Frankfurt's Classical Theory: the Higher Order I

CEU eTD Collection In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the ofPhilosophy oftherequirements of In partialfulfillment degree Doctor R EFLECTIVITY Supervisor: Professor Ferenc Huoranszki Central European University European Central Department of of Philosophy Department Budapest, Hungary Zoltan Wagner in Philosophy , Submitted to Submitted C 2011 ARING AND By A GENCY CEU eTD Collection ______reference. form the of bibliographic published byanotherperson,except whereappropriate acknowledgment hasbeen made in and/or written previously nomaterial contains this dissertation that declares Undersigned ______degrees in institution any other for any other accepted material no contains this that dissertation declares Undersigned ii March 3, 2011 March 3, 2011 CEU eTD Collection interfere with self-control and become self-defeating strategies. self-defeating and become self-control with interfere can they help desires; rather, inmanagingour not us desires do second-order reflectivity: andtrust method will openness.This addonemore importanceagainst the argument of is self- based on which of conceptof and caring redefined the with consistent importance the abilities. However, Iwill try sketchto a method of self-control and self-management which is do not directly control by decisionsany caring based theory of action: the problem whatof self-control and self-management. we Since carewe about, for problem aserious discuss briefly will I it dissertation endthe of At the sense. seems inthis things that we cannot have thesecare about motivation beingable to our on reflectdepends about and important ability our to evaluation is more caring,first-order asa feature of life.Rather, human important is most the is it reflectivity that not creatures, humans arereflective is though thefollowing: dissertation claim important this mostof As the aconsequence, we care about. what words, other care about desires Thus,things. second-order should our based personal on be values;our in action. I will also try to show to important iscentrally evaluation which a first-order a but ability reflective sense isnot that the reason humans have second-orderdesires.mostinwillcaring basic the I second-order on arguethat of as dependent caring desires is that theyconnected to each other. However, Iwill disagree about their relation and about the definition both reflectivity very that important andbasic and caring they are abilities, that are Iwill argue with Frankfurt, have desires. In agreement ability second-order based our to on for understands themin important Frankfurt both as of crucial aspecialway.these abilities is, are things, that things some about caring humansarecapableof Second, desires. own their evaluate can is, they that reflective, are humans First, most. emphasized Frankfurt that humanfeatures agency of of two importance it the discusses particularly, in agency.More dissertation is not focused on the problem of free will but on the role of second-order desires practical identity, rationality in action and the problem inof agency this general.Thus, connectionin only not debates fruitful to led theory controversial This with desires. of theory hierarchical the problem of freeAs a solution for problem the free of will and determinism,developed Harry G. Frankfurt his will but in other areas as well including personal and Abstract iii CEU eTD Collection Also, this dissertation would never have been written without the inspiration of his ideas. his of inspiration the without written been have never would dissertation this Also, Frankfurt for reading an earlier version of version foran readingearlier Frankfurt Fellowship (2010/2011Fall). Fellowshipwas funded Fall) Slovak Mobility bythe VisegradMobility and(2008/2009 the in in giveresearch, talks andpublish Slovak the papers Bratislava My Republic. research Sciences and Martininvaluable tothis contribution dissertation. Muransky funded Research by Doctoral the Support Grant of Central University European – wasan and Fall) (2006/2007 inRiverside – University California of Ispentatthe research period Tibor Pichlerquestions of the philosophy of action and Harry G. Frankfurt’s philosophy. The three-month for giving without his guidance. me an opportunityme clarify my often confused ideas. Iwould nothave been able to complete this dissertation First of all, I would like to thankmy supervisor,to Professor Ferencdo Huoranszki, whohelped And last, but of course, by no means the least, I would like to thank Harry G. I am also very grateful to the Institute of PhilosophylikeI would also tothank Watson whohelped Gray me in alot basicunderstanding of the Slovak Academy of Acknowledgements Chapter 6 iv and sending me detailed comments. me detailed sending and CEU eTD Collection B C C C C P C C P C C P I NTRODUCTION ART ART ART IBLIOGRAPHY ONCLUSION HAPTER HAPTER HAPTER HAPTER HAPTER HAPTER HAPTER . ehdfrSl-aaeet...... 154 7.3 A Method for Self-Management ...... 7. 2. First-Order Caring as a State 150 that is Essentially ...... a By-Product 7. 1. The Problem of Self-Control or Can You Make 144 Yourself Care About It?...... 6.3. Freedom 138as Self-Transcendence...... 6.2. Freedom 133 as Self-Expression...... 1306.1. Two Views on the ...... Self and Freedom 5.2 Caring, 121 Valuing and Integration...... 5.1. Deep Caring 114 and Reflective Caring...... 4.5. 103Love, Reason and Action...... 4.4. Love, 90 Worth and Value...... 88 4.3. The Definition ...... of Love 84 4.2...... Love and Emotion 4.1. Love 81 and Practical Reason...... 3.4. Caring, 65 Free Will and Autonomy...... 3.3. Caring and 61 Reflective Self-Evaluation ...... 3.2. Frankfurtian 56 Caring and its Significance...... 3.1. Frankfurtian Caring and 53 other Theories of Caring...... aifcin...... 44 2.3 Satisfaction...... 2.2. Identification 37 and the Real Self...... 2.1. Identification 31 and Rejection...... 1.3. The Problem 24 of Regress...... 19 1.2. Watson’s criticism...... 1.1. The theory freeof will based on the 9 hierarchical theory ...... of desires III: II: I: T F HE 7: 6: 5: 4: 3: 2: 1: A RANKFURT REVISED C C C F F F C F ...... 159 RANKFURT URTHER ELABORATION OF URTHER ELABORATION REFLECTIVE SELF RANKFURT ARING AND ARING ARING ASA RANKFURT LASSICAL ...... 163 ...... 1 , H L ’ S OVE AND IERARCHICAL T ’ ’ ’ T S S CLASSICAL THEORY S CLASSICAL M S HEORY OF S HEORY ELF C C ULTI ONCEPT OF ONCEPT ONCEPT OF ONCEPT -C T -O S ABLE OF ONTROL ELF ...... 8 RDER C -T T ARING AND HEORY RANSCENDENCE C P L ...... 144 v C ARING HENOMENON OVE ONTENTS ...... 9 ...... 80 ...... 111 ...... 52 L OVE ...... 128 ...... 112 ...... 51 - EVALUATION ...... 28 CEU eTD Collection 1 more general theory about human reflectivity and its role in agency. As a result, besides free besides As aresult, in agency. role its and reflectivity human about theory general more Frankfurt’s term, use ourselves, to evaluate ability our to which mechanismthrough ultimate the They are desires reveal somethingabout importantvery our attitude to own desiresour andwants. for from Butapart freedom, onehas second-order a contrary not. significance their desire when on butdesiresof will, hasfreedom the acts one one with second-order one’s accordance have ability of and byvirtue our to humans we arepersons that claimed desires. Besides tryingexplain to the conceptof free will with helpof the view,this he of theory his freeon hierarchical built theory will of Frankfurt’s to one:Harry G. attracted solveAmongdeterminism. particularly this to problem the diversesuggestions I was and offreewill in problem the bymyinterest motivated first was This dissertation or not desire. haveacertain or to But what is exactly a second-order desire? When one has a desire like that, one wants to have As we will see, Frankfurt uses the term “to desire” in a broad sense, interchangeably with “to want”. “to with interchangeably sense, broad ina desire” “to term the uses Frankfurt see, we will As Thus, the hierarchical theory of desires is not simply a theory about free will but a reflective self-evaluation reflective 1 Frankfurt’s claim about free will was that when one acts in Introduction works. 1 second-order desires . CEU eTD Collection order desires. One mightdoubt that aresecond- is there it possible to motivation. Of course, their reflectivity about simply say that thereWhen second-orderdesires, aboutI talk Iwillassumehumans that dohave this kindof is no such thing as “to want to want to do of chapter. each overview will give I follows a what In brief caring. on based be should that summaryis reflectivity it is, that about, care we what of the key ideas of should in be understood a quite differentway: second-order desires our the should bebased on dissertation and relationship the show that to try will reflectivity. I care presupposes theability to Frankfurt, I will also give a short For way are connected. about the they Frankfurt will with I However, disagree together. tied closely and –are caring self-evaluation abilities –reflective two thatthe dissertation someimportant, persons inandthem things matter aspecial way. inargue my Iwill beingsHuman because things: theyfind arespecial they care about in some things life their weareableto because we areagents views imply that his recent Second, possible. A creature without them is without them possible. A a creature in process decision-making of the make participation desires active which second-order ownselves our through We desires. evaluate have second-order becausewe and persons in above. listed claims all interesting areas the is,as it Frankfurt’s concept of desiressecond-order has provedto be very heuristic andled to controversial love. Obviously, lately,and as andmost caring wholeheartedness, satisfaction, identification, commitment, as such discussion the into concepts new introduced he personal identity. views Frankfurt’s controversial ledtoalively in debate courseof the which and practical rationality,reason, in practical general, action of topics problem including the will, ideas andmoral determinism a rangeresponsibility, Frankfurt’s of reinterpret other I found claims two interesting:first, Frankfurt particularly thatweareagents thinks wanton , someone whom we cannot regard asaperson.regard , someonewhom we cannot 2 care about things. about CEU eTD Collection 3 Philosophy only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve to than office other any to pretend never can and passions, the of slave be the to only Agency”, in 2 will.” the of any action be“reason alone amotive cannever to that Hume believed by reason. are notmoved pure they that sense the in rational not are beings human nature: in Humean assumption, an under human agency with the help of the vocabulary of second-order desires and caring. I will work objective values. beliefin our What or judgments practical desires than rather second-order of vocabulary the I will try to do is to describe certain problems drugandthe stophis self-destructive way life.of and complexities notjudgesit moreinstead totake wouldhis that addict wastingthe be better andthat of time of work itto bejudgeswould that better say student the might Forexample, one that of desires. theory hierarchical of the from that different vocabulary a with scenarios these can describe type of reflective concern about our own motivation that Frankfurt talks about. No doubt, one want“I not Idid wish badly”. to take drugso the These are typicalinstances of having the desires might appear, anaddict whohas a strong desire totake the drug might say himself:to a second-order bedincase going movies.typical Ortotake the lazing which or around to work more and that he didnotmade enough progress with his work, a studentnot might wish that he wanted to focus on his wanthas he that fact to the with faced wastewhen example, For much”. so this do to want his not did I wish time on the things that attitude towards our them. think:“I wemight Insuch thismore”“Icases Iwanted wish or distract him, say desires and our awareof in webecome which situations isfamiliarwith way.But everybody something” or“not to wantwant to todo something”. Sure, itmight be awkward to put it this Hume, David A similar view was developed by Gary Watson. I will discuss it in I will not try proveto that we get closer to the truth if we describe such situations with 72 (1975), 205-20. Agency and Answerability , A Treatise, A of Human Nature 3 As it is well-known, he also declared that “[R]eason is, and ought (Oxford: ClaredonPress, 2004),13-32, reprinted from (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000), 265. 3 2 chapter 1 . See Watson, Gary, “Free Gary, . SeeWatson, Journal of CEU eTD Collection Internality”, 6 488-513 and also book,her in agency. See Arpaly, Nomy, “On Acting Rationally Against One’s Best Judgment”, 5 4 of care. theobject towards attitude positive evaluative more important,is a there caring, sense of is areflective Though there be correct. seem quite not to this does more “primitive”desires. However, in sense the reflectivity requires second-order of is caringthat acapacity Frankfurt’s concept of meaningcaring and try to develop a different one. According to Frankfurt, of criticize of will importance Iacceptthe central caring, agency. I organizing our Butthough the term asitismake ourdecisions andhowact: toestablishing important centrally priorities and well, whichour second-ordersimply desires meansitis that which caring on in a way.will them argue tous; I personal we evaluate matter they should rest.a What we careus: to important particularly some things we find meansthat care aboutthings we areableto about is crucially important That things. careabout to ability for agency: the important isvery which ability a particular to how we desires have to be based on something. In agreement with Frankfurt, I will argue that there is reasoning and rational judgments. of result the not are actions thus instrumental, merely is reason of role the nature, human of his theory love.of his and In built caring concept on on view reason practical a controversial hehe developed on later Assee notwewill arational process. ismaking consequently which decision- for needed are they that and second-order the to belong they is, that reflective, desires some are that of our he stresses Rather, rule passions. the notof the about talk does them”. obey and order desires. second- generate to tendency a has agency, for importance its given which, phenomenon, For a recent similar concept of caring and criticism of Frankfurt, see: Jaworska, Aginieszka, “Caring and “Caring Aginieszka, Jaworska, see: ofFrankfurt, criticism and of caring concept similar a recent For Ibid., 266. Nomy Arpaly developed an important theory of agency in which she also questions the importance ofrationality importance the questions also she which in of agency theory important an developed Arpaly Nomy Though reflectivity is an important human second-order important Though reflectivity is capacity,argue that our I will an Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 But there is an important difference between Hume and Frankfurt: latter the between andFrankfurt: Hume difference is animportant Butthere Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Human Agency 5 4 74,No. 3(May 2007), 529-568. 6 Thus, caring is primarily first-order a is primarily caring Thus, (Oxford University Press, 2002). Ethics 110 (April 2000), CEU eTD Collection the concept of caring. In caring. of concept the concept of caring and its significance for reflective self-evaluation, free will free autonomy. and will self-evaluation, reflective for its significance of caring and concept desires. second-order provide abasis in Frankfurt’s andcriticize forIwill our discuss detail itcan isthat of caring significance the that will show from them. I concept Frankfurt’s Iwill differentiate theories, contemporary is usedseveral inother this concept caring. Since in escapethe endobjection discussed they cannot in the of lotcomplexities, explaina these though concepts arguethat I will evaluation. But self- reflective of view sophisticated and an elaborate lead to concepts These satisfaction. identification and including commitment, newhe concepts, answer hisintroduced critics, basis for our second-order desires. Watson’s criticism. Iwill argue that Watson’s criticism is rightinasmuch as we need a certain it. I will consider some of the objections directed against this view, most importantly Gary Voluntarism: In Defense of Hierarchy”, of InDefense Voluntarism: 7 In of desires. theory hierarchical classic Frankfurt’s andit chapters of discusses two first the consists dissertation management which I will discuss towards the end of the dissertation. self-and self-control in with connection problems difficult and this raises we careabout psychology. in our element a non-voluntary to a voluntary in aparticular way.Anotherconsequence important of a caringis basedtheory the shiftfrom not only our ability reflectto on our desires but our ability careto about things, to value them makes and is What beings human usagents importance. of becomes secondary reflectivity Stefan Cuypers discussed this shift in detail in a paper:recent Cuypers, Stefan E,“Autonomy beyond In the second part of my dissertation I will discuss Frankfurt’s recent views basedon recent Frankfurt’s my discuss of I will partdissertation In thesecond In Before I begin, let me give a brief overview of the chapters. The first part of my part of The first thechapters. of abrief overview let megive begin, I Before caring, of significance the if westress that implies caring of concept The redefined chapter 2 I will look at in detail how Frankfurt developed his views further. To chapter 1 chapter chapter 3 I will discuss this theory and the concept of free will based on Canadian Journal of Philosophy I will discuss some general points about the problem of problem the about points general some discuss will I 5 chapter 1 : they have: seem firm they basis. no to 7 We do not directly control control what directly Wenot do 30,No. 2 (June 2000), 225-256. CEU eTD Collection us agents andhuman beings. ofhis Because of and complex caringunderstanding reflectivity makes itself in itnotiswhat reflectivity argues, as Frankfurt agents are importantly reflective on an ability formto beliefs of a certain kind. self-management which – insteadofFrankfurtian reflectivity – isbuilt a type on of self-trust: leads to skepticism about self-controlcentrally importantand for agency. We do notself-management.control directly what we care about and at first this I will briefly sketch a theory of possible. thatloveliberates making view andshow self-transcendence us by will Frankfurt’s criticize I category. first the to belongs view Frankfurt’s that claim and self-transcendence as freedom and self-expression as freedom between differentiate I will Rather, free will. of in sense the freedom us. problemnot the liberates Thus, though picture, which love the back comes of to chapter 6 caringdeep, first-order andisimportant, more that reflectivity our is it. basedon phenomenonorder which first-, involves both and desires. second-order Iwill argue that between the basis of a revised concept of reflectivity. In and of caring basis ofarevisedconcept the including practical reason, subjectivity values andabout for action. reasons caringto refer problems will important in be discussed in to chapter general. the Several lovewide,is besaid loveof of might heconcept too with claims andalot hasinconnection Frankfurt’s show, will I As love. caring: of mode important most be the to thinks Frankfurt This sketch already reveals the most basic claim of my dissertation: though humans though mydissertation: of claim basic most the reveals already sketch This In love in moveconceptof of will the caring, redefined I concept to the After discussing After discussing the concept of inAfterin discussing conceptof caring the detail, In the last part of my dissertation I will try to develop a revised theory of agency on agency of theory develop arevised to try I will my of dissertation part last In the deep caring . I will especially focus one of Frankfurt’s most controversial claims according to chapter 7 I will consider a very important problem of any view that treats caring as and reflective caring reflective and Iwill redefine the concept of caring as a multi- 6 chapter 4 chapter 5 I will look at what Iwill differentiate CEU eTD Collection 8 and deliberation. actionisrevisedin Humean theory about more theoriginal veinwith of caring assumption the Thus, beings. human of feature basic a very but phenomenon reflective sophisticated a is not of caring conceptcaring: isredefined Andthe agency. significance of this the average human seemsbecomplicated toaccommodate that to too acomplex structure lead to reflectivity requiring of caring,his concept as and of reflectivity, hiscomplex picture least, Nevertheless, as she adds, in the end Frankfurt himself overintellectualized human agency. At action”. reason about to capacity human the on emphasis overintellectualized traditional the beings,human avoiding while agency of to peculiar the organization “todelineate attempted Frankfurt notes, As Jaworska ofagency.failsprovide picture Frankfurt aHumean to Jaworska, “Caring and Internality”,566-67. 7 8 CEU eTD Collection Part I: The Classical Theory 8 CEU eTD Collection responsibility. free is will Frankfurtian free will.metaphysics of Second, problem of determinism of problem “Freedom andof of paper Will a Person” the Frankfurt’s theConcept seminal desires of theory the hierarchical on based offreewill theory 1.1. The 10 Journal of Philosophy Importance of What We Care About moral responsibility. First, Frankfurt’s theory of free will is will free of theory Frankfurt’s First, responsibility. moral and freewill views of mainstream to as compared unusual make itrather view of that this action. desires of hierarchical theory philosophy andhisidentity.of action theory of practical he In paper the this introduced his of basis the contains it time same the at and problem will free the to solution original 9 Frankfurt, Harry G., “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, inFrankfurt, Harry G., Ibid., 25. Before starting to analyze the theory itis necessary to point out two important features 98, 23no. (January 1971), 5-20. Chapter 1: Frankfurt’s classical theory Frankfurt’s classical Chapter 1: 10 . It is mainly concerned with the psychology and not the not and psychology the with concerned mainly is It . which is at the center of thinking about human psychology and , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 11-26, reprinted from 9 neutral not a condition of moral with regard to the The 9 offers an CEU eTD Collection Defending the conceivability claim as a metaphysical claim would be a different matter, andmatter, a claimwouldclaim as ametaphysical be different Defending conceivability the but the main isgoal nottodefendit but todescribe thepsychological conditions offreedom. asan assumption, claim only theconceivability viewaccepts then, this metaphysical debate main issuehereis the not metaphysics, but psychology the of freedom. As regards the worlds. nondeterministic and deterministic of in avariety exist conceivably can phenomenon these claims the claims these 114, No. 1 (October 2002), Agency”, and 116 (italics Identification W., “Caring, in theDavid original). Shoemaker, irrelevant.” becomes means indeterministic causes”. natural ofasequence of as the outcome or chance describes as freedom he state of the affairs that itis that is conceivable he thinks What more, by free chance. of the will comes about is one is andthat determined casually yetfree in some third way, orneutral “a way withotheris it on based regard will the of than freedom of conception the that out tobyhe points and themetaphysics with problem of determinism. mightitthough be labeled Frankfurt’s ishierarchical as notconcerned theory a compatibilist, That is, he claims thatin way. However, right the aredetermined as longactions asone’s world, itin a deterministic is to do otherwise, impossible. On the other hand, compatibilists claim that one can be free even determinism or simply a matterof one’s will embodying acertain structure, thanfreedom is actually compatiblecompatibilist with claimed that freedom is not only compatible withdeterminism but requires it, if freedom instead is 13 12 11 consequence argument as the arguments incompatibilist well know to According will.possess free cannot one metaphysical See also David W. Shoemaker, who has developed a Frankfurtian view on freedom: “Whereas the classical the “Whereas freedom: view on Frankfurtian a developed who has Shoemaker, W. David Seealso Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will”, 25. See for example Inwagen, Peter van, Peter Inwagen, example Seefor Though this claimmakes Frankfurt acompatibilist, wehave keepin to mind that the To look at the first characteristic, philosophers often treat the problem freeof will as a 13 problem. On the one hand, incompatibilists claim that if determinism is true, indeterminism conceivability claim conceivability , 11 . Whether one comes to have a properly structured will through deterministic or laws of nature and past events jointly make free will, as an ability an as will, free make jointly events past and nature of laws An Essay on Free Will according to which free will as a psychological 10 and that it is also conceivable that one becomes one that itisconceivable that also , (Oxford: ClaredonPress, 1983). 12 We can call the conjunction of We call conjunction can the conceivable Ethics CEU eTD Collection “What We Are Morally Responsible for”, in for”, Responsible Morally WeAre “What 16 Parsons, Robert Schwarz (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983). How Many Questions? Essays in honor of Sidney Morgenbesser About 15 volume, 95-125. of What We Care About 351-65.Frankfurt also accepts thispossibility “Threein Concepts of Free Action”, in Frankfurt, Compatibilism”, in Watson,Hard Libertarianism, “Soft Watson: Gary See “devil/neurologist”. by a of design aresult as responsible and non-historic, that is, it does not matter how they come about. This evenmakes it possible that one becomes free 14 if one were to do that, one would count as some kind of “hard compatibilist”. addict he has ifhisdone only willwas he free when it”.did responsibility, Frankfurt states that “itis not true that a person is morally responsible for what is that though philosophers issue. this discuss not will generally metaphysics offreeprimarily with with willbutconcerned inproblems of agency I general, treatnot Iam since However, determinism. and freewill on debate of the center the still at free will important on literature this isis and it extensiveand topic, and There an responsible. morally as the primaryin agent which the havecould not andyetcan done otherwise be regardedashaving free will conditioncouldhave done otherwise”. of PAP thefollowing“[A] way: personismorally he forresponsible what has if done only he moral defined Frankfurt Responsibility” Moral and Possibilities “Alternate hisfalse. paper is In (PAP) Possibilities ofAlternate Principle the that demonstrate to try which counterexamples’ hierarchical account of agency I will discuss not this question. primary focus of thesisthis isnot problemthe freeof will and determinism butdefend to a Frankfurt, “Freedom of Will”,the 23-24. Frankfurt discussed the problem of responsibility in another paper, Frankfurt Harry G. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” in I take this expressionfrom Gary Watson who thinks that the conditions of free and responsible agency are , 1-11, reprinted from reprinted 1-11, , , whose will is notfree but nevertheless might be responsible for taking the drug. The second difference between Frankfurt’s view on free will and mainstream theories mainstream and free will view on Frankfurt’s between difference The second For the same reason I will also not discuss the so-called ‘Frankfurt type of , 47-57,, reprinted from Journal of Philosophy Agencyand Answerability 15 He tried showto that this principle is false by presenting cases The Importance ofWhatWe Care About Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 No. 23.(December1969), 829-839. 11 , 197-215, originally , ed. L.S. Cauman, Isaac Levi, Charles D. 16 He introduces the case of the caseof the introduces He The Importance of What We Care Journal of , 95-103, reprinted from 49 (1975), supplementary Ethics 3 No. 4(1999) 14 But since this since But The Importance willing CEU eTD Collection is closely Thismeans together. tied thatthe criteria of being apersonandthatof havingfree Asdetail. the ofhis he thatbeing title free papersuggests, believes and having aperson will an act. It isnot requiredreach highestthe to freedom degreeof in tobemorally order responsible for reach. we cannot like idealthat an is rather It moral of responsibility. be condition the cannot less.” typically less free agents, more or “only are beings human sense; in this free is totally God only that claims He values. one’s insystem, or on words other degreeone’sthe motivation and aredependentupon actions freedom depends on degreeone’sthe motivational system with overlaps one’s evaluational This viewconcept. by includingWatson. Gary Forhim, isnotable thinkers accepted other freedom or one does not. classicThis is which according views opposed to subject, to the on eitherone possesses Frankfurt is not aloneAs hein it puts a lateris paper,“freedom variations in necessarily susceptible to degree”. in claiming that in degrees. freedom comes thesis that freedom toFrankfurt’s isconnected morally This responsible. is held a justly be to quantitativeorder in ideal this reach to necessary not is it but responsible, morally course, is will Frankfurt free Frankfurtian Thus, responsibility. believespeople can ideal,achieve an itwould obviously be strongtoo as a condition moral of that an agent satisfying the conditions that he talks about is Originally 19 Philosophical Association Cambridge University Press, 1999), 76, reprinted from 18 34, No. 4, Supplement Best”, 14 its at Agency and Will “Free Gideon, Yaffe, will. offree basis the is best” its at “agency or agency Motivation and Agency Possibility of Practical Reason, J. David in Velleman, Acts?” Someone when Happens “What Velleman: example See for agency. his in participate toactively capacities his exercise fully to one require These action”. “full-blooded and excellence” 17 Frankfurt, “Concerning the Freedom and the Limits of the Will”, in Will”, ofthe Limits the and Freedom the “Concerning Frankfurt, par “agency including meaning, similar a with expressions other used recently ofaction philosophers Some Watson, “Free Agency”, In After these preliminary remarks, let us look at Frankfurt’s early theory of free in of will early theory atFrankfurt’s look let us remarks, preliminary After these It could be argued that Frankfurt’s theory Frankfurt’s discusses theory could be arguedthat It Journal ofPhilosophy , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). See also Gideon Yaffe,who thinks that ideal , 59, No.2 (November1985). 2000. Agency and Answerability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 123-143, and Mele, Alfred R. 72 (1975). 19 Watson’s point shows that freedom in this sense in this freedom that shows point Watson’s 12 Proceedings and Addresses of the American (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 31. not a condition of moral responsibility. Of Necessity, Volition and Love ideal agency . 17 Since not many not Since (Cambridge: The Nous 18 CEU eTD Collection interchangeably in Frankfurt’s writings. Frankfurt’s in interchangeably motives”. and nottohave)desires certain have (or and“to want” pick differentkinds of phenomena. might conflict with some of my other desires but that does not mean that the verbs “todesire” what I do because I want to do it. cigaretteOf or Igo jogging, in thecourse, end I do what Ido because ofa desire thatmotivates me; I do the motivation thatfactbe moved by this desire (unlesshe hismind)inchanges whenhe acts. the end moves me still is his desire that is motivating or moving A to do what he simplicity,is actually Frankfurt suggests the following usage: “A doingwants to Xmay mean conveyto or that itthat A will in and desires one what want to fail can one that fact the indicated by bedifferent, and desire”seem want” to “to case, life. “to healthy lead this aIn makes sense to say that though I desire to smoke, I do not actually want it because I want to “besidesit, wanting and choosing beingmoved and puts As Frankfurt desiresthemselves. at desires aredirected of second-order courses action, atpossible is motivation directed order while first isthat difference Theprimary capacity? 24 23 22 21 20 capacity our for of second order”. “desires or the desires” it,of free because,asFrankfurt they puts achieving will are capableofforming“second-order structure of Average humanbeingstheir will. “bydefault” are persons and theyarecapable lies The mainin of freeagents and the will persons feature connected. are alsoclosely Ibid., 14. 2. footnote 12-13, Ibid., Ibid., Italics in original.the Ibid. Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will”, 12 It is important to note here that the verbs “to want” and “to desire” are used desire” are “to and want” verbs “to the here that note to isimportant It Now, what makes these desires so special that they are a basis of an important reflective self-evaluation 23 . 20 21 Of could Of one itcourse, to object usagethis that Our capability to form such desires is the basis of 13 22 to do vice versa vice this or that, men may also want to want also may men that, or this . However, for the sake of 24 Whether I smoke a smoke Whether I CEU eTD Collection 25 London’s autobiography, in Jackisit as expressed want tosmoke,because, life,Ialso Iwanttolivehealthy that a differentiate between two types of cases. In the first case, though I want quit to for the reason committed myself to one of them on a higher, reflective level. Onemight still say that we can yetnothave I and is, desires, haveThat smoke. competing I to smoke andnot both to would say the following about thiswant to case:smoke a I cigarette.am in a conflict Actually, about I doFor not smoking; wantexample to do it becauseI desire I mightI want or wantto quit. desire Frankfurtmightsince I desire something very strongly but nevertheless fail wantit, andto vice versa. smoking a cigarette very strongly, but it does not imply that I nature beingreason. opposed But Frankfurt’s to way using the term of suggests amuch by somehow rather, but non-rational simply not as regarded been often have Desires rational. non- other the and rational being one sources, distinct two has motivation our that believe volitions. and desires higher isbutevaluations order to whichareprior important what not thehierarchy desires of itis that in he claimed Agency’ when made ‘Free point Watson Gary asimilar than a desire. smokewantsmoke reflectsto ismorenot mywanting ajudgmentand consequently notto I do of is Thefactthat tosay desires. is this merely a conflict anditthat want, inappropriate I I desire is what between what and because there aconflict is important what Iwant very to smoke. One might argue toahealthycommitted that life, butIstill have astrong smokedesireactually without to wanting in this second case thewhich contrast life between I want what to adventuresI commitdesire is notand myselfa man’s life. In to.this caseIn therethe is a otherreal conflict I inwant which it tois notquit yet clear smoking because I am Watson, “Free Agency”, 30. Someone might still say that treating the two terms as synonyms is very unhelpful Watsonian evaluations have a distinct nature from nature butWatsonian does not have adistinct Frankfurt evaluations desires 25 John Barleycorn , I think that a lifesmoking, that , Ithink without and drinking 14 CEU eTD Collection Princeton University Press, 2004). I will discuss it in more detain in 29 28 27 26 several other types of acts of will,including normativity; its role is only instrumental, in itself it does not move us. of source the likethan a tool is rather It importance. is of secondary reason that claims structure of will the ismore being essential which aperson.to the way to action. his is will agent’s an simply, them guide our actions and express our authority about what to do. some in of sensethat the can bebutforces blind “intelligent” arenotnecessarily him, desires for Consequently, agency. of theory his in role important an play thus and self-evaluation reflective of capacity the basis of the are volitions and desires meaning. Higher-order broader itself. A second-order volition itself is an a in reason andnot of will the structure in the lies of agency feature crucial the that maintains Frankfurt instrumental. only is it us, move not does reason pure that claim Humean the with will makes that us beingpersons. Though aperson presupposes rationality well,as the but reason not is it that shows This person. a as count he cannot ability this without but itis without a “wanton”. creature be our to desire want acertain is wecan that action; to way movethe all us to desire a certain wanting capable of are also beinghave abletowantornot becausewe besides aspecialrole tohavecertain desires, can desires form second order ability to desires. Our first-order one’s some with of identical For a detailed discussion of Frankfurt’s view on practical reason see reason practical on view of Frankfurt’s discussion a detailed For Ibid., 17. Ibid., 16. Ibid. With this we get to a very essential claim of Frankfurtian philosophy of action. He itput “will”. To identify agent’s also us proposes the helps The usageFrankfurt 26 Since one’s will is a desire that motivates one in action, one’s will is effective will 27 A wanton might be a very clever and reasonable creature be might and avery A reasonable clever wanton . This very ability is the essence of being a person, and a desire, in or other words moves desirethe that himall ct of will commitment 15 . As we will see Frankfurt later introduced , chapter endorsement The Reasons of Love 4. 29 and Thisis in accordance identification (Princeton: 28 it is the is it . It is CEU eTD Collection capacity is also a condition of free will. As I mentioned earlier, the conditions of of personhood conditions the earlier, As Imentioned free will. of is alsoacondition capacity volitional condition, namely on the capacity case. canbethe of these neither volitions, to form second-order volitions. However, this 31 30 it on heacts or desire certain is case. neither the “moved by either the is while isa person that will a wanton aand between person Thecrucial difference personhood. he wants or a will heindifference wants to be without”,takes when sideswanton in acts,the conflicta “passiveand aperson.Heisnot bystander” and tries to influence what moves himhe wants it, he takes the drug,to when he does not, heact. abstains. It is the wanton’s when momentary desires; his actson simply addict wanton the In contrast, act. him to move should what about concern a he has ineffective, is volition second-order his though Even will. his be to it wants and abstain) to desire (the desires his of one favors he which by volition first-order desires (a desire to take the drug and adesireabstain), to alsoforms ahigher-order his lacksbetween havingaconflict besides addict, addict thiskindof Theunwilling concern. it, thewanton he against and thefacthates struggles isthat unwilling addict the addicted while of one them, namely that in psychology, istheir difference butthere acrucial addicted both physiologically are thatthey Heassumes possible drugaddicts. two differentiating reason. of not will but and are acts they self-evaluation, reflective of capacity the of manifestations all are they that in these common Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will”, 18. Frankfurt As we have seen above, according to Frankfurt, personhood is based on certain isbaseda on personhood Frankfurt, to according seen above, have As we Now, itisNow, the addict’s hismakesunwilling concern with what motivation himhuman Frankfurt tries to illustrate the difference between a person and a wanton by , orlack of hisself-concern and passivity deprivesthat him humanity hisof and 31 When a person acts, itis either When acts, a person against his will. And since a wanton hiswill.formAnd since higher-order awanton cannot 30 16 with regard to his own desires but he actively because he to wants be moved by a CEU eTD Collection 32 for necessary nor sufficient neither is which action, free from is different it Thus, volitions. ablessing.be than acurserather might it in some cases indeed, initself; a perfection is not capacity the this that course, suggests many important complexities humanof psychology that do notarise for simpler creatures. Of explain be can usedto for self-evaluation reflective capacity the Therefore, problematic. will possible open allup their counterparts: negativethe makethat states humanlife freemake that capacities the that note we can Here most. wants what hereally about himself deceive hemight or willed might hisbecome weak lead He free loss will the to of will. end will. updoing something our is againstexecute addictthe If unable histo decision, this might we addict, unwilling the of case the in as example, For problems. of host a of source befree a becoming can of possibility The achieve it. it alot of to effort is takes not: will free reflective is it. usthankstoour capacities, personhood lackand Though given to of the us differentfrom supposedly (and animalssuperior to) can also be of freedom source the both makes that very capacity the since problematic, is essentially action human bethat link might does notmake usfreeitmakes but us capable of enjoying freedom. A inprofound point this The (thecondition formof ability personhood to desiressecond-order andvolitions) initself Frankfurt atlength here: melet quote relation Toseethe exact thinking. inFrankfurt’s arefree related andwill Ibid., 19. Having free will depends on our ability to adjust our motivation to our second-order motivationadjust our to our ability to dependsfree on our Havingwill free. arenecessarily whose wills the enjoyment for freedom of itof will.the And those suprahuman beings, excludes if any, condition essential an satisfy to fail they since human, and infrahuman freedomsecond of order. itsthe conceptIt canwill alsoenjoying and of lackingof freedom of the will. The a beconcept of a maypersontype is not only,construed then, both he that isof capable order of second of the has volitions is becauseaperson It only beentity a as problem.thatthe concepthas both offirst-order a type This of entity desiresconcept for whom and volitions excludes of the all wantons, both 32 17 CEU eTD Collection freedom is a matter of degree and claims that “humans are only less typically free, areonly more “humans is or matter and that a of freedom degree claims that argues also Watson by them. Gary overcome when freedom face of loss their to the have also might mentioned, complexities psychological the with struggle to have who Those, having having Frankfurt freedom matter not is of to have a or according degree. mentioned, “the enjoyment of freedom comes easily to some,” others “must struggleachieve to it”. against contrary desires. However,for some, lifeis not that simple. To quote Frankfurt, while kind” be to want they when kindness resultstruggleAspoints of decision. and Frankfurt “some out, are movedby people naturally a as not and spontaneously arise volitions higher-order the people some for life; volitional in one’s these complexities face all hasto one necessary isthat not It persons. different in work processes these how difference is there asignificant volitions but second-order ambivalence are in desires with each other. conflict that higher-order can have one desireshas,and really one kindsecond-order of what candeceiveoneself one arise here: complexities psychological more yet above, listed ones the Besides themselves. volitions these form to difficult more even be might it but volitions, second-order and motivation 36 35 34 33 means that the agent “is free to will what he wants to will or to have the will he wants”. action. Just as free action free free of Frankfurtvolitions. tothat of willanalogous suggestsadefinition However, is “the freedom to do what form second-order still free willsincewecan away nottake our does deprived ability of the one wants to do”, enjoyinghaving free will. free will Ibid. Ibid., 22. Ibid. Ibid., 20. As we have seen lots of complexities and difficulties might arise in connection with first-order create between harmony one’s to itbe very seems to difficult Now, already are also related states which I will discuss later on in detail. 33 Being able to do freely as one wants is not enough for free will, and being 35 ; they do not need to exercise self-control or struggle 18 Indifference 36 34 As I and CEU eTD Collection 37 me Watson at lengthhere: desiresLet quote aswell? higher-order hedesires,first-orderregard toone’s benot indifferentwith could why regard toone’s with if indifferent canbe one For volitions. desiressecond-order and form second-order to But Watson argues that if indifference is the main point, itis not enough to assume the ability is latter so. As we have seen, the basic freethat secured willissomehow itself, by itisbut special this status questionable this that is difference between assumption the rest on to seems view Frankfurt’s volitions. and desires second-order of a status person and a wanton is that while the freedom. of theory of Frankfurt’s what heoffersinstead athiscriticism view. see “Free Letuslook and Agency” analternative paper developed and special status of desiressecond-order and volitions. Gary captured Watson pointthis in his criticismimportant The most Frankfurt’shierarchical totheputativeis theory of connected criticism 1.2. Watson’s seems that it is, to some extent, amatter of luck whether one is free or not. entirely in his voluntary control. So whether freedom is given or the result of a process, it isnot process the that bethe case might itstill his efforts, to free due becomes someone matter of luck and itbecomes unjust to blame or praise people for their actions. And even if simply andsome not everachieve given will regardless it being of theirefforts, isa free achieve it. the rule and not the exception. For some, freedom is a given butfor most, it takes effort to less” Watson, “Free Agency”, 31. 