T. Cosentino, USA/National War College; Brig Gen Thomas H. Deale, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; Col Keil Gentry, USMC/Marine Corps War College; Lt Gen David L. Goldfein, USAF/The Joint Staff; BGen Thomas A. Gorry, USMC/ Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Col Steven J. Grass, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; MG William E. Rapp, USA/U.S. Army War College; RDML John W. Smith, Jr., USN/Joint Forces Staff College; LtGen Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC/The Joint Staff
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Stephen D. Chiabotti/School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/National War College; Mark J. Conversino/Air War College; Thomas P. Ehrhard/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.)/Office of the Secretary of Defense; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Mark H. Jacobsen/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Thomas L. McNaugher/Georgetown University; Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.)/National War College; James A. Schear/Office of the Secretary of Defense; LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)
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Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Commissioned Officer Training School student hoists herself around pillar during ropes course, part of confidence and team-building exercise for commissioned medical, legal, and chaplain officers (U.S. Air Force/Natasha Stannard); Soldiers with 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, move behind mud walls in order to take over enemy sniper position during Operation Charkh Restoration, Charkh District, Logar Province, Afghanistan (DOD/Sean Casey); Sailors direct F/A-18E Super Hornet assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron 31 Tomcatters on flight deck of aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush, which supports maritime security operations, strike operations in Iraq and Syria as directed, and theater security cooperation efforts in U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility (U.S. Navy/Brian Stephens). About the Cover In this Issue Marine with Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, stands prepared for enemy contact Dialogue in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2 Letter during 3-day mission in town of 4 From the Chairman Gereshk, which involved numerous firefights with Taliban insurgents, 6 Where Do We Find Such July 2014 (U.S. Marine Corps/ Men and Women? Joseph Scanlan) Forum 8 Executive Summary 10 Navy Perspective on Joint Force Interdependence By Jonathan Greenert Features Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the 15 Bringing Space Crisis 64 Refocusing the U.S. Strategic Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship Stability Down to Earth Security Perspective joint military and security studies journal designed By James P. Finch By Linnea Y. Duvall and to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and other partners on joint and integrated Evan O. Renfro operations; national security policy and strategy; Jpme Today efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; 71 Nonlethal Weapons: A and developments in training and joint professional 21 Debunking Technical Technological Gap or military education to transform America’s military and Competency as the Sole security apparatus to meet tomorrow’s challenges Misdefined Requirements? better while protecting freedom today. All published Source of Innovation By Ofer Fridman articles have been vetted through a peer-review By Burton H. Catledge process and cleared by the Defense Office of 78 Challenges to Improving Prepublication and Security Review. 30 Should Military Officers Combat Casualty Survivability NDU Press is the National Defense University’s Study Policy Analysis? on the Battlefield cross-component, professional military and academic publishing house. By Nikolas K. Gvosdev By Robert L. Mabry The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 35 Assessing Causality in a 85 Mosquitoes: A Viable 21st- expressed or implied within are those of the Complex Security Environment Century Soft Power Tool contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views By Andrew L. Stigler of the Department of Defense or any other agency of By Mary Raum and the Federal Government. Kathleen J. McDonald 40 Next Steps for Transforming Submissions and Communications Education at National JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent Recall research from members of the Armed Forces, security Defense University policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic By Christopher J. Lamb 93 Operation Cottage: A specialists, and civilians from the United States and and Brittany Porro Cautionary Tale of Assumption abroad. Submit articles for consideration by email to [email protected], with “Attention A&R Editor” in the and Perceptual Bias subject line. Or write to: By Del C. Kostka Commentary Editor, Joint Force Quarterly 48 A Strong Fighting Force Is NDU Press Book Reviews 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504) a Diverse Fighting Force Fort Lesley J. McNair By Larry O. Spencer 100 The Roar of the Lion Washington, DC 20319 Reviewed by Richard A. McConnell 52 Revisioning Strategic Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 Email: [email protected] Communication Through 101 A Scrap of Paper JFQ online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm Reviewed by Nicholas Rostow Rhetoric and Discourse Analysis 1st Quarter, January 2015 By William M. Marcellino 102 Brothers Armed: Military ISSN 1070-0692 58 A Theater-Level Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine Perspective on Cyber Reviewed by Michael Kofman By J. Marcus Hicks Joint Doctrine 104 Seeing 2020: America’s New Vision for Integrated Air and Missile Defense By Geoffrey F. Weiss 112 Joint Doctrine Update Letter
o the Editor: As I read Rebecca problem. Solve it. What do I mean? I is an opportunity, not an occasion for Patterson and Jodi Vittori’s mean do not regard big words as an “feeling stupid” or being made to feel T article titled “Why Military Offi- enemy. Instead, regard your own igno- stupid by someone else. It is a great way cers Should Study Political Economy” rance of their meanings as the enemy and to develop critical thinking and expand in Joint Force Quarterly 75 (4th Quarter the writer or speaker as an unwitting or your vocabulary. Smart officers learn big 2014), I reconsidered my own under- even intentional ally of your adversary (al- words even if they would not speak or standing of the term political economy. though withhold judgment for a moment write them. But do use with care. At one time I was admittedly unsure of on that last part). Do some intelligence its precise meaning, although I could preparation of the battlefield. Perform Dr. John T. Kuehn make some informed guesses, and some reconnaissance (another big word, General William Stofft Chair for thankfully the authors do a good job but one military professionals are com- Historical Research of giving readers many opportunities fortable with). In other words, find out U.S. Army Command and to understand what it means based on what the word means, not only in its General Staff College context in various passages. primary sense (usually the first definition However, this chance encounter with in a dictionary), but also in its secondary a phrase that field-grade officers might or idiomatic (normal use in conversation) not see regularly in their professional sense if these are provided. This will fur- reading brought to mind the entire topic ther allow you to accomplish three useful of language and its challenges. I have things. seen a phenomenon up close and per- First, you have now added that sonal here at the U.S. Army Command word to your own “force,” so it is no and General Staff College, particularly in longer in support of the “enemy” (the some of the readings we historians assign unknown, ignorance). Secondly, learning to our students in books such as Makers the meaning of a word will allow you of Modern Strategy. I can vaguely recall to evaluate its importance to what is being a bit miffed the first time I chanced being said and perhaps further clarify an across the word particularism, but then I unclear thought. Finally, it can help you looked it up and turned the tables on my understand the strength, or more often own ignorance. weakness, of a person’s argument. If he So-called big words, words such as misused the word, you can now engage misanthropic, heuristic, and epistemolog- in dialogue, debate, conversation, and ical, too often serve as a convenient way even criticism. A word on criticism: I for the intellectually insecure to withdraw do not use this word in the sense of from the battlefields of words and ideas your wife, husband, father, mother, or and retreat to the safer ground of simple, boss nagging at you (or you nagging at monosyllabic conversation. There is a them). Criticism in the intellectual world unity and beauty to such conversation involves exchange and testing of ideas, that is admirable and even desirable in skepticism, challenge, and response, and writing and speaking, but big words are ultimately a better understanding of not without value. They add texture, the problem or situation at hand. That richness, and nuance to writing and sounds like something military profes- speaking if not misused—which is often sionals should engage in, does it not? how we see and hear them used if we Finally, you may get to a point where you are honest. At other times, people use actually enjoy running across a big word big words to confuse, obfuscate, and precisely because you have mastered intimidate. enough of them that running across one When midgrade officers encounter becomes a rarity. unknown words, they should act like Bottom line (which is what I am Napoleon or Nelson and treat them the told majors and lieutenant commanders way they might treat a difficult military crave): going after all those big words
2 Dialogue / Letter JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 call for entries for the 2015 Secretary of Defense and 2015 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions
Are you a professional military education (PME) student? Imagine your winning essay published in a future issue of Joint Force Quarterly, catching the eye of the Secretary and Chairman as well as contributing to the debate on an important national security issue. These rewards, along with a monetary prize, await the winners.
Who’s Eligible? Students, including international students, at U.S. PME colleges, schools, and other programs, and Service research fellows.
What’s Required? Research and write an original, unclassified essay on some aspect of U.S. national, defense, or military strategy. The essay may be written in conjunction with a course writing requirement. Important: Please note that entries must be selected by and submitted through your college.
When? Anytime during the 2014–2015 academic year. Students are encouraged to begin early and avoid the spring rush. Colleges set their own internal deadlines, but must submit their official entries to NDU Press by April 17, 2015, for the first round of judging. Final judging and selection of winners take place May 14–15, 2015, at NDU Press, Fort McNair, Washington, DC.
National Defense University Press conducts the competition with the generous support of the NDU Foundation. For further information, see your college’s essay coordinator or go to:
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/EssayCompetitions/SECDEFCompetition.aspx http://ndupress.ndu.edu/EssayCompetitions/CJCSCompetition.aspx
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Dialogue 3 Chairman talks to Reserve Officers’ Training Corps cadets at University of Notre Dame, September 2014 (DOD/Daniel Hinton)
From the Chairman The Posture Paradigm
or the first half of my 40 years conflict—shaping, assuring, and deterring engage, and posture around the world in the military, we were largely through forward presence. As soon as a in a way that is more strategic and more F a readiness-focused force. We Service had a unit ready, it deployed and sustainable. deployed for exercises and demon- it went someplace. The general mindset strations to send signals to the Soviet was that if we did not use it, we did not A More Agile Force Union and to reassure allies. Certainly, need it. In developing strategy, we have stated we had forces forward based in Europe Today, with the number of complex that in the face of constrained resources, and the Pacific. But mostly we trained global security issues we face growing and we are going to be more agile and more our forces in the continental United with resources shrinking, neither of these innovative. As we unpack these words, States, building readiness in case we paradigms is adequate. A Joint Force with we challenge ourselves to see just how had to fight “the big one.” global responsibilities and finite resources agile we currently are and identify inno- After the Berlin Wall fell and the must prioritize threats and balance to- vative opportunities to become even Iron Curtain was furled in 1991, we day’s risks with tomorrow’s uncertainty. more so. We can certainly improve our reevaluated the cost and size of our mil- This is not to suggest we must “do agility in decisionmaking; we tend to itary and changed our readiness-focused more with less.” Rather, in the highly be very agile in a crisis but not as agile paradigm to a presence-focused one. dynamic security environment that we in our daily operations and long-range Now the greater good was in avoiding operate in, we must adapt how we lead, planning. We also need to be more agile
4 Dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 to something more resource-informed, thereby allowing the Joint Force to protect U.S. national security interests in ways that are different, more deliberate, and more sustainable. At its core, this means determining the proper mix between forward-pres- ence forces in geographic combatant commands and surge forces based in the continental United States and U.S. ter- ritories. We have kept an eye focused on forward, highly ready forces in part be- cause we have grown accustomed to the big payoff. But now we have to recon- sider our “stance” to ensure we maintain our “balance.” This we know: our Joint Force must be able to dynamically reconfigure and move rapidly, integrating capabilities and part- ners across domains and boundaries not only to respond to emerging events, but also to surge ready forces from the conti- nental United States or among geographic theaters to seize and maintain the initiative. The details of how we are going to do this are very much part of the ongoing dialogue. We are discussing how to base- line theater presence, we are determining First Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Soldiers review attack plan with Moldovan soldiers what innovative ways we can apply to before situational training exercise at Hohenfels Training Area, Germany, October 2014 (U.S. Army/ maintain forward presence as we rebuild Sarah Tate) our readiness, and we are thinking about how best to prioritize capabilities to in the ways we manage our forces—that allies while not destroying readiness. preserve flexibility. Any choices in these is, how we dynamically and purposefully Concurrently, it means giving the com- areas must improve our ability to seize employ assets around the globe. We batant commands a clear understanding opportunities that demonstrate U.S. must better identify opportunities that of what is possible in terms of resources, leadership and strength to allies, partners, generate the greatest advantages and balanced with the needs of the Services and adversaries. results using the right tools, in the right to maintain a healthy force, as well as I encourage you to become a part places, and with the right partners. constantly assessing risk to mission and of this dialogue. The decisions we make Most of our Joint Force works in risk to force. now will define our future for decades either the realm of combatant commands to come, both in terms of how we react or of the military Services. There is always A More Dynamic Global to crises and how we can help shape the tension managing the force. The com- Operating Model international environment. JFQ batant commands tend to want as much As we look back at the assumptions forward-positioned force structure as pos- underlying the balance in our force Martin E. Dempsey sible not only to shape, deter, and assure posture since the end of the Cold War, General, U.S. Army and but also to “fight tonight” if required. it is clear our global posture is not—and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff The Services want to support the demand, should not be—immutable. Nor is it but they also have a responsibility to sus- one size fits all. Posture evolves over tain the readiness and health of the force. time and should change to adapt to the This is a healthy tension in my view, but global security environment and the one that can get out of balance. threats that we face. Becoming more agile requires finding Accordingly, we are in the process of sustainable ways to manage the global adapting our global force management force to deter adversaries and reassure mechanism from strictly demand-based
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Dempsey 5 Old Amphitheater at Arlington National Cemetery (DOD)
Where Do We Find Such Men and Women?
he title of this article is a slightly years to April of 1861. Our nation is Due to his injuries, Corporal Tanner edited sentence from James divided and has fallen into civil war. was left behind when the Union Army T Michener’s 1953 novella The James R. Tanner, a 17-year-old farm boy moved on, and he was ultimately cap- Bridges at Toko-Ri. On December 17, from Richmondville, New York, enlists tured by Confederate forces. After being 1777, General George Washington in Company C of the 87th New York paroled, he spent weeks recovering before recruited former Prussian officer Baron Volunteer Infantry Regiment. Through finally being sent home. His time in the Friedrich Wilhelm Von Steuben to his steadfast dedication and incredible Army was finally over. However, his com- strengthen professionalism in the Colo- performance, he is rapidly promoted to mitment to service was not. Undaunted nial Army. Von Steuben then wrote the rank of corporal. Over the course of by the loss of his legs, he learned to a manual outlining the duties and the next 16 months, he would see action walk with artificial limbs and navigated responsibilities of the noncommissioned in nine major battle campaigns. His last through life continuing to serve the officer (NCO). In essence, this hall- battle would be the Second Battle of Nation. mark document was the creation of the Bull Run in August of 1862. When a Corporal Tanner, as he would be NCO in the U.S. Armed Forces. This Confederate artillery shell hit his position, known for the rest of his life, began his article is about one of those NCOs. he sustained massive shrapnel wounds civil service as a deputy door keep for the To fully understand the significance that required surgeons to amputate both New York State Assembly. During this of this event, we must go back 153 of his legs below the knees. time, he studied and became proficient
6 Dialogue / Where Do We Find Such Men and Women? JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 in stenography, a skill that would soon prove critical. On April 14, 1865, while working as a clerk and stenographer for the Ordnance Department in Washington, DC, Tanner was summoned to the bedside of the critically wounded President Abraham Lincoln. During the course of the night, he meticulously recorded the eyewitness accounts of the shooting of the President. Tanner was present in the room when Lincoln finally succumbed to his wounds. Shortly afterward, Corporal Tanner left the Ordnance Department and began working as a committee clerk for the (Photo courtesy of Michael R. Patterson) New York State Legislature. He later moved on to the New York Customs Congressional Charter. Tanner lived a to fully recognize the actions and service House and eventually was promoted to remarkable life, and upon his death in of Corporal Tanner, the leadership of deputy customs collector. Tanner fin- 1927 was buried in Arlington National Arlington National Cemetery proudly ished his civil service as the tax collector Cemetery, just a few yards from the Old renamed the “Old” Amphitheater as the for Brooklyn and become an important Amphitheater. James Tanner Amphitheater on May 30, public speaker on behalf of fellow veter- Though this article highlights 2014. ans. Eventually Tanner opened a private Corporal Tanner in particular, it is im- Stop, if only for a moment, and re- legal practice dedicated to the defense of portant for the reader to know a little member those whose footsteps we have veterans. In April 1904, he was appointed about the Old Amphitheater. It was followed, those who dedicated their lives by President Theodore Roosevelt as erected in 1873 to serve as a location to service. Consider, too, the title of this the Register of Wills for the District of for patriotic meetings in celebration of article. It is a slightly edited sentence Columbia, a position he held until his Decoration Day (later renamed Memorial from James Michener’s 1953 novella death in 1927. Day), which had been established in The Bridges at Toko-Ri. In a 1982 radio Though employed in a full-time 1868. The amphitheater was first used address, President Ronald Regan asked capacity, it was not enough. Corporal on May 30, 1873, and remained in use this same question and answered it thus: Tanner did not just continue to serve his until the early 1900s when it became “we find [such men and women] where nation through civil service; he dedicated evident that the popularity of the events we’ve always found them. They are the much of his time to various veteran or- dictated that a new, larger venue was product of the freest society man has ever ganizations. Tanner served as a member needed. In 1920, the current Memorial known. They make a commitment to of the Grand Army of the Republic, an Amphitheater was christened, and the the military—make it freely, because the association for Union Army veterans. He original structure became informally birthright we share as Americans is worth was elected as the commander for the known as the Old Amphitheater. defending.” Next Memorial Day, visit the New York chapter and ultimately served Ninety-four years after assuming the James Tanner Amphitheater at Arlington as national commander. He was also a Old moniker, the amphitheater was for- in honor of all those noncommissioned member of the Union Veteran Legion mally renamed in recognition of a Civil officers who have served the greatest and went on to serve as its national com- War veteran who spent his life dedicated fighting force in the world. JFQ mander as well. While a serving member to civil service and advocating for his of the Grand Army of the Republic, fellow veterans. This Soldier can be de- Tanner was the driving force behind the scribed as the epitome of professionalism, Bryan B. Battaglia establishment of a Soldier’s Home in courage, patriotism, and more of what Sergeant Major, U.S. Marine Corps Bath, New York, and later, a Confederate our current NCO corps traditionally rep- Senior Enlisted Advisor to the veteran’s home in Richmond, Virginia. resents: leadership, selfless sacrifice, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Around this same time, Tanner a lifelong commitment to the Nation. and the Senior Noncommissioned Officer became an active member of the newly The amphitheater began its service as a in the U.S. Armed Forces founded American Red Cross. His efforts gathering place for the remembrance of saw him elected to the board of directors. the selfless actions and honorable deeds Donald B. Abele Through his tenacity and hard work, of all our veterans. Who qualifies more Command Master Chief, U.S. Navy Tanner would champion the Red Cross than Corporal James Tanner, U.S. Army, Deputy Director in its reorganization and ultimately to a to represent our veterans? In an effort U.S. Navy Senior Enlisted Academy
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Battaglia and Abele 7 U.S. Air Force Captain Erica Stooksbury, a C-17 Globemaster III aircraft pilot with the 816th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron, adjusts cockpit lighting controls in C-17 over Iraq, August 2014 (DOD/Vernon Young, Jr.)
Executive Summary
s we reach the end of U.S. In a recent Veteran’s Day speech involved in decisionmaking on the use of combat operations in Afghan- at Georgetown University, Lieutenant armed forces in war. A istan, the American joint force General H.R. McMaster, USA, repeated Joint Force Quarterly is here in part is closing one chapter but seemingly an important thought for those who to support the idea that the study of war opening another. The rapid change of believe that military officers study war in and all of its elements is essential to learn- events in Iraq and the ongoing civil order to create war. General McMaster ing how to avoid war if at all possible, war in Syria cannot help but make us told the audience that military officers are and to successfully and rapidly conclude wonder if we are perpetually at war. I expected first “to study war as the best combat operations as soon as practical teach a class at the Eisenhower School means of preventing it; and second, to and in a fashion that enables transition on war termination, and despite the help the American military preserve our to a peaceful postconflict situation. This many and varied examples of how warrior ethos while remaining connected is the fundamental reason why Service wars terminate (or not), the “school to those in whose name we fight.” His and joint professional military education solution” is ever elusive. We seem to be view, which all who serve should share, (JPME) schools, their curricula, and their somewhere between the near certainty is that the study of war allows officers faculty and staffs exist. Moreover, this is of the geometric concepts of Antoine- to understand the costs in blood and the reason General Colin Powell created Henri Jomini and the “it depends” treasure before recommending how to this journal over 20 years ago: to spur an school of such greats as Carl von respond to threats or actual attacks when open debate on issues important to the Clausewitz as we seek to understand asked by civilian leaders. This is not a new joint force. Without these platforms to both the wars we are in and those we requirement for military officers, but is support learning, the intellectual power might face in the future. increasingly seen as important for civilians of the men and women involved in
8 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 recommending military options would be of transformation in JPME, Christopher Quick quiz: which disease has had greatly diminished. Lamb and Brittany Porro suggest how as much as an 80 percent infection rate An important part of the successful to complete the transformation effort at among deployed U.S. forces? Hint: the accomplishment of this education mission NDU and provide a range of options for disease is generally more widespread and is you, the reader. You can do more to all PME institutions to consider. deadly than all other viral hemorrhagic foster the study of war and promote the As you read the first article in the fevers combined, including Ebola, warrior ethos simply by reading, sharing, Commentary section on the topic of Marburg, Lassa, Korean, and Crimean- discussing, and, if so inclined, writing for diversity in the joint force, you will see Congo, as well as the deadly Yellow Fever. this journal. Our mission supports your beyond the four-star rank of the author Mary Raum and Kathleen McDonald tell efforts to become better educated and to and simply see the power of his words. us the answer: dengue, for which there is achieve a higher level of understanding Working through the various social no cure except to kill the mosquitoes that and capability as part of the human di- changes in the force, General Larry carry it. They suggest that a campaign to mension of the military. Spencer’s words become even more eradicate these deadly carriers would be In this issue’s Forum section, Chief powerful as a means to get from good fairly inexpensive and align perfectly with of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral to great. William Marcellino brings us a combatant command “shaping” efforts Jonathan Greenert returns with his view different take on strategic communica- in affected areas. This article should be on how the Navy does its part to achieve tions, suggesting a new way to make it mandatory reading for those serving in successful joint force interdependence. work by taking advantage of the fields or headed for U.S. Pacific Command and Of course, no single Service can sustain of rhetoric and discourse analysis instead U.S. Africa Command. operations independent from the others, of the current focus on communications If you are looking for a way to be and in the CNO’s view, the Services must theory, public relations, and market- published in JFQ where the competition strive to work out the best ways to suc- ing. Continuing a robust discussion of is not as fierce, try a history piece that re- ceed together. Another continuing area of all things cyber in this journal during lates to jointness. JFQ gets relatively few interest for the joint force is how to deal my tenure, J. Marcus Hicks offers his submissions in this area, but nearly all of with emerging concerns over the potential perspective on the subject that adds them fit our Recall section. In this issue’s for open warfare in space. James Finch some geographic context to one of the Recall, Del Kostka adds a great review of helps us see the connections between Chairman’s seven security issues (see the combined campaign in 1943 to eject space activity and strategic calculations of General Martin Dempsey’s remarks at Japanese forces from the Aleutian Islands the major powers on the ground. the Atlantic Council on May 14, 2014). in Alaska. Never heard of this operation? As I write this essay, the National As a side note, these seven issues and Read on, as there is joint and combined Defense University (NDU) has just especially a focus on cyber have been an knowledge to be gained in these pages. gained its 15th president, Major General integral part of this year’s curriculum here Also in this issue, we have three Frederick M. Padilla, USMC, and the at National Defense University. JFQ is in- excellent book reviews, as well as the pace of joint professional military edu- terested in all of these issues, and I hope Joint Staff J7 joint doctrine update and cation continues fast and furious. So too potential authors who read about them an important essay by Geoffrey Weiss on is the pace of article submissions in the will take advantage. the Defense Department’s vision for inte- JPME arena, and the downloads from Leading off our Features section, grated air and missile defense. our JFQ Web site indicate that JPME Linnea Duvall and Evan Renfro provide As you work your way through this Today has become one of the journal’s some interesting ideas on how to adjust issue, consider whether you agree with the most popular sections. First, Burton our national strategic security perspective arguments. Think about what these ideas Catledge analyzes what it takes to spur from a reliance on Cold War deterrence can do for your situation or that of your innovation with a surprise for some: it thinking to a more nuanced conflict organization. We are interested in your is not technical competency alone that management approach. Ofer Fridman views on these or any other topic related makes it happen. Nikolas Gvosdev next brings us back to the nonlethal weapons to the joint force. What separates suc- provides a strong argument for the discussion we had a number of issues cessful organizations from the rest is the inclusion of policy analysis in profes- ago by suggesting that we need to better degree to which the people in them learn sional military education. Those of us refine our requirements. As this issue and grow intellectually. JFQ offers you the who have been subjected to advanced hits the streets, U.S. combat operations chance to learn about your profession and statistics courses in our academic careers in Afghanistan are coming to an end, at the same time help others learn what are familiar with the standard caution spurring many efforts to capture the you know. That is a critical component of that “correlation is not necessarily cau- “best practices” from our decade-plus the warrior ethos, helping others learn. sality.” Andrew Stigler helps us work of war. Along these lines, Robert Mabry Let us know what you think. JFQ through what causality means, especially outlines the challenges in improving the in national security issues. Adding the record-setting advancements in combat William T. Eliason “what next” to the ongoing discussion casualty survival rates from these wars. Editor in Chief
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Eliason 9 Airmen working on Distributed Ground Station–1 Operations Floor at the U.S. Air Force’s 480th Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Wing (U.S. Air Force)
Navy Perspective on Joint Force Interdependence
By Jonathan Greenert
ooking ahead to the Department line intelligently, innovate, and wisely more dramatic fiscal changes can lead of Defense’s (DOD’s) fiscal pros- use funds at our disposal. We need a to retrenchment. While Service rivalries L pects and security challenges in the broader conversation about how to cap- are somewhat natural, and a reflection second half of this decade and beyond, italize on each Service’s strengths and of esprit de corps, they are counter- the Services and their partners will “domain knowledge” to better integrate productive when they interfere with have to find ever more ingenious ways capabilities. Moving in this direction combat performance, reduce capability to come together. It is time for us to is not only about savings or cost avoid- for operational commanders, or produce think and act in a more ecumenical way ance; it is about better warfighting. unaffordable options for the Nation. as we build programs and capabilities. The DOD historical track record Rather than expending our finite energy We should build stronger ties, stream- shows episodic levels of joint deconflic- on rehashing roles and missions, or com- tion, coordination, and integration. Wars mitting fratricide as resources become and contingencies bring us together. constrained, we should find creative ways Admiral Jonathan Greenert is Chief of Naval Peacetime and budget pressures seem to to build and strengthen our connections. Operations. compel the Services to drift apart, and We can either come together more to
10 Forum / Navy Perspective on Joint Force Interdependence JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Figure. “Smart Interdependence” Improves synergy. Notable examples of historical Warfighting and Fiscal Responsibility interdependence include the B-25 Doolittle Raid on Tokyo from the USS Full Hornet in 1942 and the Army’s longest ever helicopter assault at the start of
Excessive Risk Zone Operation Enduring Freedom from the Levels of Cooperation USS Kitty Hawk. The Navy has leaned Where heavily on Air Force tankers for years, and DOD B-52s can contribute to maritime strikes Redundancy must go by firing harpoons and seeding maritime $ Savings mines. Likewise, other Services have Partial relied on Navy/Marine Corps EA-6B aircraft to supply airborne electronic Combat DOD Today warfare capabilities to the joint force since Effectiveness the 1990s—paving the way for stealth Allies Today assets or “burning” routes to counter Partners Today improvised explosive devices. Examples of where the Navy and Army have closely interfaced include Navy sealift and prep- Minimal ositioning of Army materiel overseas, Deconfliction Coordination Integration Interdependence ballistic missile defense, the Army’s use of Navy-developed close-in weapons systems to defend Iraq and Afghanistan forward operating bases, and the use of Army ro- tary-wing assets from afloat bases. Special preserve our military preeminence—as a These concepts ring true for the mar- operations forces (SOF) come closest to smaller but more effective fighting force, itime Services. The Navy–Marine Corps perfecting operational interdependence if necessary—or face potential hollowing team has operated interdependently with tight, deeply embedded intercon- in our respective Services by pursuing for over two centuries. Symbiotic since nections at all levels among capability duplicative endeavors. their inceptions, Marines engaged in providers from all Services. Unexplored potential exists in ship-to-ship fighting, enforced shipboard Opportunities exist to build on this pursuing greater joint force interdepen- discipline, and augmented beach landings foundation and make these examples dence, that is, a deliberate and selective as early as the Battle of Nassau in 1776. the rule rather than the exception. We reliance and trust of each Service on the This relationship has evolved and ma- must move from transitory periods of capabilities of the others to maximize its tured through the ages as we integrated integration to a state of smart interdepen- own effectiveness. It is a mutual activity Marine Corps aviation squadrons into dence in select warfighting areas and on deeper than simple “interoperability” or carrier air wings in the 1970s, developed Title 10 decisions where natural overlaps “integration,” which essentially means amphibious task force and landing force occur, where streamlining may be ap- pooling resources for combined action. doctrines, and executed mission-tailored propriate and risk is managed. From my Interdependence implies a stronger net- Navy–Marine Corps packages on global perspective, advancing joint force interde- work of organizational ties, better pairing fleet stations. Land wars over the last pendence translates to: of capabilities at the system component decade have caused some of the cohesion avoiding overspending on similar level, willingness to draw upon shared to atrophy, but as the Marines shift back •• programs in each Service capabilities, and continuous informa- to an expeditionary, sea-based crisis selecting the right capabilities and tion-sharing and coordination. Chairman response force, we are committed to •• systems to be “born joint” of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General revitalizing our skills as America’s mobile, better connecting existing tactics, Martin Dempsey notes, “The strength of forward-engaged “away team” and “first •• techniques, procedures, concepts, our military is in the synergy and inter- responders.” Building and maintaining and plans dependence of the Joint Force.” Many synergy is not easy; in fact, it takes hard institutionalizing cross-talk on capstone documents emphasize greater work and exceptional trust, but the Navy •• Service research and development, interdependency between the Services’ and Marine Corps team has made it work requirements, and programs structures and concepts including the for generations, between themselves and expanding operational cooperation Chairman’s Strategic Direction to the with other global maritime partners. •• and more effective joint training and Joint Force, which calls for “combining The Services writ large are not unfa- exercises. capabilities in innovative ways.” miliar with the notion of cross-domain
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Greenert 11 Innovative Employment of Ships. The Navy–Marine Corps team is already developing innovative ways to mix expe- ditionary capabilities on combatants and auxiliaries, in particular joint high speed vessels, afloat forward staging bases, and mobile landing platforms just starting to join the force. We see opportunities to embark mission-tailored packages with various complements of embarked intelligence, SOF, strike, interagency, and Service capabilities depending on particu- lar mission needs. This concept allows us to take advantage of access provided by the seas to put the right type of force for- ward—both manned and unmanned—to achieve desired effects. This kind of approach helps us conduct a wider range USS Freedom, Littoral Combat Ship 1 (U.S. Navy/Tim D. Godbee) of operations with allies and partners and improves our ability to conduct persistent distributed operations across all domains to increase sensing, respond more quickly and effectively to crises, and/or confound our adversaries. Mission-tailored packages for small surface combatants such as the littoral combat ship, and the Navy’s mix of auxiliaries and support ships, would enable them to reduce the demand on large surface combatants such as cruisers and destroyers for maritime security, conventional deterrence, and partner- ship-building missions. We cannot afford to tie down capital ships in missions that demand only a small fraction of their USS Independence, Littoral Combat Ship 2 (U.S. Navy/Carlos Gomez) capabilities, such as contracted airborne in- telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance The Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept, we traded off interoperability and are (ISR) services from Aegis destroyers. We and the capabilities that underpin it, now doing everything we can to restore are best served tailoring capability to need, represent one example of an opportu- it, such as developing solutions for interchanging platforms and their payloads nity to become more interdependent. fifth-generation fighters to relay data suitable to the missions that they are best While good progress has been made on to fourth-generation ones. ASB has designed for. At the end of the day, it is developing the means, techniques, and become a forcing function to promote about achieving economy of force. tactics to enable joint operational access, joint warfighting solutions earlier in To make these concepts real, the we have much unfinished business and the development stage. For example, Navy would support an expanded joint must be ready to make harder tradeoff the Navy and Army are avoiding unaf- effort to demonstrate roll-on, roll-off decisions. One of the principles of ASB fordable duplicative efforts by teaming packages onto ships to create a set of spe- is that the integration of joint forces— on the promising capabilities of the cialized capability options for joint force across Service, component, and domain electromagnetic railgun, a game-changer commanders. Adaptive force packages lines—begins with force development in defeating cruise and ballistic missiles could range from remote joint intelli- rather than only after new systems are afloat and ashore using inexpensive gence collection and cyber exploit/attack fielded. We have learned that loosely high-velocity projectiles. systems, SOF, modularized Army field coupled force design planning and Additional areas where interdepen- medical units, humanitarian assistance/ programming results in costly fixes. In dence can be further developed include disaster relief supplies and service teams, the pursuit of sophisticated capability the following. to ISR detachments—either airborne,
12 Forum / Navy Perspective on Joint Force Interdependence JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 surface, or subsurface. Our ships are ideal platforms to carry specialized configurations, including many small, autonomous, and networked systems, regardless of Service pedigree. The ulti- mate objective is getting them forward and positioned to make a difference when it matters, where it matters. Tightly Knitted ISR. We should maximize DOD investments in ISR capabilities, especially the workforce and infrastructure that supports processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED). SOF and the Air Force are heavily in- vested in ISR infrastructure, the Army is building more reachback, and the Navy is examining its distribution of PED assets between large deck ships, maritime operations centers, and the Office of Naval Intelligence. While every Service has a responsibility to field ISR assets with sufficient “tail” to fully optimize their collection assets, stovepiped Service- specific solutions are likely too expensive. We should tighten our partnerships between ISR nodes, share resources, and maximize existing DOD investments in (Top) USNS Lewis B. Puller, Mobile Landing Platform–3/Afloat Forward Staging Base–1, under people, training, software, information construction at General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding Company shipyard; (below) artist’s systems, links/circuits, communications conception of MLP/AFSB with departing V-22 Osprey (U.S. Navy/Courtesy General Dynamics NASSCO) pipes, and processes. To paraphrase an old adage, “If we cannot hang together We can also be smarter about develop- find DOD spending extraordinary time in ISR, we shall surely hang separately.” ing shared sensor payloads and common and effort healing itself from legacy de- ISR operations are arguably very control systems among our programmers cisions that did not fully account for the “purple” today, but our PED investment while we find imaginative ways to better reality that every platform across the joint strategies and asset management are not. work the ISR “tail.” Each Service should community will need to be networked. Each Service collects, exploits, and shares be capitalizing on the extraordinary Greater discipline and communica- strategic, anticipatory, and operational progress made during Operations Iraqi tion between planners, programmers, intelligence of interest to all Services. Freedom and Enduring Freedom in in- acquisition professionals, and providers In many cases, it does not matter what tegrating sensors, software, and analytic for information systems at all classifica- insignia or fin flash is painted on the ISR tools. We should build off those models, tion levels are required. We must view “truck.” Air Force assets collect on mar- share technology where appropriate, and all new information systems as part of itime targets (for example, the Predator continue to develop capability in this area a larger family of systems. As such, we in the Persian Gulf), and Navy assets among joint stakeholders. should press hard to ensure convergence collect ashore (the P-3 in Operations Truly Interoperable Combat and between the DOD Joint Information Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom). Information Systems. The joint force has Environment and the Intelligence Yet each Service still develops its own par- a shared interest in ensuring sufficient Community’s Information Technology ticular PED solutions. We should avoid connectivity to effect information-sharing Enterprise initiatives. Why pay twice for any unnecessary new spending where ca- and command and control in all future similar capabilities already developed pability already exists, figure out dynamic contingencies. We cannot afford to de- somewhere else in the DOD enterprise? joint PED allocation schemes similar to velop systems that are not interconnected Why would we design a different solu- platform management protocols, and by design, use different data standards/ tion to the same functional challenge increase the level of interdependency formats, come without reliable under- only because users live in a different between our PED nodes. Not only is lying transport mechanisms, or place classification domain? Ensuring “best of this approach more affordable, but it also burdens on our fielded forces to develop breed” widgets, cloud data/storage/ makes for more effective combat support. time-consuming workarounds. We still utility solutions, advanced analytics,
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Greenert 13 sea-based strategic deterrence, persistent power projection from forward seabases, antisubmarine warfare, mine countermea- sures, covert maritime reconnaissance and strike, amphibious transport, underwater explosive ordnance disposal, diving and salvage, or underwater sensors, vehicles, and quieting. I cannot shed or compro- mise those responsibilities, nor would I ask other Services to rush headlong into a zone of “interdependence” that entails taking excessive risks. Joint interdependence offers the opportunity for the force to be more efficient where possible and more ef- fective where necessary. If examined deliberately and coherently, we can move toward smarter interdependence while avoiding choices that create single points Newest naval platforms include Joint High Speed Vessel, Mobile Landing Platform, and Landing Craft of failure, ignore organic needs of each Air Cushion (U.S. Navy) Service, or create fragility in capability or and information security capabilities information-sharing must become an capacity. Redundancies in some areas are are shared across the force will require extensible interdependency objective essential for the force to be effective and heightened awareness, focused planning, between joint forces, agencies, allies, and should not be sacrificed in the interest inclusive coordination, and enlightened partners alike. Improving the exchange of of efficiency. Nor can we homogenize leadership for years to come. information on shared maritime challenges capabilities so far that they become ill In the world of information systems, continues to be a constant refrain from suited to the unique domains in which enterprise solutions are fundamentally in- our friends and allies. We must continue to the Services operate. terdependent solutions. They evolve away meet our obligations and exercise a leader- Over time, we have moved from from Service or classification domain silos. ship role in supporting regional maritime deconflicting our forces, to coordinating We are not on this path solely because information hubs such as Singapore’s them, to integrating them. Now it is time we want to be thriftier. Rationalizing our Information Fusion Center, initiatives such to take it a step further and interconnect acquisition of applications, controlling as Shared Awareness and Deconfliction better, to become more interdependent “versioning” of software services, re- (SHADE) designed for counterpiracy, and in select areas. As a Service chief, my job ducing complexity, and operating more other impromptu coalitions formed to is to organize, train, and equip forces compatible systems will serve to increase deal with unexpected crises. and provide combatant commanders the flow of integrated national and tactical Other fields to consider advancing maritime capabilities that they can use to data to warfighters. This, in turn, leads joint force interdependence include protect American security interests. But to a better picture of unfolding events, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum ca- these capabilities must be increasingly improved awareness, and more informed pabilities, assured command and control complementary and integral to forces of decisionmaking at all levels of war. (including resilient communications), the other Services. What we build and Enterprise approaches will also reduce ballistic missile defense, and directed en- how we execute operations once our cyber attack “surfaces” and enable us to ergy weapons. capabilities are fielded must be powerful be more secure. To conclude, some may submit that and symphonic. In our eagerness to streamline, “interdependence” is code for “intoler- Together, with a commitment connect, and secure our networks and able sacrifices that will destroy statutory to greater cross-domain synergy, the platform IT systems, we have to avoid Service capabilities.” I agree that literal Services can strengthen their hands in leaving our allies and partners behind. and total interdependence could do just shaping inevitable force structure and ca- Almost all operations and conflicts are that. A “single air force,” for example, is pability tradeoff decisions on the horizon. executed as a coalition; therefore, we must not a viable idea. Moreover, each branch We should take the initiative to streamline develop globally relevant, automated, of the military has core capabilities that it ourselves into a more affordable and multilevel information-sharing tools and is expected to own and operate—goods, potent joint force. I look forward to update associated policies. This capabil- capabilities, and services no one else working to develop ideas that advance ity is long overdue and key to enabling provides. As Chief of Naval Operations, smart joint interdependence. This is a quid pro quo exchanges. Improved I can rely on no other Service for strategic imperative for our time. JFQ
14 Forum / Navy Perspective on Joint Force Interdependence JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Flying over East Asia, Expedition 38 crewmember on International Space Station took this night image of the Korean Peninsula (NASA)
Bringing Space Crisis Stability Down to Earth
By James P. Finch
ensions in the South and East ditional naval forces lurk just over the China’s unilateral expansion of its China seas have been elevated horizon. Given that the objects of these air defense identification zone (ADIZ) T during the last year. Territorial political disputes are islands, shoals, appears to have introduced a new and disputes in these areas flare periodi- and the vast resources around and dangerous element into the situation. cally, but historically the brinkmanship beneath them, it is only natural that the While such zones are not new, the uni- has largely been confined to encounters armed instruments of power brought to lateral extension of one country’s ADIZ at sea, with maritime law enforcement bear would operate in close proximity to overlap with another country’s ADIZ, vessels confronting fishing fleets as tra- to the territory in question. with no prior consultation and over polit- ically disputed territory, necessarily breeds suspicion and rancor. Moreover, the du- plication sets the stage for misperception James P. Finch is the Principal Director for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Office of the Under and miscalculation, with each party re- Secretary of Defense for Policy, where he previously acted as the Principal Director for Space Policy. He has held space-related leadership positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Headquarters fusing to recognize the legitimacy of the U.S. Air Force. declared defense interests of the other.
