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THE HISTORY OF THE 2/2nd AUSTRALIAN FIELD REGIMENT ROYAL AUSTRALIAN ARTILLERY A.I.F.

Published by the 2nd/2nd Field Regiment Association Melbourne, 1961

THE COMPILATION OF THIS HISTORY

The General Editor was Brigadier W. Cremor. It is a joint effort. Sections were written by Brigadier W. Cremor, C.B.E., E.D. Brigadier A. E. Arthur, D.S.O., E.D. Lieut.-Colonel R. F. Jaboor, O.B.E., E.D. Major G. M. Lee Major R. E. McPherson, M.C. Lieutenant L. Creed Lieutenant C. Adam

Revisions and amendments were made by a number of original ex-N.C.O.'s of the regiment -- Lieutenants G. Smith, C. Gilbert, C. Morley, A. Bickell, G. Griffeth and D. Cunningham; Sergeants A. Wilcox and E. King; and Bombardier J. Lee.

To supply names of other ranks who were in various parties, meetings of original sergeants of 3 Battery and 4 Battery (all eventually commissioned) were held. So that really it is a compositely produced history.

An original member of the Regiment, Harell Day, prepared the maps of Greece and Crete, and also designed the dust jacket.

The thanks of the Association are due to Mrs. W. R. G. Hiscock and to Colonel W. H. Elwood, M.C., M.A., M.Ed., for their very careful work in revising the manuscript and for making so many suggestions to improve the style or to clarify the meaning.

We would also like to thank Major J. McGrath, Director of the Australian War Memorial, and his Staff, for their ready co-operation.

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

To the memory of All Ranks of the 2/2nd Field Regiment R.A.A. who were Killed in Action or Died during the War 1939-1945 FOREWORD

by

MAJOR-GENERAL J. S. WHITELAW, C.B., C.B.E. One time M.G.R.A. (L.H.Q.), and Colonel Commandant. ROYAL AUSTRALIAN ARTILLERY

"Wooriyen" Upper Beaconsfield, Victoria.

The function of a Unit History is twofold -- to instruct and to amuse maybe. The instruction is in its record of Unit happenings for the historian of the future, and its amusement for the refreshment of the memories of participants, and maybe for the settlement of arguments. “Do you remember? --.”

In spite of delays and frustrations, the Editorial Committee of 2/2 Field Regiment has succeeded in producing a true and lively record. Probably, due to the delay in production, a better historical perspective has been attained than if its history had been produced earlier.

I am indeed grateful to the Editorial Committee for asking me to write this foreword, and flattered, too, in spite of a sneaking feeling that no one ever reads forewords.

I must admit that as M.G.R.A. I was very proud of the R.A.A., and had arrived at the opinion that in the field regiments there was a genius, and a spirit of team-work that ranked them amongst the best in the world. I am not alone in this opinion, which had its origin in my mind after my tour with Brigadier “Bill” Duncan,* Inspector R.A. at the War Office, and his comments thereon.

Among the distinguished field regiments of the R.A.A. there may have been equals, but none to surpass the 2/2 Field Regiment. It differed not at all from others in the pure gold of its personnel, who joined from the civilian world, but it was more than fortunate in its three Commanding Officers.

Like the minting of a golden sovereign -- it was Alan Ramsay who first stamped the “round” from the metal in the first six months; it was Bill Cremor who indelibly impressed his image on it in the next two and a half years; and Roy Jaboor who provided the milled edge which preserved it free from defacement or spoiling during the remainder of its existence -- from beginning to end a Regiment to be proud of.

I think that the outstanding characteristic of the Regiment was its family feeling, from which came its superb team spirit, and its creed that nothing but the best was good enough for the regiment, and for the Infantry it was supporting.

Major -General

* Brigadier W. E. Duncan, M.V.G., D.S.O., M.C. In 1945 inspector RA, and later editor of the R.A. War Commemorative Book.

