Dymond and Michael Hart

THE POTEMKIN VILLAGE OF CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Bill Dymond and Michael Hart

Canadian foreign policy over the past decade resembles the false fronts of the Potemkin village, proclaiming empty statements of “Canadian values” and nostalgic portrayals of Canada as a middle power in a world that no longer exists, the bi-polar era of the Cold War, when Canada played an important intermediary role between the United States and its NATO partners in the Atlantic alliance. Today’s challenge is a rather different one, note Bill Dymond and Michael Hart, two of Canada’s pre- eminent authorities on foreign affairs and international trade. It is the context of Canada’s relationship with the “hyperpower,” the US, in the situational sense of the world after September 11, 2001, and in the bilateral framework of “deepening economic integration” between the world’s two largest trading partners. As prime minister, they suggest, Paul Martin has an opportunity to move Canada beyond the Potemkin village of foreign policy to a setting that not only recognizes the new realities that limit Canada’s margin of maneuver, but also offers possibilities for new Canadian leadership that will recapture its influence with Washington and its historic role of explaining the world to the US and the US to the world.

Notre politique étrangère des dix dernières années ressemble aux villages en trompe-l’œil du maréchal Potemkine, multipliant les déclarations creuses sur les « valeurs canadiennes » et les rappels nostalgiques de notre rôle de puissance moyenne dans un monde révolu, ce monde bipolaire de la Guerre froide où le Canada servait d’intermédiaire entre les États-Unis et leurs partenaires de l’OTAN au sein de l’Alliance atlantique. La conjoncture est aujourd’hui tout autre, observent Bill Dymond et Michael Hart, réputés spécialistes canadiens des affaires étrangères et du commerce international. Elle a pour cadre les relations entre le Canada et l’« hyper- puissance » américaine dans le monde de l’après-11 septembre, et le schéma bilatéral d’un « approfondissement de l’intégration économique » entre les deux plus grands partenaires commerciaux du monde. En tant que premier ministre, jugent les auteurs, Paul Martin aura l’occasion d’en finir avec cette politique étrangère en trompe-l’œil pour prendre acte des nouvelles réalités qui, tout en réduisant notre marge de manœuvre, nous offrent la double chance de regagner notre influence auprès de Washington et de renouer avec notre rôle historique, qui consiste à expliquer le monde aux États-Unis et les États-Unis au monde.

t has not been a good year for Canadian foreign policy, Over the past decade, Canadian foreign policy has been a year highlighted by further deterioration in relations stuck in a nostalgic time warp harking back to Canada’s sta- I with the United States and punctuated by a series of tus as a middle power within the small club of Western, humiliating cases of Canadians imprisoned, tortured, and democratic, market-economy states. Canadian foreign po- even murdered abroad. The government is facing a rising licy during that period moved with confidence in the con- chorus of criticism for looking feeble, vacillating, and bereft ception of its national interests and the deployment of of purpose. Bad foreign policy years sometimes occur for political, financial, and human resources to pursue them, factors beyond a government’s control. Not this time. This well exemplified by the vast expansion of Canada’s diplo- bad year was the product of ten years of Potemkin-village matic presence during and after the Second World War. No foreign policy, featuring brightly painted false fronts mask- longer. The emergence of a unipolar world dominated by ing a grim reality of naiveté and confusion. the United States, an integrated North American economy,