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Finch 15 Although much is being written about vary, and the U.S. Army War College sought it, not because of miscalcula- the ADIZ, the expansion of the political highlighted this point in a recent tion.”3 Colby’s insightful description not dispute from the seas to the skies por- volume of essays that explore various only applies to nuclear conflicts, but also tends an additional evolution of a future aspects of competing interpretations.1 can help advance our understanding of political crisis—a jump to the heavens. Understanding the concept of strategic how space systems fit into broader no- Just as analysts are closely scrutinizing the stability is an excellent foundation, tions of strategic stability, crisis stability, repercussions of the competing ADIZs yet by its focus on nuclear weapons it and arms race stability. on strategic and crisis stability between largely overlooks the critical role of the the claimants, we would be wise to begin space domain. Importance of Space to Stability thinking about the implications for stra- The focus on nuclear weapons at Space is vital to the national security tegic stability if future crisis escalations the expense of space power in strategic of the United States. As noted in the involve the space domain. It is far easier stability literature is understandable. For U.S. National Space Policy, space-based to dispassionately consider implications of the four-plus decades of the Cold War, capabilities enable the Armed Forces such a jump before it occurs, when analy- nuclear weapons were the coin of the to see with clarity, communicate with sis can occur free of the politically charged strategic realm. As both sides fielded certainty, navigate with accuracy, and suspicions that follow the horizontal esca- space systems during this period, the operate with assurance.4 Maintaining lation of a crisis into a new domain. safety of satellites was maintained by their the benefits afforded by space is also A discussion about the political close linkage to nuclear force structures. essential to economic growth and pros- import of space cannot occur as if space In peacetime, space systems provided perity, both in the United States and were somehow abstracted from the reassurance that the other party was not around the world. terrestrial political situation or, in the massing forces in threatening ways, while U.S. and allied forces rely on satellites case of nuclear-armed powers, abstracted also providing technical insights that to operate far from established terrestrial from nuclear or strategic stability. Just helped to verify arms control regimes. communications networks. Satellite as the expansion of the ADIZ must During crisis and wartime, space systems communications provide the backbone be considered within the context of were designed to provide early warning to ensure that analysts and warfighters the political dispute over the territory of missile launches and to enable national receive real-time access to intelligence, beneath it, so too must space power be leadership to execute nuclear warfighting surveillance, and reconnaissance data understood in the context of the political plans. Space systems could also be called streams provided by remotely piloted objectives here on Earth that gave rise to on to conduct battle damage assessment aircraft, which themselves are operated by the crisis. Important, too, is the overall to confirm that nuclear weapons had det- pilots via satellite. The global positioning stability of the strategic situation, and our onated as planned and to order further system provides forces critical position, understanding of such stability must not attacks as needed. Given these roles and navigation, and timing information, allow- somehow be artificially separated from the connection to nuclear warfighting, ing the joint force to better understand what is happening or could happen in the decisionmakers in Washington (and the contours of the battlespace, target heavens. Understanding how space fits perhaps Moscow) presumed that an with precision, and synchronize effects. into strategic stability, and how actions attack on space assets would prefigure a Space-based assets provide for global in space can affect, or even drive, crisis nuclear confrontation. Thus, the problem and theater missile warning, and assets dynamics, is imperative to reduce the risk of space deterrence, or crisis stability in operated by the Department of Defense of miscalculation. space independent of nuclear stability, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric was uninteresting at best. Times have Administration provide accurate, timely Giving Meaning to changed, and those concerned with weather information. All of these capa- Strategic Stability understanding contemporary strategic bilities are critical to the joint force in Over the past 5 to 10 years, it has stability would be well served to consider projecting power far from the homeland. become common to focus on “strategic the synergistic effects of space warfare For an adversary seeking to disrupt stability” as the new modus vivendi and crisis dynamics. or deny the ability of the United States between great powers. Before exploring In one of the most insightful chapters to project power, space capabilities may the synergies of space and strategic of the Army War College volume, author provide an appealing target, especially stability, it is important to settle on a Elbridge Colby states that “strategic early in a crisis or conflict. As such, space workable definition of strategic stability. stability should be understood to mean as a domain is inextricably linked to In many ways, for those not schooled in a situation in which no party has an in- crisis stability. First, space capabilities are nuclear strategy, this term has come to centive to use nuclear weapons save for critical enablers for the joint force, and replace “mutually assured destruction” vindication of its vital interests in extreme some have viewed these capabilities as an in defining the relationship between situations.”2 He goes on to assert that in Achilles’ heel for that force. Because a potentially adversarial nuclear powers. “a stable situation, then, major war would first strike against key space forces could Precise definitions of strategic stability only come about because one party truly undercut the ability of the rest of the
16 Forum / Bringing Space Crisis Stability Down to Earth JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 joint force to meet its operational and tactical objectives, it may be a tempting option. Second, many space capabilities can be degraded through electronic means, enabling the use of weapons systems such as jammers that an adver- sary might perceive as less escalatory. Just as China has found the use of civil “maritime law enforcement” ships to be less provocative than People’s Liberation Army naval forces in maritime standoffs, so too an adversary may believe that jam- ming a spacecraft is less provocative than other means of purposeful interference. Finally, it is often said that “satellites have no mothers.” Adversaries may therefore believe that they can attack such targets without fear of engendering strong public outcries that must be satisfied through some form of retaliation. But focusing exclusively on the U.S. use of space systems misses a significant change in the larger environment—a change that will only become more pronounced in the coming decades. The United States is not alone in its growing reliance on space for political, economic, and military purposes. The unique attributes of the space domain—global coverage, persistence, access to denied areas—are attributes that are valuable to all societies and militaries irrespective of their political ideologies. China is the best example of this trend, as that country’s space program both mirrors and directly contributes to its overall modernization, military and otherwise. China has contributed to new challenges for traditional and emerging actors in space, such as through compe- tition for commercial contracts to launch satellites and through China’s antisatellite Standard Missile–3 Block IB guided missile launched from USS John Paul Jones during Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Navy test over Pacific Ocean (Missile Defense Agency/Leah Garton) test in 2007 that created thousands of pieces of space debris. Yet it should be benefit from space capabilities. And, like For the past decade, the strategic recognized that China also shares a com- the United States, China has discovered community has thought of dependence mon interest in the safety, stability, and the military benefits enabled by space. A on space systems and the accompanying security of the domain. President Barack critical feature of China’s so-called antiac- vulnerability as a “U.S. problem.” While Obama and then-President Hu Jintao cess/area-denial strategy is the ability to this was accurate a decade ago, this prob- agreed during one of their first meetings engage an adversary’s force at a distance. lem increasingly confronts any modern that “the two countries have common This is best accomplished by relying on state seeking to project power regardless interests in promoting the peaceful use the ultimate high ground of space. Space of its political motivation. The implication of outer space and agreed to take steps to provides an ideal location to identify and of this development is profound, with enhance security in outer space.”5 target forces, to communicate with and wide-ranging potential effects for strategic China, like the rest of the world, guide weapons systems, and to assess stability. If both sides depend on space continues to derive significant economic damage after the strike. systems to ensure that military forces can
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Finch 17 achieve political objectives (or deny the Such shared understandings are largely is much higher. Given the low cost and political objectives of an adversary), then nonexistent in space. Not only do nations relative simplicity of some counterspace the overall stability of the space domain have less experience operating in the do- weapons, even nonstate actors have will become a central component of the main, but the criticality of space systems found utility in employing them. As for- overall stability of a crisis. to broader operational objectives also may mer Deputy Secretary of Defense William Decisionmakers in a crisis must weigh create a tempting target early in a crisis. Lynn noted, “Irregular warfare has come the implications of accepting the status Combined with the lack of potential to space.”8 Consequently, this type of quo or seeking to alter it through the human casualties from engagements in weapon—temporary and reversible—may application of some element of power. space, this lack of common understanding appear at first glance to be less escalatory In such a circumstance, a decisionmaker may create a growing risk of miscalcula- and less prone to miscalculation than will evaluate the relative balance of forces tion in a terrestrial political crisis. If not kinetic weapons. at different levels of conflict and may be explicitly addressed, this instability in At the other end of the weapons deterred by the likelihood of failure or space could even create a chasm that un- spectrum are weapons that have perma- the risks of unacceptable retaliation. If, dermines the otherwise well-crafted tenets nent and irreversible effects. The extreme however, it appears that an early strike can of strategic or nuclear stability. version of such a weapon would be a improve the odds of success or neutralize While much has been written about debris-generating kinetic kill device such an adversary’s ability to counter-escalate— how nuclear weapons contribute to, or as the kind that was tested by the United for example, by denying critical space detract from, crisis stability, space, in States and Soviet Union during the Cold capabilities—the adversary’s conclusion some ways, is more complex than nuclear War and by China in 2007. These weap- may be different and deterrence may fail. stability. First, today a clear taboo exists ons are particularly insidious because they An effective deterrence strategy must against the use of nuclear weapons. generate large amounts of debris that in- balance across domains and elements of Crossing that firebreak at any level has discriminately threatens satellites and other national power. The alternative is to risk immediately recognizable and significant space systems for decades into the future. that vulnerability in one narrow area, such implications. Second, in the context of One additional dimension to the as space, could collapse the threshold for nuclear weapons, theorists can (at least weapons spectrum that merits consid- deterrence failure more broadly.6 arguably) discriminate among escalatory eration in the context of crisis stability Simply put, strategic stability must be motives based on the type of weapon— relates to the survivability of a weapon. sought in space, and space stability must strategic or tactical—and based on the It is commonly accepted that space is an help maintain the overarching stability type of target—counterforce or counter- offense-dominant domain, which is to and deterrence posture here on Earth. value targeting. This was most famously say that holding space targets at risk is far Strategic and space stabilities are inex- sketched out in the form of an escalation easier and cheaper than defending them. tricably linked, and they are linked not ladder in Herman Kahn’s 1965 book, On This could lead to first-strike instability only for the United States, but also in- Escalation.7 by creating pressure for early action at the creasingly for China and other countries This convenient heuristic method for conventional level here on Earth before that rely on space systems to achieve understanding escalation based on the counterspace attacks could undermine military and political objectives. For this target and the weapon type is arguably the capability for power projection. But reason, we must give serious attention more complex for space. This is a byprod- the offense-dominant nature of the do- to how to achieve and maintain crisis uct of the lack of mutual understanding main has implications for both peaceful stability in space. on the implications of the weapon and satellites as well as space-based weapons. the value of the target. These factors This could also create first-strike instabil- Crisis Dynamics and Space deserve detailed consideration because ity regarding space-based weapons since As potentially dangerous as the over- they describe the playing field on which the advantage would go to the belliger- lapping ADIZs are, they are far less a terrestrial crisis could spiral into space ents who use their space weapon first. In destabilizing than actions in space could conflict. Efforts to manage crises, there- this way, space-based weapons may be be during a crisis. All contestants in the fore, must account for these complexities. uniquely destabilizing in ways that their “great game” unfolding in Asia have To begin, there is no taboo against more survivable, ground-based relatives fairly similar appreciations of the impli- many types of counterspace systems. are not. cations that would follow engaging mil- Starting a framework with weapon type, Adding complexity to Kahn’s heu- itary or, worse, civilian aircraft transiting the threshold for use of temporary and ristic, however, is the situational context their ADIZ. These understandings have reversible counterspace weapons appears surrounding the employment of coun- been built over 100 years of air travel much lower. There are documented in- terspace systems. In the space context, and were underscored dramatically in stances of electronic jamming happening strategists will have to consider weapon the miscalculation associated with the all over the world today, and the number type, the nature of the target, and also Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines of actors who possess counterspace weap- the terrestrial context. Today’s electronic Flight 007 in 1983. ons such as communications jammers jamming has primarily been witnessed
18 Forum / Bringing Space Crisis Stability Down to Earth JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Views of zenith side of International Space Station over Lake Baikal in Russia, Mongolia, and China taken from Atlantis, Orbiter Vehicle 104, during STS- 106 mission (NASA) in the Middle East, where regimes have destroying or otherwise rendering in- be remembered that an inherent char- sought to deny freedom of informa- operable such assets could raise a party’s acteristic of crises is a short timeframe tion to their populations by jamming stake in the conflict, by threatening either for decisionmaking. When time is short commercial communications satellites. its power projection capabilities globally and the potential cost of inaction is The same weapon type—a satellite com- or its assured ability to retaliate against significant, or even catastrophic, decision- munications jammer—applied against a nuclear strike. Many militaries use makers tend to lean toward worst-case a satellite carrying strategic nuclear commercial assets to communicate with interpretations of an adversary’s actions. command and control communications deployed forces, and a “show of force” This is a clear recipe for inadvertent during a crisis could be perceived much strike against a commercial satellite could miscalculation. differently. In such an instance, decision- inadvertently engage an adversary’s vital makers might conclude that the other interests. Bringing Space Down to Earth side is attempting to deprive them of nu- Simply put, the weapon, target, and The Cold War adversaries had many clear command and control as a prelude context all contribute to the perceived in- years to develop mutual understandings to escalation. tent and effects of a counterspace attack. about the nature and role of nuclear Similarly, the application of per- Unlike in other domains, tremendous weapons, and these understandings manent, irreversible force against a ambiguity exists regarding the use of contributed to strategic stability. These commercial or third party satellite would counterspace weapons. This means that understandings were born out of real- have a much different effect on crisis all of these variables would be open to world crises, such as the Berlin crises, dynamics than mere jamming. Physically interpretation in crises, and it should Korean War, and Cuban missile crisis.
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Finch 19 time and require a common understand- ing of the nature of the space domain and space systems. Returning to the formulation of Colby, recall that “in a stable situation . . . major war would only come about because one party truly sought it, not be- cause of miscalculation.” Miscalculation is best avoided when each side understands the implications of its actions and under- stands how the other side will interpret and react to those actions. This situation does not exist in today’s environment regarding space systems and space weap- ons. We lack a common understanding of how space will contribute to, or come to define, potential crises between the United States and China. As both coun- tries seek to define a “new type of great power relationship,” it would be wise to consider how new technologies and Single modified tactical Standard Missile–3 launches from U.S. Navy Aegis cruiser USS Lake Erie (U.S. Navy) operational concepts are best managed during crises. Given both sides’ growing They also emerged from dialogues, such direction have been slow and tentative, reliance on space systems to achieve their as formal summits and long-running and there is much work to be done. future military and political aims, a lack arms control negotiations. The former Recently, some engagements led by of understanding comes with great peril. are certainly much more dangerous than think tanks (known as Track 1.5 dialogues We should strive to build a common the latter, and no one wants to see the due to mixed delegations of government framework now, using dialogues during space equivalent of a Cuban missile crisis. and academics) have begun to explore the peacetime, before provocative actions in There are signs of progress. The issue, and it is clear that both sides harbor space during a crisis imperil stability here United Nations Group of Government a lot of mistrust and misperception. The on Earth. JFQ Experts recently recommended bilat- United States continues to raise questions eral and multilateral transparency and about China’s military modernization confidence-building measures. In ad- and its potential coercion of regional Notes dition, the European Union is leading neighbors over contested territory. China 1 open-ended consultations to develop continues to question the implications of Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson, eds., Strategic Stability: Contending Interpre- an “International Code of Conduct for expanding U.S. missile defenses and, to tations (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War Outer Space Activities.” While these mea- a lesser extent, the U.S. rebalance to the College Press, February 2013). sures will help promote the responsible Asia-Pacific region. 2 Elbridge A. Colby, “Defining Strategic use of space, they do not squarely address Suspicions about space activities fit Stability: Reconciling Stability and Deterrence,” the current lack of mutual understanding within this broader geopolitical mistrust. in Strategic Stability, 55. 3 Ibid., 57. Emphasized in original. regarding how space attacks will be per- The United States continues to express 4 National Space Policy of the United States ceived in the midst of a crisis. This is of concern about Chinese space activities of America, June 28, 2010, available at
20 Forum / Bringing Space Crisis Stability Down to Earth JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 In April 2010, the United States, Canada, Spain, South Korea, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation agreed to pool resources for a new multilateral agriculture and food security program (The World Bank/Simone D. McCourtie)
Debunking Technical Competency as the Sole Source of Innovation
By Burton H. Catledge
The inadequacies of our systems of research and education pose a greater threat to U.S. national security over the next quarter century than any potential conventional war that we might imagine. American national leadership must understand these deficiencies as threats to national security.
—Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change
cademic and governmental dation (NSF) report stated, “If an organizations have sounded the unfriendly foreign power had attempted A alarm that the United States is to impose on America the mediocre rapidly losing technical competence, educational performance that exists Lieutenant Colonel Burton H. Catledge, USAF, is a student in the Dwight D. Eisenhower School for and this decline places the Nation at today, we might well view it as an act National Security and Resource Strategy. risk. A 1983 National Science Foun- of war.”1 In 1999, Congress chartered
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Catledge 21 Figure. into believing that STEM-credentialed personnel are the source of technology and that a decline in technical compe- Technical Drives Innovation Drives National Competence Security tency translates into a decline in progress.
Historical Patterns the U.S. Commission on National of war, while others hail it as the savior of There are historical precedents for poli- Security/21st Century (also known humankind. The United States tends to- cymakers and scientific organizations as the Hart-Rudman Commission) ward the latter view. American history is overreacting to perceived declines in to provide the most comprehensive replete with examples of technology posi- U.S. technical competency. The pattern Government-sponsored review of U.S. tively influencing society. Technologies of declining technical competency starts national security in 50 years. The report such as the railroad, telegraph, and with a perceived threat from another highlighted a lack of U.S. technical steamboat provided the means to settle country, followed by an American competence as a national security threat vast territory. Thomas Edison’s electric outcry for improving the U.S. educa- second only to the threat of weapons of light permitted work past sunset and tional system and scientific research, mass destruction in the hands of terror- hence increased productivity and output. only to discover later that the threat was ists.2 This article attempts to answer the The automobile and aircraft opened not as dire as originally perceived. This question: “Does improving technical opportunities for Americans to explore cyclical nature of diminishing techni- competency enhance innovation?” the United States and the world. These cal competency is not unique, and the The Hart-Rudman Commission technologies and the resulting improve- roots of these warnings can be traced report and many others argue that tech- ments in quality of life were equated with as far back as the late 1950s. In 1957, nical competence is a prerequisite for progress, a relationship that has driven for instance, the Soviet Union was per- innovation. Producing technically com- the Nation to elevate the role of those ceived as having a strategic advantage petent Americans in science, technology, who give us that progress. According to a in the larger numbers of scientists and engineering, and mathematics (STEM), 2007 survey, 86 percent of Americans be- engineers in Soviet universities and according to such reports, would stimu- lieve that the United States must increase technical institutes.6 Following the late innovation. Technical competence the number of workers with science and launch of Sputnik, the U.S. Government refers to technically trained people with a mathematics backgrounds, or else the expanded Federal support for research high level of knowledge and skill related country’s ability to compete in the global and education in science, mathematics, to one or more specific technologies or economy will be diminished.4 Consider and engineering.7 American educators at technical areas.3 Technically competent the closing statement in the NAS report the time decried the educational system individuals are typified as those who have titled Rising Above the Gathering Storm: as too focused on extracurricular activi- received post-secondary STEM degrees. ties, while depicting the Soviet Union A lack of U.S. STEM-credentialed per- For the first time in generations, the na- as superior in science and engineering. sonnel and the subsequent technologies tion’s children could face poorer prospects A Senator announced that the Soviet they produce threatens national security. than their parents and grandparents did. Union was training more scientists than For the purposes of this article, national We owe our current prosperity, security, any other Western nation, while an aide security is broadly defined as success on and good health to the investments of past to Lyndon Johnson warned that Russia the battlefield. generations, and we are obliged to renew had 350,000 high school science and The figure illustrates the argument those commitments in education, research, math teachers compared to 140,000 in that technical competency drives in- and innovation policies to ensure that the the United States. Admiral Hyman Rick- novation. The subsequent claim is that American people continue to benefit from over, the dour “Father of the Nuclear improvements in innovation will result in the remarkable opportunities provided Navy,” hoped Sputnik would spark a enhanced national security. If technical by the rapid development of the global revival of American intellect in the same competency does not lead to innovation economy and its not inconsiderable under- way that the attack on Pearl Harbor cat- or innovation does not improve national pinning in science and technology.5 alyzed the military-industrial complex.8 security, then technical competency The Secretary of Health, Education, claims are unsupported. The primary The technical competence of a nation and Welfare highlighted that all Russian drivers for increasing technical com- can be measured in science and engi- students took 5 years of physics and petency are the National Academy of neering degrees awarded, basic research math and 4 years of chemistry. Only one Sciences (NAS) and similar scientific and investment in research and develop- in four American students even took defense organizations. ment (R&D), patents filed, and STEM a physics course, and just one in three The role of technology and its influ- articles published. The assumption that took a chemistry class.9 ence on society are controversial. To technology is the single greatest factor to In response to this perceived some, technology increases the carnage progress has misled the American public educational gap, the National Defense
22 JPME Today / Debunking Technical Competency JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Education Act (NDEA), passed by sources.18 The current concern about The evidence that science communi- Congress in 1958, authorized spending U.S. STEM deficiencies echoes previous ties of practice are more conservative slightly less than $1 billion over a 4-year claims of shortages. and tend to coalesce is highlighted in period to strengthen the Nation’s educa- The Federal Government and indus- Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific tional system to compete with the Soviet try have had difficulty making accurate Revolutions. His central thesis is that Union. According to Roger Geiger in predictions about future personnel scientific communities tend to conduct Research and Relevant Knowledge, the demands. A National Research Council science that proves the established norm “NDEA was prompted by the peculiar panel of experts evaluated the success of or paradigm, rather than discovering attitude of national insecurity and inad- past forecasts for the 2000 science and groundbreaking innovations. Kuhn equacy that prevailed after Sputnik.”10 engineering workforce estimates. The uses the term normal science to describe Congress declared that Federal action council reported that labor market pro- research based on one or more past was required to address the “educational jections for scientists and engineers that scientific achievements that a particular emergency” and “to help develop as go more than a few years into the future scientific community acknowledge as its rapidly as possible those skills necessary to are notoriously difficult and that “accu- foundation.22 Kuhn states, “The most national defense.”11 rate forecasts have not been produced.”19 striking feature of normal research prob- The Federal Government also tried to lems is how little they aim to produce bolster American technical competency Alternative Contributors major novelties.”23 As a result, most with direct investments in scientific to Innovation scientists assume that they already know research. Federal investment in R&D The shortage of personnel evokes a what the world is like, and research between 1957 and 1967 more than strong U.S. reaction primarily because typically reaches conclusions confirming doubled, and total government outlays of the perception that innovation is these scientists’ anticipated outcomes.24 for basic research at the NAS and other based on a single factor. This single- Normal science does not attempt to agencies tripled.12 In reality, the Soviet factor method reduces a complex discover and investigate anomalies, and, Union was not producing scientists, phenomenon into one cause and rel- when conducted successfully, it finds but training technicians.13 Although the egates other factors, such as social ele- none.25 Scientists and engineers contrib- Soviet threat was overblown, Sputnik and ments, to secondary importance.20 The ute to innovation, but they are not its the subsequent NDEA enlarged the ca- single-factor method offers a simplistic single source. pacity of research universities that became approach in identifying a cause-and- Rather than being unbiased and ob- increasingly dependent on the Federal effect relationship; however, the role jective thinkers, scientists will anticipate Government for financial support.14 of technology in innovation is not as research conclusions because of past By the 1980s, American fears straightforward as this method pre- training. Members of the scientific com- about declining technical competency scribes. By limiting the cause-and-effect munity, more than most other fields, focused on the threat posed by Japan relationship to a single factor, there is have undergone similar education and and its growing export-led economy. great potential to overlook alternative professional initiations, been exposed to The press and academia amplified these contributors to innovation. the same technical literature, and drawn concerns, and Congress responded Technical competency proponents many of the same lessons.26 Kuhn contin- by increasing the NSF’s science and employ a single-factor method when they ues, “One of the fundamental techniques mathematics budget substantially.15 highlight the role of STEM-credentialed by which members of a group . . . learn Once again, the Nation overreacted personnel in the innovation process at to see the same things when confronted to a perceived threat, and within a few the expense of other contributing factors. with the same stimuli is by being shown years the Investigations and Oversight However, scientists and engineers cannot examples of situations that their predeces- Subcommittee of the Science, Space, and be the right single factor because these sors in the group have already learned Technology Committee of the House of groups tend to avoid the anomalies that to see as like each other and as different Representatives reported that there was may result in innovations. A recent article from other sorts of situations.”27 an excess supply of newly minted scien- in The Economist claims, “Scientists’ role If scientists and engineers were the tists and engineers.16 in innovation seems obvious: The more single factor driving innovation, the By the 1990s, multinational compa- clever people there are, the more ideas expectation would be that innovation nies working in high-tech sectors such are likely to flourish, especially if they can would only come from this community. as software, information technology, be commercialized.”21 Although society However, innovation can and often does and telecommunications were claiming considers them creators, designers, and result from ideas outside the community another STEM personnel shortage.17 researchers, these individuals tend to form of practice. Edward Constant, in The Companies were experiencing difficulty conservative, rather than innovative, social Origins of the Turbojet Revolution, offers hiring skilled workers. Their claims groups. These groups, or communities of such an example of innovation resulting about the looming personnel shortage, practice, are not necessarily more innova- from outside the expected community. however, were not verified by other tive that those outside the community. Conventional wisdom held that aircraft
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Catledge 23 performance could be improved by mod- tions developed within their borders. Sputnik, for instance, scientists urged ifying the existing aeronautical design The internal combustion engine was President Dwight Eisenhower to appoint with supercharged liquid-cooled piston first produced in Germany, but that a Presidential Assistant for Science and engines, turboprops, higher octane fuel, country was not the main manufacturer Technology to increase the funding of and sleeker aircraft structures to increase of automobiles within 20 years of the NSF grants in fiscal year 1958 from $38 performance. The aeronautical com- industry’s formation. The airplane was million to $55 million.32 Curiously, the munity of practice, however, required a invented in the United States in 1903, organizations emphasizing declining completely new aeronautical design that but Great Britain, France, and Germany U.S. technical competency today are the was drastically different from the conven- capitalized on the invention with larger same organizations that would receive the tional wisdom. This design would not air fleets by 1914.30 Although air fleet greatest benefit from Federal aid. Third, come from the expected community of size alone is not a measure of inno- the nationalistic doctrine must find a practice. Constant cites the fact that four vativeness, it does highlight society’s place in the popular mind by means of men, geographically separated and with willingness to capitalize on an innova- “new and curious, but singularly univer- diverse backgrounds outside the normal tion. The underlying assumption of sal, forms of mass-education.”33 One of aeronautical community, produced the technical competency advocates is that the consequences of the Sputnik launch turbojet engine.28 Narrow communities if a nation’s community of practice was increased Federal funding of science of practice, such as the aeronautical com- produces an innovation, that innova- education from $17 million to $53 mil- munity, tended to overlook the anomalies tion will remain within the country’s lion in 1958.34 The three factors that that could have provided the important borders. This assumption encourages characterize nationalism and its propa- sources of innovation within their fields. nations to develop technically quali- gation are applicable to the declining The theory that increasing the fied personnel and innovations along technical competency claim. number of STEM-credentialed person- nationalist lines. This assumption is a A techno-nationalist country claims nel increases innovation is not an iron variation of nationalistic ideology called that it is best suited for the technology law of science. Scientists do not evaluate techno-nationalism. age.35 Citizens of a techno-nationalist research with unbiased and objective Nationalism denotes a condition of country tend to view their country as lenses, but their communities of practice the mind in which members of a nation- technologically superior to other nation- often shape their vision. This vision ality or nation-state express loyalty to states. The techno-nationalist country makes the recognition of anomalies dif- that state above all other loyalties and to can also be threatened by other nations ficult because of similar backgrounds and which pride in one’s nationality and belief that demonstrate a technical capability or education. When those anomalies present in its intrinsic excellence and in its “mis- capacity that threatens its superiority. In themselves, those closest to the problem sions” are integral parts.31 In other words, the 20th century, the United States char- tend to overlook them, while outsiders nationalism is an ideology that promotes acterized the Soviet Union, Japan, China, attempt to explain them. If outsiders a country’s accomplishments as superior and India as technological competitors, are capable of identifying anomalies compared to other nation-states. Three and this competition stirred a nationalist and translating those insights into in- factors must be considered to understand need to innovate. According to David novations, the science and engineering nationalism and its propagation. First, Edgerton, “Techno-nationalism assumes communities of practice cannot be the a group of intellectuals must promote a the key unit of analysis for the study of single source of innovation. nationalist doctrine. In the case of the technology is the nation: nations are the technical competency advocates, the units that invent, that have R&D bud- Techno-nationalism intellectuals promoting the nationalistic gets, cultures of innovation, that diffuse, If four men in three countries simulta- ideology are U.S. policymakers. Second, that use technology. The success of na- neously and independently developed these citizens typically find satisfaction tions, it is believed by techno-nationalists, the turbojet, how can a nation hope and refreshment for their souls (and often is dependent on how well they do this.”36 to capture the benefits of its scientific their pocketbooks) in this doctrine. Since The claim that the United States and technical communities? Proponents the Federal Government is the single must develop more STEM-credentialed assume that the United States will be largest source of basic research funding, personnel is grounded in a techno- more innovative if it has more techni- organizations such as the NAS must con- nationalistic ideology. The issue is not cally competent personnel. However, tinue to emphasize threats to U.S. science that there is a dearth of scientists and invention only opens a door; it does and engineering superiority. As men- engineers, but rather that those scientists not compel one to go through it. The tioned earlier, fears that the United States and engineers are not Americans. If acceptance or rejection of an invention was losing its technological advantage as increasing technical competency in the depends on the condition of a society, compared to the Soviet Union, Japan, United States was the only dilemma, the imagination of its leaders, and nature of China, and India have all resulted in large science and engineering workforce could the technology itself.29 Nations do not infusions of government funds into sci- be managed with changes in immigration necessarily exploit the benefits of inven- ence and engineering organizations. After policy. In other words, if all the United
24 JPME Today / Debunking Technical Competency JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Cecil County math teachers visited Edgewood Chemical Biological Center for Math Forensics where Army scientists demonstrated importance of math in their research and development mission (U.S. Army)
States needed was a more technically policy, however, do not satisfy technical able to educate American citizens to qualified workforce, the solution should competency advocates because the core operate their own economy at its highest be to increase the number of foreign- of the issue is not pragmatism but nation- level of technical and intellectual capacity. born citizens authorized to work in the alism. The Hart-Rudman report states: United States. However, rather than Techno-globalism encouraging workers from abroad to fill There will not be enough qualified The danger of pursuing a techno- positions requiring STEM-credentialed American citizens to perform the new jobs nationalist ideology in a globalized mar- personnel, the United States is seeking to being created today—including technical ketplace makes the advantages gained limit the number of foreign workers. In jobs crucial to the maintenance of national from technology extremely perishable. response to immigration reform, techni- security. Already the United States must If the United States were to produce an cal competency proponents will often search abroad for experts and technicians innovative technology, globalization has cite the U.S. citizenship requirement to to fill the United States domestic economy, increased the likelihood that the inven- fill security-related positions. This could and Congress has often increased the cate- tion would be replicated and modified be overcome by changes to American gory limits for special visas (H-1B) for that by nonproducers of the technology. The security policies. There is a historical prec- purpose. If current trends are not stanched United States is proud of its market- edent. During World War II, the United and reversed, large numbers of specialized driven economy, but it seems reluctant States relied heavily on European im- foreign technicians in critical positions in to let market forces guide the develop- migrants to complement its science and the United States economy could pose secu- ment of American STEM personnel. engineering workforce. U.S. citizenship rity risks.37 Today’s market-driven economies and subsequent security requirements have produced interdependent world could be modified to fill science and More important, however, while financial markets through globalization. engineering positions that require this the United States should take pride in The principal characteristics of global- level of access. Increasing the number of educating, hosting, and benefiting from ization are increases in foreign direct foreign-born citizens filling the technical foreign scientific and technical expertise, investment, intensified international workforce and modifying U.S. security it should take even more pride in being rivalries in technology, and looser trade
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Catledge 25 through overseas direct investment. If Walmart were a country, it would be China’s eighth largest trading partner.40 The Walmart example emphasizes the difficulty the United States would have in imposing restrictions on multinational firms such as these. Third, many foreign scientists and engineers are trained in the United States and are now work- ing in their native countries. Seventeen of the world’s top 20 universities are American, and international students and scholars flock to the United States to enhance their skills and collaborate with American researchers.41 The education of foreign-born scientists and engineers has created a global diffusion of techni- cal competency leveling the science and engineering knowledge base. Since the diffusion of science and engineering knowledge is already occurring, prevent- ing collaboration across national borders would stifle, not encourage, innovation. Techno-nationalist countries such as the United States, which seek to produce STEM personnel and technologies along nationalistic lines, may invest consider- able resources only to discover that globalization offers a greater innovation advantage. Many 20th-century inventors would not have been predicted to create in- ventions using the current measures of innovation. STEM advocates would have dismissed Edison when he was 7 years old and described by his teacher as “ad- dled.”42 He was withdrawn from school Thomas Edison in Washington, DC, April 1878, with his second phonograph (Library of Congress/ by his mother and received his education Mathew Brady) working as a telegraph operator. With no formal education, Edison went on to restrictions.38 Globalization has also cre- economy. This implies that the techno- hold 1,093 patents and produce tech- ated technological interdependence that nationalist country is fighting a losing nologies such as motion picture cameras, places the techno-nationalist country battle because market incentives tend to the phonograph, and light bulb. at a disadvantage. Globalized corpora- encourage innovation. Techno-globalism Orville and Wilbur Wright also had tions, which are not limited to national is the term used to describe the impact atypical backgrounds with no formal borders, must innovate more rapidly and of sharing technology in a globalized, education but still produced a signifi- effectively to remain competitive. The market-driven economy.39 cant technological achievement. Orville competition between globalized firms Techno-globalism challenges the dropped out of high school in his junior results in collaboration across national country pursuing techno-nationalism. year to start a printing business with his boundaries, and the fruits of this in- First, the expansion of international trade brother, using a damaged tombstone novation do not remain within national has made high-tech products available to and buggy parts to build a press.43 The borders. Conversely, the techno-nation- countries that do not have the techno- two brothers later opened their own alist country seeks to limit innovation to logical capacity to produce them. Second, bicycle business, but Wilbur’s interest in within its national borders and is there- nations are losing control of businesses aeronautics started after reading about fore in direct conflict with the market as they become more transnational a famous German glider pilot. Wilbur’s
26 JPME Today / Debunking Technical Competency JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 significant breakthrough was his recogni- did not invent the first incandescent being cheaper, simpler, smaller, and tion that in order to fly a machine, its light bulb, but his bulb lasted longer frequently more convenient to use.53 three axes of motion—pitch, roll, and with its carbonized thread. His real in- Disruptive technologies will eventually yaw—had to be controlled.44 Other novative success was the introduction of overtake or match the performance inventors attempted to develop such a a central power plant with generators, of the sustaining technology based on machine; however, on December 17, voltage regulating devices, and copper market demand. Conversely, sustain- 1903, an unlikely high school dropout wires to create a commercial market for ing technologies will focus on product with a printing press and bicycle repair the light bulb.47 The Wright brothers improvements that may be beyond what background invented a flying machine were not the only inventors working the market demands. In other words, that changed the world. on a flying machine when the Wright managers of successful top companies Arguably the most significant in- Flyer first flew, but it was a contract with may invest heavily to improve their novation in the later 20th century was the the Army in 1907 that commercialized existing product and later discover personal computer (PC). Interestingly the success of the aircraft.48 Xerox Palo that the improvement outstrips market enough, the two individuals most re- Alto Research Center created the mouse demand. Apple’s iPhone and Samsung’s sponsible for development of personal and Graphical User Interface, but Steve Galaxy provide a good illustration of computing also had diverse backgrounds Jobs recognized the significance of the disruptive and sustaining technologies with limited formal educations. Steve inventions and integrated them with the in the smartphone market. Jobs and Bill Gates were at the forefront personal computer.49 IBM was working Steve Jobs did not invent the cell- of personal computer innovation, but on its own operating system called Top phone, MP3, hand-held computer, or neither would have been recognized as View in 1985 while VisiCorp had already digital camera, but he did recognize that STEM-credentialed professionals accord- released an operating system in 1983 integrating these devices would revolu- ing to current metrics. called VisiOn that contained the first PC- tionize the portable electronics industry. Steve Jobs’s innovativeness and busi- based Graphical User Interface.50 Gates Apple released the first-generation ness sense were not provided by formal and Allen would not release Windows 1.0 iPhone in 2007 and rapidly became the education. He dropped out of Reed until 1985, but Microsoft is running on market leader in the smartphone and College after 6 months and along with his 91 percent of computers worldwide.51 consumer electronics technology. The friend Steve Wozniak built the first Apple first-generation iPhone represented a computer in his parent’s garage. After Sustaining vs. Disruptive disruptive technology because it was less leaving Apple in 1985, Jobs started NeXT, Technologies expensive to purchase the capabilities which later became Pixar.45 He revolution- Advocates for increasing the number of individually. The first-generation iPhone ized the smartphone industry with the STEM-credentialed graduates often link did not include available technologies introduction of the iPhone in 1997, which U.S. innovation to economic prosper- such as the Global Positioning System remains the market leader today. ity. A common misperception is that that may be found in other smartphones. Similar to Jobs, Bill Gates dropped the next innovation breakthrough will Since 2007, Apple has invested in sus- out of Harvard after 2 years to start result in significant economic gains for taining iPhone technology by releasing Microsoft with Paul Allen. Their vision the organization, company, or country newer generations that included faster was a computer on every desk and in that creates it. Clayton Christensen processors, better cameras, and improved every home. IBM approached Gates and addresses this fallacy in The Innovator’s navigation.54 Korean electronics giant Allen to develop software to interface Dilemma by offering an explanation Samsung challenged Apple’s lead posi- with their computer hardware. They pro- of why successful companies fail to tion in 2011 when the company flooded grammed the Microsoft Disk Operating stay on top of their industries when the market with myriad products such as System, which became Windows 1.0 in confronted by certain markets and cellphones, smartphones, and tablets in a 1985. Since then, Microsoft has released technological change.52 Christensen short period of time to appeal to low- and multiple versions of its software, with argues that successful companies are high-end markets.55 Samsung’s strategy Windows being the predominant world- led by talented managers who focus appears to have been particularly success- wide computer operating system.46 on developing sustaining technologies ful with lower end markets, as evidenced Technical competency advocates rather than on what he calls disruptive by the company’s market share doubling contend that technological innovation technologies. Sustaining technologies to more than 36 percent in the second spurs economic prosperity; however, are characterized by improving on quarter of 2011 from about 18 percent commercialization of innovation can established product performance by during the same period the previous create even greater economic benefits. making incremental improvements. year.56 Samsung introduced a disruptive Edison, the Wright brothers, Jobs, and Disruptive technologies, however, typi- technology; its strategy was to cater to Gates were more than inventors; they cally underperform established products those markets that wanted a less expen- were savvy businessmen who understood in mainstream markets, but have other sive and possibly less capable smartphone. their environments. For instance, Edison features that customers value such as
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Catledge 27 overshooting mainstream market needs and creating a vacuum where competi- tors can enter.58
A STEM-Literate Approach STEM-credentialed personnel are needed in the workforce, but they are not the sole source of innovation. Rather than creating new innovations, this segment of the workforce tends to focus on sustaining technologies. Instead of focusing on sustaining tech- nologies, a U.S. policy is needed that creates a STEM-literate workforce. In David and Goliath: Underdogs, Misfits, and the Art of Battling Giants, Malcolm Gladwell claims that more than half of college students who start a STEM degree program change their majors. STEM advocates may point to this sta- tistic as an education failure to prepare college-bound students in these courses of study and demand further funding of high school STEM education. Instead of increasing high school funding for STEM education, we should incentivize STEM literacy and innovation. One reason that college students do not pursue STEM degrees or drop out of the programs is that graduates can earn more money in service-related industries such as health care, finance, and law. A STEM-literate policy recognizes the financial incentive for entering these in- dustries and provides graduates a broader background in STEM disciplines. Literate graduates entering service industries Replica of Sputnik 1 (U.S. Air Force) would understand STEM without having to commit to 4 years of study. Apple lost a considerable share exist cannot be analyzed. Prior to making The United States should not directly of the smartphone market by invest- a significant investment, companies often compete with countries such as China ing in a sustaining technology while want to understand the environment and India on the number of STEM Samsung invested in disruptive tech- and likelihood of success. Since disrup- college graduates, but instead should nology by developing a less expensive tive technologies are entering emerging leverage its own strengths such as leading and capable product to create a new markets, the environment is not well university systems, an entrepreneurial market. Christensen argues that large, understood, and therefore large suc- culture, U.S. intellectual property rights well-managed companies fail to invest cessful companies are reluctant to enter. protection, and natural resources to in disruptive technologies for a number Fourth, an organization’s capabilities foster innovators. A STEM-literate policy of reasons. First, successful companies define its disabilities. There is a tendency would create graduates who can improve depend on customers and investors for in successful organizations to develop publishing technologies, business majors resources and are reluctant to seek lower high-margin over low-margin products. who can develop predictive economic margin opportunities that their custom- Finally, technology supply may not equal indicators, and economics graduates who ers do not want.57 Second, small markets market demand. Companies developing understand the human genome. do not solve the growth needs of large sustaining technologies follow a trajec- The government has significant lever- companies. Third, markets that do not tory of improvement that often ends up age to encourage STEM literacy using
28 JPME Today / Debunking Technical Competency JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 43 Federal funding such as Pell Grants. House, 1998), 200. “The Wright Brothers,” TheHenryFord. 9 Ibid. org, available at
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Catledge 29 President Obama meets in Situation Room with national security advisors to discuss strategy in Syria (The White House/Pete Souza)
Should Military Officers Study Policy Analysis?