37 which aconflictedthat inalso suggests state which freedom is diminished ismorelike Watson’s basic worry in connection with Frankfurt’s theory is the alleged special thatforsome luck.is freedom ifittrue For question this raises the of Of course, indifferent to what moves him act,to a person has a concern with his own motivation. 19 CEU eTD Collection evaluations. will makewill not usfree. be indifferent which desire wins out and what higher order volitions forms.one still can one but volition, order higher a forms agent if an out win might them of one end the in and in conflict desires order higher have may One is. awanton way same in the indifferent not is one that imply necessarily not does order higher the of volitions and desires having that of the Heart, and Frankfurt’s Concept of Free Will”, of Free Concept Frankfurt’s and Heart, the of desires are the expressions of his second-order intellect’s agent’s the reflection“because but on his will”. second-order of the Stump, are they Eleonore, that simply “Sanctification, not is freedom to Hardening important are 41 of choice. problem the solve to 40 seem not does level ahigher to problem the pushing about talking is she since Wolf: Susan See well”. as choices higher-order her from be alienated “can choice first-order his from alienated who is agent 39 38 point: question because the point about wantonness is about because point the question sensibleask to whatmakes an agent with these any better than a wanton. And we can ask this is volitions, itThough Frankfurtassomeonedefines nosecond-order still with a wanton volitions. order higher one’s to with regard canbeawanton one that notes Watson But act. to Why is that so? As we have seen a wanton is somebody who is indifferent to what moves him For him, an action is free only if it is motivated by something that is isit order. higher the a desire thatof giveto notit status does anyspecial Watson thinks that Eleonore Stump has a revised Frankfurtian account according to which the reason why second-order desires why second-order reason the which to according account Frankfurtian a revised has Stump Eleonore Watson, in conversation. an that claims she and action of theory hierarchical the with connection in worry asimilar Wolf has Susan Watson, “Free Agency”,28-29. indifference cangouptohigher indifference orders. Rather, he thinks that itRather, he is that make thinks will usfreeifthishierarchy only second-order desiressecond-order The win sameout. arises possibility each at order. higher special to them add to is itis increasenumber togivea not justto context of contenders; the of the conflict desires, simply placethemselves are volitions second-order Since volitions? to any of volition it.concerning Butwhydoesonenecessarily careaboutone’s higherorder- those an atmost has ( desire the second it, whereas volition concerning order in contention. firstThat the desire isover the given a specialstatus its secondisdue havingto an The agent may not care which of the Freedom Within Reason 41 Evaluations are Evaluations choice . It is really uncommon in everyday life to choose to choose something, and something, choose to choose to life everyday in uncommon really It is . , (Oxford University Press, 30).However, this matter is slightly different prior to second-order to volitions: wemake afirst-order The Journal of Philosophy 20 40 Therefore, if Watson is right, hierarchy itself indifference to one’s motives. Watson claims 85, No.8 (August 1988),408. more thanameredesire grounded in 39 To sum this n –1)order 38 our n - . CEU eTD Collection completely was someone if indifferenthappen would What all. it doing not he was if than indifferent less is he least to what second-order at something, doing is somebody Formeonce actively itseems that indifferent. active and desires and volitionsbe to itis possible that itassumes failsbecause assumption but this processes, order he forms? In that state I agency. volitions can have a special role; they make it possible for us to us for possible it make they role; special a have can volitions desires and needed, case volitions?is second-order desires it In and second-order first-order our between conformity spontaneous no is there in which case the about what But motivation. by definition, he to wants be moved by hekindness; isnotindifferent with regard histo Now, the spontaneous agent cannotbe completely indifferent towhat moves him act,to since to be kind. On the other hand, as we have seen, some others need active effort todo the same. because they want kind something action,forway do examplepeople spontaneously some to the all them move that desires very the by motivated be to want spontaneously people some hand, one the On volitions. and desires second-order have can one how ways two the at look order desires. 43 Press, 1996), especially 33-64. desires”. mere than more any they are grounded so are volitions higher-order when only and “when In paper,“Freeanother Action and Freewill”Watson puts inthis point followingthe way: will in decision making see also Pink, Thomas, (2007),93-102. For asimilar view,both as regards skepticismthe about second-order agency and the role of the this view in detail in my paper “Practical Reason and the Work of the Will”, ofthe Work the and Reason “Practical my paper in detail in view this Weakness of the Will andPractical Irrationality Watson, will in decision-making, as an ability independent from both beliefs and desires. See “The Work of the Will” in42 only and do to what about judgment evalutional Watson, “Free Action and Free Will”, in Watson, in Will”, Free and Action “Free Watson, In a recent paper Watson developed a different view on judgment and volition, emphasizing the role of the role the emphasizing volition, and judgment on view different a developed Watson paper a recent In Watson claims that it is possible to be totally indifferent with regard to our higher- our be indifferent with regardto totally itis possibleWatson to claimsthat I believe that the concept of second-order desires and volitions can be defended if we if defended be can volitions and desires second-order of concept the that believe I Agency and Answerability 43 Evaluations have a special status because that can give , 123-157, originally in Stroud, Sarah and Tappolet, Christine (eds.) The Psychology of Freedom , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 172-200. Idiscussed Agency and Answerability 21 then they generate second-order volitions. second-order generate they (Cambridge: Cambridge University Croatian JournalofPhilosophy , 167. actively reasons engage inourown tooppose first- both 19 42 CEU eTD Collection 44 Let me quote here at length what Watson says on the subject: losthe them. in more, simply any his values notbelieve agentsimply does the state alienated the In them. has longer no he that imply would it so, do to reason any having without values from one’s if could recoil values.even one But onsome other materialism rests one’s values? If one does that, he has some reason todo so, and in that casehis attitude to his sin.” of sense own his or materialism own his from recoils “someone when example for values, values does notWatson thought Frankfurt’ssolve theory does notwork. He states that grounding our actionsin our the problemHowever, Velleman thatthishelp, does not suggestion forthinks same the reason why of them. action on based be must they desires, second-order form we if even and values, becauseown one can similar kind of argument.be As we have seen,Watson claims that ouractionsalienated should rest on our a from be defended can himself Watson that believe I and time; same the at be indifferent from to his own order processes. Ihave tried to show that itis not possible to have second-order processes and go uptothe higherorders. indifference cannot notconcerns, consequently have does one any higher-order precisely that sense means in indifferentFrankfurt’s Being activity. all reflective Istop indifference, complete I reach me, once moves what anymore interested I amnot that of state this is part it Since volitions. desires and form anysecond-order to cease wouldsimply one that believe Velleman, “What Happens When Someone Acts”, 134. Acts”, Someone When Happens “What Velleman, 44 But this argument does not seem to be convincing. For why would one recoil from is that one cannot coherently dissociate oneself from it from oneself dissociate coherently cannot one is that view of of from feature system one’s judgestheone world.which important The evaluational point the standpoint, one’s constitute to be said may system evaluatinal One’s second- our from alienated or to indifferent be to is possible it that claimed Watson from one set of ends and principles only from the standpoint of another such set that set such another of standpoint the from only principles and ends of set one from oneself can dissociate One system. valuational one’s of be constitutive to aside) cease disclaim them, principlesand repudiate and so anyends disclaimedor (self-deception isto system evaluational one’s constitute that principles and ends the from oneself 22 in itsentirety . For to dissociate CEU eTD Collection our second-orderour volitions. In hisit view, is our this point Watson seems to be right: there must be something on the basis of which we form explanation of important point. And this is not the special status of second-order volitions, but an them, it robustly shows that one is one that shows robustly it them, the problem. However, process. second-orderhashe simplylet hishim of some movehis desires without in participation own active the volitions meseems volition? that to It asecond-order performed has hereally moveunkind him. But are different. be desire to moves whilelettinghe his second-order care what him, makesanunkind remark not he does since end, the In loss. a suffered just has Once who someone with unkindly or kindly one behaves he whether actively indifferent be completely might be unkind, to one and be kind to desire performsexample a person, who is regularly motivated by unkindness, but who has both a higher-order volitions. desires his form higher-order to and heceasesto indifferent ownmotivation, completely is somebody once indifferent in beBut sameistrue with cease to hisvalues. the connection they from his values, all of himself totally dissociates oncean that out agent points Watson forms. one volitions whatsecond-order to with regard indifferent be completely cannot reflectivity. One higher-order Frankfurtian in with sameistrue connection The values. one’s Though one can get alienated from some of one’s values, one cannotget alienated from 45 Watson, “Free Agency”, 26. So it does seem to be the case that in themselves, second-order desires do not solve desiresnot do second-order in bethemselves, seem it casethat the does So to Of course, we can imagine examples that seem to show that Watson is right. For judgments without forfeiting all normative andstandpoints therewith one’s identity all as an agent. from oneself dissociate cannot one short, In disclaim. not does one why an agent forms a particular second-order volition and not another. And at And another. not and volition second-order particular a forms agent an not indifferent. But in a sense Watson still has an 23 valuational judgments that we form them. If all of 45 CEU eTD Collection desire,it not becould why form possible yet desires to on higher-order fourth, etc. third,the a certain first-order to formdesires with volitions regard and is to second-order possible regress infinite importantAnother problem Frankfurt’s of itfacesclassical is theory that the danger of of Regress Problem The 1.3. based on problemthe infiniteof regress. moved whichbypurereason. humans arenot to claim basicthe according Humean desiresorder and volitions should bebased on something while makingitpossible topreserve second- our criticism that the it to can answer revised, asvaluing.sufficiently If understood judgment. In my dissertation I would like to show that Frankfurt’s concept of caring can be injudgment itself not isenough and thatvaluing is something from different a rational judgingvaluablebelieve betweenvaluingand hisdistinction arational shows that that to be valuable, and one can even fail to value it. theory presented in “Free Agency” is too rationalistic. istoo Agency” in“Free theory presented Will”Free Action the and that in“Free of agency. Headmits human picture rationalistic overly an involve to seems judgments valuational our on based system valuational coherent 47 46 between differentiated himself Watson false. is action of theory a Humean showthat necessarily not does action. Humeanism about refuting Frankfurt’s thereby matters, reason butthat our faculties is volitional it itafter all, shows our not this, that about is he right Ibid. 168. Will”, Free and Action “Free Watson, In the next section I will look at another important objection to the hierarchical theory hierarchical the to objection important another at look will I section next the In I agency, on view Platonic or non-Humean, a defend to wishes still Watson Though But showing that we should perform volitionsBut showingwe shouldhigher-order that perform onthebasisvalues on our . It seems that the theory is vulnerable to the infinite regress problem since if it judging something valuable and something 24 47 One can fail desireto that one judges valuing it. 46 Having a more or less CEU eTD Collection When I do not simply say that “I want to sense of what it means tolose know completely we something.until us confuse will sentence this to The clauses casemore adding isa while, after similar in case of the verb “to want”. p that know “I that say simply not do I When “know”. and “want” that hearing a sentence like: “I know that Iknow that Iknow that Iknows that Iknow that Iknow “I know that I know that I know that that I know that “I know sentence: the of makesense While wecan verb. look atothercomplexhave sentences several using to containing co-ordinations the same just we limitation acognitive is primarily see thatthis To of. makesense can we sentence adding clauses to the sentence:“I want towant to wantwant to to want…. to be kind” is not a follow ifwe easily seethis We can means. speaker the follow what to possible less less and itmakes sentence the to clauses more adding be kind”, want to to “I want that sentence the harder to understand what it means to form a desire. For example we are able to higherascend understand impractical for usto or to orders. difficultincreasingly higherascend makeit maybe Thesethan limitations prevent usto orders third. the to desires and volitions. I will argue that there are1) there that argue Iwill volitions. and desires bestill movedmight really askto one by desire. whether wants particular this in other word because one has a higher orderyet higher level,for example,desire when one acts out of kindness because one wants to bethat kind (or endorses the desire to It mightbe be possible orevenkind) makes sense, totry to re-evaluate oursecond-order one attitudes on a orders? Frankfurt does admit that this is possible to ascend to higher orders than the second. ” my utterance might mean that I have a higher level of certainty about the truth of truth the about certainty of level higher a have I that mean might my utterance ” p ” simply because our cognitive limitations. There is another similarity between verb the between similarity is There another ” cognitivelimitations. simply because our First, to look atour First, to But it seems that there are certain limitations to the process of forminghigher-order the of process to limitations arecertain itseems thatthere But cognitive limitations, it seems that on each level, it gets harder and p ”, weseem is of to loose whattrack beingsaidwhen a ” “Ibutwant want to to 25 cognitive and 2) p ” but “I” but Iknow knowthat practical a ”, it mightimply that I p ” orperhaps even limitations that limitations p . But CEU eTD Collection state hestate shouldthat overcome by stopping forming process the volition.and asecond-order himself. trust heisseriouslyabouthimself,not Andthisisa does because perhaps uncertain self-trust, for someone of it? question problem This raisesthe bother desireto forms why one second-order a certain who is always questioningin And case itis pathological. pointclearly a andafter itis very unpractical it is that butclear his motivation people whoengagein have,kind limitations thatthey withincognitive such the activities of on a higher order clearlyknow which expressesorder heis what wouldand this surely him. mightparalyze There be higher levels would soon make him loose a sense of who he is. After a while he would not person he really wantsquestion:“Whatkind of person doIwant tobeall?” after hemightthinkwhatkind about himself of to be, that is,simply notknowingget paralyzed, whatdesiretobe moved by.When one asks oneself the ascend to the second-order,itBesides, not only arrivinginwouldon aresolution,that wemight postpone process this but going onhigher ourmotivationtry re-evaluate higher very yet orders. to and toon time-consuming yet preventus from higher than ascending to When third. orders facingthe it a decision would be also in case I do not want to control and self-management,of self- which problem the I with will discussconnection in in the important bevery lastwill chapter. problem This different. were desires our that to a” and I actually want to 48 the sixth or the eleventh order. sincemeansit ascend tounderstandwhat problem for Frankfurt wearesimply to unable to a serious not isinfinite regress seems that it Thus asentence. understand fordifficultto us make it few times a even clause sametypeof the repeating limitations, cognitive of our result a as but long, very are they if even co-ordination and subordination of variety a containing sentences conclude,we can understand To want something. meansit to what senseof lose we completely confidenceuntil pointwouldthe undermine wewant inwhat gradually our want. I in what self-confidence higher a have The verb “to want” is slightly different than the verb “to know” though. If I say the sentence “I want to want But besides our cognitive limitations there are there limitations cognitive besides our But a a , it might express a confidence in what I want, but the same sentence makes sense , in which case it does not seem to imply self-confidence; it expresses our wish 26 48 But adding more clauses to the sentence the to clauses more adding But practical limitations as well that should CEU eTD Collection 49 of ascending to higher and higher orders, he claims that lengthsee Frankfurtat here what Frankfurt to say on this process the problem. about Talking they introduce new complexities and they havenot new they and complexities do afirm basis. introduce they questions self-evaluation, asregards reflective see thatthough conceptsraise important these We and will sophisticated. moreit elaborate bymaking histheory criticisms of answer to to special types of acts of will themselves. In the next chapter I will analyze Frankfurt’s are volitions second-order we haveseen, attempt as However, its significance. lost has volitions second-order on stress the original that seems to each identification If other. andas commitment differentabilities dothe important work,it desires conform second-order and order-desires make first our to ability our dependson will free which to according thesis original his questions move this that is seems first At theory. Thus, he tries solveto the problem if interminable ascent by introducing newideas into his identification commitment. and concepts: newimportant two introduced Here Frankfurt Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will”, 21, italics in the original. inthe italics 21, Will”, of the “Freedom Frankfurt, this“resounds” commitment apotentially throughout endless array higherof orders. off. identifiesWhen himself a person decisively with first-orderhis desires, of one it cutting arbitrarily without of acts such series toterminate however, isIt possible, But howcan we prevent ourselves from ascendinghigher to levels? Letme quote acts of will 27 , and the new terms introduced refer, andthenew terms to introduced 49 CEU eTD Collection 50 desire. toafirst-order with determines where hestands respect agent which the of help with the make asan agent” astand to capacity “the which requires of Frankfurt In Reduction”, Double and Circularity “Hierarchy, his 51 sophisticated, thisis attempt unsuccessful originalsince the problem lackwas the of basis of and more elaborate self-evaluation reflective of make to concept the help they though that whether the hierarchical theory of see to concepts these desires Iwill discuss chapter second the In identification. and commitment can be rescued with the help of them. I will argue inpsychic stew” the seem to have no basis. As Bratman points out, a second-order desire is just “one more desire I triedshow, to most counter-argumentthe important is desires thathigher-order andvolitions it. As developed against someevaluate arguments it, free tried basedon and to theory of will In the first chapter I looked at Frankfurt’s classical hierarchical theory of desires and the Bratman, Michael E. Michael Bratman, Ibid., 24. Bratman also tried to combine Frankfurt’s hierarchical theory of desires and planninghis theory in weak This isdo what Frankfurtbystressing precisely tried to importance of the , ed, Buss, Sarah andOverton,Lee, 65-85 (Cambridge,Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2002). reflectivity. He argues that we need something more, namely thatweneed something Heargues reflectivity. Chapter 2: Further elaboration of reflective self-evaluation ofreflective 2: Furtherelaboration Chapter Structures of Agency 50 and the ability to form is desiresmanifestation second-order andtheability form only to the , (Oxford:, Oxford University Press,2007), 23. 28 Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry 51 strong reflectivity CEU eTD Collection we commit ourselves to somedesires. to of our ourselves we commit terminate the ascent at agiven point.is It part of our ability actto that at some point other, or begoing permitted”, isnot to higherto orders ascent means thatan“interminable convincedHe thinks simply thatthis thatFrankfurt’s of isso. concept commitment decisive “cut off”. “cut verb the to is related decide” “to verb the that a coincidence not is it explanation etymological permitFrankfurt’s use further making doesnot function ascent; one any to of decision that Commitment desires. higher-order impractical of toone inourselves our be and and commit time-consuming this sense say, thefourth order,havingwe mightfurthersay would or third ascended the to ascent that is not arbitrary:Buridan’s Ass,itis simply rational arbitrarily pickto options. oneof Similarly,the after it servesequally incaseof asfor example faced options, Sometimes, when appealing we are two with reason and effective is argues that arbitrary.this action. It is a higher-orders”. by making a decisive commitment and his decision “resounds to apotentially endless array of classic paper. As we have seen, Frankfurt claimed that one can anstop ascent tohigher orders About 54 53 52 vulnerable make counter-arguments. theory to the other and themselves controversial very are introduced has Frankfurt that phenomena higher-order cannot solve the problem,require some basis just desiresand explanation ashigher-order and do, consequently they they can just push it one desireshigher-order introducing and yetmore phenomena higher-order step willnothelp. These further. What is more, the diverse Frankfurt, Harry G. “Identification and Wholeheartedness”, in Frankfurt, in Wholeheartedness”, and “Identification G. Harry Frankfurt, Watson, “Free Agency”, 29. Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will”, 21. , 170. Now, is “arbitrariness” always a problem? In what sense is the decision arbitrary? is decision is“arbitrariness”whatsense the Now, In aproblem? always First, let us look at the concept of concept the at look us let First, 54 Therefore, since decision serves practical purposes, itis notaltogether arbitrary to 52 He also states that such a decision is not arbitrary. However, Watson isnot Watson However, arbitrary. is not such adecision that states Healso decisive commitment decisive 29 introduced introduced firstin Frankfurt’s The Importance of What We Care 53 and CEU eTD Collection desires and volitions. and desires assecond-order face counterarguments theyhave similar to moreevaluation elaborate, self- reflective of concept the make they though that show and these at look will I section next the In satisfaction. and endorsement identification, and commitment and including view criticism against with helpofintroducing other types phenomena,higher-order the of atany process given an butpoint important ability is that partof being an agent.autonomous the stopping simply not is commitment decisive orders, higher to ascent of series a terminate to us.Tosum point,up this thoughWatson isit would right that bearbitrary simplyto isimportantdo trust abilitybehind ourselveswhat ability andstand this our to reflectsour to rather, about; what wecare to commit ourselves to arbitrary isnot It act. to reasons give us reason. Especially in his book, of practical –theory a –very intocontroversial weredeveloped caring recent viewson Frankfurt’s how on later see will We reasons. have can we how way only the not is this judgments. Thus, hisview isPlatonic, sincevalue judgmentsarerational some But extent. to a on namely therightthings. regard we haveas capableof about ourselves caring to choose andcontrol cannot by directly decisions. Thisisour precisely why we need self-trust: we will we will see, form paralyzes that self-doubt of andmakesitimpossiblefor us ustofunction agents. Asas 55 Lehrer. Keith by out pointed been has it as agency, of condition important is an Self-trust ourselves. Lehrer, Keith, Lehrer, 55 But before Frankfurt tocaring turned andlove, he firsttried defend to his classical Nevertheless,Watson is ourdecisionsbasedthat should on right be something, Another point is that in order to make a decisive commitment, we need to trust Ascendinghigher to and signifies higher and orders alack of self-trust an extreme caring Self-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge and Autonomy reason is central isnotagency,we dois that to wecareabout what central something and . In turn, he thinks that our reasons should be based on our value The Reasons of Love The Reasonsof 30 , Frankfurt claimed that caring and love and caring that claimed Frankfurt , (Oxford: ClaredonPress,1997). CEU eTD Collection Externality”. firstat Frankfurt’s discussion of problemthis in one ofhis earlier papers,“Identification and look Let us agency. of human nature active for the account to tries and desires hierarchical of However, it seems to be intuitively true that agents are something that merelyhappensin making agent, the him kindsome of passive bystander. reduce agency it to seems view isthat to central with the problem He thinksthat this actions). and (intentions events other cause desires) and (beliefs events of kind some which in a process to is agency reduced suggest that to seems which actions, beliefs cause our with view, his In him. in happens merely that itbuildssensesomething agency to agentactively that the does as something that opposed on in philosophyVelleman of is“non-standard” Frankfurt’s arguesthat action, the theory a deliberation. inof process the participate we actively requires that thatbeingan agent true Press, 1977). 58-69, originally in Rorty, Amelie(ed.), in of Action”, Problem “The paper, inhis detail in view this criticized Claredon Press,1980) Davidson argues that we canunderstand actions throughcausal explanations. Frankfurt 58 69-79, reprinted from and reflect on our own motivation in a special way. we that can be andonly if persons agents we areable ascend hierarchically higherorders to to view stresses this Aswehaveseen, thinking. element inFrankfurt’s important is a centrally 57 56 makes up part of arsenalthat the is important It an of action. The identificationconcept of is one of mostthe problematic partsof Frankfurt’s philosophy Rejection and 2.1. Identification Frankfurt,Harry “IdentificationG.: and Externality”,in: Frankfurt For a standard causal explanation of action see Davidson, Donald, Davidson, see of action explanation causal standard a For Acts?” Someone When Happens “What Velleman The importance of the concept of identification is that it both complements thetheory itcomplements both is that identification of concept the of The importance Frankfurt also stresses that stresses also Frankfurt 58 The notion of identification is quite elusive and difficult to grasp; as grasp; to difficult and elusive quite is identification of notion The American Philosophical Quarterly The Identity of Person being active 56 standard modelsdesires standard claimthat taken together 31 15 (1978). is indispensable for agents. It is intuitively is It agents. for indispensable is , 239-253 (Berkeley: University of California active The Importance of What We Care About Essays on Actions and Events The Importance ofWhat We Care About , whatever that may mean. may that , whatever reflective self-evaluation reflective (Oxford: , which , 57 , CEU eTD Collection 62 61 60 59 passions”. example, liesnotinis ifit“[I]t asvisiblethepresent may even ofthis adds bedecision kind, that a that behind everydecision instanceis a it rather, attitude; an merely not is identification Frankfurtian But of the establishmentit external. becomes this ifhedesire, hisand rejects internal to identity, itbecomes desire, of internality or externality of precisely messy beingsareand difficult”. because human difficult, and messy is identification and freedom of “talk the it, notes Shoemaker identity and the desires that we reject become external to, we passive,to the but makes it external to him. Thus, the notion of identification is not only connected to the active- makesthis rejection the genuinelyhis desire andhis jealous hurthim his own to of desire it. from them of some expelling while own his truly as desires his of some he renders which of help the with performs, agent the that act conscious is a identification identification as a particular type of decision: “Identification andWholeheartedness”. we In can find paper this discussion a detailed of decisions. man”.the recent achievement, but that he also notices within himself a jealously spiteful desireinjure to following example: “[S]uppose a person wants to compliment an acquaintance for some Ibid. Ibid., 66-67 Ibid., 68 Shoemaker, David W, “Caring, Identification and Agency”, in himself apart from the desire to which he has committed himself. It islongerholds himself. no It which hehascommitted from to desire the himself apart longer no person the Then decisive. is entails it commitment the reservation, is increasingly When ismade higher orders decision terminated. without the of preferences or desires a sequenceof that […] by a decision is…it characteristically in paper, later identification his of further theconcept explores Frankfurt . Frankfurt thinks that a person clarifies his relation to his desires by this decision and 61 62 If this person identifies with his desire to make a compliment to the acquaintance, This also implies that since the desires that we identify with become part of our of part become with identify we that desires the since that implies also This internal-external distinction as well: if an agent identifies with a certain 32 59 But it seems that at first approximation, Ethics 114,No. 1,(October2003), 117. create our identity our such through 60 Frankfurt has the has Frankfurt commitment or a CEU eTD Collection “replace the liberty “replaceimpulsive with liberty the of anarchic behavior being autonomy the of underhis function for important Frankfurt, such they agent: the havean decisions ourdesires regarding of our desires internal, and personalwhy identity. do we have to externalize some of them? According to identification isidentification a sophisticatedquite tool with helpof the which agentthe oneself. Thus, to alien as regards one desires that to subjected and passive becoming involves desireswhich actingexternal as to on opposed agent, free,autonomous active, identity. And when he acts on a desire that belongs to his identity or “real self”, he acts and as into groups whichthem those hisown, and are fully thosewhichheexpelsfrom an his itselfmanifests in with decisions helpthe which, of asit agentwere, the hissorts out desires, All this clearly suggest that identification is a crucial element of the higher, reflective level. It order processes, it does not go as far as Frankfurt or Bratman in the level of sophistication that they require. they that sophistication of level the in Bratman or Frankfurt as far go as not does it processes, order R. Alfred Mele, it”. having his Autonomous Agents valuing his and V, having or his D, having of his combination a as understood excellence the bar too high”, which would not make it possible to accommodate average agency,does not only want to agencyinclude self-constitution and policies in it as Frankfurt and Bratman do, inorder not to “raiseplus a belief about the value of the given desire. Mele admits that this is a “thin notion(Mele, of identification;thing” but he has is, roughly, a matterof desiring to continue to have that desire and believing24, 1996, that 1-18.On the one’sother Melehand, defineshaving this notion inthe followingit is way:a good aReason”, “to as identify with adesire one treating and Decision “Identification, Bratman: See: actions. his guides that policy of a part itas treat to decides he that means it desire, a with identifies agent an when that claims example, Frankfurt is not the only one who claims that identification is a sophisticated higher-orderprocess. Bratman, for 64 63 For some, this concept of identification might be too sophisticated to accommodate average human agency. human average accommodate to sophisticated betoo might of identification concept this some, For 170. Wholeheartedness”, and “Identification Frankfurt, Now, what is exactly the point of identification? Why should we have to make some involuntary spasm that happens to occur in the history of his body. It comes to be a him into by he fact that ithas of is incorporated virtue the desire to that comes It body. his of history in the occur to happens that spasm involuntary asapersonmay“have” an in tooccur, ithappens history asubject merely whose as pertinent desire islonger no in any way external to him. Itis not adesire that he“has” making a by decision hewhich identifies with a desire, making the by really wants person what the determines The decision wants: what hereally desire on whichunsettled he ordecides uncertain fullywhether histhe objectown. of Tothat this desire extent – that is, the what person, he wants – is in . Or a different definition: “an agent’s identifying with a desire D, or a value V, that he has may be Motivation and , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, 117. Though this definition also includes higher- includes also definition this Though 117. 1995, Press, University Oxford Oxford: , 64 Agency , 227). Curiously, this definition involves Frankfurt’s decfinitionof caring, 33 constitutes himself constitutes Philosophical Topics, by his own will par his own . The . . 63 CEU eTD Collection makes them more important than passing wishes and whims. tendency. mercy be butincase persist, this of at we would that to for structure agiven a tendency replacing this structure with another in a chaotic manner. Frankfurt admits that there might be needvolitions. usfrom andsomething that we time, Butwepersistprevents through desires and that is,byforming second-order hierarchical structure, creating areflexive, We can synchronic ataparticular and adiachronicwantons by aspect. being avoid time a both has wantonness in detail, later discuss will I As want. they what considering avoid beinghave whoany Weact on or desirewithout to occurring agents wantonness, provides the agent with temporal continuity and unity. it andwe canhas a specific function: identification But very already important see herethat particular type of decisions described as identification above. For when an agent identifies whenan For agent above. asidentification described typedecisions of particular by meansof isstructure, and the of creating dynamic precisely coherence thispoint the 68 Stanford University (April 14-16, 2004). 67 66 65 Frankfurtdiscusses in in detail hisbook control”. in detail init discuss Iwill and the important very is nextintegration static and dynamic between part distinction The as in such kind of control of our motives? Let me quote here Frankfurt at length here: Iwill come back to this claim in Frankfurt’s contains book The 2006. Press, University Stanford Stanford: Ibid. Frankfurt, “Identification and Wholeheartedness”, 175. The reason why we need such unity is the same why we need second-order desires. is whyweneedsecond-order same the needsuchunity The why we reason which are then authoritative for the self.for the which arethen authoritative remaining areharmonious, butby identifying endorsing or with certain elements not achievedIn both respects, by eliminating by hierarchical structure which person’sidentity the may be in construed. part the intent isit establishesa reflexive over insofar unity […] statically of or time; as purpose at least onepartly for coherence […] itand provides insofar as Dynamically andstatically.dynamically orto resolvemore conflictofIt might be said,the then, that theor function to conflictingof decision avoid is to integrate the personit. both This is elements so that those 65 68 But not only self-control ishere. being self-control issueis Butnot only Forwhat point primary the the of Therefore, we need something to actively sustain a particular hierarchical we need toactively a particular something sustain Therefore, chapter 5 diachronic and argue that some desires by nature tend to persist and this and Taking Ourselves SeriouslyandGettingItRight 34 synchronic volitional unity 66 Tanner Lectures of the agent which delivered at delivered . 67 CEU eTD Collection 71 70 69 profound”. are,vivid,lives there among blessed, best the are happy-go-lucky, see-what-comes-along “truly the that hebelieves waybecause living intheepisodic and narrative a single avoiding narrative of kind a diachronicagainst notion self,the of accordingwhich to human life should be livedas some paper heargues arecent self.In narrative the personal identity, of diachronic conception continuity. volitional of level desires, and inthis itself iscase, this attitude a temporally stable desirefor that sufficessome stablehaving not temporally towards attitude apositive above expresses Even the agent desires. persisting any have not and agent an be can one that case the not is it continuity, volitions change through time. But though people might disagree as tothe extent of volitional his how with happy is and one, have to prefer not he does that say simply might Somebody stable. temporally structure hierarchical reflexive, particular a make helps identification time, through And has sinceagentspersist thatparticular who desire. conceives oneself asaperson one that means also it order, higher a on it wanting mean only not does it desire, a with not imply that their lives are not diachronic. They are just indifferent about some (narrative) some about indifferent just are They diachronic. not are lives their that imply not a carrier, this persons, a placedoes beingto attached or aslackof independence value they way liveone can life. one’s Though these people mightnever settle inlife in anysense and A aspects important. lifeagent differentof more Strawsonian view. Forit only implies that there are narrative people and episodic people and that they find future”. in the (further) and bethere will past (further) in the was there that something self,as a as considered figure not does oneself, Ibid., 84. Ibid., 65. Strawson, Galen: “Against Narrativity”. In: Stawson (ed.), To see that this is so, let me briefly consider Galen Strawson’s criticism of of of a type criticism Strawson’s Galen me letbriefly consider this isso, To seethat why Now, we exactly do need such kind temporal of in volitions?unity our 71 Such people live their life the way they do because they think that it is the best is the it that think they because do they way the life their live people Such 69 and he argues for an “Episodic View” instead. If one is episodic, “one 70 But this view can be Frankfurt’s with reconciled viewcan Butthis 35 The Self? , 63-87 (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005). does care about something: CEU eTD Collection wholeheartedness is not simply the feeling of “enthusiasm” or “certainty” or “enthusiasm” of feeling the simply not is wholeheartedness stands behindsome ofhis and any them desires commits himself to Thus, without conflict. 72 past. Therefore, agency is essentially diachronic, or temporally extended. in andthe directed rooted future actions are decisions, our important of inespecially case alcohol addiction,account his near andpast: if distant he had already ifseveral or drinks, he hasapast of this toavoidliqueur or his developing into anaddiction. decision Besides, should alsotake should affectshould take into more distant consequences hisas for example a commitment to avoid drinkingdecision.and distant past.Ifhe todrive wants for instance,this should influence his buthedecision, These ithow futurehis andhisrelates and both has tothinkto immediate about immediate distant examples showpast experience. Or to take another example, when somebody thatis offered an alcoholic drink, he very job. that Healso has tothink abouthow thisjoboften, particular fits his into long term goals and doconsider butwantshas agentheof the such to to whether of kind decision person who is that job for a certain lengthdo to want he will of whether time.about think to It has he is job, a not enoughaccepting isconsidering to wantsomebody to do something at the moment example, when For aswell. preferences ourfuture account into andtake consequences tied our past.When to make a decision we dosomething,considerhaveto we to its andare their future through consequences tothe connected Our actions areessentially future. existence. making Asaconsequence, decision influenced be should both by and past our our temporal in our is embedded deliberation of process the and creatures we aretemporal defined by alwaysa concern to livein which itself present, isthe concern diachronic. is self individual’s episodic The family. or relationships personal carrier, including values Ibid. Frankfurt’s term for volitional integration is integration volitional for term Frankfurt’s leastThus, agency some at level requires in desires. iscontinuity of our This because 36 wholeheartedness . A wholehearted agent . Awholehearted 72 but implies the CEU eTD Collection later, Frankfurt’s theory of autonomy is a autonomy of theory Frankfurt’s later, according identification.constitutes whichidentity his to agent the As through I will show claim Frankfurt’s with is concerned one important most The identification. of concept atus look let objectionstothe otherimportant discussion of wemoveBefore caring, tothe Self Real the and 2.2. Identification section. next in the identification of concept Frankfurt’s to objection another consider concept of caring, sufficiently redefined, can perform this role. But before that, let me longbe should term, In based these on something. prima facie the concept of concept the with our desires, both identify to ability our on limitations certain are there part, next in the show will I As with. limitations wouldcould on there which isimportant, theagent identify beno that desires which desire isimportant, more another? Andwhat not desireand a particular identify with fact, of matter identification, both a factual and anormative explanation is missing. Why does an agent, as a reservation. well, as a result of one’s commitment topreserving a given hierarchical structure without any as diachronically wholehearted be can one or reservation, any without desire second-order volitional integration One agent. the of canbe synchronically, wholehearted is,having that a But something is missingstill now here.Though we have afunctional explanation of true that when one makes decisions which affect how one lives one’s lifeinthe lives one’s how one affect which when makes that decisions one true should caring the agent identify with? If it is only the functional role of identification of role functional the is only it If with? identify agent the . In itself, the concept of identification is insufficient, for it seems to be to seems it for insufficient, is identification of concept the itself, In . factual and normative real-self view real-self , but we cannotexplain these without introducing 37 chapter 3 , that is, it claims that one is free and I will argue that Frankfurt’s Iwill argue that CEU eTD Collection 74 376. paper “Identification and Responsibility”, Chapter 2,23-46. Lippert-Rasmussen offers convincing arguments against real-self viewsof responsibility in his oneself”. being to impediment as an self-control rigid overly view frequently and claims that Frankfurt’s views to imply too tight selfstrong control desires.over our One is objection connected to this ofidentification, feature control. As Schechtman puts it, “we concerning desires, our either rejecting authorizing or this them. Now, implies having a be should determined by it? actions our that mean it does what and all, after self” “real one’s is What claims? real is,self is? That doesmyidentifying with makea desire it ofmy part identity as Frankfurt find identification on.HereIwilllater help atthefollowing: only look does usto our what of caring makesitpossibledevelop to a richer real-self view, Iwill more it indiscuss detail 73 do. should they what on namely issue deliberation, concentrate of primary the on be able to much mightnot too desires sense putting involves side. the emphasis onthe Agents whoarefocusingwrong on their first-order process? If isthat so, putting the emphasis on reflective self-control in Frankfurt’s a primarily deliberation isn’t words, other all? In after of action course a certain deliberation Why should agents be concerned of self-control might be of and result excessive andself-doubt. pathological self-concern the with kind theirSuch spontaneity. kills that desires extent an to self-control exercising be to seems he them, of all the time? Isn’t the primaryto have one.When is agentthe identifying with some ofhis desires andis repudiating some issue one prevents ofidentity, one’s create one helping than rather identification, of practice the that when autonomous by his aredeterminedone’s actions real self. Schechtman, Maya: “Self-expression and self-control”, in Strawson, in self-control”, and “Self-expression Maya: Schechtman, Susan Wolf discusses and criticizes the real-self view in detail. Wolf, detail. viewin real-self the criticizes and Wolf discusses Susan makinginvolvesdecisions identification sense inFrankfurt’s have As seen, we Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 38 The Self? The Freedom Within Reason 6,No. 4(December2003), 349- 73 Since Frankfurt’s Sinceconcept Frankfurt’s , 49. 