POLICY OPTIONS 39 DECEMBER 2003 – JANUARY 2004 Bill Dymond and Michael Hart

and the decline of multilateral rules and misery. Canada’s modern-day for- of US extraterritorial measures on and institutions as prime instruments eign policy Potemkin village has three Canadian trade and investment with of global governance, have left Cana- principal features that seek to shroud Cuba with Canada’s pressure on the dian foreign policy searching for new embarrassing reality. First, it thrusts for- United States and Britain for sanctions purpose and direction. It sometimes ward domestic values as the foundation on South Africa in the 1970s and seems the single most important deter- of foreign policy; second, it assigns merit 1980s. As Stairs observes, “if there is minant of contemporary Canadian to establishing difference and distinction anything worse than the value-based policy is a corrosive and self-defeating from the United States; and, third, it imperialism of the strong, it is the anti-Americanism, reflecting, in John invents principles of convenience to value imperialism of the weak.” Holmes memorable phrase “a linger- substitute for the definition of interests. ing colonial mentality.” Canada’s All three fail to survive close scrutiny as he problem arises from the inap- friends and allies have become weary the basis for a serious foreign policy. T propriate use of values to define of the whining and fretting of Canadi- Ministerial declarations on the interests. The values espoused by an diplomats looking for a place in centrality of values in Canadian for- recent Canadian foreign ministers are world councils warranted by neither eign policy have become as common as virtually universal; foreign policy inter- interests nor power nor contribution. the autumn leaves. In launching his ests, on the other hand, derive from The time has come to bring “Dialogue on Foreign Policy,” current the combination of geography, demog- Canadian foreign policy into the 21st Foreign Minister Bill Graham asserted raphy, and history peculiar to each century by grounding it in a concep- that Canadian foreign policy has a country. The United States, for exam- tion of a national interest that accepts wealth of assets, notably, the Canadian ple, is no less an open, tolerant, demo- the primacy of the United States in image in the world as a “democratic, cratic, multicultural society than securing both our national security bilingual, multicultural, free and open Canada, yet its foreign-policy interests and our prosperity. There is an urgent society that respects and celebrates its are those of a great power with both need to recognize that the the resources and the responsi- bilateral Canada-US relation- While eager to jump into moral bilities to pursue global inter- ship has outgrown the tools crusades, Canadian attitudes to ests. None of Canada’s principal and institutions to manage it value-based crusades conceived and European partners — for exam- and to define the parameters of ple, France or Germany — can a new accommodation. This directed by the United States have make the claim of multicultur- will not be an easy task. The often been marked by reluctance, alism and bilingualism, yet attention of Canadians to for- even hostility. their interests in global security eign policy is modest and inter- and prosperity are not signifi- mittent and the susceptibility to diversity.” His most recent predeces- cantly different from those of Canada. anti-American notions remains strong. sors, John Manley and Lloyd Before the wave of market-based The risk of capture by narrow visions Axworthy, proved equally forthright in democracy swept over most of Latin and confused ideologies will be strong, proclaiming values to lie at the heart of America, few if any would have been as will the temptation to substitute Canadian foreign policy. Both the out- eligible to join Canada’s value club, yet sentiment for interest. The most effec- going prime minister and his successor their interests in managing relation- tive antidote will be to establish a hier- have felt the call to trumpet Canadian ships with the United States as the archy of interests focusing on the values. Even Trade Minister Pierre regional hegemon, were not observably bilateral relationship as the touch- Pettigrew contends that when Canada different from those of Canada. stone of successful foreign policy. exports, “we are exporting our values.” Historically, the defining moments This essay analyses the Potemkin As political scientist Denis Stairs of Canadian foreign policy have had village of contemporary Canadian for- observes in this spring’s International little to do with values as proclaimed eign policy and sets out a framework Journal, Canadians have been actively by recent foreign ministers. They have for restoring maturity and perspective encouraged by their leaders to believe derived their legitimacy and impor- to the definition and pursuit of that Canada is unique among the tance from quite different factors. For Canadian interests. nations of the world in its moral supe- example, Canada’s participation in the In 18th century Russia, Prince riority and distinctiveness. While eager First World War was entirely a product Potemkin, favourite of Catherine the to jump into moral crusades, Canadian of its devoted membership in the Great, used to line the royal route with attitudes to value-based crusades con- British Empire. The government’s pur- painted canvasses thrown over wooden ceived and directed by the United suit of a distinct voice in military strat- frames to give the impression of prosper- States have often been marked by egy, a seat at the peace conference, and ous villages in a land of milk and honey reluctance, even hostility. Contrast, for a place in the post-war arrangements, and mask the reality of shabby poverty example, Canada’s indignant rejection flowed not from values but from an