By Nikolas K. Gvosdev
ecently, during a symposium with would encourage their students— Others take the view that, for military security studies faculty members people bound by oath to faithfully officers, ignorance may be bliss, follow- R from civilian institutions, the execute the orders of the commander in ing the advice popularly ascribed to the question arose as to how those of us chief—to probe and analyze decisions German chancellor Otto von Bismarck: who teach in the country’s professional taken by the current and past Presi- “The less the people know about how military institutions approach the study dents as part of their academic experi- sausages and laws are made, the better and use of policy analysis in our class- ence. Indeed, many question whether they sleep in the night.” rooms. There was a certain degree of military officers need to engage in the Such a view helps to explain why, incredulity that places such as the Naval dissection and discussion of national initially, the study of “politics”—the War College (and its sister institutions) security decisionmaking since, echoing behind-the-scenes and often messy pro- Alfred Tennyson’s famous exhorta- cess by which national security decisions tion in his classic poem “The Charge are made—was not deemed appropriate Dr. Nikolas K. Gvosdev is a Professor of National of the Light Brigade,” “Theirs not to for officers. Soon after the formation of Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. reason why/Theirs but to do and die.” the Naval War College, however, that
30 JPME Today / Military Officers and Policy Analysis JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 approach was reversed. In his lectures, Thus, as Michael Clarke has observed, the military can evade or circumscribe Alfred Thayer Mahan noted that al- “Any study of a state’s foreign policy civilian authority by framing the alterna- though the direction of national policy is over a given period reveals that rather tives or tailoring their advice or predicting properly set by the “statesmen,” political than a series of clear decisions, there is nasty consequences; by leaking information questions “are also among the data which a continuing and confusing ‘flow of ac- or appealing to public opinion (through the strategist, naval as well as land, has to tion’ made up of a mixture of political various indirect channels, like lobbying consider”; Mahan explicitly renounced decisions, non-political decisions, bu- groups or retired generals and admirals); the notion, which he said “once was so reaucratic procedures, continuations of or by approaching friends in the Congress traditional in the navy that it might be previous policy, and sheer accident.”7 for support. They can even fail to imple- called professional,” that “politics are of Policy analysis forces students to ment decisions, or carry them out in such a no professional concern to military [of- consider the influence of political agen- way as to stymie their intent.10 ficers].”1 Yet the concern remains that the das, personalities, rivalries, bureaucratic captain or colonel who in the classroom interests, the media, legislative input, But are the country and its national is learning to use analytic perspectives to and outside advocates and lobbyists, security best served by having officers examine decisionmaking could upset an among others. It strips away the rhetoric leave the schoolhouse never having been already precarious civil-military relation- of sacrifice in the service of vital national exposed to or applied the work of scholars ship by giving him or her additional tools interests to reveal Robert Putnam’s “two- and practitioners such as Graham Allison, “to frustrate or evade civilian authority level game,” where, at “the national level, Steven Krasner, Mort Halperin, Valerie when the opposition seems likely to domestic groups pursue their interests Hudson, and Bob Jervis to real-world preclude outcomes the military dislikes.”2 by pressuring the government to adopt national security decisions? Should we Policy analysis, after all, moves away from favorable policies, and politicians seek worry that some officers may be inspired the more general study of the prevail- power by constructing coalitions among to become policy entrepreneurs and ing global and regional security trends those groups. At the international level, in so doing try to upset the balance of (covered in the discipline of international national governments seek to maximize civil-military relations? Would a frank relations) to concentrate on government their own abilities to satisfy domestic discussion in the classroom of the “other decisionmaking.3 It is the proverbial pressures, while minimizing adverse forces that drive U.S. policy (interest “peek under the hood” at what underlies consequences of foreign developments.”8 groups, lobbies, alliance commitments, international affairs and is centered on Objections to the study of policy analysis legal constraints, geopolitics, etc.)”11 fa- understanding how policy is shaped and are similar to those voiced about the tally undermine trust in—and acceptance executed at the national level.4 Policy creation of fellowship programs that of—civilian control? Would a detailed analysis focuses on probing the “whys” of would allow officers and others to be examination of the factors and influences governmental behavior—to open up and placed as observers in senior levels of that, for instance, led President George probe the “black box” of the decision- government, which argue that doing so W. Bush to commit to military action in making process so that “one could . . . is akin to “letting little children watch Iraq in March 2003 (or President Barack recognize the actual complexity underly- the sex act”—with a corresponding loss Obama to eschew the use of force against ing decisions (which includes individual of innocence in discovering how “messy, Syria in September 2012) compromise biases and bureaucratic processes).”5 disappointing, even shocking” the policy the authority of the commander in chief? What seems to disturb people is that process can be—and potentially under- My answer to these questions is a clear no. a sustained classroom examination of mining confidence in how government First, these concerns can be mitigated national security policy punctures the functions.9 by carefully framing how policy analysis myth embodied in the “rational actor One concern is that officers might is taught in the classroom. Partisan model”—that is, the idea that decisions choose to ignore policy directives if they critiques, for instance, do not constitute are taken as a result of a deliberative were to conclude that a particular deci- policy analysis. Instructors must draw process where all options are placed on sion was motivated not by a dispassionate a clear line between policy analysis—a the table and considered and where a analysis of the national interest, but dispassionate assessment of the facts on choice is made based on the assessment resulted from a satisfying compromise the ground and the consequences and of what best serves the national interest. between different bureaucratic interests implications of the possible options for It assumes, as Amy Zegart has noted, that or came about due to sustained lobbying addressing a particular problem—and the Nation’s decisionmaking process has efforts of a particular constituency. Even policy advocacy—marshaling arguments in been “structured to translate national worse would be if the graduates of the favor of or against a particular course of objectives into national policies and to country’s professional military education action.12 Taught correctly, policy analysis carry those policies out faithfully”—an (PME) institutions decided to take this focuses attention on the importance approach she calls “theoretically elegant” knowledge and use it to become policy of structures and organizations, with but one that falls short of fully explain- makers rather than policy executors. an interest in the immediate decision ing how and why decisions are made.6 Already, there are worries that environment, and then expands the
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Gvosdev 31 policy decision making to enable states to achieve better outcomes.”15 National security decisions “involve a great deal of uncertainty” with a number of issues subject to debate; a study of policy helps those who will provide their professional opinions and be charged with the execu- tion of policy directives to “understand the debate” and the factors that led to a decision.16 In addition, as graduates of PME institutions rise through the ranks, they are more likely to end up in posi- tions to give advice or provide options to senior decisionmakers; an understanding of the policy process allows them to pro- vide civilian decisionmakers with feasible and realistic alternatives.17 Advice that is often given to public-sector scientists, and is just as apropos for military officers who are tasked to provide recommenda- tions to civilian policymakers both in the executive branch as well as in Congress, is as follows:
[W]hen the major points of dissension in a policy debate are over values and prefer- ences (the usual case), try to exhort decision makers to focus on these often fractious elements of the decision making process rather than the technical and scientific aspects. Debates of questions of science often end up serving as a surrogate polemic for the inability (or unwillingness) of decision makers to adjudicate unpleasant value and preference trade-offs. Do not fall into the trap of substituting debate over scientific information and interpretation of data for debate over which values and preferences will carry the day. . . . [B]e bru- tally honest with decision makers about the technical feasibility of each possible policy option and the uncertainties associated with the resulting . . . consequences. Often, the most useful input scientists can provide Retired Army General Colin Powell signs books at Marine Corps Exchange aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico in June 2013 (U.S. Marine Corps/Sam Ellis) is to identify the estimated probability of success (for achieving the stated policy goal) discussion to encompass both domestic in-depth examination of “the actors, their for each of the various competing policy and international influences on policy. motivations, the structures of decision- options.18 The goal of these exercises is to explain making and the broader context in which “process, as opposed to foreign policy . . . policy choices are formulated.”14 American professional military outcomes.”13 In other words, the ques- Furthermore, there are a number of education places great emphasis on tion we seek to have our students answer compelling reasons to have military of- the study and application of strategy, is to understand how and why decisions ficers study policy analysis. Many of those and “senior military officers, first and were made—rather than whether they involved in the field of policy analysis see foremost, must be knowledgeable about were “good” or “bad”—through a more their work “as aimed at improving foreign the planning and execution of military
32 JPME Today / Military Officers and Policy Analysis JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 operations at the theater and strategic decision taken in 2009 to retire General those outside with whom they will be levels.”19 Yet such plans are not formu- David McKiernan as commander in interacting. lated in a vacuum. Instead, they are “an Afghanistan, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, a Holding to a supposed ideal that organized action or an integrated set of reporter for the Washington Post, con- national security decisions ought to be actions—from making public declara- cluded that the decision “reflects a view “above” politics, personalities, and or- tions to waging war—intended to bring among senior Pentagon officials that top ganizational interests—and structuring a about favorable consequences that will generals need to be as adept at working PME curriculum that fails to educate stu- help achieve articulated national goals.”20 Washington as they are the battlefield, dents about the actualities of the national Indeed, the “management of violence”— that the conflict in Afghanistan requires security decisionmaking process—consti- identified by Samuel Huntington as the a leader who can also win the confidence tutes an academic dereliction of duty by essence of the military mission—seems of Congress and the American public.” failing to prepare officers for the realities far too narrow given the much wider Chandrasekaran went on to note that they will encounter. The process is explic- range of tasks that fall under the rubric of the definition of what constituted an itly and deliberately political. Speaking national security. Today’s military officer effective senior military leader has been at the Naval War College more than two is really a “national security professional” changing, quoting a senior Pentagon decades ago, when he was Chairman of whose expertise is expected to extend to official: “The traditional responsibilities the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin the interconnected intellectual space of were not enough anymore. You had to Powell advised the students: everything from strategic theory, strategic be adroit at international politics. You thinking, and strategy formation to di- had to be a skilled diplomat. You had to You are about at that point in your career plomacy, nation-building, and homeland be savvy with the press, and you had to now . . . when you have to have a better defense.21 be a really sophisticated leader of a large understanding of the broader context in Strategy often focuses on provid- organization.”24 Defense correspondent which you are serving. When you have to ing the “ideal” or “best” possible way Thom Shanker of the New York Times have a better understanding of what is to achieve goals. Policy analysis helps concurs, pointing out, “Mastery of happening on the world scene. Where you to explain why the “best” options may battlefield tactics and a knack for leader- need a better understanding of how politics not always be available to or feasible ship are only prerequisites. Generals and works, of how public relations work, as to for policymakers. Former Soviet leader other top officers are now expected to how you generate support for the armed Mikhail Gorbachev, building on another be city managers, cultural ambassadors, forces of the United States. To make sure Bismarckian observation, noted, “Politics public relations whizzes and politicians you understand the influences that are is the art of the possible, the emergence as they deal with multiple missions and pressing on the Department and on your of agreed interests through a process of constituencies in the war zone, in allied particular service. choice.”22 Theoretical options may not be capitals—and at home.”25 It’s important for you, at this stage available in reality. An air operation that Working through the policy process, in your career, to . . . have a firm grasp is technically feasible might have to be however, can be a type of cultural shock of the outside pressures that come to bear, scrapped if needed overflight rights over for career military officers. One staffer at the political pressures, the public relations a country are not forthcoming. A mission the National Security Council observed pressures. I am still not satisfied that senior might not be authorized if there is an ex- that in his experience, military officers, officers coming up, or officers at this level, pectation that it might lead to bad press particularly naval officers, wanted to really understand the political context and coverage broadcast around the word on go off in isolation and work on “The how politics works in Washington. It’s not CNN and Al Jazeera. In his observa- Solution” to a problem at hand—to a dirty business. It’s the business that the tions about the national security team provide the “best” strategic option. The “good guys” upstairs put in place. of George H.W. Bush, Bob Woodward problem, he noted, was that whatever was Anybody who says that politics is nasty, noted that decisions were evaluated not proposed would be dead on arrival unless and military people should stay away from only on their strategic merit but also there had been significant input and buy- it, or never become a political general— on their likely impact on Congress, the in from all the key policy stakeholders. don’t worry about that—you’re not going media, and public opinion; as a result, This is why Jon Anderson, a public policy to be successful. Politics is the way the coun- part of the policy process was focused on analyst, counsels, “If you hold on too try runs; it’s the way our Founding Fathers managing these reactions.23 The extent to tightly to your policy formulation you wanted it to run. So as you become more which political considerations influence will wither in this environment.”26 Policy experienced, as you leave here and go on to strategic decisions is something officers analysis gives officers a basic fluency in jobs, start to understand the international cannot ignore. the language of national security affairs as situation a little more. Start to understand Indeed, senior military leaders and spoken by the members of the so-called the political context in which we do our their staffs are not immune from the strategic class—“the foreign-policy advis- business. Start to understand the public necessity of knowing how the political ers, think-tank specialists and pundits”27 relations and the media context in which system operates. In an analysis of the both within the government as well as we do our business. Because ultimately we
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Gvosdev 33 18 Lackey, 17. 19 Kevin P. Kelley and Joan Johnson-Freese, “Rethinking Professional Military Education,” FPRI E-Notes, October 2013, available at
34 JPME Today / Military Officers and Policy Analysis JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Defensive line of Berkut soldiers in riot gear by Cabinet of Ministers building during 2013 Euromaidan protests (Ivan Bandura)
Assessing Causality in a Complex Security Environment
By Andrew L. Stigler
n May 2014, I was moderating a Naval Spring. That shows that the image of To my understanding, methodologi- War College seminar on the topic of an Iraqi woman holding up her purple cal issues receive little coverage in the I U.S. policy in the Middle East. The fingertip after having voted, it resonated professional military education (PME) discussion involved President George W. with the entire region. I mean, look what system. There are many excellent reasons Bush’s statement that a democratic Iraq happened.” for this, one of which is that the master’s would serve as a “beacon of democracy” I offered counterarguments. Did that degree that students receive is not in in the Middle East, leading nations and image have the same meaning to other political science, but covers a host of criti- peoples in that region to reappraise their audiences that it did to us? How many cal strategic issues and other topics. But systems of government and, perhaps, people in the region saw the image? Was PME is also the last opportunity to ad- initiate democracy movements of their that image counteracted by distrust of dress, in an educational setting, subjects own. A student raised his hand. America’s motives in Iraq? The student in the social sciences that could genuinely “Well, we know it worked,” said a shook his head. “We know it worked,” benefit those students. Navy captain. I asked how. “The Arab he said. Causality is one of these critical issues. Causality has many definitions, but we might profitably see it as the search for rea- Dr. Andrew L. Stigler is an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College. sons as to why a particular event occurred.
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Stigler 35 Causality is certainly studied in the military An example of spurious causation relationship, suppose again that A has in the physical sense: calculating a jet would be arguing that the crash of an created a stable deterrent relationship engine’s thrust or managing the operation F-16 was caused by the ejection of the with B. This stable deterrent relation- of a nuclear reactor, for example. But of- pilot. Since ejections are often closely ship—and, by implication, the decision ficers preparing for greater responsibilities, correlated with fighter airplane crashes, by B to be deterred—could then have an including understanding contingencies an investigator (albeit a poorly informed impact on State A. State A might believe in the international arena, are forced— one) with no understanding of the subject that the stability of the relationship, and whether they know it or not—to address might be forgiven if he speculated that the lack of confrontational steps from causality in the strategic arena. it was the ejection that primarily caused State B, would allow State A to reduce A causal relationship is a way of de- the crash. This is possible, of course; in its military expenditures while still re- scribing how a cause and effect interact. the absence of mechanical problems, a maining safe. A change in the cause leads to a change in decision by the pilot to eject would cause State A could decide that State B is a the effect (at least some of the time), or the plane to crash. However, it is far more candidate for an alliance, or initiate some there is no cause and effect relationship.1 likely that the two events, A (ejection of other change in the relationship; these are A simple representation would be cause the pilot) and B (crash of the airplane), are only a few of the many impacts that State à effect. both caused by a third event, C (serious B could have on State A by engaging in a Often a mechanism, seen or unseen, mechanical issues with the plane). stable “deterred” relationship with State is involved. When a car strikes a light pole The risk of arriving at spurious causal A. In this respect, the effect has become a and the light pole falls down, we see the implications in international security is cause. Other states—C, D, E, and F—may causal relationship. Other physical causal considerable. What may appear a cause play a role in determining whether the re- relationships are unseen, such as gravity may in fact be the effect of a larger cause, lationship between A and B is stable, and causing an apple to fall from a tree. just as with the example of the ejecting those states could add further causal com- pilot. The prior reference to the Arab plexity. In this sense, with each state being Causation and Its Pitfalls Spring example is most likely this sort a cause and effect in multiple relationships, Efforts to simplify complex causal of spurious causation. Would the Arab and often both cause and effect at once, relations in the international arena Spring have occurred if the United the concept of multidirectional causality account for much of the work in politi- States had never invaded Iraq, or even becomes a useful (though daunting) heu- cal science, which seeks to illuminate Afghanistan? Very possibly so; though ristic for illuminating these interactions. issues of strategic significance. Consider it is difficult to prove a negative, I am Causal relationships in the strategic the subject of deterrence. In one of aware of no instances of those rebelling realm can be incredibly complex. At the his most prominent early works, John in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, or elsewhere same time, attempting to understand Mearsheimer offered a relatively simple who cited the recent histories of Iraq and them is necessary to make sense of his- theory of what leads to a stable deter- Afghanistan as their motives. If this line tory. John Lewis Gaddis, for example, rent relationship between two states. of reasoning is correct, then the assertion attributes the end of the Cold War to Mearsheimer argued that when State A that the Arab Spring was caused by evolv- two primary causes: the U.S. conven- fields a deterrent capability sufficient to ing democracies in Afghanistan and Iraq tional arms buildup and firm policies defeat State B, State B will be deterred is an example of spurious causation (and of President Ronald Reagan, and the from attacking State A.2 The theory is possibly biased analysis to boot). willingness of his Soviet counterpart, a reasonable one on its face (though A new concept that may have consid- Mikhail Gorbachev, to reassess the Soviet we might think of exceptions, such erable application to the strategic realm Union’s geostrategic position and to act as Georgia’s decision to attack Russia is the idea of multidirectional causality. boldly based on that reassessment.4 Many in 2008). The causal relationship of Many of the simplified concepts of causal- would agree that these factors played a Mearsheimer’s theory might be stated ity were designed for the physical realm, role, but assessing the end of such a dis- as follows: dominant conventional mili- where causation can be simplified with persed and longstanding rivalry is a most tary capability vs. B à stable deterrence considerable accuracy in many environ- complicated task, even with the advan- vs. B. ments. Gravity causes a stone thrown tage of hindsight and vast knowledge of Stephen Van Evera warns against a into the air to fall back to Earth; no other the subject, as Gaddis has relating to the number of potential errors in determining forces are needed to explain this result, Cold War. causation.3 The most important of these is and this outcome is easily explained by Such complex causal assessments spurious causation. This occurs when the reference to a single causal factor. are exactly what we are asking military incidences of both A and B are reliant on In international environments, how- officers to make when they offer their some other factor, rather than one caus- ever, this is only rarely the case. In fact, insights into strategic guidance, contin- ing the other. In this case, A and B are not we could say an “effect” has an impact gency planning, and the like. When we causally related, but instead both rely on a on the “cause” all the time in strategic ask officers to assess the question “What third cause: C à both A and B. interactions. Returning to the deterrent is the likely threat posed by China in the
36 JPME Today / Causality in a Complex Security Environment JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 near future?” it is precisely this complex intelligence reports. MacArthur had a Consider this excerpt from a National causal environment we are asking them “determination to surround himself with Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that was read to attempt to understand. Assessing people who would not disturb the dream to President John F. Kennedy days before intentions is difficult in and of itself, but world of self-worship in which he so he decided to proceed with the Bay of suppose we assume that China seeks to often chose to live.”5 Pigs operation in 1961. This NIE was expand its sphere of influence and control Assess the Full Spectrum of Causal seen as supporting the expected causal over natural resources. To be sure, the Factors Involved. Since strategic situa- relationship that the invasion would spark question “What will China do?” is a criti- tions are so complex, it is easy to seize an anti–Fidel Castro popular revolt. Of cal one. But even if we could assess that upon the first few causal factors that course, the Bay of Pigs invasion was a question accurately, we could not gauge we believe are most important and disastrous failure, one that humiliated the the strategic importance of whatever ac- stop our analysis at this point. In the new President. The NIE went as follows: tions we believe China would undertake spirit of Atul Gawande’s The Checklist without also asking, “What impact will Manifesto,6 below is a list of categories of The great mass of Cuban people believe the those actions have?” Here, we are as- possible causal factors that could merit hour of decision is at hand. . . . They expect sessing causality—the likely effect that consideration: an invasion to take place before mid-April specific Chinese actions could have. 1961 and place great reliance on it. The actors involved—primary and sec- •• Castro regime is steadily losing popularity. ondary, possible future actors Five Steps for Successful . . . housewives and servants must stand policy choices of relevant actors/ Assessment •• in line for hours to obtain such necessities governance/political factors The Arab Spring example illustrates as soap and lard. . . . Church attendance leaders/advisors/influential two issues related to causality that are •• is at an all-time high as a demonstration individuals important for military officers to under- of opposition to the government. . . . It is military factors stand. First, anything we study in inter- •• generally believed that the Cuban Army social/cultural/historical national security—an event in history, •• has been successfully penetrated by opposi- considerations current crisis, speculative future engage- tion groups and that it will not fight in the normative factors/international ment—is almost always more complex •• event of a showdown.7 community than it seems at first glance. Under- strategic trends standing complex national security •• Though much of this is simply ques- regional dynamics events requires simplification, and that •• tionable intelligence, the excerpt also technology/changes in technology. simplification has become a routine part •• offers evidence of questionable causal of how we assess a strategic situation. The term normative factors is a sug- relationships, as this NIE was evaluating Simplification is, in fact, necessary to gestion that we might consider how the the possibility of an anti-Castro uprising. make almost any sort of command deci- relevance or irrelevance of international What is the causal connection between sion. But when the stakes are significant norms (customs, standards of behavior, soap lines and a readiness to spontane- and the time is available, attempting and the like) might play on a certain ously revolt? Even if a revolt occurred, to parse out the causal complexity of a causal analysis. For example, the impor- would it occur quickly enough? How situation is essential. tance of the sanctity of internationally could we predict these critical elements Second, it is important to be aware recognized borders plays a major role of a plan? When does dissatisfaction lead of the need to be prepared to change our in interstate behavior, even though we to resistance? What are the obstacles to minds. If we are not open to reassess- can point to instances of recent viola- mobilizing a revolt? By asking these and ment of a causal relationship, we run the tions (Crimea, for example). The fact other questions in an attempt to make the risk of missing an opportunity to revise that a norm is sometimes violated does predicted causal relationship as concrete an incorrect assessment. General Douglas not mean it does not have an impact. In as possible, we increase the likelihood of MacArthur did not believe his advance the United States, banks are occasion- identifying aspects of a causal relationship to the Yalu River would lead to Chinese ally robbed, but most people know that that merit further consideration. involvement in the war because he was bank-robbing is illegal, and that belief Stay Alert to the Length of the Causal confident that the Chinese could only affects the behavior of most people. Chain. When we consider a causal im- manage to send 50,000 to 60,000 troops State Your Understanding of the pact such as “U.S. military policy A will across the Yalu, a number that would be Causal Relationship as Concretely as have causal result B,” we must remain no match for the United Nations force Possible. By rendering a complex causal alert to each step in the causal chain. that was advancing north. MacArthur’s relationship into something close to its The more distant the event is from the inability to remain open to alternative true complexity, we may stumble on—or, cause being investigated, the more likely explanations regarding China’s likely more likely, force ourselves to recog- it is that other causal factors will have an involvement was at least partly due nize—a causal link that seems dubious on opportunity to affect the event we are at- to the fact he received few unfiltered further analysis. tempting to explain.
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Stigler 37 evidence that the West would not take significant action to defend a non-NATO member that bordered Russia. Decisions related to the extent of NATO’s expan- sion could have played a role as well—for example, could NATO have halted the expansion at an earlier stage? If the answer is yes, then we might be more skeptical that the earlier decision to ex- pand NATO led to the current situation in 2014. These are the sorts of alternate explanations that would merit consider- ation as we evaluate a causal relationship. Realize Causal Comparisons with Past Events Are Always More Complicated Than They First Seem. In March 2014, both Zbigniew Brzezinski and Madeleine Albright offered inter- views in which they attempted to suggest possible causal outcomes in the Crimean situation by making historical references. Brzezinski recommended threatening Russia with “very serious” consequences “because, otherwise, some years from now, we will be regretting failure to act the way we regretted the failure to act after Munich in 1938 and 1939, and we know what followed.”9 Similarly, Albright offered, “I think the problem of Munich was that the United States was not paying attention.”10 Such efforts to predict causal out- comes for present situations based on historical events always gloss over a vast array of causal complexities. Also keep in Eight hundred female strikers for peace on 47th Street near United Nations Building in New York, 1962 (Library of Congress/Phil Stanziola) mind that we are often still puzzling over the causal explanation of the original his- There are two general types of “links” For example, it was argued in the torical event. The outbreak of World War in the causal chain that can be considered. 1990s that North Atlantic Treaty I is now a century old, and there are still The first is events. The larger the number Organization (NATO) expansion could potent debates over the role of the cult of of external events between the cause and raise profound security concerns for the offensive and other factors.11 And we effect we are interested in explaining, the Russia.8 Two decades later, in response know even less about the causal factors greater the possibility that other factors to fears that Ukraine was becoming too at work in current geostrategic situations play a role in the explanation of the event close to the West, Russia invaded Crimea, than we do about historical events. in question. and Ukraine continues to be a focus of Below is a partial list of “categories of The second is time. Even absent diplomatic friction between a former su- difference” that might be kept in mind as events that raise the possibility that other perpower and the West. historical analogies are being compared. In causal factors are at work, time itself can Did NATO expansion cause the cur- effect, we might ask if the historical event add to our skepticism that a causal rela- rent impasse? It is worthwhile to keep and current situation differ in terms of: tionship exists, or at least may cause us in mind that both a considerable span geostrategic environment to question the strength of the suspected of time and range of actions occurred •• leadership cause. Events in the strategic realm are between the two events. The 2008 war •• regional actors not always instantaneous to be sure. But between Georgia and Russia, for exam- •• cultural and social considerations a significant span of time between a cause ple, may have played a significant role in •• and effect is reason to be skeptical. Vladimir Putin’s thinking—offering him
38 JPME Today / Causality in a Complex Security Environment JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 •• motivation and commitment (short present, there are reasons to wonder rence (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983). and long term) if it will become still more complex in 3 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for •• level of threat. the future. U.S. national security policy Students of Political Science (New York: Cornell continues to assess counterterrorism as University Press, 1997), 8. Beware of Mirror-Imaging. Mirror- a major focus in the decade-plus after 4 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: imaging refers to the danger of assuming 9/11, and this focus raises additional Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Clar- that other individuals have the same, endon Press, 1997). potential for causal complexity. or very similar, desires and perceptions 5 William Stueck, The Korean War: An A major reason for this is the role of that we have. Just as a mirror reflects International History (Princeton: Princeton individuals. Terrorism is a threat posed by University Press, 1995), 107, 112. us, mirror-imaging suggests the danger small groups, many (but not all) of which 6 Atul Gawande, The Checklist Manifesto: of projecting our strategic preferences are not dependent on outside actors for How to Get Things Right (New York: Picador, onto another actor. For example, in the 2009). direct support or guidance. As such, these prelude to the 1973 war between Israel 7 Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile groups are able to choose actions while and Egypt, Israeli intelligence delayed of Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), being unencumbered by the institutional 80–81. mobilization in part because there was bureaucracy that could have a stabilizing 8 For an early article in the North Atlantic an assumption that Egypt would not effect on state government policies. This Treaty Organization expansion debate, see attack until its air defense problem had Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. increases the complexity of causal assess- been solved—because Israeli leaders Stephen Larrabee, “Building a New NATO,” ment and prediction since it increases the would have been restrained from at- Foreign Affairs (September/October 1993). fluidity of decisionmaking on the part of 9 Fareed Zakaria, “Ukrainians Reacting to tacking, in their opinion, had they faced these (relatively) small organizations. Russia’s Military Movement in Crimea,” CNN. such a situation.12 Furthermore, predicting social com, March 2, 2014, available at
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Stigler 39 Chairman walks with Major General Frederick M. Padilla, USMC, after change of command ceremony in which Major General Padilla became 15th president of National Defense University, November 2014 (NDU/Katherine Lewis)
Next Steps for Transforming Education at National Defense University
By Christopher J. Lamb and Brittany Porro
ational Defense University the result will be a transformation in 2014–2015 academic year and identifies (NDU) is implementing major the way the university educates senior future steps senior leaders might con- N reforms in the graduate-level national security leaders.1 This article sider in order to maintain momentum programs it provides senior military does not review the status of current for the transformation of joint profes- officers and other national security change initiatives. Instead, it looks sional military education. professionals. If all goes as planned, beyond the changes under way for the The basic rationale for the change at NDU is that in a period of declining defense budgets and increasingly complex security challenges, the Nation needs Dr. Christopher J. Lamb is Deputy Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at National Defense University. Ms. Brittany Porro was a Research Analyst for the Director of INSS and the best strategic leadership possible. now works at the Department of State. By extension, we need the best possible
40 JPME Today / Next Steps for Transforming Education JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Table 1. Senior War College Problem Areas According to Critics Systemic Problems: Support for Sources Evaluating Adequacy of Joint Institutional Problems: Who Teaches What, How, and to What End? and Management of JPME Professional Military Education (JPME) Faculty Curriculum Methods Rigor Support Leadership Cronin (2010) X X X X X X Government Accountability Office on X DOD JPME study (2013) House Armed Services Committee X X X X study (2010) Johnson-Freese (2012, 2014) X X X X X X Reed (2011, 2014) X X X Ricks citing Daniel Hughes (2011) X X X Scales (2010) X X X X Wiarda (2011) X X X X X
Sources: Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades after the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010); Patrick M. Cronin, “PME: A Strategic Education,” Marine Corps Gazette 94, no. 6 (2010); Joint Military Education: Actions Needed to Implement DoD Recommendations for Enhancing Leadership Development: Report to Congressional Committees, 2013; Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Reform of Military Education: Twenty Five Years Later,” Orbis 56 (Winter 2012); Kevin P. Kelley and Joan Johnson-Freese, “Getting to the Goal in Professional Military Education,” Orbis 58, no. 1 (2014), 119–131; George E. Reed, “What’s Wrong and What’s Right with the War Colleges,” DefensePolicy. org, July 1, 2011; George E. Reed, “The Pen and the Sword: Faculty Management Challenges in the Mixed Cultural Environment of a War College,” Joint Force Quarterly 72 (1st Quarter 2014); George E. Reed, “Examining the War Colleges: An Administrative Perspective,” conference paper presented at the Reforming Professional Military Education: A Clash of Professional Ethics session at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Francisco, CA, April 5, 2013; Thomas Ricks, “Need Budget Cuts? We Probably Can Start by Shutting the Air War College,” April 11, 2011; Ricks cited Daniel Hughes chapter in Douglas Higbee, Military Culture and Education (Farnham, United Kingdom: Ashgate, 2010); Robert H. Scales, “Too Busy to Learn,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136, no. 2 (2010); Howard Wiarda, Military Brass vs. Civilian Academics at the National War College: A Clash of Cultures (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011). educational program for emerging stra- concerns about the way military culture pursue education rigorously.4 Major tegic leaders. General Martin Dempsey, and leaders manage joint educational General Robert Scales, USA, for example, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, institutions and programs. We review argues that Service cultures do not value argues that developing capable future these criticisms to better explain how education enough to send the best and leaders is the best hedge against an aus- the changes taking place at NDU can brightest officers to teach and claims the tere and uncertain future. Good leaders, improve the educational experience for war colleges have become “intellectual he notes, can “see us through when our students and, more importantly, why ad- backwater[s], lagging far behind the cor- organizational structure is not perfect, ditional steps to reinforce and extend the porate and civilian institutions of higher when technology comes up short, when changes are necessary. learning.”5 The Goldwater-Nichols training misses the mark, and when Department of Defense Reorganization guidance is late to need.” In the future, War College Critics Act of 1986 makes joint assignments and leaders who can think through complex and Reformers promotion to general and flag officer problems, out-think adversaries, reconcile Critics assert that war colleges and contingent upon senior military educa- context, uncertainty, and surprise, and universities fail to attract top-flight tion, so a steady flow of students to the seek and embrace adaptability will be faculty, teach outdated curricula, no war colleges is assured. However, long- “our decisive edge.”2 Producing such longer pioneer or use innovative teach- time war college faculty members such leaders is General Dempsey’s intent and ing methods, and pamper rather than as Joan Johnson-Freese of the Naval War NDU’s current ambition, but there are challenge students (see table 2).3 Critics College worry that the disdain for educa- challenges to overcome. further contend that with a few excep- tion in military culture diminishes student A substantial body of recent work tions, war college classes are pass/fail motivation to learn.6 argues that the traditional approach to experiences where everyone passes, and Moreover, administrators who run joint professional military education performance at the colleges matters military educational institutions come needs reform, particularly at the war little to parent Services. from the same culture and rarely are college level. Criticisms fall into two Most critics argue these conditions inclined to challenge it. War college com- categories (see table 1). Most attention persist for reasons beyond the immediate mandants have short tenures and typically is paid to immediate institutional issues: control of the colleges and their faculties. retire after their terms, so there is little namely, who teaches what, how, and with They believe an anti-intellectual military incentive or opportunity for them to chal- what qualifications, degree of rigor, and culture devalues education and disinclines lenge the status quo. These factors make efficacy. There are also broader, systemic students and college administrators to reform from within an unlikely prospect.
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Lamb and Porro 41 Table 2. Top Performance Issues as Identified by Critics Systemic Issues: Support and Management of Joint Professional Institutional Issues: Who Teaches What, How, and to What End? Military Education (JPME) Support and Faculty Curriculum Methods Rigor Value of JPME Management Active Duty: Focus: not enough Innovation: lack Goals: focus is Culture: Service Competency: Services do not emphasis on of innovative on social goals, cultures biased administrators send top talent; critical thinking and teaching methods, not academic toward action, not chosen because thrown into classes leadership skills. particularly to excellence. reflection; training, of former military unprepared; have balance demand not education. careers are short tenures. for generalists and not qualified specialists. for academic administration. Former Military: Relevance: weak Thinking skills: more Level of Difficulty: Partiality: Value: burgeoning Summary of retired military relationship to focus on “training” not challenging; no priority is hiring administrative Major Criticisms with PhDs lack follow-on duty (information entry requirements; administrators ranks impose published research assignments. transmittal) than one year is not with military, costs without records and areas of on critical thinking. enough to cover the not academic, compensatory specialization. material. experience. value. Civilians: not Balance: generalist Intellectual Standards: it is Personnel Tenure: war college attracting top and specialist vibrancy: not pass/fail, and Systems: Service presidents leave civilian academic models not sufficiently everyone passes; human resource too quickly to make talent. reconciled. thought-provoking. not rigorous. requirements needed changes. trump educational goals. Practitioners: too Theory: topical Social Dynamic: Academic Inquiry: Proponency: no much emphasis issues emphasized catering to student military culture in full-time, senior on practitioner without sufficient preferences at general clashes proponent for perspective. attention to the expense of with academic military education theoretical education. culture. is up to the task. framework.
In the past, Congress has intervened sensus in favor of reform, much less a questioned.10 The percentage of tenured to “fix” military education. One conse- specific agenda. In part this is because faculty fell from 37 percent in 1975 to quence is that existing law and written some of the criticism is misplaced. For 24 percent in 2003, a trend that has con- guidance from the Chairman of the Joint example, former National War College tinued over the past decade.11 Similarly, Chiefs now require the war colleges to Professor Mike Mazarr rightly skewers the right balance of faculty research and provide a “rigorous” educational experi- critics for repeating the canard that war teaching duties is debated. George Reed ence. However, a recent House Armed colleges focus on tactics at the expense asserts that the “dirty little secret of top Services Committee study declined the of strategy, observing that “no one with tier civilian universities” is that “great, opportunity to take the side of critics even a glancing familiarity with National and sometimes inordinate, emphasis is who charge lack of rigor. Instead, per- War College’s curriculum could possibly placed on research and publication that haps cognizant of criticism that Congress [think or] write such a thing.”8 can detract from effective teaching.”12 As has already legislated too many demands Another reason the reform agenda for academic freedom, it may be easier to on military education, the committee did not catch on is that critics and propo- question orthodoxy in a war college than study noted that pass/fail approaches, nents of the war colleges tend to talk past in a typical civilian graduate program. when based on objective learning stan- one another. The critics start with the Free thinking at civilian universities in- dards and supported by comprehensive assumption that the war colleges should creasingly is circumscribed by the vagaries and timely feedback, do not necessarily emulate top-tier civilian universities. of departmental politics,13 institutional detract from the rigor of the academic They recommend tenure for professors, review boards,14 and political correctness programs.”7 This arguably sets a low bar, more emphasis on faculty research, and from academic disciplines that are over- considering the weighty, life-and-death cultural changes to better align with whelmingly captured by one portion of responsibilities war college graduates academia, which is “open-minded, free- the political spectrum.15 often shoulder. wheeling, questioning of authority [and] Those who defend the traditional war of any and all established truths.”9 Some college approach typically start with the Comparing Civilian and Military of these prescriptions seem antiquated opposite assumption: that war colleges Institutions of Higher Education given changes in higher education. are unique institutions that should not The critiques of joint education over For example, the value of tenure in be judged by or seek to emulate the best the past decade did not generate a con- civilian higher education increasingly is graduate programs at top-tier universities.