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

CONTENTS

Chapter 1 Our Three Commanding Officers Chapter 2 The New Regiment Chapter 3 Growing Up Chapter 4 Puckapunyal to Palestine Chapter 5 Somewhere East of Suez Chapter 6 Desert and the Delta Chapter 7 Into Battle Chapter 8 The Battle of Bardia Chapter 9 Tobruk Chapter 10 On to Benghazi Chapter 11 Return to Egypt Chapter 12 Prelude to Disaster Chapter 13 Greece. A Tragedy of Heroism Chapter 14 Crete. A Debacle Chapter 15 Recuperating and Refitting Chapter 16 Whither Bound? Chapter 17 Ceylon and Senselessness Chapter 18 A Visit Home Chapter 19 In the Doldrums Chapter 20 Back to 6 Division Chapter 21 Aitape to Wewak Chapter 22 The End of a Regiment The Roll of Honour Decorations awarded to Members of the Regiment Appendix Account by Bombardier D. S. Spark of escape from Crete. Epilogue

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

CHAPTER 1 THREE C.O.’s 1

(This sketch of the three C.O.'s of the regiment was made by an officer who knew the three of them in militia days and who served from 1939 to 1945 with the regiment.) He says: "My all too imperfect sketches of them, made with the help of several others, are designed to enable the reader to envisage the type of men who made -- and led -- one, not altogether insignificant, section of the Second A.I.F."

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR ALAN RAMSAY, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D. Alan Hollick Ramsay is one of that small but impressive group of Australians who have made a success of their careers, both as civilians and as soldiers. Enlisting in the First A.I.F. in 1915 at the age of twenty, he served as a signaller, gunner and N.C.O., and received his commission at the end of 1918. On his return to Australia he resumed duty with the Education Department, and his ability as a teacher brought him successive promotions until in 1939 he was a Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Education at the Melbourne University. Whilst on service with the Second A.I.F. he was selected for the most coveted position in the secondary division of the Victorian Education Department -- the head•mastership of Melbourne Boys' High School. Finally, he reached the highest post open to a Victorian educationist -- Director of Education. In between the two wars, Alan Ramsay continued to serve in the militia forces, and when war broke out he was C.R.A.,1 4th Divisional Artillery, with the rank of Brigadier. On the formation of the 6th Division, he was given the opportunity to take command of the newly formed 2/2nd Field Regiment and he unhesitatingly reverted to the rank of Lieut.- Colonel to do so. His job was to form a regiment. To do this he had to pick officers and get them all working together as a team; he had to train his troops, most of whom were raw recruits, and he had to weld the whole into a perfectly co-ordinated fighting team. No one could have been better suited to the task. Alan Ramsay was the best type of teacher. He was a scholar, but he was also a broad-minded individual. As a gunner officer he knew his job perfectly and as a commanding officer he inspired the respect of all ranks. He was completely unselfish and he was just. He was imperturbable, very far-seeing and determined. Under him, all differences in the early days were quietly smoothed out and he gave the regiment a start which few others could have done. The regiment is very proud of his subsequent record in becoming in succession C.RA. 9th Division, C.C.R.A. 1st Corps, and G.O.C. 5th Australian Division.

BRIGADIER W. E. CREMOR, C.B.E., E.D. A brief taste of the 1914-18 war (aged twenty, he arrived just in time for the finish) and an intensive study of Japan and her history, by which he concluded that Japan would eventually attack Australia, furnished the impetus for Bill Cremor's decision to re-join the militia in 1923 as an artillery subaltern. By May, 1936, he had become a Lieut.-Colonel and C.O. of the l0th Field Brigade. Reverting from Lieut.-Colonel to Major, he followed Alan Ramsay into the A.I.F. as he had followed him in command of the l0th Bde. In all his service he was animated by two ideals: that all ranks must be efficient at their own jobs and that officers must look after their troops. Within twenty-four hours of their arrival all recruits were vividly aware of his presence; his direct and picturesque flow of language, his walking stick, and his energy impressed themselves on everyone. Efficiency was still his god. He knew his own job as a gunner, but he also knew that of the infantry and other arms. No one, senior or junior, was ever in any doubt as to his views, but this forthrightness did not tend to endear him to some seniors, and sometimes the regiment suffered through these having “a crack” at its C.O. and, in the process, hitting the troops.