40 OPTIONS POLITIQUES DÉCEMBRE 2003 – JANVIER 2004 The Potemkin village of Canadian foreign policy understanding that Canada’s interests of this sentiment into a guide for policy, other varieties of anti feelings directed at could not be served by subsuming however, that seems to have inspired a group or a country, it is ignorant, them within broader imperial policy. the architect’s sketch for the Potemkin small-minded, and often driven by fear During and after the Second World village of contemporary foreign policy. and envy. The gratuitous anti-American- War, Canada’s active engagement in ism on public view in the Liberal Caucus global governance derived from a real- n his memoirs reflecting on a long and the Cabinet in the weeks preceding ization that failure to do so would risk I diplomatic career, The Rise and Fall the Iraq war reflected the view that a incurring serious damage to Canadian of a Middle Power, the late Arthur deep relationship with the United security and prosperity. No longer was Andrew recalled that a principal objec- States, which geography, economics, it true, in the words a decade earlier of tive of Canadian foreign policy had and interests make inevitable, is a weak- O.D. Skelton, the architect of modern always been to establish a difference ness, not a strength. The response is to Canadian foreign policy, that between Canadian and US positions on look for, even, on occasion, manufac- “Canadians were immensely more major issues. Writing during the ture, opportunities, as if declaring differ- interested in Alberta than Abyssinia.” Mulroney years, he sadly noted that ence constitutes independence. Canadian membership in the North ensuring that such a difference existed Proclaiming difference is one of those Atlantic Treaty Organization, the was no longer an objective of Canadian harmless myths needed to nourish General Agreement on Tariffs and foreign policy. Mackenzie King would national vanity. It is not, however, poli- Trade, the International Monetary have found such an attitude bizarre. As cy, nor a basis for policy in a challenging Fund, and the World Bank originated he indicated during the 1923 Imperial global environment. There is no virtue in perceptions of how Canada’s securi- Conference, “there [was] no greater in maintaining a difference when the ty and economic objectives could be contribution that Canada can make to resulting foreign policy departs from a best served. There is no evidence that the fair and peaceful settlement of hard-nosed appreciation of national Canadian engagement was based on international affairs…as by so handling interests and the commitment of statements of Canadian values. our relations with the United States as resources in pursuit of those interests. Values play an important role in to build up an enduring fund of good- Following the prime minister’s sustaining national self-esteem. No will.” This did not mean sacrificing announcement that Canada would not Canadian government can profess Canadian interests to achieve good support the United States and other indifference to international events or will, nor did it mean the “policy of pin- coalition members in the Iraq war, US situations that arouse Canadians’ pricks.” His foreign minister and suc- Ambassador to Canada Paul Celucci sense of justice and compassion. cessor, Louis St. Laurent, defined issued a sharp rebuke of Canadian for- However, the readiness of Canadians relations with the United States in his eign policy. In a time of need, he said, to pay the cost of making Canadian principled Gray lecture in 1947 as Canada’s closest friend, ally, and neigh- bour had a right to expect The readiness of Canadians to pay the cost of making more. As David Jones, a for- Canadian values operational is weak. They would prefer more mer US diplomat, and oth- healthcare. As Deputy Prime Minister John Manley aptly ers have reported, some members of Cabinet and commented during his brief sojourn as foreign minister, Parliament evidently want- Canadians have the habit of taking strong stances on any ed the ambassador expelled number of international issues, but when it comes time to for such comments. The take action, Canadians take a washroom break. Ambassador had had the effrontery to look behind values operational is weak. They would those of negotiation and compromise the gaily-coloured canvasses and report prefer more healthcare. As Deputy combined with “our readiness to what he observed. Prime Minister John Manley aptly accept our responsibility as a North The pursuit of principle in foreign commented during his brief sojourn as American nation.” policy is costly when it conflicts with foreign minister, Canadians have the The current search for difference is interests, but if the principle is con- habit of taking strong stances on any largely informed by anti-Americanism stant and well-grounded in interest, number of international issues, but among politicians, academics, and the cost may be acceptable, for exam- when it comes time to take action, much of the media, to the extent, as his- ple, maintaining strict controls on Canadians take a washroom break. torian Jack Granatstein observes in the trade in weapons at the cost of com- Foreign Minister Bill Graham 2003 C.D. Howe Institute Benefactors Lec- mercial opportunity. When principle is doubtless speaks for many Canadians in ture, that “it seems to have become a shaped to fit circumstance and con- asserting, “a better world might look core value for many politicians and flicts with interest, it becomes parody, like a better Canada.” It is the elevation commentators.” Moreover, like many for example, the invocation by the gov-