42 JPME Today / Next Steps for Transforming Education JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Reed, with experience in both war col- war college is competitive whereas assign- Critics argue that innovative methods leges and civilian higher education, ment as an instructor is not, which means are needed to impart critical think- notes the war college model is “more instructors may have less credibility with ing skills. The traditional reliance on akin to that of a professional school (for their students. Scales emphasizes the need the Socratic method of open seminar example, law or medicine).” Like lawyers, for the Services to change their ways and discussion moderated by faculty has its engineers, and doctors, military officers populate the war colleges with experi- advantages but falls short as a means of are sent to senior Service schools to learn enced, upwardly mobile instructors with replicating complex problem-solving a well-established canon of professional long-term immersion in a subject.18 under stress, an essential requirement knowledge. Another problem with using the for strategic leaders. They believe the It is true that war colleges are profes- professional school model to explain lack customary Socratic approach should be sional schools, but that does not explain of academic rigor is that it overstates the augmented with more advanced simula- their lack of rigor. On the contrary, dichotomy between professional schools tions and crisis decisionmaking exercises the prevailing pass/fail standard at and research universities. All graduate- to better prepare students for future stra- war colleges is not consistent with the level programs impart established tegic leadership challenges. professional school model. Professional knowledge and teach critical thinking Typically, the deviations from pro- schools mandate the acquisition and skills. Medical schools want doctors fessional school norms and outright retention of specialized knowledge who know not only the basics but also contradictions in the traditional war and are ruthless in testing whether stu- the results of recent research and how college model are attributed to a military dents meet this requirement—and for to solve uncommon medical problems. culture that favors its own members at good reason. Who wants a doctor who Law schools want lawyers who not only the expense of civilian faculty. War col- graduated from a medical school where know the law but who can also devise leges often (but not exclusively) hire everyone passes? Military culture is not creative ways to assist their clients within retired military officers with doctoral a valid excuse for lack of rigor when it the bounds of evolving law. War colleges degrees as administrators. At NDU in comes to education. At the Service acad- want strategists who understand not only 2014, for example, the chancellors of emies, for example, cadets are constantly current doctrine but also how to manage the College of International Security tested, rank-ordered, and not infre- emerging national security problems. Affairs and iCollege as well as the deans quently flunked, and their performance Thus, as Steven Metz argues, the purpose of the Eisenhower School and National is directly tied to future assignments and of the war colleges is actually a mix of War College were all retired military career field selection. professionalism (that is, sharing a body colonels or Navy captains holding doctor- War college practices diverge from of knowledge related to the military ates and having substantial professional established norms at professional schools mission) and higher education, which in- military education experience, as were in other respects as well. Professional cludes developing critical thinking skills.19 the university provost and director of schools use experienced practitioners At issue is the proper balance between research. (In addition, the commandants with the gravitas and authority to transfer professionalism and higher education. of the National War College, Eisenhower knowledge in their areas of expertise. In that regard, the consensus has shifted School, and Joint Forces Staff College Critics acknowledge that war college toward greater emphasis on critical are Active-duty flag officers.) Critics may faculties have some extraordinary talents, thinking skills and less on transferring an see this as favoritism, but military leaders but they also argue that too many civilian existing body of knowledge. Most ob- understandably want war college adminis- and military instructors have insufficient servers believe most professional military trators who comprehend military culture, experience and academic credentials. knowledge is better transferred earlier professional requirements, and modes of They claim top-flight civilian academ- in officers’ careers when they attend operation. A natural byproduct is that the ics are not attracted to war college command and staff colleges.20 The war war colleges are inclined to give students culture and that uniformed instructors colleges are supposed to focus on higher the maximum latitude to determine how lack experience,16 academic credentials, order strategic problems and question much effort they put into their education and sometimes also practical expertise established ways of doing business, par- rather than “coercing” them with grades, in the subject areas they are asked to ticularly during periods of great change tests, and onerous reading lists. The net teach. These faculty profiles contradict when the value of traditional methods effect is an educational experience that, the professional school model, which and approaches is suspect.21 This is pre- while impressive in some respects, lacks emphasizes experienced, expert instruc- cisely the point that General Dempsey the rigor typically associated with top tors. As Johnson-Freese notes, in the case and many other senior leaders have been civilian graduate programs. of the Army, Air Force, and Marines, it making in recent years: the war colleges actually is “easier and less competitive to need to impart the critical thinking skills A Better War College Model be assigned to a War College as a faculty that will allow future leaders to adapt and Powerful cultural factors prevent the member than it is as a student.”17 In perform well in a dynamic, complex secu- war colleges from fully emulating civil- other words, selection as a student to a rity environment. ian research universities, and in some
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Lamb and Porro 43 Table 3. The NDU Educational Transformation Strategy Elements Attributes Value Reviews with faculty mentors across NDU Tailored experience, motivated students, distributed mentoring burden Multiple progressively difficult educational tracks Meet student demand without watering down rigor
Student Topics of individual interest identified Allows construction of elective schedule tailored to student demand Assessment Individual learning plans Self-conscious goal-setting; basis for student learning assessments End-of-year student self-assessments Identifies areas for improvement and continuing education plan Continuing learning plan for the student Students continue to learn after 10-month program NDU-wide core curriculum Identifies core priorities for national security professionals Foundational material Logical building block; less redundancy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff content added Prepares for complex security environment Phase I Taught by NDU-wide best talent Students receive the best NDU can offer Students pair with others from different profiles Expands student learning perspectives from start Exploit Washington, DC, location for experiential learning Gives students memorable practical insights College core curricula Phase II Students benefit as colleges concentrate on core competencies Colleges hire/focus faculty on expertise Tailored to student needs Individualizes student research experience Electives to support research and student careers Increases chances students can focus on relevant, specialized research topics Research projects under direct faculty mentorship Students demonstrate problem-solving capability using critical learning skills Phase III Students control research design and maximize ability to generate good Optional travel in support of research projects products Mentors are best experts from across university Students receive the best that the university has to offer Thesis for those pursuing master’s degree Elevates the rigor of a 1-year graduate program for a degree End of year program evaluations Empirical feedback permits objective program improvements
Program Learning-based feedback from students More objective assessment Evaluation Feedback from “customers” Provides critical perspective from objective source Evaluations managed outside of components Facilitates objectivity Common annual calendar Permits collaboration among all NDU components Common Academic Common class lengths Facilitates taking classes in other colleges consistent with student learning plans Calendar Common times for no classes Permits students to get the best from full range of activities at NDU respects that is a good thing. The war leges must attend, and a good percent- Given these realities, many people who colleges are always going to respect age—the numbers are debated—may teach at the war colleges believe they and reflect military service and values, undervalue the opportunity. It is not must woo students with stellar classroom as they should. They also are going to uncommon to hear war college faculty efforts and hope the inherent profes- be populated with students who often guesstimate that one-third will end up sionalism of the U.S. military will incline value practical experience more than valuing and profiting from their educa- its charges to get as much from the class- reflection and research and who are tional experience, another third will just room experience as possible. assigned to the war colleges rather than meet the requirements as necessary, and For example, this is the case Mazarr selected as the most likely to succeed in the final third will never really engage or makes in rebutting the “lack of rigor” the halls of higher education. Students exploit the opportunity. charge made against the war colleges. He at civilian universities compete for posi- Since most experts on adult education argues graduate students anywhere can tions in graduate programs and pay agree student motivation is the greatest take a half-hearted approach to educa- hefty tuitions to obtain their graduate single determinant of learning outcomes, tion: “Graduate school is like that. Really educations, so they are highly motivated any predisposition to doubt the value of smart folks can sample a little stuff, stay to succeed and exploit their invest- higher education is a significant hurdle mostly quiet, binge for exams, and get ments. They also have a wide choice to learning. This makes the war college by.” He believes the vast majority of U.S. of institutions and programs to choose professor’s job difficult. The onus is on military professionals refuse to do that from to best meet their personal needs the institution to capture the interest of and consequently get a lot from their and goals. Officers assigned to war col- the students and motivate them to learn. war college experience. It is doubtful
44 JPME Today / Next Steps for Transforming Education JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 that graduate students can loaf their way paths, and interests. Faculty mentors limited resources (such as time, staff, and through programs at top universities help students craft an academic program faculty). Opposition by some teaching where entry is extremely competitive that will meet their individual needs faculty has also played a role in diluting and successful completion not at all as- and then work with the student to or limiting the scope of the transfor- sured. Fewer than half of all admission monitor results over the year. The next mation effort in its inaugural stages. applications to master’s programs are three elements restructure curriculum Reworking the curricula, programs, and accepted,22 and fewer than half of all doc- into different phases: a common core standards to give students more choices toral students finish their degrees.23 Data curriculum that provides a founda- and instituting systems for empirical for completion rates for master’s degrees tion of knowledge necessary for any feedback on staff and student perfor- are harder to come by and tend to focus graduate-level national security student, mance are demanding tasks. The best on science and technology degrees, but a second phase that delivers the core way to ensure success is to retain sight one study indicates a completion rate of curricula that each of the five colleges of the original strategic logic underlying about 66 percent.24 By contrast, informal specializes in and allows the colleges to the transformation plan and to carry that discussions with many who have attended offer students greater depth of expertise logic forward in successive iterations of and taught at the war colleges reveal in those areas of specialization, and a the academic program. deep skepticism about the assertion that third phase that focuses on electives and the “vast majority” of military students research that students can tailor to meet Extending the Diversity Logic are too professional to skate through a their personalized learning objectives. To realize the promise of a better edu- no-fail system, especially given competing The fifth element in the overall plan cational experience for students, NDU demands on their time and the fact that is detailed program evaluations based can advance its change program in the program offered to students is not on student self-evaluations and reviews three areas. In each case, the university tailored to their specific needs. from the organizations that benefit could offer more diversity that will One hopes Mazarr is right, but other from receiving war college graduates. facilitate its burgeoning commitment inside observers have expressed the op- These empirically based evaluations to a student-centric approach. The new posite concern, arguing that “students would enable better management of the program currently being implemented who maximize the learning experience at overall educational experience, includ- was designed to enhance diversity by the war college are in a decided minor- ing faculty development programs. The allowing students to have a greater say ity.”25 Thus, many conclude we must do last element is a common academic cal- in structuring their graduate programs. better than the traditional war college endar that facilitates collaboration across The university needs to reinforce this model, which inconsistently adopts campus and better allows students to trend over time. the practitioner focus of professional attend the many diverse educational First, NDU should create a variety schools without the faculty and rigor opportunities at NDU. of graduate-level educational tracks for such schools typically demand. General The entire NDU transformation students, including a doctoral program. Dempsey holds this view. He charged plan is intended to be student-centric. Doing so would further circumvent the leaders at NDU to “break out” from Rather than forcing all students into a contradictions that previously handi- established ways of doing business and single, common program irrespective of capped the ability of the war colleges to directed the “transformation of joint their individual career paths, desires, and offer an exceptional educational experi- professional military education pro- future objectives, this approach explicitly ence. Relatively speaking, for many years, grams.”26 The response was a plan that embraces diversity, expanding the choices professional military education has been markedly increases student choice and available to students and inviting them to “one size fits all” with several negative thus student motivation to learn. participate in managing their own educa- consequences. A regimented approach tion. The entire approach is consistent inclines the war colleges to treat all NDU Education with well-acknowledged principles of suc- faculty the same regardless of qualifica- Transformation Plan cessful adult education, which emphasize tion, which undermines quality; reduces National Defense University’s educa- partnering with students, taking their student motivation by forcing students tion transformation plan is explained unique circumstances into account, link- to devote too much time to material they elsewhere27 but can be briefly sum- ing the educational experience to their know is not relevant for their particular marized to illustrate how the university career needs, and tapping the internal as career path; and ultimately requires the is moving forward from the traditional opposed to external factors that typically watering down of educational standards. model of military education (see table motivate adults to learn.28 Standards are kept low to accommodate 3). The plan has six major elements, Table 3 depicts the advantages that students who—often for good rea- the first of which is a comprehensive should accrue from the program as sons—cannot manage a typical graduate student evaluation that takes into originally envisioned. In practice, the program full of tests, papers, exams, and account individual student circum- program is being modified during imple- other hurdles but who also cannot be stances, previous education, career mentation as necessary to accommodate allowed to fail. Providing students with
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Lamb and Porro 45 multiple educational tracks—directed assessment, all the factors affecting the Active-duty military personnel, retired study, certificate, graduate degree, hon- students’ needs and motivations to learn military with academic credentials, and ors, doctoral candidate—with different are considered to craft programs of study civilians with senior-level experience in levels of difficulty tailored to student that will maximize chances for students to the national security system. With rare needs and interests allows university emerge at the end of the year better pre- exceptions, civilians with no practitio- leaders to set and insist on standards ap- pared for their follow-on assignments. ner experience ought to be avoided in propriate for each path. In the first phase of the curricula, professional schools such as the war col- For example, students interested in which is short and focused on transfer- leges. The main point is that rather than particularly challenging issues in their ring foundational material (mandated by treating all instructors largely as inter- career fields could focus singularly on legislation and Joint Staff guidance) to changeable cogs in a teaching machine, those issues without being constrained students, the guiding approach should be the university should distinguish between by master’s degree requirements. Perhaps social learning where students dialogue levels of qualifications and categorize these students already have a graduate with colleagues, network, conduct team faculty and their duties accordingly. The degree and know they will not become projects, and demonstrate they have ac- war colleges already distinguish faculty by a flag officer, but would value the op- quired knowledge of material by passing titles and offer some assistance and men- portunity to solve a problem that has “no-fail” online exams they can take at toring to new instructors thrown into the repeatedly surfaced in their careers. their leisure. The idea would be to trans- classroom, but we are suggesting a much Alternatively, students with no graduate fer basic knowledge while exposing the tighter alignment of experience and ex- degree who aspire to promotion might students to other points of view about the pertise with teaching responsibilities. want master’s degrees in strategy to maxi- significance of the material. During this Although there would be exceptions, mize their chances for advancement. Still period, students would have a chance to in general assistant professors would help other students already in possession of decompress from the taxing operational administer the educational program as master’s degrees might aspire to publish assignments they complete prior to arriv- team teachers, graders, and program ad- their theses and ask for honors tracks and ing at National Defense University. ministrators; associate professors would chances to compete for scarce slots in The approach taken in the second teach the lower level courses; and full doctoral programs. Embracing student phase would depend on the student’s professors would teach mostly higher choice acknowledges the reality of dif- educational track, but if the student is level courses in their area of demon- ferent student abilities and aspirations pursuing a master’s degree, it should be a strated expertise. Full and distinguished and also the preferences of mid-career behaviorist approach with well-identified professors would mentor doctoral can- learners. It balances the need to educate learning objectives and graded papers and didates, and so on. Uniformed faculty both generalists and specialists, gives war examinations. without academic credentials or excep- college students a chance to get the most The third phase, focused on student tional experience in the subject matter from their graduate experience, and helps research, should be administered with would begin in the assistant professor mid-career professionals take the next a cognitive approach that emphasizes category and move up as they benefit step toward becoming senior leaders. sense-making, problem-solving, and from faculty development efforts, experi- Allowing students to choose the best fit self-directed learning via case studies, ence, and research. Deeply experienced for their circumstances will increase stu- projects and simulations, and papers. practitioners (military and civilian) would dent motivation to learn, which is the key Mentors should assist students in setting lead those classes in which their practical to success in adult education, particularly up their research problems and construct- experience is clearly relevant. If they stay for seasoned professionals on well-defined ing appropriate methodologies to solve on and publish, they could rise and be career tracks. the problems, but the level of difficulty assigned more traditional academic and Second, NDU needs a guiding would depend on the topics and educa- research duties. There would be no ten- theory and approach to adult education tional tracks chosen by students. Such a ure, but full professors would have more that informs its graduate programs.29 hybrid approach to adult learning would time for research and control over their The Socratic method alone does not permit university staff and faculty to bet- course content. constitute an optimum approach to adult ter administer the new program in a way General Dempsey gave National education. A hybrid approach that sup- that supports multiple educational tracks Defense University a chance to be the ports a commitment to student-centric for students. first military institution of higher educa- graduate education can better serve Finally, the university needs to em- tion to break away from the model of the target population. The war college brace and rationalize its faculty diversity. military education that critics have been foundational approach could and should War colleges, with their relatively gener- assailing for the past decade. The new be a humanist approach that emphasizes ous salary structures, are well positioned program under way at the university is the importance of meeting the student’s to recruit faculty with both impressive a clear step in the right direction. It re- full range of needs: emotional, spiritual, practical and academic credentials. quires modifying the curricula, programs, physical, and intellectual. During student However, there will always be a mix of and standards to give students more
46 JPME Today / Next Steps for Transforming Education JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 10 19 choices and instituting empirical feedback The debate over tenure is longstanding, Steven Metz, “Strategic Horizons: U.S. but a representative case against tenure is found Professional Military Education on the Chop- on staff and student performance—all in James C. Wetherbe, “It’s Time for Tenure ping Block,” World Politics Review, April 17, difficult tasks. It will be tempting to to Lose Tenure,” Harvard Business Review, 2013, available at
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Lamb and Porro 47 U.S. Army Sergeant 1st Class Melvin Morris receives Medal of Honor from President Obama inside White House, March 2014 (U.S. Army/Mikki L. Sprenkle)
A Strong Fighting Force Is a Diverse Fighting Force
By Larry O. Spencer
strong fighting force is a diverse achieve numbers for the sake of achiev- role models and heroes were African- fighting force. Said another way, ing numbers, but because young enlisted Americans. On the surface, I suppose A diversity equals combat power. members and officers need to see a way there is nothing wrong with that. In Therefore, we should strive to have to top leadership positions if they have fact, that type of “isolation” within diversity, both up and down the ranks, the drive and talent to get there. one’s own ethnic group or “hood” is because it makes us better. In addition not uncommon. In hindsight, however, to the benefits of diverse views and Up Close and Personal I realize that so many Americans spend- opinions, it is important for the top I grew up in Southeast Washington, ing their formative years this way is a echelon of military leadership to reflect DC. In my neighborhood, and for the problem because America, as a whole, is the diversity of the Nation—not to most part in my world, there was little not represented and its diversity is not diversity. As a kid, I played with African- highlighted. Americans, went to school with and was As I entered high school, my family General Larry O. Spencer is Vice Chief of Staff of taught by African-Americans, went to moved just across the DC border into the U.S. Air Force. church with African-Americans, and my Prince George’s County, Maryland. At
48 Commentary / A Strong, Diverse Fighting Force JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 the same time, societal views were chang- was new and intriguing to me as it was to not a source of weakness, it is a source of ing about “neighborhood segregation.” my white classmates. As we debated and strength, and it is a source of our success. Attending de facto segregated schools discussed various ideas, I was struck by The fact that America is the strongest was deemed incongruent with building the varying views on a singular issue. most powerful nation on earth is not an America’s leaders of the future, so the Years later, the infamous O.J. accident and that achievement was not concept of busing was introduced. I was Simpson trial reminded me of these earned by fate. Hard working Americans, bused to a high school that, even though early high school days. When the verdict from every walk of life, from every race it was predominantly white (by the way, was announced, there was a large por- and ethnic group, both male and female, that statistic was reversed by the time I tion of the country that supported the made it that way.” graduated), it was at least racially diverse. decision and another large portion that Achieving diversity in senior military The concept of disparity was not was outraged. It always puzzled me positions is a challenge to be sure be- entirely foreign to me; my mother had how an entire country could watch the cause, unlike industry, we cannot simply told me stories about when she was a same presentation of evidence and reach go out and hire a general or flag officer sophomore at Moton High School, a completely opposite conclusions. But or senior noncommissioned officer. But predominately African-American high the key takeaway for me was that people there are specific actions we can take that school, in Farmville, Virginia. Concerned from different backgrounds, educa- are not one-time-only events but rather about the poor conditions and lack tion levels, and experiences can view a ones that require constant focus and of resources, students (including my singular problem from varying points reinforcement. mother) protested and the entire student of view. Unfortunately, as with the O.J. body eventually went on strike. As his- Simpson trial, diverse opinions will lead Achieving a Diverse tory records, the Moton High School to disagreement; however, healthy debate Fighting Force protests became part of a Supreme Court in an organization is not only desirable The Air Force has successfully accom- decision, known as Brown v. The Board of but also essential to approaching complex plished its mission. Going forward, it is Education, which declared segregating problems. likely that any future conflict the Nation schools (known then as “separate but When I joined the Air Force, I began faces will rely heavily on air, space, and equal”) on the basis of race no longer to see the absolute value of diversity and cyber power as well as the capabilities permissible. Following that decision, the inclusiveness. When I lined up next to a of the other Services. And this means Prince Edward County School District fellow team member in high school, it did we should strive to become even more decided to withhold funding from all not matter what he looked like or where diverse. Like many organizations, we county public schools to show its dissent. he came from. The only criteria were have norms that tend to support the As a result, my mother did not graduate competence, commitment, and work ideas, culture, and experiences of the high school and did not receive a high ethic. Whereas I was taught to block and majority. While these norms work to school diploma until she was in her 40s. tackle a certain way, I quickly learned help the organization achieve its goals, During my formative years, I rarely that my way was not the only way, and in we must be careful to ensure that encountered professionals who looked many cases, my way was not the best way. they do not also cause the organiza- like me. Whether it was visiting the doc- The same is true for the Air Force—race tion to view new or different ideas as tor’s or dentist’s office or going to a used or gender does not matter, but com- countervailing or irrelevant. Diversity car lot to buy a car, the doctors, sales- petence, integrity, trust, and respect do forces organizations to understand and men, lawyers, pilots, military officers (my matter and what we should value most. accept differences, which fosters a more father was enlisted in the Army), police, In my view, diversity and inclusion culturally sensitive workforce that could firefighters, and store managers were all have everything to do with success and reduce problems such as discrimination white. It would not be until much later little to do with numbers. Steve Jobs and sexual assault/harassment. in life that I understood the impact those stated, “A lot of people in our industry This is more than a conceptual or images had on my self-esteem. haven’t had very diverse experiences. So aspirational discussion because the de- As I look back, my first day in high they don’t have lots of dots to connect, mographics of the Air Force will change school was an eye-opener. To begin, I and they end up with very linear solu- in the near future. As of 2012, the racial stepped onto a bus where the students tions without a broad perspective on the breakdown of the U.S. population was were predominantly white. As a star foot- problem. The broader one understands 63 percent white and 37 percent minor- ball player, it was the first time I would the human experience, the better design ity (17 percent Hispanic, 12.3 percent play for a white coach, and the equipment we will have.” Former Secretary of State African-American, 5 percent Asian, and field conditions were better than any and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and 2.4 percent other). By 2060, the I had ever seen. As we began to blend to- of Staff General Colin Powell stated, projected U.S. population breakdown gether as one high school, I was exposed “America is a nation of nations, made up will be 43 percent white and 57 percent to varying ideas and ideologies, including of people from every land, of every race minority (31 percent Hispanic, 13 per- music, that I had not heard before. This and practicing every faith. Our diversity is cent African-American, 8 percent Asian,
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Spencer 49 Airman walks perimeter of C-130J Hercules, November 2014 (U.S. Air National Guard/Matt Hecht) and 5 percent other). More telling, the recruitment. We can recruit the best on to serve a full career as an amputee Air Force is projected to recruit from a folks, but without a good retention (something that is not uncommon population in which the minority is the strategy, we may not be able to keep today, but was not the norm in the majority by 2024. them. Obviously, like all decisions in the 1950s and 1960s). He grew up on With that said, first, we must recruit Air Force, a good retention strategy is a farm and learned the value of hard a diverse population. As I stated, unlike based on the Air Force mission. This mis- work. He instilled that work ethic in all other employment opportunities in sion—the deployment of air, space and my siblings and me. He often said that the United States, the military is unable cyberspace power to achieve political ob- he had a high school diploma from his to hire uniformed personnel directly jectives—is expected to remain constant local high school and a Ph.D. from the into senior leadership positions. Because for the foreseeable future. Because of this, “school of hard knocks.” His philoso- of this, the senior leadership candidate the Air Force retention program is essen- phy was that one does not have to be pool is directly tied to recruiting efforts. tially the management of the relationship the smartest or brightest to get ahead, It takes roughly 24 years to develop and between leadership and the people but absent those things, one must be season an Air Force general officer. To they lead. The management of this the hardest worker. put a finer point on it, if the Air Force re- relationship comes down to two things: So commanders and supervisors must cruiting pool is not diverse today, we will delivering a clear message that hard work ensure that everyone understands there lose the opportunity for a diverse general and living Air Force core values are keys are no shortcuts. Our talent, drive, and officer pool for the next 24 years. This to a successful career, and purposeful and work ethic will ultimately determine how means we must make a concerted effort focused mentorship. far we climb up the military rank struc- to recruit a military force that represents ture. Natalie Crawford, a senior fellow the American public. The Importance of Hard Work at and former vice president of RAND Second, we must retain a diverse My father was a career Army noncom- Corporation, stated, “As a woman work- force. When it comes to a diverse force, missioned officer who earned a Purple ing in an environment dominated by retention is merely an extension of Heart during the Korean War and went men, I learned quickly that management
50 Commentary / A Strong, Diverse Fighting Force JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 will always remember who you are—they great chief master sergeant, who encour- with a primary career-track of budget/ remember if you are good and/or they aged me to complete my college degree resource management promoted past the remember if you are not good—so as a and become an officer. As a second lieu- grade of major general, and none of those woman I had to be good.” Is this fair? tenant, I had a great lieutenant colonel were women or people of color. Do not I am not sure but perhaps it is not. Is boss who taught me to be “eager and get me wrong—at that point in my career this reality? My experience says it is. enthusiastic.” As a first lieutenant and I was not thinking about being a four-star Along those lines, I have to point out an captain, already assigned to the Pentagon, or general officer, period. But I did won- important fact: no minority member or I had numerous mentors who challenged der why those in top leadership positions woman I know ever wants to achieve a and encouraged me and taught me the all looked the same and if there was some position based solely on race or gender. ropes of the Building. As a major and barrier or glass ceiling that precluded Conversely, everyone I know wants a fair lieutenant colonel squadron commander, someone like me from achieving that and equal chance to advance in the orga- I had a wing commander who made me level of rank and responsibility. nization—nothing more, nothing less. want to someday become a wing com- Some may feel there is no point in I think the responsibility of Air Force mander (something at the time that was pursuing diversity. They may point to leaders goes beyond what I have stated. unheard of for someone with a resources the fact that the Air Force has performed Leaders should cultivate an environment management background). spectacularly well in every endeavor that is empathetic and understanding of This constant lineup of mentors has since its inception—and that is certainly diversity. We must promote critical think- followed me throughout my career. true. However, the world is becoming ing skills to foster acceptance of differing There have always been Air Force mem- increasing complex, and the threats to viewpoints and experiences. In the end, bers, both Active duty and retired, who our nation and the associated challenges Airmen must understand that the ideas, wanted to see me do well and get ahead. are asymmetrical. The more diversity of culture, and experiences of all Airmen Interestingly enough, most of my men- thinking we apply to these challenges, are valid. That does not mean different tors did not look like me or come from the more opportunities we will have ideas are always better; neither does it a similar background. As a wing com- to discover innovative approaches to suggest that there will not be disagree- mander, my two-star boss literally gave problem-solving. ment. Rather, we should be open to me the keys to the wing and let me go. Today, our Airmen are the best in the hearing ideas from varying perspectives He was always in the background encour- world. Our country relies on them to and experiences and respect those sugges- aging and guiding, but I always knew he perform a host of missions from gaining tions that differ from our own. Healthy had my back, and I could sense that he and controlling the skies to launching and debate within an organization is critical to wanted me to succeed—something that operating space satellites, from sustaining achieving ultimate success. I will be forever grateful for. Even as a two-thirds of the U.S. nuclear arsenal to three-star director on the Joint Staff, the providing real-time intelligence and sur- The Importance of Mentoring two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff veillance, from conducting humanitarian Mentors from and for majority and I worked for were great mentors and missions to, when called upon, putting minority members are particularly leaders who provided overall guidance, bombs on target. The Air Force should important in retaining a diverse force. let me go, but watched and guided from seek to represent the demographics of the Minority mentors can offer advice based the background. society it defends, but we should also em- on their experiences while majority The point here is the term mentor brace and seek a diverse military because mentors can help interpret the unwrit- is much more than a title; it is, if done it produces stronger combat power for ten “rules.” As a minority officer, I right, a relationship. A relationship the Nation. We can better accomplish our know this is critical. For example, as a that can help steer a career in the right mission with a more diverse fighting force second lieutenant I grew a mustache, direction. A relationship that transcends because diversity makes us a more flex- which at the time was not uncommon gender or race. A relationship that can ible and innovative force. U.S. Supreme for African-American males; however, a turn a mediocre performer into a great Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor mentor of mine constructively pointed performer. A relationship that provides wrote that “effective participation by out that it was a violation of the unwrit- someone to bounce ideas and challenges members of all racial and ethnic groups ten rules. At the time, casual dress to off of. A relationship that provides hon- in the civic life of our nation is essential if me meant jeans. Again, I was pulled est and candid feedback. A relationship the dream of one nation, indivisible, is to aside and “schooled” on the definition of trust. And finally, a relationship that be realized.” Likewise, the strength and of “officer casual.” Mentors can provide teaches the mentee to become a mentor vision of our Air Force are underpinned networking opportunities and identify for others. by embracing and achieving diversity. JFQ specific military support resources for When I entered the Air Force, there both peers and subordinates. had been no African-American of- I have had great mentors during my ficers promoted to the four-star rank. career. As an enlisted member I had a Additionally, there had been no officers
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Spencer 51 Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Admiral John Kirby answers questions for media during weekly press conference, October 2014 (DOD/Glenn Fawcett)
Revisioning Strategic Communication Through Rhetoric and Discourse Analysis
By William M. Marcellino
trategic communication is an cratic in relation to the definitions of visibility failures in strategic communi- important but contested issue, other agencies. In turn, this argument cation—for example, the 2001 “Shared S visible in continuing criticisms runs, the lack of conceptual clarity and Values” campaign and the 2012 U.S. over the last 5 years. One critique is of shared, precise terminology hurts Presidential response to the “Innocence that the U.S. Department of Defense the implementation and further devel- of Muslims” video—as evidence of both (DOD) definition of the term strategic opment of strategic communication.1 strategic communication conceptual communication is vague and idiosyn- Additional concerns have been raised flaws and implementation failures.3 about the lack of both domestic inter- I propose here that strategic commu- agency and foreign partner coordination nication can be made more conceptually and cooperation and the absence of robust and draw on a more powerful Dr. William M. Marcellino is an Associate Behavioral and Social Scientist at the RAND credible expertise in strategic commu- and useful suite of tools and methods by Corporation. nication.2 Still, criticisms point to high- borrowing from two language-focused
52 Commentary / Revisioning Strategic Communication JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 disciplines: rhetoric and discourse and efficiently operationalize insights and enemies and partners. Instead of trying to analysis. Rhetoric offers an explanatory methods from these disciplines. control the narrative, the goal is to artfully framework for how and why com- Strategic communication as it cur- and effectively enter into conversation—a munication fails or succeeds, as well as rently stands draws primarily from subtle difference that has profound impli- practical domain knowledge for how to communications theory, public rela- cations for practice. design and effect sound communication tions, and marketing. In this model, To illustrate the range of concepts strategies, while discourse analysis is a set communication is understood to be and methods that we could borrow from of approaches and methods to analyz- primarily monologic (from a speaker to an rhetoric and discourse analysis and then ing real-world language use (discourse). audience) and dependent on the ability apply to strategic communication, I offer Rhetoric, a humanities discipline cen- of the speaker to manipulate or tailor two widely separated and disparate case tered on argumentation and persuasion, language to properly craft and deliver studies. They include both quantitative has had practical value and been effective the right message to persuade or change and qualitative approaches, using com- since Aristotle’s time, but it also has an opinions of the audience. This model also putational and human means, for both empirical wing developed over the last implicitly borrows from linguistic theories international and domestic problems, at 60 years. Discourse analysis is a relatively popularized by Noam Chomsky that treat the macro and micro scales of analysis. recent offshoot from sociolinguistics, language as having a preexisting structure which brings systematic, empirical analy- that good speakers use to their advantage. Linguistic Smuggling in Taliban sis to language at the micro level and It is from such a model that a ubiquitous Information Operations features a wide range of qualitative and phrase such as “controlling the narrative” Taliban strategic communication makes quantitative methods. can have currency and be in circulation. use of the rhetorical device “linguistic This issue of which disciplines, and The above conceptual model is smuggling” as a tactic in opposing the thus which conceptual models, to draw significantly different from much con- International Security Assistance Force from has high stakes because they imply temporary theory in linguistics and (ISAF). Their public statements appear different practical choices and methods. sociolinguistics. In more contemporary to focus on technical details to which As a simple example, ask yourself: if you theory, communication is dialogic: ISAF is most likely to react, disguising had to convince the authorities that everyone is talking to everyone else, all what the author(s) consider a more you were not at place X at Y time, and the time. Even when there is a single important point to Afghan audiences: if you had to convince them you were speaker at a given moment, such as a defining ISAF as crusaders and invaders. sincere, how would you do it? From formal speech or delivery of a single As a result, ISAF’s responses likely will an empirical perspective in discourse author paper, all kinds of other talk are not credibly satisfy Afghans. analysis, the answer would depend on the implicated (intertextually): prior speeches As an illustrative example, consider discourse conventions of the authorities. and writing, public talk in the news or how Taliban propaganda and an ISAF If American English speakers were asking private talk in the streets, and expected press release treat the same green-on-blue you, then brevity, concision, and coming responses. This means that text and talk incident. Below is a two-part rhetorical straight to the point might be convincing. are more like conversations than mes- analysis of a Taliban press release, coded However, if Arabic speakers were your sages. In place of linguistic code to be to show linguistic smuggling (hiding a audience, repeatedly proclaiming your manipulated, we enter into a conversation contestable claim) and an argument stasis innocence might be the right strategy. with a set of dynamically evolving con- (sticking point of contention): Most importantly in this example, those ventions and expectations that provide strategies are opposed—strategies suited current structure. The casualties of the CRUSADE for one discourse and culture would likely Instead of thinking about strategic INVADERS: As “a handful is a specimen fail for the other. communication as manipulating code of the heap” and the evidence is that the Below are two illustrative case studies (and thus manipulating an audience/out- CRUSADE INVADERS have always that show both the conceptual power of come), contemporary linguistic science tried habitually to conceal their casual- rhetoric and discourse analysis and also offers us a model of partners in dialogue ties. Let us have a look on the incident of the nuts-and-bolts methods for analyz- and argument, working interactively and the Jalraiz district of Maidan-Wardak ing communication and communication iteratively to accomplish practical ends. province which took place on Monday 11th failures. For these examples to make Even when these partners in dialogue March. In this incident, an infiltrated the most sense and provide context, I have diametrically opposed goals and Mujahid who was performing his duty first briefly sketch out how rhetoric and their interactions are hostile, they are still among the Arbakis, turned the barrel of his discourse analysis conceptually differ interactive and social. This model is inher- gun to the CRUSADE INVADERS and from our current iteration of strategic ently reflective because to be good at it, opened fire. Consequently 22 soldiers were communication. I then recommend we need to have as much understanding killed and a number of them were severely how DOD in general and the combatant of and insight into our own communica- wounded but the enemy acknowledged only commands in particular could effectively tion practices as we do into those of our 2 casualties.4
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Marcellino 53 Table 1. Argument Stases Neither side disputes the first possible stasis point—the existence and relevance Stasis Point Taliban Propaganda ISAF Message of ISAF. But through linguistic smug- Existence: Does it exist/did it happen? gling, the Taliban writers have found covert (and very plausible) ways to argue Definition: If it exists, what kind ISAF members are crusade of thing is it? invaders, a threat to Islam. the second stasis point, which ISAF does not explicitly address. This is critical be- Value/Quality: Is it worse ISAF minimizes loss of civilian or better, increasing or life. ISAF takes minimal cause stases are progressive—we cannot decreasing? casualties. ISAF maximizes successfully work on later stases until we enemies killed. have worked through prior ones. Since Cause: What is its origin? ISAF misses that the stasis point in play is Action: How should we the definitional stasis, they cannot argue respond? the last one: the action stasis. If ISAF are legitimate defenders of an Islamic The above sample text shows a This press release reflects current Republic, then they should be supported, Taliban communications tactic: lin- DOD best practices in strategic commu- or at least not opposed. But if they are guistic smuggling. Advertisers in the nication: clarity, openness, and honesty.6 “crusade invaders,” Afghans have a moral West frequently use this to divert at- This corresponds to American ideas of obligation to resist. tention away from contestable claims, “straight talk” and implicitly trades on The stases also have an ethos dimen- attempting to get consumers to accept two kinds of proofs (modes of persua- sion. The ISAF/American-style response embedded assumptions. Linguistic sion). One is logos-dependent—trying tries to gain credibility through virtue smuggling works through our expecta- to arrange the facts of the case in a way (honesty), which helps build up our tions for given/new information, by that supports our position. The other ethos. But so does another part of ethos: moving new (and therefore contestable) is ethos (credibility), which has three eunoia—goodwill to the audience. information from its conventional posi- components: practical wisdom, goodwill, “Crusade invaders” do not bear goodwill, tion after established given information. and virtue. Straight talk aims to dem- and consistency in talk does not change In the sentence “These condos are luxu- onstrate virtue. The whole approach is that. Telling people we hope to persuade rious,” we can think of the condos as very American: get the facts straight, and (or leaving unchallenged the belief) that the topic (what the statement is about) do it with consistent honesty to develop we are indeed an invading foe, dedicated and the claim of luxury as the comment credibility. to a crusade against them, but that we are (commentary on that topic). But if we While I want to temper my claim honest invaders, is a questionable com- say, “These luxury condos are avail- here—there is not a body of good empiri- munications strategy. able for only a short time,” the claim cal data verifying Afghan public discourse of luxury has been smuggled from the and argument conventions—the Taliban A Computer-Aided Rhetorical comment into the topic. tactic is more plausible, on the terms Analysis of U.S. Marine In the above Taliban example, the of Afghans, than the U.S.-style ISAF Corps Public Speech author(s) tactic does not rely on how tactic. The facts and figures of any given When U.S. Marine Corps general many ISAF members were killed but incident may not be all that important: officers speak on the record in public, rather on defining ISAF as anti-Islamic whether 2 or 20 ISAF members died they have a distinctive linguistic style invaders in the vein of the Crusades. The in the attack may be immaterial. What that communicates their stance: one of tactic is to covertly smuggle the claim of more likely matters in Afghan discourse— moral and knowledge certainty. They ISAF as “crusade invaders” into sentence the center of gravity here—is ISAF’s perform this style consistently, regard- topics, as if it were given information. definition as either a crusade invader or a less of how contested an issue is and However, instead of countering/an- legitimate defender of Islam. Taliban au- to whom they speak. This may be a ticipating such definitions, and perhaps thors such as those in the above example constraint on their ability to speak effec- proposing an alternate definition of ISAF clearly understand this principle; ISAF tively in civil-military deliberations. as defenders of the legitimate Islamic strategic communicators may not. This second case study is a domestic government of Afghanistan, ISAF offers In this sense, such Taliban propa- example using corpus analysis software only the factual details. The ISAF press ganda writers and ISAF are talking past to empirically describe large amounts of release for the same incident reads: “Two each other, at different segments of textual data. In this case, corpus analysis U.S. forces-Afghanistan service members argument. In rhetorical theory, these seg- software is used to quantify style: the died in eastern Afghanistan today when ments are stases, literally “sticking points” linguistic micro-choices we make in rep- an individual wearing an Afghan National in argument. The five major stases can resenting the world. Small but consistent Security Forces uniform turned a weapon be used to diagram speakers talking past choices in language aggregate to offer the on U.S. and Afghan forces.”5 each other (see table 1). audience a perspective on what is being
54 Commentary / Revisioning Strategic Communication JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 talked about. For example, a leader in an Figure. Marinetalk vs. FROWN English Corpus organization who uses “I” regularly ver- 25 sus “we,” or says “I know” rather than “I Marinetalk think,” is offering very different rhetorical FROWN experiences to his or her audience. When journalists consistently describe the object 20 of their reporting with phrases such as “tries to,” “makes an attempt to,” and “appears to be,” they are hedging—offer- 15 ing small but critical linguistic markers to their audience that they should not trust Consistent the surface presentation of the object. 10 Corpus analysis software designed to count these micro-style choices across a range of categories allows for statisti- 5 cal tests on the results in order to make empirical claims about what is happening in communication, and to make visible 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 trends and differences that an analyst could not see because of human limits to Inconsistent memory and attention.7 In this sense, cor- pus analysis software acts like a prosthetic Table 2 illustrates some of the relevant rhetorical experience to others through for human communication analysts, and characteristic style features of Marinetalk linguistic choices as they speak. In this can both empirically support or disprove when compared to general English, case, Marines use lexical and gram- human qualitative impressions and bring with example word strings. Essentially, matical choices to sound certain, speak a bird’s-eye view to the kind of data we Marinetalk sounds like a highly confi- from experience, and create a “we” in usually use human reading to analyze, but dent/certain person telling others about a shared future.10 The certainty that in mass quantities no human could ever a shared future, invoking positive reasons marks Marinetalk puts Marines on a address. Through the following domestic why they should buy into it. This will superior footing as duty experts on communication case, I want to show how likely not surprise anyone who has been military subjects. This works well most an empirically grounded discourse analysis a Marine or has worked with the Service. of the time—in uncontested issues, the method can help speakers from one group What does seem surprising, and needs Marine senior officer speech analyzed in (in this case, senior Marine Corps officers) explanation, is the consistency of this way this study received collegial questioning, be more self-aware in their communica- of talking. thanks, and praise. tions with another group (civilians) and The rhetorical profile detailed above But in contested issues such as end- thus be more effective. makes sense given the mission and struc- ing “Don’t Ask/Don’t Tell” (DADT), Figure 1 is a graphical representation ture of the Marine Corps. The institution Marine speakers received a much more of how distinctive Marine Corps public needs to motivate large groups of people challenging reception, including cross- speech is—a style I call Marinetalk. This to coordinate their actions to arrive at examination, critiques, and counters to is the speech of Marine senior officers desired endstates/places. Marinetalk their claims. Given the contested subject speaking in 2010 referenced against gen- reflects institutional needs to speak with and the opposition of audience mem- eral contemporary English, which shows certainty (which includes subjective bers, Marinetalk seems to function as a a tight, distinctive cluster.8 register speech from personal authority constraint on Marines’ testimony before The terms Consistent and Inconsistent and confidence, and directive insistence), Congress. How Marines spoke is not the on the Y and X axes refer to how consis- argue constructively for future goals, only issue, of course. The content of the tently present, and thus characteristic, a index positive values both as means and argument and political positions of other given stylistic feature is relative to general end, and promote cohesion with posi- participants are relevant as well. However, English. The graph uses a nonparametric tive/inclusive values. this only highlights the choice not to vary statistical test that allows two data sets to The consistent style Marine general speech by situation and context—talk- be compared for the regularity of distri- officers use indexes their attitudinal ing to a civilian audience as if they were bution of features.9 Thus, the farther up stances toward their audience and topic, a Marine audience on important and and to the left a data point is, the more how sure they are, and so forth. This is contentious issues such as ending DADT strongly the text aligns with Marinetalk, something that emerges cumulatively in does not make sense. while data points lower and to the right talk, not through any specific, discrete Just as in the ISAF example, Marine are the least like Marine public speech. element; their style offers a particular senior officers tend to repeat the most
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Marcellino 55 Table 2. Sample Lexical Items/Strings for Marinetalk Speech Features Language Category Relatively Consistent Relatively Inconsistent Subjective Register First person: “my,” “I” Private thinking: “realize,” “believe that” Self-disclosure: “I thought” Subjective time: “their time” Autobiography: “when I” Subjective perception: “personal,” “view with” Intensity: “every single” Uncertain: “guess,” “about [#]” Immediacy: “right now” Confident: “certainly” Emotion Positivity: “the best,” “comfortable with” Negative emotion: “the problem with,” “stress,” “suicide” Institutional Register Commonplace authority: “coalition,” “forces” Innovation: “breakthrough in” Responsibilities: “obligations” Negative values: “violence,” “not be able” Positive values: “adequate capability,” “gains” Future Projecting ahead: “in training,” “in readiness” Predicting the future: “will,” “will be” Past Projecting back: “we’ve been,” “year ago” Personal Relations Inclusiveness: “our,” “partner with”
Reasoning Reason backward: “because” Reason forward: “So we,” “so that” Resistance: “defend,” “impose” Support: “in support of” Concessive: “although” Directives Insist: “the need for” Imperatives: “Do not,” “remember” Character Personal pronouns: “she,” “he” fundamental structural patterns of their in argument. In Arabic discourse, repeti- Arabic and English discourse conventions discourse. These Marines are smart tion operates at the level of both content and argument strategies. The author(s) of people and are no doubt aware of many and structure. To be persuasive in argu- those messages knew not only to translate surface features of language they need to ment, Arabic speakers might repeat their into the right languages but also to adopt vary by audience—not using acronyms point over and over again (content), matching discursive strategies. or insider technical terms is an obvious but they might also do so rhythmically, Turn the Culture and Language one. Borrowing from discourse analysis repeating parallel sentences or phrasing Lens on Ourselves. Critical analysis of and methods such as corpus analysis and (structure). This conflicts with Western, how others in the world speak and live computer-aided rhetorical analysis could particularly American, ideas of sincerity, is essential to U.S. operations overseas, add high-precision visibility over their which rely in part on brevity and the con- from the tactical to the strategic levels of stylistic choices, strongly leveraging their struction of a trustworthy ethos of virtue. war. The Services recognize this and have ability to communicate effectively with Our enemies understand this; con- their own iterations of culturally/linguis- civilian audiences. sider the English and Arabic suicide tically grounded education and training message videos of Hammam Khalid (for example, the Army Culture and Implications and Al-Balawi, responsible for the 2009 Foreign Language Management Office Recommendations bombing of Forward Operating Base and Marine Corps Center for Advanced Borrowing from these language-focused Chapman in Afghanistan. Both have Operational Culture Learning). This is disciplines has important implications roughly the same content, but their good; however, we need to understand at multiple levels for both policymakers discursive strategies differ greatly. The our own culture and the cultural aspects and commanders. Some possible direc- Arabic version relies heavily on rhythm of our own language just as much as we tions include the following. and repetition, an appropriate argument need to understand the language and Incorporate Discursive Strategies to strategy for an Arabic speaking audience. culture of our partners and enemies. Language Translations. Translation into By contrast, in the English version the Cultivating a self-aware and reflective another language is not enough by itself; author(s) establish the moral virtue of posture in which we habitually inter- it is very possible to speak another lan- the bomber through ethos proofs in a rogate our own discursive and rhetorical guage while repeating our own culture’s prelude (or proemion), a standard feature practices would put us in position to use discursive strategies. The sincerity and of Western rhetoric. The Arabic version such insights skillfully when we talk to trustworthiness issue mentioned earlier is also features plural pronouns exclusively, the world. a good example. In Arabic discourse, rep- while the English version includes sec- Draw and Adapt from Language- etition is an incredibly important proof of tions with singular pronouns, again Focused Disciplines. There is an existing sincerity and a principle linguistic strategy reflecting microlevel understanding of body of theory, research, and methods
56 Commentary / Revisioning Strategic Communication JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 require expertise in cultural knowledge. from discourse analysis and rhetorical Notes studies that DOD can leverage. To adapt Language is just as fundamental to this mature field to a novel application, human behavior as culture is, and tapping 1 Dennis M. Murphy, “The Trouble with the Services and DOD will need to the human capital of professionals in this Strategic Communication(s),” Army War Col- operationalize a scholarly body of study. area can be a powerful tool for informing lege Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper This is something the U.S. defense estab- strategic communication. 2-08, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2008; Christopher Paul, “‘Strategic Communication’ Is Vague: lishment has experience doing, and it is Make Combatant Commands the Say What You Mean,” Joint Force Quarterly 56 well positioned to develop relevant part- Point of Insertion. As the entities best (1st Quarter 2010), 10; Patrik Steiger, “Virtu- nerships with academia. This could follow situated regionally to communicate in ous Influence: An Imperative to Solve U.S. three lines of effort. audience-appropriate ways and because Strategic Communication Quandary,” Army Adapt concepts and methods. Strategic of their functional needs, combatant War College Center for Strategic Leadership, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 24, 2011. communication can benefit from em- commands are the logical point of 2 James G. Stavridis, “Strategic Commu- pirically derived concepts for thinking insertion for revisioned strategic com- nication and National Security,” Joint Force through roles in communication, issues munication. We can envision empirical Quarterly 46 (3rd Quarter 2007), 4. of identity and relatedness in commu- data collection and both quantitative and 3 Steve Tatham, U.S. Governmental Infor- nication, problems in argument, and so qualitative analyses to establish baselines mation Operations and Strategic Communica- tions: A Discredited Tool or User Failure? Impli- on. The argument stases analysis in the and variances for regional responses and cations for Future Conflict (Carlisle Barracks, Taliban messaging case study is a good interpretations of combatant command PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2013). example of a conceptual starting place messaging. This in turn could provide in- 4 “Afghanistan in the Month of March for thinking through ends and means valuable data-driven and timely feedback 2013,” Ansar Al-Mujahideen, April 19, 2013, in persuasion. There is also a significant and insight for improved communication accessed at
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Marcellino 57 Master Sergeant Charlie Sanders (left) and Captain Lashon Bush work on Mission Event Synchronization List in Joint Cyber Control Center during Operation Deuce Lightning, Grafenwoehr, Germany, February 2011 (U.S. Army/Lawrence Torres III)
A Theater-Level Perspective on Cyber
By J. Marcus Hicks
Gentlemen, the officer who doesn’t know his communications and supply as well as his tactics is totally useless.