74 Thus, it seems ; see especially ; CEU eTD Collection Vellemann indetail problem the of discusses is. self his real andwhat really wants agent an what conceal to failure a implies self-control at failure a cases such In own. his genuinely is not,this it desireor agentwants an butwhether such onethat consciously repudiates, problems were rooted in problems wererooted hefor factthat the his repressedhishatred which lead tothe father, Man’s Rat the is known, As itwell Freud. Man” from “Rat of the case well-known detail the in Hediscusses his identity. from them andexpels his desires, of some represses agent the self-control”. at fails she when herself truly is person “a often, that out points Schechtman instance, For them. desires which mineare kind express person Iam and notwhat of whether Iidentify or with are there that namely intuition, different very a have would Many true. intuitively being from part of what I am, ormy real self, external desires are somehow notpart of me. But this isfar are repudiates Buss,Sarah andOverton, Lee (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002), 91-124. 76 75 are with identifies is, agent the desires the from it. That excluded one’s identity is made up of those desires that he identifies with, and those that he rejects seems imply view befrom seems point to problematic a different of to aswell.Frankfurt that are pathological second-guessing of what one really wants. lackthe Identifyingbasic of self-trust. and canrejecting desires becomeeasily amethod of frequently butquestioning isway asthey of sign any occur, in awanton them the too desire thus, autonomous agency. Of course, Frankfurt is right is self-trust in and action mentioned already lackof thatthe effective against the them.Ihave that we should not just simply act on Velleman, “Identification and Identity”, in Ibid., 50. This problem is even more apparent in light of some pathological cases. For example, But besides the danger of preventing one to be But besides identification oneself, thedangerof preventing one to conceptof the trust of sense basic a lacks desires his with concerned much so is who agent an Also, external 75 In some cases one fails at self-control and one ends up acting on a desire to the self. This suggests that while internal desires are a constitutive a are desires internal while that suggests This self. the to Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt Themes from Essayson ofAgency: Contours 39 repression . 76 Through this pathological process, internal and those that he that those and , ed. CEU eTD Collection change himself and to manage his hostility toward his father. his toward hostility his manage to and himself change an Accepting than opportunity beleadhisto to ambivalent ambivalence would wholehearted. his toward ambivalent father”. should have done was to accept his filial hostility as part of himself, to accept himself, to partof as his filialhostility accept wasto done have should does he unfortunately that admitting rather, but himself, of part not as father his towards hostility them. To go back to the Rat Man’s example, the right strategy for him is not expelling his or not. it he wants him, whether to belong father his against wishes hostile Man’s Rat the sense, this In directed. is reflexivity which at person is the self one’s rather, with; identifies he motives self-image or conception, self-understanding beitlike he case. to the only would identity; ishis ispart of true that it. not It not Thishatred his against practice. isclearly a pathological hisistowards father notpart of his identity, the Rat Man itrepresses and himself defends pathologicalsimilar to repression a as defense mechanism. By claiming hishostility that 80 79 78 77 first-personal”. reflexive, notionally selves future pastthe arejust or persons whom he with canpick out thatare thoughts AccordingVelleman’s to reflexive,conception Lockean of “a self,the person’spast orfuture describes; Frankfurt and rejection identification development compulsive behavior. Velleman claims that this is close to the practice of Ibid., 103, italics in originalthe Ibid., 111 Ibid., 110 Ibid., 102 have this motive; it is part of what he is. Or as Velleman puts it: “what the Rat Man Thus, it seems that first-order desires can be part of one’s real self, even if one refuses one’s self- is self but Frankfurt notone’s talks about Velemann what claimsthat 80 Curiously, then,it would have been better for the Rat Man to 79 In this sense, a person’s self is not identical with the 40 78 , or we can perhaps call it one’s ideal self. 77 that is, the practices that he suggests are himself as CEU eTD Collection 83 Metahysics 82 Oxford University Press, 2003), against hisagainst father partof arethe hisso psychologicalspeak, makeup; itbelongs to, theraw to his hostile wishes that Man acknowledge simply place.in can Rat The from first the are select desiresto the what knowing itrequires obviously and desires, one’s selecting among create is identity one’s asophisticated to identification tool haveused Frankfurtian seen, his ifhe even father isnot aware of Aswe desirestoward them? his hecouldhostile reject Frankfurt can only work for the Rat Man if he first goes through an ambivalent state. For how having practice hand,the them. On ofidentification other the by suggestedand rejection in his leasteven he of sense) a full (at isnot aware Asa consequence, his consciousness. is a pathological defensive mechanism, and itinvolves himself”. from he conceal them that feelings or those misrepresent a person even that permit) (or require not unconscious, and hegoeson to say “making that stand adecisive certain feeling against does making involves Repression concealing adesireor mechanism. in pathological defensive a as repression to is similar father his against wishes hostile his Man’s rejecting Rat the that 81 Choice”, and “Emotions papers, controversial most and hisearlier in of one is more, what emotions; our over degree of control we haveagreat that believes Solomon Notoriously, emotions. these change form a strategy to basis of gradually can asone’s recognition own.This the them accepting emotion apart”. unflattening plays herenvy inwhichtheas his largernarrative resentment own,the andacknowledge or or will accept resentful nature grudgingly or herownenvious hisor recognizes “[A] who person Frankfurt: “Reply to J. David Velleman”, in Solomon,Robert C., “Emotions and Choice”, in Solomon Robert C., “On the Passivity of Passions”, in Frankfurt has a detailed answer to Velleman’s criticism. He refuses Velleman’s claim Velleman’s refuses He criticism. Velleman’s to answer detailed a has Frankfurt Talking about hidden, hostile feelings in general, Solomon states something similar: something states Solomon in general, feelings hostile hidden, about Talking 28, No. 1 (September 1973). 1 (September No. 28, 83 The difference here seems to be the following. What the rat Man performed rat the What following. be the to here seems Thedifference 82 he claimed that we choose our emotions. 207. 81 Recognizingsuch emotions is a processthat involves The Contours of Agency Not Passion’s Slave 41 Not Passion’s Slave: not lettingin , 3-24, reprinted from reprinted 3-24, , , 126. Emotions and Choice some of his desires into his desires some of Review of (Oxford: CEU eTD Collection which every man realizes himself” (Sartre, Jean Paul: Jean (Sartre, himself” realizes man every which 84 way.we arefree in arbitrary his buttodefinean apparently ourselves actions has a similar point about freedom: it is its freedom lies furthermore, phenomenon; in very Sartre’s nature. existentialism its arbitrary not the case that man arbitrary is an has itself will the an in asense, essence that claim simply might one but thatis arbitrary, determines permitting it. As we have seen, Watson objected that terminating the ascent ataspecific point identification, and repressing his justdesire precisely consists in Frankfurtian of sense the in stand a make to has he Then with. work to has he material the sense Sartre implies, but are based onwhat we care about, which, as I will try to show,his is morality”a first-order 50). (Sartre, However, I will argue later matter. onof thatour second-order choice commitments by the are not arbitrary himself makes in he readymade; found isnot he himself; makes “[M]an that declares Or, he 47. that phenomenon higher-order isspecial acertain assert there that be to would strategy oneobvious course, Of phenomena. higher-order of kinds postulate different or yethigher-orders ascend to desire to higher-order a certain of explanation an demand who critics his by forced be always can Frankfurtian a debate a such In explanation. an demand themselves that attitudes higher-order other psychology. If we want toexplain higher-order desires it will notbe much help refer to yetto in one’s elements order higher other yet to referring by criticism this to answer effectively Frankfurtforbased evaluations something, cannot example, one’s andjudgments. on be attitudes higher order demand one’s CriticslikeWatson that others? forming of instead inelement one’s Why psychology. does one form desirescertain higher-order and volitions an important objection to Frankfurt’s views on agency is thatit involves arbitrarily picking seen, an already have we As basis. any without phenomenon mysterious a quite is identification that seems It explanation. a real without still are we explanation, functional a now have a pathological self-defense an mechanism,arestill without we explanation it. Though of we “What is at the very heart and centre of existentialism, is the absolute character of the free commitment, by commitment, free of the character absolute the is of existentialism, centre and heart very the at is “What But even if Frankfurtian identification and rejection is not identical with repression as repression with identical not is rejection and identification Frankfurtian if even But terminates any ascent to further levels by simply not simply by levels further to ascent any Existentialism and Humanism 42 avoiding . London: Methuen, 1955), doing so. 84 CEU eTD Collection desiring orwanting mean something more can complex something and sophisticated, and this we will seethat makeit However, valuable. notdoes of this window, activity the jump out we desire or want it. In this itis hassomething value exact butsomething valuable, because for usbecause opposite: the crude form this view is rawestobviously mistaken. form If I book, want, say,seems to to be quite unacceptable. It claims that we do not desire or want desires we desires evaluations, rather, the other way round: when we endorse or value positively one of our “it is identification that indispensably constitutes indispensably isthe “it andtheground that of identification source constitutes reasons”. reasons are essentially related” butit is nottrue that identification depends on reasons, rather, and “identification that he admits Moran’s criticism, hisreply to In actin away. certain to identification, but the other way round: the fact that Iidentify with a desire givesme a reason so. Itdo leads that to is to reason reason not justifying hashe anindependent, because his concepts. of interpretations rationalistic 86 Oxford: Claredon Press, 2004. and Value: Themes from The Moral Philosophy of Joseph in Raz Reason”, “Disengaging See Frankfurt, on rationality. based is wholeheartedness that view Raz’s refuses Agency 85 it, a form ashecalls to of evaluation, connected identity one’s ispractical and guide one’sactions. thus notionidentification, His then, of one values his because motives one has a good on? Why one valuedoes some ofhis motives not others? and Naturally, would one think that some others as alien to it. But identity rejecting and of parts one’s whatas legitimate them of some endorsing and motives one’s does identification in the sense of endorsement depend Frankfurt “Reply to Richard Moran” in Moran” Richard to “Reply Frankfurt in Identification”, on “Frankfurt Moran: and Passions” and “Reasons Scanlon: example: Seefor , 165-184 and 189-218. He also contrasts viewhis with the rationalism developed byJosephRaz and The Reasons of Love The Reasonsof The is aboutvalue:nosame there isobjectivetrue valuethatwould precedeour Frankfurt treats concept of identification as involving crucial shape identification crucial that of as involving treats concept decisions Frankfurt create value. developed Frankfurt thisvery controversial inis intheory detail his , and I will discuss it later. The basic tenet of this theory in its Contours of Agency 85 Itisnot the case that one identifies with a desire 43 , 219. , ed. Wallace, Pettit, Schefflerand Smith, 119-129. endorsement reason to do so. But Frankfurt rejects , which involves evaluating involves which , Contours of 86 Reason CEU eTD Collection to alter its condition”. alter to justentire constituted psychicsystem a state absence– bythe inclination of any or tendency of the “astate itas he defines where Passion” Faintest “The in in hispaper detail concept its action enduring andto presence guiding role. its to contributes this desire with satisfaction My time. through and organized coherent my satisfaction with a topursue career indesire helps memakephilosophy my more actions my example, For coherence. volitional a stable ittemporally create helps us identification: Cambridge university 1999),Press, 95-107. stability to its isconnected importance that out points who ofaction theory Bratman’s a role in counterarguments. earlier ones hisand views. Thisin is a the sense,concept of satisfaction,mighthelpyet defend introduced one more conceptthat Frankfurt haveabasis.But seem to is which,an in improvement,a sense, strikinglyAs I have tried showdifferentto above, the concept of identification is problematic because from it does not the but as I will show,2.3 Satisfaction it has to face other from others. very the butdifferent 88 87 of concept Frankfurt’s us, and creating wanting caring of or modes which guiding are capable love areof andframework, desiring real value the Frankfurtian stillvery In morecontroversial). appealing theory (though can make this in our lives. But before I move on to these, I will look at Frankfurt, Harry G. “The Faintest Passion”, in Frankfurt, Bratman, Let us first look at what exactly Frankfurt means by satisfaction. He discusses this means Hediscusses by satisfaction. Frankfurt atwhatexactly look Let usfirst Frankfurt is not the only one who makes use of the concept of satisfaction. It also has which is for required Structures of Agency 88 satisfaction It is important to note that satisfaction is not a further higher-order a further is note not satisfaction that is to It important , 99. temporally extended which is also a feature of a hierarchical system of desires, of system hierarchical a of feature a also is which 44 Necessity,Volition and Love agency . 87 Thus,its role is similar to that of (Cambridge, CEU eTD Collection his ownwill”. Velleman, “Introduction” claimed that if an agent’s satisfactionwith a desire is due to depressionor 92 desires. contrary excluding satisfied with a desire entails treating it as the best available option, it still contributes to commitment through 91 90 University Press, 1999), 194. 89 is satisfaction of characterization Frankfurt’s of deliberation, active on the nature stress satisfied with it, or in other words he lacks any negative attitudes to it. is he because it to himself commits and desire a with identifies someone that example nota further higher order desire,it is a good candidate to solve the problem. We could say for is satisfaction failure. since Therefore, to is doomed anexplanation demand themselves that desireshelp attitudes higher-order introducing higher-order of volitions other and with the to findfor anattempt abasis because areproblematic Ashave seen,these we identification. and commitment of concepts the to improvement important an is this sense, a In a “non-occurrence”. refers to satisfaction of concept simply refers to the absenceorder of desireany contrary directed attitudes atmore higher- meanone we haveyet not that does is, satisfied being that some attitude; desire or ofto ourit. desires.As Bratman Rather, puts it, when Frankfurt’s we are satisfied with a desire it desire does not seem to guarantee agentialguarantee seem authority”. not to desire does desirein sense“maybe this indepression, grounded with a insuch and cases satisfaction Bratman, “Identification, Decision and Treating as a Reason”, 204. Velleman made a similar point and point similar a made Velleman 204. aReason”, as Treating and Decision “Identification, Bratman, Frankfurt notes that satisfaction does not necessarily entail commitment (ibid), but it seems that since being Frankfurt, “The Faintest Passion”, 103 Bratman: “Identification, Decision and Treating as a Reason”, in aReason”, as Treating and Decision “Identification, Bratman: restlessness or resistance. or restlessness a with conditioneven be satisfied also might he However, condition. improved an with inferior satisfied to the it of would bealteration acceptableno onehim. that to follow Itgoes not almost does it without he saying,then, of course, thatiscondition, he would his be with in.satisfied is that someone fact the WhatFrom get. to them for satisfactionbe possible would it think they what than less for does by gladly settle conditioned ambition tomaximize.People often an uncompromising entail is an absencenever settleas less for anything willing a rule, thanthat.But to isnot satisfaction of the best condition ithemean considers that not does it? of It aspect or element with some or availablecondition, to him. SomeNow people maywhat be so demanding does that they are it mean to say of a person that he is satisfied with his psychic But this concept raises an important problem. As Bratman notes, satisfaction with a 90 , 13. 45 89 Let me quote here Frankfurt at length: 92 We might also add that in light of his of light in that add also might We Faces of Intention ennui , it cannot be “an expression of 91 (Cambridge: Cambridge CEU eTD Collection the reason itself and not satisfaction all. after satisfaction not itself reason the and on rests authority case, in that but authority, agential it of becan asign word), the sense of very different: while the former while talks about the very different: something talkFrankfurt about Schopenhauer and course, pessimism.classic of Of theory involvedof conceptof inand the satisfaction Frankfurt’s concept satisfaction Schopenhauer’s between There arestriking similarities pessimism.involvesthis unwarranted view an a certain basis, that is, when one is satisfied with adesire with is, issatisfied one when that basis, a certain on rests satisfaction When explanation. an needs itself that phenomenon mental acertain with explainishe to agency trying earlier: encountered faces objection we familiar Frankfurt the sense of approval which differentiates it from depression. from it differentiates which ofapproval sense our ownmotives, with for example,satisfied we are when we Frankfurt: do for not mean problem that areal upon any touches contrary a“non-occurrence” desire to is refers absent. Rather,satisfaction thereof is concept a positive Frankfurt’s that point Bratman’s However, concept. negative ita make not does coercion of absence the as freedom example for defining But something. of absence the as it by defining “negative” as concept 93 adesire toward but attitudes any negative have not someone does that is not real question so the resignation, and of depression result the be can it itself in seen, have As we authority. agential ground to insufficient is desire state. of his depressed result really wants, or as Bratman puts it, his authority as an agent, rather, it might be passivityof as a resignation or severe it enough”isspeak,given Butit agent. situation,the “good can easily result bethe depression soto for as well. In thatif the canbejustified is negative; necessarily acceptance way are.This not the state things case it does not express not reach goal,doanything butdoes becauseheissatisfied with that hissituation improve to what the agenthe could that and off better much be he could that know might agent An action. to one curious since it seems thatit could refer to some sort of Note though, that in a sense, the term “negative concept” is rather vague. For it is possible to define any Also, why do we even have to say that satisfaction is merely a Satisfaction therefore, as the sheer non-occurrence of negative attitudes toward a toward attitudes negative of non-occurrence sheer as the therefore, Satisfaction satisfying why 46 he does not have any. It seems then, that then, seems It any. have not he does our desires, the latter emphasizes latter desires, the our passivity because of because with regard to what moves to regard with a reason (in thebroadest (in areason negative state? 93 I think I being CEU eTD Collection 96 Press, 2000). Yaffe: also see uneasiness of concept spoiling the relish of evenof those good which things we have” (178).For a recent discussionof Locke’s desire) is not yet happiness, only the “first step” to happiness: uneasiness “is inconsistent with happiness,is quite different from that happiness of of concept Schopenhauer,Locke’s uneasiness. though. pressing most the Forwe him eliminate we act thewhen elimination Thus, 1,333. Vol. 1894) of uneasiness (the satisfaction of a himself will quickly find”, Locke, John, 95 andbe happiness definedcannot by pain-pleasurea simple as out by calculus, pointed satisfaction that suggests This either. for happiness sufficient is not states negative of absence something and positive isnotthus taken away by of presence the negative;something and the paincan be yet without and be is by unhappy.constituted Happiness presenceof the one that and pain experience yet and happy be can one that realize if we option coherent is a Satisfaction ends suffering, but contains positive elements as well.We can easily see that this suffering”. end that states other two the death, sleep and from fact psychological a as it differentiates which happiness of moment positive the overlooked have […] not satisfaction as the presence of a positive state? As Simmel pointed out, Schopenhauer “should But this Why negative darkviewis states. wenotdefinecould unwarranted. happiness and absencethe meaning not of itinvolve that does pain, anypositive only state absencethe of 94 does not involve any positive element. Desire and causes tension is pain,and it satisfying nothing elimination butthe it pain; of this only absence the to of itsdesire through elimination: Schopenhauer thinks of satisfaction. have concept both anegative they theories, arevery different these But though that satisfaction doessatisfied with not refer to the presence of something positive, Simmel, Georg: Compare with Locke’s concept of uneasiness: “That desire is a state of uneasiness, everyone who reflects on reflects who everyone of uneasiness, state isa desire “That of uneasiness: concept Locke’s with Compare Schopenhauer, same position as we were before this suffering or desire appeared. gained butdeliverance from be some suffering desire; or consequently, ever weare inonly the can … [N]othing awant from pain, from deliverance than more be never always All satisfaction, or what is commonly called happiness, is really and essentially having them, which obviously makecould nosense atall for Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Representation negative Schopenhauer and Nietzsche only, and never positive … [T]he satisfaction or gratification can Liberty worth theName:Locke on Free Agency An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 95 , (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), 64. A pessimist might say that happiness is nothing but nothing is happiness that say might A pessimist 47 , (New York: DoverPublications, 1969), Vol.1, 319. (PrincetonUniversity , (Oxford: Claredon Press, 94 96 CEU eTD Collection 98 Janaway, 344-375. Schopenhauer’s pessimism see also:Nussbaum, Martha C.: “Nietzsche,Schopenhauer Dionysus”.and Companion toSchopenhauer 97 identification connects it with treating as a reason: satisfaction with is that a desire of element agencya crucial extended temporally and hisextendedof concept emphasizes also He problem. the to solution Bratman’s at look us Let desire. of hedonism. form onan and simple rests Schopenhauer’s unfounded pessimism Janaway, whothinks that with another? with explanation. whyisFor an certain agent satisfied with in a desire not sensethis positive and itself an demands attitude that another higher-order to attitude by referring higher-order a explain effectively we cannot earlier: we encountered that difficulty same to the theory the expose would this adesire.But toward attitude bea positive would satisfaction Rather, qualify as satisfaction. not could of depressed state the passive this way, the satisfaction it?we have being with satisfied toward a desiremeansthat we defined apositive If attitude say that we it? Whycouldn’t toward attitudes negative any of by absence the constituted is itis, that state, negative a is merely a desire with satisfaction say that to we have Why do isas well. unfounded of satisfaction concept negative Frankfurt’s pessimism isunwarranted, as the absence of any or terms, negative in define satisfaction both try to negative they similarity: havealogical theories two state. And I think that in the same way as Schopenhauer’s Bratman, “Identification, Decision and treating as a Reason”, 204. aReason”, as treating and Decision “Identification, Bratman, Janaway, Christopher: “Schopenhauer’s Pessimism”. In: Janaway, Christiopher (ed.): treat it as reason-giving if matter. it the she weretoreflect on as reason-giving treat continue to treat it as reason-giving, be satisfied with that decision, and continue to reason-giving, ( … apersonis,in identifiedan with sense, extended a desire if ( As I pointed out above, we need to have some kind of kind some have to need we above, out pointed I As Strikingly, regardless of their different treatment of the concept of satisfaction, the 97 ii , (Cambridge, University Press, 1999), 318-344. For further arguments against ) she does not treat it as external, and ( 48 reason 98 iii ) she would to decide to be satisfied with a The Cambridge i ) she treats itas treats ) she CEU eTD Collection voluntarism.” a to second the and of autonomy concept nonvoluntaristic one.volunatristic a I to will come leads backconcept to Cuypers’ first The views in nonvoluntarism. Frankfurt-2 two different Frankfurtian views, Frankfurt-1 and Frankfurt-2.Frankfurt-1 emphasizes voluntarism and 99 show that with these concepts, Frankfurt turns to a radically different direction. Frankfurt’s namelythinking, his concept of together. connected are elements different Bratman’s theory of action that it triesdemand to construct a complex, unifyingan explanation,theoryalways in which the face the same objection,But if sowe try theyto satisfaction. on, explainlater and namely endorsement and identification human including cannotthat phenomena, agencyhigher-order in bythemselves, stressing be theused importance these different itby torescue tried emphasizing histheory, he to objections heencountered after tohigher-orderof one explainof these, we willattitudesformdesires volitions, but capacity and papers. Atfirstheemphasizedour second-order to the all others.psychology. Frankfurt, as we haveIt seen, emphasized different elementsis in his different a virtue is itthat explainby in totry mistaken to agency human stressing onesingle element our of reflection.upon it treat to it decision as areason with and also treating as areason,beingthat with continuing satisfied decision our itself, desire the are phenomenon this of Parts phenomenon. complex more is a of only element an way.is, satisfaction it totreat That that giving andcontinuing extended is agency. Butone notsimply with satisfied a desire butwith ittreating asreason- temporally and for continuity needed element is the satisfaction that argues Here Bratman actions but we cannot directly control what we care about. On the contrary, caring and love and caring contrary, the On about. care we what control directly cannot we but actions caringis What somethinghas quite about different. importantbearing wecare an on our of his concept voluntarily, acts we perform of will that second-order heemphasized earlier Asimilar interpretationof shiftthe inFrankfurt’s thinking was developedby CuypersStefan E. who describes In the second part of my thesis I will look at a very important development of suggest a larger into context satisfaction of concept the puts Bratman The way how caring 49 Chapter , and an important version of it,love. I will 7. See Cuypers, “Autonomy beyond 99 While CEU eTD Collection constraints are internal to the will they make autonomous agencypossible. internal makeautonomous will the are to they constraints impose volitional necessities on us and yet do not take away our freedom. Rather, since these Rather, not away do freedom. yet take us and on our 50 CEU eTD Collection Part II: Frankfurt’s Theory of Caring and Love and Caring of Theory Frankfurt’s II: Part 51 CEU eTD Collection significance of the ability to care. stress the that theories contemporary other from of caring concept Frankfurt’s differentiate I will section first in the detail, in issues these Idiscuss before But essence. volitional our of part are they in agency: role important an have yet and control directly cannot we which involves of caring form concept voluntarily, the we arecapable to that desireshe andvolitionsthinking. Whileearlier of emphasizedtheimportance second-order discussed. widely has been agency in role their and love and caring of theory Frankfurt’s and views controversial very are guiding These action. important principleof themost mode and thus of caring important and committhings about care wholeheartedly to be able to have we that claims He lives. our of ourselvesprinciple guiding basic most is the caring him, For action. human on view his of basis to the became what we carein ofWhat his“Theimportance paper We andCare About”, he after in developed it it detail about. Besides,of The concept he thinks that We will see that this concept can be interpreted as a significant shift in Frankfurt’s shift as a significant interpreted be conceptcan see We this that will caring is centrally important iscentrally later in Frankfurt’s thinking. Hefirst it discussed Chapter 3: Frankfurt’s Concept ofCaring 3: Frankfurt’sConcept Chapter 52 volitional necessities love is the most , CEU eTD Collection Ethical Theory and Moral Practice feminist Ethics 101 “Care and Compassion: Moral Sentiment Theory Revisited”, 43-75. sense they in thing,For one a in features as well. common has important all some care andethics of ethics belong to the Humean approach to would conceptthe obviously berejected by ethics the of virtue ethics.care or tradition,and this caring in Frankfurtian of beterms can asHitler characterized consequently agents that is, itthey does not by any means imply being moral. Morality is just oneand try thing to care phenomenon, about wider andmuch a is caring Frankfurt, for to assuch, morality for thus and baseothers, their for views basis arethe of a concern andempathy caring moral sentimentalism while for is that difference Another on these. of last the on emphasis the with elements, volitional and cognitive Solomon, Robert C., Robert Solomon, 100 sentiment, feminist including of ethics, theories contemporary influential several in role has acentral of caring The concept of Caring Theories other and Caring Frankfurtian 3.1. both of the former belong to the tradition of tradition the to belong former the of both is while concepts that thetwo between main difference mind. The has in what not Frankfurt sentimentalism traditional utilitarianismethical theories: and Kantian ethics and canbe as labeled most with two the are contrasted Both of caring. concept anormative based on is ethics virtue C.Baier,Carol Similarly,Slote’s, Michael Anette andNelNoddings. Gilligan others, an important normative ethical theory that was developed by mostly feminist thinkers, among is it.care of Ethics discussing before caring of concept Frankfurt’s thesefrom differentiate to See forexample:Noddings, Nel: “Caring”. In:Held, Virginia (ed.): Another sentimentalist opposing Kantianism who thinks that care is the basis of ethics is Solomon.See But regardless But differences, of virtue of these Frankfurt’s concept caring andof that It is important to stress that the concept of caring in feminist ethics and virtue ethics is ethics virtue ethics and in feminist of caring concept the stress that is to It important 101 (Boluder, Colo: Westview Press,1995), 7-31 Slote,and Michael: “Moral Sentimentalism”, for Frankfurt it is a more complex phenomenon which includes affective, includes which phenomenon complex more is a it Frankfurt for . 100 In Defense of Sentimentality ethics of care ethics of 7,No. 1(March2004), 3-14. and Michael Slote’s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), especially 3:chapter moral sentimentalismmoral 53 virtue ethics Justice and Care. Essential Readings in and thus treats caring as a . Therefore, itis necessary . Therefore, moral CEU eTD Collection involves “a kindof metaphorical idea ofidentification with a feeling of samethe thing.” empathybelieves outthat well empathiccaring) something similar. Hepoints thus and(and Clement argues that personal autonomy and ethics of care can be reconciled with each with be reconciled can care of ethics and autonomy personal that argues Clement of concept Grace providingcaring abasisfor feministthinker, as likewisethe autonomy, and latter’s the interpret can One views. Frankfurt’s in and sentimentalism moral of versions himselfidentifies mostthe important mode of caring. Inhis discussing book love he claims “alover that as he love, regards which sense inconnection with in this adifferent term heuses however, for Frankfurt; important identification is centrally conceptof the that previous chapter from from attitude”. caring the moralfrom principles are “derivedthinker, statements claimsfactsor but not Noddings that 106 105 exaggerated”. be to tends lives our directing in morality of importance “the that believes he caring: would say one can though that beingmoral, care about itis only one possible objectof beingmoral.focused He on not is wider,andconsequently much is caring his conceptof For him, what we most care about tells us what we should do, but as I have mentioned above, emphatically. very ethics Kantian refuses also and view this shares Frankfurt ethics. Kantian basis of isthe caring and concern ethics, emphatic virtue For 104 103 102 try to base their views on a different foundation. and exaggerated is rationality of importance the that think all They non-rational. something Slote, 6. Ibid.,61 (Italics in original). the Frankfurt: Noddings, 22. See Slote, 7. Another important similarity is that caring and caring that is similarity important Another One more similarity is connected to the concept of concept tothe is connected One more similarity Another similarity is that for all of these theories, caring has a The Reasons of Love of The Reasons 104 with what he loves”. he what with 103 Thus, Slote’s virtue ethics and ethics of care are both opposed opposed toboth virtue andethicsof ethics Thus,Slote’s care are (Princeton, PrincetonUniversity Press, 2004), 105 Slote stresses the importance of identification identification as of stresses the importance Slote 54 autonomy identification moral virtuemoral are related both in different both related are 6. normative . We have seen in the . 102 The feminist The dimension. 106 CEU eTD Collection say and thus I will discuss some of his points on the way. individualist conception ofpersons agent. As Helm puts it, we have to refuse the it, wehave to puts As Helm agent. an of onthe psychology only focusing interpreted, inaretraditionally way we the concepts interpret these and linkslove ustoothers wecannot of and Caring socialnature persons. the discussingsubjectivism Frankfurt’s with in connection his love.on theory it into thewhile problem brings of backcaring,to good objectively in come Iwill the Sincetheory for us. this good is what objectively promote be ableto have to we ourselves: 110 109 Oxford University Press, 2010). what is what recognize andpromote involves beingableto care ability the to love. arguesthat of Darwall theory in Frankfurt’s involved subjectivism the discussing while later claim this to back come 108 107 theory. ethical contemporary the loss freedomof or personal autonomy, on the contrary: they somehow contribute to it. mean necessarily not do limitations these that argue both the Nevertheless, choices. range of their definition of caring is, both of them implies that caring somehowlimits or restricts one’s other. she is fully knowledgeable andexperienced she isfully knowledgeable if itsomeone’s good is whatthatperson wouldfor herself, wantinsofar is, assheactually as promotingwords foris someone. good what Now,Darwall claims that“somethingforis caringinsomeoneby that welfareor about meansclaiming promoting someone’s other Helm, Bennet W., Bennet Helm, Darwall, 31. Darwall, Stephen: Darwall, Grace: Clement, 107 Finally, Bennett W.Finally, Bennett Helm developed atheory of caring love whichemphasizes and Rational care theory of welfare developed by Stephen Darwall is another important Both of these views have faceto a similar problem in this project. However different really good for the individual cared for. This applies for the ability to care about Care, Autonomy and Justice Frienship and the Self: Intimacy, Identification and the Social Nature of Persons Welfare and RationalCare 108 This view links personal welfare with the concept of of caring concept the with welfare personal links Thisview . 110 My view has a lot in common with what Helm has to (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1996). (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2002). and 55 individualist conceptionautonomy individualist of unreservedly concerned for herself”. for concerned unreservedly 109 (Oxford: and the Iwill CEU eTD Collection of of morereflective self-evaluation elaborate, they solvecannot the justproblem, pushit they desiresour is, and Thatshould weendorse identify with? help though these concept makethe of normativethe Ortotake which problem: desires others? andnot someof we endorse our Nevertheless,itcannot solve the original asthe sameproblem, question here: arises why do identification explain the process of forming higher-order desires and volitions morein detail. and endorsement Thus, with. identify or endorse we which volitions higher-order forming by desireswe wouldinthose saythat effective should action Frankfurtnormative question, put itis because we endorse orvalue it, and because weidentify it.with And concerningthe volition desire and higher-order acertain when weform is that factual question the answer to self-evaluation reflective dimension of this process: what kind of higher-order desires and volitions should we form? normative focuses on latter the one? a different The not volition and desire and higher-order form volitions: higher-order desires why andwe a certain our concerns theorigindo of We saw in saw We itsSignificance and Caring Frankfurtian 3.2. significance. This question can be into broken down 1) further. And this wasthefollowing: what is basisofhigher-orderdesiresthe and volitions? explanation introducing andconsequently justpushes the onestep original question them some need that phenomena higher-order themselves are identification and Endorsement volitions. and desires order higher of theory original the as counterarguments same itfacesfailure is and phenomena becausethe to doomed elaborate order sophisticated more As we have seen, endorsement and identification are both part of the ability of ability the of part both are identification and endorsement seen, have we As In the next section I will move on to the definition of Frankfurtian caring and its and caring Frankfurtian of definition the to on move will I section next the In chapter 2 that an attempt to defend the hierarchical theory by making second- bymaking defend to theory thehierarchical attempt that an and at first sight can give an answer to both of these questions. The a factual 56 and 2) a normative question. former The CEU eTD Collection 112 findingitintrinsicallyinteresting valuableis becauseonemight quite thatcaring think and finding it valuable. 111 it important important tomeall. at caring Frankfurttreats Thus, about something equivalentto as all, because I personally judgethis though I case, life that ahealthy intrinsically valuable,Iam isnotmoved byit at do not care about valuable,healthy but nevertheless go on smoking, eating unhealthy food and drinking all the same. In life,intrinsically is life healthy a that judge might orI example, For inme. to indifferent otherbe totally words,even might it all; at I attractive thing do that find not do I not valuable, intrinsically is findsomething that it isI recognize It though is tomylifeimportance possible alsothat activity of whatsoever. no of might bethatthiskind it because ice-cream eating I careabout entail that not surely does it but ice-cream, an desire might I it. about care we that imply not does that but something by contrasting itboth with desiring something finding and itvaluable. something is him?caring about He explainssomething care about what mean to according to that role under Humean assumptions. wouldnot accept caring asthe ground for higher-order desires butIwill argue itcan fulfill volitiondesire mustor be Of because insomething. grounded course, his of he Platonism which higher-order Watson’s to a certain according as criticism an answerto interpreted be can it that argue will I phenomena. higher-order different of basis the provide to phenomena themselvesdemand that abasis. other by to referring basis of a phenomenon the effectively Wefurther.give cannot step one Frankfurt, “On Caring”, 155. See for example Frankfurt, “On Caring”, in Frankfurt’s caringthat be point with contrasted has both desiring to something and Let us first look at how Frankfurt defines the concept of caring. What does it exactly of What does caring.defines theconcept athowFrankfurt look Let usfirst it be is used that can sufficiently redefined, caring, of concept the of The significance to us, 112 and claims that it is ultimately different from both desiring something desiring both from different is ultimately it that claims and Necessity, Volition and Love, 57 158 or The Reasons of Love of The Reasons 111 We might desire finding , 12. CEU eTD Collection not involve any judgment about the value of the object cared for. Asfor. wewillsee,theconcept about cared involve value of judgmentthe object the not any in for him,caring so does way above. First, it and does a very different I described desiring, valuing of kind some both involves though caring, of concept His Frankfurt. for not certainly refers to something to refers course, is when I desire. When I say When something hasvalueImake desire. a rational that I say hand,other finding valuable something seems beto something more intelligent mere than the On forces. driving non-rational similar, be might like the and money fame, for desire like of desires Other types nature. in biological our are rooted forces that driving non-rational casein the sexfor or with survival. food, connection desire aremere“unintelligent” These or is this least At in us. force driving brute some to refer to seems desire hand, one the On way. valuejudgments. If one wantedtopursue this view,one wouldhave argue following to the rational and the non-rational elements of caring, in this case we need amixture of desires and the of mesh or mixture proper be a to has there that say could view Such value. of kind some involves something from comes discrepancy between desire andvaluejudgment desire factthat the desiringintrinsically valuablefail without it. it, and consequently, careabout The to it.care about notconsequently Anditisfind thatImight also true obviously something and negatively, very it judge might I furthermore, value; objective no having as find I that whatme; it nottell anything the does Idesirething about might islike.desire something I find objectof the Desiringa non-rationalcaringvaluable, too. only refers to forcein driving sufficebecause notIhaveto either desiring does it, butdesire something without care about value. ithasobjective acertain that namely One mightOneimply that should both judgment. Icannotvalue argue caring desiring and both in having desire the appropriate thethat object and the judgment caredfor has me (the driving force), whilefinding something valuable intrinsically both outside ofme find valuable intrinsically something desire and it. Isthiscaring? Itis (the object and its characteristics). The happy case, of happy The its characteristics). (theand object 58 judgment about that thing,that about only refers to only CEU eTD Collection caring not necessarily is. Acts of will help us form intentions but they do not entail caring, entail not do they but intentions form us help will of Acts is. necessarily not caring voluntarily, and consciously areperformed Whilethose chapters. in previous the I discussed from attitudes differentbetween actsof caringit is and will, higher-order significantly all the one consciously, voluntarily performs. I will argue later that as a result of this contrast according Frankfurt’s views. Frankfurt’s recent according is, henecessarily himself havingconsiders afuture”. as something that inherently is it, prospective: cares about of a person who “[T]heoutlook puts Bratman’s theory of action as well. Now, caring also has a temporal dimension. As Frankfurtforseen, this hasimportantnot satisfaction only role butin an reason in Frankfurt’s have anynegative attitudes higher-order toward its presence and continuation, and as we have of According beinga givendesire.Frankfurt, to satisfiednot with meansa desire thatwedo presence temporally atthe extended is itdirected inasmuch satisfaction isitis,That to similar reflectively. ourselves evaluate ableto weare desires, second-order through force: abrute merely is sinceit not is of his different, desire aswehave seen, concept Second, value. objective imply not it, anddoes caring about our is from derived we careabout that of object the 115 114 Philosophical Studies Will?”, aDiachronic Good is “What Luca, Ferrero, see also important is agency of why diachronic discussion 113 it of nature forpersists caring agiveninherent period of that time. the of is part It belief. and desire given the of continuation the entail necessarily, least differentiates caringfrom desires beliefs; and believingdesiring or something at does not, of valueis important that Frankfurt’s for is philosophy of agency a Ibid., 84. Frankfurt, “The Importance of What We Care About”, 83. Aswe have seen,Bratman also thinks that temporality is an important partof agency.For arecentdetailed One of the most significant aspects of caring is that it has a Caring is also different from different also is Caring 144, Vol. 3,403-430. 