POLICY OPTIONS 41 DECEMBER 2003 – JANUARY 2004 Bill Dymond and Michael Hart

The Gazette, Montreal A pensive Paul Martin ponders a question at a Liberal town hall in Montreal. Among the many issues he’ll have to confront on taking office is the state of Canadian foreign policy, which resembles a Potemkin village — brightly painted false fronts with no substance behind them.

ernment of the need for UN approval wholly separate governance arrange- devastating stocks, would have encoun- as a precondition for Canadian support ments and have succeeded in insulating tered a solid wall of resistance, at a min- of the Iraq war. themselves from the principal preoccu- imum from Spain’s European Union Protestations that the United pations of the United Nations. When partners. In 1997, Canada led a success- Nations is the supreme arbiter of global opportunity presented itself, Canada ful campaign to ban the production, peace and security wither before the abandoned even these multilateral trade, and use of landmines entirely mildest scrutiny. Canada has consis- arrangements and embraced first the outside the UN, again to avoid the cer- tently shunted the UN to a minor role Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and tain failure of such an initiative in the in pursuing Canadian foreign policy then the North American Free Trade UN. In 1999, Canada set aside its interests. Regional and bilateral military Agreement as the best ways to preserve attachment to UN principle and played alliances in the form of NATO and and promote Canadian prosperity. a leading role in a NATO military cam- NORAD, not the UN, were the instru- Even under the Chrétien govern- paign to drive the Serbian government ments of choice for assuring peace and ment, Canada has embraced pragma- out of the Serbian province of Kosovo, Canadian security through the long, tism, not UN principles, when interest forcing regime change at the provincial bitter years of the Cold War. Canada demanded. In 1994, Canada seized a level. Applying the government’s newly sought its prosperity as a country Spanish fishing trawler in international discovered devotion to the UN to deeply dependent upon international waters and deployed the navy to dis- Kosovo would have had Canada argu- trade in the GATT, the IMF, and the courage Spanish intervention, in clear ing that, whatever the depredations of World Bank. While these organizations violation of international law. Taking the Serbian government upon the pop- maintain a tenuous and largely formal the complaint to the UN, claiming that ulation of Kosovo, nothing could be relationship with the UN, they have Spanish flagged fishing vessels were done without the United Nations. As