—General George S. Patton
ost U.S. military cyber pro- however, most cyber discussions focus include cyber espionage intrusions, fessionals will tell you that on sophisticated computer hackers industrial-scale intellectual property M “defense is the main effort” conducting exploitation (espionage) theft, and denial-of-service attacks that and that providing secure and reliable or attack (sabotage) operations. The cost millions of dollars and naturally communication is job one. In practice, reasons for this seeming contradiction capture headlines and the imagination. Likewise, the potential for cyber attacks to disrupt infrastructure with kinetic- Major General J. Marcus Hicks, USAF, is Director of Operations, Headquarters Air Force Special like consequences provides fodder for Operations Command. books and articles that bridge reality
58 Commentary / A Theater-Level Perspective on Cyber JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 and science fiction, empowering arm- communicator I became. If we add to capability. Cutting manpower to operate chair theorists to contemplate a new this portfolio the need to coordinate with military networks consistent with lean and different type of war and warrior. allies, partners, and emerging partners, corporate models may work in peacetime, Still, the military’s main effort must then cyber looks like an increasingly but it may not leave sufficient personnel be to provide, operate, and defend operational and inherently coalition expertise in the right places to operate the ability to command and control activity. A few of my observations may be and defend networks in a contested (C2) forces. If we fail at this task, the controversial, but most will be common environment. commander’s mission will likewise knowledge to communicators and cyber I generally agree with the conven- fail. Effective command, control, com- professionals. My target audience is the tional wisdom that separates traditional munications, and computer systems operational community because I believe information operations and electronic define the modern American way of war. that command, control, communications, warfare (EW) from the cyber enterprise. This requires highly technical systems, and cyber are a commander’s business. Cyber may enable information opera- consuming large amounts of bandwidth First, I have developed an expansive tions, but its discipline exists apart from to support the intelligence, surveillance, view of cyber, seeing no meaningful dif- the technology-centric cyber realm. and reconnaissance mission requirements ference between information technology Electronic warfare, however, is a more that feed the C2 system. Our high-tech (IT) and cyber. Virtually everything is difficult question because it straddles advantage enables and arguably defines in—from the core of traditional com- the cyber fence. One could argue that much of the conventional overmatch munications and signals intelligence anything involving RF spectrum man- currently enjoyed by the U.S. military disciplines to command and control agement or controlled by computer and its allies. Our operational concepts programs of record. Radio frequency processes with any external interface assume levels of situational awareness and (RF) spectrum management, telephony, should be considered part of the cyber the ability to control forces with a level of crypto-management, security policy for domain. Accordingly, EW could be part precision unimagined a generation ago. information-sharing, and intelligence of the cyber enterprise, and I suspect it To maintain that advantage, I too agree support to signals intelligence are all will migrate in that direction. that defense is the main effort and that cyber or cyber-related activities. The cur- Second, cyber is an increasingly we must keep it the main effort. rent Department of Defense definition operational activity. The American way In this article, I offer a theater-level of cyberspace is “a global domain within of war heavily relies on cyber capability. perspective of cyber and hope to provide the information environment consist- Furthermore, given the increasingly con- a view of what is in, what is out, how ing of the interdependent networks of tested cyberspace domain, it follows that we are doing, where the thorny issues information technology infrastructures cyber capability must represent a substan- lie, and finally, some thoughts on a way and resident data, including the Internet, tial focus for the military. The military ahead. This is not a new discussion, and telecommunications networks, computer recognized this initially in standing up I do not have all the answers, but I do systems, and embedded processors and the Joint Task Force Global Network have a unique perspective. From 2011 controllers.”1 Consistent with this defini- Operations and, more recently, U.S. to 2013, I served as the U.S. Pacific tion, even administrative systems used Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). Command (USPACOM) J6 as well as to process sensitive information, support Still, much of the cyber overmatch the director of the USPACOM Joint decisionmaking, or transmit decisions can we currently enjoy developed from Cyber Center (JCC). My responsibilities be part of the C2 process even though long periods of operations in Iraq and included the cyber portfolio for over half they are not a recognized program of Afghanistan, against technologically un- the world, ranging from traditional J6 record. Cyber capabilities are essentially sophisticated adversaries, which provided command, control, communications, a high-tech, high-speed successor to a virtual sanctuary for our own capabili- and computer systems to the emergent written communications, maps, and ties. As we withdraw from Afghanistan, mission of offensive cyber operations. calculations, providing intelligence and worry about Iran, and rebalance toward As a career Air Force Special Operations C2 capability. Like dispatches carried by the Pacific, we have a renewed and pilot, I came to the cyber discussion with riders on horseback a thousand years ago increased emphasis on developing and few preconceived notions or paradigms or conveyed by the telegraph a hundred maintaining our ability to operate in con- to shatter. years ago, cyber is subject to the vulner- tested and denied environments against Managing the J6 portfolio, I was abilities of intercept, exploitation, and technologically sophisticated adversaries. impressed with how strongly planning, disruption. The Great Game has entered Recognizing that potential adversaries architecture, and engineering efforts the computer age. pose threats to our intelligence, logistics, (provisioning) inform resilience and de- Thus, I find it counterproductive to and C2 functions, commanders and the fensibility (operate and defend) and even seek cuts in IT while investing in cyber operational community are realizing offensive considerations (exploitation capability. I do support seeking efficien- that we must treat cyber more like an and attack). The reverse is also true. The cies in IT, cyber, or any other endeavor, operational activity and less like an ad- more I learned about cyber, the better but not at the expense of operational ministrative support function. This makes
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Hicks 59 sense since the C2 system is effectively a global and regional element. We rec- J6 personnel. More importantly, the JCC the commander’s primary weapons ognize that the domain is too large and integrates directly into the theater com- system. Thus, the capabilities provided activities too complex to be centrally mander’s decision cycle through battle by cyber are operational imperatives and managed by a single operations center. rhythm events, thus retaining cyber deci- truly a commander’s business. At the same time, however, the physical sions at the theater commander level and Third, cyber is inherently a coali- characteristics of the global information avoiding bifurcating C2 by outsourcing tion activity. Whether the mission is grid (GIG) do not lend themselves to critical C2 functions to a separate compo- humanitarian assistance and disaster relief purely regional control. Thus, we need nent. Thus, the USPACOM Joint Cyber or combat operations, the United States to strike the right balance between global Center operates with some characteristics rarely goes it alone. We maintain treaty and regional equities. From my perspec- of a separate component, but one more alliances across the globe, continually tive, we should err on the side of giving efficient and closer to the theater com- seek to improve relations with existing geographic combatant commanders more mander. Many constructs could work, partner nations, and expand partnerships capability and authority to plan to create and I do not favor a one-size-fits-all ap- with others. We aim to improve collec- cyber effects as well as command and proach or a centrally directed solution. tive security and reduce the possibility of control their command and control, or as We will need to experiment and evolve miscalculation where tensions exist by le- Admiral Robert F. Willard often stated, as conditions dictate. Availability of re- veraging coalitions and their capabilities. their C2 of C2. sources, more than any other condition, These activities require varying degrees Fifth, because cyber has become so will suggest the best organizational con- of information-sharing with substantial critical to the American way of war, I see struct. Combatant commands with fewer policy and technical implications. real value in having a single organization cyber resources will organize differently Like other geographic combatant within a combatant command manage than those with more assigned cyber commands, USPACOM engages with the entire cyber portfolio. In particular, forces. Similarly, subunified commands more than 20 allied, partner, and emerg- I value the current Joint Cyber Center and component commands may organize ing partner states across the Pacific to (JCC) construct that combines all cyber differently from their combatant com- evolve and improve communications activities from across the command staff. mand as circumstances dictate. interoperability through activities such In the legacy construct, the J6 man- as RF spectrum management, security ages the “provide, operate, and defend” How Are We Doing? policy agreements, tactical data-link coor- portfolio; the J2 works exploitation From the “provide, operate, and dination, and crypto-management. These through intelligence channels; and the defend” side, cyber has rapidly evolved activities are as far from hacking as pos- J39 supervises the cyber attack mission from Service-provided administrative sible, but they provide the foundational under the information operations rubric. IT systems with some connection to elements of cyber and are critical to the Some other variant could work, but my dedicated C2 systems to become critical main effort. experience suggests that operationally warfighting systems for the joint force. Foundational cyber activities directly minded individuals viewing challenges Unsurprisingly, the pace of change has address the combatant commander’s through a cyber lens would develop left suboptimal legacy infrastructure priorities of strengthening relationships more holistic and innovative solutions in place that renders it more difficult with allies and partners and building than could be achieved by individuals to operate and defend. Concurrently, partnership capacity. The cyber security from organizations that support cyber cost savings measures have centralized instruction we offer during bilateral and as a collateral duty. Simply put, because operations and stripped system admin- multilateral engagements consists primar- cyber is its primary focus and singular istrators—read “cyber operators”—to ily of best practices from the disciplines mission, the JCC can focus more energy levels more in line with corporate IT of information assurance and computer into this critical and dynamic domain. In structures than operational C2 systems. network defense. These offerings are other constructs, cyber could be rendered Similarly, outsourced contracts main- increasingly popular and have served not a secondary focus in organizations with tain Service-level agreements that are only as catalysts for relationship-building competing domain demands, such as the optimized more for routine, peacetime but also as necessary preconditions for J2 or J3. operations than for exercises or contin- the development of secure, trusted, and The objective of a JCC, with the gencies. Taken together, it is easy to see reliable information-sharing capabilities. entire cyber portfolio, is to develop an how over-centralization of operations If we hope to operate successfully with al- operationally focused tool for the com- centers and minimal manning could lies and coalition partners, we must invest mander in partnership with the rest of lead to capacity overload with anything in relationships and cyber capabilities the J-staff. Advantages include inherent other than a routine disruption, which with integral mission partner capability. efficiencies of remaining within an exist- might be an acceptable level of risk if Fourth, cyberspace has a global ing staff organization for administrative the networks were purely administra- and regional component. Like other overhead, which also allows for dual- tive. Since, however, we have built a traditional military activities, cyber has hatting of certain low-density JCC and concept of operations that relies heavily
60 Commentary / A Theater-Level Perspective on Cyber JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Secretary Hagel tells troops cyber may be biggest threat to U.S. security (DOD/Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo) on our overmatch in C2 capabilities, By way of analogy, every Air Force addressing emergencies. This is pretty those capabilities must be operated and aircraft I have flown comes with techni- standard for operational weapons sys- defended as a weapons system. cal orders (TOs) on maintaining and tems. Similar analogs exist on ships, in Operationally responsive networks operating them. For example, the TO missile silos, and more. do not rely heavily on compliance-based AC-130U-1, known as the “dash one,” Unfortunately, this analog breaks security measures. Centrally mandated is a massive volume of procedures for down for network operations. Technical security policies enforced across the operating the AC-130 gunship. Like in specifications normally exist and system enterprise through a rigorous inspec- all dash ones, chapter three is dedicated administrators are often highly skilled, tion regime are necessary and show to abnormal and emergency procedures but networks are not treated as weapons progress toward treating cyber as an and includes certain emergency proce- systems. The vendor providing a network operational domain. However, the ability dures (EPs) deemed sufficiently critical does not provide a dash one or even to dynamically adjust security policies, to commit to memory, verbatim. These anticipated failure modes that would nor- to sense—rather than inspect for—com- “boldface EPs” cover time-sensitive, mally constitute “chapter three.” Thus, pliance, and to isolate compromised life-threatening eventualities, such as networks that are not treated as weapons portions of the GIG before a risk to one engine fires and loss of cabin pressure. systems lack boldface EPs and deliberate becomes a risk to all is critical to ensuring Before flying an aircraft, fully qualified processes for training to operate when secure and resilient operational capability. pilots must first study normal and emer- under attack or degraded due to a natural My experience through exercises and con- gency procedures, demonstrate unerring disaster. Those networks are not easily tingencies unambiguously suggests that understanding and recall of boldface severable to isolate damage or infected we must develop a concept of operations, procedures, and train for their practical enclaves. Nor are they capable of provid- capability, and capacity to defend, recover, implementation in high-fidelity simula- ing enhanced security for the most critical and reconstitute our cyber capability in tors. Much routine training is dedicated systems or information. At USPACOM, the face of a contested environment. to operating with degraded systems and we have demonstrated time and again
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Hicks 61 Admiral Michael Rogers addresses audience and workforces of U.S. Cyber Command, National Security Agency, and Central Security Service at his assumption of command ceremony, April 2014 (National Security Agency) that the implementation of responsive risk across the areas and operations for an operational focus for traditional network security measures is ponderous which they are responsible. supporting functions. Reminiscent of and inexact due to complex C2 arrange- the early days of carrier aviation, cross- ments, insufficient manning at major A Way Ahead decking traditional operators to provide a operations centers, a dearth of network Although the current state of cyber may cadre of senior officers to advance a new instrumentation, or an inability to take seem less than ideal, there is reason for concept is a sound and proven technique. action at a regional location due to exces- optimism. Much has been done already Creating operationally minded cyber sive centralization. to set conditions for success in the cyber operators from the beginning of their We have built in these foundational domain. Additional resourcing and careers will be necessary for the long term problems by making our C2 system reli- the standup of USCYBERCOM and and constitutes the real test. ant on economically efficient networks combatant command JCCs are the most As the Services struggle with this originally deployed by the Services as obvious examples. Ongoing discussions effort, aviation provides another useful administrative tools. Additionally, we about workforce development and the analog. Like aviation, cyber requires have centralized network operations and Joint Information Environment (JIE) many disciplines and training standards reduced manning to such an extent that give further reason for hope. Still, as we across a multitude of mission areas to only routine technical problems are easily set the framework for future cyber capa- function properly. Therefore, just as manageable. Service-level agreements bilities, getting it right is critical, and the aviation community is made up of with contractors are not responsive to the time to act is now. pilots, maintainers, air traffic controllers, operational requirements in exercises and Developing an operationally minded weather specialists, airfield managers, contingencies. Centralization by defini- cyber workforce is a critical requirement. engineers, and more, we should embrace tion reduces regional capability. Excessive Born of the communications and intel- the notion that many different career centralization leaves combatant com- ligence disciplines, the cyber community fields will make up the cyber enterprise. manders little or no capability to manage has leveraged career operators to provide Network operations personnel should
62 Commentary / A Theater-Level Perspective on Cyber JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 have different training and follow a a healthy emphasis on cost savings. The The exquisite command and control different path than those trained in ex- JIE aim, however, is to improve informa- capability cyber provides represents a ploitation or attack missions. Like pilots tion capability and network defensibility foundational aspect of current U.S. of different aircraft performing different through network normalization, a single military capability. Since cyber and IT missions, cyber operators will have differ- security architecture, and reduced infra- are indivisible, we must take a holistic ent specialties at the tactical level. Most structure where consolidation and other approach to cyber. As the domain be- officers, however, should broaden across best practices make sense. comes increasingly contested, we need other specialties as they progress through Given the criticality of cyber to coali- to operationalize cyber, and we fail to do their careers in preparation for leadership tion effectiveness and interoperability, we so at our own peril. To do so, traditional of larger, more diverse organizations. require the inclusion of coalition capabil- operators should become more aware Said differently, we do not have to ity into the next JIE stage. Leveraging of and well versed in cyber, and cyber recruit and train every cyber professional commercial solutions for classified net- operators must become more operation- to the same standard. We can recruit a works, we envision rapidly establishing a ally minded. We have an opportunity to variety of talents and use them appropri- specific network enclave for a particular develop the next generation of opera- ately without trying to train everyone as a exercise or event that coalition partners tionally minded cyber warriors who will hacker. The challenge lies in ensuring that can join and use to share classified underwrite the American way of war all career paths remain competitive for information releasable to the coalition and create effects currently unobtain- leadership opportunities at all levels, lest members. When no longer required, the able. Necessarily, our next-generation we create a class system with all its nega- network enclave could be easily disestab- warfighting network must be a weapons tive connotations. lished. This kind of flexibility could prove system for the next-generation war, not Like pilots, all cyber operators will valuable across the operational spectrum an administrative network for the inter- need a basic knowledge and skill set. Also, from small-scale missions to large coali- war peace. Ultimately, cyber should be they will need advanced knowledge and tion operations. to the 21st-century military professional skill in their particular tracks. Here, the The same technology, currently what logistics was to their 19th- and track seems to split between defense and undergoing advanced testing, would 20th-century counterparts: the discourse offense, between those with the “provide, also provide increased cyber situational of professionals and the business of com- operate, and defend” mission and those awareness and defensibility. The design manders. JFQ on-net operators with the “exploit and at- specifically allows for protection of cer- tack” mission. I recommend that we send tain enclaves or communities of interest. quality individuals to both tracks because Thus, critical data will be more resilient Note I am not convinced one is inherently and secure than the overall network, fur- 1 more difficult than the other. This is par- ther improving cyber security through a Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated ticularly true if we operate and defend the defense-in-depth approach. Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, July networks as a weapons system, especially Vast distances and the maritime na- 16, 2013). in a contested environment. Additionally, ture of the Pacific theater dictate a data since defense must remain the main ef- center consolidation plan consistent with fort, we cannot let it become viewed as a a potentially disconnected, intermittently second-class activity. connected, low-bandwidth environment. Along with personnel, we need to In anticipation of natural disasters or con- field the best equipment we can afford to tingencies, redundant and dispersed data avoid taking a proverbial cyber knife to a centers across the area of responsibility cyber gunfight. Fortunately, a solution is are crucial. in our grasp as long as we focus on opera- Finally, the operating concept for the tional capability and not IT efficiencies. JIE must provide geographic combatant Developing an operationally re- commanders sufficient capability and au- sponsive infrastructure is a critical thority to manage risk to their command requirement. Deployment of the JIE can and control while a global enterprise op- solve most of our cyber material shortfalls erations center manages risk to the global so long as the focus remains on ensur- information grid. Consistent with other ing that the next generation of military traditional military activities, disputes networks provides defensible warfighting between geographic and global priorities capability to commanders. The effort would be arbitrated by the Secretary of originated as “IT Efficiencies” and Defense as the first common boss in the morphed into “IT Effectiveness” before chain of command. becoming the JIE, so there will always be
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Hicks 63 MH-60S Seahawk helicopter assigned to “Swamp Foxes” of Maritime Helicopter Combat Squadron 74 departs USS Mason during U.S.-China cross-deck landing exercise with People’s Liberation Army Navy destroyer Harbin (U.S. Navy/Rob Aylward)
Refocusing the U.S. Strategic Security Perspective
By Linnea Y. Duvall and Evan O. Renfro
ince the early days of Cold War escalation, the United States has applied rights, maritime borders, and cyber- rivalry between the United States deterrence haphazardly in its relationship space rather than establishing consistent S and Soviet Union, policymak- with China. Yet U.S. policymakers have mechanisms to reduce tension and ers have recognized that low-intensity failed to identify an alternative approach prevent escalation. Some analysts, such conflict and limited wars often occur for chronic disputes that are not readily as Richard K. Betts, see only two stark in spite of deterrence—that is, using shaped by military posturing. This choices to address this dilemma: “accept the threat of military force or coercion deficiency is overlooked at the expense China’s full claims as a superpower when to change an adversary’s behavior. of muddling through commonplace it becomes one or draw clear redlines Because of this shortcoming and risk of confrontations with China over fishing before a crisis comes.”1 However, we do not need to limit our options to deter- rence or acceptance. Rather, we should complement deterrence with a more Linnea Y. Duvall is a Sasakawa Peace Foundation Non-Resident Fellow with Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies. Evan O. Renfro is an Instructor in the Department of Political flexible, strategic framework focused on Science at the University of Northern Iowa. conflict management.
64 Features / Refocusing the U.S. Strategic Security Perspective JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 While deterrence has been an essential situational awareness, bilateral com- through a limited war. Yet the incident in component of its military strategy, the munication, and law enforcement while the Gulf of Tonkin was a sideshow to the United States requires the addition of a mitigating the risk of escalation and real conflict occurring within Vietnam conflict management framework to ad- miscalculation. between an illegitimate government and dress China’s violations of international an ideological insurgency. While a deter- norms that underpin regional stability. How to Start Worrying rence strategy kept the United States China has demonstrated its assertiveness and Loathe the Bomb focused on adversaries outside Vietnam, by taking control of the Scarborough U.S. policymakers recognized the a conflict management approach would Reef in the South China Sea, entering limitations of deterrence early in the have emphasized preventing the spread of Japan’s airspace over the Senkaku Islands Cold War. Even as Washington and the discontent within Vietnam that was (called the Diaoyu Islands by China), Moscow assembled massive stockpiles of undermining the country’s stability. Such and infiltrating U.S. military and public nuclear and conventional weapons that a view would have prioritized minimizing cyber networks. This unlawful behavior prohibitively raised the cost of war, they the negative fallout of Tonkin by focus- is likely to continue in the absence of a also competed for influence in proxy ing on the political and domestic context coercive response from the United States conflicts across the globe. Deterrence beforehand and allowing for a propor- or its allies. But the United States, and to theorist B.H. Liddell Hart warned in tionate political and military response a lesser extent Japan, have little appetite 1954 that the threat of nuclear war afterward. to escalate such nonviolent disputes into reduced the likelihood for direct aggres- This is not to say that Cold War open military or diplomatic crises. An ef- sion but simultaneously increased the leaders failed to consider conflict fective strategic approach must therefore possibility of limited, peripheral conflict. management. In crises that avoided mitigate the destabilizing impacts of As fictional character Dr. Strangelove hostile action, fear of escalation helped China’s behavior without militarizing the commented, the reason deterrence is the United States and Soviet Union disputes. not practical in such contexts “must develop bilateral conflict management The objective of conflict management be all too obvious” as it fails when mechanisms, albeit in an ad hoc manner. is to minimize the negative political, eco- threats are not “completely credible and A breakthrough in crisis management nomic, and military impacts of disputes convincing.” followed the Cuban Missile Crisis in and avoid escalation. Conflict is here To mitigate the limitations of strategic 1962 when Washington and Moscow defined as a dispute with the potential to deterrence during the Cold War, the established a “red phone” hotline for draw nations into war. A conflict often United States developed flexible response leadership consultations. The two su- escalates into a crisis, a critical decision options that prepared for military action perpowers also signed an agreement for point at which military action is im- across the spectrum of warfare. This ap- handling incidents at sea in 1972. Yet minent or limited to less than the 1,000 proach complemented and was used in conflict management never became a stra- deaths that normally define a war. In the conjunction with strategic deterrence. It tegic framework on par with deterrence case of the U.S.-China relationship, man- expanded the military options for limited or embedded as part of a multifaceted aging chronic conflict requires a greater war and therefore made deterrence more spectrum of response options. emphasis on local information and aware- credible at the lower end of the conflict ness, law enforcement, and coordinated spectrum. Yet while the flexible response Moving Up, Moving On political-military responses to crises. doctrine enabled more nuanced military Today, the United States addresses This approach is similar to preventative action, it was still at its core a means to disputes with China with a mindset diplomacy, but with the key distinction better deter the Soviet Union. It did not stuck in the Cold War. Washington that conflict management implies a reso- require policymakers to develop a more continues to rely on deterrence and lution is not possible either under current sophisticated political and social under- flexible response options with too little conditions or in any reasonable amount standing of the conflicts they faced. appreciation for expanding its ad hoc of time. Mediation and negotiation over The Gulf of Tonkin incident illus- approach to minor, nonmilitarized specific claims are therefore less central to trates the risk involved with this strategic disputes and crises. Just as it developed conflict management than conflict resolu- framework. When North Vietnamese flexible response options to complement tion. This is not to say that resolution is vessels fired on U.S. Navy ships in 1964, strategic deterrence during the Cold not desirable: by reducing tension in the President Lyndon Johnson favored an War, the United States needs a coherent near term, conflict management leaves increase in the American presence in approach to conflict management to open the option for a more permanent South Vietnam to deter Soviet expansion- address incidents, such as cyber crime solution in the future. While deterrence ism. In this mindset, the U.S. security and incursions into sovereign territory, will continue to underpin the prevention architecture was limited in the courses that remain below its threshold for a of war, dealing with China’s nonmilitary of action it allowed itself: to respond military response. assertiveness requires a coherent conflict with nuclear weapons to deter Russia, This is especially clear in the South management framework to strengthen through the proxy of North Vietnam, or China Sea, where the drivers of China’s
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Duvall and Renfro 65 excessive sovereignty claims—includ- about the region’s ability to manage, which is by definition directed against ing access to fishing and hydrocarbon but not necessarily solve, disagreements. a specific adversary. By eliminating an resources as well as resurgent national It would also clarify that Washington’s implied adversary, conflict manage- pride—have increased in recent years. underlying interest is in stability, whether ment builds a more inclusive narrative Yet with each new incident, the United that involves the repeal of excessive consistent with the view that productive States seems taken aback, scrambling for claims. bilateral cooperation is possible despite an effective show of force but ultimately Like the State Department, the U.S. inevitable points of friction around failing to curb the illicit actions. This con- military is already conducting conflict China’s periphery. fusion arises in part because diplomatic management, but in ad hoc ways and Sovereignty disputes in the South and military officials have approached without the benefit of a clearly articulated China Sea and Senkaku Islands are the sovereignty disputes from opposite strategic framework. Many of these ac- not the only aspect of the U.S.-China directions: the Department of State has tions look like diplomacy: supporting relationship that would benefit from a focused on resolving the disputes while cooperative security mechanisms through conflict management framework. Cyber the Department of Defense talks in terms ASEAN, talking frankly to Chinese lead- security also falls within the category of of deterring adversaries, even as both re- ership in military-to-military dialogues, confrontations that deterrence is not sort to conflict management in practice. and encouraging U.S. allies to maintain designed to prevent. As Betts correctly The State Department has ap- a cool-headed response to aggression. A points out, retaliation in response to proached the disputes through a lens of conflict management framework would cyber attacks is rarely credible because conflict resolution, arguing that stronger connect these activities in an approach of the difficulty of identifying the perpe- international codes of behavior, military that is separate from, but complementary trator.4 Conflict management, with its posturing, and strategic dialogue will to, deterrence. emphasis on mitigating the consequences eventually convince China to abandon A clear framework would also help of recurring attacks, provides a more flex- its excessive maritime claims. Yet this ap- the military balance its priorities for ible perspective. Such a framework would proach overlooks the intractability of the conflict management and deterrence, encourage open communication, publicly disputes, causing diplomats to scramble particularly as resources are reduced. revealing perpetrators rather than fighting for ad hoc responses as each new in- Guidance published in Sustaining U.S. back, demonstrating one’s own commit- cident occurs. A dialogue focused on Global Leadership in 2012 stated that ment to cyber norms, and galvanizing resolution also misses the point that U.S. the U.S. military would “continue to multilateral support for enforcing those interests primarily lie in staying out of promote a rules-based international order norms. This approach is broad enough to the conflicts, not in solving them. While that ensures underlying stability and en- address the myriad cyber criminals who Washington stands willing to back its al- courages the peaceful rise of new powers, attack government and private-sector lies in the event of an armed attack, it has economic dynamism, and constructive systems, while also being more agile than been equally clear that it does not take defense cooperation.”2 However, the pri- an adversary-focused deterrence strategic sides in the South China Sea sovereignty ority missions articulated in the guidance framework that risks escalation through disputes. include deterring adversary aggression retribution. U.S. efforts to shape China’s behav- and countering adversary antiaccess capa- While its flexibility is ideal for multi- ior without getting drawn into specific bilities, while military efforts to “provide party disputes, conflict management also disputes have led diplomats to pursue a stabilizing presence”3 are to be carefully has a role in cases where there is a clear conflict management without clearly ad- examined in light of shrinking budgets. adversarial relationship. The stalemate mitting they are doing so. For example, Differentiating the military’s conflict with China over Taiwan illustrates the the United States has been supportive management activities from deterrence potential benefits of conflict management of a robust and enforceable Code of would help to bring it in line with the when an effective military deterrent is in Conduct on the South China Sea. Such diplomatic discourse by addressing the place. Since rapprochement with China a document could significantly reduce behavior of all parties in the dispute. In in the 1970s, Washington has politically tensions and inspire joint development the South China Sea, nearly all parties prioritized conflict management in the of disputed waters. While China’s resis- have made excessive maritime claims and Taiwan issue, warning Taipei against tance and the need for consensus in the engaged in provocations. As the United independence and acknowledging that Association of Southeast Asian Nations States attempts to reduce tensions with- China has a claim to the island. At the (ASEAN) make it unlikely that a Code of out taking sides, it is more useful to think same time, the United States has main- Conduct would be an enforceable docu- in terms of managing a complex situa- tained a deterrent capability through its ment, it would at the least defuse tension tion than deterring a potential adversary. forward presence in the western Pacific. by establishing norms of behavior for all Establishing a discourse about conflict While various administrations have claimants. Describing this effort as an management would moderate the expec- waffled about whether deterrence or element of a conflict management frame- tations of allies and alter the “us versus conflict management is more effective, work would set realistic expectations them” dynamic inherent in deterrence, as demonstrated by regular changes in
66 Features / Refocusing the U.S. Strategic Security Perspective JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 U.S.-China combined visit, board, search, and seizure team, comprised of Sailors from USS Winston S. Churchill and Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy frigate Yi Yang, holds briefing aboard Winston S. Churchill during bilateral counterpiracy exercise (U.S. Navy/Aaron Chase) arms sales policies to Taiwan, it is the two Washington in 1962, the influence of Commander of U.S. Pacific Command approaches working in concert that has deterrence has dissipated, and with it Admiral Robert Willard pointed to “dif- provided the greatest stability. This two- the impetus for robust escalation con- ferences in philosophy regarding the pronged approach does not “undermine trols. China often refuses to commu- purpose of military-to-military relations Washington’s readiness for a crisis,” as nicate at moments of high tensions. It in which China emphasizes strategic dia- some argue.5 Rather, it mitigates the has not established a “red phone” with logue and the U.S. seeks comprehensive likelihood of a crisis while maintaining Japan and at times does not respond military contact from the strategic to tac- military readiness. to its crisis hotline with Washington. tical levels as a way to build confidence.”7 Beijing also actively works to undermine Optimists hope that gradual military Easier Said Than Done ASEAN unity on security issues, recog- modernization and experience as a world Conflict management makes sense for nizing that a united ASEAN can coun- power will help China recognize the two powerful countries that recognize terbalance its own interests. Michael importance of tactical military contact for the costs of war, but a critical shortcom- Swaine maintains that although China preventing crisis escalation. For example, ing of conflict management compared understands the dangers of miscalcula- it was reported on January 19, 2013, that to deterrence is that it requires both tion, it tends to view conflict in zero- a Chinese warship aimed its fire control countries to play along. While deter- sum terms and has a low threshold for radar at a Japanese military helicopter, rence qua mutually assured destruction the use of force, possibly to compensate an action that indicates either a careless forced a process of conflict management for its perception of relative weakness.6 radar operator or a precursor to lock- with the Soviet Union, it fails with Even in areas where it recognizes the ing on a gun or missile system. Greater China. As the likelihood of an exchange value of strategic dialogue, China has a military-to-military contact would help of intercontinental ballistic missiles different approach than the Soviet Union to normalize such accidents and clarify between Beijing and Washington today to its relationship with the United States. intentions. Yet China’s willingness to risk has decreased relative to Moscow and In testimony before Congress, former its relationship with the United States, in
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Duvall and Renfro 67 spite of, or perhaps because of, a strong the Philippines to send its claims to an are not suited to deterrence and address bilateral strategic dialogue, suggests that arbitration tribunal is also a success for them more as issues of law enforcement. China’s political maturity alone would conflict management. Even if China One important conflict management not lead to better conflict management. rejects the findings of the tribunal, the objective is strengthening partner nation Unilateral U.S. actions to limit the politi- Philippine effort represents a nonmilitary interoperability and combined exercises cal, economic, and military consequences approach to the problem. to reduce the political-military conse- of enduring disputes would be essential With a conflict management mindset, quences of incidents—an area in which for enduring what promises to be a rocky the Intelligence Community should the U.S. military has already made sig- road ahead. reassess its intelligence, surveillance, and nificant progress. The U.S. invitation to reconnaissance (ISR) in order to address China to join the Rim of the Pacific exer- If It’s Broke, Fix It issues before they escalate. While ISR cises in 2014, for example, contributes to To progress from a strategic framework supports both deterrence and conflict conflict management efforts and should based primarily on deterrence to one management, conflict management be prioritized accordingly. These activities that integrates requirements for conflict prioritizes political and social factors will be even more important (and should management, the United States should that influence disputes. Tracking fishing be expanded) as greater military activ- focus on three critical areas: altering the boats in the South China Sea may seem ity in disputed regions increases the risk definition of success for longstanding a low priority from the classical deter- of escalation. Indonesia, Vietnam, and disputes, refocusing U.S. objectives on rence perspective, but through the lens Singapore are investing in new subma- whole-of-government conflict man- of conflict management, its strategic rines, and defense spending is on the rise agement activities rather than flexible importance is made clear. Twenty-four across the region. China has also been response options, and encouraging a hours can make the difference in whether more visible since conducting a series of broader dialogue on security issues and Washington is involved in managing a naval exercises in the South China Sea their economic and political impacts. dispute or reacting to a crisis, and imag- in 2008. A primary mission for the U.S. Perhaps the most significant impact of ery of incidents helps clarify who is acting military in a period of fiscal austerity is adding a conflict management framework contrary to international norms and to ensure these new forces learn to work is that it establishes feasible metrics for galvanizes opinions against the aggres- and play together—and with the People’s success. Deterrence is notoriously dif- sor. As data are disseminated, the United Liberation Army Navy. A conflict man- ficult to assess. The failure of deterrence States should also improve coordination agement framework would prioritize to prevent war is readily apparent, but across the Intelligence Community and these value-added engagements. how does one know if a given absence with nongovernmental organizations. Differentiating deterrence and con- of conflict is caused by a given policy of Unlike strategic deterrence, the indica- flict management as two distinct efforts deterrence? Metrics for conflict manage- tions and warnings for escalation to crisis might generate cost savings by reorient- ment, however, could assess progress go beyond movements of military assets ing the military’s capability requirements. even if—or when—an incident occurs. and require a detailed understanding of Whereas a credible military deterrent Progress might include implementation the broader environment, with special includes rapidly deployable bombers, of crisis communication mechanisms, emphasis on both domestic and interna- aircraft carriers, and ballistic missiles, incident response procedures, and in- tional political relationships. China used paramilitary vessels and fish- stitutionalized consultations on issues In terms of military planning, a ing boats to gain control of Scarborough of concern. In addition, success would conflict management framework would Reef. A U.S. aircraft carrier in Subic Bay involve establishing realistic expectations restructure military peacetime objectives. is unlikely to dissuade these fishing ves- among parties, and identifying “off- Realistic objectives should acknowledge sels if its threat of force is not credible. ramps” rather than “redlines” to ensure the limitations of deterrence while focus- Deterrence still requires an assured con- incidents do not escalate to crises. An ing attention on preventing escalation ventional response, but at the lower end ideal endstate need not include conflict of inevitable incidents. The military of the conflict spectrum, destroyers could resolution. might come to view disagreements over be as effective as carrier strike groups at A few examples of moderate successes disputed islands in much the same way it demonstrating U.S. resolve to enforce in- are already available in the South China views natural disasters: as detrimental to ternational law, and F-16s are as obvious Sea. Brunei and Malaysia are jointly regional stability but addressed through as F-35s at flying by disputed territories developing their overlapping South consistent engagement and capacity- to show the flag. Only by clearly articulat- China Sea maritime claims, and several building that supports the work of ing distinct missions in support of conflict other parties have shown an interest in other governmental agencies. While the management can the military identify the multilateral exploration. This approach Department of Defense must maintain its right assets and partners to support non- provides robust conflict management primary objective of deterring adversary military confrontation. without solving the underlying sover- militaries, it should reorient its approach However, military activities in conflict eignty disagreement. The decision of to problems such as cyber security that management will always be only a small
68 Features / Refocusing the U.S. Strategic Security Perspective JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Pilots from the United States and other nations attend flight deck familiarization tour while onboard U.S. Navy Oliver Hazard Perry–class frigate USS Gary as part of Rim of the Pacific Exercise 2014 (Royal Australian Navy/Chantell Bianchi) part of the solution. China’s civil and in the South China Sea, but rather that This professional maritime law enforce- paramilitary aggression requires a civil nonmilitary agencies should be provided ment capability would make it more and paramilitary response. Therefore, with extensive new resources to do difficult for China to establish and hold more important than expanding the international engagements and capacity- its excessive claims. A greater local law military’s role in conflict manage- building missions with other partners. enforcement presence would also provide ment is expanding the ability of U.S. The Coast Guard, which primarily oper- a clearer distinction between military and law enforcement agencies to conduct ates domestically, has one-sixteenth of the nonmilitary confrontation compared to capacity-building abroad. The best U.S. Navy’s budget, at just under $10 billion, a naval vessel operating with law enforce- interlocutors to develop partner na- while NOAA has half that amount. If the ment authorities. tion capabilities to patrol their exclusive United States intends to build regional To ensure that partner nation military economic zones and manage intrusions capabilities to counter China’s nonmili- and law enforcement assets contribute to during the fishing season are the U.S. tary approach, Congress must ensure regional stability rather than undermine Coast Guard and National Oceanic and other agencies have the bandwidth to it, the United States must continue to Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), engage more internationally. As these support multilateral forums such as which leads scientific exploration and resources increase, it might be possible ASEAN and the annual China–Japan– fisheries management. Unfortunately, to create a joint task force, similar to U.S. Republic of Korea trilateral summit. their international reach and blue-water Pacific Command’s Joint Interagency These forums strengthen relationships resources are limited, so these organiza- Task Force–West for counternarcotics, among senior leaders, and when tensions tions must rely on military assets to and to establish truly cooperative ap- are high, they work as a venue for claim- support their engagement and conflict proaches to domestic maritime issues, ants to voice their frustration without management activities. including patrolling exclusive economic resorting to military coercion. During This does not mean that Coast Guard zones, managing fisheries, and support- periods of cooperation, the forums could ships should be patrolling the islands ing other law enforcement activities. promote agreements on joint resource
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Duvall and Renfro 69 development and establish procedures know a comrade in the classroom, coffee approaches to one that better leverages for post-incident investigations. Focusing shop, and pub. civil-military power and the best practices on institution-building by leveraging Such cultural changes needed for a of negotiation. Moving to such a strategic international governmental bodies would strategic reorientation are not as difficult framework would also allow resources of simultaneously ameliorate pathologies to execute as they may at first appear, time, money, and talent to be used more that spread political disagreements and and they could effectively be instituted effectively to manage the unavoidable, empower multilateral cooperation toward by congressional legislation. In 1986, while deterrence would be used to avoid conflict management. The extent to Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols the unthinkable. There is no reason why which China undermines these organi- Department of Defense Reorganization we should forget about deterrence, but it zations would highlight its disruptive Act, which ensures officers gain experi- should not continue to monopolize our behavior. While this is consistent with the ence in joint Service positions as a strategic thinking. The Cold War is long current U.S. approach, a conflict manage- prerequisite for promotion to senior over, and it is time to implement what ment framework would clarify the intent ranks. A similar action would cause a is already widely acknowledged but not and purpose of multilateral engagements, much broader inter-Service outlook by acted on. Ultimately, by reducing tension particularly for defense cooperation, be- mandating not only joint military Service and the risk of escalation in the near term, yond just reinforcing international norms. positions, but also experience working conflict management leaves open the pos- To develop these tools, a serious in other nonmilitary departments and sibility of a more permanent and secure dialogue about conflict management organizations entirely. This interagency solution in the future. JFQ requires experts from the fields of ne- development would operationalize gotiation, mediation, and arbitration, Joseph Nye’s concept of “smart power” while incorporating and expanding the and ensure that all elements of national Notes tools of preventative diplomacy. Unlike power are brought to bear on the intrac- 1 deterrence, this broader dialogue offers table disputes of the Asia-Pacific. Richard K. Betts, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs (March–April an opportunity to better address histori- 2013), 99. cal and cultural factors vis-à-vis the most It’s a Conflicted World after All 2 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priori- intractable problems in the region. Conflict is endemic and will continue ties for 21st Century Defense (Washington, DC: All of the above initiatives also to occur. It is fortunate that, in some Department of Defense, January 2012), 2, require that the security dialogue be ways, we live in a safer world than available at
70 Features / Refocusing the U.S. Strategic Security Perspective JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Soldier aims XM-25 weapon system, Aberdeen Test Center, Maryland (U.S. Army)
Nonlethal Weapons A Technological Gap or Misdefined Requirements?