115 acts of willacts of These include decisions, choices andthelike, which 59 , the significance of areexaggerated significance of , the which 114 This is also something that subjective temporal dimension one. The value The one. . 113 CEU eTD Collection understood asa understood he which commitment decisive of importance the emphasized himself Frankfurt that desireworks. essentially a complex way of desiring or wanting it. surprising and isin vein ofhis Humean motivation.theory Thus, caring aboutsomething is connectedis caring that means this terminology Frankfurt’s In element. volitional a to has necessarily what caring hand, we other the On something. about care desire to beliefs or emotions any have to necessary or want. for caring. necessary arenot elements these of former two the suggest that His emphasisstates”. and volitional dispositions and affective cognitive, on the volitionalthe process of caring works. There he only said thatcaring is “constituted by a complex set of element how exactly of hedid description What nothaveadetailed About”, We of Care Importance is hardly through which it When Frankfurt works? first discussed inthis concept detail,in his “The directly by cannot andvoluntarily adopt control a decision. thatwe issomething most will part of the central the that claimed direction opposite and 120 119 118 117 Agency”,and in Filozofia 64 (2009), 739-747. 116 that In concert. the to going about cares he that suppose Now, favor. important an him asks his “what expresses will truly someone what it, caresabout as he puts Frankfurt’s thinking that what we care about is more central to our since intendone can something it. caring without about Frankfurt, Harry G, “On Caring”. Frankfurt, personal communication. Ibid.,85. original). inthe (italics 84 About”, WeCare ofWhat Importance “The Frankfurt, Idiscussed the concept of intention and its relation to Frankfurt’s views onagency in my paper “Intentions As I mentioned, this is asignificant shiftin Frankfurt’s thinking. We have seen earlier In a later paper, “On Caring”, Frankfurt describes in detail how caring as acomplex howin caring detail describes Frankfurt paper,“OnCaring”, later In a mechanism the exactly is what will, of acts from different so is caring if Now, 120 In his example someone is about to attend a concert but a close friend of his decision . With the introduction of the concept of caring he moved to the to moved he caring of concept the of introduction the With . 60 116 118 It is a very important aspect of However, later to onheseemed However, will is than our intentions, or ”. 117 119 It is not CEU eTD Collection 122 be taken forgranted; we are not born to it and, once acquired, it must be sustained”. Ferrero, 430. 121 case, he at the relationship between these two. Does the ability careto contribute to ourability formto desireshigher-order andvolitions. Butcaringis important another ability so weneed tolook have seen, earlier he evaluationclaimed that and reflective his laterIn relationship lookatthe section this I will betweenFrankfurt’s self-theory of reflective theoryself-evaluation of caring. Howis basedare these on Self-Evaluation Reflective and our3.3. Caring two ability related toto formeach other? As we self-evaluation. reflective phenomenon Frankfurt’s classicchanges hierarchical theory of desires andhis concept of this kind”. in desireidentifying wouldhaving his with concert of and consist a higher-order essentially the about caring “[H]is following: the isthus psychology lover’s music the of description Frankfurt also adds to the recipe of how to care his concept of identification. The full In other words,hewants tokeep or sustain desire.this all Butthis isnot caringinvolves. that desire. first-order isthis continuation desire atthe of directed plus that concert asecond-order attend the desire he to hasmeansfirst-order it a that concert, the about agent really cares if example, In the the desire. first-order a given of continuation atthe directed desire, order does one activelysustain Frankfurta desire? thatthis thinks forming worksthrough ahigher- ismomentum”of theown activity. agent’s the but result due to“itsowninherent simply not is desire his of continuation this that stress to important is it but caring, of nature Ibid, 161. Frankfurt,“On Caring”, 160. Ferrero also argues that “[O]ur status as temporally integrated agents is not to In the next section I will look at how caring as a special kind of complex higher-order continues 122 to desireto togo the concert. Thisis connected to the temporally extended 61 121 But how But CEU eTD Collection concept of concept the only using will the of freedom have and bepersons can we how explain to managed problem free by of will theory. this By developing desires our placing he inahierarchy, insolve Frankfurt his tried to the early writings, The significance was that theory of this weareabletocare. because desires to form higher-order We is areable upon normallycaring. dependent because ability this conceptual possibilities aremerely desires, suchcreatures form anythingyethigher order can and care about because the two are very conceptual ismerely separation incloselythis reality abilities, these two separate conceptually tied together. Though forrequiredform ability the volitions.higher-order desires Though can to and we we can imagine agentspart who do not of reflective self-evaluation. self-evaluation.reflective up make that abilities of list the of type of higher-order desire.first At sight, then, it seems that caring is just one more extension It has more it seemscaringis basically that one Now, satisfaction. identification and endorsement, a special significance andintroduced discussed indetailfurther abilities, reflective includingdecisive commitment, working onmaking his theory moreon reflectivity and more sophisticated and He detailed. andbeen has Frankfurt thevolitions, and desires higher-order of introduction ability the since that chapters earlier the in seen have We to self-evaluation. reflective up makes care that arsenal in the element is more one just is it that think to he seems Thus, ourselves. evaluate reflectively to ability our to belongs that activity an itself is caring that suggests clearly desire first-order given other? volitionsdesiresare from independentthese or higher-order each higher-order and perform First, let us recall Frankfurt’s classic theory of the hierarchical theory motivation. of theory of hierarchical the theory classic letus recall Frankfurt’s First, a simply just not is caring Frankfurtian that show to try will I follows, in what But Frankfurt’s definition of caring asidentification with a higher-order desire sustainto a desire . He claimed that if an agent’s will or effective desire depends on a second 62 CEU eTD Collection Structures of Agency in Will”, the and “Valuing E., Michael See Bratman, construction. creature on Gricean based agents 123 length here to answer this question. He claims that even if we do not care about anything, at Frankfurt me desires? quote Let second-order merely has and who one the caring agent caring is nota condition of having higher-order desires. Sowhat is the difference between the is anything. true, If care aboutnot that butdo have that order-desires higher be creatures notcare aboutanything. desires butdoes second-order self-evaluation itself. reflective of concept andthe of desires theory hierarchical ofboth the reinterpretation the leads to it as aresult and activities of one’s organization in cross-temporal rolethe important has an Caring desires. theory of his hierarchical outfrom grows of importance caring desiresorder forming through yet other higher-order Frankfurt’s desires. So, theory about the As we have seen, Frankfurtian desiresorder desires justashigher-order arereflexive desires. with regard toone’s order first caring and love are higher- toone’s are reflexivewith regard love directed Caring and these areclosely thus connected. at sustaining some his theory of grow caring seem out directly from to his hierarchicalaccount of desires and of our first- belove, helately, the most to understands which in mode important of mycaring. view, But leastwill,for himself, at to deal started and differentwith topics, namely caring andmost he wants to want just as freedom of action means that one is free to do what one wants to do. first-order desire he has not. In other words, free will means that an agentis free to want what if he ismoved actby desire to desire first-order his his while is his highest-order contrary to forming a second-order volition that makes this first-order desire his will, he has free will, but order volition he has free will. If somebody is moved to act by a first order desire while In an exciting paper Bratman tells a similar story about a series of more and more complex and developed and complex more and ofmore series a about story asimilar tells Bratman paper exciting an In Frankfurt’s agent who cares seems to be more developed than the agent who forms It seems that with this solution Frankfurt laid to rest the problem of freedom of the , 47-67,, reprinted from Philosophical Perspectives: Action and Freedom 63 123 Atfirst sight, it seems that there can 14 (2000), 249-65. The CEU eTD Collection 124 islost. something butwithout thelatter caring organizingfree agency havethrough will without one’s this sense requires or Thus, isforbasis caring theagent. autonomy Being a certain in the of autonomous of kind. implies Frankfurten possible makes self-governance it its dimension, temporal Because of depend. identification free will, but not theas otherthe way such self-evaluation ability of forms round. other which upon self-evaluation, of form Oneprimary most the is can to form higher-orderevaluation seems to be quite defective without a temporal dimension. Frankfurean caring then desires to organizehis cross-temporally. actions and volitions, withwrong him:volitions his donothave atemporal dimension; he doesnot seem beto able endorsement,is something there of desires, structure hierarchical and acoherent desires second-order have can anything about care not does who somebody commitmentthough even that seems It volitions? and and projects. Quite intuitively,itis preferable to be a creature that can do that. goals long-term have hecan consequently and time over identity volitional his maintain and shape is able is oneto becauseashe non-caring morethe The than developed agent caring Frankfurt, “On Caring”, 162. Thus, caring is not simply Thus, isnot caring evaluate more ourselves tool to one Self- reflectively. is desires But merely higher-order an forming caringto additional and ability nodefiningplaying concerned role. or be would insuccession of we ourselves their and contrivance while. But design the various hierarchicalvolitions of part.Desires and on our guidingintent or resultof the any deliberate orders wouldcomein about way to this would bemerely fortuitous and Itwould inadvertent. be happen not might unity or comecoherence whatever however, and agents, as view of go; point our and sometimesprovide and to involitional lives. a degree thus stability our From of consistency or they might lastendure desiresvolitions to higher-order mighttend and Moreover,intact. someour of for a them act. In to words,other ourcapacity for higher-order by volitions mightremainfully moved be to not want and others certain have to not want might we and do; we [W @ e might …still want to have certain desires and to behave by motivated and to …still e mightinthem to want certain desires what 124 64 CEU eTD Collection “Caring and Full Moral Standing”. Moral Full and “Caring a specific kind. For a detailed argument forthe possibility of caring without reflectivityIn thischapter I will sticksee to Frankfurt’salso Jaworska, concept of importance. caring, which requires ofsecondary is and involves caring of second-orderdesires of level reflective the that and dimension a temporal with desires first-order 125 caring. hishis hierarchical latertheory about desires and of theory In this section I will look at the relationship between Frankfurt’s theory of free will based on Autonomy and Will Free Caring, 3.4. Frankfurtian free will. Iwill also discuss the theory of autonomy based on this concept. caring. We are able to develop the psychological structure that grounds free will because we grounds freebecause that will structure developWe psychological the caring. areableto freedomshow necessarily not thatnormally isinwholehearted – though our – our grounded conceptual free because willisnormally willcaring. possibilities upon to dependent I try aremerely such do), that creatures less those than of freedom (as showed have amount some because the two are very closely tied together. Though agents who donot care about anything separate Frankfurtian free and will in caring, reality ismerely separation this conceptual us free with regard to more aspects of human life than we would be without it. bymaking freedom our Caring increases one. freedom degreeof non-caring the than greater has a a caringfree agent that show will The comparison agents. free non-caring caring and For degree. agreater compareenjoy this itmakes to usto caringpossibleit wehave for to of and freedom isdegree –thatamatter Frankfurt inwith agreement by showing – freedom structure grounds that free will and one the that grounds caring and autonomy? thus the psychological between is What therelationship of caring? concept helpthe the of without will free of theory Frankfurt’s interpret can we or freedom our to contribute caring following: does the problem of caring has any relevance to the problem of free will? Does Iwill try to redefine the concept of caring in the last chapter, arguing that caring is primarily constituted by In the next section I will discuss how caring is related to reflective self evaluation and The second line of The secondmy argumentation we goeslikethis: lineof though can conceptually our to contributes caring that show to try will I First, lines. two on argue will I 65 125 My questions are the CEU eTD Collection in 127 luck, which, according to Frankfurt,of amatter is is a quiteor not will realistic the of conclusion. freedom wehave whether Consequently us. in about comes wholeheartedness 126 within a person’s will, itfollows that the will he has is the will he wants.” wholeheartedness desires our between conflict internal no is there in which coherence volitional implies that the agentis not opposed to his effective desire. Frankfurt calls the state of endorsement since oneself within coherence avolitional create to is able it, one endorsing improbable. would aquite of conditions these satisfaction caring the without hand, Onthe other satisfied. automatically free are will conditions of psychological the caring, wholehearted wedeveloped once hand,care. Ontheone are ableto order to be free; But itseems tofollow from Frankfurt’s caringclaims thatitis notneeded care to aboutanything in have. to iswants he will the has he not consequently and wholehearted, is he a conditionsatisfied: is it having of havingfreedom at first sight. He does have Frankfurtianfreedom free will, of course, because the condition of of the will. So what voluntarily. is wholehearted the ourselves make cannot we consequently and volitions our over control voluntary immediate have not wedo because have, to wewant will have the we that happen itmake way, that this will is,free have can us like if creatures limited that wholeheartednessthinks Frankfurt desire. contrary a by or volitionalwant becausewant whathe his isnotopposed to is free wants will one to wholeheartedness unity comes aboutjust in us. We cannotas alwaysfreedom of action means that one is free to do what one wants to do. In Ibid., 100. whether circumstances ofthe mercy at we are then, extent, some To 101. Passion”, Faintest “The Frankfurt, chapter If one is moved by a first-order desire because one has made a higher-order volition made ahigher-order has one because desire first-order by a moved If oneis Frankfurt’s ideal agent who wholeheartedly cares and loves seems to mere seems transcend andloves ideal to whowholeheartedly cares Frankfurt’s agent 1, free will for Frankfurt means that an agentis free wantto what he wants to want . A wholehearted agent has agent will free “ because . A wholehearted 127 66 > I @ f there is no division no is f there 126 As we have seen CEU eTD Collection continuation of his volitions. his of continuation freedom would haveno temporal andhedimension would no attitudes have toward the his volitions. However, higher-order he make because could free will satisfy condition of the without a significantability Anagentthis bewould possibly could degree. compromised to it.an without Without ability organizeidentity volitional one’s to temporally freedom one’s much with amount freedom of intuitively,can a enjoy acreature than one this greater ability Quite and his long-term to projects. goals be with hecanfree regard time andconsequently over identity volitional his maintain and shape to is able he as because it Hetranscends one? more aspects of human life than somebody who does notcare about anything. freedom the one who cares can? It seems meto that the agent who cares is free with regard to required for form desireshigher-order free volitions,andthuscan and the create psychological structure will. Butwho does does notit care mean about thatanything, such or claim. even this an demonstrate stronger, to agentwill canwho lacksenjoy thedevelop thisclaimmore by indetail examining anon-caring agent whohas free Frankfurtian abilitythe I samefollows to what In care. to care ability the upon is dependent kindstillvolitions and desires higher-order canof conceptually possible, and there is reason to think thatthis in the defaultis true, case our ability agents to form who have freedom of willisthe notthreatened by lackthe of caring. Iclaimed in that though principle this ability and yet docare aboutnot anything maystillbe volitions higher-order abletoperform and consequently not have the ability to care are merely whohas free will? of agent merely the wholeheartedness the and lovesand things about who cares theagent of wholeheartedness the between difference Now, how does the caring agent’s freedom transcend the freedom of thenon-caring of freedom the transcend freedom agent’s the caring does how Now, agent an Superficially, freeagent. non-caring a and a caring me compare will Let Wehave seen in the previous section that according to Frankfurt, somebody who does 67 CEU eTD Collection of the power of the will ingrounded nature”. person’s the own that does not takevolitional necessity away wills our our of feature this calls freedomFrankfurt things. certain want to us for impossible it makes since it goes togetherunlimited power”. with reason “ why reason the is this probably and want cannot simply we that thing of lots are There whatsoever. power of my iswill limited simply because Icannot bring myself want anythingto The variations of degree? to susceptible will freedom of the andthe arethe power how Now, something with the power to do it and states his case in the following way: against Albritton theFreedom of Limits isand the free. Inhis“Concerning Will” perfectly the paper heargues whoit andthat indivisible and willissimple which the to idea according toDescartes’ and objects tries to defendmotivational and valuational systems.Frankfurt also thinks that free will is amatter of degree Descartes’ degreeof the can havebetween degrees various freedom overlapping upon of depending our view.we inclaimhaving free framework, instance, is of Watson’s that will degree. For a matter He compares the freedom to do 130 129 and Love 128 in noted already have I as But it. have not does or it has either Ibid., 81. Ibid., 75. Frankfurt, Harry G., “Concerning the Freedom and the limits of the Will”, in Frankfurt, either more or less of them. areessentiallypower quantitative and comparisonsopen to of measure. Onemay have properly understood neither as a kind of freedom nor as a kind of power. Freedom and is characteristic that than arise, reasonably cannot extent or its amount of question which the about acharacteristic has if it enjoys; and freedom something power or that enjoying a certain freedom or acertain power, it also makes sense askto how much of the that same is Whenever trueof power. itdescribemakes sense to something as variations indegree,and susceptible to necessarily mefreedom is it thatBut seems to Some mightobject having that nothaving or free will is an all nothingor affair; one , 76. > N @ o one […] claims an immediate awareness or sense that the will has 129 and claims that this limitation does not impair one’s will because “it is “it because will one’s impair not does limitation this that claims and Our power to want things is limited by our own volitional identity that identity volitional own by our limited is things want to power Our 128 130 Also, this kind of volitional necessity is a limitation a is necessity volitional of kind this Also, 68 Chapter 1 , some philosophers, some Necessity, Volition CEU eTD Collection youth. Study in Psychoanalysis and History biography, Erikson’s Seealso 39). (Kane, act” inhis issued that motives and character the argues thatduring the inner turmoil he went through inhisyouth“Luther was gradually building and shaping Robert, See Kane, otherwise. resoluteness, in which case his free will (and responsibility for his act) still depends on past. Kane his argues(past) forexample couldthatability he have performed self-formingto a do act that couldlead to his 133 Otherwise – So What?” in 132 Failures of Agency to more wholeheartedness, butroad on the thatstep a itas only might not us for be beimportant might conflict “”internal that argues example for Kalis reach. 131 and projects. more Rather,his free. isimpaireditwill becausehe not determine does his long-term goals limited byhislongmakenot However,commitments and term goals. his this will any does because his isnot will anything degreeof of whatsoever power might enjoy wanting a greater He cares. who someone than alternatives more of the want to power has the he moment each in result, a as and continuity volitional his about preferences any have not does He does. who enjoy.this care Now, iswhy whoanything agentnotthe does about is lessfreethan one the such rather, ability make our willswould impaired. free;make us not wantanything does to much Beingable wantthings. more iswho ableto one the than autonomous more be and freedom of amount bigger a enjoy might only things wantotherwisedo. thanthey to power the have not do Luther like Agents freedom. its of loss the imply not does this that thinks Wejust donothave power anabsolute of will it makesthat possible for us wantanything.to Christianity. goof hisproject on with reforming to wants because hewholeheartedly other” Luther simply cannot wantmakes itbecause internal conflict impossible. an to renounce his views whenwholeheartedness.implies it Indeed, in wholeheartedness thestrongest possible sense he says “Here I stand I can do no Of course, one might argue that Lutherdid have the ability to commit himself to a different life project in his Dennett introduced this famous example to the free will debate. Dennett, Daniel C,“I Could Of course, one can question that question is necessarily bad and that wholeheartedness is what we should all we should what is wholeheartedness that and bad necessarily is question that question can one Ofcourse, According to Frankfurt the more wholehearted we are, the more freedom morewe can freedom weare,the more wholehearted Frankfurt the to According The ofourwill canbelimitedpower byvolitional necessities. Frankfurt However, (PhD dissertation, Utrecht University, 2009), 177. The Journal ofPhilosophy The Significance of Free Will (New York: Norton,1958) fordetails of Luther’s identity crisis in his in itself in 133 However, somebody who is able to want a few 81, No. 10(October1984), 553-565. important forbeing an authentic self”. Kalis, Annamarie, 69 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). He also 131 To take the famous Luther example, Luther famous the take To Young Man Luther: A Not Have Done Have Not 132 CEU eTD Collection wholeheartedly: “Ok, I’ll become the advocate of now”. of the Pope advocate the “Ok,I’ll become wholeheartedly: heminute later says and a can donoother” “Herestand, I I wholeheartedly: says Luther that example to show that caringChristianity. does contribute, His choice or expresseseven, his long-term goal of reforming in his views, becausehekeeps perspective renounce ground, what he caresour freedom. about most to refuses dimension. Hewholeheartedly has atemporal because it in words or stable, other Justin life. imagine His case a is a very good wholeheartedness. ofhis free degreeof because he will want allbut has a greater these, cannot Luther actual can Nature detailed discussion of conversionsee James, William, Christianity is the best answer to solve problems,his and consequently he had some volitional continuity.much, Forbut a he wants to solve something with his relentless persecution of them. He might have realized that them. St. Paul might have realized oncan accommodate that will occasion free of theory that caring-based the he does this, of because and not blue careof the out about occur changes destroying such Christianity that 134 hasagreater degree of The latter hewill; of do. power whathesitating to degree freedom standswho there, of about a greater an imaginary than one mean limited willis lossthe of freedom, providedthat the byitself. TheLuther actual enjoys coincide with the degree of our freedom. If the will is limited to one certain choice it does not will we can enjoy. However, the of power degreeof greater want, the to bring ourselves wecan alternatives morethe of The degree that we might have of thisthis, wehave only a certainkind degree of power of will chooseto amongof the alternatives at hand.power does not always, there will be alternatives that we just cannot bring ourselves to want. And becausewith a choice, weof have the power to want any of the epistemic possibilities. Quite often,if not faced case the that, is not itanything; want we canequally case the is not itthat seems that Suddenconversions of this occur,might like in well-known the case of Paul. St. However, I do not think that even become a Satanist or he or evenbecome aSatanist (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004). Luther enjoys a greater degree of freedom and autonomy also because his decision is because hisdecision freedom degreeof and autonomy also agreater Luther enjoys We can talk about degree in connection with the will in two different senses. First, it First, senses. different two in will the with in connection degree about talk can We can forget about religion and become a lawyer, etc. The etc. lawyer, become a about and religion forget The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human 70 can convert back to Catholicism or he 134 CEU eTD Collection who does not? Each of them has his own volitionalforand other people. coherence, but ifforleast chaotic,agent himself would both at unreliable, not unpredictable become, and while the one who haslead later or such happento him.Sooner hisat mercyofwhereprocesses an spontaneous as well change spontaneously, andevenif hecan andremain wholehearted free, hewould be canjust states his volitional is that His problem states. of these continuation spontaneous the of at certain moments states time would hisvolitional between merely depend on connection the But continuity. volitional have and moment each in thing same the want to happens just he that case be the might it course, Of states. volitional wholehearted his between isHis isconnection all, no there he that have at problem aproblem. seemsto is not threatened in someone like is each moment this and his wholehearted freedom consequently of will the follow each otherinrapidsuccession.moments time might Though of t3,andthese time at priest a catholic become mightwant to he and time t2, at bachelor apromiscuous remain to wholeheartedly want and t1 time at wholeheartedly married get to want might who agent imagine an section, in previous the example the back to go To wholeheartedly. wantthem andyet moments indifferent things contradictory he wants be might casethat the equally it But moment. each in thing same the he wants that case be the might it even, and freely, will might he moment given each At moment. a given at only always it have he can will, free will is groundedin wholehearted caring.our our On contrary, the from other. each free caring and will separate we cannot consequently do not care about anything? I will try to show that there are no such agents; and that What is the exact difference between the wholehearted agent who cares and the one the cares and agentwho wholehearted the between difference is exact the What free have can anything about care not does who somebody though even that seems It So it seems that caring contributes to our freedom.But are there at all free agents who 71 CEU eTD Collection 135 it has hasmerely will freed only without volitional continuity, 2a) agents with merely spontaneous volitional continuity but continuity volitional spontaneous merely with agents 2a) continuity, volitional without will. free about intuitions our affect differences these whether and agents these between differences Could atall? besuchagents there toexamine order In problem, this at look wehave to the continuity his of volitional iswillunity justasfreely to able who hiscounterpart as does? the toward attitudes have any not does who an agent that true really it Is free the will? likeattitudes these. volitional his unity or wholeheartedness,toward while the one who does not care about attitudes anything does nothave any temporal reflexive some has cares who agent wholehearted is the main that too.The for thefuture, is itdifference with satisfied counterpart diachronic is agent momenta desireonly,his with at a certain satisfied synchronically wholehearted butvolition additionally,have also desire desireto in future.While we this the a by higher-order adesire a doweendorse only something, not we careabout simple: when is answer unity? The volitional adiachronic caring exactly achievecreating How does Frankfurt, diachronically role in successive designing the ofour will.configurations nothing, no ofactive desires.guiding If we caredabout wewouldour theplay course maintain various in thematiccontinuities in ourvolitions. Weengage ourselves structural of lives. important bearing character the our By caring, upon our we an has caring freeLike then, will, theself time. across which integrates coherence, withinsomething it, asynchronic implies Caringabout coherence. adiachronic is, There integrated. harmoniously time is selfisatthe thatthe means freely Willing For this we have to look at all three main types of wholehearted agents: 1)agents agents: all atmainlook wholehearted of For this to three wehave types of explanation in the figure unity volitional of dimension temporal the not does Now, Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting it Right . Frankfurt explains this in the following way: following in the this explains Frankfurt . synchronic volitional coherence, the one who cares about things about cares who one the coherence, volitional 72 , 180. 135 CEU eTD Collection a certain spontaneous continuity of desires can be understood as caring. as be understood can desires of continuity spontaneous certain a without any reflective activity, thoughof course, caring usually involves reflectivity. Thus, on the revised view 136 moment. each in volitions different completely he has that mightwell be soit of case the his states, helacks continuity lifetime. But his during whole will the of freedom has he consequently and life, his of moment each at unity volitional two versions: 1)and 2a). things. contradictory care about often caring without look into it. This should be the case unless his mental states in each moment are totally are moment in each states mental his unless case the be should This it. into look for a period of time. Chaos and disorder would prevail at if looked chaotic but moment in each are coherent that be creatures cannot There thisin state. a mind like that no matter how we hardly be wholehearted, or at leastfirst. His beagent completely and mindseems such a person disordered; chaotic could to it is quite implausible chaotic atthe us look Let agent. continuous spontaneously the or chaotic likethat the creatures such a person would developfree no are there are not, all? If they at realistic free agents non-caring the are all, And after changes of his volitions? imagine: who would like to be the chaotic agent, thatis, an agent with constant, unpredictable share the will many Probably time. of periods some over but time of intuitionmoments singular in only not accordingas volitionshisprevail tend to timethrough andconsequently he wantswholeheartedly things to which this agent is luckier than the previous one. Just results in results caringfor thisis agent, tostressthat important modes It iscaring. any of maintainedor by, On the revised concept of caring I will try to develop in the last chapter one can care about something about care can one chapter last the in develop to try will I of caring concept revised Onthe Agent 2a), whom whom mightcall 2a), we Agent We can call agent 1) a has anything about care not does but will free Frankfurtian has who agent the Thus, But how can we be free without actively doing anything about our long-term long-term actively about our can how goals? befree anything But we doing without both 136 continuity and coherence. Caring itself does not make us coherent since we and 2b) agents with volitional continuity and coherence that is the result of, result is the that coherence and continuity volitional with agents 2b) and chaotic agent spontaneously continuous agent continuous spontaneously . Just like the other two, he hasawholehearted two, other likeJust. the 73 is luckier inasmuch isluckier CEU eTD Collection as Frankfurt puts it, “ a longer period of time goes together with the lack of caring about changing the situation. Or, their volitional unity. Being satisfied that one is naturally forand spontaneously wholehearted way they are for them, or otherwise, their being dissatisfied with the situation would disrupt it and give it at least some consent. They would at leastcontinuous be volitional satisfied unity,it is hardly possible that they thatnever reflect about itthings ornever notice are going the changes in his volitions. long-termtowards volitional coherence? After all, they could equallyleadspontaneous to But even if therean agent like this would beatmercy hisof processes spontaneous and why would these arepoint some people with improbablealso exist.Without caringhaving to about thesamevolitional inunity thefuture a firm and spontaneouslybe to of seems longer time periods over volitional havespontaneously unity to wholehearted happens who agent an realistic, not is whatsoever continuity volitional no has spontaneously volitional anything.justwho asanagent notcare about do But incontinuity that creatures even spontaneous of degree some is there is, That volitions. their in continuity some findpeopleitwhat might do will unimportantquite in they want to there will be future, the ifsome even identity, narrative against argument Strawson’s with inconnection earlier show volitional continuity even in people who do momentarily. only not exist would they but will, seemfree have would them to care about of Each moment. each in exist anything. would person a different all; at person one about talk cannot As I tried to we be.are really disconnected, mental states Butifhis his would state wholeheartedness of sort imagine what isit difficult incoherent, moments andsinceare these in other mental states his with least some connection at have would atmoment a certain state mental disconnected from hisinstates mental all moments.other Without this disconnectedness his The spontaneously continuous agent is more realistic since there tends to be some to tends there since realistic more is agent continuous spontaneously The > S @ atisfaction is a state of the entire psychic system – a state constituted –astate system entire psychic of the isa state atisfaction 74 CEU eTD Collection Quite intuitively, it seems that whether we have synchronic volitional unity depends upon depends unity volitional synchronic have we whether that seems it intuitively, Quite look athowsynchronicis coherence 1)achieved normally itisand 2)groundedin. what in tobefree. order wholeheartedly care wehave to words, free.In other case wearenot in that things, and contradictory freedom coherence. it inasmuch grounds is create Wemightcareabout able only to caring freedom is and of consequently condition coherence, free.would Frankfurtian be The all us exist, of to implausible are anything care about notdo that creatures case, since that something In isfree. meananybody cares about not that who this does course, Of free will. these conclusions are true, it follows that there is nobody who cares about nothing and yet has sense. Frankfurtian in the caring of amount minimal a constitute these and volitions leastagents continuous have volitional some with theirat temporal unity toward attitudes hand, other the On possible. not is clearly moment in each wholehearted is who agent chaotic chaotic agent. the in of of a version case the leadwhich existence tothe would of a largenumbermomentary just of moments, persons aswesawit other the all in states mental his from disconnected be would time of moment agent himself lack could only having attitudes ifhistemporal intoward mental states each spontaneous The type. this to belong cannot continuity volitional their accept who those sort, have themselves toward anything attitudes not notcare about of atemporal whodo do any agents since And dimension. temporal a have attitudes these time, over continuity volitional one’s toward taken since, states, volitional one’s of continuity the about minimally least at cares one that entails already this acceptance, or of satisfaction is that oneself toward attitude reason: I will argue that a certain type of spontaneous volitional continuity is sufficient forcaring. 138 137 condition”. its alter to inclination or tendency any of absence the by just On my revised concept of caring such agents could also satisfy the conditions of Frankfurt, caring, “The but forFaintest adifferent Passion”, 104. In order caringunderstandIn order wholehearted how andfreeto is wehave will to related, the hand, one the On is realistic. agents free non-caring the of neither that seems it So 75 137 And if one’s 138 If CEU eTD Collection a certain moment and the other is the same coherence with a temporal duration. a temporal moment is with and other the samecoherence the a certain are only aspects of humanthe mind:oneis different conceptually at volitional as looked unity caring. two The wholehearted with identical is essentially Freewill things wholeheartedly. wholeheartedor caringis primary havingfreeand will dependsthus on certaincaring about having about overbecause time.wholehearted them volitional Diachronic weare coherence itsminus motives havingWe about being temporal are certain duration. wholehearted unity a diachronic about talk we unity volitional synchronic about talk we when consequently ifreveals in thatisvolitional it unity normallythere us, hasa dimension; temporal it. ourselves havinglooking toward Theattitudes above about way of temporal discussion at still identical with synchronic volitional as groundedin unity, caring. Butthere is another Atquestioncaring.first sight this doesnot Frankfurt’s freedefinition remains of will; that caring.is,achieved through free That is will upon caring. normally wholehearted dependent Frankfurtclaims,it further depends a diachronicon creating unity,it and asaresult,is volitional Andunity. ifhavingfree willdepends on having synchronic volitional unity as wecanachieve itcreating adiachronicthrough diachronic abovesuggest, oneasthe a of part is unity volitional synchronic if simple: is answer The unity? volitional of ground moment. in certain unity diachronic that our but nothing is moment a given at have might we that coherence volitional the is, itis That in of one. moments also state any unity, and our is of coherence volitional that state any for of aperiod followsvolitional continuously andunity justtime, at that it straightforwardly have we that case is the it normally least at Or unity. volitional diachronic have we whether tn moment of this period wehave asynchronic volitional unity. ourdiachronic Since Therefore, Frankfurian free will is achieved through, and grounded in wholehearted grounded and freeisachievedthrough, will Frankfurian Therefore, originanswer the questions and the about help to does consideration this How us 76 CEU eTD Collection his desires might be stronger than others. who cares about nothing can preserve his ability to form higherorder desires, here he claims only that some of 139 wanton justhehimself. a is Butthen,to anything isindifferent care about not whoThe does agent volitions. by our about concern is our created identity make our will essentially our own or in other words we can make it apart of our identity. Our weareableto have If we suchattitudes have toward ourselves. we needattitudes temporal to The answer is simple: since personalidentity is essentially about our own temporal duration so? that is Why time. over identity volitional a has he unless words, in other or something, This suggests that agent’s will cannot be genuinely his own unless he cares about at least anythingabout can have a will, his will is“genuinely not his own”: book, recent his In will. free have can consequently and will, a have can agent momentary a desire, indeed, canhehow will?free all? Or awill have at as “will” If agent’s we definethe effective have agent an such can how But identity. personal no has he anything, about care not does For Frankfurt, the core of one’s identity is what one cares momentary with iswrong problem personal being identity.such agent? The a connected to about. Since the momentary agent ablewill to freely, and this provides the agent only withmomentary a free will. Now,what is Frankfurt, The ReasonsofLove It is important to note that Frankfurt uses the term “indifference” in the text above. in thetext “indifference” term uses the Frankfurt note that to is important It of him that his will was genuinely his own. could bemeaningfully said of such aperson he hadthat it awill, hardlybe could said in what,interest from no one momenthave to the he would next, but his desires and others; preferences than would be. be stronger Even if itmight desires those of some and tohim. matter happened, would identity, and in this respect volitional his of neglectful desires, his of continuity and coherence the with wouldimportant tohim. be nothing He would beuninvolved life: inhis unconcerned own then nothing, absolutely about cared literally who someone were there If Having volitional synchronic coherence means a givenonly moment, at that one is in this sense. Earlier Frankfurt defined wantonness as indifference towards one’s asindifferencetowards wantonness definedFrankfurt Earlier sense. in this The Reasons ofLove The Reasons indifferent to himself , Frankfurt claimed that even though an agent who does not care not does who agent an though even that claimed Frankfurt , , 22-23 (italics added). Note whilethat earlierFrankfurt claimed that an agent > … @ Of course, he might still have various desires, various have still hemight course, Of 77 . Nothinghe that did felt, or and nothing that 139 CEU eTD Collection what the agent really wants most. Second, it gives an account of account an gives it Second, most. wants really agent the what not necessarily volitional. It is also different from and which merely intellectual are itconcept valuejudgments a better makes than of caring raw or first-order desires which do not tell caringto us.Our dictates will determinedis by not butitself.anything nature The volitional tries to establish the Frankfurt how isidentity.his volitional belongs This to cares about Whatan concept. agent claim according to which we act autonomouslywilling. when of moment wethe at it of actmanifestation the just is will free thegrounds that coherence wayvolitional the and phenomenon, primary is the caring wholehearted that seems it Furthermore, free. us makes that isit caring, thisstate wholehearted is through achieved normally Since thisunity isfreedom realized through having volitional momentunity at the of wanting something. casethat isit notthe conceptually,separate two the to is it possible Though having freewill. caringin likefreedom. loss the is uswholehearted for Fortemporal essential of creatures results impairment this and areimpaired; capacities volitional one’s that means Indifference concerning hisvolitional survival he cannot have free will regarding hisvolitional survival. volitional continuity itis hardly possible that he can have free will. Since hehas no will at all his toward indifference wanton’s the Given freedom. of opposite be the to thought Frankfurt synchronically, but he is a wanton a wanton not is He moment. next the in have will he desires what to indifferent is indifferent concerning the continuity of his desires. He might have higher-order desires but heis he sense: another in though a wanton, hence, and indifferent, is also caring lacks who agent desires concerning them desires. Hesaidisan that agent whoalways acts onhis desires forming without higher-order indifferent to his desires, or in other words, he is a wanton. An Now, can a wanton of any type have free will? After all, it was wantonness that wantonness itwas all, After will? free have of any canawanton type Now, It is an important feature of Frankfurt’s concept of caring is that it is a diachronically 78 . personhood . The ability to ability The . volitional CEU eTD Collection address the objection address thein objection subjectivism involvedthe about caring. understands importantas mostmodethe of itiscaring, thus discuss important to itin to order at happy andfulfilling.look he chapterIwillFrankfurt’s In love next the of concept which be extremegood, equally take Theresa’slivescan Hitler’sandMother examples, way that,to our personal history. This gives rise toanimportant objection. Values become subjective ina couldjustify rationalize it. partlyor Ourcaringin isrooted nature ourbiological and in partly that it beyond nothing is There ultimate. explanatory be an to seems describes Frankfurt and both itgrounds is autonomy.personhood very also becausecontroversial Butas caring notstress does importancethat of forpersonhood the caring. reflectivity in his earlier Frankfurtcalled tothecreature a‘wanton’ wewouldbesimilar we wouldbe or likeanimals, writings. In the last chapter I will develop a different view of caring and 140 thoughts”. and desires attitudes, own our are about that attitudes desires, have thoughts, us “to having care about things presupposes a level makes itthat psychic complexity of possible for Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will”, 17. To concludeTo section,Frankfurt’s this concept of caring issuccessfulinasmuch itas 140 For Frankfurt, without this reflexivity we would not care aboutanything, withoutnot Frankfurt, For wewould this reflexivity and 79 CEU eTD Collection controversial view according to which love has a centrally important role which love in hasa to reason. important practical view according centrally controversial in recently,his book, forher.Most concern he herin caresfor way:hehas adisinterested meansthat it aparticular individual certain determined the inrelation belovedway.loves When we inacertain to say agent an that a continuity in our agency. As a result, caring, atemporal show caring andthat creates hasanaction agency guidingin role tried to detail. I can serve as the basis of a theory discussedits concept of significancefor and chapterI In the caring previous Frankfurt’s of 141 cognitive noraffectivecognitive but neither primarily is love Thus, wanting. or desiring of mode acomplex in turn is seen, loveit, oflove.concept As is amode heunderstands of which,aswehave caring, primarily problem loveof in detail. Inhis book Recently, developedFrankfurt hisviews on furthercaring and by agency discussing the Frankfurt, The Reasons ofLove The Reasons Chapter 4: Frankfurt’s Concept ofLove 4: Frankfurt’sConcept Chapter volitional , 42. . 