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

CHAPTER 1 THREE C.O.’s 2

Endowed with intelligence and imagination of a high order, unpleasant or awkward situations never worried him. He had a technique of “putting on an act” when it did not matter, but in a critical situation in action no one could be calmer or more humorous. Normally quick-tempered and impatient, particularly at red-tape and “eyewash,” he could, when circumstances demanded, be deadly cool and far-sighted. He hated hypocrisy and incompetence, whether in high or low, and social position or wealth counted for nothing with him. At bad times, as when on two occasions one of his closest friends was killed, he concealed his emotions and pretended to be callous, but the real man was intensely human and always tried to deal with his subordinates on a man-to-man basis. On a number of occasions he risked his career by fighting for a gunner or a junior officer, although he had not wholly approved of that junior, and he never ceased to fight for the well-being of his troops. He demanded an extremely high standard of discipline but ensured that, despite all difficulties, leave, good food, canteen supplies and other amenities were always available to the men of the regiment. That the 2/2nd Regiment was the best cared for unit in the whole A.I.F. was due to him and to his high conception of duty. His only critics were the uninformed or the incompetent. His unselfish, untiring and imaginative efforts made a regiment which many others apart from the unit knew was an outstanding one in the A.I.F. What those who served under him thought was best expressed when he left them: The N.C.O.'s and gunners presented him with a gold hunter watch -- "to Old Bill as a demonstration of appreciation" -- but, also, knowing him, they posted it to him!

LIEUT-COLONEL R, F. JABOOR, O.B.E., E.D. To retain the spirit and ideals that had animated the regiment from its inception, no better successor to Cremor could have been found than "Jabbie," as he had been known to the troops since he joined in 1939. When first commissioned in 1930 in the militia he went to Cremor, who was then a battery commander, and served with him throughout his militia days. Naturally, both adopted the same ideas and just as naturally both joined together in October, 1939. A close personal friend of Cremor, he was shown no more consideration than anyone else; in fact, his life was probably made harder in order to demonstrate that there was no favouritism. Successively troop commander, battery commander, and second- in-command, he and Cremor thought alike on the need for efficiency and regard for the welfare of their troops. Jaboor was of a most generous nature and so sometimes accepted excuses for human failings to which his predecessor would have shown little mercy. Technically, he knew his work from A to Z and he was always willing to experiment and to encourage others to experiment. Gifted with a vivid imagination and a quick wit, he was able, in the dull days of 1943-44, to think out many forms of amenities for his troops and so he kept the morale of the regiment at its normal high pitch. Sensitive to a degree, he yet possessed both moral and physical courage of the highest order, and like his predecessor he could always be relied upon to put up a strenuous fight on behalf of a junior. Every officer, N.C.O. and man in the regiment knew that he would never spare himself; so much so that his sense of duty often induced him to overtax his powers of endurance. Likewise, everyone knew that not even august powers such as Second Army Headquarters would be permitted “to put over” anything which adversely affected his troops, who to him were the alpha and omega of his existence. He served throughout the whole war with the regiment -- and he served the regiment throughout.

