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The Routledge Companion to Free Will
Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith, Neil Levy
Reasons-Responsive Theories of Freedom
Publication details https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315758206.ch3 Michael McKenna Published online on: 29 Nov 2016
How to cite :- Michael McKenna. 29 Nov 2016, Reasons-Responsive Theories of Freedom from: The Routledge Companion to Free Will Routledge Accessed on: 29 Sep 2021 https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315758206.ch3
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The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 14:01 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315758206, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315758206.ch3 instance, justbecausethevery mentionofgermscauseshimtothinkhorribledirty related tohisoverallgoals and projectsasasaneperson.Hedoesnotwashthem, for reasons towashthem,asinkeepingwithhis dandy ways,thesemanyreasonsarestill risk seriousharmtohimself justtowashhishands,andwhilehedoesfi ndlotsofgood with thefullrangeofreasons animatinghowheacts.Dandy, forinstance,wouldnot reasonsnotto,buthis hand-washing isstillwell-integratedhis hands andfewgood hygiene.Thus,hefimost normalpeoplewithgood nds commitment tokeephishands(andtherestofhim) superclean—farmoresothan very clean,well-groomedappearance.Assuch,Dandy mighthaveanidiosyncratic wash hishandsfreely. suggests thatHandyisnotincontrolofhishandwashing inastableway. Sohedoesnot reasonsisnotproperlyintegratedwithwhatleadshimtoaction.Thisinturn of good when theyaredirty, itis ous gas).Whatthissuggestsisthat,insituation, when Handywasheshishands in thecircumstancesonlywayforhimtowashhishands requiresbreathingpoison- dirty, doingsowouldresultinhisbeingseriouslyinjured(suppose forsomereasonthat one withinearshothadwhisperedtheword‘germ,’orevenif,whenhishandsweretruly washed themiftheywerecleanandhejustsawagarbagetruckdownthestreet,some- they weredirtyornotinresponsetoanynumberofwhackyreasons.Hewouldhave his hands.Butasithappens,Handywouldhavewashedhandsatthetimewhether reasontowash so freelyandthatthisconsistsinhisrespondingappropriatelytoagood day andwashesthem.Itmightbetemptingtothinkthatinwashinghishands,hedoes extreme compulsivehand-washingdisorder. SupposeHandy getshishandsdirtyone Consider a familiarcaseofunfreeaction:anagent,Handy, washeshishandsfroman cast intermsoftheoriesthecontrolconditionformoralresponsibility. tion(s) necessaryformoralresponsibility, reasons-responsive theoriesarealsofrequently of reasons.Becausemanytheoristsunderstandfreewillintermsthecontrolcondi- tivity toreasons.Anagentwhoactsfreelyisresponsive Reasons-responsive theoriesoffreedomexplainfreeagencyintermsanagent’s sensi- Contrast HandywithDandy. Dandyisabitof‘dandy.’ Heenjoysfancydressanda THEORIES OFFREEDOM THEORIES REASONS-RESPONSIVE Reasons-Responsiveness: AnInitialCharacterization fortuitous reason.Therole thathedoes soinresponsetoagood ihe McKenna Michael 3 lots reasonsforwashing ofgood variation inasuitablespectrum
Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 14:01 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315758206, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315758206.ch3 causal processesconsist.) cult inthesecontextstonaildownjustwhatnon-deviant asopposedtodeviant that involveshiscontrollingaction.Asreadersmight suspect,itisextremelydiffi - was notintentional.Here,hedoesrespondtoreasons,but notthroughacausalprocess must letgoofarope.Thethoughtsounnerveshimthat hedoesso,butinawaythat famous caseduetoDonaldDavidson[1963]ofaclimber whorealizesthattosurvivehe action isfamiliartothosewhoworkonthetheoryof action. To illustrate,considera (The issueof to beafl ukeoranunreliableoccasionforhimtogiveexpressionhiscompulsion. an appropriatelyrationalone,andsoisinthiswaynot freedom-conferring.Itislikely the actualcauseofhishandwashing,itisbywayadeviantcausalprocessthatnot ology leadingtohisactofhandwashing.To theextentthathisdirtyplansarepartof hands donotevenplaytherightsortofroleasareasonforhimthatisparteti- sphere ofhislife.Whenhewashesdirtyhands,thereisreasontothinkthat Handy, bycontrast,appearstobedrivenlargelyhiscompulsion, atleastinthis evidence thatDandyis‘wired’intherightway.degree ofreasons-sensitivityisgood playing aproperroleinhisactofhandwashing.Thisispartbecauseadequate related tohisrationalabilitiesasanagentandthatthesefunctionwellin because theyaredirty, wehavereasontothinkthatthereasons forhand-washingare hisfreedomonthespectrumof reasonstowhichheisresponsive. to model In thisway, heisnot them justbeforetendingtohistoddler’s breakfast,butwheninahurryhefailstodoso. even heisabitrecklessanddoesnotwashthem.Forinstance,perhapsshould reasons,thereareafewoccasionswhere often wouldwashhishandsinresponsetogood which Dandywould responsibility. NowconsiderDandy. Supposethatthereissomerangeofreasonsto the basisforhisbeingfreeinanycrediblesensethatwouldbearonwillandmoral just thatthe was onfi reandhewereabouttobeincinerated,wouldforgo washinghishands.Itis was threateningtokillHandy’s childifHandywashedhis hands,orifHandy’s house him nottowashhishandscompulsivelyinsomesituations.If,forinstance,amurderer as unfreeinhishandwashingeveniftherewassomesliverofreasonsthatwouldget action mustinvolvetheagent’s reasons-responsiveresources. and thisspectrumcomesin involves anagent’s controlinrelationtoaspectrumofpotentialbutnon-actualreasons, responsive theory. First,tounderstandfreedomintermsofreasons-responsiveness