141 TheReasonsofLove That is, the essence of love is that the lover’s will is will lover’s the is love that of is,essence That the The ReasonsLove of 80 , he developed anewand genuine , Frankfurtdeveloped avery autonomy . CEU eTD Collection Philosophy 142 “Howlive?” should weThus, the focus isof Frankfurt’s discussion seminal importance. discussedlove and is and isnot enough this contribution Frankfurt’s that subject of to in caring involved normativity the be that true to itseems iscorrect, claim this controversial role the argues that morality actions of and rationality Whetherinour not is or exaggerated. actingargue that out of prudenceduty isor equally,if notmore, important. ButFrankfurt in love children”. should duty importance singular beof normative of our the in our dealings with others”, iflove andcarewereemphasized better be far world“[O]ur would recently, argued Cuypers and as a result, “the actions.sort ofAnd intuitively,normative love agency should surprising. loveis Butwhen havea central itimportance play decisions forpresent, and our does associated a more importantbe might reason withpartpractical for love in of importance our the about actions. claim Frankfurt’s first, At As Haji and Reason Practical and 4.1. Love reason. practical problem of first section I will focusFrankfurt’s views love on and agency andunsatisfactory Iwill criticize himin detail.the In on how Frankfurt’sFrankfurt’s subjectivism values. Especiallybecause about hisfind subjectivism of I controversial conceptlove of love influencesis related examine love.I am how definition goinggiving of Rather, to of concept isthe acorrect not to the agency. My primary concernour is not the concept of love itself, so the mainagency goal of the chapter and practical reasoning. I will also discuss and criticize which refers “deliberationto in which people endeavor todecide what todo, or in which they Haji, Ishtiyaque and Cuypers, Stefaan E., “Moral Responsibility, Love and Authenticity”, Frankfurt’s book on lovebegins with a chapter focusing on following the question: In this chapter Iwill Frankfurt’s discuss concept oflove andits significance for 36, No. 1(Spring 2005), 124. 81 practical reasoning Journal of Social 142 One might One , CEU eTD Collection reason that he does not say the following: once you know what you care about, try to answer try youto careabout, what know say you following: once the he not does reason that to it. Itis a and importantquite controversial feature of Frankfurt’s thinkingpractical about is simply that once you know whatyou care about, you have to commityourself consciously task: hastask: one it”. in “tobedecisively about caring and robustly confident following the has one about, cares really one what into insight gains one After knowledge. inimportant in ideal life. isan So, caseFrankfurtian reason practical self- based on howquestion he live shouldfirstabout understand without trying to whathe 145 emotional. be not need love him, 144 143 about what itis that we we should how weshould door live,instead, but it asks us toanswer first the what bytelling question normative answer the to is task not Its theories. normative traditional whatwealready want. usachieve helps regards the follow reason. our rather then heart our should we that claims it that sense the in “romantic” view this label might one Thus, hearts dictate iswhatdecidedus butdo. notcertain our by situation to reasoning cool-headed indo isfor usto instead.a best What “heart” of the that a but“head” theory is not the itof practical reason, his view is notprimarily a theory of rationality. In a sense, we could say that meaningful life morality than as Also, thoughFrankfurtsuch. attempts todevelop atheory of as important philosophers often Inhisthink. is view,it muchmoreimportant liveto a as not is morality that believes he Notoriously, prudence. or morality not is focus his hasdone”. evaluate what been to undertake Ibid., 28. for Also, Frankfurt. for of love instance good a not is love romantic later, discuss I will as that however Note Ibid., 6. What is exactly the normative claim of Frankfurt’s theory of practical reason, then? It then? reason, practical of theory Frankfurt’s of claim normative is the Whatexactly Frankfurt’s theory of practical reasoning is normative in a way that differs from differs that way in a normative is reasoning practical of theory Frankfurt’s instrumental already role of reason. Reason itself does not tell us what to do; rather, it rather, do; to us what tell not does itself Reason reason. of role care about in life. An individual cannot answer the normative 144 But more obviously, Frankfurt’s theory is Humean as 143 82 But though Frankfurt Butthough talks about 145 factual already normativity question finds , CEU eTD Collection 148 147 146 objective stance that would tell us what we should find worthy of caring about: is itreally whether question the concerns that are rooted in our are rooted that concerns groups: (1)concernscan beintotwo care about havea devided that based on the factual answer to the question about what we already care about. Now, what we for themost. I already is itcare creativity that best”, it shows that I already have criteria that picks creativity as the answer, so in some sense ifThus, the “a “howbysayinglive?” lifequestion is answer should to that creative I I the morality. and creativity pleasure, satisfaction, personal including criteria evaluative these into regard mostwhatlists life. important the some Frankfurt usualfor the of candidates cannot try to answer this question unless we already have some evaluative criterialive?”We I should “How that question tothe answer have tell arational we can claim that views that us Frankfurtputs problemthe in waysbutseveral these the problem other quotations show with experiences or shortly, ourpersonal history. and upbringing, including factors environment between several our as interplay a resultan of things other several about care we Besides, basis. biological instinctive, an have children our Ibid., 47. Ibid., 24-25. Ibid., 24. various ways of living.” in be employed are to criteria that specify the one it that answering– requires about one should have settled liveupon judgmentsthe at which inquiryaims.the Identifying questionthe how already of must he live, to how into inquiry – an thatinitiate to and conceive to even able is, understanding“The trouble just here what is a ratherquestion of each.” relative weights andthe against, count what considerations another, in than rather way in one obvious live to choosing of favor in it count considerations is sortwhat and of justcircularity.know to needs employ He to how employ them. and to criteria howevaluative know what to go In order“In order forto carry a outperson a rational evaluation to be of some way of living, a person must first For aFrankfurtian, then, the answer tothe question about how we should live must be 147 personal history worth caring about that thing. There is no “pan-rational” no is There thing. that about caring 148 83 . Concerns as caring about our survival our Concerns caring about andas . biological basis 146 and (2) and CEU eTD Collection so. According tosome prominent theories, emotionshave some kind of cognitive contentin a his definition love.of First, one reason might be that it is strategically important for him doto in avoids emotions whyFrankfurt somereasons are there good However, involves emotions. sight. Indeed, it is quite common to sayemotions. Rather, the relevant configurationsthat of the will are sufficient. love is an emotion not lovenecessarilyemotional: involve it it does, can, andusually does strong though or at least love is not of concept As beloved. Frankfurt’s aresult, in to the relation determined that it usually volitional a primarily is love Thus, wanting. or desiring of mode acomplex in turn is which caring, important features. As I Beforehave I start discussing mentioned in detail Frankfurt’s concept of love, letme look at oneearlier, of its he thinks that love Emotion and 4.2. Love is primarily a mode of where I will try to develop a revised version of the hierarchical theory. III part in in detail them discuss I will Frankfurt of those from significantly diverging involve my change. tothese problems solutions itis Since cannot thatwecanand determine what isiteasy to not that by fact the complicated isfurther picture the course be Of changed. weshouldof course, always not simply accept things theway they are; some things need to That this does not threaten our freedom our autonomy is of course controversial in itself. And volitional lives.features Thisviewinvolves contingentlives. weshould that acceptthe of our contingency is rooted in the fact that we have only a limited degree of control over our love. On the other hand, this view brings in brings view this hand, other the On love. hasfar as love, abiological theexampleofidealbasis whichobviously treating parental as The claim that love need not involve affection might be surprising for many at first On the one hand,Frankfurt’s view involves some kind of phenomenon and not an affective state. Its essence is that the lover’s essencewillis is Its the that state. an affective andnot phenomenon contingency 84 asamajorfactor in lives. our This naturalism ; he even goes as CEU eTD Collection maturity to face and acceptloss and this is one more reason why itis not simply an emotion. loss.it and As requiresmakes certain vulnerable abilities lovera consequence, to himself the that involves love endeavor, a difficult being besides Also, effort. person’s the requires and that than difficult more much is however, Love love. of constitutive emotions the feel to sufficient be simply would it love; to thing easy be an would it emotion, apleasant merely 150 Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain another important discussionof the role of emotions in agency see also Damasio, Antonio becameR., mainstream. However, Solomon himself stresses that we should not overintellectualize emotions. ForReview of Metaphysics in Intelligence of Emotions 149 negative forattitude from somethingbut apart involve emotions this, might implicitly a or positive Havingsense mightnot. desires impliesonly havinga desires ornegative that positive Emotion an it he calls reason this for and thing, demanding and difficult more much a but feels, one that emotion pleasant a simply just not is love that out points Fromm Erich misconception, this Criticizing emotion. apositive simply is love misunderstanding According thisitsdefinea misunderstanding nature. to love of while isdueto trying to emotions. Some authorities of is think there amore reason important iswhy Frankfurtdefine to love reluctant in of theterms subject think that putting later on I will thediscus problem valueof andlovetoo indetail. And apartfrom problem this I much emphasis on emotion result of it. the is only it rather, but about it brings what not is love to attached value particular the but cause,the even love:loverbelovedbutconstitutive result or of of, the judgeshis the valuable itisnot are judgments that for crucial Frankfurt andfeelfearthereby.dangerous However, the emotion itself. For example, I might judge, or at least perceive that a particular dog is Erich Fromm, For some eminent cognitivist views on emotions, see for example de Sousa , Ronald. Not Passion’s Slave: Emotions and Choice (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1987), Nussbaum, Martha C, I will not discuss in or detail notwhether emotions involve anyvalue judgment,but judgment The ArtofLoving about that thing.that about 28, No. 1 (September1973). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2001) or (New York: Harper, 1956). (New York: AvonBooks, 1994). 149 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 3-24, reprinted from reprinted 3-24, 2003, Press, University Oxford (Oxford: Further, these judgments Further, these might precede constitute or Since this paper by Solomon, cognitivism about emotions about cognitivism by Solomon, paper this Since 85 The Upheavals of Thought: The Solomon, “Emotions and Choice”, and “Emotions Solomon, The Rationality of Rationality The art . 150 Descartes’ Error: Descartes’ If love was Iflove CEU eTD Collection Press, 1997) 209-225. 152 151 conative both are they is, That love. Frankfurtian of that to nature similar a has love romantic athere: Frankfurt length me Let beloved. quote forthe concern disinterested a as love of example best the not is it that thinks Frankfurt emotions these romantic emotion, we should treat it as a complex set of desires. of set itas acomplex treat should we emotion, intense emotions;more is complexlove romantic importantly, and Most love. thatasFrankfurtian with for common in lot a Frankfurt’s has love example Green text fact, romantic In this isso. Iam that convinced not love.even However, instance of an is not argues, above suggest.insteadseen above, he seems tosuggestthatromantic love, given its turbulentand distracting nature, ofIt definingis not the caseromantic that itlove merely samethe category. as consists of ofits essence. So it seems that for Frankfurt genuine love and romantic love do not belong a partgenuinethough by lovecanbe, not these is, typically and emotions, are accompanied to contrast, all. In at concern involve adisinterested not itneed therefore love and romantic of essence arethe intense emotions these that suggests love.Healso of genuine be part love cannot be of constitutive romantic seem to that view thevivid emotions In Frankfurt’s Green, O. H., “Is Love an Emotion?” in Frankfurt, love. instances of pure to offeringcomes recognizably closest speciesthat the caring of relationships between humans, the love of parents forinfants their orsmall ischildren nearly impossibleforbe anyonejust clear is to about Among going what on. are soconfusingthey itmake that but that concern, loveof asamode of disinterested a number vividly of distracting elements,whichdonot belong the essential nature to paradigms oflove as I am it.construing Relationships kindsthose of typically include sexual provide notare primarily or very illuminating do romantic or authentic possessiveness, and dependency invarious their forms. In relationshipsparticular, that It isimportant avoidto confusing love infatuation, […]with lust, obsession, differentiatefrom itinFinally, avoids to Frankfurt love the definition emotions of In my view, however, Frankfurt’s view on romantic love is unduly stern. As we have As we stern. is unduly love romantic on view Frankfurt’s however, view, my In love. Thelatter obviously involves strong emotions and of becauseof nature the The Reasons ofLove The Reasons 151 , 43. Love Analyzed 86 , ed. Lamb, RogerE., (Boulder, Colo: Westview 152 If this is true, it follows that CEU eTD Collection 153 modes of important incaring detail. romantic love. from my discussion as Frankfurtlove excluderomantic will not As I aconsequence, thebeloved. for concern disinterested does, and I willa incommon: feature citeimportant one have they someNevertheless, features. authorsdistinguishing who focus their primarily as desires certain have all love of types other and friendship on love, parental love, involve. ofthey nature the that given Romantic some specialdesiresdueto the relationship concern. a disinterested involve both and tendencies destructive involves love parental nor love romantic neither case ideal the In nature. destructive love of examples prove itsdestructive,romantic butagain, this pathological doesnot beloved. concern for the involves adisinterested usually it as inasmuch love of features benign the has love romantic that believe I Besides, concern. lack a listed aboveand real Frankfurtdisinterested that features of negative some the involve can love Parental love. parental namely love, of form exemplary most the be to thinks Frankfurt in appear cases of what can but even these jealousyexample possessiveness and asfor pathologies even and certain excesses rise to love can give romantic True, general. in love with essence common a have not does it that imply not does this However, love. of itfrom differentiate kinds other involves due that formerits the desires eroticthat nature, to forms love andother between loveConceived this of romantic way, is primary difference the desires. certain by constituted are they words, other In volitional. it, puts Frankfurt as or See forexample Green, 216 or Soble, Alan: “Union, Autonomy, and Concern”, in Lamb, 65-93. In the next section I will discuss Frankfurt’s definition of love as one of the most the of one as love of definition Frankfurt’s discuss will I section next the In To sum point,up this love of haslots and variations by they are all constituted partly 87 153 Of course, one cancome upwith one course, Of CEU eTD Collection poor. Someonepoor. whohasfind this mightdesire anysickpoorindividual or beto asatisfactory Frankfurt’s love example, isvery from different likea things helpdesire to thesick and the example, if my bike getswould be the case, lovestolen, would be similar for example to the possession I of usefulmight objects. For want If important. findsthat thelover that features particular certain of with individuals a classof a very similar an exemplar”. or bike instance is an beloved his that is not loves to replace it. Or to take loverhe the to love of is “[T]he of significance what explainedbythefactthat This feature by and substituted individualanother ifeven individual that were very beloved.similar tothe are concerns for my beloved areconcerns and are concerns for flourishing of belovedthe is desired only itsfor own sake. for the beloved are my beloved and I want my beloved not be harmed. Now, it is quite crucial that these concerns beloved”. the for is good what for concern practical in a consists that will the of configuration look at these in detail. 155 154 is it thebeloved, for 2) concern or are the results it accompany ofonly they it.rather, but love of In his constitutive view,necessarily not are love elements affective has these three core features: 1) it Weissections haveseenin the previous two thataccordingFrankfurt, cognitive to and a Love of Definition The 4.3. view that if love is based on some qualities of the beloved he is replaceable by another individual who possesses who individual qualities. same the another by replaceable is he beloved of the qualities some on based is love if that view Ibid., 44. I will come back to this claim in the next sectionwhile discussing the problem of Frankfurt The second feature of love is that it is strictly The first featureThe first defines howlove constrains will:do with “a our loving hasto 154 The Reasons of Love If I love an individual I have certain dispositions to act, namely I want to benefit disinterested , 43. personal . I do not have them to promote some other goal, but the and 3) we have we 3) and 88 only for her. The beloved cannot be replaced cannot The beloved forher. personal no voluntary control 155 . The concerns described above described . The concerns The beloved is not an example an is not beloved The fungibility over it. Let us disinterested or the CEU eTD Collection 156 control”. voluntary any individual.other by inbe love substituted of concern case of cannot thebeloved objects our are replaceable, individual and in sensethis its are“replaceable”.objects Butwhile in these examples the can atany because be love,itsnature, his of directed object impartial of care. Humanitarian No.1 (April 2003), 52. themselves. within are notdetermined by heteronomously outsidesomething butonly themselves, by something they love, of out act they when that sense in the autonomous agents makes love general, in justlikeit. Thus, caring defeats constrains andconsequently thewillfrom outside nature, the coercive its of asaresultfrom which, isit compulsion very different autonomy. Therefore, something that constrains the will from within itself, is and thus necessity is the A volitional basis love. of of Frankfurtianconcept his of heart very isthe it indeed, Frankfurt; for us”. up to not to stay alive. In Frankfurt’s steps helpto defenditmaking appropriate against the the view wanting danger becausewecannot love is similar: “what help we lifeisin When our staying wecannot danger alive. we careabout that nature biological love and what we fail to love is Non-Reductive Analysis“A of Van, the Theo Normativity Willigenburg, of Agent-Relative willitself”. the inside from Reasons”, originates by what only be necessitated can will the that surprisingly similar to it. Willigenburg notes that “Frankfurt holds, in agreement with a Kantian line of thought, 160 159 Agency and Answerability 158 157 it. with contrasted a sense in are rather, but ofmorality basis the not are impartial a issimply It alive. staying example for as help about caring we cannot to things that compares Frankfurt this tolove someone.choose Thus Thus Frankfurtian love ispersonal and It is interesting to note here that thoughFrankfurt is opposedto Kantianism, his claim about autonomy is Frankfurt, in Necessities”, “Volitional Gary Watson, See necessity. of volitional concept the discusses also Watson Ibid. And the last, third feature of love is that “it is not under our directunder “itnot our and immediate is of love feature thirdAnd isthat last, the love. The same is true of Frankfurtian caring, and this feature might be a reason why caring andlove why caring be a reason might feature this and caring, ofFrankfurtian true is same The love. The Reasons of Love 159 Rather, love involves volitional necessities. This concept is a very important very is a concept This necessities. volitional involves love Rather, 160 157 156 , 88-122. Love cannot be a matter of conscious decision; we cannot simply , 46. partial , and , and thus is very different from humanitarian, impersonal and 89 volitional necessityvolitional Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 158 that follows from our 8 CEU eTD Collection havefrom, avalue andisindependent that precedes caring by andlove orisvalue created valuedoes and precedecaring islove or it derivative of it? In otherwords,doindividuals In value section this main problem love.is the I will discuss worth, of Thequestion this: and Value and Worth Love, 4.4. only by loving it. I will thisdiscuss problem in indetail the next section. worth of the object that moves us when we come to love they have objectively. characteristics something but we come to attachvalue some kind of value to our love objects at least partly on the basis of what is it that, such characteristics, with certain objects certain they are because we have that objects lovewe have implies the that this approximation Atfirst andin experience. character our have individual is that we have is certain that individual love an to wecome reason why suggests thatthe Frankfurt say that. about morebit to conditions, concerning which we have nothing much to say”. to nothing much have we which conditions, concerning “Necessity and Desire”, and “Necessity G., Harry Frankfurt, See desires”. satisfying over priority merits needs “meeting that argued he and necessities, 163 162 161 andexperience”. character needs thatderiveother andinterests from more particularly features individual the of “[W]hat welove isshaped by universalthe exigencies of human life, with together those how exactly loving Frankfurt comedoes has thefollowing about? very answer: disturbing In anearlier paper Frankfurt already discussed problem the of Ibid., 48. Ibid., 47. them biological However, Frankfurt insists that as in case of caring in general, it is not the inherent the is not it in general, caring of in case as that insists Frankfurt However, But if itis absolutely not up to us whether we come to love a certain individual or not, that we need to satisfy thatpsychological weneedto we biological If needs. and istrue, this our needs, on the other we also have Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 161 In end,the love is whatwe by “biological determined and other needs . 163 His claim seemsimply to that on the one hand, we 90 psychological volitional needs 45,No. 1 (September 1984), 7. 162 But actually, Frankfurt has a needs that arerootedin our in connection with volitional CEU eTD Collection relationship is just the other way is otherway relationship justthe “what weloveround: necessarily love: by loving her, the lover bestows some value on the beloved. because value of an object is not a if we recognize that he is “utterly bad”. he is“utterly that if we recognize loveeven anindividual we can to more, come What’s is it worthless. that ifwe even perceive something love to come We can not. does typically it way, this about come might it though beloved.whichof perceivedis lovethe worth aresponsetothe according to Iwillmean value value love. it as the has derivative of a consequence will mean its value that contributes to the development of love and when I talk about the group, wecanfind bygroup, is constituted 2a)valuethat the value that precedes or contributes to the development of love and 2) and love of development the to contributes or precedes that value love can worth an has everybody 1a) further: divided be can value of types both that argue will derivative of love or in other words the value the beloved acquires as a result of love itself. I we can types ofvalue talk love: abouttwo inconnection with 1) arguethat will Rather, I beloved? the or in eitherlove lover the to berooted value connected of belovedthe by is created loving her. an individual has comingprior tolove her and 167 166 165 164 love itself? caring and Ibid., 39, italics in the original. Ibid. Frankfurt, 21-34. Helm, see love, views on different of these discussion detailed a recent For to be loved and 1b) there isbe loved a to and1b) there Let us look at the concept of look at theconcept us Let However, I see no reason why we should follow one of these lines. Why should all we love it”. bring about The Reasons ofLove The Reasons 167 . Thus, in what follows, when I talk about the worth of an individual I individual an of worth the about talk I when follows, in what Thus, . Appraisal accounts Appraisal Thus, Frankfurt’s view can be characterized as a bestowal of abestowal account as viewcanbecharacterized Thus,Frankfurt’s , 38. formative worth relational 164 166 Frankfurt’s basic claim is that the perception of the of love argue that love is created by value that that love iscreated the ofloveargue or first. Frankfurt straightforwardly refuses the view 91 grounding bestowal accounts worth that contributes to love. In the second the In love. to contributes that worth relationship condition of love, but rather, the rather, but love, of condition of love claim that the value the that claim love of worth itself and 2b) values that derivative value acquires , or a specific type of 165 He admits that value for us intrinsic that is that CEU eTD Collection ferociously ferociously wicked”. be to out turn “should they if even children his love should a parent that say to right is Thisrequirements. “love” of kind conditional is genuineobviously not love. Thus,Frankfurt parentthe told shelove herchild not that will herunlessshecomplies some with todeny wrong love from childbecausethe helacks any of Itwouldthese. beif worse even be obviously would it and well-behaved or talented is clever, she because child her love not examplelove Thisis these upon is characteristics. does parentwhy parental a good here:the certain properties and itcount would not asgenuine love ifwe made ourlove conditional about sofar, namely that love is does not precede butvalue that stresses he reason why the that believe I generally. quite is love but case of parental the result of love is an important featureideal type of love, parental oflove, it cannot count as lovea consideration against love. I have not talkedadmits that we can say that somebody or something is unworthy of our love, for the most imagine confirmed by the phrase “only a mother could love could “only him”. amother by imagine confirmed phrase the The parent would love his son or daughter even if he or she childin the same wasregardless valuable way qualitieswhat hehas of hasnothave. does or or the worst person one could 170 latersaying on, in an interview “he’sthat my son, and I love him matterno what”. See Helm, 195-196. participated in 9/11the attacks, declared that he was nolonger her But son. reportedly, changedshe her mind 169 168 them”. for mylove of independent in them inheres that value some of aware am I because children my love do not I that that confidence his for candeclarewith “[I] tohisunequivocal lovelove. very Herefers children: own from loving her with the help of an example that also serves as an ideal for love: parental Frankfurt, had Moussaoui Zacarias son, her that heard having after who, el-Wafi, ofAicha case the discusses Helm Ibid. Frankfurtdefends his thesis according towhich value the belovedthe of is derived Now, FrankfurtNow, thinks thisthat between relationship love andvalue holds only in not The Reasons ofLove The Reasons 170 Genuine parental love is unconditional. love parental Genuine , 39. unconditional 168 Itis obvious for aparent he that wouldlove his 92 . We do not love. Wedonot anindividual 171 169 Though Frankfurt because shehas CEU eTD Collection brake your with friend because youhelp want to change him to his way unhappy of living. shouldHow we yourevaluate love? you Suppose refuse my andadvice you say will that not what”,inmatter case the ifyoufriend “no way same loved yourthe loves hischild? a parent to this ideal, the more genuine they become. To go back to the example above, what would be love get of types other closer the that argue might And one tothese. be responsive not should loving her, the friendship itself constitutes further reasons that might override them. I will discuss the reasons the discuss will on. I later them. by relationship a override created might that reasons further constitutes itself friendship the her, loving against areason as count might these Though inher. qualities objectionable facesome to youif have even friend 172 Personal and Good,”(Royal “Preference-Formation Institute of S., Philosophy Supplements Connie 81, Supp. 59, 2006),Rosati, 57. children. own our were they if as that loving without love is not unique to the parent-child relationship” and we might love a great many people “no matter what” 171 of asaresult afriendship some considerations, toterminate permissible isitor acceptable thatwhereas itideal shows Ithink love? is closerlove to that of instance the object ofwhether about love considerations by be guided should islove cases in other worthy that and urge instinctive of love? Or rather, does it prove that parental evenlove preferable, it would notbe in the second.is a higher Whereaswrong. in case first the stopping love to friend your would bearguably acceptable or drugs and commits crimes. In this case my youadvice that shouldnot love himseemsbe to person becauselovenot youshould just now, thatyour him. son But suppose takes drinks, and And commits crimes. supposethatsomebody break yougives with to the advice this takes drugs wicked”:hedrinks, isfriend yours “ferociously of example. another a Suppose to love the child even if he finds not for parent the makesimpossible itit for that basis is abiological there because exception him unworthy of love. To love isan love, see parental our of worthy are they reason some for because love persons if this is true, let us look atqualities, in other types of love, thisis notalways so. One could claim that though we usually Though of course, once you are involved in a friendship, it might be argued that it is your duty to help your Of course, unconditional love is not limited to parental love.For instance, Rosati notes that “unconditional Nevertheless, one might argue that though parental love does not depend on depend on objective not love does parental though that argue might one Nevertheless, Now, what does all this prove? Does it prove that after all, parental love is just an 93 172 parental love parental and CEU eTD Collection 174 173 that I am mistaken to say that your friend is unworthy of your love. After all, you know him roleimportant in love. developmentof the go back To tothe exampleyou again, could say another by individual, be replaceable not should beloved the that and beloved the of qualities the on conditional it still does not imply that worth of an objective by substituted individual.another kindbe cannot beloved the that fact does the for account can it is that notview Frankfurt’s of playvirtue an with these? I will not discuss these problems here in love else you everyone supposedto aren’t why her qualities, because detail;of if you lovesomeone problem isAnother that have leadsuch not consequences. to butthisto does People change, experience. is our somecontrary to least apparently loving to extent, her,which,at stop ifinstance, you thatyour notice beloved in haschanged some respect, this mightlead you to sustained bysome objective qualities, there area number of disturbing consequences. For and justified is love that involve to seems view appraisal or quality the since Also, individual. similar byanother sheisreplaceable that itimplies her qualities, of because love someone value”. any loss of without object similar relevantly by another replaceable the is qualities objective becomes. it praiseworthy more the love, parental unconditional to gets love closer the that be argued could it Therefore, person. the of worth the on based not is it if positively would Frankfurt suggestthat is right. Loveisideal more orshould be more evaluated you are doing somethingyou good; shouldjustleave not yourfriend his to bad faith. And this sensitive to the consideration that he is “unworthy” of your love. Many people would say that areYou just leaveunable to him You his letare not evenworse. become and situation See Helm for adetailed discussion of the problem. Helm, 20. But though this shows that Frankfurt is right in the sense that love should not be not should love that sense the in is right Frankfurt that shows this though But Another important objection view which tothe is by worth according to constituted fungibility problem fungibility 94 . As Helm puts it, “to be fungible is to be 174 I only want to point out that a that out point to want only I 173 Thus, if we CEU eTD Collection implies that we have to apply a standard (one that is independent from caring itself) to the waywecare. the to itself) caring from independent is that (one standard a apply to wehave that implies Synthese and things in the wayright the at right time and place”. See MacIntyre,Alasdair, “Comments onFrankfurt”, mature agent is to have educated one’s feelings appropriately. It is to care the right amount forthe right people 177 176 175 value”. further objects of or acts, experiences, forth bring or create potential to the has object the and person the between relation the much) how (and whether and question, in object the for affinity an has person the much) how (and whether about, caring worth itself is in question object the much) how (and “whether object: an love or about care should intoaccount when he question the take haswhetherconsiderations about to thinking thatone on somewhat depends about, care they things to other relative and in themselves both things, about care should people much how and about; caring isworth which careabout according “[P]eople only somewhat should what requirement” to worth, and that this is not simply a minimal condition but there is a “proportionality hasan individual tohave objective is She claims belovedthat importance. the nocentral of paper. criticizes of Frankfurt’s concept lovecaring and and his values in about subjectivism a recent intelligence, bravery or any similar qualities. someone, love we comeMost of the to love. time, when accountof in appraisal truth the intuitive some this is at latently helptraits and youis wantto And himmake more certainlty, effective. there these to least partly valuablemany has he person; better much isa is potentially and that he this that superficial, due to Andbetter. you that know though his that he lifestyleis suggests a“bad”you person,her know qualities, for example her sense of humor, Frankfurt: “Autonomy, Necessity and Love”,Frankfurt,in paper was writtenbefore the publicationof in objects are”. question Ibid., 235. In his comments about Frankfurt, MacIntyre argues fora similar view. Wolf, He “Thestates True, that the “[T]o Good be and a the Lovable”, 232. Wolf, “The True, the Good and the Lovable”, in 175 53 No. 2 (November 1982), 292. This claim is obviously contradictory to Frankfurt’s views since it Susan Wolf also thinks that there is worth that is not merely derivative loveof and she She refuses Frankfurt’s claim according to which the worth of the object of care or 176 More precisely, she thinks that there are three sorts of sorts three are there that thinks she precisely, More The Reasons ofLove Contours of Agency 95 Necessity, Volition and Love , so Wolf focuses on an earlier paper by how , 227-244, ed. Buss and Overton. The much worth caring about the about caring worth much , 129-154 177 Therefore, CEU eTD Collection length Darwall who makes a distinction between merit and worth: at melet quote means this see whatexactly be To loved. to intrinsic worth an has everyone two senses: 1a) two in worth about talk can we mentioned, have As I indetail. division this discuss will I follows love into 1) value to by connected problem solving Isuggested dividing this chapter beginningthis of the At basis. objective of kind some have to has love subjective; merely is love to connected through love. But as I haveconditional upon evaluatinga certain anindividual standardagainst andthatvalue is created been trying to show above,loveis isnot to think is, that right lovein Frankfurt That of sense. some areright accounts it cannot be the case that all value 178 lovability upon qualities individual.the of as I will But to pointout, thoughin try isa sense it objective, lovable or not. In this seewhether are kind they standards to can somehow of individualsagainstsome evaluate sense it involves a lovingandloving individual. about Wolf’s view imply deliberate ornot seemsto an we that quality view of love of thateach individual is to bemakes loved? It seems that she suggestslove that we somehow conditional weigh reasons individual has tobe objectively good, or lovable. But can we really determine what the worth friendworthy partner. or she argues thatit does make sense to give advices to someone for example, to find a more Darwall, Stephen: Darwall, (recognition) respect. or of care object as anappropriate example, for important, or significant intrinsically “mattering” ( “mattering” or importance significance, of a kind and hand, one the on emulation, or admiration between is that “worth” and “merit” calling I am what between I haveinmind The contrast a kind of value ( So it seems that both Frankfurt’s and Wolf’s view, that is, both bestowal and appraisal What is it that makes an individual worth of care and love? Wolf argues that the does notdepend on evaluationthe of individualan against acertain standard. worth intrinsic wort Welfare and RationalCare , that precedes love and 2) , that worth ) that something can have by virtue deemed beingof appropriately havebyvirtue something can ) that 178 h and 1b) h and merit relational worth ) that persons and actions have in being worthy actions persons ) that in haveand being worthy of ( Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2002), 78. 96 derivative value derivative . To look at the first, my claim is that that the result of it. In what CEU eTD Collection being aperson”. by virtueof he value possesses to the that when “weareresponding welove aperson, that claims he similar: is view Velleman’s respect. deserves thus and dignity a has person Each 180 179 value.comparative a is it since not is dignity but different objects; priceother of the can with compare we is that a value pricean object The of from price. value asdifferent of form as a specific havea Persons iscomparative. not this value stresses that and Velleman love. respect justallis ofbeing someone. pointthe byvirtue persons areworthy that of But persons, way we respond andto everybody has an intrinsic value thisas a result this of capacity. Of course, in case of love the capacity is very different from the way we do when we respect intrinsic worth that he has. that worth intrinsic the love; worthy rather, of makes an agent that of a certain qualities Itis set work. not cannot intrinsic value to be cared for orloved. This is one of the reasons why a quality theory of love if thus an complyagent fails to with moral any non-moral or standards,notlose hedoes his and standards, setof a certain him to from about facts relating any is for independent cared notan is of An againsta certainevaluation be objective agent the to standard. agent’s worth in worth sense this andlove. Thus, care respect, is, deserves ways, that in different be valued non-moral. or moral standards, 181 Velleman: “Love as Moral Emotion”, in Emotion”, Moral “Love as Velleman: 78-79, Ibid., italics original.in the Ibid., 364-366. regarded in ways.regarded those toward the person and certain feelings that are that feelings certain and person the toward certain valuing formsmakes “mattering,” conduct value of appropriate or that status a The value someone has just by virtue of being a person […] is a kind of Any person has dignity or worth; in other words, any person “matters” and deserves to 180 He thatbeingthinks apersonislinked be capacity the to autonomous to 181 As a result, in this sense everybody deserves love regardless of of any regardless love deserves everybody sense in this As aresult, 179 Ethics 109,No. 2 (January 1999),365. 