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Predestination and Certainty of Salvation in Augustine and Calvin by MARK E

Predestination and Certainty of Salvation in Augustine and Calvin by MARK E

Predestination and Certainty of in Augustine and Calvin by MARK E. V ANDERSCHAAF

Calvin's doctine of predes tination is often referred to as" A ugustinian." Indee d , Ca lvin himself readily ac knowledged his ties with A ugustine, exclaiming in one dis­ cuss ion of predes tination: " Augustine is so much at one with me that , if I wished to w rite a confession of fa ith, it would abundantly sa ti sfy me to qu ote w holesa le from his writings." ' In ge neral, the labe l is just ified. Ca lvin clearly shared A ugustine's con­ viction that fa llen man ca n do nothing to initiate hi s sa lvation; rather uncondi­ tionall y elects certain indi viduals w ho, moved by irres istible grace , persevere to the sa lva ti on to w hich they are ca ll ed . T he t hes is of this paper , however , is th at the similarity between A ugustine and Ca lvin should not be allowed to overshadow fundamenta l di ffe rences between th eir doctrines of predes tination. We will examine th ese differences and will di scover that there is a ruling purpose behind Calvin's departures from Augustine. Spec ifica lly , Ca lvin used the doctrine of predes tination to provide Christi ans w ith ce rtainty of sa l­ vati on and un shakeable confidence in the gracious purposes of Goel: in A ugustine' s th eo logy ce rtainty and confidence are not emphas ized and are even frowned upon. 2 T he logica l place to begin our d isc uss ion is w ith predes tination as it relates to the crea tion and fall of man. We find th at for A ugustine there is no predes tination until after the fa ll of man. In the word s of Euge ne TeSelle, " It is onl y in connec ti on w ith th e work of that we encounter the problem of predes tinati on. T he heritage of sin is a res ult of human freedom, not of divine ord ering. ":J A ugustine limits predes tina­ tion to the di vine preparation of ce rtain individuals to receive the gra ce necessary for sa lva tion and thu s associates it only with God's mercy . " Betwee n grace and predes­ tination is only this difference , that predes tinati on is the preparation for grS\ce, while grace is the donation itself. '"' A ugustine's doctrine of th e crea tion and fa ll of man was intended to preclude the two mos t likely expl anations of the so urce of ev il and sin , namely th e expl anation that sees evil arising ultimately from God and the M anichaea n explanation that places the so urce of evil outs ide of God. A dam, according to Augustine, was created good. H e was endowed w ith an ad equ ate knowledge of God , his proper end , and a good w ill abl e to cling to th at end . In the Augustinian psychology Adam could abandon his proper end only through ignorance of intellec t or wea kness of will." How then is it poss ible that he in fact fell into sin by an act of disobedience rooted in the attitude of , " the craving for undue exaltation . .. when the abandons Him to whom it ought to clea ve as its encl , and becomes a kind of encl to itse lf" ?'; A ugustine's answer to thi s ques tion qu alifies hi s noti on of man's original good will. Considered purely as crea ted nature devoid of God's grace, Adam's w ill was adequate to cling to God only in th e abse nce of competing evil influences. Since such influences existed even in parad ise, grace was necessary for Adam to rema in sinless. God granted Adam grace, enough to enable him to avoid sin (posse 11011 p eccare ) but not enought to make him unable to si n (11 0 11 posse peccare). T he first man had not that grace by which he should never will to be ev il ; but assured ly he had that in w hic h ifhe w illed to ab ide he would never be evil, and without w hich, moreover, he could not by be good, but which, nevertheless , by free w ill he could forsake. God , therefore, did not wi ll even him to be without His grace, which H e left in his free will ; becau se free will is sufficien t for evil ; but is too little for good , unless it is aided by Omnipotent Good. 7 T he final ques tion th at mu st be asked of A ugustine is what is th e source of the influences that led to Adam's downfall?" Augustine remains true to hi s desire to avoid both and the attribution of evil to God. Rather, he focuses on the Chris­ tian teaching that God crea ted th e world ex 11ihi/o and gives this doctrine a neoplatonic interpretation to so lve the problem of ev il. Behold, then, evil arises out of good ; nor was there any other source, in­ deed , whence it could arise, but out of good. I ca ll that will bad which no evil has preceded ; no ev il works, of course, since they only proceed from an evil will , as from a corrupt tree. N evertheless, th at the ev il w ill arose out of good , could not be , because th at good was made by the good God, but beca use it was created out of nothing-not out of God.'1 A ll creatures retain a tend ency to revert to the nothingness out of which they were made. This tendency makes sin a necessary po ss ibility in nature and in the case of A dam it res ulted in his prideful turning from God. Now, nature could not have bee n depraved by vice had it not been made out of nothing. Conseq uently, that it is a nature, this is because it is made by God; but that it falls away from Him, this is because it is made out of nothing. 