his handsfreely, Dandydoes. Handy wasinandsoDandywasheshishands.Itseemsthatwhiledoesnotwash thoughts. Suppose,likeHandy, Dandydirtieshishandsinasituationmuchliketheone (about bothfreewillandmoral responsibility).Buttheappealofareasons-responsive In recenttimes, reasons-responsivetheoriesareadvancedmostlybycompatibilists Now considerthematterofactualcausalprocess.WhenDandywasheshishands To explain,considerfi rstthematterofdegree.NotethatHandywouldberegarded The casesofHandyandDandysuggesttworelatedfeaturesacrediblereasons- range ofreasonstowhichHandywouldberesponsiveistoolimited Reasons-Responsiveness andtheCompatibilism vs. deviant asopposedto not beresponsivebutshouldbe,evenbyhisownlights.Whilehe perfectly reasons-responsive.Stillheisreasons-responsive enough degrees . Second,the Incompatibilism Debate MICHAEL MCKENNA non-deviant of causalprocessesintheproduction 28 actual causalprocesses issuinginfree Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 14:01 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315758206, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315758206.ch3 of distinguishing between kinds of causes of actions, some of which are freedom-defeating of distinguishingbetweenkinds ofcausesactions,somewhicharefreedom-defeating over, bydoingso,reasons-responsive theoristsdevelopafamiliarcompatibiliststrategy assign aspecialroletotheagent quarationalbeingasthesourceofheraction.More- ingly abletodrawjustupon farmoremundaneresources.Nevertheless,theseresources so forincompatibilists.Reasons-responsive compatibilisttheories,however, areseem- ment ofindeterminismmight includethenotionofagent-causation.Thisisespecially appeal torestrictiveviewsaboutthemetaphysicsinvolved, whichalongwitharequire- is amatterofshowingthatanagenttherightkind of sourceheractions.Many One ofthemajorburdensanytheoryfreedom—compatibilist orincompatibilist— she freelypreformsarecausedintherightwaybyresources thataredistinctiveofpersons. theories helptoshowhowitisthat,whenanagent reasons-responsive, theactions to theactualworld,thatpastisabitdifferent. postulate non-actualbutpossiblereasonsinvolveantecedents thatpresuppose,relative were herpast(orthelaws)justabitdifferentthanthey were.Counterfactualsthat the lawsofnature.Determinismissilentasregardstruths abouthowanagentwouldact what isphysicallypossibleforanagentgivenherexactactualpastandthetotalityof at thetimeanagentactedshewasdetermined.Why?Determinismisathesisabout of action.Thesepropositionsarenotinanywayinconsistentwiththeassumptionthat have actedhadcertainreasonsbeensalientthatwerenotinheractualcontext explained (evenifnotreducedto)asetofcounterfactualsabouthowanagentwould to whichshe reasons: Nelkin 2013;McKennaVihvelin 2013;Sartorio, forthcoming) Herearetwo 2003; Wolf 1990;FischerandRavizza1998;Haji Nelkin2011;Brinkand ibilists optedforareasons-responsivetheory?(See,example,Dennett1984, cognition.) the philosophicalquestionofwhatapersonisaswellempiricalquestionsaboutanimal existing non-humanprimatesandothermammalsarepersons.Naturally, thisturnson Replicants inthefi lm I assumethefi ctionalnon-humancharacter Datafrom can befoundinrationalcapacitiesuniquetopersons. the freedomavailabletopersons(skepticalworriesaside),thenitisplausiblethatthis of freedom.Butifoneseeksatheoryfreedomthatexplainswhatisdistinctiveabout their environments.Assuch,thereisaclearsenseinwhichtheypossesscertainkind coyotes, areuncontroversiallyabletoexerciseaconsiderableamountofcontrolover of agentswiththecapacityforsophisticatedgoal-directedactivity, suchastitmiceor accounting forfreedomintermsoffeaturesagencythataredistinctive aside, thecontemporaryappealofareasons-responsivetheoryisinpartmatter of duty—asaconditionformoralityactuallyapplyingtopersons.Historicalorigins required somethinglikereasons-responsiveness—beingabletotrackreasonsinsupport a wayofexplaininghowmanisrationalanimal.AnditplausibletothinkthatKant Some (e.g.,Irwin1980)contendthatAristotleadvancedareasons-responsivetheoryas the metaphysicalproblemsassociatedwithworriesaboutdeterminismorindeterminism. theory isnotlimitedtocompatibilists;itsmeritsextendbeyondanyhavingdowith Second, asnotedwhenrefl ectingonthecasesofDandyandHandy, reasons-responsive First, anagent’s reasons-responsivenessisestablishedintermsoftherangereasons What oftheappealforcompatibilists?Whyhavesomanycontemporary compat- (I takeittobeanopenquestionwhichcreatures—actualandpossible—arepersons. would beresponsiveatthetimeinwhichsheacts.Thisturncan REASONS-RESPONSIVE THEORIES OFFREEDOM REASONS-RESPONSIVE THEORIES Bladerunner . Moreover, itisnotincrediblethatmanyactually 29 Star Trek isaperson,asarethe . Lots persons . Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 14:01 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315758206, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315758206.ch3 freedom todootherwise let uscallthissortofcompatibilism include Frankfurt[1971],McKenna[2013]andSartorio [forthcoming].)Inthischapter, defense ofit(1998).