97 as of someone who is to be treated and beis someone treated to who worth , dignity , dignity CEU eTD Collection 184 (London: Penguin Books, 1951). Indeed, Solomon calls relational reasons for (romantic) love (romantic) for reasons reasons relational calls Solomon Indeed, 1951). Books, Penguin (London: 183 182 beloved. thelover and between match some kindof be must there be comfortable, to shoe the for in order be similar to has foot the of that and shoe a of shape as the just means that comparison this Perhaps shoes. of a pair of suitability the to it compares she though suitability, by means she exactly what in detail explain which, as she puts it, means “theabout and love them.suitabilityWolf claims that we need tohave a certain of an object for forour this affection”.is that persons have a particular relational reason The loveand everyone. care about not do Wemeets. obviously anyone that worthcondition” by virtue of which we come to care the object, concept. orWhether or not I havein an affinity for an objectother depends on some facts about me and words, somecertain set of standards, moral or non-moral.facts about However,others. lovability dependentis upon not evaluation the of individual an against a how I am personal history isexplain whyit casethatthe some individualsaremore lovable for us than and forcharacter and our Our explain fornot others. objects some why we haveaffinity which loveaccordingindividual by and to is Thesecan experience. character shaped our moreothers. us for loveable than are some people and beloved, asaresult, the Velleman’s view who thinks that that thereobjects has to be a contingent fit betweenare the lovermore and suitable for us to care about and love than others. This is similar to properties that contributeinasmuch toas theaffinity development is part of ofworth, love. it isAt anthe objective same time, concept. it does It refersnot imply to some relational Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion”, 372. This could remind one to Aristophanes’ discussion of love in Plato’s in of love discussion Aristophanes’ to one remind could This Wolf, “The True, the Good and the Lovable”, 233. . See Solomon, . See But though affinity is not based isnot itBut thoughaffinityis kindassessment, stillanobjective onsuch of But of course, intrinsic worth in itself is not sufficient; rather, it is only a “minimal a is only it rather, sufficient; not is initself worth intrinsic course, of But I think that the concept of affinity or contingent fit is in vein with Frankfurt’s claim Frankfurt’s with vein in is fit contingent or affinity of concept the that I think In Defense of Sentimentality of Defense In , 208-213. 98 183 For some reasons some persons and persons some reasons some For Symposium related affinity . SeePlato, to the object. Thus, toward an toward individual, 182 184 aristophanic The Symposium She does not CEU eTD Collection lover; he cherishes her in a way that is the result of love or the relationship itself. Second, the Second, itself. relationship the or love of result is the that a way in her cherishes he lover; ofvaluetypes as in well. group second thethe First, beloved acquiresaspecialvaluefor the itself and value broughtintrinsicabout in by and andvalue group relational constituted worth first the relationship the about by that relationshipderivative value in the second. That is, we can find two On the onehand, we can talk about they toaffinity.contribute loveinasmuch of development the on effect have apositive even could qualities negative love.is against Aevaluated better these standards person notany morelove. worthy of Such affect is negatively chessplayer,heis certain orforgetful, alousy does person this awkward a that recognize might one For example, though evaluation. negative this because of even is evaluated poorly against some certain standard, one is still drawn to him regardless, or even work even evaluating the individual any against of kinds moral standards, non-moral. or Affinity might beloved.the relational Butthough involves valueworth ita certain of does not kind, involve so). do to obligation an have necessarily notovercomelimitationsmight we usanditevenmake to them sense do on (though the beloved does nothave leadto to such results. Affinity is just something that places certain thus,such inin qualities. arecreated, change Loveisa she lost those reasons which process, explain her notimplylovethat itwe would and affinity iftowards does cease that our her to qualities lovebecause of those individual,imply we doso not to when wecome an does that lovingsimply incapable of of is explainswhy theconcept and affinity so.It everyone this makinglove conditional upon Itonly certain properties. how loveexplainsWe develops. are We have seen that the concept of value in connection with caring and love is complex. love and caring with in connection value of concept the that seen have We Thus, relational worth is due to a contingent, objective match between the lover and the match between is objective acontingent, dueto worth Thus, relational against that is the result of it. I divided these two types of value further and I talked such evaluations. For example, one might recognize that though mightsomeonerecognizeexample, though that one For suchevaluations. worth , or the value that precedes love, on the other, the on love, precedes that value the , or 99 CEU eTD Collection 190 189 188 reprinted from reprinted 187 186 Authority”, in Authority”, “Love’s Jonathan, Lear, goodsee something at aim should love that claim of the discussion psychoanalytic 185 youlove someone, this provides you with a goodreason continueto lovingher. A similar independentlyvaluable of us”. is, lives wewantour tohavesome people positive ideasto things relation or or are that to Wolf, “in addition to wanting to live in the real world, we want to be connected to it – that us”. notes that “[I]f there is nothing we lovelove contributes meaningto inlife andis part of orwhat makesliving life Wolf worthwhile. are able to love, a meaningful life obvious person. beingloved that is make someone can abetter Andimportantly, most maybe not open to legitimate to consider them as counting in favor or against acertain individual. Itis also quite uncontroversialdesirablelove bring caringitis can andabout and consequences thus that further value”. of orobjects acts, experiences, create forth or bring to potential the has object the and person the between relation the much) how (and “whether important is look at the second of these briefly and discuss the second in detail. will I first important, is more first values.the Since creation of tothe contributes relationship it. As Solomon puts it, sometimes it is argued that “loving is itself a reason for love”. for reason a itself is “loving that argued is it sometimes it, puts Solomon As it. relationshipthe itself. The itselfrelationship is valuable andit constitutes a reason continueto world. the with connection this it,from andmeaning connect to arises to live lifebecausewewant to We ameaningful want ends Solomon, Ibid., 236-37. Wolf, “The True, the Good and the Loveable”, 236. See Frankfurt, “On the Usefulness of Ends”,Final in Frankfurt, Ibid., 237. Wolf, “The True, the Good and the Loveable”, 235. For another critic of Frankfurt and a more 186 187 Frankfurtwould agree and in say that to haveorder meaningin life need finalwe andlove with provides howus is them. But worth connectedmeaning? to According A bringcertainrelationship Wolf, about can valuesanditself is valuable.quote it To This brings metothe more important value by in value group, second the constituted In Defense of Sentimentality Contours of Agency Iyyun, the Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly , 275-292. 188 This is “the core of the desire to live a meaningful life”. , 199. 100 41 (1992), 3-19. Necessity, Volition and Love , 82-95, 185 It is fairly is It 190 Once 189 CEU eTD Collection 193 in Press), 192 considering andone reasons, notbeshould blamedloving for failing or love”,to of basis the on love to decide not does “[O]ne as insofar non-voluntary is love that Frankfurt but are these reasons normative, too? According toKolodny, they are. Though he agrees with explanatory? They might explain why it is the case that loving comes about inmore than any reasons a these are certain But reasons. to beresponses might these case,as such, and states, And forlove lacklove third,of psychological husband his of consists oraparent’s child. inappropriate; for example,wejudgenegativelyfor awife’s love her and abusive uncaring it of absence the love or judgecan we from perspective third-person the Second, emotions andmotivations constitutive love of be seem appropriateto ormake reflexive sense. properties of the object. First, he claims that from the first-person perspective of the lover the loveIn viewhis valueconnectedto by is by andnot relationship constituted the intrinsic relationship. He criticizes Frankfurt’s theory of love in the following way: 191 the or friend, my or sister, my or mother, my or daughter, my is she that her: to relationship Kolodny’s relationship is theory following: the loving “[M]y for reason is Jane, Isuggest, my be avoided. do not simply explain how loving comes about, but they also tell howit should come about or three types of considerations help us toassess how appropriately one loves or loves not. They with todo have the they because arenormative listed reasons Kolodny. by has Niko accountdefended been recently Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship”, 138. Kolodny, Niko Review of Kolodny, Niko, “Love as Valuing a Relationship”, in argument is nolonger so clearly decisive. properties,be extrinsic might reasons such that is seen it Once thing. or person that of suchproperties intrinsic be to ashave would historicalreasons such any that assumption implicit the on depends thing or relationsa person loving for reasons no be can there that argument of Frankfurt’s the sum, In lover to the lover of a certain type, the But what makes love appropriate and in what way andin is itway toreasons? a response what makes what appropriate But love The Journal of Philosophy The Reasons of Love 103, No.1 (January 2006), 50. by Harry G. Frankfurt (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity 101 The Philosophical Review 192 191 He understands love as valuing a appropriateness 112,No. 2,(April 2003). of love. The 193 the CEU eTD Collection Consequently this theory, unlike quality theory, does nothave face to the fungibility problem. same because with the other love weshould any features, relational certain some with love aperson we it relationshipitself isis the reason forlove, itcannot be objected to the relationship theory that if simply true love. for reasons the constitute that of an object that one should love all of his children or friends. count aslove”. count as well just any accept reasons love “an with to andasKolodny anyone notes, samethe qualities thatwouldattitude responsivebe not should love to that maintain itsshould theorist quality the own wrong, be obviously would reasons. Furthermore,their one qualities, wouldlovingstop soon them they as as theirlost since qualities and this if the quality theoristhave face an accounthas seen, appraisal to problems. If several people loved thingsone or for were right I would whichtheobject’s aredecisive.Aswe according qualities “quality to refuses the theory” have he object, love the of properties intrinsic not and relational are love for reasons Kolodny’s own whom seesone nowand then passing by. childasone’s love stranger’s to tostart a it Kolodny’sbe inappropriate would take example loverthe believeslove thatrelationshiphis some but appropriate belief false; isrenders to his by relationshipthe itself. otherhand,the Love,on would in beinappropriate cases in which constituted reasons to areresponses involves it states psychological becausethe perspective Lovingappropriate. one’s from child isappropriate both first-,the and third-person love makes automatically above someone ways listed inthe to Being related appropriate. 195 194 my havelife”. woman made I whom with Ibid., 141. Ibid., 146. This theory is opposed to both both love.to appraisal bestowal This is of Since and account opposed theory Kolodny’s theory has an advantage to both appraisal and bestowal accounts of. If the If of. accounts bestowal and appraisal both to advantage an has theory Kolodny’s 195 On the basis of these arguments of Kolodny, it is not the intrinsic qualities intrinsic the not is it Kolodny, of arguments these of basis Onthe Doppelganger or swamp-Jane that happened scarcely would swamp-Jane along that or 194 102 It is the relationship itself that renders love renders that itself relationship the is It CEU eTD Collection 196 againstit. The thatcount husband, with arealso her relationship reasons the there perpetuate go back to Kolodny’s ininvolvedexample. letus love ofreasons types see between relationshipwhatthe different To isthe As we have seen, though there Action and Reason 4.5. Love, are reasons for the wife to reason. agency practical and our influences importantmost question And chapter. thiswasnotof thethis conceptlove of itself it buthow relationship between the section fit I will examine last In the as well. contingent in and lackof senseof the the these differentbrings about, not love in relationship lackof reason values him the terms the to of positive types good has of she hand, other the On reasons. worth. intrinsic of sense minimal in the and relationship, More specifically, the of presence the by simply constituted husband her loving continue to areason has wife I willthe example, the In lookimportant? more be should one which other, atin the it against thea reason but in love sense, to one important? If wehaveareason is most Whichone the chapter? in this I discussed reasons of types different the between relationship is the what remains: question presence of her love isnot enough to justify continuing loving him. oneimportant Thus, claimed wife’s love the that her for thatthe which husbandisinappropriate abusive suggests and respected accepted independently whetherof therelationshipexits ornot. As it,Solomon “loveputs shouldbe reasons absence itsloverprovides or presence beloved and the andthe fitbetween be acontingent should there earlier, As argued love. Ihave of presence of the because simply in not and others. some Also, it unlike Frankfurt, can explainnormatively whyitis tolove appropriate in some cases Solomon But itBut is notthe case thatyou once you loveloving should someone, her continue In Defense of Sentimentality of Defense In so longas there are notgoodreasons against it , 200. 103 ”. 196 Kolodny himself CEU eTD Collection 198 missing from this relationship.abuse. But surely, we cannot reduce persons to some of their desires. Plus, we canwife’s whole personality could be reducedto desirethe be abused, to andthe husband’s to add that theredesires complement each other.are In the example, the contingent fit would be presentother only if the types toeach individualsthe involved be other related of reasonsthat is is required What missing. is fit contingent relevant the Thus other. each to complement that perverse desires between two persons, only two fitbetween a about talk really in loverelationship”. loveand the a a person of take as fail to 197 love. for reasons of perverse to bethen, category belongs the needs to reasons,this example abused.But subconscious she true afterlikesmasochist Butthis being tortured. doesnotgiveact. And genuine notitreasons isto the alland torturing, likes sadist The well. as masochist the and sadist the between fit thatcontingent the thus,wife the likes contingent Onethrough. could say the husband likesthat abusing and hiswife“likes” being abused, being fitis fit there notin somekindof I do contingent thiscasebutthink argument goes that the isabused; present. that argue could way. One in an a particular agent to in casesheisrelated worth relational Butwe a has individual an that and beloved thisthe and lover should the between fit or match contingent surelya about is worth relational above said I As rathercannot relationship. by the about brought values be right.say lackand of init the against lackworth of of relational terms thatcount considerations also that After forall,minimal theresomesensein the husband her ofloving continue intrinsic to reasons has wife The is other? the override should a worth and the relationshipquestion is following: the which of these reasons ismore important? Which one of them itself might be a reason. But here are Ibid., 217. For adetailed discussionsee: Solomon, Thus,it seems obvious that the contingent fitin the sense of two persons as a whole is 197 Solomon thinks that some reasons are perverse because “they because perverse are some reasons that Solomon thinks In Defense of Sentimentality of Defense In 104 as persons , especially 213-218. , and not just that some of their of some that just not and , 198 In the example wecannot example Inthe CEU eTD Collection understood, it does not refer to selfishness. not refer itdoes understood, to Love self-hatred. and self-love genuine between differentiate love.due showits against that view subjectivism,to And also try cannot to Frankfurt’s Iwill or for reason important most the not is this important, is self-love and love between link problem,the it Iwill look at since Frankfurt discussesin it detail I will argue that though this notshowsitis relationship Though isdo solve think the that thebest way I perverse. that to have come apart: the wife’slove and loveself-love for her are husbandtied together. reflect We could some arguekind thatof self-hatredin the example andlove thisand self-love “someone wholoves himself anddemonstrates displays lovethat justbyloving whathe foriswhat someone good isdefined bywhathe loves.claims As Frankfurt a result, that the other is tied together. Loving one’s self means that one wants the good for oneself, but 199 namely relationship? their amend to try and way unconditional an in husband her love wife the not Should love. of nature namely inunconditional of him,the helping favor count that are considerations permissible terminate to the friendship incase of drugaddictthe and criminal friend, there relationship itself? myselfI suggestedin previousthe example that even itisthough husband’sby these intrinsic and value the considerations override worth his the constituted severely conductabusive isin forfavor the relationship.terminating why But shouldexactly Anabout. abusive bringsany hardly relationship about values and thus husband’s the brings relationshipon the that values the namelyreasonsbased relationship, the terminate Frankfurt, . He begins by noting that though self-love is self-loveproperly . Hebeginsbynoting asadefect, thatthough often dismissed Frankfurtdiscusses the concept of self-love indetail in his book, One way of One furtheransweringin way thesequestions isa of love, element considering self-love The Reasons ofLove The Reasons , and the relationship between love and self-love. Frankfurt himself think that , 70. 199 105 The reason for this is that self-love and love for The Reasonsof CEU eTD Collection love,as acommitment to the import of an individual rationally requires self-sacrifice.See especially 168-170. 201 200 and did not live up to what the most important was for him. Also, he might add that not saving her out of cowardice would imply that he betrayed himself hisnegatively well-being. influence wouldher in obviously shootingand accident death the would say that the reason for this is that his well-being is tied to the well-being of hisbeloved imply helove that doesnotconsider himself anddoesnot hiswell-being. own Frankfurt jumps in front of Janice to protect her. Though with his action he threatens his life, it does not shootinginand love starts followingfor Mark,out of her, someone a supermarket example: the self-love. Take thelackof implying this for without beloved one’s sacrifice oneself instance,onecan For ashiswell-being. regard one would whatotherwise jeopardizes one love, of sake the for that is possible it how explains This beloved. the of well-being loves”. than self-love. Though it is true that the ability to love and to loveloveisis self-love.than itability and that the closely one’sself to Though true tied to some rather or perversereasons in other self-hatred isrooted “love”in suchcases cameapart: has other the for love and self-love that shows this self-destruction, reveals love his if For problem hereis thatone’s bewell-being cannot defined solely on basisthe of whathe loves. is not. example first in the self-sacrifice love, whereas of form bewould apathological It perverse. relationship andthe self-torture playing the trumpet loudly falselyand and now then.after But apoint, self-sacrifice becomes might work, as in the case physical lovewell-being outof for him himand let her.abuse Insome lessserious cases this in which the wife hershe, recognizing husband’s that depends well-being her, ontorturingsacrifices her lets his husband enjoy the annoying habit of For a different view on love and sacrifice see Helm, see sacrifice and love on view a different For Ibid, 8. 200 Now, why does not self-sacrifice work in the second case? One might argue that the that argue might case? One second in the work self-sacrifice not why does Now, The same does not work in the case of the abused wife. One might try to argue that argue try mightto wife. in One caseof abused work not the the The samedoes Thus, what is good for me and what contributes to myismecontributes for onthe what to Thus,what good well-being depends and 106 Love,Frienship and the Self 201 . There he argues that that that argues he There . CEU eTD Collection possessiveness, self-destruction and similar disordered forms of love in which the intimate the inwhich love of forms disordered and similar self-destruction possessiveness, destructive.self- or insane outright are that options exclude can we The way, This justified. or constraintwarranted tells us what cannot be part itnegatively. affects it contrary, of caring the on well-being, his to contribute not anddoes about cares agent an love what cases some In loves. as for example stresses as Helm is forinvolves caring individual for the casedesires; that the anything care cared promoting that It is care. not welfare and between by relationship close the constituted constraints rational are love. There and caring indesire of sense the even want, happenshe or to anything that just not for him desire should oneself,one someone or caresabout insofar asone Thus, welfare and rational care. He claims that there is a strong relation between welfare andcare: betweenwelfare relation isHe claimsthere astrong rational that care. welfare and properly and their relationship toeach other. Itis useful here lookto at Darwall’s theory of be concepts define able to these to rational constrains or loveneed objective of fails: some we concept Frankfurt’s that shows above example The loves. and about cares one what on only self-love Careandlove, and andself-care suggests. Frankfurt isas phenomenon a subjective merely 203 202 aswell, by noted authors other together, 205 204 Darwall, Stephen, Darwall, Fromm, account: classic Fromm’s Erich example Seefor Helm, 86. Ibid., 9. regulated by This constraint on caring places a limitation on love in cases in which love cannot be cannot love which in cases in love on limitation a places caring on constraint This own sake. own someone’sit welfareisbeingsomething that be wantfor would himforrational his to cares about him. isa This about cares justified)isfor todesire himinsofarasone or is warranted sense, (makes rational itsay is what that for for be something to good someoneitforbe is to something that equivalently might We sense. normative general most its is again, ‘should’ of sense should desire for him for his sake, that is, insofar as one cares for him. The relevant What it is for something to be good forforitisWhat besomeone something to good are tiedtowell-being, butwell-beingis notasubjective phenomenon depends that what is good for the person in question,in other words, by his welfare. 205 203 Welfareand Rational Care , one’s welfare is welfare , one’s rational caretheory ofwelfare just partly 202 (Princeton and Oxford: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2002), 8-9. it is not the true that love, and thus one’s welfare, 107 constituted by what one wants, cares about or about cares wants, one by what constituted The ArtofLoving just is . for it to be something one . It saysbeing. It that (partof) 204 And CEU eTD Collection 206 merged As together. wecan a result, concerninvolved the only understand inlove in union account the beloved’s well-being into the lover’s well being. This makes this conception some kind of incorporating is between due to identifies connection the close two the beloved, with then lover the claims, as Frankfurt because, together aretied love and self-love If egocentric. itmakelove lovewould for because be a reason cannot primary Self-love loves. one towhy we should self-love carenotto important is ascentrally love together, treat tied take love self- agree and that wemight Even though there. have apart come love self-love and self-sacrifice. genuine and situation wife’s casesastheabused between differentiate he his cannot subjectivism, because of measure. Nevertheless, by issome objective worthier remains subjective, andin a sense Frankfurt is right that itis not better to love something that love care and then, alarge extent, To festival. a rock of instead go Bachconcert tothe to better to listen to the former or more importantly, that one should force somebody one loves might be more worthy than a rock band in some aesthetic sense, this does not imply that it is unjustifiable in in cases which beloved’sthe capacities are not impaired. Thus, though Bach understandto it whatis that really his to contributes well-being. Butpaternalistic love is forhim. In this case the drinker obviously has a diminished capacity actto autonomously and of his well-being.Caring aboutaperson like himcertainly amount not does buying to vodka is part day every vodka of bottle a drinking that thinks who someone of case the example for “displays a diminished capacity for autonomy or a diminished understanding”. love paternalistic, which, asHelm it, is onlyincasesputs warranted in which belovedthe exactly in, welfareshouldit one’s consist should what only This not. would make caring and it not prescribedoes what But arecompromised. love andwell-being between relationship Ibid., 227. But the primary reason why self-sacrifice does not work in the second case is not that isnot case in second the work not does self-sacrifice why reason primary But the , which means that the identity of the lover and the beloved somehow is somehow beloved the and lover the of identity the that means which , 108 206 Consider CEU eTD Collection interrelated claims, in three chapters. In in threechapters. claims, interrelated but precisely,will three separate, I hierarchical More defend a revisedon theory. Franktean something important and implicitlythis involves first-orderdesires. thatin desire,defined asa stressed healso caring second-order a basicsense,isfinding of first-order motivation is later indebtedtoFrankfurt’s work on caring love. and Thoughhe significance the towards shift This importance. secondary of are these like, the and volitions, argue though that sometimes this guiding role canmanifest itself in desires, second-order due totheir typically presence,enduring are capable they action.guiding of will our I also they are directed at certain and atcertain desires, they are directed for oneself”. in a concern in grounded “loveultimately of another account, love an As involves it, egocentrism. in underlying thisHelm factthat puts isduetothe this significance of returning to the first-order and I will develop the concept of freedom freedom self- as of concept the develop andfirst-order Iwill the to returning significance of desires. higher-order generate guiding In role andto atendency is, desire anaction with as desire”,caringfirst-order of kind that acertain asa“multi-order 208 207 is focus primary process.If love thus desires, as they their involvea second-order second-order are primarily show that this for concern oneself involved hereis duetoFrankfurt’s definition of caring and concerns the identification of kind this calls Helm terms. egocentric constituted by first-order desires directed at something at desires by and directed first-order constituted are love and Caring first-order. tothe belong primarily they However, of desires. structure hierarchical involve a they phenomena: multi-order love arecomplex, caring that and Ibid., 149-150. Helm, 10. In the last part of the dissertation I will developin detail my own claims that are based Nevertheless, I will develop a revised hierarchical theory of motivation. I will argue will I motivation. of theory hierarchical revised a develop will I Nevertheless, . 207 In chapter not what the agent cares about or loves. Since they are of the second-order, are of loves. Since they or cares about agent the what 6 of my dissertation I will argue in detail that Frankfurt’s concept of not Chapter 5 on the object of care or beloved. care or of object on the 109 , I will develop in detail the concept of egocentric conceptionof intimate not on some other desires. But, Chapter 6 I will discuss the will discuss I 208 I will try to CEU eTD Collection motivation. exercise some amount of control over them by forming certain nevertheless kind can of beliefswe about control, our voluntary direct, our under not and spontaneous are desires skepticism self-control.about Iwill defendto try view my by arguingfirst-order that though In self-expression. to opposed as transcendence 110 Chapter 7 I will discuss the problem of problem the discuss will I CEU eTD Collection Part III: A revised Hierarchical Theory 111 CEU eTD Collection care about and love we act autonomously. andlovecare about weact with autonomy. They define who we are and perform.Wenot control by do them it decisionsis directly and yet our them providethat us thus when we actwe that in will of acts accordanceof result the not are They unchosen. both withare love variant, what important we no longer of decisions agents changed. Autonomous identity freedom andview dramatically onagency, depend on Frankfurt’s However,asIhave byintroducing concept of point. showed, the caring, already second-ordera certain at commitment byadecisive deliberation of process the off cutting “arbitrarily”, acts viewof ledwill. to a Sartrean On identification.and This of such asendorsement acts will, second-order perform and volitions view the of freedom contrary: according desiresand higher-order forming arecapable of becausewe andpersons we areagents to which thecaring, agent that implied theory hierarchical firsthis At motivation. chosen notvoluntarily deeper, will to makes his anddecisions its of Frankfurt’s thinking andthe shiftin his from thinking acts emphasizing second-order of most In thefirst partsofmytwo phasesin distinct andcriticized I discussed two dissertation detail Chapter 5: Caring as a Multi-Order Phenomenon asaMulti-Order Chapter 5:Caring 112 CEU eTD Collection – that is to say, voluntarism depends upon non-voluntarism, but not vice-versa”. not but non-voluntarism, upon depends voluntarism say, is to – that order desires;second and first-, and between distinction I willoriginal Frankfurt’s with developoperate I division, voluntary a view that defines caring as a his theory of caring. later andnon-voluntarism of views earlier the we care about.This way, Cuypers combines voluntaristicthe thinkinginvolved inFrankfurt’s what on should depend desires and second-order our thus about we care by what constituted is Our will desires form second-order voluntarily. capacity to our fundamental that and important more is involuntary, is which caring, that means this in detail, more it discuss voluntary/non-voluntary distinction does not completely overlap with the first order/second order distinction.degree of (indirect)control over first-order his desires, asI amgoing to argue in last the chapter. Thus, the 212 211 210 209 same. the not are they overlap, partly distinctions thetwo of Though desires. structure involves ahierarchical acomplex that desire words, conception “the voluntaristic that claims also and elements non-voluntary and voluntary combines that autonomy of view that we do not choose by a decision is the basis of our autonomy. Cuypers argues for a hybrid viewbasis autonomy to Frankfurt’s secondcorresponds caringand that the of assomething one corresponds to Frankfurt’s‘non-voluntaristic’”. tradition Romanticism the with affiliated primarily and that ‘voluntaristic’, tradition classicalEnlightenment the with associated largely autonomy of conception view and emphasizes“the he calls and autonomy on views different two to lead agency on views different two voluntarythe that argues He actsaction. in elements non-voluntary of second the and willvoluntary emphasizing as the Frankfurt’s thinking. One can have second-order desires as a matter of fact, without actively forming them and one can have a canhave one and them forming actively without of fact, amatter as desires second-order canhave One Ibid. Ibid., 226. Cuypers, “Beyond Voluntarism”. My view isMy viewin hybridbut aswell, adifferent way.Instead voluntary/non-of using the Stefaan E. Cuypers has recently developed a similar interpretation of the changes in changes of interpretation the asimilar has recently developed Cuypers Stefaan E. 209 Hedifferentiates andFrankfurt-2, betweenFrankfurt-1 thefirst asymmetrically depends asymmetrically 113 212 My view is also different from Cuypers upon the non-voluntaristic conception multi-order desire, in desire, other 211 210 As I will The first The CEU eTD Collection 213 of autonomy. conception” non-voluntaristic […]the the on been working has “implicitly Frankfurt Care About”, Caring and Reflective Caring 5.1. Deep self-management. and self-control of view develop possibility havingof aninfluence on motivesour when itis needed. In lastthe chapter I will inasmuch as his asymmetrical involve seems dependency thesis to skepticism aboutthe special higher-order desire; in or itis words other on the a is caring sense, one in that seems, it So diachronically. it preserve to a desire also, but a diachronic performs volitional unity. It taskbyincludingthis not only desire,a higher-order phenomenon. doof asamulti-order my caring to concept own this and Iwilldevelop chapter attempt redefine In this this concept. theproblemwe haveto Frankfurt’s later thinkingagency, to of ambiguitythe his useof term the of Thus,in ‘caring’. tounderstand implications the order of is implicit was thinking Frankfurt’s in shift the why reason the that out point will I desires. first-order of significance the to focus the shifted implicitly) (and he partly about, care agencythinkinglater on, and byemphasizing we importance of about autonomy,what the inhis desires second-order stressed Frankfurt while earlier desires say that and second-order and first-, of in thisterms change grasp to I will try clearly. articulated is not as thechange Frankfurt’s from shifthis earlier viewsa quite to differentone in his writings later inasmuch phenomenon higher-order attitude, is also of the first order. What’s more, I will argue that the most Ibid, 227. Cuypers claims that since the publication of the paper “The Importance of What We What of Importance “The paper the of publication the since that claims Cuypers We saw in the earlier chapter that the significance of caring is that it isprovides uswith that of caring significance the that Wein chapter earlier the saw reflective caring reflective 213 Cuypers is right to say that there is something implicit in implicit is something there that say to is right Cuypers . But I would like to point. ButIwouldcaring,liketo out that besides beinga 114 reflective level reflective . I will call this call will I . CEU eTD Collection important tome”. Putting the emphasis in one or the other part of this sentence reveals which or, putting the emphasis differently, “caring about something means that means something about “caring differently, emphasis the putting or, say, his garden he means that he has an attitude, or adesireis or that he hasanattitude, his hemeansthat say,garden about, cares someone when that tothink is moreit commonsensical Rather, way. a certain But he might not (only) mean by this that he endorses some of his desires on a higher-order in of caring andsay:“caringsomething about means thatthis notion basic Frankfurt’s mightreply with he something, care about meansit to what someone in youask If this. is of rooted caring power reflective more, the what’s sense usage,and ability reflecton motivationto our and actively influenceactions. our our of part important, most the if not important, very a is caring So life?” in want really for me?”do I “Whatis and important as“Whatisitthat really answers questions It desires. some about own of our attitude areflective is phenomenon, itbasically since higher-order defines caring as a diachronicfollowing commitment question: what does it exactly mean to care about something? As we saw, Frankfurt to some of our desires. In this sense, caring is desirethat as acomplex a us. For one us. For can say: “caringmeans aboutsomething this that meanswe which it it something as importantaccording that regard to to when we careabout of care. at butobject the desires at other directed is desire:itnot is afirst-order is, primarily that etc; myflowers, caring water trees, there thing in question, which is in casehisthis garden. Caring aboutmy meansgarden thatI plant caring call Iwill which phenomenon, first-order a basically is caring of element important . Using this distinction I will keep Frankfurt’s term But in my view, besides this meaning of caring, it also has a more basic, common- basic, more a has also it caring, of meaning this besides view, in my But the ask to have simply we phenomenon, first-order a is primarily caring that see To This beambiguity foundcan inthe simpler, commonsensical definition caring of unifies the differentorders. 115 wholehearted caring something is important tome.” isimportant something something is important primarily this directed at the and redefine it something is to me deep ” CEU eTD Collection moral Standing”, in the Capacity to Value”, in Value”, to Capacity the and Patients Alzheimer’s ofAgency: Margins the “Respecting well: as papers other ofher two and Internality” 214 reflective. being without about care they what with in accordance act and something about care wholeheartedly desiresand havediachronic who relevant the “naïve”agents imagine We volitions. andcan desires form second-order needto necessarily not something wedo care about be able to to have capacityinwith action-guidingrole. order our an Thus, to desires enduring, diachronic on rests something care about to ability The phenomenon. is afirst-order caring that follows the word is a concern directed at something or someone in the world and thus itsimply part of moreimportant.most Caringcaring one commonsensicalregards as inthe meaning of walk. If, on the other hand, he decides that he will stay walk. hand,he the inhe stay at home If,other will watchTV on and his decides that hisfor a take dog will donow anddecide to probably he activity he happensto then, that to be he case the his really that finds about dog and cares TVonly watching apleasant and watch TV. Now, his decision will reveal what itis that he really cares about. If it happens it’sSuppose cold outside, andhe wondersif he his should take dogfor awalk stay or at home desires. higher-order in mightinvolve do the formation of his a certain occasion, deliberation his at is directed that primarily is anattitude thatcaring naturally think hewould words, in other caring about his dog means that he feeds his dog, takes him for awalk, plays with him, etc, or will not answer thatat thehe followingwants example.to sustain If we ask someonesome whatkind it means of desires,that desires. make try wesometimes deliberating to useof hesecond-order cares about but or his conflict in rather, while and dog,motivation our about he We reflect that. like typically not are he will say that Though a naïveis capable agent of caringnotform andyetdoes desires, any we second-order Recently Agniezska Jaworska has been arguing for the same claim in a series of papers. See her “Caring and “Caring See her ofpapers. a series in claim same the for arguing been has Jaworska Agniezska Recently dog and not at some of his desires. Of course, if he starts to reflect about what he should let look in us caring, involved desires first-,are andsecond-order see areboth how To Ethics Philosophy & Public Affairs 117 (April 2007), 460-497. 214 However, caring usually does involve second-order processes. involve second-order does usually However, caring 116 28, No.(Spring 2 1999), 105-138 and “Caring and Full CEU eTD Collection claim is very controversial if we understand “reason” in the sense that it gives us normative us gives it that sense in the “reason” understand we if controversial very is claim once one finds out what one cares about (or loves)it gives one a have. desires wereally first-order want. by answer the we find about what wecare find out to are trying live,first we have answerto the factual question about what we already care about. When we in will naturallyinvolve an to the reflectiveascent level.Butas Frankfurtwe haveseen,argued playing with his dogathome. way,in by express it say, for be awalka different hewill still able to fordog some reason, is If owner One’sactionscaresabout. the not. simply one his incapableof takingwhat reveal himunderstand willbe agoraphobic. towhetherhiscaresabout able or Buteven a dog owner simply hindered in his fortaking a becausedog has hewalk ishisleg, broken or seriously is thedog of owner the mightit casethat be the course, him.Of care about not does owner stays doggy instead, athome poor might bejustified watchingTV the his inhisfeelingthat his for awalk fails dog and take to is,itafter repeatedly all. ifsomeone about That care not does one that suspect might we a particular thing, caring about to relevant actions the perform 215 if one itcare aboutafter all. not Rather, does entail one not does that to doonaparticularfailure one’soccasion something issince caring attitude, adiachronic and about, cares really a person itis that here what weask Since case. the thisisreally that that he does notcare about his dog after all.But of course, one single occasion will notprove comfortable chairin warm the instead room of taking hisfor a dog walk, this mightsuggest See also Cuypers, 237. The Reasons of Love of The Reasons 215 As we have seen earlier, the basis of Frankfurtian practical reasoning is the following: practical isthe Frankfurtian reasoning have earlier, of As basis seen the we True, if at some point, one starts to wonder what it is that one really cares about, it Self-discovery Self-discovery process importantis an whichfind involves what to trying kind out of that in order to answer the normative question about how we should we how about question normative the answer to in order that 117 reason discovering to act. to Of course, this repeatedly what we really what fails to CEU eTD Collection my relevant first-order genuineness.mymy desires, If consistscaring about desire inmy solely preservedog second-order to do I really caresomeleastquestionsto their fact, extent, at conscious this preservedour efforts, through about my dog? Isn’t it the case that when I is cruciallyimportant for him,is agent the and passivewith regard tothese desires. momentum” but this is notwhat he has in mind when he talks about caring, since being active we saw,he claimed that some of our desiresmight preserve themselves due “theirto inherent Frankfurtand isin with his vein emphasisonbeing active ourmotivation. with regard to As for important is crucially point This contribution. our without persist simply not should Frankfurt claims that only howis, desiresby being that desire. bediachronic, way can keptalive byahigher-order the continuity of a is we wantbe the not desirethem fact preserved.Butthis the to that be then,nature, dueto would has to be the result desire desires. first-order order atpreserving whichis someTheirour of directed diachronic of our own activity;is a because ithigher- primarily nature caring hasadiachronic claimedFrankfurt that that it andactions has second-order desires. anatural generate tendency to guide our to desires,hasthe potential first-order of diachronic aset Caring,direction. as they cannot offer much guidance for our actions. Some others might push us in the wrong and significance, just little goandhave and might desires. come desires Someorder of our be qualitatively on asdifferent first-order the well, thusground and theauthority higher-of They can desires. other to be cansuperior howdesires only thisway the isnot agent, of the desires aswell they in aresuperior thereflective authority higher-order sensethat express the from is nature momentary,diachronic desire.Though different a merely passing qualitatively what one cares about than actto on an urge or on a transient desire.Caring, as a desire with a justification to do something. But at least it seems to be clear that one has more reason to do But one can look at this matter in a different way: if some of our desires need to be Now, what does the diachronic nature of caring consist in if all this is true? We saw 118 CEU eTD Collection Obviously, what you care about might change through time, but it hardly makes sense to say to sense makes hardly it but time, through change might about care you what Obviously, ingeneral. do them to want to tending but moment, that or this at only not them do to wanting doseveral essentiallyyourin and things, wanting dog caring to forconsists example about havingitmomentary involves but onehas desiresdesires, that of overaperiod Thus, time. diachronic, since if someone cares about something, say, his dog, his attitude is notlimited to is It also first order. tothe belongs itprimarily another desires, andnot its object, at directed is desires. it Since first-order isset it lessdiachronic, of amorehave or coherent argued, influence our agency for an extended period of time. Caring is first-order desire like that. As I and stable remain to tendency the have to has it is that momentum”, “inherent the have primarily by our conscious efforts. In order for a desirebe to a good basisfor caring, ithas to careful in excess, avoiding theopposite namely desires claim the our that be should keptalive persisttending contribution withouthaveit to our might butwe should to something be wewant,that have wantedand supposedly keepwantingwill aswell. makesof morewhat important: them they are notjustbut passing whims things and wishes desiresmotivational toremain thattend part animportantof our lives? is This part precisely having with is wrong what all, after For momentum”. inherent own their “by persist to have they words in other or nature, by be persistent to have it constitute that desires the genuine, preserved are desiresmean caring constituting our that not something thisshould we careabout put constantin effort preserving it, onewould my naturally lovethink that isnot real.When aliveis thatI love iskept someone a passing whymy for If whim? reason to as opposed the remain stable to they tend that is of their nature part itbecause but my of activity own result justsomething, anenduringnotinvolves asthe presence; andcare about desireswith this Frankfurt’s claim that caring cannot simply be the matter matter simply desires of be the of thatcaringour some cannot claim Frankfurt’s only thanks to our efforts to preserve them. In order for caring to be sincere and 119 CEU eTD Collection involves desire,caring asaspecialit first order may and alsogivedifferent rise to higher- called it object sense of the word, caringis essentially a first-order phenomenon; itis primarily directed at its caring reflective such, itis ahigher-order desire attitude or is that at first-order directed desires. Icalled this Frankfurt is right to say that caring is a manifestation of reflective self-evaluation and as different orders; thatis, caring is essentially a of phenomena includes that phenomenon psychological a complex is Caring structure. form from phenomena rather,they a bigger separate noteach isolated other; are processes identification. or endorsement volition, and desire higher-order is, that phenomena, deliberationinto higher-order by itselfmanifesting in form the of variousthe higher-order sinceactions long ititAnd expresses term one’s guiding becauseof its can goals. role, enter caring expresses guide In hislong-term has a that contrast, concerns. potential one’s to something watch TV isnot him. to desire caresabout His in atleast hereally case important, whenformore hemakes whattodo,hewillfind up his mindabout a hisdog walk taking The owner of the dog might have a momentary moment. desirea certain at happensone to what overrides about cares one why explainwhat or even a persistent desire to watch alsofinds agent expressvaluable.being the important features persistent what or These TV, but besides of Caring desires that getting consists drug. cares about the addictthe tosay not that is like drugis caring. the addict’s craving forand the Somedesires this persistent obviously, not anything atall.does careabout person such a that say rather in wewould moment; each different something care about can one that and not at andany distinguish not desires. thissense To caringof reflective from caring, I My claim that caring is a multi-level desire implies that first-, and higher-order and first-, that implies desire multi-level a is caring that claim My Of course, itis not enough for a desire to be persistent to be alegitimate candidate for deep caring , since itis found on the higher, reflective level. On the other hand, in a basic . It is . Itnatural when cares something, that about one this 120 multi-order phenomenon. On the one hand, one the On phenomenon. necessarily CEU eTD Collection 217 216 in Idiscussed which criticism Watson’s to answer an as beregarded by could isis, desires multi-order valuing The viewconstituted atypethat of that on caring, Integration and Valuing 5.2 Caring, and rejection. phenomena,order higher-order desiresvolitions, includingandidentification, endorsement, Agency valuable. it andjudginghimself earlierbetween admits, valuing difference he the something overlooked Watson As judgments. value explicit on based be to have values our that believe not do well. Our values as are motivation of indeed theory hierarchical the and veryagency about important assumption Humean the preserve and our actionsyet and criticism shouldthis to answer both can view restMy them. on based on are desires them.second-order However, I specialthe Frankfurt that status they andourvalue thinks do, judgments areprimary and our seen,was Frankfurtagainst his second-order argument desires that have in donot themselves see it as expressing or even conforming to a general a general beone wouldsee it evenconformingstandpoint expressing preparedto or to as notdoes judge the thebest, isproblem thatwhen one valuessomething this way “one needn’t one that something value might one sometimes though that is this for reason The desiring. to whichbe reduced valuing should to Humean viewaccording rejectthe wantsto Watson still judgment does not entail because, ofmyjudgment regardless valuing, Ipersonally value smoking assuch. just Thus, asvalue the latter does I canfornot example judgethatahealthy life is valuable butnevertheless smoking, continue entail the former either.thing: it, ashe “oneputs canin sense animportant fail value whatto judgesone valuable”. Nevertheless, Ibid. Bratman also stresses that judgments of value underdetermine action. See Bratman, 168. Will”, Free and Action “Free Watson, . Helm makes a similar point, see Helm, 69. 