42 OPTIONS POLITIQUES DÉCEMBRE 2003 – JANVIER 2004 The Potemkin village of Canadian foreign policy former Ambassador to Washington, States is high on his agenda. He has this case arising from a resource Alan Gotlieb, comments, “one has to also suggested that he will chair a cabi- endowment that encouraged the wonder whether a country adopting net committee on Canada-US relations. development of a highly trade- such a policy is hiding isolationist ten- Both are constructive signals of neces- dependent economy. Across a broad dencies behind a fake international- sary changes to come. Even more spectrum of goods and, increasingly, ism.” Our colleague John Noble adds important, however, is getting a handle service production in Canada, access “the idea…that the UN must hence- on the object, purpose, and content of to exports and imports is indispensa- forth endorse any military action against known Reduced to its fundamentals, Canada is an integral part of the tyrants is the height of folly US security and economic perimeter. In security terms, the and is unlikely to last perimeter has been in place at least since the late 1930s. At beyond the mandate of Prime Minister Chrétien.” that time, US President Roosevelt made clear to Prime Minister Mackenzie King that the United States viewed with oined at the hip with sup- grave disquiet the utter inadequacy of the Canadian military. J port for the United Nations is the abiding public faith in refurbished relations. A top priority in ble. Some 75 percent of this trade is multilateralism, not only as a tool but this respect is to begin by restoring conducted with the United States. In even as a goal of foreign policy. During maturity and perspective to Canadian many sectors, a rising proportion of the 1980s free-trade debate, many oppo- foreign policy in all its ramifications North American trade consists of intra- nents, including voices within the feder- and placing Canada-US relations industry trade in intermediate goods. al government, argued that a bilateral squarely at the center. It should start There is every reason to expect the agreement with the United States would with an analysis of Canadian security continuing integration of the destroy Canada’s multilateral heritage. and economic interests, an examina- Canadian economy into the North In fact, the practice of Canadian foreign tion of the options available to pursue American economy and no reason to policy has long been to treat multilater- those interests, and deployment of the believe that Canadians would al, regional, bilateral, and even unilater- steps necessary to pursue them. exchange the prosperity flowing from al (as the Spanish fish war demonstrated) Reduced to its fundamentals, North American integration for a strat- approaches to problem-solving as the Canada is an integral part of the US secu- egy, if one were available, to reduce the contents of a toolbox from which the rity and economic perimeter. In security proportion of trade with the United government is free to choose to suit the terms, the perimeter has been in place at States in favour of expanded trade circumstances. least since the late 1930s. At that time, with other countries. It is, therefore, There are encouraging signs that US President Roosevelt made clear to no more than idle chatter to contend the UN-multilateral approach to deter- Prime Minister Mackenzie King that the that Canada has a choice of living mining the direction of Canadian for- United States viewed with grave disquiet either inside the perimeter or outside eign policy may be withering. During the utter inadequacy of the Canadian of it. That choice was determined by the Liberal leadership campaign, military. In the event of war, the United geography and reinforced by more attacks by contenders Sheila Copps and States was not prepared to tolerate the than three generations of policy. John Manley on Paul Martin to the use of Canada as a launch pad for attacks The process of North American effect that he was prepared to abandon upon it. The choice for Canada was clear, integration arises both from the push of the UN and become a US toady failed as King recognized: Canada could public policy and the pull of private to resonate. The new prime minister defend itself or the United States would behaviour. The push is the response of will no doubt manoeuvre carefully, but do the job itself and serve its own inter- governments to the realities of integra- his statements suggest that he will lead est. The creation of the Canada-US tion. If Canada is to have a voice in pro- foreign policy away from an outdated Permanent Joint Board of Defense in tecting its territory, cooperation with and dysfunctional preoccupation with 1940 institutionalized the King- the United States is necessary. To assure form over substance and embrace an Roosevelt vision of a joint approach to the prosperity of the trade-dependent approach based on the national inter- North American security. Ever since, Canadian economy, Canada has been est. Hopefully, we can then send Canada has been an explicit part of a an enthusiastic participant in global Canada’s Potemkin village to the muse- North American security strategy economic governance, with the pur- um of historical oddities. defined, determined, and almost entirely pose essentially of assuring access to the As he prepared to take on his role implemented by the United States. vast US economy. In the 1980s and as leader of the Liberal Party and prime 1990s, through the FTA and NAFTA, minister, Paul Martin indicated that anada is equally part of the North Canada obtained a special arrangement refurbishing relations with the United C American economic perimeter, in with the United States that carried eco-