(Othercompatibilistsadvancing asourcecompatibilistthesis compatibilism , andalongwithhiscoauthor MarkRavizza,hasofferedthemostsustained the freedomtodootherwiseisnot.JohnMartinFischer (1994)callsthisthesis a compatibilistconclusion. appealing tocompatibilists.Thesefeaturesaidthecompatibilists,buttheydonotentail was simplytoshowcasethesimplefeaturesthatmakereasons-responsivetheories located) tocementalibertarianthesis(e.g.,seeGinet2006).Thepointofthissection bilist’s proposalandthensimplyaddafurtherrequirementofindeterminism(suitably responsive view. Theymight,forinstance,takeonthemajorelementsinacompati- incompatibilists seekingtodevelopalibertariantheoryoffreedomadoptreasons- general appealofreasons-responsivetheories,itshouldbeemphasizedthatisopento so on)theagentisnotreasons-responsive. actions arefreedom-defeating(compulsion,psychosis,phobia,coercion,delusion,and and othersthatarenot.Inawiderangeofconditionsinwhichthecausesanagent’s responsibility? sort thatmattersformoralresponsibility. Whatofthefreedom that then advanceFrankfurt’s argumenttoshowthatthefreedom todootherwiseisnotthe the soundnessofConsequenceArgument—perhaps Berofsky 2012),othershaveinsteadseenthatwithFrankfurt’s argument,theycangrant (e.g., Lewis1981;Horgan1985,2015;Campbell1997;Kapitan2002;Vihvelin 2004,2013; many ablecompatibilistshaveattemptedtorefutetheConsequenceArgument law ofnature,neitherwhich,itseems,anordinaryhumanpersoncando.While minism, apersonisabletodootherwiseonlyifshealterthepastorviolate Wiggins, 1973;vanInwagen1975,1983),hasitthat,undertheassumptionofdeter- do otherwise.Thisincompatibilistargument,theConsequenceArgument(Ginet1966; bilist argumentfortheconclusionthatifdeterminismistrue,noagenthasabilityto benefi otherwise. Frankfurt’s argumentforthisconclusion,ifsound, wouldbeofconsiderable is requiredformoralresponsibilitydoesnotincludetheability(andsofreedom)todo for compatibilistswhoalsodefendHarryFrankfurt’s (1969) thesisthatthefreedom One importantdetailaboutreasons-responsivetheoriesisthattheyposespecialpuzzles one, ShootSmith,truncated justforthepurposesofourpresentdiscussion: Frankfurt’s argumentconsidertheexamplesmotivatingthatargument.Hereisasimple freedom and So astoavoidanymisimpressions,andinkeepingwithmyearlierremarksaboutthe To appreciatewhyitisthatreasons-responsivetheoristshavetroubleaccepting that Joneswouldnotshoot Smith,BlackwouldcauseJones(maybebydirect on hisown.ButBlackarranges thingssothat,ifthereisanyreasontothink to Jones,BlackwantsJones toshootSmithandwouldpreferthatJonesdoso Jones seeks toshootSmith,whichhedoesonhisown.Asit happens,unknown t tocompatibilists, sinceitwouldallowthemtosidestepapowerfulincompati- Reasons-Responsiveness andFrankfurt’s Attackonthe leeway freedom. That freedom,itcanbeargued, leeway compatibilism . Andcallthetwosorts offreedom Freedom toDoOtherwise MICHAEL MCKENNA source compatibilism andthesortthatrequires 30 is compatiblewithdeterminismevenif just forthesakeofargument—but is requiredformoral source semi- Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 14:01 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315758206, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315758206.ch3 Why? It in aFrankfurtexample,itcannotbeaccountedfortermsofreasons-responsiveness. striking problem.Itlooksonitsfaceasif,whateversortoffreedomanagentdoespossess noted above,andsoendorseFrankfurt’s argument.These sourcecompatibilistsfacea Butotherreasons-responsivecompatibiliststakeadvantageofthedialectical 2013). b instead buildareasons-responsivetheoryofleewayfreedom(e.g.,Nelkin2011;Vihvelin regarded ashighlycontroversial.Somereasons-responsivecompatibilistsrejectitand a follows, letusrefertoBlack(oranythingplayingBlack’s roleinaFrankfurtexample)as leeway freedomisnotrequiredformoralresponsibility. Foreaseofdiscussioninwhat he lacksleewayfreedom.So,grantingthatismorallyresponsible,itappears In theexampleShootSmith,Jonesexercisessourcefreedom,yetduetoBlack’s presence, distinguish betweenan agent’s ownactually-operativereasons-responsivemechanism ofaction.Thatis,they bilists bydistinguishingbetweenanagent’s reasons-responsiveness andinsteadan theory? leeway example. Doesthismeanreasons-responsivecompatibilistsareforcedtodefenda theory offreedomappearsill-suitedforthefoundina(successful)Frankfurt does whensheactsonherownforthereasonsactuallyhas.Hence,a reasons-responsive otherwise. Thecounterfactual intervenerwouldseetothatbycausingheractasshe given differentreasonstodootherwise,shewouldnotrespondotherwisebyacting agent’s call thatcausalprocess,oratleasttheinternalstatesofagentin causal processthatledtotheagentactingasshedidwhenactedonherown.Just erwise, giventhepresenceofcounterfactualintervener. Butnowconsidertheactual responsive becauseshewouldnotrespondotherwisetodifferentreasonsbyactingoth- According toFischerandRavizza,anagentinaFrankfurtexampleisnotreasons- and individuatemechanisms onefromtheother(McKenna2001).Canwe be theory (Ginet2006).Finally, others raisemorespecifi cworriesabouthowtoidentify 2001). Othersclaimthatthe postulationofmechanismsdoesnotdoanyworkin the 1997). Someobjectthatitis justnotclearwhatamechanismissupposedtobe(Watson terms ofagentsresponding toreasonsratherthanintermsofmechanisms(Wallace of objections.Somecontend thatitiscounterintuitiveandbettertotheorize in reasons-responsiveness intermsofmechanismsratherthan agentsgivesrisetoarange join areasons-responsivetheorytosourcecompatibilism, itcomesatacost.Explaining compatibilism bywayofamechanism-basedreasons-responsive theoryofsourcefreedom. were hermechanismlefttofunctiononitsown.Thus, FischerandRavizzaadvance Then wecandeterminehowtheagentwouldactbyway ofhermechanismaction however, requiresthatwe‘factorout’thepresenceofcounterfactualintervener. which itisallowedtofunctionunimpededinthepresence ofdifferentreasons.This, differently toreasons.Butwecanonlyrunthistestbyconsidering possiblesituationsin reasons-responsive, wewillhavetotestthatbyconsidering whether counterfactual intervener. Frankfurt’s argumentandtheexamplesheusedtoadvanceit,likeShootSmith,are Fischer and