10 As is well known, A ugustine taught that Adam's sin impaired not only his own nature but human nature in general. For Augustine this impairment consists not only of pain and death (the res ults of sin traditionally accepted by the Church Fathers) but of so mething even more serious. T he relationship between man's higher powers and his lower powers was damaged to the extent that man is now unable to order his life to the attainment of his proper end. Failure to cling to God is sin and thus gu ilt is inherited along with pain and dea th . It came by the freedom of choice th at man was with sin ; but a penal cor­ ruption closely followed thereon, and out of the liberty produced neces­ sity ... With these necess ities upon us, we areeither unab le to understand what we want or else (while having the wish) we are not strong enough to accomplish what we have come to understand." It is out of this nwssa damnata of humanity that God now predes tines so me to sal va tion. It is important to remember th at strictly spea king only con­ cern s sa lvation for A ugustine. Two aspects of Augustine's writing have occasionally led to a misunderstanding of thi s point. First , Augustine occasionally speaks of t he predes tination of the damned . For example, in De C i1 ·itate Dei he mentions " the two cities, or the two communities of men , of which the one is predes tined to reign eternally with God, the other to suffer eternal punishment with the devil. ' ' ' 2 Secondly, Augus- 2 tine developed a strong doctrine of Providence, allowing him to say that "those which follow the world are so entirely at the disposal of God, that H e turns them whither­ soever He wills." ' 3 In both cases we must keep in mind what we have already dis­ cusse d ; these actions of God are posterior to a condition which He permitted but did 1 1 not cause to exist, namely the condition of a sinful humanity deriving from Adam. • By viewing predestination as infralapsarian election to salvation Augustine is able to preserve the goodness of God. But the price for this accomplishment is more than Calvin is willing to pay . Augustine's formula depends upon a division of th e will­ ing and ac ting of God into two distinct parts. On the one hand is God the Creator of nature. As such, God is perfectly good but limited in what He ca n do. It is in fact ini­ po ss ible fol' God to create a nat ure that as 11at11re is impervious to ev il influence. In­ sofar as creation is made out of nothing it retains the inherent tendency to fa ll away from God toward nothingness. On the other hand God is th e bestower of grace. A s such, God is ab le to counter­ ac t the ev il tendencies in nature through th e addition of th e gift of grace. His goodness is preserved since his predestination is strictly grac ious. But the price is the lessen ing of hi s direct control over the uni verse. He is placed in the position of reac ting to things which He did not cause rather than fulfilling a definite and unified pl an. Ca lvin consistently avoid s the kind of dualism that A ugust ine utilizes in hi s doc­ trine of predestination. For Ca lvin, created nature is not inherentl y subject to evil tendencies which can only be counteracted by the added gift of grace. God could ha ve made human nature in such a way that it would have been unable to sin : that He did not is due only to his hidden plan.' " Similarly Calvin st rongly rejects any view of God in w hich He merely foreknows and permits ev il to happen and th en reacts to ev il conditions for which H e was not res ponsible. For Calvin , predes tination is " th e etemol predes tination of God , by which /Je.fi1re t!t efa/I <~/A dam He dec reed what should take place concerning tlti' 1\'ltcili' /111111011 rnci' and e 1· ery i11di1 ·id1wl. " "; (Italics mine.) The corollary of this is, of course, th e doctrine of double predestination, a doctrine which Calvin readily affirmed. Not onl y the elect but also th e reprobate are c hosen by God before the foundation of the earth. In a certain se nse double predes tination makes God direc tly res ponsible for the fall of man into sin . Aga in I ask: w hence does it happen that A dam's fall irremediabl y involved so many peoples, togeth er with their infant offspring, in eternal dea th unless because it so pl eased God? Here th eir tongues, otherw ise so loquac ious, mu st become mute. T he decree is dread ful indeed , I con­ fess. Yet no one ca n deny th at God foreknew what end man was to have before he crea ted him , and consequ ently foreknew because he so ord ained by hi s decree. ' 7