By Ofer Fridman
he internal and international con- a crucial variable within the international this military quest; however, observers flicts that have taken place in the community in general and Western soci- point out that, to date, “few non-lethal T last few decades have significantly eties in particular.1 In this new political weapons incorporating new technolo- raised the issue of interacting with with reality, the military seeks new technolo- gies have actually been deployed on a civilian populations, a problem that has gies that have “greater precision, shorter large scale”3 and that “operational use been worsened by urbanization. In the duration, less lethality, and reduced of available non-lethal weapons by the last few decades of the 20th century, a collateral damage . . . [as these technolo- military has been limited.”4 Despite the universal respect for human life became gies] may provide more effective power reasonable demand for the employment than their larger and more destructive, of less lethal military technologies on but also more inexact and crude, prede- the battlefield, then, it seems that such 2 Ofer Fridman is a Ph.D. Candidate at the cessors.” Nonlethal weapons (NLW) technologies are still far from becoming University of Reading, United Kingdom. would seem to be the perfect answer for a reality.
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Fridman 71 German soldiers form crash line at riot control training on Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, October 2014 (U.S. Army/Lloyd Villanueva)
In 2009, the U.S. Government operationally useful NLW, this article ar- during Operation United Shield, the Accountability Office (GAO) reported gues that the main problem can be found effort where U.S. forces supported the that “the joint non-lethal weapons in misdefined requirements for nonlethal withdrawal of United Nations peacekeep- program has conducted more than 50 weapons that, in their turn, lead to incor- ers from Somalia. The process of the research and development efforts and rect characterization of technological gaps. institutionalization of NLW in DOD was spent at least $386 million since 1997, but led by a Non-Lethal Weapons Steering it has not developed any new weapon.”5 NLW in the U.S. Military Committee established in 1994 and was There are three possible explanations In the early 1990s, the American mili- promoted by groups such as the Council for this detrimental situation: ineffective tary was caught up in the theory of a on Foreign Relations. The process was management of the provided resources, revolution in military affairs, which finalized in 1996 with the establish- significant technological gaps that cannot consisted of the implementation of new ment of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons be filled within the framework of the exist- military technologies combined with Program (JNLWP). In July 1996, DOD ing funding, or an incorrect translation fundamental shifts in military doctrine Directive 3000.3, “Policy for Non-Lethal of the desired capabilities into the tech- and organization. Speculations about Weapons,” defined nonlethal weapons as nological requirements that define these new military technologies that have “[w]eapons that are explicitly designed gaps. In other words, the current situation revolutionary potential did not overlook and primarily employed so as to inca- with NLW has been caused by one of NLW; for example, a prominent think pacitate personnel or materiel, while the following: ineffective management tank held that “if U.S. forces were able minimizing fatalities, permanent injury by the Department of Defense (DOD), . . . to incapacitate or render ineffective to personnel, and undesired damage to insufficient resources, unbridgeable tech- enemy forces without destroying or property and the environment.”7 nological gaps, or the misdefinition of killing them, the U.S. conduct of war Since 1996, the JNLWP has had these gaps. While the GAO report points would be revolutionized.”6 five defined missions: identifying and at DOD’s ineffective management as DOD started to pay more coherent understanding current and projected the main reason for the inability to field attention to nonlethal weapons in 1995 operational requirements and capability
72 Features / Nonlethal Weapons JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Mongolian police officer operates X26 taser during nonlethal weapons training at Five Hills Training Area, Mongolia, August 2013 (U.S. Marine Corps/Ben Eberle)
gaps; identifying and developing tech- of whether these systems are necessary on of U.S. Interests (CMOSUSI); and U.S. nologies into operationally suitable and the current and future battlefield because Army Training and Doctrine Command effective less lethal solutions that are only the existence of such a necessity (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-66, Force cost-effective; facilitating the acquisition could justify efforts to improve the cur- Operating Capabilities (FOC). and fielding of less lethal capabilities; rent detrimental situation with NLW. The purpose of CCJO is to provide advancing awareness of policy and public general guidelines for future force devel- understanding through strategic com- Does the U.S. Military opment and describe the future operating munication and support for education Need NLW? environment. Its main concept, globally and training; and efficiently managing An understanding of the necessary integrated operations, defines how the resources and support.8 However, despite military capabilities requires a compre- joint force should prepare itself for the 18 years of activity and millions of dollars hensive analysis of current and future future security environment. Describing spent, most of the NLW that have been threats, possible adversaries, broad politi- one of the key elements of this concept, adopted by the military are commercial cal and military environments, and many the CCJO states: off-the-shelf systems produced for the law other noteworthy factors. In an attempt enforcement market (for example, Taser to answer the question of the relevance Future Joint Operations will be in- X26, Long-Range Acoustic Device, and of NLW on the modern battlefield, this creasingly discriminate to minimize FN 303 riot gun) rather than a product article analyzes three primary official unintended consequences. The increased of JNLWP research and development.9 documents that consider all required transparency of the future security environ- Moreover, the flagship of the JNLWP’s aspects and define current and future ment . . . heightens the need for force to activity and investment, the Active Denial military environments: the Joint Chiefs be used precisely when possible. . . . In the System, has never been used.10 of Staff’s Capstone Concept for Joint saturated information environment of Today it seems that the promised rev- Operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO); tomorrow, even minor lapses in conduct or olutionary change offered by NLW is still DOD Defense Science Board’s Chal- application of fires could seriously damage far out. This raises the obvious question lenges to Military Operations in Support the international reputation of the United
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Fridman 73 States. This reality places a premium on for nonlethal weapons, even in conjunction future operations, and consequently, there joint operations informed by values and with lethal weapons, to achieve a decisive is an obvious necessity to field operation- professionalism.11 outcome.14 ally useful NLW. While there are many different possible reasons that can explain In other words, while the CCJO calls The FOC describes the future security the current lack of such NLW (for exam- for increasing competence of the future environment as an increasingly complex ple, the GAO report mentioned above), joint force, it also states that undesired one that will include a vast spectrum of the following examination suggests that collateral damage would compromise operations, but it clearly states that nonle- the main cause is a failure to translate the U.S. activity and therefore has to be mini- thal actions will unquestionably be a part demand described above into appropriate mized. In addition to this statement in of future conflict. Moreover, it defines NLW policies and requirements. the CCJO, the Defense Science Board’s the ability to minimize noncombatant report, which focuses on challenges that fatalities and undesired damage as an op- Current Policies and the United States has to be prepared tion that has to be available to joint force Requirements for, clearly argues that “with respect to commanders. DOD Directive 3000.3E lists 10 differ- the human toll on innocent civilians, Thus, all three documents emphasize ent capabilities that NLW can provide the U.S. strategy is to reduce ‘collateral the need to minimize collateral damage to joint forces. According to the damage.’”12 and harm to innocents during future directive, NLW have the potential to Unlike the CCJO and CMOSUSI, military confrontations. The first two enhance the commander’s ability to: TRADOC’s FOC is a more specific docu- formulate this general requirement and ment that formulates force operation point toward the possible solution that (1) Deter, discourage, delay, or prevent capabilities desired for the U.S. Army in is inherent in higher professionalism, hostile and threatening actions; (2) Deny the short and long term. It analyzes the better intelligence, better targeting, and access to and move, disable, and suppress future security environment and describes precision weapons; the FOC translates individuals; (3) Stop, disable, divert, and specific military capabilities and require- this general requirement into feasible deny access to vehicles and vessels; (4) Adapt ments for future forces. Describing the capabilities that should be provided by and tailor escalation of force options to complex nature of future conflicts, the NLW. According to the FOC, nonlethal the operational environment; (5) Employ FOC states: weapons should enhance the capability of capabilities that temporarily incapacitate the joint force in accomplishing the fol- personnel and materiel while minimizing While the nature of war will remain a vio- lowing objectives: the likelihood of casualties and damage to lent clash of wills between states or armed critical infrastructure; (6) De-escalate situ- groups pursuing advantageous political (a) Discourage, delay, or prevent hostile ations to preclude lethal force; (7) Precisely ends, the conduct of future warfare will actions; (b) Limit escalation; (c) Take engage targets; (8) Enhance the effective- include combinations of conventional and military action in situations where the use ness and efficiency of lethal weapons; (9) unconventional, lethal and nonlethal, of lethal force is either not the preferred Capture or incapacitate high value targets; and military and nonmilitary actions option, or is not permitted under the (10) Protect the force.16 and operations, all of which add to the established Rules of Engagement (ROE); increasing complexity of the future security (d) Better protect our forces; (e) Disable While these capabilities emphasize environment.13 equipment, facilities, and enemy person- the nature of NLW, they insufficiently nel; (f) Engage and control people through suit the general demand described in the In the section that describes the civil affairs operations and Psychological CCJO and CMOSUSI documents—min- desired maneuver support, the FOC Operations (PSYOP); (g) Dislodge enemy imizing noncombatant fatalities on the continues: from positions without causing extensive battlefield. Furthermore, this list does not collateral damage; (h) Separate combat- correspond with the required capabilities The major combat operation focus, coupled ants from noncombatants; (i) Deny as defined by the FOC. For example, with the increasing likelihood of smaller- terrain to the enemy.15 translating the complexity of the future scale contingencies, clearly establishes the battlefield and undesired consequences need for a full spectrum force. This force The analysis of these three fundamen- of collateral damage, the FOC accurately must be able to: execute [the] full spectrum tal documents clearly demonstrates that argues that nonlethal weapons have to be of forces; minimize noncombatant fatali- minimizing collateral damage and non- able to “dislodge [the] enemy from posi- ties, permanent injury, and undesired combatant fatalities is a military capability tions without causing extensive collateral damage to property and environment; required by the reality of present and damage” and “separate combatants from maintain force protection, reinforcing de- future conflicts, and NLW can be a practi- noncombatants.” Unfortunately, these terrence; and expand the range of options cal tool in achieving this capability. There significant characteristics are not in the available to joint force commanders. All of is no doubt that the U.S. military has to DOD directive, which in essence defines these imperatives demonstrate a clear need develop this capability to be prepared for
74 Features / Nonlethal Weapons JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 U.S. Navy unmanned surface vessel is equipped with cameras, computer systems, and nonlethal weapons during Trident Warrior (U.S. Navy/Betsy Knapper)
policy and, therefore, the aims of the Furthermore, on the one hand, the that nonlethal weapons “must be pro- future development of NLW. NLWRFS states that it addresses “spe- vided with multifunctional/multirole The Non-Lethal Weapons cific non-lethal capability requirements lethality options in integrated multipur- Requirement Fact Sheet (NLWRFS) for U.S. forces operating in complex pose systems.”20 The NLWRFS fails to is an official document published by environments.”18 On the other hand, define required NLW as weapons that the JNLWP that generalizes two initial it barely corresponds with the desired have an adjustable level of lethality and capabilities documents and identifies NLW capabilities and requirements as are integrated in multipurpose weapons requirements for nonlethal effects. The defined by FOC: systems; in other words, it fails to require JNLWP is interested in investment in the need, as correctly defined by the and promotion of new NLW that can The future Modular Force, specifically, FOC, for weapons systems that integrate support the tasks listed in the fact sheet. must be provided with organic nonlethal nonlethal and lethal capabilities. For example, the NLWRFS defines capabilities to disrupt, dislocate, disorga- As shown, DOD Directive 3000.3E the following four counterpersonnel nize, disintegrate, fix, isolate, suppress, and the NLWRFS clearly misdefine the required tasks for NLW: “(1) Deny ac- and destroy enemy functions. Joint force required NLW capabilities and mislead cess into/out of an area to individuals commanders (JFCs), furthermore, must be the development of future NLW, de- (open/confined) (single/few/many); provided with multifunctional/multirole creasing the chances of new nonlethal (2) Disable individuals (open/confined) lethality options in integrated multipur- technologies emerging that answer the (single/few/many); (3) Move individuals pose system configurations. . . . The future demands of the future complex security through an area (open/confined) (sin- Modular Force Soldier must have the abil- environment. Thus, the analysis indicates gle/few/many); (4) Suppress individuals ity to employ a wide array of lethal and that these two authoritative documents (open/confined) (single/few/many).”17 nonlethal munitions based upon mission pave the way for NLW in an incorrect Like DOD Directive 3000.3E, this need and force protection.19 way, allowing an adaptation of off-the- list again does not correspond with the shelf law enforcement technologies. desired capabilities defined by the FOC, The fact sheet neither refers to the The joint force is not a law enforcement and, therefore, barely addresses the future whole spectrum of desired capabilities agency, although it sometimes fulfills threats on the battlefield discussed in the defined by FOC nor addresses one of the similar missions; therefore, military ori- CCJO and CMOSUSI. most important requirements—namely, ented nonlethal weapons have to be more
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Fridman 75 Marines from 1st Law Enforcement Battalion conduct first ever live fire with Non-Lethal/Tube-Launched Munition System, Camp Pendleton, California, September 2014 (U.S. Marine Corps/John Baker) versatile and more integrated. While future threats created by the increasing Shotgun System (MASS). It is an under- there is no expectation that the U.S. complexity discussed by the CCJO and barrel shotgun attachment for the M16 warfighter in Afghanistan will replace CMOSUSI, nonlethal weapons have to that, while preserving the lethal capability the M16 rifle with the Taser X26, FN answer the capabilities emphasized by of the main rifle, simultaneously provides 303, or Oleoresin Capsicum Dispenser, the FOC—versatility and integration a warfighter with an additional capability these nonlethal capabilities have to be with existing lethal weapons systems. On of 12-gauge nonlethal ammunition.21 integrated with the warfighter’s M16 or the one hand, the JNLWP, and therefore Unfortunately, MASS has remained other lethal weapons systems. This argu- DOD, do not define these capabilities outside the JNLWP scope of interest. ment, however, raises the question about as a technological gap that has to be Other good examples of emerging systems the ability to bridge the technological bridged. On the other hand, examples of are the XM25 and 81 millimeter (mm) gaps related to such integration. such systems are already employed by the Non-Lethal Indirect Fire Munitions U.S. military or are under development. (NLIFM). The first is a 25mm air burst A Technological Gap Moreover, certain systems developed by grenade launcher with various lethality, (or Lack of It) foreign manufacturers clearly demon- from highly lethal to nonlethal depending The current policies regarding nonle- strate the ability to integrate nonlethality on the type of ammunition.22 The second thal weapons clearly mislead military with and within lethal systems. system expands the existing capabilities of industries in defining the required Regarding U.S. technologies, the best the M252 81mm mortar into the field of capabilities. To address the existing and example is the M26 Modular Accessory nonlethality.23 Unfortunately, again, these
76 Features / Nonlethal Weapons JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 12 two systems are not in the JNLWP’s focus. minimize noncombatant casualties and Defense Science Board, Challenges to Military Operations in Support of U.S. Interests, (The NLIFM was reported in the JNLWP collateral damage. To meet that neces- Volume II, Main Report (Washington, DC: annual review, but it is not included in sity, DOD in general, and the JNLWP Department of Defense, December 2008), 9. the lists of current, developing, or future specifically, have to translate that need 13 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com- NLW supervised by the JNLWP.24) and incorporate it into their NLW poli- mand (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-66, “Force Given the achievements of interna- cies and requirements. Operating Capabilities,” March 7, 2008, 17. 14 Ibid., 88–89. tional industries in the field of integrated Since World War II, the U.S. mili- 15 Ibid., 88. nonlethal capabilities, it is important tary has been the technological leader 16 DOD Directive 3000.3E, “Policy for to look at Russia and Israel. In the last in military affairs, and the American Non-Lethal Weapons,” April 25, 2013. few years, Russian industries successfully military-industrial complex has been able 17 The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, demonstrated a range of nonlethal muni- to deal with all the technological chal- “Non-Lethal Weapons Requirement Fact Sheet,” available at
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Fridman 77 Servicemember trained as tactical critical care evacuation team nurse prepares for patient transfer mission at Forward Operating Base Orgun East, Afghanistan (U.S. Air Force/Marleah Miller)
Challenges to Improving Combat Casualty Survivability on the Battlefield
By Robert L. Mabry
We succeed only as we identify in life, or in war, or in anything else, a single overriding objective, and make all other considerations bend to that one objective.
—Dwight D. Eisenhower
he United States has achieved taking place overseas. Military physi- unprecedented survival rates (as cians, medics, corpsmen, and other high as 98 percent) for casualties providers of battlefield medical care T 1 Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Mabry, USA, served arriving alive to a combat hospital. Offi- are rightly proud of this achievement. as a Rescue Medic in Mogadishu, Somalia, and cial briefings, informal communications, Commanders and their troops can be Special Forces battalion surgeon during Operation and even television documentaries such confident that once a wounded Service- Enduring Freedom. He is currently the Director of the Military Emergency Medical Services as “CNN Presents Combat Hospital” member reaches the combat hospital, his Fellowship Program. highlight the remarkable surgical care or her care will be the best in the world.
78 Features / Improving Casualty Survivability on the Battlefield JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Combat casualty care, however, personnel, medical training, equipment medicine and warrior transition care. does not begin at the hospital. It begins allocations, doctrine, and the medical Dentistry and nursing are both led by in the field at the point of injury and force mix in their units. In turn, while major generals. Battlefield care would continues through evacuation to the the institutional base trains and equips strongly benefit from similar centralized combat hospital or forward surgery. This the combat medical force, it defers the senior leadership. Establishing organi- prehospital phase of care is the first link in responsibility of battlefield care delivery zational ownership such as a battlefield the chain of survival for those injured in to line commanders. While this divi- medicine directorate, division, or com- combat and represents the next frontier sion of responsibility may at first glance mand is the key first step. for making significant improvements in seem reasonable, the net negative effect battlefield trauma care. of line commanders lacking expertise Challenge 2: Data and Metrics Even with superb in-hospital care, and medical leaders lacking operational The Services’ medical departments recent evidence suggests that up to control has been documented.3 The repeatedly cite the reduction of case 25 percent of deaths on the battlefield axiom “when everyone is responsible, fatality rates to historically low levels as are potentially preventable.2 The vast no one is responsible” applies. a major medical accomplishment during majority of these deaths happen in the The concept of Tactical Combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. prehospital setting. The indisputable Casualty Care (TCCC) evolved to fill this While seemingly positive, this statistic conclusion is that any meaningful fu- gap for line commanders. Originating tells only part of the story. The case ture improvement in combat casualty from a paper published in Military fatality rate, or the percentage of those outcomes depends on closing the gap Medicine in 1993,4 TCCC created a injured who died, reflects multiple in prehospital survival. Improving pre- conceptual framework focused on treat- factors including weapons and tactics, hospital combat casualty care, however, ing life-threatening battlefield injuries protective equipment, and medical may be significantly more challenging while taking into account tactical consid- care.5 In other words, current data than improving hospital-based casualty erations. A Navy physician and former equally support the conclusion that the care because of significant structural SEAL team member, Dr. Frank Butler enemy’s lack of regular combat units, challenges facing the military medical es- spearheaded what has now emerged as artillery, and armor (the major casualty tablishment. I describe five key challenges the most significant battlefield medical producers in conventional warfare) and and a plan to overcome them. advancement of the past decade. Before reliance instead on improvised explosive the advent of TCCC, combat medics devices is plausibly just as responsible. Challenge 1: Ownership were taught civilian-style first aid. Many While many intended improvements Responsibility for battlefield care deliv- of these techniques, based on civilian have been made in military trauma ery is distributed to the point where injury patterns such as motor vehicle systems, especially at the combat hospi- seemingly no one “owns” it. Unity of accidents, were unhelpful or frankly dan- tal and higher, there are few data to link command is not established, and thus gerous when performed under fire. specific actions to a direct and quantifi- no single senior military medical leader, The Committee on TCCC able relationship to lowered case fatality directorate, division, or command (CoTCCC) is organized under the Joint rates. Repeatedly citing “the lowest case is solely focused on battlefield care, Trauma System and is responsible for fatality rate in the history of warfare” the quintessential mission of military promulgating the tenets of TCCC. Its as an affirmation of military medicine’s medicine. This diffusion of responsi- origins were nontraditional, reflecting a success over the past decade, without a bility is a result of multiple agencies, grassroots effort by a dedicated group sober account of other contributory and leaders, and units of the Service medical of surgeons, emergency physicians, and confounding factors, risks sending the departments each claiming bits and experienced combat medics to incorpo- message that battlefield trauma systems pieces, with no single entity responsible rate new evidence and best practices into are nearly perfected and no further sig- for patient outcomes forward of the prehospital treatment guidelines. As a nificant improvements are required or combat hospital. Combat arms com- paradigm, it is thoroughly grounded in even possible. manders “own” much of the battlefield the realities of the modern battlefield. Another problematic statistic is the casualty care assets in that medics, bat- The very existence of the CoTCCC, an “died-of-wounds” (DOW) rate, or the talion physicians, physician assistants, organization born outside the traditional percentage of those reaching medical flight medics, and associated equipment military medical establishment, exposes a care who later die. Remarkably, recent are assigned to their operational units, void in ownership and expertise in battle- DOW rates exceed those of World War yet combat arms commanders are field care. II and the Vietnam era.6 While startling, neither experts in, nor do they have the In contrast to combat casualty care, this does not necessarily reflect a decline resources to train their medical provid- other areas of the military medical es- in care. As evacuation becomes faster ers for, forward medical care. Com- tablishment are led by flag officers. In and prehospital care improves, the DOW manders rely on the Service medical the Army Medical Department, for ex- rates will go up as more mortally injured departments to provide the right ample, brigadier generals lead veterinary casualties will reach the hospital alive.
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Mabry 79 Conversely, if evacuation is delayed or reflect inadequate care. All of these casual- the basic emergency medical technician medic care is poor, more will die in the ties were severely injured. Some would level. Staffing civilian medical helicopters field and reduce the DOW rate. Neither have required immediate, on-the-spot ac- with advanced paramedics has been the DOW nor the case fatality rate cess to the most advanced care (that is, the done since the 1980s and advocated quantifies the effect of medical care on kind found only in premier trauma centers for military medevac since the 1990s. A survival, nor do they provide insight into in the United States) to have any hope recent study comparing a National Guard where specific improvements in combat of survival, and others died related to medevac unit staffed with flight paramed- casualty care can be made. unavoidable delays due to ongoing com- ics trained in critical care showed a 66 Another statistic that distorts the bat operations (for example, hostile fire). percent reduction in mortality compared overall effectiveness of combat casualty However, many could have survived with to the standard flight medics.11 The Army care is the hospital survival rate. Surgical currently available prehospital medical adopted a program—after nearly 40 bat- care in combat hospitals and care in interventions if only these interventions tlefield after-action reports recommended the subsequent evacuation chain back were routinely and correctly employed. it but lacked detailed supporting data—in to the United States have advanced to Unfortunately, we continue to know little 2011 to train critical care paramedics for such a degree that 98 percent of casual- about what care is provided before casual- helicopter medevac. With better data ties making it there alive will go on to ties reach the combat hospital. collection in the prehospital setting, it is survive their wounds. By definition, it The key goal is a coherent system to likely the decision cycle could be far re- does not capture those with potentially collect prehospital patient care informa- duced from the 11 years observed. survivable injuries who died in the field tion. We know little about this phase Changing the narrative of “unprece- or died during prehospital evacuation. In of care.8 Only one military unit we are dented” survival rates to instead highlight other words, it does not speak to all of aware of, the U.S. Army’s 75th Ranger the 25 percent potentially survivable the casualties who succumb prior to hos- Regiment, has collected complete sets death rate does place military medicine pitalization. What is needed is a metric of casualty care data. The commander in a difficult strategic communications encompassing the full spectrum of care of the 75th Ranger Regiment has taken predicament. A fair and open accounting that includes the prehospital setting. ownership of that unit’s casualty response of the successes to date as well as where In contrast, the potentially prevent- system. Using their Ranger Casualty Card progress needs to be made is imperative. able death rate illuminates where care can and their unit casualty registry, unit lead- In 1984, Dr. Ron Bellamy examined be improved along the entire chain of ers are able to determine what happened many of the same issues discussed here survival, from the point of injury to reha- to every Ranger casualty during all phases following analysis of Vietnam-era casualty bilitation back in the United States. This of care. Ranger commanders routinely data. He noted, “A research program rate is defined as deaths that could be use this data to improve their casualty designed to improve health care delivery avoided if optimal care could otherwise response systems. The Rangers are also will have the greatest impact if its goals be delivered. The challenge of deriving the only unit in the U.S. military that can are chosen after a comprehensive review this statistic comes from the complexity demonstrate no potentially preventable has been made in the ways of which the in determining if a death is potentially deaths in the prehospital setting after existing system fails.”12 A similar compre- preventable. To accomplish this, specific more than a decade of combat.9 hensive review of combat casualty care in clinical facts must be collected on each Systematically examining potentially Iraq and Afghanistan is recommended. case; however, as we discuss shortly, pre- preventable deaths and prehospital care hospital data are often difficult to collect. data gives a more accurate assessment Challenge 3: Prehospital The potentially preventable death rate of the entire continuum of care com- and Trauma Expertise is derived by examination of autopsy and pared to other metrics. If collected and If the prehospital setting is the area medical records by a multidisciplinary analyzed quickly, it also allows for the where nearly all potentially prevent- physician panel. One such review exam- development of an agenda to improve able deaths occur, then it is likely not ined all the U.S. combat deaths in Iraq casualty care in near real time. The Israel coincidentally an area of limited organi- and Afghanistan from 2001 until 2011 Defense Forces (IDF) medical corps has zational expertise. It would be natural and found up to 25 percent to be poten- embraced the concept of eliminating to expect that the Services, especially tially preventable.7 The vast majority of preventable deaths as part of the next 10- the ground forces, would invest heavily these (87 percent) died before reaching year force build-up plan and emphasizes in clinical experts in far-forward combat a surgeon or combat hospital. Many of point-of-injury care.10 casualty care. Paradoxically, the opposite the remaining 13 percent who died in the A significant recent positive example appears true. The Army, for example, hospital were in profound shock on ar- of data-driven combat casualty care relies on the Professional Officers Filler rival and would have likely benefited from improvement concerns the capabilities System (PROFIS) to provide the bulk aggressive prehospital resuscitation. It is of medics staffing medical evacuation of forward medical officers. PROFIS important to recognize that this figure, (medevac) helicopters, which have tradi- is a Cold War–era program whereby like the DOW rate, does not necessarily tionally been staffed by medics trained at primary care physicians from the base
80 Features / Improving Casualty Survivability on the Battlefield JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Soldier from 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, based in Fort Wainwright, Alaska, gives thumbs-up to members of his unit after being injured by roadside bomb in Kandahar Province (DOD/Haraz Ghanbari)
hospital are tasked, often just before of emergency medical technicians, a demonstrated need for them in the combat deployment, to serve as bat- ambulances, communications, training military until now. Nor has there been a talion surgeons responsible for the programs, medical direction, and trauma critical appraisal of how these relatively resuscitation of battle casualties in the centers that integrate prehospital and new specialties could be leveraged to op- battalion aid station. This is reminiscent hospital trauma care. The investment paid timize combat casualty care. For example, of how emergency rooms (ERs) were off as trauma centers opened in nearly the Department of Defense has only one staffed in the 1960s and 1970s, when every major urban center, and large relatively new prehospital training pro- junior physicians just out of training (or swaths of the population are now served gram capable of training three physicians disinterested physicians from unrelated by effective and cohesive trauma care per year. Today, the Army has fewer than specialties) were rotated into the ER. systems. Yet the combat casualty on the a dozen prehospital physician specialists Like the PROFIS physicians, these battlefield today, like the accident victim and about the same number of trauma physicians had no in-depth training in the 1960s ER, is likely attended to by surgeons on Active duty. By comparison, in resuscitation or emergency care or, a physician or physician assistant with no the Army has roughly the same number worse, little interest in even learning formal training in emergency medicine or of radiation oncologists and nearly three it. Many of these PROFIS physicians, trauma resuscitation. In the intervening times the number of pediatric psychia- often inexperienced and unprepared, are years, ERs and the physicians who staff trists and orthodontists. This is largely placed into operational positions outside them have evolved into a sophisticated because medical specialty allocations are the scope of their training. This profes- and specialized system of care, while the based on traditional peacetime beneficiary sionally unrewarding experience likely model for physician care in forward aid care needs. Refocusing on the wartime contributes to many leaving the military stations remains largely stuck in the prac- needs could populate key institutional at the first available opportunity.13 tices of the past century. and operational billets with a critical The Korean and Vietnam wars set Since the 1980s, programs have mass of trained prehospital and trauma the stage for the emergence of modern emerged to train physician specialists in specialists and drive further advances in emergency medical services (EMS) sys- trauma surgery, emergency medicine, battlefield care during peacetime. tems in the late 1960s. These wartime and prehospital care. Without a major experiences spurred the development of conflict since the emergence of these new a robust “system of systems” comprised specialties, there simply has not been
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Mabry 81 Flight medic treats Soldier from 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, while en route to Kandahar Airfield for additional treatment (DOD)
Challenge 4: Research civilian air ambulance standards during (such as reducing preventable death, im- and Development helicopter evacuation in Afghanistan proving procedural success, and reducing Current research and development showed a 66 percent reduction in the secondary injury). efforts are focused on material “things,” risk of dying.16 The training level and To be sure, advanced technology and our current medical combat devel- capabilities of the providers in these can pave the way for enhanced combat opment efforts are primarily focused on examples exceeded the existing doc- casualty care. Examples of recent tools rearranging existing paradigms for doc- trinal model, and the benefits were placed in the hands of medics and battal- trine, manpower, and equipment. Less tangible. The solution lay with people, ion medical officers include tourniquets, attention is paid to training, leadership, not technology. Using a sports analogy, junctional hemorrhage control devices, and organization, yet the current litera- the Department of Defense is spending and intraosseous needles. Yet many of ture shows these areas have made the billions of dollars trying to perfect golf these so-called new tools and concepts most significant documented improve- clubs, golf balls, and golf shoes, and have existed for decades or even centu- ments in survival. Three examples can virtually no research dollars on how to ries. With the exception of the hemostatic illustrate the potential for capitalization. train the best golfers. dressing, no new technology has been First, the Rangers, with their command- Prehospital care experts should direct put into the medic’s aid bag today that led casualty response system, are able and advise key research and development did not exist a century ago. The proposi- to document no potentially preventable efforts and set research priorities focused tion is to balance the investment between prehospital deaths after more than a on improving prehospital casualty sur- things and people to optimize care on the decade of combat.14 Second, staffing vival. Traditional measures of research battlefield. a forward battalion aid station with program success (grants awarded, papers emergency medicine–trained provid- published, and abstracts presented) Challenge 5: Hospital Culture ers showed a 30 percent reduction should be shifted in favor of measurable The delivery of health care in fixed in deaths.15 Third, adopting current solutions to specific battlefield problems facilities is military medicine’s largest
82 Features / Improving Casualty Survivability on the Battlefield JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 mission, dwarfing all the others. At a military beneficiaries in its fixed facilities research on training, organization, cost of nearly $60 billion, the Military every day and be prepared to go to war and leadership, not just material Health System (MHS) represents one at a moment’s notice. Historically, the solutions. of the most expensive components overwhelming pressures of providing •• Evolve the current paradigm of mili- of the overall defense budget and is beneficiary care in clinics and hospitals tary medicine from an organization under constant scrutiny from Pentagon have conspired to redirect resources away culture chiefly focused on full-time leaders. Former Assistant Secretary from maintaining or improving battlefield beneficiary care in fixed facilities and of Defense for Health Affairs Dr. Sue care skills during peacetime.19 Future ef- part-time combat casualty care—the Bailey stated that “we are an HMO forts should be devoted to breaking free “HMO that goes war”—toward an [health maintenance organization] that from this seemingly intractable constraint. organizational culture that treats goes to war,” a statement that sums up battlefield care delivery as its essential a continuing concept regarding military A Way Forward core mission. This need not lessen medicine’s primary focus on beneficiary If history is any guide, making signifi- the importance or scope of benefi- care at fixed facilities. Indeed, when cant interwar advancements in battle- ciary care and, if agilely executed, physicians are tasked to deploy from field medical care will be difficult. As could enhance the prestige and hospitals in the United States to the the current conflicts end, repeating the cachet of the beneficiary mission. combat zone, a regulation calls them narrative of low case fatality and high Addressing leadership, strategy, “fillers,” and hospital personnel officers survival rates without a comprehensive metrics, workforce, and patient out- colloquially refer to the loss of skilled and sober review of both successes and comes is the common methodology for physicians as “the operational tax.”17 where improvements could be made promoting excellence in hospital-based Regarding the combat medics’ role, risks impeding the ability to truly learn healthcare. The same methodology could the traditional conceptual framework for the lessons that would improve the sur- be used to improve care forward of the some medical leaders starts not at the vival of Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and hospital. Such a program would require a point of injury but rather in the combat Airmen in the next conflict. significant realignment of resources and hospital (or forward surgical team): “Get As a call to action, the following steps priorities within military medicine that the casualty to the hospital and we will offer a potential way forward to over- would challenge existing bureaucratic and take care of them.” This is a legacy of the come these five challenges. leadership hierarchies. Acting on what we Cold War era when the combination of Adopt the Israel Defense Forces or have learned to prepare for the next con- massive casualties and limited far-forward •• similar model of combat casualty care flict in a resource-constrained interwar capability meant few meaningful inter- focus and make an institutional com- period will challenge our medical leaders. ventions were possible until the casualty mitment to eliminating potentially Civilians can operate peacetime hospital reached a combat hospital.18 Today, we preventable death. Allow careful systems, perhaps even more efficiently know the actions or inactions of the study of these deaths to drive the than the military. Yet ultimately, going ground medic, flight medic, or junior training, research, and development to war is the unique mission of military battalion medical officer can mean the agenda. medicine that distinguishes us from civil- difference between delivering a salvage- Establish leadership of battlefield ian healthcare and justifies our cost to the able casualty or a corpse to the combat •• care at the most senior level, and Nation. If military medicine cannot dem- hospital. We expect medics to perform hold the Service medical depart- onstrate ownership of and expertise in its life-saving treatment under the most ments accountable for improving it. quintessential mission, prehospital and difficult of circumstances, but we invest Obtain data and metrics from the battlefield trauma care, we must ask our- minimal institutional effort toward train- •• point of injury and throughout the selves why military medicine exists. JFQ ing them to a high level or insisting they continuum of care, and use this train alongside physicians and nurses information to drive evidence-based in our fixed military hospitals during decisions. Notes peacetime. •• Commit to training physician, In their defense, military medical 1 nursing, and allied health providers The author would like to recognize Sur- leaders face a unique set of challenges geon Commodore Alasdair Walker, the United to become “combat medical special- combat arms commanders do not face. Kingdom’s Military Health Services’ Medical ists” and placing them in key opera- Combat arms commanders focus on Director, as the inspiration for this article. tional and institutional positions to During the 2013 Military Health System Re- preparing for war. When not deployed leverage improvements in training, search Symposium in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, or in a recovery or support cycle, they doctrine, research, and development. Dr. Walker described a concept called the are focused on training and preparing “Walker Dip.” Citing the abysmal medical care Direct research funds toward solving for the next mission. Conversely, the •• available to British forces during the Crimean prehospital clinical problems, and MHS is expected to perform its mission War, he traced recurrent historical cycles balance these funds to include whereby medical care improves during con- of delivering high-quality healthcare to
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Mabry 83 Aeromedical evacuation technician with 651st Expeditionary Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron checks on Afghan man in critical but stable condition for transport, Forward Operating Base Tarin Kowt, Afghanistan (U.S. Air Force/Greg Biondo) flicts, but the lessons are forgotten afterward 5 John B. Holcomb et al., “Understand- 13 Melony E. Sorbero et al., Improving the and have to be relearned again during the next ing Combat Casualty Care Statistics,” Journal Deployment of Army Health Care Professionals: war, thus repeating the cycle. The Walker Dip of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 60, no. 2 An Evaluation of PROFIS (Santa Monica, CA: can be traced from the American Civil War (February 2006), 397–401. RAND, 2013). through every U.S. conflict since, including 6 Ibid. 14 Kotwal et al. Iraq and Afghanistan. The author hopes this 7 Eastridge et al. 15 Robert T. Gerhardt et al., “Out-of-Hos- discussion will help the U.S. military health 8 Brian J. Eastridge et al., “We Don’t Know pital Combat Casualty Care in the Current War system avoid the Walker Dip and thanks Dr. What We Don’t Know: Prehospital Data in in Iraq,” Annals of Emergency Medicine 53, no. Walker for his inspiration. Combat Casualty Care,” Army Medical Depart- 2 (February 2009), 169–174. 2 Brian J. Eastridge et al., “Death on the ment Journal (April-June 2011), 11–14. 16 Mabry et al. Battlefield (2001–2011): Implications for the 9 Russ S. Kotwal et al., “Eliminating 17 Sorbero et al. Future of Combat Casualty Care,” Journal of Preventable Death on the Battlefield,”Ar - 18 Robert A. DeLorenzo, “Improving Com- Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 73, no. 6, chives of Surgery 146, no. 12 (August 2011), bat Casualty Care and Field Medicine: Focus Supplement 5 (December 2012), S431–S437; 1350–1358. on the Military Medic,” Military Medicine 162, Joseph F. Kelly et al., “Injury Severity and 10 Author correspondence with Dr. Elon no. 4 (1997), 268272. Causes of Death from Operation Iraqi Freedom Glassberg, Head of Trauma and Combat Casu- 19 Robert A. DeLorenzo, “How Shall We and Operation Enduring Freedom: 2003–2004 alty Care Branch, Israel Defense Forces, August Train?” Military Medicine 170, no. 10 (2005), Versus 2006,” Journal of Trauma and Acute 20, 2013. 824–830. Care Surgery 64, no. 2 (February 2008), S21– 11 Robert L. Mabry et al., “Impact of S26; discussion S27. Critical Care-trained Flight Paramedics on 3 Robert L. Mabry and Robert A. De Lo- Casualty Survival during Helicopter Evacuation renzo, “Improving Role I Battlefield Casualty in the Current War in Afghanistan,” Journal Care from Point of Injury to Surgery,” Army of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 73, no. 2, Medical Department Journal (April–June Supplement 1 (August 2012), S32–S37. 2011), 87–91. 12 R.F. Bellamy, “The Causes of Death in 4 Frank K. Butler, Jr., John Hagmann, and Conventional Land Warfare: Implications for E. George Butler, “Tactical Combat Casualty Combat Casualty Care Research,” Military Care in Special Operations,” Military Medicine Medicine 149, no. 2 (February 1984), 55–62. 161, no. 1, Supplement 1 (August 1996), 3–16.