Ravizza(1998)attempttogetaroundthisproblemforsourcecompati- While FischerandRavizza’s mechanism-basedproposal offers aningeniouswayto never intervenes.Hethusremainsonlyacounterfactualintervener. manipulation ofhisbrain)toshootSmith.SinceJonesactsonown,Black mechanism ofaction . Ifwefocusuponjustthismechanismandthenaskif seems thatanagentinaFrankfurtexampleis REASONS-RESPONSIVE THEORIES OFFREEDOM REASONS-RESPONSIVE THEORIES agent-based anda 31 mechanism-based reasons-responsive theory. not reasons-responsive.Ifshewere it wouldrespond enefi ts is it Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 14:01 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315758206, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315758206.ch3 decides toshootSmithand thatheissuitablyreasons-responsive.Amongthereasons acting asshedoes.To explain,supposeJonesisnotinaFrankfurt examplewhenhe If so,thentheabsenceofcertain reasonscanbepartofthe causation andreliesuponthe thesisthatabsencescanbecauses(orinsteadquasi-causes). developed byCarolinaSartorio (forthcoming).Sartorioturnstothemetaphysics of not manifestitselfinher Frankfurt example heractionsasaresultofownreasons.Inthisway,she produced anagentevenina in whichtheintervenertakesover, she that), buttheagentwouldnotactasshedoes anagentwouldnot reasons, siveness eveninaFrankfurtexampleasfollows:while inthepresenceofdifferent dormant? Ihaveargued(McKenna2013)thatwecanmake senseofanagent’s respon- reasons byactingdifferentlythanshedoeswhenthecounterfactual intervenerremains even if,weredifferentreasonsputtotheagent,agent wouldnotrespondtothose source compatibilisttoclaimthatanagentinaFrankfurtexampleisreasons-responsive agent-based reasons-responsiveapproach?Thecrucialquestionisthis:thereawayfor way freedom. compatibilists facedearlier:agent-basedreasons-responsiveviewsappeartorequirelee- Fischer [forthcoming]forthereply.) This,however, leadsbacktotheproblemforsource should bedevelopedinagent-basedtermsratherthanmechanism-basedresources.(See for freedom intermsofresponsivenesstoreasonsshouldsurelybestandardsthe anism (subsystem)bywhichtheagentacts.Butourstandardsforassessinganagent’s the freedom-conferringresponsivenessofagenttomech- problem foranymechanism-basedaccountoffreedomisthatitwillalwaysrisklimiting thus designedtobegreaterthanthefl exibilityofthesubsystemscomposingit.The ‘switching’ toothersubsystemsthatcanthentakeover. The fl exibilityofthesystem is to allowsomesubsystems(mechanisms)rununinhibitedunlessthereisoccasionfor the systemasawhole—inthiscaseentirepersonpracticalagent—willbeable nism-based views.Anysophisticatedsystemwithsubsystemswillbedesignedsothat As Ihaveargued,Ginet’s examplerevealsageneral,structural problemwithmecha- she wouldrespondtoreasonsindeliberation,sincethisnotbeunrefl ectivehabit. have it,weholdfi xedthemechanismofunrefl ectivehabit,thenwecannotassesshow sons-sensitivity should would begivenreasontodeliberateaboutwhatotherexitsheshouldtake.Herrea- if conditionsweredifferent(aclosedroadandnootherroutessheisfamiliarwith), agent freelydriveshercardownahighwayfrommechanismofunrefl ectivehabit.But incompatible withherfreedom(McKenna2013).Forinstance,inGinet’s example,an any mechanism-basedviewriskshamstringinganagent’s responsivenessinaway his [2012:144–62]replytoWallace.) McKenna; his[2004:169–71]replytoWatson; his[2006:333,334]replytoGinet;and same mechanismweareassessing?(ForFischer’s replies,seehis[2004:166–71]replyto require (1998:39,40),andconsidertheinfl uenceofdifferent reasonsthatitisthe confi dentwhenwehold fi xedanagent’s mechanismofaction,asFischerandRavizza Yet adifferentwaytoadvanceanagent-basedreasons-responsiveapproachhasbeen Can asourcecompatibilistovercometheapparentconfl ictwithconstraints onan More recently, buildingonapointmadebyCarlGinet(2006),Ihavearguedthat agents toact—notpartsofagents.IfIamcorrect,thenreasons-responsivetheories is responsive todifferentreasons,evenifherresponsivenesswould make roomforthat.However, ifasFischerandRavizzawould acting anydifferently. act differently(thecounterfactualintervenerwouldseeto MICHAEL MCKENNA would bereactingdifferently thanshedidwhen 32 for herownreasons . Assuch,incontexts actual causeforanagent’s Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 14:01 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315758206, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315758206.ch3 was responsive to good reasons—sheactuallyactedonthem.When, ontheother was responsivetogood worthy forit,shedoesnotneed leewayfreedom,sinceinactingasshedid,clearly does. Ifanagentactsinamorally exemplarywayfortherightreasonsandispraise- try thesis:praiseworthiness doesnotrequireleewayfreedombutblameworthiness reasons whenshefailstodoso. good reasons.Herblameworthinessisthusdependentonherabilitytoactfor act forgood ments, notethatonherview, whenonedoeswrongandisblameworthy, shedoes reasonsismeanttobeneutralregardinganymetaethicalcommit- standing ofgood Wolf’s reasons.LestonethinkthatNelkin’s intermsoftheabilitytoactforgood under- intended. Evenmorerecently, DanaNelkin(2011)advancesacompatibilistviewlike the True ThecapitallettersindicatethemetaethicalcommitmentsWolf andtheGood. view, whichshecalledtheReasonView, intermsofreasonssupportof,assheputit, and actfromduty. Butinrecenttimes,SusanWolf (1990)proposed suchacompatibilist with hisrequirementthatrationalbeingsbeabletograsp theCategoricalImperative for theabilitytoactfreely. Ofcourse,awell-knownhistoricalversionofthisisKant’s, responsiveness consistsinandhowtotestforanadequatedegreeofsensitivity. moral