But Calvin will not concede that this removes human respo nsibility for sin . Funda­ mental to hi s analysis of predestination is a distinction between remote and proximate causes w hich agree in " spl endid and fitting sy mmetry ." 18 T here is only one remote ca use of all things, the w ill of Goel. Nevertheless we ca n also understand things in the created realm as arising from proximate causes . In matters of ev il it is proper to ascribe 3 the primary res pon sibility to proximate agents whereas in matters of good the primary res ponsibility must be asc ribed to God . God 's ca usa lity of evil is paradoxica l ; evil is blameworthy but God is blameless. Because we are un able to fully understand how the good Goel can be the ca use of ev il we mu st blame the proximate ca uses of evil w hile recogni zing God's ultimate control. T hu s th e reprobate are damned because of their pride and rebellion aga inst Goel (a lthough the remote cau se of th eir rebellion is the will of Goel) w hereas the elec t are saved through the grace of Goel (a lthough the proxi­ mate ca use of th eir sa lvation is th eir ac t of fa ith). ' " Calvin is adamant in affirming t hat Goel ultimately w ills all things in order to bring glory to himse lf even w hen we ca nnot see th e big picture. "So now it is to be main­ tained th at there is a dive rsity of kinds w hile He wills in the sa me way, so that out of th e variety w hich perplexes us a harmony may be bea utifully contrived. " 20 H e comes , close to reali zing his difference from A ugustine when disc uss ing this topic. I w ill not repea t here with August ine w hat I yet w illingly accept from him as true: T here is nothing positi ve in sin and ev il: for this subtlety does not sa ti sfy many . For myse lf, I take another principle: Whatever things are clon e wrongly and unju stl y by man , the se ve ry things are the right and just works of Goel ." ' It is unfortunate th at Calvin did not consider more close ly the "subtlety" of A u­ gustine on this iss ue for it illustrates a fundamentally different perspec ti ve in the two th inkers. Both A ugustine and Calvin reveal an interes t in preserving the glory of Goel. A ugustine considers it unfitting th at Goel be made the ca use of ev il and thus limits God's predestination to infralapsarian election to sa lva tion . Ca lvin asserts that in order for God's glory to be preser ved he must remain always in complete control of hi s crea tion. A ugustine's view entails a du alism of nature and grace whereas Calvin is left with a highl y paradoxical view of Goel as both the ca use of evil and the opponent of ev il. But Calvin's doctrine of predestination does more th an preserve God's glory by emphasizing his co mplete o mnipotence. T he omnipotence of Goel is not a notion to be considered wi th abstrac t indifference. Rath er it ca n only be properly understood by Christ ians who co nfess the full implications of God's gracious and unshakeab le mercy toward hi s ch ildren. It is of little use to talk of th e stability of God's purpose if we do not relate it to ourse lves. T herefore the [in Psa lm 33 ] declares that those whom Goel takes under hi s guardianship are bl essed because God's purpose is not hidden from th em, for it is see n in ac tion in the safe ty of the church. A nd so we understand that it is not those who consider God's power coldly and w ith indifference. but those who apply it to their own immediate need , that have a right knowledge of God as the Pilot of the world. 22 Thus Calvi n reveals the close connection betwee n hi s doctrine of predestination and hi s nee d for ce rta inty and confidence in the gracious purposes of Goel. This connection becomes even more evid ent when we examine how both Augus­ tine and Calvin view th e operation of grace after th e fa ll of man. A ugustine consistently claimed that predestination is someth ing th at must always remain mysterious and seemingly arbitrary in th e eyes of men. This view was considerably rei nforced by his 4 doctrine of and hi s doctrine of . Infants are born in original sin and are thu s worthy of eternal in th e eyes of Goel. According to A ugustine, th ey ca n nevertheless be saved through baptism w hich accounts them among believers " by virtue of the and the an swer of th eir sponsor s. " 23 T hi s is predestination in its most mysterious, external, and see mingly arbitrary form. While some in fa nts perish without baptism others ar e saved through no action of their own. What seems fortuitous in human eyes takes place through the deliberate choice of Goel, however. You must refer the matter, then, to the hidden determinations of Goel , when you see, in one and th e sa me condition, such as all infants un­ ques tionably have,-who derive their hereditary evil from A cl am,-that the one is ass isted so as to be bapti zed , and another is not ass isted , so that he dies in his very bondage . 24 T he very inability of infants to do anything to obtain grace was not rega rded by A ugustine as an exception to the rule. Rather , along with the election of Jes us to be th e second Adam, it serves as a paradigm of the way in which Goel deals w ith all men. But all thi s reasoning, whereby we maintain that th e grace of Goel through Jes us Christ our Lord is truly grace, that is, is not give n accord ­ ing to our merits ... involves so mewhat of a difficulty in respec t of grown­ up people, who are alrea dy exercising the choice of will. But when we come to th e case of infants, and to th e M ediator between God and man Himse lf, the man Christ Jes us, there is wanting all asse rtion of human merits that precede the grace of Goct. 20 Since th e paradigm of God 's dea lings w ith man see ms so arbitrary A ugustine offers no cause for ass urance of sa lvation. His doctrine of th e