POLICY OPTIONS 43 DECEMBER 2003 – JANUARY 2004 Bill Dymond and Michael Hart

nomic integration further and faster Canada’s enviable international image exercise of soft power consists largely than the global system could provide. is of little value when the bilateral rela- of prattling about Canadian values as The pull of private behaviour derives tionship with the United States is in if those values were an exclusive pos- from Canadians’ comfort with integra- poor repair. Other countries rightly session. Values are essentially domestic tion. Canadians understand that the wonder about the value of partnership, foreign policy in that they reflect back bedrock of their national security is the multilateral or otherwise, with a to Canadians the image they wish to relationship with the United States. In Canada that cannot manage the rela- project internationally. They are of lit- their choices of what to buy, what films tionship with the United States. tle use in pursuing foreign policy inter- to watch, or what vacation spots to fre- Second, multilateral institutions ests unless they are backed by hard quent, when they are not buying and rule-making as a tool to influence power. As Jack Granatstein, Denis Canadian, they are choosing American. US behaviour are assets of declining Stairs and others have argued, an As a measure of that choice, on average value. Multilateralism is at a low point increasingly enfeebled military, an 15 million Canadians, half the popula- in US foreign policy and the readiness of underfunded and widely dispersed tion, travel annually to the United the United States to restore it to a place development assistance effort, and a States for visits of more than one day. of prominence will not return during diplomatic presence staffed more and Whatever discomfort these choices may the Bush administration and likely more by foreign nationals leaves cause politicians, they show no appetite beyond. Canada’s insistence on the pri- Canada without the tools to pursue for interfering with them, fearful, no macy of multilateral rules and institu- Canadian interests. Major reinvest- doubt correctly, of the backlash that tions in circumstances in which the ments in these tools should go hand in would result. United States judges its vital interests to hand with making the pursuit of be at stake, places the relationship at Canadian interests the foremost objec- ormer US Secretary of State tive of Canadian foreign policy. F Henry Kissinger once The first and only option for observed that Canada has nar- Canadian foreign policy is to reach a n these circumstances, the row room for maneuver and has new accommodation with the US by I first and only option for proved over time adept at Canadian foreign policy is to defending its interests within taking deliberate steps to bring the reach a new accommodation that space. The room for maneu- architecture of the relationship into with the US by taking deliber- ver for any country is defined by line with the challenge and fact of ate steps to bring the architec- the immutable realities of its his- deepening integration. ture of the relationship into tory, its geography, its resource line with the challenge and fact endowment, and the characteristics and serious risk for no gain. This is what of deepening integration. Historically, preferences of its people. A well-con- happened over Iraq. Canada effectively Canada and the United States have ceived and skillfully executed foreign joined with France, Germany, and oth- managed their complex relationship policy will maneuver to maximum ers in arguing that the United States had on an item-by-item basis. Great care advantage within this narrow space. no right to act without UN approval, has typically been taken by both coun- The policy options open to however vital the issue to US interests. tries to prevent the treatment of indi- Canada are defined by some hard real- The result for Canada was a pyrrhic vic- vidual issues in the relationship from ities. First among these is that no other tory: Canada upheld its commitment to affecting the handling of others. This relationship is so important to the the UN and the bilateral relationship pragmatic management scheme may country than the relationship with the with the United States fell to its lowest have served both countries well in the United States. While the imperatives state in more than a generation. The les- past, but is now out of date. The of geography have always made that son is clear. Mounting gratuitous oppo- United States now regards relation- relationship vital, the emergence of sition to US policy on grounds that the ships with other counties, including its the United States as a hyperpower with United States explicitly rejects is a sure closest allies, through the lens of no serious military or economic rivals recipe for removing Canada from the national security. Prior to September on the near or far horizon makes the list of countries whose opinions and 11, 2001, bold initiatives to construct a search for effective counterweights to interests US officials respect. Sneering new trade and economic relationship that relationship a pointless diversion. that Canada was too clever to be conned could be considered on their merits. Indeed, it is only with the United by the United States into joining the Now it is evident that no initiative has States that Canada has a comprehen- war may be emotionally satisfying for any chance of acquiring traction in the sive bilateral relationship. With every some, but it is hardly the product of United States unless it addresses US other country, Canadian relationships mature foreign policy thinking. preoccupations about security. The are for the most part brokered through Third, soft power is no substitute new relationship that Canada needs multilateral institutions. Further, for hard power, even more when the with the United States will have to