216 Judging something valuable doesnotentail one personally that values the given 121 Chapter 2 Structures of . As we have we As . 217 CEU eTD Collection glass of wine. Nevertheless, it does not express what I care about, that is, it does not express notis, it does about, that I care it expresswhat not does Nevertheless, of glass wine. force; I personally value smoking say, acigarette after dinner, in companygood and with a external an me as overcomes simply that desire irresistible an have I because smoke not do I However, Ido not care about smoking; on the contrary, Icare aboutmy health. In these cases really smoking; care about in true, some situations I dovalueit indulgingand enjoy init. my best judgment because I value smoking in certain situations. I would say that I do not do, but one goes for it without compunction”. without it for goes one but do, butisbest, thrilling; fun,or one loves it,it’sbad doing and it’s alsotoo bestnot the thing to “it may be by Watson’s words: more thought arenot These described appropriately cases sense desires. with having stable, of guidingsecond-order desirescomplemented action care aboutinWhen them paragraph. way, the intheperverted valuedonot we things we section amountvaluingnot does to way in mentioned perverted the things inthe previous something as itcaring about in redefinedthe sense of caring Idiscussed in previousthe viewa crudereductionism can criticismanswer tothe andisnot above values. Valuing of will others find still defining values in of our terms desires unconvincing, Ibelieve thisthat concept ofvaluing which thiscan solve problem.While IamawareWatson andmany that ideal case weboth value somethingjudge it andvaluable. agenthisvalue Inthemost general the regards asstandpoint. own and expressing that our (or valuational system)haveof tooverlap. Incase valuingperverse wecannottalk about in a Assituation. we have seen, inhisviewmotives motivationalour (or system) andvalues value happensto judgments between and whatone value integration lack isone’s aserious of 219 218 defend”. Ibid. Ibid. I think that using the redefined concept of caring, it is possible to work work a Humean is itout of to possible caring,concept redefinedI thinkusing the that 218 Watson thinks that such cases can be called “perverse cases”. In these casesthere In these cases”. “perverse be called such can cases that thinks Watson 122 219 For example, I might light a cigarette against a cigarette light might I example, For CEU eTD Collection especially genuinebe love this correct. True, caringcannot loveand provide us with goals in will caseofgenuinelove and becauseargue that meaninginlife.I usgoals and give they care aboutfor things usto is it So this important fact. actions dueto our guide final endsand us becauseimportant with theyprovide love Hethinkscaring are and that we careabout”. of what “importance forhe the Frankfurt; stresses is itself important actions? very Caring our its importance in deliberation: its special action-guiding role. of caring explain features These want. we really desire what expresses multi-order a complex being Caring, life. in our want truly and important find we what but judgments or beliefs our making judgmentsorforming beliefs something:about is it more personal and expressesnot desires.second-order is Caringa kind of valuing personal of It is things. a matternot of enough in itself; we need to have the relevant first-order motivation as well. defined desires. by Thisone’s is second-order is reason why the not self-evaluation reflective order desires are central part to what we are, itsois inappropriate to say that one’s real self is express what the agent really wants. Iargued earlier that there is reason to think that ourfirst- not does and in action ineffective is it itself; in insufficient also is evaluation Reflective level. reflective the on motivation create to tendency the have not do they is, that role, guiding have anaction- donot Perversevalues desires. concerns second-order and first-order stable of involves both itsince aspects a person of different integration the involves the caring importantly, More values. and concerns long term one’s itexpresses but sense “pervert” example a tendency to valuelike to satisfy in certain situations. smoking desiresthatI occasional, Suchvaluesonly refer passing my stable,guiding to desires. action a cigarette occasionally. It is not valuing in the But isBut action goal the careaboutguiding of toguide thingscaring? we Should inorder Caring involves integration the of levels, different the includes sinceit both first and Caringjust ismore valuing that somethingevenifit hasatemporal fordimension, as 123 CEU eTD Collection going well with the cared-for object in order for one truly to be said tocare for it”. emotions), accept the possibility of distress (and other negative emotions) when things are not along joy possibility the positive involves(and other of apackagedeal:onemust, with object”. ofthecared-for fortunes the to respect with have to is expected one reactions emotional of range the to referring that the word caring simplyandfortunes depending Shoemaker joy on and cared-forof the the misfortunes object. thinks refers to such dispositions:one cares about something, “talk in object. a certain “investment” someinvolves kind caring for example that stressed of onecaring is emotionally is simply investeda is often many It argueotherwise. would philosophers way However, constitutivecaring. of of in it, and is vulnerablenot tonecessarily feel do they volitional; a pain primarily are love and caring Frankfurt, for seen, have As we authors. involve by butwhichisother acknowledged neglects notoriously often Frankfurt aspect of that caring emotions. Even if they achieving something. do, it seems something atsomeonean on or and not love end; aredirected to especially caring, and that these emotions are not reducible to such dispositions. For the most important isfollowing: question such mostwe the For the reducible why to are dispositions. is caring mean that not this should part of caring. However, important form a centrally these things 223 222 Agency”. and Identification 221 1991). 220 of action”. byproducts essentially and asIwillmeaning inlife,but, whatElster are callssimilar to they “states that argue, are Ibid., 92. Shoemaker, “Caring, Identification and Agency”,94. Watson,“Volitional Necessities”,Cuypers, “Autonomy beyond Voluntarism” and Shoemaker, “Caring, Jon, Elster, in order to To seethatcaring phenomenon,letme is atan primarily look a first-order important I agree with Shoemaker that caring involves a set of emotional dispositions and that and dispositions emotional of aset involves caring that Shoemaker with agree I Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality make our lives meaningful. In other words, we do not use caring as a means 220 222 In case of caring this means that we do not care about He also thinks that “genuinethinks Healsosomething that caring about 124 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 223 221 When CEU eTD Collection 224 Solomon isprocess”. “a argues, love protracted Rather, dispositions. of set a as love define to strange very is it but dispositions adisposition”. itself not is it but affection, of passionate moments experience to a disposition as well as jealous or feel protective to says Solomon about loveWhat applieshere aswell: “[L]ove many involves including dispositions, a disposition dispositions. of set a with identical not is itself caring But richer. life our havecaring doubt, having isto certain makesemotional No dispositions. such dispositions pointof say thatthe something.to be strange care about Itwouldmeansit to what explain we care about when something.reactions a rangeofemotional to we aredisposed that for thefact account might itand about care we what with identify we that true be might However, It explanation. real a with us provide these points loves doesnot what Identifying motivesone cares or of andnotothers. about with our seem to be aswell: weneedanexplanation irrelevant isincomplete motives with one’s when from of Asisidentification missing picture.caring the Iarguedearlier, still the conceptof we want essence very the still, But object. cared-for to the with identify we because reactions emotional Identification is a possiblehavedisposed inconnection certain with to thecare things emotional responses about? we candidate to solve this problem: we are disposed to have these some final ends and make livesour meaningful. tohavein we dothat order that ifwebelieve even desires some of preserve our is to caring preserve some of our desires. As I mentioned,it would be unsatisfying sayto that the pointis to of things about caring of point the that say to strange very be would it again, but prevail, to desires of our might wantsome something we about When we care focus. misplaced caring: it is not to be processdefined thatas a setinvolves of dispositions. (among other Frankfurt’s things) emotions view has as thewell. very The same same thing is true about 225 Press, 2003), 203. Solomon, “On the Passivity of Passions”, In Solomon, In ofPassions”, Passivity the “On Solomon, Ibid. 225 That is, it has a temporal dimension: it is a long-term a is it dimension: temporal a has it is, That 125 Not Passion’s Slave 224 Love involves all kinds of emotional , (Oxford: Oxford University Oxford , (Oxford: why we identify with some with identify we CEU eTD Collection “emotions are orientations to the world that show up how things matter to us, revealing the revealing us, to matter things how up show that world the to orientations are “emotions As it, Cavell connected together. puts caring tous,thus, are matter andemotions persons reactions but the story does not end here. Our emotions only reveal that some things or connectto the world.but to life meaningful a live to even, or object, an with identify to or emotions any feel to desires, somethingpreserve some For isnot to about pointreduce caringthe tothese. of caring we cannot of butthisand object dispositions process areapart emotional with cared-for the Caring importantway isan how we of do this. Sustaining of some desires, identifying our world. to the we needareal connection thinks that Wolf earlier who quoted I way. certain tothein worlda connected gets issueisthat something crucial the about And cares one when things. about care they is that engagement this of part important very a and world, the with something. Why do we have any of these? Humans are not isolated: they are actively engaged kind of desires,mental states, or dispositions there are in our psychology when we care about explanation of this concept by analyzing by concept this of explanation our identifications, even if these make our life meaningful. Similarly, the point of caring is not the emotional dispositions that we have when we care,explanation: theof having pointis aheartitor inpumps that blood, helpto order usstay alive. we needapurposive Rather, aheart. real having of the point muscles are not heart’s the of movements in the sameway as the meaning of isare thereal caring, it that For these not questionis it notenough to talk mentalthe about phenomenawhich through caring works. that have to full to in answer a something and order care about meansitknow what to want to We is. of caring point real whatthe tell us cannot part of these caring, important might bean It is true that when we care about something we are vulnerable to certain emotional The problem with concepts of caring I discussed so far is that they try to give an identification emotional desires,dispositions and second-order Thus, certain though only 126 the psychology of the agent, focusing on what CEU eTD Collection 227 226 world. Caring about things is mostthe ultimate mode of our engagement with world.the establish, aconnection tothe initiate Whatmeans isto something it careabout or about. to personsorideals wecare with that those Wolf it, apositive relationship as establishing, puts mental lives. Rather, caringis an engagement with the world (and ourselves) and want to have diachronic coherence, emotional dispositions or whichever features in our we notthat isitis certainly question, to this whatever answer the always open. But remains things about care we why question the above, mentioned As I incomplete. remain always investdesires, in something, haveemotional etc. Butsuchdispositions, explanations will certain have is to something about care to that claim they Then detail. in volitions or desires Whenunderstand try philosophers caring,to they analyze such states, mental cognitions, as level. whichever on want, we what of result the or reason of judgments of matter a the discussion of emotions make his view incomplete. The value that things have for us in not neglecting Frankfurt’s reason this andfor have, we emotions kind of and what we careabout what between is Thererelationship aclose feel emotions? anything, whywouldany about we emotions”. in all “implicit is it that emotions to essential so is caring inus, andinworldits relation the world”. to relation ourselves to Ibid., 136. Cavell, Marcia, Cavell, In order to understand caring it is not enoughunderstand atlook isitIn orderto to psychology notthe caringa subject. of Becoming a Subject (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 126. 127 226 227 She even thinks that If we did not care CEU eTD Collection there isthere a need for asecond-orderdesire promote to the option which I findmore important. formy stayof awalk. homedog such cases, taking andwatchTVinstead In at inclination to unimportant activity. This might especially the case when I, say, out of laziness, feelmight a strong be generated as a result of the fact that I care about my dog but I find watching TV an choose between taking my desires in willbe of favor For generated careabout. dog instance, thingthe we when to I have for a walk and watch a a second-order TVfeelsbutcare about notdesirefor, does astrong somethingand one doing program, a second-orderdeliberation. Thus,desire when one is faced with a choice between doing something one cares about in desires second-order generate caringthey to tend constitute that desires order that generated by the first-order of are caring desiresare part which second-order that I argued Also, role. action-guiding level of caring. It desiresan with first-order part of isof mostimportantis diachronic stable, caring aset the that part of the action-guidingorder by nature, that is,it involves a hierarchical role structure of desires. However, Ialso claimed of the first- caring of claimed isIn theprevious I arevisedthat I sketched theory multi- caring. section Chapter 6:Caring,LoveandSelf-Transcendence 128 CEU eTD Collection 228 chapter. last the in in detail discuss will I which self-management and self-control of problem the volitional essence in the sensehavenotwe do show a that itby to against trying more arguments some consider will Frankfurt thinks we do. This andfreedom Ihave love: real-self already viewbutI as self-transcendence. the argued against claim is centrally important builton caring theory important more is which freedom of notion is there another that instead for self. which express by real actions freeor our aredetermined if our to freedom, according weare features”. volitional higher-order, or one’sthat identity personal the depends on of one’s characteristics will,are “reflexive, which which a wehave according to a view implies this I willarguethat about. caring help really care about or find importantwe by what We aredefined towhoweare. important arecentrally these as wehaveseen, in life, or to put it in Frankfurt’s and necessities, involve These volitional motivation: caring andlove. of importance unchosen terms, what we cannot the he stressed Instead, important. less became choices our As aresult, non-voluntarism. to from voluntarism it, turned Frankfurt noted asCuypers However, free choices. make arbitrary typewhichhaveexistentialism of according to we areablewe donot anessenceandthat top with a Sartrean consistent views are earlier Frankfurt’s part that in first I showed the chapter. freedom. in areconnected, soIwill theseturn, of In concept this two them consider together reinterpretsconsequence. It conceptthe of self the inFrankfurt’s viewsembedded and the Frankfurt, Harry G., “On the Necessity of Ideals”, in I will argue against the self-expression view of freedom chapterandsuggest in viewfreedom this of self-expression I will the argue against important has an desire first-order a is primarily caring which to according claim The volitional essence 228 Also, this view implies a self-expression view of view aself-expression implies view this Also, 129 Volition, Necessity and Love that defines that whoweare.Frankfurtthinks real-self view , 113. of personal identity CEU eTD Collection view being determined by, and expressing one’s real self amounts tofreedom.is realself amounts by, somethingbeing and expressing one’s There determined thesecond. to stress objectivity who and others can call the first view the can thefirst call ourselves real self or essence one’s hand there are 1) thoseone the freedom. On and self the of concepts different two are there above, mentioned As I who think that freedom amounts Freedom to and Self onthe Views 6.1. Two be determined by, and for thesamereasons. aswell liberating ifis caring wholehearted argues thatloveFrankfurt isliberating but ingeneralis true, this 229 in claims of a lot that wide, isitbe argued of too love could Frankfurt’s concept cases.Thus,since incaring other about and talk relationships personal love to restrict to is better are. It there of modes caring other what hebutspecifies mode never of caring important love most talks asthe about other objects than persons as an ideal, acountry, etc.itis better to talk about caring. Frankfurt at concern directed andwe talk about personal when to relationships be love restricted should love. Rather, of be example an consider to not would people most otherwise that concerns includesmany wide. It loveof istoo his concept love that his theory of discussing chapter in the I havelove. mentioned already of caring and of concept the treatment Frankfurt’s University Press, 1999). Berofsky, Bernard: . In my view Watson and Frankfurt belong to the first category, Susan Wolf, Berofsky Wolf, Susan category, first the to belong Frankfurt and Watson view my In . Let us look atthe us look first.Let viewself-expression AsImentioned, this view according to But before I begin, I would like to consider a general problem in connection with in sensethe being of by determined is objectivelythe makes good what usfree.We Liberation from Self: A Theory ofPersonal Autonomy The ReasonsofLove ; on the other hand, 2) there are those who think that think who those are there 2) hand, other the ; on self-expression view self-expression can be applied to caring in general. For example, in caring For applied canto general. be 130 , and the second one the (Cambridge: Cambridge self-transcendence transcending express 229 CEU eTD Collection especially Susan this objected to the view, philosophers view. Several againstthe real-self arguments Wolf, who claimeddesire that and internalone’s real in and identification of rejectionself might makes be it“insane” external. Inas thisa result chapterdesires. ofI will considerhas a non-rationalrational on nature; whether our valuesjudgments are expressedor by our different it self, whether real of this nature the about disagree only they mainpoint, this agree about one is free. In both views, our real self is defined by our most deeply held values. self, real by one’s determined are if actions Thus,one’s that claim theories Both free. is theyone life, most inandloves mostcaresabout whatone by express and aredetermined one’s actions andloveif careabout inlife.Thus, bywhatwe manifested which are unities, form diachronic with this form difficulty. synchronically Desires a hierarchicalstructure inand these turn is andpsychology less butFrankfurt’s quite complicated than transparent, theory can deal human True, desires. by moved basically are humans that claims Frankfurt nature. human On the other hand, therevalues. One mustbe ablemaketo evaluative and judgments make these effective inaction. are philosophers held deeply most one’s on are based that judgments one’s with in accordance act to ability as Frankfurt whoperson build is his onevaluative a contrary humanfaculty, theory onenature. might of say withIf mightbe versionsthinksabout theory,free.this of one depending There several onwhat Garyone Watson thinks that freedom thatifloses hisInstead, freedom. agentis by an isdetermined only what rests humans on an are basically whichaccording to if issomeone by determined something rationalaffairs inby nothingmyself? whichIam determined but isview built the This assumption on and that if notsuchof thewhat elsecouldbefreedom a state view.For this intuitive about or attractive essence of a I have already argued against the real-self view while discussing Frankfurt’s Frankfurt’s concept view real-self I have discussing while the argued against already chapter 2 . There I argued that it is not the case that identification makes a 131 external to himto in his actions, he internal to him, he is CEU eTD Collection self-expression self-expression than precludeon andhissubjectivismself-transcendence, seemsto realself- self. transcend one’s to obligation involves an 234 233 2000). self-transcendence that claimed himself Frankfurt as self-expression. freedom loveof than effect important more self-transcendence and not self-expression, and asa result,freedom as self-transcendence is a love essence is the will express of is ina real Iarguethat self and it able However, action. to express ourselves and be free in that sense. If one loves wholeheartedly, itmeans that one has views love with freedom one imply Frankfurt’s makesusable as self-expression. that to determineloveCaring actions, andconsequently haveapowerto and one’sthey can provide 232 agent. expressive merely self- freedom of the to the freedom agent hasasuperior self-transcendent which the to well, according as theory has Locke a self-transcendence that view andclaims expression self- Gideon the arguedagainst Yaffealso choiceswe truly if our are. Recently express what free, donot even this weare to are unable we If self-transcendence. which implies and good, true objectively the with in beact accordance ableto have to free,bewe to which inorder 230 focus his of on theory Iwill especially are connected. andself-transcendence andherself, likebecomes thereby God”. inher– andshe expressesherself conduct will of freedom and transcends escapes – she free. not are insane agents that negative developmental circumstances, orcoercion, brainwashing, addiction and like,the and 231 Characterand the Emotions Frankfurt, personal communication. Ibid., 74. Yaffe, Gideon, Yaffe, See: Susan Wolf: “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility” in Schoeman, Ferdinand, Schoeman, in of Responsibility” Metaphysics the and “Sanity Wolf: Susan See: Wolf, In this chapter I will focus on Frankfurt’s views to show how exactly self-expression Freedom within Reason Liberty worth theName. Locke on Free Agency 232 is He argues that “the full fledged free agent has both freedom of action freedom – action both has of freefull“the fledged agent Hearguesthat involved inhis involved love as theory: necessarily a volitional configuration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1987), 46-62. . 230 Rather, she argues for the Reason View Reason forthe Rather,sheargues 233 132 234 However, it seems that he focuses more on he focuses that itseems However, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, University Princeton (Princeton: 231 caring Responsibility, according to and love . CEU eTD Collection benefit the beloved, without being able to want to harm her. What we truly care about and about care truly we What her. harm to want to able being without beloved, the benefit to want escape. Wenecessarily wecannot that necessity isThis a volitional beloved. the of well-being the promote but to choiceno have we lovers, weare once Second, this matter. will be.We simply end uploving objects some lovingand not withoutmuch others, in choice at an irreplaceable object, but in such a way that we cannotvoluntarily control which object it voluntary andcontrol”. immediate itunder our loveis not of that feature possible. effectloveliberating love of implies makesusfreethat makes becauseitself-expression self that we can express in our actions.volitional Therefore, necessities it seems and consequently Loveagents. provides uswith impotent that weare a consequence as and volitional essence, Frankfurt’s it makes claim us aboutpotent the agents. It provides us with a real ambivalence “arethese liberating” themselves and us, on necessities volitional imposes Love ourselves. of expansion and enhancement wholeheartedlyany andwithout an experience wegothrough liberation,self-doubt of ourselves”. 238 237 236 235 In Self-Expression as 6.2. Freedom of autonomy”. conception “individualist andan concerns” intimate useHelm’s view real-self of To implies an“egoistic term,transcendence. the concept Frankfurt, 44. Ibid, 66. Frankfurt, Helm, 9. The Reasons of Love Reasons of The Now, there is determination involved in love in two senses. First, “it is anecessary “itsenses.in First, two inlove involved is there determination Now, 237 The Reasons ofLove The Reasons and By this crucial phrase he means that love frees us from lovefrom of hemeansthat freesBy thiscrucial us states painful the phrase indifference Frankfurt claimed thatlove liberates us. When we are able tolove , 65. . When we are ambivalent or indifferent we do not have a 236 because they “freeing us from are capable of 133 235 238 Loveis directed CEU eTD Collection 241 240 239 all”.at selfas the “entity” construe an to inclined is “not he that and implications have ontological not any view does his that stresses singular entity. Rather, volitional necessity draw only the boundaries of the self,but Frankfurt a self a in the sensehetalk of about doesnot declares that Velleman, Frankfurt reply to befound”. to waiting entity “singular of a in leastsense not the at self,a real have we donot connection Velleman byarguingFirst, withproblem. this that Frankfurt criticized are, orin wordsareal other BeforelikeI wouldself. going toconsider on, some problems in involves volitional a motivational or essence. love seems beto part of, if not the essence of our practical identity, and thus Frankfurt’s view to intentionally harm her child simply because she loves her, and she wants what is good for is good what wants she and her, loves she because simply child her harm intentionally to herself bring cannot mother The love. her of essence the is that one positive the of derivative love issimply defined bywhat cannotdo.Thisnegative she is necessity volitional only mother who cannotbring herself intentionallyto harm her child. Butit is not the case that her love,use his a consider example involve of parental view To essence. avolitional does possibilities that we cannotmake”. bring ourselves to hecan that want. thechoices bylimiting himself, person the necessity constrains “[V]olitional But it is easy to show as if they thatwere merely negative, that is, they make itimpossible Frankfurt’sfor us to act in a certain way: thing as “a single entity to be found”, he does think that our volitions define who weare. continuitythe diachronicity) volitions. (or heThus,our of though thinks no is there that such on depends existence continued our that assert he does seen, have as we However, “entity”. a real-self view after all, since we do not have a real self or essence in the sense of an Frankfurt, “On the Necessity of Ideals”, in Frankfurt, Frankfurt, “Replies”, 124. Velleman, “Identification and Identity”. 99. 241 Thus it seems that we have a motivational or volitional essence that defines who we who defines that essence volitional or motivational a have we that seems it Thus Another point about volitional necessities that Frankfurt sometimes talks about them about talks sometimes Frankfurt that necessities volitional about point Another This suggests that we do not have a volitional essence after all; there are only some 240 This mightsuggest Frankfurt’s that theory in not 134 Necessity, Volition and Love , 138. 239 In his In CEU eTD Collection caring about somethingcaring about involves caring aboutone’s self,loving individuals wholeheartedly ambivalencetoward one’s both in selfandsome objects world,the andaswehaveseen, both is,means means indifference world, toward selfandthe ambivalence indifference one’s that reference, a double have All threeterms wholeheartedly. care loveor to and ambivalent being indifferent, being of experiences: types compares three Frankfurt In thistext volitional necessities it creates: it necessities volitional the of because precisely states negative these from us liberate to is able Love hesitancy. and self-doubt by are characterized adifferent uncertainty, degree, of Both to these, Synthese in About, We Care of What Importance 243 242 either is us moves love which by necessity the to alternative the that thinks Frankfurt But above. kindsitfreedom two away to the that of by making takes ussubject determinations our child. of interests the in the case this love, and in caring involved determination positive the of, consequence the and on, dependent self by makingimpossiblefor it agent the towantsome possible of courses action.are They the bad for her. Thus, after all,volitional necessities do not simply draw the boundaries of the interests beloved”, of isthe bythe her; “she guided Ibid., 65-66. Frankfurt also discussed the liberating effect of volitional necessity in anearlier paper, “The Frankfurt, indifference 53,No. 2(1982), 257-72. neither flounder aimlessly nor hold ourselves back from definitive adherence to a to course. meaningful practical adherence definitive from back ourselves hold nor aimlessly flounder neither cannot help we therefore help andthat loving, we cannot that fact The overcome. thereby are act, being guided and choose capacity impairto may to our radically which ambivalence, and unsettled Indifference in another. and by direction one in both the inconclusively drawn in being interests ends or final no having in either consist that action and choice of impediments the offrom what we love,we areliberated by care about.Inbeing beloved, our captivated to what concerning helps theindecisiveness anend to puts ourwills love binds necessity with which […] the to ensure that we But if love has such nature, how can it make us free? Some might have he intuition he have might Some free? us make it can how nature, such has love if But The Reasons ofLove The Reasons or a state of a state or , 66. ambivalence TheImportance of WhatWeCare About 243 and itis these states that take away out freedom. 135 242 and as a consequence she cannot want and shecannot asaconsequence , 80-94, reprinted from CEU eTD Collection itis importantfor them alwaysto live in present.the showfit intothislifesomething: docareabout episodic AsItried canpicture. well to agents wholeheartedly cares about, butas Iarguedin about, wholeheartedly cares one that something be to has there that involves only It sense. narrow in the least regards morality, and it viewnarrow isis on live what life. bestway the to our As havewe seen,thisview is neutral as neutral with regard to iswhat important tostress Frankfurt’sthat view, though based on caring andlove,not does imply a vision of the good lifeboredom, emptiness and Thisis meaninglessness. quite the not state Strawson has in mind.It is correct, at of itselfexperience a make manifests as painful lack decisions to of ability indifference. This this is the key point: the point: key the is this one is completely lacking of any motivation and henceanything.caring about unable to make any decisions. anythingnotlife careaboutthey care about to revealbuttheir not somehow that attitude And argument against a narrative view of theit 2in chapter caringanything. with After connection all,Strawson’s not about asIdiscussed self, there might be people who claim sense: possible in strictest the isunderstood indifference here stress that to thatisit important this, they do see To as an agent. impotent be one might completely astate in such actually, compromised: a severe form of depressionhaving goals in life and notbeing able see to any meaning in life. Such indifference might be in whichby not characterized emptiness of experience the know Many state? this of be cause the one’s capacity to make choices compare states. wehave to these thinking and act is severely implies loving In toseehowone’s love andself. inFrankfurt’s order freedom are connected Whatmeans Frankfurt by caringnot aboutanything is a quite inpainful state which If somebody is indifferent, he has no goals in life and “flounders aimlessly”. What can lack of capacity tomakedecisions lack of 136 Chapter 2 , Strawson’s vision of the episodic is what characterizes the state of state the characterizes is what CEU eTD Collection transcendence, there seems beto too much focus on self-expression.According to him,love’s me. commands love than otherwise do to want cannot I wholeheartedly love I once and otherwise, believe to want cannot is I truth the what know I Once agents. potent and asfree – weexperience ourselves hearts followand reason loveof andwe our –when reason necessities uponus,butso they withoutdo impairing us.When necessitieswe submitto the impose both they because similar very are reason and love Frankfurt, to According agents whoagents can make decisions: makes uspotent It ambivalence. and ofindifference states the overcome or avoid eitherto incompatible divided between alternatives. being torn between alternatives. The ambivalent person lacks person ambivalent The alternatives. between torn being serious internal Andconflict. again, impotencemanifests this itself as a painful experience of 244 he indifferent: the agentisthesameasin of isanimpotent so. The docase why such reason a person ability to person isnot atall indifferent, he findsitsolveimportant to hisconflicts, but lacks he the basicabout issueslife, inhis with together solving a concern about ambivalent them. The incompatibleintobeingin drawn directions life.In painfulstate one isunablesettlethis to Ibid., 66-67 (italics in the original). To sum To sum up, though Frankfurt’s theory loveon andits liberating effectimplies self- their own the inexorable will of God.) acceptingas through having discovered profess others from inner that disturbance what reason required of him evidently corresponds, at least up to apoint, to the escape foundin discovery the of having Russell peace”.The restfulness reports that “is our ancient most and persistent the themesamong is of our religious control and moral traditions. voluntary “In his will,” Danteimmediate wrote, his beyond are that constraints nothing new.The possibility apersonmaybethat liberatedthrough submitting to It may seem, then, that the way in which the necessities of reason and of love liberate us is byfreeing love usfrom Thatourselves. of and reason of necessities the inwhich way the that then, seem, may It Frankfurtclaims reasonwhy itmakes makes Now, love the that us us freeis that able The other alternative to Frankfurtian love is ambivalence which is characterized by is which characterized love isambivalence Frankfurtian to alternative The other lacks the capacity to make decisions capacitytomake lacks the 137 244 is , in a sense what they do. The idea is idea The do. they what a sense in , ; in this case he is unable to solve a solve to is unable he case this ; in wholeheartedness ; his heart is CEU eTD Collection 245 outside lover, of the namelyin goodof beloved.the asFrankfurt Since, himself claims, that the primary focus of our actions is no longer our own selves but some other. Its goal lies self-regulation. If be case, bethe it would this implies genuine not Genuinelove love. would that we make love instrumental to this goal. However, love should not be an instrument of mean This would internal state. some lovecertain toachieve in to choose order intentionally of love. states and self-expressioninternal some overcoming ourselves; are transcend is to love only of goal primary The itsitself. love effects. Or, to take Elster’s term, they of nature is tothe solipsism. connected main argument our frees of usfrom My prison the are it sense: important more in a ourselves from us frees Love it. on relies about talks Frankfurt that liberation the and is self-transcendence, love us freedom as with provides freedom of that variety important most I would emphasize thatthe like as But to self-expression. understood indifference and ambivalence. Andis it alsothen, true love that provides with freedom us from us liberates it that sense in the ourselves from us liberates It action. in ourselves states of ambivalence and indifference and as a result, itmakes it possible for us to express internal painful the overcome to us helps love and caring wholehearted agreethat I quite Self-Transcendence as Freedom 6.3. states. mental some transcending merely than more is which solipsism, our of prison the escape forit usto makes possible self-transcendence freedom: andof variety important more ifis involvesBut self-transcendence. itlove necessarily true, that provides us with a different create a harmonious real self in us. Iwill argue that this liberating effect relies on the fact that and to internal states, from liberate us some painful itsis powerto dueto effect liberating Elster: 245 Sour Grapes These are such states that come about as a result of love, but we cannotbut love,as a result of come about that states These aresuch . I will discuss this concept in detail in the last chapter. 