responsibility(e.g.,Dennett1984).Butmostworkoutinsomedetailwhat suitable responsivenesstoreasonsaswouldberequiredforatheoryoffreewilland Some reasons-responsivetheoristsonlygestureinthedirectionofwhat isinvolvedin based resources(e.g.,McKenna2013;Sartorio,forthcoming). reasons-responsiveness eveninthecontextofaFrankfurtexamplebywayagent- Yet athirdalsoinvolvescommitmenttosourcecompatibilism, butseekstoexplain compatibilism andoptforamechanism-basedtheory(e.g.,FischerRavizza1998). own. AsecondstrategyistoacceptthelessonsofFrankfurt’s argument,embracesource agent retainstheuninterfered-withabilitytodootherwisewhensheisleftactonher (2011) andVihvelin (2004,2013),forinstance,arguethat inaFrankfurtexample,an Frankfurt exampleisunabletodootherwise(e.g.,Nelkin2011;Vihvelin 2013).Nelkin adopt aleewaycompatibilistthesisandrejectthecontentionthatfreeagentin compatibilists mightadoptwhenfacedwithFrankfurt’s argument. Onestrategyisto This isanelegantproposal. responsive toarangeofreasonsthatincludenotshootingSmithifhischildiswithhim. Jones wouldnothaveshotSmithonhisown.Inthisway, inactingashedoes,Smith actual causesofJones’s shootingSmith.Were thatabsencenotpartofthecausalmix, not toshootSmith(areasonthatinvolvesthepresenceofSmith’s child)isoneofthe scenario inwhichJonesacts—whenBlackremainsdormant—theabsenceofareason But grantingSartorio’s thesisaboutabsencecausation,thisremainstrue:Intheactual of thecounterfactualintervener, Black.Thisrenderstheprecedingcounterfactualfalse. that ifSmith’s childwerewithhim,JoneswouldnotshootSmith.Nowaddthe presence present.) Thus,itistrueinthiscase—becausetherenocounterfactualintervener— happens tobewithhimatthetime.(Inactualsituation,Smith’s childwasnot to whichhewouldreactdifferentlyandnotshootSmithisthereasonthatSmith’s child The Wolf-Nelkin reasons-responsiveviewgivesrisetoamuch-discussed asymme- One waytoclarifyresponsivenessisintermsofthe To summarizetheresultsofthissection,therearethreepositionsreasons-responsive Getting DowntotheNitty-GrittyDetails:Capturing REASONS-RESPONSIVE THEORIES OFFREEDOM REASONS-RESPONSIVE THEORIES the SpectrumofResponsiveness 33 content ofthereasonsthatmatter not is Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 14:01 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315758206, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315758206.ch3 the spectrumofresponsiveness requiredforfreedom.So,accordingtoFischer and Fischer andRavizzaputit, is thatitreliedexclusivelyonaquantitativeassessment of message fromMartians,and soon.TheproblemfortheGertandDugganproposal, as so, orifaSpringsteensong wasplayingontheradio,whichIwouldtakeasasecret $1,000 andover).Butsuppose alsoIwouldbemovedtolieifmypeasouptoldme do ways specifi ed(wouldnotforincentivesof$100and under andwouldforincentivesof that Iwouldnotforsomereasonsandothersbe movedtoliemybossinthe an agentwhoisnotsane,andsosuffi cientlyfree.Supposeasintheexampleabove might permitsuchastrangecollectionofpreferencesthat itwouldbeconsistentwith (1998:67,68)isthatthepatternsidentifiRavizza edassuffi cientforreasons-responsiveness present purposes. mechanism’s sensitivityandinsteadjustwriteintermsofagents.Thisisadequatefor mechanisms ofaction.Inthissection,Iwillforgoqualifying eachpointintermsofa ceding section,theyaccountforreasons-responsiveness intermsofthesensitivity I willexamineFischerandRavizza’s proposalinsomedetail.Asexplainedthepre- (1998) whodemonstratedjusthowsophisticatedthisstrategycouldbe.Inwhatfollows, $1,002, andsoon. $99, $98,andsoon.Likewise,if$1,000wouldmoveme,thenshould$1,001, move meorinsteadme.So,if$100wouldnotme,thenneithershould like-reasons fallingonascaleofdescendingandascendingstrengthshouldalsofailto would, thenmysaneresponsetosuchincentivesshouldpassaplausibletestthat instance, $100wouldnotbesuffi cienttoconvincemeliemybossbut$1,000 incentives thatwouldbesuffi cientforanagenttoactotherthanasshedoes.If, Duggan (1979)explainedreasons-responsivenessintermsofpatternsthreatsand Brink andNelkin[2013].)Inahighlyinfl uentialpaper, BernardGertand Timothy count as suitably free.Foranexampleofaviewthatjoinsthetwoapproaches,see specifi esthecontentofreasonstowhichoneshouldberesponsiveinorder of HandyandDandy).(Thisdistinctstrategyisnotincompetitionwithonethat what countsasasuffi cientpatternofresponsiveness(recallourdiscussionthecases the spectrumofresponsivenesstoshowwayreasonshangtogetherandaswell further here. The disputeremainshighlycontested.(SeeNelkin’s reply [2011].)I’llnotpursueit worthiness doesnotrequireleewayfreedomanymorethanpraiseworthinessdoes. refutes theWolf-Nelkin asymmetrythesissinceitcanbe usedtoshowthatblame- orists areasons-responsiveabilitytodootherwise.Butother the- about would not.Naturally, Wolf andNelkinresistthisresultbydefendingcompatibilism Then praiseworthinesswouldbecompatiblewithdeterminismbutblameworthiness minism isincompatiblewithleewayfreedombutnotsourcefreedom. reasons—itmakesroomforanunusualresult.Supposethatdeter-ability toactforgood about blameworthiness. Nelkin aresourcecompatibilistsaboutpraiseworthinessandleeway reasons.Thus,Wolfworthy turnsonwhethershewasabletorespondgood and hand, anagentdoeswrongandisacandidateforblameworthiness,herbeingblame- The problemwithGertandDuggan’s originalproposalaccordingtoFischerand While GertandDuggan’s suggestionshowedpromise,itwasFischerandRavizza A differentstrategyfordevelopingareasons-responsivetheoryinvolvesexplaining While theWolf-Nelkin viewisintuitiveincertainways—freedomaboutthe (e.g., FischerandRavizza1998)resist.Intheirview, Frankfurt’s