84 Features / Improving Casualty Survivability on the Battlefield JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Public health officers releasing P. reticulata fry into artificial lake in Lago Norte district of Brasília as part of a vector control effort (Fábio Rodrigues Pozzebom/Agência Brasil)
Mosquitoes A Viable 21st-Century Soft Power Tool
By Mary Raum and Kathleen J. McDonald
ilitaries and soft power have the Napoleonic wars, military altruism measures of humanitarian aid have been interlinked since Alexan- had become customary enough to be shifted as the sizes, types, and durations M der the Great began assisting included in soldiers’ military science of conflicts have changed. Military the populations his armies conquered studies. Napoleon viewed humanitarian roles now involve functioning as relief by rebuilding infrastructures and dis- assistance as a form of philanthropy that agents, participating as surplus disposal tributing food and first aid. Humane helped change civil social order among entities for old or outdated materials gestures by armies were considered those populations his troops defeated and machines, acting as international important to winning loyalties. During on the European continent. Over time, peacekeeping forces or as liberators, and delivering organized and rapid natural disaster relief. The latest addition to these scenarios is the performance of Mary Raum is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College and is currently long-term humanitarian roles in peace- Chair for the Women, Peace, and Security Series. Commander Kathleen J. McDonald, MC, USN, is a Cardiothoracic Anesthesiologist in the U.S. Navy Medical Corps. She is currently serving as Inspector of ful settings with nations that may have a the Naval Medical Inspector General Office in the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. future potential value as allies.1
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Raum and McDonald 85 Frederick Cuny, a world-class human- reservation, respect the privacies of those unusual manifestations of dengue are ap- itarian specialist who led many projects being treated, tread lightly on matters of pearing and showing cerebral symptoms, in the largest conflicts of the late 20th life and death, and remember that treat- which are associated with the functioning century until his forced disappearance in ing illnesses is the treatment of human of the central nervous system, and hepatic the Chechen war of 1995, believed the beings and that the economic status of the symptoms, which affect the liver.4 There military had been drawn into five com- ill should not drive choice of treatment. is no specific treatment for dengue, and mon humanitarian scenarios: Each of these is to be remembered in light there is no vaccine. of the idea that medical professionals hold The U.S. military has had a long-term undertaking rapid logistical-based •• special obligations to society and as such relationship with the ailment. During the relief deployment for natural disasters should strive continually to seek the “true Spanish-American War, the virus caused operating as martial law constituents •• joy of healing others.”2 Current ideology major illness among Servicemembers, at the conclusion of a conflict in support of using medical soft power and throughout history, high incidence overseeing Phase Four reconstruc- •• within military theaters of operation is of the disease occurred during operations tion and peacekeeping efforts that healthy populations are more secure in Somalia, Haiti, and the Philippines. In overseeing point relief for civilian •• populations, which in turn are more Asia and the South Pacific during World populations between two warring stable populations. Soft power medical War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam parties programs expand access and influence War, attack rates on troops were as high acting as interventionists for civilian •• and strengthen military and diplomatic as 80 percent:5 victims in conflict zones. relationships. Each scenario requires a military to It is probably soldiers who caused the perform a diverse set of noncombat roles Globalization and Disease original spread of dengue fever around under fundamentally different mission Public health is more important than Southeast Asia during World War II. . . . models. Militaries are expected to be ever due to the global integration that is A Japanese scientist first isolated the virus good at detached deployment, augment- occurring as a result of rapid globaliza- during the war, and a United States Army ing civil manpower, substituting for tion, interrelated financial systems, and physician, Albert Sabin, made the discov- civilian workers, acting as police forces, the ability of populations to afford travel. ery that there were distinct virus types. . and secondment (what the military calls For all the positives of a borderless globe, . . you had a movement of soldiers from individual augmentation of troop person- a damaging consequence of this dynamic England, the U.S., Australia and Japan. nel). Nations go to militaries because has been the ease with which diseases . . . soldiers flew from city to city. . . . In the they have at their disposal high-end spread. The Severe Acute Respiratory 1900s, during the Philippine tour of duty, communication equipment, a massive self- Syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2003 is a approximately 40% of newly arrived troops supporting manpower base, established clear example. Beginning in China, the contracted dengue within one year.6 organization due to a chain of command syndrome was brought into Canada by structure, and sophisticated command a passenger on a commercial airliner and For over 100 years, the Army has and control systems. According to Cuny, then spread to other countries in North documented and conducted research per- thinking of a military as both combatant America, South America, Europe, and taining to numerous facets of the disease. and altruistic helper has evolved because Asia before being contained. In 2009, an Since the 1990s, the Services have been of militaries’ talents to perform as “cor- H1N1 influenza pandemic commonly developing and testing possible vaccines nucopias of assistance.” Added to the five known as Swine Flu, which had not in its medical research facilities in the common roles within the cornucopia is appeared in society in equal magnitude United States and Thailand. This long- a growing belief that the military should since 1918, spread from the state of term study by military personnel from conduct aid operations permanently and Veracruz, Mexico, to several continents, 1900 onward has resulted in extensive on a long-term basis. hitting North America when a 10-year- knowledge regarding how and why the One of the least operationally antago- old patient in California was diagnosed disease spreads. Presently, at the Armed nistic and organizationally disruptive ways with the disease. Eighteen thousand Forces Research Institute of Medical for the U.S. military to serve as soft power people were killed by the virus within 1 Sciences Bangkok, two experimental agents on a long-term basis is through the year. These events and others like them variations of vaccines are being studied Services’ medical corps. Medical profes- make public health programs a key con- in conjunction with the pharmaceutical sionals act in dual roles as supporters and sideration as a primary choice of military company GlaxoSmithKlein and regional defenders of the Constitution against soft power projects. community health institutions. foreign and domestic enemies and as ser- Even graver in proportion than vants of the covenants of the Hippocratic H1N1 and SARS is dengue fever, fol- What Is Dengue? oath. The oath obligates the taker to share lowed by Lyme disease, HIV/AIDS, The World Health Organization scientific gains, look to disease prevention human papilloma virus, and diabetes.3 Of (WHO) defines dengue as a mosquito- rather than cures, benefit the sick without great concern is that in the last 25 years, borne viral infection that causes a
86 Features / Mosquitoes: A Viable Soft Power Tool JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 flu-like illness and frequently develops and used tires, two important mosquito experienced epidemics in 1987 and into the potentially lethal complica- breeding grounds have emerged. These 1988, and 43,609 cases were reported tion of dengue hemorrhagic fever used materials serve as quality incubating resulting in 60 deaths in a 6-month (DHF). Infected mosquitoes bite their habitats for larvae due to their structural timeframe in 2013. The Philippines victims primarily in the daytime, rarely qualities, which are highly conducive for reported one of the highest numbers of travel more than 100 yards from their housing water breeding pools for ex- incidents in the region, and in the first birthplace, and cannot survive freezing tended periods of time. 6 months of 2013, Malaysia reported weather.7 Occurring in four different over 10,000 cases. The Association of forms, dengue is considered one of the Asia-Pacific Region Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) news most complicated viruses known today. In 1947, U.S. Pacific Command source, The Diplomat, reported that Symptoms include high fevers; severe (USPACOM) was established to “because of changing climate patterns headaches; eye, muscle, and joint pain; manage and direct forces that fought and the inevitable rise of mega cities, rashes; and extreme nausea. In its sever- in the Pacific theater of World War II. the dengue virus will continue to ter- est forms, it causes internal bleeding Today, it covers approximately half the rorize many tropical nations . . . . If left and organ shutdown or impairment.8 Earth’s surface, from the U.S. West unchecked, it could lead to bigger out- International deaths from dengue coast to western India and from the breaks that governments may not be able fever have at times ranked equally with North Pole to Antarctica. As the largest to adequately handle.”13 those caused by yellow fever and have of the six U.S. military geographic com- exceeded deaths from all other viral mands, it collectively represents one- Vietnam in Context hemorrhagic fevers combined, includ- fifth of America’s total military strength. In this vast and socially complex part ing ebola, Marburg, Lassa, Korean, and Six nations in the region—Australia, of the globe, where 50 percent of the Crimean-Congo.9 New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, the world’s population resides, sits the A 2014 WHO Global Alert and Philippines, and Thailand—are allied Socialist Republic of Vietnam. It is Response notification, which relays with the United States through mutual an ancient country dating to the 2nd the severity of dengue, states that since defense treaties, and key strategic rela- century BCE, having achieved its inde- 1964, the disease has increased 30-fold, tionships exist with Singapore, India, pendence from China in 938 CE. Only that 2.5 billion people live in over 100 Taiwan, and Indonesia.11 American 25 miles wide at its narrowest point, endemic countries where the virus can Active-duty troops number 300,000 as and with a coastline of 2,140 miles, it be transmitted, and that up to 50 mil- part of 5 aircraft carrier strike groups; is bordered on the north by China, to lion cases occur annually with its more 2,000 aircraft; 2 Marine Expeditionary the west by Laos and Cambodia, and extreme form, DHF, occurring in over Forces; and 5 Stryker brigades. to the east by the South China Sea. half a million individuals, with death The Asia-Pacific region, which is in Since the 20th century, the nation has rates among children reaching 22,000 the USPACOM area of responsibility been impacted by French occupation, annually. Ninety percent of childhood (AOR), is being particularly hard hit an overthrow by Japan, internal revolu- deaths are patients under the age of 1 by dengue. DF and DHF are upward tions, an invasion by China resulting in a year. Current statistics, while staggering, trending in Southeast Asia overall with an separation of peoples into northern and constitute only estimates because accurate attack rate in the range of 300–400 cases southern partitions, coups, and internal and timely reporting remains problem- per 100,000 members of the population. struggles with communist political atic. In addition, dengue fever (DF) and Dengue attacks are the leading cause of movements such as the Pathet Lao.14 DHF are leading causes of hospitalization hospitalization of children in Southeast Contemporary American military globally, accounting for 1,000,866 cases Asia in general and within Vietnam in connections began with the country reported from 1991 to 2004, with the particular.12 In Vietnam, cases are ob- in 1950 during the French Colonial highest numbers in the Western Pacific.10 served from the northeast to the Mekong Administration. Combat action began A January 2008 issue of the Journal of the River Delta all year round, with a slight in 1960 when 100 U.S. Special Forces American Medical Association noted that peak in autumn. In a 2013 global health troops were sent in after 2 Americans global urbanization and increasing air action report for Hanoi, the situation were killed in a guerrilla strike east of Ho travel are expected to make dengue fever in Vietnam was called a “major threat,” Chi Minh City. From 1963 until the U.S. a growing international health concern with the numbers of recent outbreaks withdrawal in 1973, over half a million for the foreseeable future. The transmis- generating significant international health ground, sea, and air force personnel were sion profile of the disease is multifactorial authority concern. deployed for a variety of military actions. due to the weakening of control measures Other upward trends are being Twenty years after the Vietnam War, in affected areas, rapid urbanization, experienced in Singapore and Thailand. President Bill Clinton announced the unreliable water supplies, high popula- Singapore had an outbreak in 2005, and normalization of diplomatic relations be- tion densities, and global warming. Due in 2012–2013, reported cases rose from tween the two countries. Several U.S. and to international trading in plastic wastes 4,632 to 10,257 in 12 months. Thailand Vietnam cross-nation agreements have
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Raum and McDonald 87 Medical task force from Australia helps manage dengue fever outbreak and treats patients at National Referral Hospital in Honiara, Solomon Islands (Courtesy AusAID) occurred since the mid 1990s: an annual and Civic Aid funded projects. Sixteen buildup and modernization are taking bilateral human rights dialogue, bilateral thousand U.S. military personnel assisted place in the region, and East Asian coun- trade agreement, counternarcotics letter during the 2004 natural disaster that tries in particular are upping their naval of agreement, civil aviation agreement, affected 11 South Asian and Southeast arms race, which is increasing the risk of and approval of permanent normal trade Asian countries when nearly a half million military confrontations. The area’s stra- relations. A Pew Research Center poll people were displaced. Joint task forces tegic economic importance and some of notes that 71 percent of Vietnamese peo- for humanitarian assistance have helped the rapidly expanding economies in the ple view Americans in a favorable light.15 Burma and the populations along its theater have the potential to inflate stress American military medical aid is coast. Since the 1990s, the United States as these nations vie for scarce resources.17 not uncommon within USPACOM. A has aided victims of typhoons and floods Regional development of seapower is of recurring joint/combined humanitarian and has conducted aid operations by par- distinct interest with the introduction of assistance mission, Operation Pacific ticipating in both ad hoc and multilateral China’s first aircraft carrier in 2012 and Angel, has been ongoing since 2007. assistance programs after several earth- Japan’s helicopter carrier. In Vietnam, the Other operations have involved setting up quakes, tsunamis, and cyclones. These government has introduced the first of six medical, dental, optometry, and women’s assistance programs have been short-term planned Russian Kilo-class submarines, health programs, performing children’s interventions that are geared toward eas- adding it to the ranks of several South surgical operations, repairing hospital ing immediate suffering. East Asian nations including Malaysia, equipment, and conducting civic action Though smaller in geographic size Indonesia, and Singapore that have sub- programs in the form of reconstruction and military strength than other countries marine capabilities. of hospital facilities.16 The United States in Asia, Vietnam is growing in terms of Embassy in Hanoi describes Department military strategic importance. In part, Current Initiatives of Defense (DOD) support for a variety this is due to the U.S. National Security With a population of 90 million people of Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Strategy’s pivot to the east. A military of 54 ethic nationalities, Vietnam is the
88 Features / Mosquitoes: A Viable Soft Power Tool JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 second largest country in Southeast Asia which is located in the extreme south On a larger scale, developing a soft and the 13th most populous country central portion of the country. U.S. power program based on dengue makes in the world. In the densely forested Navy medical personnel have joined with sense because the disease is a health con- highlands and tropical lowlands, dengue Vietnamese army doctors and nurses to cern that exists across all U.S. combatant has spread to six of its eight regional conduct clinics and give medical educa- commands. Lessons learned from an offi- provinces. In February 2013, Hanoi tion and training programs in patient cial USPACOM incubator program would announced that there were 62,039 cases care and surgical management. The U.S. be transferrable to many other health en- reported in the southern region alone, Naval Research Medical Unit hosted a gagement opportunities around the globe. indicating an increase of 11.2 percent as 2004 conference on developing an Early Prevalence of the disease’s existence glob- compared to 2011.18 Warning Disease Outbreak Recognition ally, its effects on the health of the world, Diseases such as dengue become key System at Vietnam’s Pasteur Institute. and the likelihood of dengue remaining a factors in the ability to retain community The institute, which has been in exis- health threat for several more years make stability because of major healthcare costs tence since 1891, conducts research in the incubator program of long-term to populations in a nation with an aver- dengue fever, diarrheal disease, HIV, interest and one that allows soft power age per capita income of approximately leprosy, and polio.20 relationships to be built with numerous $4,000 per year. The economic burden countries at the same time. Developing is alarming, with the average cost for Medicine and Soft Power a dengue program also supports one of a patient in 2007 costing $167. More The Vietnamese DF situation is a the top six key Sphere Project standards, importantly, in terms of impact on family formidable candidate as a trial case for which assist in the mitigation of endemic economics, 47.2 percent of families had creating a proactive military-backed disease and endemic disease rates.21 to borrow money for treatment, and after public health improvement program. 6 months, 71.7 percent had not begun Reasons why this choice makes sense A Way Ahead or had only managed partial repayment. are numerous. Dengue is common in To determine how an incubator Approximately 72.9 percent of the in- nations in the USPACOM AOR, and program could be built, it is useful fected population indicated that the cost the command should be an imperative to look at how the military currently of supporting a dengue fever patient had player in the current national security approaches humanitarian aid. The most affected the family’s ability to function strategy of pivoting to Asia. The health common approach used to promote normally, with an average monetary loss and well-being of American troops in medical soft power is the medical civic being 36 percent of the annual income in the region are a cause for concern, as is action program (MEDCAP). Such the lowest economic quartile.19 In Pacific their potential candidacy, as global trav- programs are routinely undertaken to Asia, the disease goes uncared for because elers, for spreading the disease. There enhance nation-building to indirectly of financial distress. are numerous U.S. military medical influence or enhance theater security by In the past decade, several short-term resources already in the region, and promoting a caring face to nonmilitary military assistance programs based on there is a history of medical exchange populations. Most U.S. MEDCAPs logistics, training, and reconstruction with the country. The geographic are formed around the three themes of efforts have taken place in Vietnam. closeness of the country to China and dental, medical, or veterinarian assis- Since 2006, eight U.S.-supported Korea may result in a higher likeli- tance. The Peacekeeping and Stability medical clinics have been built in Thua hood of having Chinese and Korean Operations Institute of the U.S. Army Thien-Hue Province in the center of the medical professionals available for a has noted some negative aspects of country. A DOD-backed medical clinic multinational pilot program. Vietnam is MEDCAPs: they can be “counterpro- was constructed in 2006 in the Quang small enough geographically to be able ductive and hamper long term capacity Ninh District of Quang Binh Province to develop a dengue trial program for development, leading often to depen- along the north central coast. Other both rural and high population areas dency on part of the host nation.”22 programs included building a disabled without expending exorbitant levels Problems with current practices and children’s center in Dong Hoi Town of of resources. Allies such as Australia procedures in implementing soft power the Quang Binh Province and a primary already have established dengue pro- medical programs are numerous. In a school and a secondary school in Gio grams in Vietnam, making it possible series of articles in the online repository Viet Commune on the north central to work with existing programmatic of PubMed.gov, individuals who have coast. DOD has also made at least three efforts, international networks, and been involved in humanitarian assistance donations of excess medical property facilities. The U.S. Army is nearby in programs for decades relate some of valued at over $2 million. Recipients of Singapore working on a dengue vaccine. the issues they have faced. The largest the supplies were hospitals located in A formal Vietnamese national dengue concern is the lack of measures of ef- the former imperial capital city of Hue control program exists, although it fectiveness related to the reduction of and the General Hospital at Can Tho, operates in a reactionary fashion to disease burdens. Without metrics, pro- the fourth largest city in the nation, dengue outbreaks. grams are less likely to be of true use to
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Raum and McDonald 89 Commander of 1st Area Medical Laboratory mixes two dengue affected insects with dozens of healthy ones to determine if his scientists could analyze and deliver correct diagnosis (U.S. Army/Carol McClelland) the host nation because no one will know in a lack of understanding of which soft in identifying, in person, defects and how the soft power program benefited it. power medical programs have been ef- dysfunctions of disease using patient Other apprehensions are that, first, DOD fective. The input-output model system histories, physical examinations, and does not have any formal evaluation does not often document useful lessons diagnostic testing. The clinical systems system for its humanitarian aid projects. learned among the host nation, the thinking model is based on the 19th- and Second, due to the multiple roles military receiving nation, and partners from the 20th-century approach to rapid, central- personnel are required to perform, solid international aid community. There is ized, short-term medical guidance that coordination with private and volunteer some consensus with humanitarian aid is inherent to field medicine mission sets, organizations and host nation officials is experts that the military focus should which should be primary to all military less than effective. Third, there is no cen- shift from instigating a short-term opera- services because of their frontline associa- tral repository of information for analysis tional clinic environment toward thinking tions with combat and the necessity for of lessons learned. Since feedback is rare, of medical aid as a larger category of saving life under horrific circumstances. projects of similar scope are reinvented public health improvement. Training for war should continue to each time they are undertaken. Fourth, Relying on the normal clinical ap- be a primary goal of military medicine. DOD does not implement health sector proach as the medical resolution model However, the increased use of militaries humanitarian assistance impact assess- for disease assistance programs may not for humanitarian aid and pre- and post- ments such as those existing within the always be the most effective tool for reconstruction activities gives military humanitarian aid community. international military healthcare agendas. medicine another set of problems to deal Traditionally, the U.S. military uses This should not suggest that the clinical with. In these new circumstances, the a clinically based input-output manage- approach is not valuable, for it has numer- tried and true clinical attitude so effec- ment measurement model that does not ous strengths such as its ability to focus tive in war and conflict is too reactive for emphasize outcomes or the why and how on the physical and biological aspects of uncustomary mission sets categorized as of program effectiveness. This results disease and conditions and its efficiencies health improvement programs.
90 Features / Mosquitoes: A Viable Soft Power Tool JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Thinking of a health-improvement to eradicate mosquitoes in which more with Vietnam may result in developing a entity rather than a clinical-systems entity than one million jars of insecticide were body of in-house expertise on program- requires some modifications in medical delivered to households. In Thailand, the matic components of effectual civilian delivery philosophy. To make the shift, government proposed that its 77 prov- disaster relief to be shared with all Service one proposed dengue engagement model inces open dengue “war rooms” to keep branches and all combatant commands. might be created using four key action families apprised of outbreaks. A Filipino The Vietnam example is worth pursuing. areas developed by the U.S. Centers for campaign called the “4 o’clock habit” A tiny mosquito could be the foundation Disease Control and Prevention over de- encouraged families to stop daily to look for instigating a new soft power philoso- cades of experience in resolving national for dengue-related problem areas in their phy based on public health improvement and international medical and health immediate surroundings. Malaysians rather than a MEDCAP mentality. JFQ issues. To deliver a health improvement established a Web portal showing updates dengue program, four perspectives of as to where dengue outbreak case clusters importance should serve as a base for are occurring.24 Notes action: epidemiology and surveillance, Health systems intervention relates 1 understanding the environment, health to gathering information about and Frederick C. Cuny, “The Lost American: Use of the Military in Humanitarian Relief,” systems intervention, and community- understanding the number, type, and Frontline, available at
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Raum and McDonald 91 Covering water to prevent dengue, Baguio, Philippines (Courtesy AusAID) a Dengue Outbreak, Calling for a Regional capabilities/a-17358069>. Resources for Prevention, Control Outbreak Response,” The Diplomat, June 19, 2013, avail- 17 Ebbighausen. and Response, Dengue, Dengue Hemorrhagic able at
92 Features / Mosquitoes: A Viable Soft Power Tool JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Landing boats pouring southern landing force Soldiers and their equipment onto beach at Massacre Bay, Attu, Aleutian Islands (Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA/OWI Collection)
Operation Cottage A Cautionary Tale of Assumption and Perceptual Bias
By Del C. Kostka
n the summer of 1943, American and can soil from Japanese occupiers. The Canadian forces launched an amphib- assault began in the predawn hours of I ious assault on the north Pacific August 15 with a heavy coastal barrage island of Kiska. Codenamed Cottage, by an armada of nearly 100 Allied war- Del C. Kostka is a Staff Officer at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency in St. Louis, the operation was intended to seize the ships. Intense fire support was followed Missouri. last enemy stronghold on North Ameri- by a chaotic but successful ship-to-shore
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Kostka 93 movement of over 34,000 U.S. Army Strategic Setting of the entire Pacific Coast region. In and Canadian combat infantrymen. For Kiska is part of the Aleutian Archi- response to the Japanese foray into the 2 long days, the invasion force slugged pelago, a chain of volcanic islands Aleutians, the Joint Chiefs of Staff began its way inland through thick fog and stretching from the Alaskan mainland a rapid buildup of U.S. forces in the against the constant din of machinegun to the far western edge of the Bering region. By the fall of 1942, ADC had and artillery fire. By the time the island Sea. Barren, windswept, and shrouded swelled to over 94,000 personnel.7 was declared secure, over 300 Allied in perpetual fog, the Aleutians embody Seapower in the region was repre- soldiers lay dead or seriously wounded. some of the harshest weather and most sented by the U.S. Navy’s North Pacific Japanese casualties? There were none. desolate terrain on the North Ameri- Task Force. Admiral Chester Nimitz, The Japanese had abandoned the island can continent. Despite this inhospi- commander of the United States Pacific almost 3 weeks prior. table environment, the Japanese were Fleet, established the North Pacific Force How could this have happened? How intensely interested in the Aleutians due in May 1942 when Navy cryptogra- could a command staff of considerable to the unique geography. The islands phers first uncovered the Japanese plan talent and intellect disregard a plethora form a natural corridor between the to attack Midway and Dutch Harbor.8 of intelligence and execute a major Eastern and Western hemispheres. By To command the North Pacific fleet, amphibious assault on a deserted island? occupying key strategic locations along Nimitz selected Rear Admiral Robert The answer might lie in a basic construct the Aleutians, the Japanese hoped to A. Theobald, a 34-year veteran of naval of the human thought process known control and defend the northern perim- surface warfare operations. Since Japanese as perceptual bias. Perceptual biases are eter of their expanding Pacific empire.4 naval operations were considered the experienced-based assumptions and The Japanese seized Kiska on June principal threat in the Aleutians, the Navy expectations that individuals intuitively 7, 1942. The attack was part of a north was designated the Service of paramount apply to the world around them.1 In Pacific diversion for the Midway cam- interest by the Joint Chiefs. Therefore, his book The Psychology of Intelligence paign orchestrated by Admiral Isoroku Theobald, as commander of the North Analysis, Richard Heuer argues that all Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, was given command author- individuals assimilate and evaluate infor- Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) Combined ity over all Army and Navy forces in the mation through a personal mental model Fleet.5 Yamamoto’s plan included a region.9 (or mindset) influenced by perceptual carrier-based air assault of American naval In sending Theobald to the Aleutians, bias. Perceptual bias is not inherently facilities at Dutch Harbor, Alaska, and Nimitz unwittingly touched off a powder bad. The assumptions we form through occupation of Kiska and Attu, the west- keg. The cerebral and cautious Theobald this bias allow us to process what would ernmost islands in the Aleutian chain. stood in stark contrast to the impatient otherwise be an incomprehensible The Kiska occupation force consisted and action-oriented Buckner. The two amount of information, but they can also of approximately 7,800 marines of the quarreled incessantly about the timetable set a lethal trap for unsuspecting mission IJN Special Naval Landing Forces under for offensive operations and the disposi- planners, decisionmakers, and intelli- the command of Rear Admiral Monzo tion of air assets in the region. Buckner gence analysts.2 Akiyama. Over 500 civilian laborers were also complained of Theobald’s propensity Assumptions are extremely relevant to also brought to the island to construct to withhold intelligence from his Army operational planning. Joint Publication harbor facilities on Kiska’s natural deep- counterparts, an assertion that Theobald (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning water bay and an elaborate system of justified based on his concern for opera- Process (JOPP), defines assumption as a caves and tunnels throughout the rocky tional security.10 Nimitz was aware of the supposition about the current situation high ground.6 contentious relationship that developed or future course of events assumed to be Japanese possession of Kiska and Attu between Theobald and Buckner and its true in the absence of facts.3 Assumptions dealt a significant psychological blow potential to be detrimental to the joint that address gaps in knowledge are critical to the American war effort. No enemy operations needed to oust the Japanese for the planning process, but the planning force had occupied North American ter- from the Aleutians. In December 1942, staff must not become so wedded to their ritory since the War of 1812, and news Nimitz replaced his reticent joint force assumptions that they reject or overlook of Japanese presence in the Aleutians commander (JFC) with Rear Admiral information that is not in accord with threatened both the confidence and Thomas C. Kinkaid, who had recently those expectations. This article examines morale of the American public. Defense served with distinction at the Battle of the perceptual bias and assumption in the of the Aleutians was vested in the Alaska Coral Sea and was reputed to be the kind historical context of Operation Cottage. Defense Command (ADC), a skeletal of aggressive and decisive leader Nimitz The pointless assault of Kiska offers a force of 24,000 under the command of required in the North Pacific.11 valuable lesson on the dangers of unveri- Major General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Kinkaid’s first major decision upon fied assumptions and the importance of Jr. The command was a component of reaching the Aleutians was to establish cognitive analysis in contemporary joint the Army’s Western Defense Command, an immediate naval blockade to wall off operation planning. established in 1941 to coordinate defense Kiska and Attu from Japanese shipping,
94 Recall / Operation Cottage: A Cautionary Tale JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Part of huge U.S. fleet at anchor in Adak Harbor in Aleutians, ready to move against Kiska (NARA/U.S. Army Air Forces/Horace Bristol)
an act of aggression much appreciated by erect a further barrier to supply and Attu constructing an airfield along the Buckner.12 American B-24 bombers had reinforcement of Kiska.14 On April 1, the northeast shore of the island. already been assailing Kiska’s harbor since Joint Chiefs approved Kinkaid’s petition Execution of Landcrab was assigned September 1942. The sea blockade only to assault Attu. The operation, desig- to the Army’s 7th Division under the added to Japan’s logistical challenge of nated Landcrab, was scheduled for May command of Major General Albert E. provisioning and sustaining its forces. By 10, 1943. Brown. The American plan was to make March 1943, the only supplies reaching simultaneous landings on the northern Kiska and Attu on a consistent basis were Lessons of Attu and easternmost shores of Attu, then those brought in by submarine.13 Attu is approximately 35 miles long and push inland in perpendicular thrusts Of the two islands, Kiska was more 15 miles wide. Its snow-capped moun- to trap the Japanese on the northeast significant from a strategic perspective. tain peaks tower 3,000 feet above sea corner of the island.16 The plan appeared Kiska had a fully developed harbor, an level. Steep, ice-covered slopes extend simple given the occupier’s isolation and operational airfield, and a substantially from the high ground down to a tree- total lack of fire support, but the opera- larger garrison. Despite Attu’s secondary less plain of arctic tundra. The Japanese tion quickly ran into difficulties due to importance, Kinkaid and Buckner agreed occupation force was comprised of a weather, the terrain, and a very shrewd to repatriate the far western island first. single Imperial Japanese Army infan- Japanese defensive strategy. Attu was lightly defended, and seizing try battalion under the command of American forces expected an intense it first would put U.S. forces astride the Colonel Yasuyo Yamasaki.15 The Japa- coastal defense by the Japanese. What Japanese line of communications and nese spent the majority of their time on they found instead were abandoned
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Kostka 95 scarce. In desperation, Yamasaki prepared a bold plan. He would use his entire force to break through the frontlines and capture an artillery battery and supply depot at the crest of a prominent hill in the American rear area. With artillery, supplies, and strategic high ground in Japanese hands, Yamasaki hoped to hold the position until reinforcements arrived by sea.20 The audacious Japanese plan almost succeeded. In the early morning hours of May 29, every Japanese soldier who was still able to walk set off on a silent trek toward the American frontlines. The Japanese quickly overpowered three sentry out- posts and began a half-mile ascent toward the supply depot at the top of the hill. The position was practically undefended except for a battalion of U.S. Army com- bat engineers who somehow managed to beat back the attackers in a frenzied hand- to-hand melee.21 The engineers pushed the exhausted Japanese back to the base of the hill. Several of the Japanese made their way back to the caves and crevices of the high ground where they were eventu- ally cornered and eliminated by American search teams. Most simply clutched a hand grenade to their chest and scattered themselves across the Aleutian tundra. As the fog lifted, the morning sun revealed a grisly sight. Over 500 Japanese bodies lay horribly mutilated on the Soldiers hurling trench mortar shells over ridge into Japanese positions, Attu, Aleutian Islands valley floor. Several hundred more bod- (Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA/OWI Collection) ies, both American and Japanese, were shores as the occupiers pulled back from elevations and cut down U.S. infantry littered across the crest and down the the coast to await the invasion force in as they appeared above the fog line.18 long slope of the hill.22 The Japanese had the higher rocky terrain.17 The unop- Lack of positive news from the front virtually fought to the death. Only 29 posed landing was welcome news to coupled with Brown’s continuous call for wounded Japanese soldiers remained alive American troops already dealing with reinforcements convinced Kinkaid that from the 2,650 that once inhabited the churning seas and 25-degree tem- Operation Landcrab was bogged down. island. The American casualty rate was peratures, but it did not bode well for an After consulting with Buckner on May stunning. Of the approximately 16,000 advance to the island interior, which now 16, Kinkaid replaced Brown with Major troops engaged on Attu, the invasion faced murderous mortar and machinegun General Eugene M. Landrum.19 force suffered 3,829 casualties, including fire from the higher ridges. The Japanese The Japanese tenaciously defended 549 killed in action.23 To Kinkaid and the deployed their forces in small groups of every ridge and stronghold on Attu, but Joint Chiefs, the bloody victory on Attu sniper and mortar teams, which used the the numbers and elements were against was an unimpeachable portent of things island’s natural network of caves, crevices, them. As fresh American troops and to come.24 and ridgelines for concealment and pro- supplies flowed freely through the open tection. Naval and artillery bombardment beachhead, the Japanese continued to On to Kiska were ineffective due to the thick fog. expend their resources in a futile battle With Attu now under U.S. Army The fog also provided an ideal backdrop of attrition. By May 28, the Japanese control, the Joint Chiefs directed their for Japanese snipers who kept watch on situation had grown critical. Food, am- attention to Kiska. American intelli- the few accessible slopes to the upper munition, and medical supplies were gence estimated Japanese troop strength
96 Recall / Operation Cottage: A Cautionary Tale JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 on Kiska at approximately 10,000, Kinkaid requested and received final ap- combined invasion force had seized an and aerial reconnaissance thoroughly proval from Nimitz to execute Operation uninhabited island. documented a labyrinth of hardened Cottage. D-day was set for August 15, The uneasy silence that settled across tunnels and bunkers throughout the H-hour at 0630. the island did not lure the infantry into high ground.25 With Attu still fresh in The morning of August 15 was a false sense of security. The rumors his mind, Kinkaid, who had been pro- unusually calm and clear in the western of casualties were true. Lives had been moted to vice admiral after Landcrab, Aleutians, but the brief respite from fog lost through friendly fire, vehicle ac- was determined to allocate sufficient and gale force winds did not insulate the cidents, land mines, and booby traps. resources for the greater challenge of assault force from adversity. An inaccurate On the morning of August 18, the Navy Kiska. Command of the attack force was tidal forecast caused several tank landing destroyer Amner Read struck a mine vested in Rear Admiral Francis Rock- ships to run aground the submerged web in Kiska harbor, killing 70 sailors and well, an amphibious operations specialist of volcanic rock off the Kiska beachhead. wounding 47. All told, the Allied forces who had served as principal planner The stationary vessels triggered a traffic suffered 92 fatalities during Operation for the Attu invasion. Major General jam, as countless landing craft backed Cottage with a further 221 wounded.34 Charles Corlett was to command the up and bobbed unproductively in the Although the assault of a deserted is- landing force, an assemblage that bal- littoral.30 The landing was unopposed as land was an embarrassment, and Kinkaid looned to over 34,000 with the addi- predicted, but to the infantry veterans was roundly criticized in the American tion of the 5,300-strong 13th Royal who witnessed the carnage on Attu, the media, the operation did pay dividends Canadian Infantry Brigade.26 lack of contact with enemy forces simply in ways not apparent to Kinkaid’s detrac- During the month of July, Eleventh meant that the Japanese were calmly tors. Amphibious warfare techniques Air Force dropped 424 tons of ordnance waiting in prepared positions on higher were refined after the Kiska landing, and on Kiska, while an offshore screen of ground.31 Kinkaid’s decision to bypass and isolate U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers lobbed As the landing craft slowly wove their heavily defended Kiska by first seizing an additional 330 tons of shell onto the way onto the beach, a dense fog began Attu set a strategic precedent for the island.27 Air reconnaissance operations to settle over the island, bringing with it successful island-hopping campaign of were relentless, collecting intelligence on a cold, steady rain. There was no shelter 1943–1945.35 Moreover, Japan’s foot- Kiska’s occupiers at every opportunity for the exposed landing force. The icy hold in the Aleutians was gone. allowed by the notorious Aleutian fog. blanket of fog soon reduced visibility The final mysteries of Kiska were not As the assault preparations extended to near zero. As night fell, disoriented solved until after the war when interroga- into August, the combined landing force troops scratched shallow foxholes in the tion of Japanese officials exposed details began to assemble on Adak Island, 200 rocky tundra in which to await daylight of the Japanese strategic retreat. The in- miles east of Kiska. and some semblance of order. Sleep was terviews revealed that the brutal slugfest Starting in late July, however, air impossible. Sporadic firing could be on Attu had made as deep an impression photo interpreters began to note curious heard in all directions, and the eerie glow on the Japanese Imperial Command as observations. Routine activities on Kiska of tracer bullets tearing through fog only it had on Kinkaid and the Joint Chiefs. appeared to diminish significantly, and added to the confusion. Voices trying to The continued Allied naval blockade of almost no movement could be detected organize and coordinate were muffled Kiska, along with relentless bombing by within the harbor. Bomb-damaged build- and swept away by the wind.32 the Eleventh Air Force, convinced the ings and craters on Kiska’s airfield were Daylight eased the tension, but the Japanese that a second Allied assault to left unrepaired, a suspicious breach of fog, rain, and cold wind remained. As repatriate Kiska was imminent.36 The protocol for the industrious Japanese. the infantry began their climb into the decision to evacuate the Kiska garrison Aircrews also reported greatly dimin- high ground, artillery fire roared out of was not taken lightly. Some voices within ished antiaircraft fire. On July 28, radio the mist behind them. Support fire from the Imperial High Command held that signals from Kiska ceased entirely.28 To warships continued to whistle overhead a withdrawal from Kiska would dishonor many intelligence analysts, the mounting and explode in the distance. Rumors of the dead of Attu and that the soldiers of evidence suggested that the Japanese casualties, firefights, and elusive Japanese Kiska should be left to fight to an honor- had somehow slipped through the snipers circulated with abandon.33 By able death as well.37 But even the most Allied naval blockade and evacuated mid-afternoon, advance elements of in- aggressive Japanese commanders realized Kiska. Kinkaid did not agree. Influenced fantry began to reach the lower echelons that Japan’s hold on Kiska was point- strongly by Japanese tactics on Attu, he of Japanese fortifications. Now, new less, and manpower was badly needed argued that the enemy had simply taken reports of abandoned bunkers and caches elsewhere in the Pacific. On May 19, the to the upper elevations. Staff suggestions of destroyed weapons seemed to contra- Imperial High Command reluctantly is- for further aerial reconnaissance and an dict the earlier rumors. As more deserted sued orders to abandon Kiska.38 advance scouting party were discounted tunnels and dugouts were explored, the The original Japanese plan was to as risky and unnecessary.29 On July 30, embarrassing truth became evident. The gradually withdraw the Kiska garrison by
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Kostka 97 The JOPP is a structured decisionmaking tool used to examine mission objectives and plan operations. JOPP is supported by Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), an analytical process used to determine an adversary’s strength, disposition, and potential courses of action (COAs). Both the JOPP and JIPOE instill struc- tured analytical techniques to challenge assumptions, identify mindsets, and stimulate outside-the-box thinking. One of the primary techniques em- ployed throughout the JOPP is red team analysis. Red teams comprise trained experts from the command staff who independently review plans from a con- trarian perspective in order to identify alternative hypotheses and challenge basic assumptions.42 Often, the same evidence that supports an initial reflex as- sumption may be consistent with several different hypotheses. Red team analysis helps the planning staff validate its in- Bombs dropping in train from U.S. Army Air Force plane on Kiska, Aleutian Islands (Library of tuitive assumptions by asking why the Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, FSA/OWI Collection) assumption must be true, and whether submarine, but this scheme was aborted the Japanese seized Malaya, Singapore, the assumption will remain true under all in late June after three submarines as- and the island of Luzon in the Philip- conditions.43 Assumptions that cannot be signed to the operation were detected pines stunned the Allies. Japan’s samurai validated through mission and red team and sunk by Allied destroyers.39 It was heritage and code of ethics known as analysis are captured as an information then decided to evacuate the force using bushido fueled a stereotype of a warrior requirement. The J2 has overall staff surface vessels as transports, leaving only culture steeped in obedience, discipline, responsibility for consolidating informa- a small rear guard to destroy hard assets and staunch revulsion to surrender. The tion requirements nominated through and plant booby traps. On the evening intensity and savagery of the fighting on the JOPP and for recommending to the of July 28, a small task force of cruisers Attu only served to reinforce this image. commander their approval and relative and destroyers slipped through the Allied Even the intelligence—the suspicious priority.44 If a key decision must be made naval blockade under the cover of fog and absence of observable activity, the unre- based upon an assumption, the informa- extracted over 5,000 Japanese troops in paired bomb damage, and the lack of tion needed to validate that assumption less than an hour.40 The rear guard, which signals intelligence—could all be attrib- is designated a Commander’s Critical accounted for the sporadic antiaircraft uted to a cunning enemy who had taken Information Requirement.45 fire in the days preceding the assault, was to the hills to await battle in prepared Contrarian assessment and cogni- later evacuated by submarine. In the end, fortifications. tive analysis are important components the Japanese evacuation of Kiska was a Every operation begins with as- of JIPOE as well. The primary pur- daring and brilliant success. sumptions. A prime objective of mission pose of JIPOE is to support the JFC analysis is to convert basic assumptions decisionmaking and planning process Analysis into known fact.41 An assumption should by providing a holistic view of the op- Operation Cottage was based on two never be accepted as fact based simply erational environment and adversary.46 key assumptions: the Japanese occupied on perception or superficial evidence, JIPOE, which is codified in JP 2-01.3, Kiska, and the Japanese would not and as Operation Cottage demonstrates, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the retreat from Kiska. That the Allied staff the logic behind invalid assumptions can Operational Environment, consists of might have had an unrealistic impres- sometimes be extremely compelling. four basic steps: a description of the sion of Japanese resilience and fortitude Fortunately, contemporary operation operational environment, description of in August 1943 is understandable planners have systematic doctrinal guid- the impact of the operational environ- given the context of prior events in the ance to avoid the pitfalls of perceptual ment, evaluation of the adversary, and Pacific. The speed and ease with which bias and distinguish assumption from fact. finally, determination of the adversary’s
98 Recall / Operation Cottage: A Cautionary Tale JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 6 likely COAs. The JIPOE process provides supporting intelligence might have been Nifumi Mukai, commander, Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), interrogation by Captain situational awareness and assumptions given more credence and directed events J.S. Russell, USN, Interrogation of Japanese Of- regarding the operational environment to a decidedly different outcome. ficials, OPNAV-P-03-100, October 22, 1945, and the adversary and lays the founda- JOPP and JIPOE provide mis- available at