perseverance of the saints mea ns that those whom Goel has chosen w ill certainly persevere to the encl. Those, then, are elected , as has often been said, who are ca lled accord ­ ing to His purpose, who are also predestined and foreknown. If any one of these perishes , Goel is mistaken: but none of them perishes beca use God is not mistaken. If any one of these perishes , God is overcome by human 2 sin : but none of them perishes, because Goel is overcome by nothing. " But it is not un ti l th e encl that one ca n know if he was rea lly chose n by Goel or not. Any fee ling of certainty of sa lvation is viewed by A ugustine as .fa lse pres umption. For who of th e multitude of believers ca n pres ume, so long as he is li ving in thi s mortal state, that he is in th e number of th e predes tinated? Because it is necessary that in this condition that shou ld be kept hidden : since here we have to beware so much of pride, that eve n so great an apostle was buffeted by a messenger of , les t he should be lifted up. 27 The Christian is left in a pos ition of prayer for th e gift of persevering grace, hoping w ith fear and trembling that he is one of God's elec t. 28 Ca lvin 's attitud e could hardly be more different from A ugustine's on this ques­ tion . Without denying th e free grace of Goel , Ca lvin does not hes itate to show th at grace need not be inscrutable to the elec t. In th e case of infants God's dea lings are not bound to the external rite of baptism. In contrast to August ine, Calvin proclaims that "we mu st utterl y rej ect the fiction of those w ho consign all the unbaptized to eternal cleath." 2 11 Baptism does not automati ca ll y was h away the sin that wou ld remain w ith­ out it. Rath er it is essentiall y a sign of the covenant betwee n Goel and his people. Al­ though th e external sign of baptism is not to be cl epise cl and ignored, God's promise 5 continues with or without th e sign. Thus God 's ac tions, although no less free for Calvin than ror A ugustine, are bound to a covenant upon w hi c h man can rely with confidence. For how sweet is it to godly minds to be assured , not onl y by word , but by sight , th at th ey obtain so much fa vor w ith the Heavenl y Father that th eir offspring are within hi s ca re? For here we ca n see how he takes on toward us th e rol e of a mos t provident Fa th er , w ho even after our dea th mainta ins his care for us, providing for and looking after our chilclren.'w L ikewise God's grace is sc rutable to th e adult Christian if viewed from the stand­ point of . From this stand point the doctrine of predes tination does not frighten th e Christian but ra th er ass ures him of hi s elec ti on. There is no consideration more apt for the building up of fa ith than that we should listen to this electi on which the Spirit of Goel tes tifies in our hea rts to stand in the eternal and inflexible good w ill of god , in vulnera ble to all storms of the world , all assaults of Satan and all vacillati on of the fl es h ... Hence arises an impreg nable sec urity. 31 It is impossible to see how thi s ca n be the case unless one recognizes th e strong connec tion between predestinati on and so teriology th at has bee n emphas ize d by much twentieth ce ntury Cal vin sc holarship. One's security indee d does not res t in the th ought that Goel inscrutably chooses some to salvation and others to damnation; ra th er it res ts in th e proclamation th at in Christ Goel has elec ted us to sa lva ti on. T hu s Ca lvin employs a distincti on pa ra ll elling th at betwee n prox imate and remote ca uses; thi s the distinction is betwee n th e labyrinthine mind of Goel as it exists in itse lf and God 's purpose as it is revealed to us. But I do not merely se nd men off to the sec ret elec ti on of Goel to await with ga ping mouth sa lva tion th ere. I bid them make their way direc tl y to Christ in whom sa lvati on is offered us, w hich otherwi se would have lain hid in Goel. For w hoever does not walk in the plai n path of fa ith can make nothing of the elec tion o f' Goel but a labyrinth of des tructi on. 32 With this kind of ass ura nce it is not surpri sing to find that A ugustine's co ntinuall y unce rtain prayer for the gift of perseverance find s no place in Ca lvin's th eo logy. T he Spirit of Goel , th en, never exhorts us to ca re and application in prayer, as if our sa lva tion flu ctu ated in a state of un ce rtainty , for it res ts in the hand of Goel ; never imposes on us a fear th at cuts away th e confide nce founded on the gratuitous love or Gocl. '13 In th e last analys is we must conclude that although Calvin's doctrine of pre­ des tinati on certainly has A ugustinian elements within it, hi s use of the doctrine is dis­ tinctl y a w ork of Reformati on th eology. L uther's qu est fo r religious ce rta inty led him to th e gospel promise ofjustifica tion by fa ith alone. With thi s promise L uther was able to withstand the oppos ition of man and the assa ults of demons. Ca lvin's less colorful pe rso nal life may so metimes obsc ure th e fac t that he too so ught ce rtainty in an age of un ce rtainty; he too found it in th e gospel promise . But for Calvin the gospel was more broadly interpreted through a grea ter emphas is on th e doctrine of predes tination. Certainty is founded on the faith that God has chose n us in Christ before th e founda­ tion of the world and that his control ove r crea tion is so complete th at nothing ca n in the leas t threaten our sec urity. If Pighius [Calvin's" Pel agian" opponent) asks how I know I am elec t, I answer th at Christ is more than a thou sa nd tes timonies to me. For wh en 6 we find ourse lves in His body, our sa lva tion res ts in a sec ure and tranquil place, as though already located in .a·• Such ass urance Augustine cou ld not provide.