argument MICHAEL MCKENNA 34 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 14:01 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315758206, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315758206.ch3 conditions foraction. require isthatanagentbeabletounderstandmoralreasonsasprovidingsuffi Nelkin dotomoresubstantivemetaethicalviewsaboutmoralityandreasons.Allthey agent beabletograspmoralreasons(1998:77–81).TheydonotcommitasWolf and of theworldthatisgroundedinreality. To thistheyalsoaddarequirementthatan party interviewerseekingtoestablishwhethertheagenthasacoherentunderstanding sensitivity isasanityconstraint,whichtheyproposeintermsofhypotheticalthird- Ravizza (1998:71–3),whatisalsoneededbeyondanadequatequantityofreasons- he washedhishands.Handy wasreactiveto Handy, whosufferedfromacompulsive handwashingdisorderandsowasunfreewhen reasonstodootherwise.Butnow recallthecaseof to reactotherwiseanygood reasontodosoprovesageneralability(ofan agent’sotherwise toonegood mechanism) reasons towhichsheisreceptive. Thatis,accordingtoFischerandRavizza,reacting that thisisenoughtoestablish thatanagentisabletoreactotherwiseanyof the such that,ifitwerepresent,theagentwouldreacttoand actotherwise.Theycontend for weakreactivityisthattheresomereasontowhich anagentisreceptivethat mere weakreactivityissuffi cientforactingfreely?AllthatFischerandRavizzarequire asymmetry. the theory. Itisforthisreasonthatareasons-responsivetheoryneedstoallowan responsible andblameworthyforwhatshedoes.That wouldcountstronglyagainst she should,thetheorywouldhaveitthatacts spectrum ofreasonstowhichsheisreceptive,thenwhen shefailstoreactasknows responsiveness forfreeandresponsibleactionisthatan agentisjustasreactivetothe to actotherwise,butinfactshedoesnotreactthem.Ifarequirementofreasons- reasons act recklesslyorsuccumbtotemptation.Insuchcases,sheisreceptivegood reasonsnottoactasshedoes.Shemight face ofreasonssheherselftakestobegood conduct. Sometimesanagentfreelydoeswhatsheknowstobemorallywronginthe receptivit limited rangeofreasons.Thus,asFischerandRavizzaputit,MRRrequires (as wellasreasonstopersistinactinghedoes),yetneedonlybereactiveavery Dandy mustbereceptivetoaconsiderablerangeofsuffi cientreasonstodootherwise previous paragraph,thedegreeofanagent’s reactivityneed not.Howso?Anagentlike receptivity hastobefairlyrobust,asisinkeepingwiththeconditionsspecifi ric betweenthereceptivityandreactivitycomponents.Whereasdegreeof nating developmentofit. have alsorelieduponthisdistinction,drawingmostlyfromFischerandRavizza’s illumi- theorists (e.g.,BrinkandNelkin2013;McKennaKozuch2016); draws asimilardistinctionindevelopingherview(1990),andotherreasons-responsive distinction appearstobeimplicitinKant’s conceptionof moralfreedom.SusanWolf choosing andactinginaccordwiththereasonsonetakestobesuffi otherwise orinsteadtopersistinactingasshedoes.Reasons-reactivityisamatterof matter ofrecognizingandassessingthereasonsanagenttakestobesuffi cienttoact reasons-responsiveness: Responsiveness (MRR),FischerandRavizzadistinguishbetweentwodifferentaspectsof To developtheirreasons-responsivetheory, whichtheycall is itcorrectthat Granting thatsomesortofasymmetry shouldbeaccommodated, Why theasymmetry?Onereasonistomakeroomforafamiliarsortofblameworthy According toFischerandRavizza,thespectrumofsensitivityreasonsisasymmet- y butonly weak reactivity. REASONS-RESPONSIVE THEORIES OFFREEDOM REASONS-RESPONSIVE THEORIES reasons-receptivity and 35 reasons-reactivity . Reasons-receptivity isa some reasonstodootherwise.Recallhe unfreely andsoisnotmorally cient for acting. The Moderate Reasons- ed in the in ed moderate cient Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 14:01 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315758206, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315758206.ch3 patibilist charges.)ButIwill notpursuethattopichere.Myonlygoalinthissection was [2005], Ihavetakenupthis issue anddefendedFischerRavizzaagainsttheseincom- reasons-reactivity thesis.(Elsewhere ing aversionofMRRthatrequires onlyamodest answer theseincompatibilist charges.TheycandothiswhilerejectingRIPandembrac- to alterthepastorlaws. reasonsinthatcontext,atleastnotwithouttheability not abletoreactthosegood incompatibilist mightcontinue,drawingupontheConsequence Argument,thatsheis reasons.Thisthensuggests,the does notreactotherwisebyactingforthemorallygood possible worldwheretheagentfacestheseactualreasons—the actualworld—theagent under theassumptionofdeterminism,holdingfi xedthepast and thelaws,innearest and Ravizza’s viewisthreatened.Finally, theincompatibilistcritic mightthennotethat we arebacktorequiringleewayfreedom.Sothesourcecompatibilist elementofFischer to reactotherwisetheveryreasonspresentthatanagent didnotreactto,itappears she unfree? ones,isn’tthese reasons?Ifso,thenwhensheactsforbadreasonsratherthanthegood as amatteroffact,shedidnotreact.Theworryisthis:whatif reasonstodootherwisearewhich, reasons.Inthiscase,theactualgood good otherwise thatmoralitycounsels.Supposefurthermoresheisreceptivetothese reasonstodo so? Consideranagentwhoisblameworthyanddoesnotreacttothegood otherwise butnotothers.Thisprovidesanopeningforincompatibilistattack.How case ofHandy, reasonstodo isselective;anagentmightbeabletoreact to somegood thesis RIP. reasonstodootherwise,asinthe IfRIPfails,thentheabilitytoreactgood anism). Theythuscontendedthat“reactivityisallofapiece”(1998:73).Callthis establish anagent’s abilitytoreactanyreasondootherwise (fromthesamemech- Ravizza wantedtoestablishthatreactivityonereasondootherwiseissuffi has todowiththebattlebetweencompatibilistsandincompatibilists.Fischer when amildproposalliketheoneIofferhereseemsanobviouscontender. Onereason Still, itisimportantthat was toorestrictiveto ing howtoclarifythereactivitycomponent.BrinkandNelkinhelpedmeseethatit indebted toDavidBrinkandDanaNelkinforanespeciallyfruitfulconversationregard- of fact,shewouldnotbereactiveand,asupshotblameworthyforsoacting.