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Kostka 99 time while some of his lesser known striking London with deadly effects. speeches greatly influenced audiences. Some leaders might have been tempted Toye explores an evolution of perception to downplay the attacks and thus poten- as contemporary audiences seemed to tially offend the people directly affected. reinterpret over time some of Churchill’s Instead, Churchill presented the facts in speeches, ascribing to them mythic such a way that, across Britain, empathy qualities that they did not possess when increased for London, spreading national delivered. He explores this phenomenon unity and renewed resolve—a great ex- resulting in a literary time capsule, which ample of being first with the truth. expertly describes this war of words over The Roar of the Lion compellingly the will of a nation. Military and civilian describes one of the most gifted orators leaders alike can learn much from this of the last century. Churchill’s speeches comprehensive discussion of strategic serve as an outstanding model because communication. they reflect a process of evaluating The strategic environment in which environmental challenges and find- Churchill operated was extremely com- ing the words to motivate a society to plex and consisted of global stakeholders meet those challenges. These speeches beyond the United Kingdom. Churchill were monumental, but they were also was constantly engaged in balancing the imperfect human utterances. Toye helps need to bolster the fighting spirit of the readers see those speeches as they really British people with encouraging interna- were. It would be difficult to find a bet- tional partners. Some speeches created ter book for the discussion of strategic The Roar of the Lion: The controversy at home because addressing communication. Commanders at all levels Untold Story of Churchill’s Russian or American interests did not can find themselves involved in various World War II Speeches always play well in Britain or vice versa. forms of public engagement. This book Among many controversies were priori- describes not only the arguments but also By Richard Toye ties of effort for the Allies. On one hand, how Churchill meticulously crafted them. Oxford University Press, 2013 ending the war in Europe before the war Toye’s work would also be an ideal study 309 pp. $34.95 in the Pacific was important to many resource for readers engaged in informa- ISBN: 978-0199642526 parties. On the other hand, American, tion operations, or public affairs, or for Reviewed by Richard A. McConnell Australian, and Chinese audiences could anyone who would like to learn about not perceive that Britain was uncommit- effective communication executed by a ted to the war in the Pacific. This message true master. JFQ t was a nation and race dwelling all was difficult to communicate effectively, around the globe that had the lion and Churchill did not always succeed at heart. I had the luck to be called it. Toye provides detailed descriptions of Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. McConnell, I USA (Ret.), is an Assistant Professor in the upon to give the roar.” the political realities that Churchill had Department of Army Tactics at the Command and The above passage is just one of many to consider in his speeches along with the General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. examples of superb oratory for which process he used to create them. Churchill Winston Churchill is renowned during dictated his speeches and then painstak- his wartime leadership of Britain. Richard ingly vetted them through multiple Toye, a professor of modern history at parties prior to delivery. Toye’s descrip- the University of Exeter, examines how tion of this process would be informative audiences received these now-famous to anyone preparing for command media speeches at the time of their delivery. engagements. Toye provides rich descriptions for read- One of the most compelling discus- ers to understand Churchill’s speeches sions in this book for military leaders is through the political and informational Toye’s description of how Churchill ad- environment existing at the time. Using dressed crisis management. Churchill was research from a wide variety of sources, adept at addressing a bad situation with ranging from Gallup polls to diaries, Toye “brutal frankness” without destroying examines audience perceptions recorded the morale of people engaged in a long immediately following speech delivery. war. A good example of this skill is the Remarkably, some of Churchill’s most description of how Churchill reacted the famous speeches were ill-received at the week after D-Day, when V1 bombs began
100 Book Reviews JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 before and during World War I. Her views of world order prevail. Hull puts scholarship merits the attention of JFQ it starkly and uses her deep research in readers because Americans and their part- primary and secondary materials in many ners who are engaged in armed conflict languages to support her conclusion. deal with its central themes every day: “Denigrating the importance of Belgian relations between civilians and military neutrality,” she writes, “appeals particu- in the development and implementation larly to those who believe that Britain of war plans; the conduct of war; the should never have entered the war, or in- meaning of military necessity, content, deed that the war should never have been relevancy, and role of international law in fought; the basis for this view is the belief politico-military decisionmaking; and the that Imperial Germany was not a danger different perspectives of governments and either to Britain’s security or to Europe’s. cultures. Significantly, specialists in German his- Hull became interested in the role tory do not generally share these views” of international law in decisionmak- (p. 33). For the German military and ing before and during World War I as most civilian leadership including the a result of research on the German and Kaiser, “military necessity was the law of other European conceptions of “military war. The grand goal of war [is] conquer- necessity” and her belief that the United ing the enemy’s energy . . . and will. This States had wandered off the legal rails single goal rules absolutely, it dictates law after the terrorist attacks of September and regulation. The concrete form of this 11. Hull begins with a simple state- law appears as military necessity” (p. 69). A Scrap of Paper: Breaking ment from which so much else flowed: The more common and at the time ma- and Making International “The First World War began with an jority view outside German military and Law during the Great War international crime: Germany’s viola- political circles was expressed by Francis tion of Belgium neutrality” (p. 16). In Lieber during the American Civil War in By Isabel V. Hull exchange for accepting and recognizing his justly celebrated Instructions for the Cornell University Press, 2014 Belgium’s independence in 1839, the Government of Armies of the United 368 pp. $45 great powers of the day—Austria, Britain, States in the Field, General Orders ISBN: 978-0801452734 France, Prussia, and Russia—guaranteed No. 100, dated April 24, 1863, which Reviewed by Nicholas Rostow Belgium’s perpetual neutrality (p. 17). became the touchstone for subsequent Germany’s war plan, first developed after understanding and development of the 1890 and then refined most famously laws of war: “Military necessity . . . con- his centenary of the beginning as the Schlieffen Plan memorialized in sists in the necessity of those measures of World War I has spawned 1905, addressed the problem of possible which are indispensable for securing the T divergent reconsiderations of the simultaneous wars with France and Russia ends of the war, and which are lawful war. Why should these different views by a preemptive march through Belgium according to the modern law and us- and the Great War itself be of interest to knock France out of the war. The vio- ages of war” (p. 67). In short, Germany to readers of Joint Force Quarterly? The lation of Belgian neutrality was a catalytic superseded law in the name of military reasons concern everything from the event, turning the war into an unforeseen operations. At the same time, the law de- nature of peace to military operations global conflict among behemoths. From fined both the aims of military operations and innovation. World War I has had the outset of World War I, Berlin justified and the nature of such operations. These such a profound impact on the struc- this violation of international law on the different conceptions put Germany at ture of our world that it has even made ground of “military necessity.” odds with international law and order. the subject of human misery an area of Germany’s conception of military Hull uses the contrasting approaches of enduring interest. Nationally, of course, necessity and the role and importance of Britain and France to issues of interna- the war represents America’s entrance law, and international law in particular, tional law and the exigencies of war to onto the world stage, followed by a differed from majority opinion in Europe drive the point home. short, costly effort to retreat, followed and America. This perspective provides Some British and French leaders by the continuing leading role since the central theme for Hull’s book. Her considered Germany to be “simply law- 1945 or, perhaps more accurately, since conclusion is that Germany’s approach to less” (p. 210). Germany was not lawless, December 7, 1941. law and order meant that the Great War but the German military and political Isabel V. Hull, author of A Scrap of had to be fought and won. Not necessar- leadership understood law in a different Paper, is a learned historian of Germany ily the way it was fought and ended, but way from their British, French, and, ulti- and Europe, particularly German history Germany had to be stopped lest German mately, American counterparts (a subject
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2016 Book Reviews 101 for additional research is Austrian, Italian, close and continuous blockade as well as Ottoman, and Russian views on the the rights and obligations of neutrals. The subject) and did not consider it to be im- British interdepartmental cabinet system portant, per se. From the first days of the ensured that civilian and legal views were war, German action triggered this kind of continuously part of the decisionmak- response and, indeed, British and French ing process. French decisionmaking also formal inquiries into Germany conduct. coordinated civilian and legal views, par- Germany’s response to Belgium’s refusal ticularly where potentially explosive issues to stand aside was draconian—executions, such as reprisals for bombing of towns arson, hostage-taking, use of human were involved. German decisionmaking shields, killing of unarmed prisoners, and followed different patterns. The Germans pillage (for example, 850 civilians were used poison gas for the first time without shot between August 5 and 8, 1914). leaving behind a paper trail to illuminate These events highlighted the lack of civil- the decisionmaking process, unlike in the ian control of the military in Germany. case of unrestricted submarine warfare, Atrocities happened with embarrassing meaning sink without warning. A Scrap frequency to reinforce growing infor- of Paper principally compares British and mation warfare (propaganda) vilifying German (and here and there French, Germany—for example, the execution of Austrian, Russian, and American) ap- nurse Edith Cavell for helping Allied sol- proaches to the problems presented by diers and civilians escape to Holland, the the nature of World War I, the rules of execution of the captain of an unarmed international law, and the evolution of British steamer for evading a U-boat warfighting and international law during Brothers Armed: Military (based on an alleged ramming), the burn- the conflict. The result is a cautionary tale Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine ing of the Louvain University library of for the contemporary policymaker and Edited by Colby Howard and Ruslan hundreds of thousands of medieval books warfighter. Pukhov and manuscripts (to “teach them to re- A Scrap of Paper is an illuminating East View Press, 2014 spect Germany and to think twice before study in relations between civilian and 236 pp. $89.95 they resist her” (p. 53), the calamities of military establishments and the terrible ISBN: 978-1879944220 unrestricted submarine warfare such as impact of self-regard and hubris. The the sinking of the RMS Lusitania, the book is deeply learned (the author appears Reviewed by Michael Kofman use of poison gas, the use of incendiary to have taught herself much international weapons, and the bombing of cities such law), well written, arrestingly original, as London. As early as 1915, the German and accessible to the ordinary reader. It rothers Armed is an edited anthol- military even sent covert agents to the is recommended for serious students of ogy comprising several essays United States armed with anthrax and international relations and strategy. It re- B detailing the history of Crimea, glanders (a disease that affects livestock) minds us forcibly both that Clemenceau, the post-Soviet history of the Russian to infect horses and draft animals bound France’s World War I prime minister, had and Ukrainian armed forces, and a for the Allies. This effort led to the es- it right when he stated that war was too detailed account of Russia’s annexation tablishment of a laboratory for biological serious a business to be left to generals of Crimea in March 2014. This volume agents for sabotage. alone and that military necessity and mili- is timely, especially given the dearth of Each of these events involved as- tary convenience are not synonymous. JFQ existing scholarly sources on some of sessments of the existing law of armed the subjects covered. It provides great conflict, whether pertaining to occupa- insights into the annexation, compre- tion and the treatment of civilians or the Nicholas Rostow, Ph.D., J.D., is a Distinguished hensively analyzes the historical context Research Professor at the National Defense war at sea and the treatment of merchant University (NDU) and Senior Director of the Center as well as the existing military balance, shipping, neutral or not. The German for Strategic Research, Institute for National and delivers a full accounting in an approach to legal issues in this context Security Studies, at NDU. objective and dispassionate manner. differed markedly from the British and The first chapter by Vasiliy Kashin French. For the British the most impor- briefly covers the history of Crimea until tant test involved the blockade: what was its controversial transfer from Russia to required by the technology of war at the Ukraine in 1954 by Nikita Khrushchev. beginning of the 20th century, whether A change of borders intended mostly for starving an opponent was lawful or even pragmatic reasons, the transfer proved worthwhile, and related questions about unpopular with Russians and became
102 Book Reviews JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 a lasting problem between the two thus nullifying any impetus for further independent operations as Western ana- successor countries when Boris Yeltsin military reforms. A disastrous scheme by logues, leading to their eventual debut pushed for a hasty dissolution of the the government in 2009 to fund a large in the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Soviet Union. Kashin explains that “the percentage of the defense budget by Dmitry Boltenikov navigates the military Crimean issue was never completely selling surplus equipment fell through, and political status of the Black Sea Fleet, forgotten, but it was seen as relatively un- leaving the armed forces bankrupt and both the force itself and its political important” as long as Moscow sought to without food or electricity. As a cumula- relevance, from Ukraine’s independence achieve other goals in Ukraine, sacrificing tive consequence, by 2012 “some 92% of to the present. This history segues into Crimea in an effort to “draw the whole of Ukraine’s hardware was at least 20 years an intricate account of Russia’s opera- Ukraine into its orbit.” An added insight old, and 52% was older than 25 years.” tion to annex Crimea, where Moscow is that Russia made little official effort Lavrov and Nikolsky paint a clear picture took advantage of several unique factors, to retain its influence in Crimea during of how and why Ukraine ended up hav- including its naval base, local concern and the 1990s, or stir up trouble there, but ing barely 5,000 combat-ready troops trepidation at events in Kiev, political mis- a personal crusade by Moscow mayor in 2014, as well as few flying aircraft and steps by the interim national authority, Yuri Luzhkov deserves most of the credit hardly any functioning ships. and an early tactical advantage. for preserving Russian influence on the Mikhail Barabanov follows up with A disguised insertion of special opera- peninsula. two excellent chapters on Russia’s own tions forces, supported by local marines Sergey Denisentsev next describes efforts at military reform. First came a already garrisoned, rapidly isolated and the Ukraine’s military inheritance from series of fruitless attempts by defense nullified Ukraine’s forces throughout the Soviet Union. Ukraine received “the ministers prior to 2008, when Russia Crimea, which were numerically superior second most powerful armed forces in fought two wars in Chechnya by creating and retained much heavier firepower. Europe after Russia, and the fourth most ad hoc task forces and seeking to create Reinforcements via airlift and sealift estab- powerful in the world.” He describes the a small combat force within a large mass lished complete control, while proximity degradation of a formidable force, left mobilization army composed of skeleton to mainland Russia allowed for heavier without a budget, purpose, or political units. The country was unable to “sup- gear to arrive. With some exceptions, the support as “completely unprecedented in port or execute either.” Russia’s units affair was bloodless and surprisingly civil, terms of its speed and scale.” The chapter sent untrained soldiers into Chechnya, concluding with the majority of Ukrainian assesses some roughly $89 billion of sapping overall strength to field individual troops joining Russia in the end. It is a inherited military assets ($150 billion ad- units, which combined into ineffective remarkable account of tactical success, and justed for inflation), detailing some of the task forces. a testament to select improvements within Soviet Union’s best technical assets. This pattern changed when Vladimir the Russian armed forces, but qualified by Anton Lavrov and Aleksey Nikolsky Putin appointed Anatoliy Serdyukov as unique factors that make it almost impos- then discuss why Ukraine largely ne- minister of defense to execute a radical sible to repeat elsewhere. glected its armed forces, letting them transformation. The goal was to abandon The book concludes with Vyacheslav deteriorate. Ukraine drastically cut mass mobilization in favor of an army Tseluyko’s chapter on how to reform and manpower but maintained the Soviet mo- that was consolidated, fully manned, modernize Ukraine’s force with an eye to bilization-centric configuration and large employed a brigade structure, and in- further conventional conflict with Russia. stockpiles of equipment that were costly tended for conflicts on Russia’s periphery He proposes a defense mindset, repairing to maintain but provided little capability. instead of a major war with NATO. The existing systems and relying on standoff Interestingly, the forces were all stationed process described is fitful, consolidating artillery, along with hopes for high-tech on the western front because of existing and transforming the military but throw- Western military assistance. It provides Soviet infrastructure, and no funding ing it into turmoil. Some of the essential great background and ideas, though the was ever allocated to rebase units in the reforms were ultimately discarded or scenarios discussed in Ukraine’s Donbass eastern half of the country. The reforms partially rescinded by Sergei Shoigu, the region are dated given current events on that did occur were pushed through by a current minister of defense. By 2014, the ground. pro-Western government in Kiev, start- Russia had a radically more capable and As a whole, this volume is an excellent ing in 2005, because of its desire to join combat-ready force to deal with Ukraine compendium for experts on Russia’s and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization than it did in the Russian-Georgian war, Ukraine’s militaries, but is equally acces- (NATO). Ukraine’s parliament, however, but many of its fundamental problems, sible to newcomers, offering background, consistently underfunded the defense such as undermanned formations and context, and insights on the annexation budget, undermining any attempts at dependence on short-term conscription, of Crimea. JFQ reform, training, or modernization. remain unresolved. Russia’s war with Georgia had an un- Aleksey Nikolsky details the formation expected suppressive effect, suspending of Russia’s new special operations forces Michael Kofman is a Public Policy Scholar at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC. Ukraine’s hopes of joining NATO and in 2011; these forces were designed for
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2016 Book Reviews 103 During exercise Stellar Avenger, Aegis-class destroyer USS Hopper launches Standard Missile–3 Blk IA, successfully intercepting subscale short-range ballistic missile, launched from Kauai Test Facility, Pacific Missile Range Facility, Barking Sans, Kauai (U.S. Navy)
Seeing 2020 America’s New Vision for Integrated Air and Missile Defense
By Geoffrey F. Weiss
n December 5, 2013, with the Corps began Operation Crossbow, the (AMD) outlines the Chairman’s guid- stroke of a pen, Chairman of Anglo-American bombing campaign ance to the joint force and, by exten- O the Joint Chiefs of Staff General against Adolf Hitler’s V-1 and V-2 sion, to all the stakeholders that con- Martin E. Dempsey profoundly altered missile forces and a missile defense tribute to the air and missile defense the U.S. approach to the pressing milestone—General Dempsey signed of the U.S. homeland and its regional problem of air and missile defense. the Joint Integrated Air and Missile forces, partners, and allies. What makes On that date—coincidentally, 70 years Defense: Vision 2020.1 This seminal the new vision both exceptionally to the day after the U.S. Army Air document for air and missile defense timely and highly relevant is that it accounts for the volatility and reality of 21st-century strategic and threat Colonel Geoffrey F. Weiss, USAF, is the Deputy Director of the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense environments characterized more often Organization. than not by rapid, enigmatic change.
104 Joint Doctrine / Vision for Integrated Air and Missile Defense JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 By crafting a holistic integrated air an adversary’s ability to create adverse limited menu of options. Of course, the and missile defense (IAMD) vision—that effects from their air and missile capa- first requisite element of any defense is, one that encompasses a full range bilities.”3 This is just a formalized way against air and missile threats is detection, of integrated means including passive, of saying AMD helps to win wars by tracking, and target discrimination. The nonkinetic, and left-of-launch—the defeating or mitigating enemy air and target in question might be the aircraft, Chairman has definitively departed from missile attacks. The origins of AMD missile, its point or system of origin, or its the previous paradigm that addressed can be traced back to the headwaters guidance or command element. This part an era of fewer, less capable threats. No of war itself and the need to defend of the missile defense calculus began with longer can the United States reasonably against ranged weapons. Throughout human spotters, who have since evolved expect to unilaterally defeat most air and the history of warfare, there have into expensive, technologically sophisti- missile threats with its own active defense been numerous so-called revolutions cated land-, air-, and space-based sensors systems or to outpace growing threat in military affairs, yet perhaps none as such as electronically scanned radars and capabilities by outspending all of its po- profound as the invention of ranged infrared detectors. After the threat is tential adversaries. Instead, the new vision weapons, of which modern air and detected, subsequent defensive options directs the joint force to embrace a broad missile threats are currently the ultimate include movement and CCD (avoid the spectrum of cost-informed options that expression. Early ranged weapons, such attack); shields, armor, or fortifications enable greater IAMD adaptability and as the bow and arrow, transformed war (survive the attack); and destroying or create flexibility to meet the challenges from a personal and highly risky affair to deterring the attacker (prevent the at- presented by proliferating air and missile a less intimate one, enabling warriors to tack). With respect to countering aircraft, threats across the global battlespace. The strike from safer distances that reduced the theories of Generals Billy Mitchell and core of the Chairman’s intent for IAMD the risk of immediate counterattack and Giulio Douhet notwithstanding, a range is encapsulated in six key imperatives de- the psychological consequences of face- of active measures, including surface- signed to guide the joint force in meeting to-face killing—an activity most people, based and airborne guns, artillery, and these challenges in a logical and fiscally even in ancient times, found abhorrent.4 missiles, has proved effective. However, responsible manner. These include rec- These weapons presented a new danger ballistic missiles present a more daunting ognizing the need to leverage all forms of that compelled a Newtonian reaction to challenge because their speed and operat- information to support IAMD detection, stave off a Darwinian fate—adapt or die. ing envelope make them nearly impossible targeting, and engagement; enacting Early humans adapted by fashioning to detect, track, and successfully engage. baseline joint and combined force em- primitive defenses, which at the time This is the problem often referred to as ployment to tap cooperative synergies; consisted exclusively of passive measures “hitting a bullet with a bullet.” targeting IAMD system improvements to such as shields or armor to survive an Not until the mid-20th century did meet specific needs while ensuring afford- attack and movement, camouflage, technology finally support a fourth op- ability and interoperability; incorporating concealment, and deception (CCD) to tion to address missiles—interception passive defense efforts to close seams avoid an attack by confounding detec- of the missile (neutralize the attack). and coordinate with other elements of tion and targeting. This new, technology-assisted alterna- IAMD; ensuring policies leverage part- Over time, as the art and science tive ushered in the era of “active” missile ner contributions and burden-sharing; of war and its weapons matured, the defense—missiles could now kill missiles. and fostering awareness across the development of improved propulsion, Indeed, so much attention has been given Department of Defense (and beyond) guidance, and payloads in guns, artillery, to this new capability that the terms ac- of the benefits and proper use of the rockets, mortars, aircraft, and missiles tive missile defense and missile defense have IAMD mission.2 Clearly, these discerning upped the ante, placing ever greater become nearly synonymous. In 1996, directives to the joint force stand on their pressure on defenses to keep up in a the United States incorporated history’s own; nevertheless, their significance and high-stakes game of cat and mouse. The AMD lessons and added command and applicability are best understood by tak- first use of a powered missile in war dates control to tie it all together within a ing a closer look at IAMD and the factors back to 13th-century China, but it was doctrinal concept known as the “four pil- and reasoning that gave birth to them. not until the early 19th century in Europe lars” of IAMD: passive defense (survive that these rockets gained the range and the attack), active defense (neutralize the A Brief History of Air power to be of true military significance. attack), command, control, computers, and Missile Defense The German V-2 missile holds the dis- communications, and intelligence (C4I) Joint Publication 1-02 defines IAMD tinction of being the first true military (detect and respond to the attack), and as “the integration of capabilities and ballistic missile.5 attack operations (prevent the attack).6 overlapping operations to defend the As the offense pursued weapons with Though no longer formally part of doc- Homeland and United States national greater speed, range, accuracy, stealth, trine, the four pillars concept is still valid interests, protect the Joint Force, and and firepower, the defense, at least for and useful for understanding the funda- enable freedom of action by negating most of war’s history, has had a more mental elements of AMD.
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Weiss 105 In the United States, modern active Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy to space-launched weapons integrated with AMD programs began about the same assign the task of active strategic defense advanced sensors and C4I. Ultimately, time that long-range air and missile solely to the Army and to establish the America’s efforts and investments in threats emerged. Defense against aircraft Advanced Research Projects Agency to pursuit of practical active missile defense gained serious attention with the advent explore innovative solutions to aid the were vindicated when, in 1991 during of combat aircraft in World War I and effort.9 Against the strategic backdrop of Operation Desert Storm, the Army’s mainly relied upon other aircraft, antiair- the Cuban missile crisis, the Army wasted Patriot interceptors became the first mis- craft artillery (AAA), and surface-to-air little time in getting to work on new sile defense system to successfully engage missiles (SAM), a paradigm that endures systems designed to intercept Soviet mis- a missile in real-world combat by destroy- to this day. In countries with fewer re- siles. Examples included the Nike Zeus ing an Iraqi Scud mid-flight.12 sources, greater dependence is placed on and Nike-X anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), Seeking to capitalize upon the AAA and SAMs, which are less costly to which used nuclear warheads to destroy proven success of Patriot and the end of develop, man, and employ than manned incoming missiles (a practice the Soviets the Cold War, President Bill Clinton di- aircraft. In this regard, missiles are also explored) in their terminal phase rected greater attention to the problem something of a “poor man’s air force,” a of flight. Yet despite some successful of theater missile defense (TMD). It was fact that accounts for their proliferation tests, the Nike programs were never fully during his tenure that many of today’s throughout the world today. implemented due to the risks of nuclear most well-known active TMD systems U.S. ballistic missile defense ef- detonations over the United States as matured, including Patriot Advanced forts originated in response to the Nazi well as technical challenges in computing, Capability-3, Terminal High Altitude V-2 rocket program in World War II. detection, and target discrimination. The Area Defense (THAAD), and the Navy’s Interestingly, the threat posed by Nazi failure of Nike did not deter the Army Aegis-enabled Standard Missile-3 (SM- missiles to the U.S. homeland was more or the other Services from continuing to 3).13 As part of this initiative to improve significant than is usually recognized; the explore and debate active missile defense integration of theater AMD, in 1997, Germans actually had plans to attack the concepts right up until President Richard the Secretary of Defense and Chairman U.S. mainland with submarine-borne Nixon signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established V-2s and had intercontinental ballistic Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1972. the Joint Theater Air and Missile missiles (ICBMs) on the drawing board.7 The ABM Treaty imposed limits on the Defense Organization (JTAMDO) as a After World War II, adversary air and mis- number of ABM sites and interceptors Chairman’s Controlled Activity report- sile threats, particularly from the Warsaw each country could field, essentially ren- ing through the Joint Staff Director Pact countries, became more numerous dering strategic missile defenses on both of Force Structure, Resources, and and capable, and the United States began sides militarily ineffective due to the over- Assessment (J8). JTAMDO’s initial char- developing countermeasures in earnest. whelming advantages in numbers and ter was to work with all the Department Direct threats to the homeland were capabilities enjoyed by the country using of Defense (DOD) AMD stakeholders, limited initially to long-range aviation ICBMs offensively.10 especially the geographic combatant but later expanded to include ICBMs, Even so, the ABM Treaty did not commands, to define requirements, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, induce the United States to abandon its architectures, and capabilities for joint and cruise missiles. Overseas, America’s quest for a viable defense against mis- force theater AMD.14 Later, JTAMDO’s forward forces, partners, and allies faced sile attack. Throughout the 1980s and role expanded to include leadership in a full range of threats to include short- 1990s, the United States created a series the integration of all AMD require- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, of organizations assigned to collaborate ments, capabilities, and architectures, a bombers, and tactical weapons such as with the Services and private industry to nod to its repository of IAMD expertise, artillery, rockets, and mortars. To address develop concepts for directed energy and its success in capabilities analysis and these threats, the Army and Air Force nonnuclear, hit-to-kill missile intercep- war-gaming, and its unique position shared the initial burden of developing tors. These organizations included the within the Joint Capabilities Integration missile defenses. They tackled the thorny Defense Advanced Research Projects and Development System (JCIDS) technical problem of creating viable active Agency; President Ronald Reagan’s process. Thus, JTAMDO became missile defenses for both the homeland Strategic Defense Initiative Organization JIAMDO with integrated replacing the and regional areas of responsibility. Early (1984–1994); the Ballistic Missile word theater. Today, JIAMDO remains Air Force programs included Projects Defense Organization (1994–2002); and the Chairman’s lead agency for imple- Wizard and Thumper in 1946 followed today’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA, menting the Joint IAMD Vision 2020, by the Army’s Patriot in 1949.8 2002–present).11 Some of their novel advocating for affordable solutions to By 1958, the dire threat from Soviet initiatives explored methods for intercep- warfighter IAMD requirements and in- nuclear-armed ICBMs coupled with tion in all phases (boost, mid-course, and tegrating AMD equities among a diverse unproductive inter-Service squabbling terminal) of ballistic missile trajectories range of stakeholders, each with its own over missile defense responsibilities led by means of a variety of air-, sea-, and organizational culture and priorities.
106 Joint Doctrine / Vision for Integrated Air and Missile Defense JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 U.S. Marines with Amphibious Assault Vehicle Platoon, Battalion Landing Team 3/2, 26th MEU, Marine Air-Ground Task Force prepare to splash at Arta Beach (DOD/Michael S. Lockett)
The final phase of U.S. AMD history defense system with ground-based inter- the Soviet Union’s existential threat. began at the end of President Clinton’s ceptors (GBIs) in Alaska and California. In contrast, the 21st century’s strategic second term. Having reinvigorated Today’s IAMD systems, due to the com- context is much harder to define and TMD, the President and Congress plementary efforts of DOD, the Services, has proven far more volatile. As the collaborated on the National Missile MDA, combatant commands, private in- recently released 2014 Quadrennial Defense Act of 1999, which made it “the dustry, and JIAMDO, consist of an array Defense Review summarized, “The policy of the United States to deploy as of advanced, strategically positioned radar global trends that will define the future soon as is technologically possible an ef- and infrared sensors, layered active missile security environment are character- fective National Missile Defense system interceptors—such as Patriot, THAAD, ized by a rapid rate of change and a capable of defending the territory of SM-3, and GBI—and robust C4I that complexity born of the multiple ways the United States against limited bal- links it all together. in which they intersect and influ- listic missile attack (whether accidental, ence one another. As a result, despite unauthorized, or deliberate).”15 This law Today’s Strategic Context the growing availability and flow of paved the way for President George W. While the strategic context during information around the world, it is Bush to withdraw from the ABM Treaty the 20th century’s formative period of increasingly challenging to predict how in 2002 and pursue a national missile de- missile defense was certainly dynamic, global threats and opportunities will fense designed to negate a limited ballistic most of it could be defined within the evolve.”16 Indeed, though the pros- missile strike on the United States. That rubric of the Cold War. During this pect of global thermonuclear war has vision became a reality with the imple- epoch, defense priorities and resourc- diminished, myriad other strategic chal- mentation of a ground-based midcourse ing could always be calibrated against lenges have cropped up, each having
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Weiss 107 Missile Defense Agency’s Flight Test 06b Ground-Based Interceptor launches from Vandenberg Air Force Base, June 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Michael Peterson) the potential to wreak havoc on U.S. to become a new battleground in the of separate IAMD domains—regional national interests at home and abroad international race for greater access to and homeland. Now, the entire globe is a as well as upon the global economy. food and energy resources. seamless battlespace within which air and Among these are nonstate criminal The Chairman’s vision outlines the missile attacks can easily and rapidly cross and terrorist organizations and their implications of all this for IAMD. First, area of responsibility boundaries, placing enablers such as North Korea and Iran, within this evolving security environ- a premium on coordination and integra- who have also developed or sought to ment, AMD remains vital in supporting tion between combatant commands develop nuclear weapons. In the Far the U.S. ability to project power and (including U.S. Northern Command).18 East, China is rapidly building more have freedom of movement and access Third, over a decade of war and the advanced weapons of all types as it to the world’s strategic thoroughfares. economic collapse of 2008 have led grows bolder in flexing its might in the Today’s geopolitical volatility means that to record U.S. budget deficits and the East and South China seas. In Europe, IAMD must be more integrated and flex- political impetus to reduce those deficits Vladimir Putin’s Russia has overturned ible than ever to respond to a wider array with smaller governmental budgets. The the post–Cold War order by postur- of less predictable and more capable coincidence of these economic pressures ing against the North Atlantic Treaty threats. Moreover, potential adversaries and the increasing combatant command Organization (NATO), defying U.S. have steadily improved their arsenals in appetite for more and better IAMD policy in Syria, annexing Crimea, invad- terms of both quantity and quality, in- systems obliges the joint force and ing Ukraine, and intimidating the other corporating upgrades in range, accuracy, Services to use extra care in setting pri- former Eastern Bloc nations along its mobility, speed, stealth, and targeting.17 orities. IAMD in 2020 must be versatile, borders. Africa continues to seethe with Second, these advanced capabilities and responsive, decisive, and affordable.19 political unrest, terrorism, and humani- the proliferating air and missile threat Finally, the ominous strategic context tarian crises, and the Arctic promises have further collapsed the old paradigm has not been lost on America’s partners
108 Joint Doctrine / Vision for Integrated Air and Missile Defense JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 and allies around the world. Never has missile arsenal, and its technology is kinetic missile defense. More must be the demand for IAMD systems and the advancing to the point where it could done with passive, nonkinetic, C4I, and protection they provide been greater.20 potentially threaten the U.S. mainland left-of-launch options. The document From Japan and the Philippines to Qatar with nuclear warhead–armed ICBMs.23 makes it clear that the first responsibility and Lithuania, more nations are turn- As the Chairman’s vision warns, “The of joint IAMD is to deter adversaries ing to the United States for assistance future IAMD environment will be by convincing them that attack is futile, in protecting themselves against attack. characterized by a full spectrum of then to prevent an attack in the first The U.S. response to this situation will air and missile threats—ballistic mis- place by “killing the archer” rather than be watched closely, not only by our al- siles, air-breathing threats (cruise shooting down or absorbing his arrows. lies but also by our potential adversaries; missiles, aircraft, UAS [unmanned Should deterrence and prevention fail, though demand for a protective U.S. aerial systems]), long-range rockets, joint IAMD melds active and passive AMD umbrella is peaking, our financial artillery, and mortars—all utilizing a defenses to mitigate and survive the ability to provide it is on the wane. range of advanced capabilities—stealth, assault. None of these actions is meant electronic attack, maneuvering reentry to be decisive alone. Joint IAMD is a The IAMD Threat Environment vehicles, decoys, and advanced terminal necessary element within the broader While America contends with the dif- seekers with precision targeting.”24 context of the joint campaign intended ficulties of a dynamic strategic context, Never has the United States faced a to buy time and preserve the joint potential adversaries seek to capitalize more complex or comprehensive global force during hostilities while imposing on perceived opportunities. Countries challenge in this area, and the forecast for increasing cost and resource expenditure such as Russia, China, North Korea, 2020 and beyond is no more optimistic. on the enemy, but it is neither intended and Iran perceive U.S. fiscal burdens Threats will continue to progress, plac- nor able to afford victory by itself.26 As and political paralysis as promoting ing greater burdens on U.S. defensive the vision points out, “the link between policies aimed at reducing and reap- capabilities and coverage as they become offensive and defensive operations portioning its overseas presence. Thus, increasingly transregional and global. for IAMD is critical,” and “all means, regional powers with goals inimical to Additionally, air-breathing threats are including penetrating assets” should U.S. interests are emboldened to strive experiencing a renaissance due to new be employed to “defeat large threat for greater local influence as the tide of technologies, many of which were pio- inventories.”27 Still, it is unreasonable American power ebbs. This has caused neered in the United States but have to believe that offensive operations can a great deal of angst around the world; now found their way into other hands. wholly negate any sophisticated threat; just ask the Ukrainians, Japanese, or Unmanned aerial systems, stealthy cruise therefore, the joint force must employ Emirati. Moreover, global competitors missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles are robust passive measures, such as CCD, have embraced an antiaccess/area-denial becoming more common, threatening dispersion, and hardening, as well as stratagem, backed by offensive air and to exploit gaps and seams in traditional layered, complementary active defenses missile weapons systems of greater capa- IAMD architectures. The challenge of to survive air and missile attacks. bility and quantity, intended to keep detecting, tracking, and engaging these Frankly, the failure of IAMD “risks suf- the United States and its friends at bay. systems has compressed response times fering potentially devastating attacks” Complicating the threat picture even and decision cycles. Even at the tactical that could jeopardize an entire cam- further is the prospect of rogue nations level, ground and maritime forces can paign.28 Because of the extraordinarily such as Iran and North Korea, against be held at risk simply by sheer numbers high stakes, the integration of IAMD which traditional notions of deterrence of cheap, long-range rockets.25 Without must extend beyond the joint force both are unreliable, developing weapons of question, all of these facts indicate a dire horizontally and vertically to encompass mass destruction capable of delivery and growing air and missile threat to the “policy, strategy, concepts, tactics, and on ICBMs. Indeed, Iran possesses the United States and its interests around the training” and will require the participa- “largest and most diverse missile arsenal world. Success in negating it will take no tion of interagency and international in the Middle East,” which it acquired less than a bold, holistic reimagining of partners and allies.29 Diplomacy, in large part from foreign sources such America’s IAMD. military-to-military engagements, officer as North Korea.21 After a recent series exchanges, foreign disclosure of previ- of tests in early 2014, “Iranian Defense A Forward Vision ously classified information, informa- Minister Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehqan Fortunately, Joint IAMD Vision 2020 tion-sharing, interoperability tests, and said [Iran’s newest] long-range ballistic paints just the type of bold new picture treaty negotiations are all vital features missile can evade enemies’ anti-missile that is required. It pulls no punches in in this holistic approach to IAMD. defense systems and has ‘the capabil- assessing the threat, nor does it hold At the same time, the joint force ity of destroying massive targets and anything back in recommending solu- cannot lose sight of its traditional destroying multiple targets.’”22 For tions. Moreover, it rejects the notion responsibilities in IAMD capability its part, North Korea also has a huge that missile defense must equal active, development, but all stakeholders must
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Weiss 109 a 22-nation, future-focused tabletop wargame that investigates multinational, strategic IAMD concerns; U.S. Pacific Command’s Exercise Keen Edge; as well as the 8-nation Maritime Theater Missile Defense forum and various combatant command IAMD Centers of Excellence. The third imperative is to “target development, modernization, fielding, and science and technology efforts to meet specific gaps in IAMD capabili- ties, all the while stressing affordability and interoperability.”34 While seemingly self-explanatory, in this imperative the Chairman asks for “special focus” on “closing high-leverage technology gaps such as an adversary’s emerging seeker or missile development, and the develop- Sea-based X-band radar, world’s largest phased-array X-band radar carried aboard mobile, ocean- ment of U.S. non-kinetic capabilities.”35 going semisubmersible oil platform, transits waters of Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam (U.S. Navy/ This last point holds great promise, since Daniel Barker) nonkinetic means such as cyber, directed energy, and electronic attack have the po- proceed in a cost-conscious manner. no source of ISR, whether traditional tential to turn an enemy’s advancements Hitting bullets with bullets will always be or nontraditional, national or tactical, in sophistication into vulnerabilities, more expensive than just firing bullets— should be considered too sacred for the and at greatly reduced cost relative to thus, the combatant commands need IAMD mission. The United States fields kinetic options. JIAMDO in conjunc- to maximize resources already in hand many highly capable detection and collec- tion with the entire IAMD community and pay special attention to prioritizing tion systems, but their information chains must work closely through the JCIDS capability and capacity gaps responsibly. remain rigidly stovepiped; the joint force and Warfighter Involvement Processes to Meanwhile, DOD, the Services, MDA, must ruthlessly seek out and eliminate ensure requirements for new capabilities research laboratories, and industry must technical deficiencies and organizational are prioritized, feasible, and affordable work together to identify and pursue only barriers to information-sharing and and address valid threats so that acquisi- the most promising, realistic, and afford- enable the free flow of ISR data from na- tion decision authorities pursue programs able solutions to IAMD’s problems. This tional systems directly to the warfighters with realistic cost, schedule, and per- methodology is the only way the joint who need it. formance parameters. While programs force is going to get the surveillance, The second imperative is to “make such as Patriot, THAAD, and Aegis have identification, discrimination, fire control, interdependent Joint and Combined been successful, there is still room for and battle management improvements force employment the baseline.”32 It is improvement as the Services develop it needs to deter and defeat current and no exaggeration to say there is no such new technologies in sensors (such as future threats.30 thing as U.S.-only or single-Service the Three-Dimensional Expeditionary The Chairman outlined six impera- IAMD. The Nation simply cannot afford Long Range Radar), interceptors (the tives designed to facilitate creation of the to do this mission without the syner- Standard Missile-6 and railgun), and C4I joint IAMD force necessary to confront gies provided by the joint force and the (Cooperative Engagement Capability). the challenges of the coming decades. cooperation of its partners and allies with Imperative number four requires the The first is to “incorporate, fuse, exploit, whom “interdependence and interoper- joint force to “focus Passive Defense ef- and leverage every bit of information ability breed efficiency and economy of forts on addressing potential capability available regardless of source or clas- resources.”33 From the earliest stages of and capacity shortfalls in air and missile sification, and distribute it as needed to planning, exercising, and employment, defense.”36 Passive defense is a pillar of U.S. Forces and selected partners.”31 IAMD must leverage the comparative IAMD that has been around for a long Intelligence, surveillance, and recon- advantages of joint force components time, but its importance is not reduced in naissance (ISR) provides the eyes and and partner nations. Successful examples the 21st century. The notion that passive ears that the IAMD force requires to to build upon include exercises such defense measures, which help joint forces operate. Joint force commanders must as U.S. Central Command’s Air and survive an attack, are a separate problem properly prioritize and allocate limited Missile Defense Exercise; U.S. Strategic from other IAMD pillars is not accept- ISR resources to support IAMD, and Command’s Exercise Nimble Titan, able. The joint force commander must
110 Joint Doctrine / Vision for Integrated Air and Missile Defense JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 be able to assess passive defense effects, This article exemplifies the spirit of “The effectiveness with which we field along with active defense and offensive the sixth and final imperative, which competent Joint IAMD capabilities will operations, within planning and execu- directs the joint force to “create an help prevent catastrophic attacks on the tion cycles. Failure to fully integrate and awareness of the IAMD mission and the U.S. Homeland; secure the U.S. econ- coordinate offensive, active, and passive benefits of its proper utilization across the omy and the global economic system; and actions places joint force objectives and Department of Defense to include the build secure, confident, and reliable Allies resources at unnecessary risk. There are development of the enabling framework and partners.”40 The Chairman’s Joint positive signs that DOD is taking this to of concepts, doctrine, acquisition, and IAMD Vision 2020 points the way. Now heart, especially with respect to dispersal war plans that support full integration of it is up to the joint force and the entire and hardening considerations within the IAMD into combat operations.”39 Here, IAMD community to make it happen. JFQ Asia-Pacific region.37 However, DOD the Chairman recognizes that great ideas needs to extend these plans to other re- are useless if they are not communicated gions as well. to the forces that will be called upon to Notes The fifth imperative is to “establish implement them. This is a directive to 1 and pursue policies to leverage partner the joint force and all IAMD stakehold- “Aerospace Chronology: Up From Kitty 38 Hawk,” Air Force Magazine, December 1, contributions.” This is similar to ers to move out smartly and educate 2003, available at
JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 Weiss 111 Years,” 15. 16 Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Wash- ington, DC: Department of Defense, March, 4, 2014), 6, available at
112 Joint Doctrine / Vision for Integrated Air and Missile Defense JFQ 76, 1st Quarter 2015 NEW from NDU Press A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions By Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan China’s military modernization includes ambitious efforts to develop antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities to deter intervention by outside powers. Highly accurate and lethal antiship cruise missiles and land-attack cruise missiles carried by a range of ground, naval, and air platforms are an integral part of this counter-intervention strategy. This comprehensive study combines technical and military analysis with an extensive array of Chinese language sources to analyze the challenges Chinese cruise missiles pose for the U.S. military in the Western Pacific.
“Cruise missiles are key weapons in China’s A2/AD arsenal, providing a lethal precision-strike capability against naval ships and land-based targets. The authors use hundreds of Chinese language sources and expertise on cruise missile technology to assess China’s progress in acquiring and developing advanced antiship and land-attack cruise missiles and to consider how the People’s Liberation Army might employ these weapons in a conflict. Essential reading for those who want to understand the challenges China’s military modernization poses to the United States and its allies.” —David A. Deptula, Lieutenant General, USAF (Ret.), Senior Military Scholar, Center for Character and Leadership Development, U.S. Air Force Academy
“This volume is a major contribution to our understanding of Chinese military modernization. Although China’s ballistic missile programs have garnered considerable attention, the authors remind us that Beijing’s investment in cruise missiles may yield equally consequential results.” —Thomas G. Mahnken, Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic Geography and National Security, U.S. Naval War College
“This book provides an excellent primer on the growing challenge of Chinese cruise missiles. It shows how antiship and land-attack cruise missiles complicate U.S. efforts to counter China’s expanding A2/AD capabilities and are becoming a global proliferation threat. The authors also demonstrate just how much progress China has made in modernizing and upgrading its defense industry, to the point of being able to develop and produce world-class offensive weapons systems such as land-attack cruise missiles. This book belongs on the shelves of every serious observer of China’s growing military prowess.” —Richard A. Bitzinger, Coordinator, Military Transformations Program, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore
Available online at ndupress.ndu.edu Joint Force Quarterly Issue Seventy-six, 1st Quarter 2015
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