138 by-products CEU eTD Collection 246 fallto asleep keepsmy consciousness working andthis way itprevents me from reaching the fall asleep my themore Ireduce isfalling of This intentionally asleep. because trying chances self-defeating. are attempts such because so, do to trying intentionally are essentiallyfall of notion, by-products action. some by Onecannot states asleep isuse be more,again Elster’s harmony way.anyway.To What reachedany other this cannot harmony internal reach that ableto waywewill love this if we successfully And genuine. involves that we abandon goal our itsnecessarily should for well-beingsake, bethe beloved the this of own and all self-regarding goals.through love. But I claim Lovethat creating such structure should notbe ourshould goal in loving. Rather, work this way if it is to be meaning in life. well-being butnot for its own sake, butbecause itis instrumental creatingto harmony and important for her lover, but herfocus. The misplaced inward all, wouldrecognizebeloved itis thatafter nother,who is their of role because fail in ways hissuch in love to psychology.Attempts all. at love not is it Hismyself, in hole a actions might be in fill to or itdirected to meaning give to want I and meaningless and empty is at life my because her love to want to overcome a messy, painful state of internal ambivalence, itis notlove atall. If I want oneself more,somethingany buton its external, good.If and I wantlove to justbecause I mental states are. On thememy for longer matters what If itnolove mental I wholeheartedly, states. some painful contrary: genuine, selflessfrom focusloveliberates onhowus we shouldnot good at the of beloved.Consequently, the love means that one does not focus on love aspectof freedom than isamore important as self-expression. transcendence freedom as self-expression,self- andnot atself-transcendence lovebe should directed Elster, 45-46. I do notclaimit is that notdesirable toreach a harmonious motivational structure directed configuration is avolitional love essenceof the that claims himself Frankfurt 139 246 The more I try to CEU eTD Collection someone who is capable of selfless love. Just as in case of falling asleep, I cannot movelove from as well. and I of caring in case is atransition fade. to sameway, there the In starts when consciousness begin with a state andit isbegins happen. preceded byastate, only transition can Thetransition conscious of either the and more, any asleep falling with interfere not does consciousness one’s indifferenceresignation or of because insuchstate And is this you succeed. asleep, fall to uptrying onceyou that give ambivalence,transition back consciousness. Insomniacs becausethatwould know me awhile bring to after and I end up as begin a andmylose state, with conscious I awareness observe Icannot gradually. this common. In both cases, there is a there cases, both In common. being of someone elseby selfishly focusing my on internal states. well- the on my efforts direct selflessly cannot I And working. my consciousness keeping by fall asleep and cannotmy lose supposedto reach.I consciousness weare that state the concentration is the enemy of sleep. Not only itis an obstacle to it, itis just the opposite of attention. A central impliesconcern that one is not aware of oneself forany more, or at leastchanging that it is not in the center of his it consequently lovelove. and isselfless Genuine or achieve caring genuine chance Ihaveto oneself is the enemy forinfalling changinginternal lessthe caseof asleep.The biggermyconcern my states, of love in the same way to careas about something or to love someone. However,start is,might try to I employ insomnia. That thein caseof might try to some people as strategy more I try, the more I will fail as notcare aboutdo or lovemightin anythingwant life.I to change thissame andthe adopt desperate about this fact.might I realize that the reason why inI am this painful state is that I become might I ambivalence, messy of a state in or the boredom or of emptiness state the in in love.find non-loversimilar isatwork If either case of I thatIamliketheFrankfurtian very sinceSomething of leavingthestate state, sleepingimplies desiredconsciousness. This comparison of love with sleep reveals that they have an important feature in feature important an have they that reveals sleep with love of comparison This transition 140 from one state to another. In case of sleep, I CEU eTD Collection 1997), 287-295. monarchs of we all freeisolated choosers, “[W]enot are sheclaims that this tradition against individual from his environment and himtreat as alonely self-contained individual.Arguing individual as a solitary will. She thinks prisonersthat of ourselves, and notbeing a prisoner is obviouslyphilosophers a certain type of freedom. since longer inWe nomakes step itthat out of thissolipsism ussense. are understood able to Hume and Kant isolate loveaspect of is important most The him. from isolated around world the gets one sense that the solipsism in the moral sense that one’s primary concern is oneself, and in the more actual 247 can talk about We can also have another word for this state. As in case self hasin exactly same as preventing lovehasrole the effortin conscious sleep. of preventing a lack of ability to fall asleep we focus on one’s of excess love. This incaseof self onone’s focus is the it asleep, and falling in of And effort isconscious case a other. thing to the this from state one transition through go to something eliminate itto is necessary that reveal cases difficult the Nevertheless, more naturally.and smoothly quite insuchcasesoccurs Thetransition genuine love easily. my of my of instead center internal attention states. own into the me oflove object putthe makes for to itpossible that of state self-forgetfulness reach ishave a What to focus. I the fading this of own selves and begin with our a focus on from lovetransition solipsism to mightbe by incapacity preceded lovean by characterized to infalling andbegins byconsciousness is asleep caseof fading it,with the the preceded my self-regarding goals and preventlovethus Thus, from justcoming about. asthe transition dowill that perpetuate doso. Trying intentionally to to other bysimply to the one state trying See Murdoch, Iris, “Against Dryness”, in Murdoch: According to Murdoch to According Of course, some people fall asleep easily, and just as well, some people can aswell, can achieve andjust people somefall easily, some asleep Of people course, insomnia , the state that prevents love can be called 247 , modern Anglo-Saxon philosophy tends to treat the 141 Existentialists and Mystics (London: Penguin books, Penguin (London: solipsism . It involves . It CEU eTD Collection Identity”, 251 250 249 248 survey,but sunkbenighted creatures in reality”. “love of another is ultimately grounded in a concern for oneself”. ina concern isgrounded ultimately “love of another conceptlove of isstill in grounded an egocentrism.underlying Hisviews seem apply to that environment, and inlove itis bound tothe reality of some other. However, as Helm notes his Frankfurt’s itthinkingis also that reveals thatone’s willisnot isolated butitis the bound to is real”. oneself than other something that realization difficult extremely desires but rather, on what action to perform, which is in turn depends on what we care about. on focusing onour not And attention is thethis rightthing.focusbe on our ableto have to agentin the full sense we have beto able“put to to sleep” our concern with ourselves and we be to withassuch. interferes agency,order In agency self-focus central excessive our to an is we careabout what falling Andsince with asleep. fall asleep interferes to effort conscious in samewayas just the a outside ourselves something with of agenuine concern development the with interferes powers reflective our of exercise excessive An world. the in individual an on direction: opposite the into just attention our turn we that involve These love. and caring motivation. As a result, Frankfurtian canbereflectivity anobstacle reaching to genuine ourselves reflectively by involves focusingdefinition attention first-order our on own our andevaluating Forming of higherorder the desires self-evaluation? andreflective desires areonly Frankfurt talksthat about basedsecondary thisand are on self-transcendence. love of effects positive the and self-transcendence, implies love that stress must we love, of in dynamic relational relational interms”. dynamic and characterized understood beproperly can individuals only mature love between whereas thebeloved), sometimes of lover the (or perspective from the love he “characterizes words, Foster, Gary, “Bestowal without Appraisal: Problems in Frankfurt’s Characterization of Love and Personal and of Love Characterization Frankfurt’s in Problems Appraisal: without “Bestowal Gary, Foster, Helm, 149-150. Murdoch, Iris, “The Sublime and Good”,the in Murdoch, Ibid., 293. Now, what isNow, of for Frankfurt’s second-order theof upshot concept discussion this Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 251 In this chapter I argued that because nature Iargued that Inthisof relational the chapter 12 (2009), 167. 142 248 Existentialists and Mystics Defining love, she claims that it is “the is it that claims she love, Defining 250 To use GaryFoster’s To , 215. 249 The virtue of CEU eTD Collection 252 both. experienced have who best the decide can those perhaps Or own. his on decide should reader the desires, externalthe world? Whether such freedom valuablemore is freedom from than selfishour from free is he that sense inthe freedom of kind different a have to claims a solipsist if what the freedom that love can provide us with only thisway. we can I reach about. attention believe that what wecare our on involves focusing The latter Iowe this point to Ksenija Puskaric. Real love and it involves liberates real self-transcendence, us from solipsism.our But 252 143 CEU eTD Collection management has to be put this way: can we make ourselves care about something? ourselvesis about be hasthismanagementcan wemake care Or this put way: to self- and self-change of question the important, centrally really is caring If it? of capable are they But should themselves. change people say these that itmakes senseto cases, both things thatseem be obviouslyto wrong:destruction the of peopleother andthemselves. In about caring end upwholeheartedly might ideal, they reachthis manage to some people if even And states. these overcome to unable simply might people some and indifference, ask: isto attain itinto our power ideal? Humanlife isthis by often troubled and ambivalence mightbe andit natural agents, wholehearted Frankfurtian hardly any are there life. However, in about most he cares by what determined are actions agentwhose awholehearted lifeof to be darkanda bit pessimistic. too Frankfurtdoes have ideal an human life,namely of the seems in caring that views on his is embedded recent nature human atheory of views: there IwillIn focus whatIthink like lastchapter the to Frankfurt’s isthe biggestproblem on with About It? Care Yourself Make Can You or of Self-Control Problem 7. 1.The Chapter 7: CaringandSelf-Control Chapter 144 CEU eTD Collection claims that we are autonomous when we actin accordance with what we care about), in other which autonomy of theory (the conception non-voluntaristic the on depends asymmetrically desires) and theactive formation second-order of stressingtheory reflectivity autonomy of will. at change fact that is given, something that itself isnotvoluntarily chosen, and which we cannot simply a is itsimply that recognition level, the and deepest the on care about not care or happen to we what about insight has andonly stop, an weare left regress to where the with point makingyourself it.caring about But thisgo regresscannot on infinitely.is,is That there a question something, you canmake be if careaboutwould yourself this: you about care this to answer something? Frankfurt’s about care makeourselves we can main question: caringis missing,itfurther depends on abilityour maketo ourselves care. And this is the changingabout if ourselves. Now, changing depends ourselves on incaring, cases in which change ourselves if Frankfurtbe able we to cannot why reason The changehe situation. cannotthe implies that caring is right is that in hiswhich he no longer view,genuinely cares about changing himself.we If Frankfurtwill is right, his lacknot of do soin at his apoint addiction hereached However, himself. he should change that realizes unlessaddict we care an for that example, Suppose ispossible. is, type of self-management acertain That change. makea to are able they yet thing and right the care about not do they that people recognize in which cases of sense make can We pessimistic. too is views Frankfurt’s in embedded directly iscontrol – the pointultimate from where everything begins motivational in our life. they do not care about it? andabout thus they Thus,incapable of are changing whychange themselves: would they want to if it seems that caring care whatthey happen peopleto simply care about itmeaningless? casethat Is the question – something which we cannot simply As I mentioned, Cuypers argues that the voluntaristic conception of autonomy (the autonomy of conception voluntaristic the that argues Cuypers mentioned, I As psychology human and nature human on theory this that argue to like would I But 145 CEU eTD Collection 256 255 254 253 desiresA more weform.what second-order desiresmore fundamental that are first-order desireorder in than one.a second-order Thus, my theory revised of caring andagency our first- a fundamentally more is caring that argued I Frankfurt, with disagreement In instead. distinction first-order/second-order the with work I distinction, voluntary/non-voluntary the primarily he uses while as inasmuch different significantly also are my views but desires of of his will rest”. acts and execution the will a person's organization of foundation the which upon ultimate the constitutes necessity voluntaristicthe something “caring and consequently aboutbyvolitional one” asrestricted than fundamental more is conception non-voluntaristic “the that argues Cuypers Thus, about. we care bywhat andrestricted informed be agency to has reflective, second-order our rather, we any that desirescan form volition of or desires; our a second-order supporting any our of with we canidentify is case that the not It we careabout. what on depends weform volitions necessity”. byvolitional restricted asymmetrically identification depends upon desires) something through caring(with about as effective identification (with through desires) forming volitions decisive second-order conception. in“[G]enuine definesthisthesis morefollowing and way: indetail the He non-voluntaristic the on depends asymmetrically autonomy of conception voluntaristic the use Cuyper’s terminology, Thus, to caresabout. onee what on desires depends order certain to beingthings”. or loving committed following way:“the of nature a person's iswill by fundamentally constituted his caring about, similar interpretation of Frankfurt’s views that I have been developing far.so He puts itin the words, “voluntarism depends upon non-voluntarism,butnotvice versa”. Ibid., 249. Cuypers, 248. Ibid, 240. Cuypers, 226. I agree with Cuypers that caring is more fundamental CuypersI agree forming with ismorethan fundamental caring that second-order 255 In other words, what kind of second-order desires and 256 146 254 Accordingly, one’s ability to form second- 253 He defends a very CEU eTD Collection 257 lovessomeone something or cares about order and I called this deep first- tothe caring belongs word, of the In this sense other desires. and noton object certain caring. I have tried to as I But desires,ishave it ata since involves first-order argued,caring directed essentially show in the previous chapterfunction. whichhasaspecific process, higher-order is caring areflective, word, the sense of that if one create adiachronic volitional unity, orto use Frankfurt’s term, we time; we volitional through essence our by weorganize islove caring, of that and caring caringlove)is. thisis (and One answerto question which Frankfurtian, goal to according the I have elementis first-order morethe important. triedshow, what real the of to purpose order phenomenon that has both a first-order and ahigher-order element. But Isuggested that multi- chapters is Iarguedthatcaringof Inthe previous essentially a two self-management? openness and as a result, wecan, to adegree, control what we care about. and of beforehand, determined Humans weopen possibilities. arecapableup aworld of we careabout actions is though we careaboutwhat dependour what on completely fixed not that believe If we we careabout. what say in have a wedo is non-voluntary, caring that to think thatit is not the case that we have a pre-fixed identity. is necessary Though it I agree identity; with Cuypersvolitional a have not do we that believe to necessary is it sometimes for effective arguethat independently Idisagree. Iwill self-management, activities our of iswhatcompletely we careabout fixed if means that itbutsomething care about I agree, boundaries and restrictions require self-identity and autonomy “personal which to according claim Cuypers’ with disagree strongly I about, care we what over control voluntary a direct, have not do we importantis difference following: non-voluntary caringthat I agree the is though inasmuch Ibid., italics in the original. Now, how exactly can the revised hierarchical theory howhandle exactly hierarchical theproblem Now, I sketched can revised the theory ”. 257 If this means that in order to be autonomous, we have to in order to 147 perform the function specified above, function specified perform the constitute ourselves. In this pre-fixed CEU eTD Collection conflict by forming a second-order desire, this second-order desire will be directed at one of atone desire be will directed second-order desire,a second-order this by formingconflict solvehis And he to other. when tries to each desires has opposed case, one two ambivalent enduring presence and efficiency. role: they add a further When levelactions. this love caringof or desires second-order is have thefollowingpresent, affirmation one’s guide to be able to have and identity one’s of tobe part to have these desires These beloved. first order desires the caring of atthe object or directed be stable, desires is, enduring haveto place. there That and thusin be to have contribute themselves desires first-order relevant the be present, to wholeheartedness to their For someone. loves wholeheartedly or something about cares wholeheartedly more important, second-order desires have only a limited role. Take the case of someone who desiresis, are first-order phenomena, reflective Because caring. rise that tosecond-order with revisedthe model hierarchical of agency. chapter I will try showto that a certain type self-controlof and self-managementis consistent in this But impossible. not if difficult, very became has self-control that seems it control, first-orderdeep desiresunder caring –first-order, importantor typeis ourvoluntary of not – leads adisturbingfirst-orderif most viewcrucial desires to and if are so the problem: our this level. But higher-order reflective, the of importance stresses the viewFrankfurt’s that to it,be not this seem without genuine does to caring. something, say,my mygarden or dog becauseonly my life would be empty and meaningless Frankfurt’s islove her,his without notterms) genuine.Andif about certainly I care ambivalent, touse or indifferent bemiserable because(or hewould apersononly loves one’s care or love ceases to be genuine. This is more obvious in case of love: if a person When one is ambivalent, second-order desires might be helpful as well. In an In well. as helpful be might desires second-order ambivalent, is one When earlier ordeepcaringI argued first-order that is andimportant this more gives is what Thus, so far I have been trying to restore the significance of the first-order, as opposed 148 CEU eTD Collection do so badly) and he does not want to try to quit enough (which he wishes he wanted to do to he wanted wishes he (which enough quit to try to want not he does and badly) so do disorder, the unwilling addict wants to take the drug badly (which he wishes he didn’t want to avolitional of example a typical to again back go To other. each complementing happen, both typically do; to wanted one wishes one else something do to want not does one and do suffers from a volitional disorder, one wants to do something one wishes one didnot want to self-managementis needed, they are rather just a symptom of a affirmationan express they cases some in ofThough whatmotivation. our with problem aserious of wesymptom want, as in the case of the wholehearted person,order desire in the robust sense. in cases in whichhimself. In such cases the agent caring desiresconstitute about that first-order wishes thathehadcertain here: agent the has a second-order desire withoutdesires having are the byrelevant definition first- motivation. Second-order genuinefirst-order desires without second-order presenceof the desires to have caringor not aboutto have himself desires or wantingbut really without moreetc. often”, tobe kind “IwishIwanted myself” or more about cared andto do thiskind things?is I wish “I exactly says, if someone what In example, these another take To missing. be to seems casestheabstinence casewe can clearly talk about desirefor first-order butagenuine take drug the his to desire against desiredirected isThe case aclassic unwilling addict the of exampleof hehas this case: a second-order present? not desires are first-order relevantbut desires the we havesecond-order case when desires can have afunctional rolein exercising control over one’s motivation. But what is the of one his his opposition.desires andovercome innerstate of handling an internal conflict:in special role havea desires can Thus, second-order conflict. involved inthe desires the the agent can try to form a conflict by committing himself to It seems that in cases as the one described above second-order desires are the desires second-order above described one in the as seemscases that It second-order that demonstrate agent ambivalent and wholehearted the of The cases 149 volitional disorder . When one CEU eTD Collection 258 overcoming indifference and ambivalence – ifwelove love with – inconnection Frankfurt about talks that states desirable reach the cannot inmeans love Iargued thatwe this of bring that case deliberately them about. to trying actions.by-products of other as the about can come only states these reach intentionally; we cannot that states desirable products of Asaction. Imentioned inthe chapter, he previous describeuses this term to some by- calledElster that phenomena the are similar to rather, desiresbut second-order our upon Having be can isdesires dependentcome nothaving not first-order something that true. or something genuinely order desires,or especially in casenot of a volitional disorder. Sometimes want the more we wish to want it that badly, second- with happen samecan The itsmore occurrence. with weinterfere be case,the the to the less chance something more wewant Sometimes the we self-defeating. become can one’s wishes Sometimes have that our wish will aBy-Product Essentially is that a State as Caring 7. 2.First-Order action. of by-products essentially are that states calls Elster Jon what to it by comparing disorder volitional a in solving inefficient are desires order second why explain to try will I section next the In itself. problem the constitutes even or to, contributes just presence Their itself. cure the interfere with can they contrary, the on be desires of disorder. asymptom can volitional a serious We usethem cannot strategically; problem:volitional disorder. acute a more). In cases like this the presence of second-order desires is the painful symptom of an precisely this feature of love that will bring about the desirable consequences of love. love the desirableprecisely of bring of The thatwill feature consequences about this is it and beloved; the of that on but interests own our on focus not do we that implies love Elster, 43. Thus sometimes, rather than being acureanda asolution to problem, second-order 258 It is not possible to achieve these states intentionally, by intentionally, states these achieve to possible not is It 150 in orderto reach these states. Genuine CEU eTD Collection First, he talks about the about talks he First, was undertaken” result of action designed to bring it about – even though it is rather a sign that no such by-products actionof the and by-products, essentially are that states desirable about bring to try about”. bring to is one state trying the sodo precludes to very attempt the because intentionally, or intelligently about brought be is, that never, can “[T]hey that stressing by on goes 262 261 260 259 for they other of by-product ends”. asthe can only undertaken actions about come that have property the appearto states social mental and “[S]ome that byclaiming chapter in hisbook detail. In and self-management works. forming desires, second-order it isbyforming beliefs through which effective self-control instead of agency.section I willthat the last ownself endsuggest our – compromising In our makesfocus hasmisplaced onourown and us motivation It – focus. a rejection – andinthe identification commitment, as phenomena reflective other and volitions second-order desires, is such self-evaluation as Thus, Frankfurtean agency – reflective built on second-order that importance. areof these desiressecondary but order second- cangenerate they that argued I anydesires. on not and their object at are directed focusing on the object of care. In other words, both caring andlove are of the first order: they implies something about caring wholehearted genuine in general: caring about is true same Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 43. Elster, Chapter2, 43-109. 261 But before I sketch this view, let me look at Elster concept of By-products morea bit By-products concept of me atElster let look view, this Isketch But before love. and caring with genuine desires caninterfere itsecond-order seems Now, that He also mentions two typical mistakes people make in connection with suchstates. with inconnection make people mistakes mentions twotypical Healso which refers to the case in which people explain the presence of a state as “the 262 – since itis a state that is essentially a by-product. Sour Grapes moral fallacy of by-products moralfallacyof 259 he devotes a chapter to this concept. He begins the Hebegins concept. tothis achapter he devotes 151 , which refers to the case when people intellectual fallacy 260 And he CEU eTD Collection As we know it from his diary, Stendhal was obsessed with “the idea of history.lifeis from other Stendhal’s the insomnia; taken –isthecaseof mentioned already I –as of them one states, such of examples two discusses Elster by-products. essentially are 265 264 263 showlearn my to indifference”. solve theproblem by maxim: the followingadopting “I shall be certain succeed if to only I himself to tried Stendhal its forit prevents occurrence. aconcern issince it that precisely be to need is a there enough, Strangely trying. of lack the and of byspontaneity is the become natural characterized since intentionally being natural, state be willed”: cannot what of“willing case isThis aparadigmatic result of are the rather, they but performed actions certain of any by-products the not are simply,put it they agency. To our of features general but of ours of of the action a single such; not of agencyas our states aretheby-product some that say to better be might it Rather, state. the about bring thus and perform simply of wecan They which foreseen asingleaction not consequences by-products. essentially are performingby about brought beeasily action can an is,foreseen of consequences example. That the given action.for being state by of caneasilyachievethe tired, of consequences exercising One an action. But foreseen caseof the israther This hasin mind. what Elster is not this However, (exercising). the case is action is of our stateof beingaby-product the tired that This wouldtired. suggest radically statedifferent is a by-product. For example, one exercises in order to be healthy, notbecause of getting desired given the which of we perform, that isaction with acertain there that suggests of actions” the states that are Quoted by Elster, 45. 44. Elster, see Farber, Leslie from phrase this takes Elster Ibid., 44 (italics in the original). To show what exactly this means, letme look at two paradigm examples of states that Before I go on, let me clarify one point: Elster’s term, “states that are the by-products 265 But, as Elster notes, this concept is “contradictory in is “contradictory this concept notes, as Elster But, 152 the way we perform our actions indifferent 264 one cannot intelligently, cannot one becoming natural about being natural, being about . ”. 263 CEU eTD Collection 267 266 be to has indifference this following: consciousness important falling focusing asnot Now, mostthe point on asleep. is here the indifference of astate as them be characterized can of Both loss of consciousness. is gradual the it in of sleep and case is it inspontaneity natural being of case reach a state: to certain desired managementmethods. What seems to be the upshot of this discussion that there is a condition emphasizediscuss Iwillnotjustbring Iwould his likesuch to in to only arguments; states. detail about that whether they occur or not. Elsterthey discusses in detail technologies self-managementof devised pointmercy all;at weareat bringabout them we cannot it seems that Thus, indirectly. or directly to a strong skepticism from desiredoccurring. state beingwork natural. either; Faking faking cannot itself is an activity the will that prevent towards with abovein connection as noted reason work for the same again,cannot but this indifferent, thebring itself itto interferesabout withits occurrence. efficacyhe sincehis willless so, chancehehasthat attempt fall asleep,the do to tries more someone of such self- terms” action. As we have seen, Frankfurt argues argues that Frankfurt have seen, we action. As be state. it; genuinely has to in one such an indifferent indifferent trick the butElster process work either: thinks thatthisbe cannot has one to at to faketry sameindifference the onemight to time. beindifferent Perhaps and intentionally Ibid., 45-46 Ibid., 45. 266 Now, Elster thinks that we cannot bring about statesbring Elsterare essentiallywe cannot by-products Now, that thinks about that Elster’s other paradigm example of a state that is essentially a by-product is sleep: the This has animportantdiscussion and surprising consequence for aFrankfurtian theory , since being indifferent implies a lack of intentionality, so one cannot act intentionality, cannot lack soone impliesof a indifferent , since being , notjustpretend thatis. one : spontaneity as the lack of a concern with what one should do and the loss of genuine 153 . One cannot fake it or command oneself to have reflective reflective self-evaluation 267 A strategy would be to appear to be is necessary for is necessary genuinely CEU eTD Collection 15, No. 1 (Winter 1986), 93. 268 aren’t there that true not is it intentionally, achieve simply with interferes agency. control that second-order is itconscious, andsometimes be agents, effective to in order we need that indifference a big enemy of itisatindifferencehe However, not dubswantonness. all indifference isalways that obvious agency. As Elster’sbiggest enemy examples of full-blownsome kind of second-order self-control over ourmotivation. In other words, for Frankfurt, the show,agency seemssometimes tobeing aperson having freedom and will,the of thatit which issuggests exercise necessary to be indifference, it is orprecisely at least a special a typetype of of management strategy. Rather, they are the symptom of a volitional disorder which asaself- we butineffective they are important, cannot ultimately desires are second-order this role misguided. volitions In are our we lack integrity and that that opposite: awareof the make us volitions are in place and our that willintegrated fact thatour is the awareof make desires can us Second-order as in the case of a wholehearted agent. forSelf-Management 7.3 AMethod But in less lucky cases they completely. jeopardized not is self-control and self-management of possibility the Thus, desires). second-order claim that we can reach this kindand I will whichisbased onopennessRather, self-trust natural and arather attitude describe of attitude by forming certainwill method,itissuggest abutintended not bemethod of asophisticated to psychosurgery. kind of beliefs (rather than “sufficiently methods reached sophisticated through of psychosurgery”. canbe states these that argues Healso states. certain desirable bring about all at to methods no thereare true that notis strong; it is too conclusion Elster’s arguesthat DonaldC. Hubin See Hubin, Donald C., “Of Bindings and By-Products: Elster on Rationality”, Nevertheless, Elster’s claim is too strong. Though there are states that we cannot that states are Though there strong. is too claim Elster’s Nevertheless, 154 any methods to reach them at all. Philosophyand Public Affairs 268 In the last section I CEU eTD Collection oneself as someone who is capable of having the “desired desires”. I argued in my I argued “desiredis the desires”. of having assomeone capable oneself who we are. Rather, who of constitutive are which desires of whatset a postulating by weimpossible needself-change positive is a certainmakes belief Such kind essence. volitional or ofmotivational a have we openness, that belief is the desires that is, one should “install” “remove” first-order or to above strategy indirectusingobstacle this biggest to understand 2)they spontaneously willor can prevent their I occurrence. spontaneous the argue that desires can things:maketwo they some for first-order to occur eitheritdo can 1) possible – not in placeor are they beliefs – whether our However, its occurrence. with can interfere on agency.effect our bein wanting Notoriously, examples, Elster’s as something to casethe person. tobecoming abetter capable he is believe that to has person was abetter he that wishes who person andthe himself about wisheshimself that believe hecaredmore has about heiscapableto that of caring more having those desires at which one’s second-order desires are directed. That is, the person who volitionalsymptom Rather, one disorder. simplyshoulda of arethe earlier desires, which,asIclaimed second-order depend notour on strategy does first-order relevant the have not he does that sense the in a wish is it – often more desires,things kind do to want at least not in the robust,have acceptthem. wejust to that action-guidingfixed desires are it case and is the our that not a belief that openness, needcertain of kind a form. somehowIn the part of our nature, that they are constitutivesuch of our personal identity. Instead, we cases are thesome desires give that belief to upthe needis, we that essence, we havevolitional a that right we need asIarguedin is Wegive last something chapter. the different, needto belief up the What therapeutic. casesarenot in desires unhappy of cure with Second-order helpthem. the We saw in the earlier section that our second-order desires might have anegative have might desires second-order our that section in We earlier the saw or himself more, care about to – something he wanted that wishes someone When 155 believe that one is one that capable of CEU eTD Collection based on forming beliefs of a certain kind and directing one’s attention in a particular way. in aparticular attention one’s directing and kind a certain of beliefs forming on based pessimistic view on agency. not necessarilyBut involve a dark, does happens thissuch one careabout. what viewon to One can employ a certainalso seems implyto that one’stype values, and alsohow one evaluates one’s own self alsoof depend cognitive strategy,that in turnwhich this is is what determinesDoes not it imply thatwhat after all, peoplethey happen to carewill or not to care endabout certain up things,doing? andview onagency? pessimistic dark, a agency imply too caring to relevance of the on theory What is more, this theory not the leftDoes inare we situation? with What this motivation way. this first-order generate first-order caring, genuine more Iwanttohaverobust, The isin thisstrategy self-defeating. above, some cases the less chance I have to develop it. Thus itdoes not want to fightis his addiction enough not(which he wishes he wanted to do more). possiblehe and badly) so do to want he didn’t he wishes (which badly to drug the take to installwants addict or unwilling the example, For do. to wanted he he wishes thing the do to want not does one and do to want not did he he wishes thing do the to wants one disorder, volitional a from suffers when in in section someone first AsIdefineditof chapter, this action. the desire effective make this enough to himself sufficiently care about he not does recognize that yethe might and livehealthy way in to a more he wanted wish that might someone example, sense). For forms second-order desireshaving motivation without inleast first-order (at robustthe desires. managementcan beliefsbe forming offorming basedinstead developed on second-order our disposal: at tool effective an is There impossible. are self-management and self-control that imply to to have formnot does this but control voluntary our under not is about our care we what that dissertation beliefs in a particular way. A theory of self-control and self- Can wehandle desires? as situations As byformingindicated this second-order one I In cases of volitional disorder, as for example the case of the unwilling addict, one 156 CEU eTD Collection nothing bad about hisbelief, whether or notit is correct. But the addict’s case is different. He his actions are determinedfor example if somebody thinksby that his lovefor his childrenit, is central to his identity and thatand that he cannot but do what is good beliefs. certain forforming by motivation own our them, over control there is self- of deal great a have can we and be different can desires our that recognize also Wewill them. to attribute we that power the have not do they that realize also we essence, volitional fixed a of part necessarily not desires are our that most? Once werealize care about to happen concern for his own self is not. But what if he realizes that what ifherealizes But not. is self for hisown concern the addictexample, this In simply self-management. of obstacle an is essence motivational stable less or believesmore that hiswe havea believe that to motivation. Now, first-order of relevant occurrence desirespontaneous for the drug simplyis central does notto carehis aboutidentity,all the way to action, thathimself is, to taking the drug. Besides,and enoughthe addict mightthat also believe desire tothat druginthe totake hismind,he givesit anda letsit he power, him overcome andmove him change himself; the of presence the increases andhebe that will most, result the about cares he this iswhat that this belief prevents point the histo part of identity important an become has substance addictive for the his desire the motivational or volitional essence. That is, when for example the addict believes that after all, indirect control youover desires, while preservingtheir spontaneity. you desirecapableof having Thisway, are a first-order possible. of degree of acertain occurrence spontaneous the make you thing, right the wanting of capable are you that believe you spontaneously. occur If first-order desireto for relevant the makes itpossible way that capable of For effective self-management, the only thing we need is that the agent believes that he is Of course, in positive cases it makes no sense to question the power of love, of caring or question power makes nosenseto the it in cases Of positive course, Now, the biggest obstacle to using this strategy effectively is the belief that we have a caringsomething about in deepthe and sense direct is ablehis to in attention a 157 there is no such thing there isnosuch that we CEU eTD Collection makes it possible to preserve their preserve it spontaneity. possible makes to that desires our over control having of way subtle is a It self-control. second-order tight isnot It others. some of occurrence spontaneous the prevent and desires some of occurrence permit spontaneous the that circumstances create beliefs, wecan forming Through ourselves. we canchange which use adifferentstrategy we can through as Isuggested, try to But control True,wecannotand self-management. something. simply start tocareaboutdecide to self- about involve skepticism necessarily not view does bya acaring-based merely decision, achieve itmightwe cannot think and that we as aresult by-products essentially thatare states more desirenottotakethedrug probable.make of hea spontaneous occurrence can, the andhimself thereby more about care drugand the totake not concern a contrary developing of heisit capable and tothat heattributes havepower not the drugdoes the take to desire believing that itwe makedoes behave itit as really Thedid. addict should thinkthat his itby be toadesire, it but If need because has suchanirresistible not power, surrenders one about or not. If we simply attribute a power to our desires, we simply let them use it over us. As a result of such insight, he might realize that heis notat mercy of what he happens careto essence? an such have not he does that he realizes if What essence? volitional his constitute simply realizes that he is notidentical histo strong desire drinkto in the sense that it does not overcome him,he will end up if,taking the whatdrug. But in amoment insight, of this addict feels this drugthathethe hisLetting himselfbeingsimplyreduced to desire. desireto might think that after all, he To conclude, though To conclude,first-order though desires andthusdeepcaringElster’s aresimilarto is an he feel mightaddict; by sooverwhelmed his totake desire 158 CEU eTD Collection order desires but belongs tothe first order. Ihave also been arguing that this particular ability inor words, in other personal values.our in Caring this senseconstituted is by not second- about, inwe care what is rooted our reflectivity creatures, wearereflective Though supposed. as Frankfurt as centrally important is not reflectivity second-order of significance the reasons, desires. During the course of this dissertation I havebeen trying argueto thatfor anumber of form second-order itis, ability to requiresthe that reflectivity, care about things requires to ability the Frankfurt, For them. between relation andthe their definition as regards Frankfurt from differ but basic statement, about this I agree together. andconnected related closely things. grasp his ideasframework in one single to interpret justicestatement: tohis the richnessdo concepts to impossible is it simplification, such with of course, humanOf Harry agency. human and life human for andG. Frankfurt’s thebeings complex work. However,are relation This keywords:reflective arounddissertation two reflectivity centered and their caring, and relevance I tried to follow between this simple andthem theyand I triedcare toabout These two abilities are centrally important for human life and agency as such. Also, such. as agency and life human for important centrally are abilities two These Conclusion 159 CEU eTD Collection 271 270 269 Elster puts it, “getting it right”. attempt to create a genuine work of art. If in endthe of hemanages impressto hisit audience, will beart. theby-product of his That is, the constant aimframework”. of the artist has to be, as by created a technical discipline within the experience of human aspect convey specific some “to condense which is intentionalis and action,choices of guided byapurpose”, an aseries focuses problemthe on of choice andintention inart. self-control. second-order a art that type of similar to a do which ismoreI suggested more that, way to subtle strategy. Rather, a self-management volitions of the agent. Though they are revealing in these cases, they cannot be used as part of notsomethingcasesare they thesymptom positive,rather, but a deepproblemwith of the Insuch addict. caseof unwilling the cases,asinthe classic in unhelpful certain particularly order caring, but I hope I have shown that the latter is deeper and more significant. able to fully discuss the complex and problematic relationshipbetween reflectivity andfirst- important issues as I tried to show in the last chapter. raises this and thing; particular the about really caring desires without havesecond-order I am aware that I might not have been manifestations of something deeper: desires bethe second-order desiressecond-order can caring. reflective Our develop and what we care about most sensein have we careaboutis first-order reason we why thingsthe inthe Thefactthat desires. life. Of course, one might – tocareabout evaluation first-order things inthe senseof is second-order thebasis – our of Ibid. Ibid, 77. Elster, 77-86. In one of the sections of his chapter on states that are essentially by-products, Elster by-products, essentially are that states on hischapter of sections of the In one be can desires second-order that argued I dissertation the of end the Towards 270 An attempt to impress the audience distracts the artist from purpose artistfrom distracts the impress real the to Anattempt audience the 271 160 269 He thinks that “making a work of art CEU eTD Collection involve a second-order process; on the contrary, a second-order concern with his concern process; first-order a second-order with involve contrary, asecond-order on the lifemanages toexpress an aspect of inbeing his notand However, experience. control does and goal his fulfills he when case in the not especially actions, his of in control not is artist say the We that cannot last inchapter. sketch the I tried to of self-management method 274 273 272 contrary, they can be a symptom of a volitional disorder. order desiressecond-order desire, the less chance I have that it will.As I argued in the last chapter, second-cannot spontaneously develop anddisappear; but morethe happen Iwantthis forming to through a be used desires can First-order effectively spontaneity. facilitate not do themselves desires second-order as part of spontaneity and thus inspiration. a self-managementirrational to survey all the possibilities because of their large number, it would also kill strategy;inspiration; is, thereis that need fora acertainkindspontaneity. of only Not wouldbe it onartist choose then? Obviously,the this is what artistic giftis good for. There is a need for artistic would not this be alternatives; rational,the among directly choosing about talk cannot we that stresses “forhe However, there are just too may possibilities to survey”. creation: artistic his illustrate viewon Elster to workLet mequote a feasible with.to to befirst set reduced to notes or brushes of paint. Initially,“an infinity is there of possible configurations” Ibid. Ibid, 79. Ibid, 78 Instead of second-order control, second-order of Instead On the basis of my discussion of second-order desires and caring, it seems thatunits. choosing within feasible the setsome reduced configuration specific of elementary by his proper, giftexercisehas creative he to Secondly, additional constraints. First, the artistmust cut down the feasible set to a more manageable size, byimposing his Whenreducehastoward artist works musicalof ahuge he goal, words, the set to 273 art might be a good model for agency and for the 161 274 How does the does How 272 that has that CEU eTD Collection do not take do nottake ourselves seriously. too genuinely be the person we would wish to be. Thus, sometimesself-control and acertain typewe of openness willas well:belief a and self-trustget that after all,it wecan right when we tightexercisingfor not too us.Thisrequires and desiresorder work develop spontaneously itisfirst- letting desires;process of thedelicate desired But have order a desiredwe desires. we have to know what kind of a personrole. still processes have Sometimes Second-order animportant tooccur. desires” “desired we wish to be, that is, sometimes from first-order processes our and we lackwill also opennessmakes it that possible for the we form second- agency and motivational control,processes second-order through be spontaneity will missing seriously, be not get wewill able itto That right. is, much when involvedwe aretoo inour When takeourselves (too) we incompatible. mutually phrases in are two title Perhaps the the It Right his TannerLectures, In the title of improve one’s skills. always can one and be cultivated always can art But others. than life for talented and gifted relevant spontaneous motivation to develop. This raises the problem that some might be more for the makesitpossible of that openness type means weneedacertain in this action general, In caseof agent. tobeasuccessful in order becomeinspired to needs also thatone argued which we is express.This trying to itway he makes possible tobecome inspired.Itcould be this meansfocusing his on goal and being the particular open to experience oraspectoflife case artist’s the In place. in are beliefs agent’s the only that control, involveto second-order processes might be an obstacle to accomplish the goal at hand. Being in control does not have When the artist is able to let his inspiration work for him, he will be “getting it right”. it “getting be will he him, for work inspiration his let to is able artist the When , Frankfurt uses the very same expression. But when will we be able to get it right? 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