FOOTNOTES

' , Co11cemi11g the Etemal Pr<•desti11 atio11

i; St. Aurelius Augustine, Th e CityThomas Merton (New York: Random House, Th e Modern Library, 1950), chap'. X IV, 13. 7 St. Aurelius Augustine, " On Rebuke and Grace." in Saint A11g 11 sti11: A11ti-Pelag ill11 Writings , chap . 31 . ' We are here ignoring Satan, th e immed iate cause or Adam's downfall, and ask ing the more ultimate qu es­ tion. 11 St. Aureliu s Augustine , "On Marriage and Concupi scence," in Saint A111;us ti11 : A11ti-Pela1:ia11 Writings, chap. 11 , 48. 10 St. Aureliu s Augustine, , chap. X IV, 13. "St. Aurelius A ugustine, "On Man's in Righteousness," in Saint A111i11sti11: A11ti-Pelagia11 Wri­ tings, chap. I V(9). 12 St. A urelius Augustine, The City '!(God, chap. XV , I. "'St. Au relius Augustine, "On Grace and Free Wi ll ," in Sllint A11u11sti11: A11ti-Pelauia11 Writings. chap. 4 I(XX). '"'cf. Gotthard Nygren , Das Pr(l(/esti11a tio11sproble111 in tier Theologie A11g11sti11 s (Lund: CW K Gleerup, 1956) , pp . 265 , 266 . In Nygren's words: "Die Lehre von der doppelten Pradestination, zum Himmel und zur Holle, hat somit- obwohl sich der positive Sinn der Geschi chte im Gedanken an Christus und die Heiligen ersc hopft- das letzte Wort in der augustinisc hen T heologie." Surely the double predestinat io n label best applies on ly to th ose w ho, unlike Augustine, are willing to make God ultimate ly responsible for th e si n of th e reprobate. "John Ca lvin , /11stit11te.\' f!( the Christian R eliuion, 2 vols., John T. McNeil! , trans. Ford Lewis Battles, The Library or Christ ian Classics (Philadelphia: The Westm inster Press , 1960) , I , xv, 8. " If anyone objects th at [man's] w ill was pl aced in an insecure position because its power was weak, his statu s should have availed to remove any excuse; nor was it reasonable for God to be constrain ed by the necess it y or makinga man w ho either could not or wou ld not sin at all. Such a 11at11re would, in deed , have bee n more excellent. But to quruTel w ith God on thi s precise point, as if he ought to have co nferred thi s upon man . is more than iniquitous, inas­ mu ch as it It 'll.\' in his 011'11 choice to f.: il'e w/Jatel'er he p leased. " (Italics mine.) " ' John Ca lvin, Conceminu the Eternal Predes ti11atio111~(Gn d , chap. VIII , 5. 17 John Calvin, lnstit11t es

7 "'St. Aurelius Augustine, "On the Predestination of the Saints," chap. 23 (XI I). "'St. Aureli us Augustine, " On Rebuke and Grace," chap. 14 . " Ibid., chap. 40. " St. Aureliu s Augustine, " On the Gift of Perseverance," in Saint A 11g 11 stin: A nti-Pl'iagian Writings, chaps. 3, 10 (V I) . "' Jo hn Calvin , Institutes f~/"t h e Christian R elii:ion, IV , xv i, 26. :io Ibid. , IV , svi, 32.

:ii John Calvin , Co11 cerni11i: th e Etema/ Predestination of God, chap. 11. ~12 Ibid ., chap. VII I , 4. "' Ibid. , chap. V III , 8. 3 1 · Ibid. 1 chap. V 111 .

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