(Iam leave openthepossibilityofanagentwhoisreceptivetoareasonwhich,asmatter spectrum ofreasons.Whyweaker?Recall,asexplainedtwoparagraphsback,wewantto enoughtodisplayastable, sanewayofrelatingtoasuffimust bemoderate cientlyrobust not beweakerthanthereceptivitycomponent.Regardless,reactivitycomponent reasons-reactivitythat ate reasons-receptivityandadegreeofmoderate weak reactivity.) grants thepointandhasrevisedhisviewsothatwhatisrequiredstrongerthanmere developed byMcKenna[2005]andMele[2006].InreplytoMele,Fischer[2012:190] example toFischerandRavizza’s requirementofweakreceptivity. (This criticism is being exposedtopoisonousgas.Assuch,hisfreedomwasimpaired.Handyisacounter- reasonsnottodoso—including hands. Still,hewasnotreactivetoalargerangeofgood would notwashhishandsifsomeonethreatenedtokillchildshouldhe In myestimation,reasons-responsivesource compatibilistshavetheresourcesto If inresponsethereasons-responsivetheoristattemptstoestablishanagent’s ability It isworthaskingwhyFischerandRavizzaoptedforsuchastrikingasymmetrythesis As anamendmenttoFischerandRavizza’s theory, Iproposearequirementofmoder- require that thereceptivitycomponentbeweaker. That’s right. may beweaker.) MICHAEL MCKENNA 36 may bebutneed able toreact cient to Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 14:01 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315758206, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315758206.ch3 thorough setofdetailedcomments onanearlierdraftofthischapter. Iwouldlike to Timmons. IamespeciallygratefultoMeghanGriffi thforanextremely insightfuland For helpfulcomments,IamindebtedtoTerry Horgan,CarolinaSartorio,andMark Schoelandt, forthcoming). that joinstheresourcesofreasons-responsiveandmesh theories (seeMcKennaandVan freedom andresponsibility. Oneinterestingpossibilityworthexploringisahybridview identify howanagent’s ownpsychologicalarchitecturecanbeasourceoftroubleforher cravings thatshefeelsplagueherinsomeway. Meshtheoriesoffertheresourcesto are internaltoourownpsychology, asinthecaseofaddictwhostruggleswith about howourfreedomashumanagentscanbecompromised. Sometimesourstruggles instance, reasons-responsivetheoriesdonotofferresources tocaptureauniquefact theories, therearealsopointsatwhichitseemsmesh theoriesarepreferable.For narrower classofreasonsthaninthelatter. contrast withfree,weak-willedactions.Intheformer, theagentisresponsivetoa explain rathereasilythedifferencebetweenunfreeactionsfromaddictivedesireasin explaining this(McKenna2011).Reasons-responsivetheories,bycontrastareableto higher ordersheprefersnottoactfrom.AmeshviewlikeFrankfurt’s hasadiffi culttime cases, itseemsmoreplausibletosaythattheagentfreelyactsfromdesiresata right incertaincases,suchasactionfromstrongaddictivedesires.Butsome desires thatshedoesnotwanttomoveher, sheissimply unfree.Andthisgetsthings as weaknessofwill.OnaviewlikeFrankfurt’s, forinstance, whenanagentactsfrom theories isthattheyseemtobeableaccountmuchmoreeasilyforsuchphenomena system, sheactsunfreely. Sheactsfreelywhentheelements mesh harmoniously. agent actsinsuchawaythathermotivational system isoutofwhackwithherevaluative resources forassessingwhatanagentvaluesandtakestobeworthyofpursuing.When her aboutandgives risetovariouskindsofdesires.Anagent’s evaluativesystemprovides rolesintheexerciseoffreeagency.different Anagent’s motivationalsystemaidsinmoving she insteadactsfreely. Watson (1975)insteadworksfromdistinctsystemsplaying fi rst-orderdesiresdoleadhertoaction,thenshe isunfree.Butwhenallgoessmoothly, about whichdesiresshewantstomoveheractionaremisalignedwith systems arecastintermsofordersdesires.Whenanagent’s higher-order desires agent’s acts freely. Butwhenheractionsarisefromadeviantorunharmonious mesh,thenthe When anagent’s action-generatingsubsystemsmeshinaharmoniousway, thenshe dom intermsoftheinternalpsychologicalarchitectureapersonquapracticalagent. as HarryFrankfurt’s (1971)andGaryWatson’s (1975).Mesh theories accountforfree- tion totheirclosestcompatibilistcompetitors,whicharemeshtheoriesoffreedom,such In closing,itisworthrefl ectinguponreasons-responsivecompatibilisttheoriesinrela- show whereandhowanincompatibilistmightresistit. to setouttheskeletonofacarefullyworkedreasons-responsivetheoryandthenjust While thisshowsthatreasons-responsivetheorieshaveanadvantageovermesh Note thatoneadvantagereasons-responsivetheoriesappeartohaveovermesh freedom iscompromised.OnFrankfurt’s (1971)view, forinstance,the different REASONS-RESPONSIVE THEORIES OFFREEDOM REASONS-RESPONSIVE THEORIES Acknowledgments Conclusion 37 Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 14:01 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315758206, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315758206.ch3 . xod: Caedn Press. 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Vol. OxfordStudiesinAgencyandResponsibility, , 2d e. e Yr xod nvriy rs , p 175–98. pp. Press, Studies inAgencyandResponsibility, University Oxford York : New ed. 2nd OxfordHandbookofFreeWill , (ed.), Kane R. 131–43. 93–100. XCVIII: of Philosophy 89–113. pp. Press, Routledge York : New PhilosophyandPsychiatry. (eds), Gala G. 127–57. pp. Press, University Oxford York : New Free Will . 117–55. pp. Press, California of University Berkeley: (ed.), 229–53. 10: 87–104. pp. House, Random Press. University Cambridge . , o. 3. xod: Ofr Uiest Pes p 34–61. pp Press, University Oxford Oxford: 3. Vol. Oxford StudiesinAgencyandResponsibility, o. 1. e Yr xod nvriy rs , p 151–84. pp. Press, University Oxford York : New 1. Vol. MICHAEL MCKENNA References 38 . Basingstoke: Agency andResponsibility. . e York : New Freedom andDeterminism. 8: 5–20. 68: Journal ofPhilosophy Philosophical Explorations The OxfordHandbookof : : 8 ),
Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 14:01 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315758206, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315758206.ch3 Wolf, S.(1990) Sartorio, C.(forthcoming) Nelkin, D.(2011) McKenna, M. andVan Schoelandt,C.V. (forthcoming)“Crossing aMeshTheorywithReasons-Responsive McKenna, M.(2011) “ContemporaryCompatibilism:MeshTheoriesandReasons-ResponsiveTheories,” Kozuch, B.andMcKenna,M.(2016)“Free Will, MoralResponsibility, andMentalIllness,”D.Moseley Gert, B.andDuggan,T. (1979)“FreeWill astheAbilitytoWill,” Fischer, J.,andRavizza,M.(1998) Fischer, J.(2012) Brink, D.andNelkin,(2013)“FairnesstheArchitectureofResponsibility,” inD.Shoemaker(ed.), Press. University Oxford Oxford: (ed.), FreedomwithinReason. Honderich (1990) T. S. Wolf in , Libertarianism,” Reasonable a “Towards 374–94. (1973) 111: D. Ethics Responsibility Wiggins , ,” and “Reason (2001) 205–20. G. 72: Watson , JournalofPhilosophy Agency ,” “Free (1975) G. Watson , JournalofPhilosophy TheMetaphysicsofFreeWill, ” Fischer’s Martin John of “Review (1997) Jay . R. Oxford Wallace , York : New 427–50. Causes,Laws,andFreeWill: WhyDeterminismDoesn’t Matter. 32: ,”PhilosophicalTopics (2013) Account ADispositional K. Vihvelin Demystified: , Will “Free (2004) K. Vihvelin , of whatkindsreasonsanagentneeds toberesponsiveinorderadequatelyfree.) andtrue.Inthisrespect,Wolfthat trackwhatisgood establishesasubstantive constraintonthecontent ibilist theoryoffreedomrelieson the elegantideathatfreedomisamatterofresponsivenesstoreasons can beavoidedbyattendingtothe metaphysicsofcausation.) the problemsforcingFischerandRavizza awayfromanagent-basedviewandtoamechanism-based Ravizza’s approachmechanism-basedapproach, shearguesforanagent-basedapproach.Shethat develops asourcecompatibilistaccountoffreedomintermsreasons-responsiveness. UnlikeFischerand against sourcetheoreticalreasons-responsiveapproacheslikeFischer andRavizza’s [1998].) book offersanadvancementonthebasicideadevelopedbyWolf [1990] andindoingso,Nelkinargues Nelkin defendsanagent-basedleewayaccountoffreedominterms ofreasons-responsiveness.Nelkin’s elements ofareasons-responsiveviewwiththebestmesh theory.) Macmillan. (Inthispaper, McKennaandVan Schoelandtproposeatheoryoffreedomthatcouplesthebest Theory,” inA.Buckareff, C.Moya,andS.Rosell(eds), Watson.) petitor identifi cationist(ormesh-theory)approachofthesortadvancedbyHarryFrankfurtorGary (In thispaper, McKennasurveysrecentreasons-responsivetheoriesandassessesthemalongwithacom- in R.Kane(ed.), conduct iscausallyinfl uencedbymentalillness.) in doingsoofferanaccountofhowagentmightstillbefreeandresponsibleevenifsometimesher and McKennaapplyareasons-responsivetheoryoffreedomtoquestionspsychiatricdisorder G. Gala(eds), developed.) a suitablespectrumofreasons.ThispaperservedasthebasisforviewFischerandRavizza[1998] breaking paper morally responsible,includingacts,omissions,andconsequencesofactsomissions.) responsiveness andinapplyingtheviewtofullscopeofvariousitemsforwhichanagentcanbe compatibilist reasons-responsivetheory, especiallyindevelopinganaccountoftheproperspectrum Cambridge UniversityPress.(FischerandRavizza’s [1998]isperhapsthemostthroughdevelopmentofa natural extensionofFischerandRavizza(1998).) [1998], andrespondstonumerouscritics.Itisanexcellentfollow-uphisearlierworkreadsasa book, FischeroffersacomprehensivedefenseofhistheoryfreewilldevelopedwithMarkRavizza reasonswithafair-opportunityresponsiveness togood accountoffreedom.) (In thispaper, BrinkandNelkindefendaleewayviewoffreedom.Indoingso,theycoupleanaccount OxfordStudiesinAgencyandResponsibility , Vol. 1.NewYork: OxfordUniversityPress,pp.284–313. 31–62. pp. Paul, Kegan and Routledge London: Action . 156–9. 94: University Press Freedom withinReason . Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.(Wolf’s highly infl uentialcompat- , GertandDugganproposeawaytotheorizeaboutfreedomresponsivenessintermsof Philosophy andPsychiatry . NewYork: RoutledgePress,pp.89–113.(Inthispaper, Kozuch Deep Control:EssaysonFreeWill andValue . NewYork: OxfordUniversityPress.(Inthis Making SenseofFreedomandResponsibility . Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.(Inthisbook, . Oxford HandbookofFreeWill REASONS-RESPONSIVE THEORIES OFFREEDOM REASONS-RESPONSIVE THEORIES Causation andFreeWill . Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.(Inthisbook,Sartorio Responsibility andControl:AnEssayonMoral Further Reading , 2nded.NewYork: OxfordUniversityPress,pp.175–98. 39 Agency andResponsibility . Basingstoke:Palgrave Noûs 13:197–217.(Inthisground Essays onFreedomof . Cambridge: . Downloaded By: 10.3.98.104 At: 14:01 29 Sep 2021; For: 9781315758206, chapter3, 10.4324/9781315758206.ch3 Determinism Kant Immanuel Aristotle Examples Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism Dispositional Identifi cationist Views Semicompatibilism MICHAEL MCKENNA Related Topics 40