44 OPTIONS POLITIQUES DÉCEMBRE 2003 – JANVIER 2004 The Potemkin village of Canadian foreign policy embrace security, immigration, and Canadian and American officials have the world require productive relations military collaboration, as well as trade developed extensive, mutually benefi- with the United States. and investment issues. cial networks of cooperation and work This should not be an impossible increasingly within the confines of he end of the Cold War dissolved task. Canadian policy objectives in internationally agreed rules and proce- T the comfortable certainties that these areas, and the manner in which dures. The reason is simple. Such coop- guided Canadian foreign policy with they are pursued, may differ in detail erative joint strategies are an efficient considerable success for almost fifty but not in broad approach. While way to meet Canadian goals and to years. Over much of that period, Canada nationalist elites remain in denial, ensure that others behave in ways that came out of its colonial shell and played there exists a remarkable degree of protect and reflect Canadian interests. a mature and responsible role in global convergence in regulatory and other A frequently voiced criticism of governance consistent with its power areas of law and policy between the deepening integration is that it fosters and its national interests. During the last two societies. Officials on both sides of a “race to the bottom.” There is little decade, Canadian foreign policy, with the border have also developed elabo- evidence to support this charge. few exceptions, has been living off accu- rate networks of cooperation, flowing Indeed, there is a preponderance of mulated capital by substituting senti- from the imperative of managing the evidence pointing in exactly the oppo- ment over interest and ignoring the common North American space to our site direction. As societies become radical changes that have roiled the mutual advantage. more prosperous — one of the most global security and economic environ- Some Canadians will inevitably important impacts of globalization ment. Canadian foreign policy has to assert that any further steps to facili- and deepening integration — the chart a course in a unipolar world domi- tate deepening integration will entail demand for regulations to enhance the nated by the United States in which unacceptable sacrifices of Canadian quality of life increases. The explosion security threats arise from the unpre- sovereignty. To this charge, there is no of government regulatory activity to dictable behaviour of non-state actors better response than that offered by address environmental, human rights, and rogue states. It needs to structure a IRPP President Hugh Segal at an security, and other issues provides new relationship with the United States Ottawa policy workshop a year ago: compelling evidence of the gap that captures the dynamics of silent inte- “Sovereignty is a vital national instru- between rhetoric and reality. In the gration. It will need to pay respect to ment. It is not a goal. …Sovereignty is other direction, the impact of regula- Canadian notions of values but dispense not hoarded, it is not locked away, it is tory convergence and regulatory coop- with “value imperialism,” which finds there to be used to advance the legiti- eration has been repeatedly to raise the the definition of interest un-Canadian mate social and economic interests of bar by establishing international and claims that principles are more Canadians on a host of fronts.” All benchmarks of minimal performance important than power to Canadians. international agreements, whether and best international practice. The events of September 11, 2001 aimed at economic, environmental, Inevitably, there will be Canadians and the Iraq war exposed the extent to human rights, military, or other objec- concerned about Canada putting all its which the assumptions underpinning tives seek to curb the full expression eggs in the US basket and failing to pay the practice of Canadian diplomacy of autonomous national decision- attention to Canada’s many interests diverge from reality. It is now abundant- making. As the history of Canadian around the world. They miss the ly clear that the post-war world has large- foreign policy has demonstrated, states point. Canada should continue to pur- ly vanished. It has been eight years since make the reasonable calculation that sue its interests around the world, the last foreign policy review. It is time their interests are better served if other from trade and investment in Europe for a new one to replace the Potemkin states are required to behave in a pre- and Japan, to aid and development in village whose false fronts are increasingly dictable and stable manner, subject to Africa and Asia, but should pursue showing their age and irrelevance. commonly agreed rules and proce- such matters through the clear lens of dures to enforce them. Canadian interests and on the founda- Bill Dymond is Executive Director of the tion of a new accommodation with Centre for Trade Policy and Law at variant on the sovereignty con- our most important partner, our Carleton University and the University of A cern is the worry about policy neighbour, and the world’s only Ottawa. Michael Hart is the Simon autonomy. Again, policy autonomy is hyperpower. Our geography, demo- Reisman Professor of Trade Policy in the not an end in itself, but a vital tool of graphy and history provide scope for a Norman Paterson School of International governance. Whether governments privileged position in Washington, a Affairs at Carleton University and a dis- achieve their goals and objectives privileged position if deployed shrewd- tinguished fellow of the Centre for Trade autonomously or cooperatively is less ly that will greatly enhance our ability Policy and Law. Both are former federal important than their ability to serve the to make a difference elsewhere. More officials with extensive experience in deal- needs and aspirations of their citizens. productive relations with the rest of ing with trade and foreign policy issues.

POLICY OPTIONS 45 DECEMBER 2003 – JANUARY 2004