1 Commander, Royal Artillery.

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

CHAPTER 2 THE NEW REGIMENT 1

To those interested in army affairs, the title "Regiment" has always had an inspiring sound, and the announcement that the artillery of the new division was to be organized into regiments instead of into brigades was received with enthusiasm. (A division of infantry as the 6th was, is supported by its divisional artillery, but each regiment of the divisional artillery is also normally in support of or closely associated with one of the three infantry brigades.) As a result, the 2/2nd Field Regiment and 17th Brigade began from their inception an association which was to be carried on through the whole long history of both units. On 13th October it was announced that the Brigadiers of the 6th Division had been appointed. Amongst them, it was learned with pleasure by all gunners, was Brigadier E. F. Herring, D.S.O., M.C., E.D., a K.C. and Rhodes Scholar1, who had been selected as Commander, Royal Artillery. Brigadier A. H. Ramsay, E.D., was appointed the first commanding officer of the 2/2nd Field Regiment, reverting to Lieut.-Colonel to take the appointment; and his example was followed by the second-in•command, Lieut.-Colonel W. E. Cremor, E.D., who reverted to the rank of Major, and by several other officers. The new regimental organization gave the regiment a headquarters, two batteries (each of a headquarters and three troops of four guns), a total of twenty four guns. Also included with the regiment was the medical officer from the A.A.M.C., a light aid detachment from the Ordnance Corps, and a signal section from the Australian Corps of Signallers. To fill the places in the new regiment, the only artillery unit to be raised in Victoria, the commanding officer drew on the members of all the Victorian R.A.A. units of the A.M.F. and it seemed that there would be few difficulties in obtaining a full muster of volunteers. But this was not to be. In fact, the decision to bring into being an entirely new force had many repercussions, most of which were to be felt right to the end of the war. Undoubtedly a number of militia officers, including some general and field officers, were too old for commands in a war. Then the fact at only one A.I.F. division was to be formed meant that of those who were competent only a proportion could be selected. Of those serving in the ranks in the militia many were married men or men in civil positions which they could not leave at a moment's notice. Added to this was the fact that a lot of propaganda was indulged in with the militia troops by officers who knew that they were not going to be selected for the 6th Division and advised the troops not to rush into the A.I.F. but to “wait a while when we can all go together.” The result was that the response from the other ranks of the militia was extremely disappointing.2 The best figures for Australia came from the l0th Field Artillery Brigade, from which seventy nine N.C.O.'s and gunners joined the 2/2nd Regiment. The officers of the regiment, with the exception of a few permanent officers, all came from the militia, 3rd Battery officers coming from the 2nd Medium Brigade and 4th Division, and 4th Battery from the 2nd Cavalry Division and 3rd Division. At the time of the unit's formation this looked a logical arrangement because each battery had officers who had previously been serving together and, consequently, started off with at least a little cohesion. In practice, however, it meant that the two batteries kept apart and distinct for a very long time, and it was only after the first actions in Libya that men began to think of the regiment as a regiment and not of their particular battery. Thus the ranks of the unit were made up largely of volunteers without any previous training. However, when they came together in their new unit, the ex-militia men, mainly N.C.O.'s, and the new diggers got along together very well but both joined in disparaging those militia men who stayed in the A.M.F. Then arose the obnoxious term "choco" -- the chocolate soldier who would not fight -- a term which was to remain until finally erased by the later lads of the militia when their turn came to engage in battle in the New Guinea jungles.

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

CHAPTER 2 THE NEW REGIMENT 2

Colonel Ramsay selected as battery commander, 3rd Battery, Major L. G. H. Dyke3 from the staff corps; as 4th Battery commander, Major C. L. Young4 from the militia; Captain M. R. Buring5, staff corps as adjutant, and Lieutenant W. G. Guy5, A.I.C. regimental quartermaster. In the meanwhile, those of the militia who had volunteered were attested and the newcomers who had not been in the militia began to stream in. These untrained men were drafted to the Melbourne Showgrounds for their elementary training and for issue with such few odds and ends of equipment as were available. These men were a true cross- section of the more gallant part of Australian manhood, and ranged from the incredibly young (fifteen)6 to the very old. Though they included their percentage of failures and were inspired to join by their own various and very private motives, they were, and still are, the cream of all that this country can offer. Those chosen to take the rough edges off the "rookies"7 were selected members of the A.I.C. and of a strange composite force then known as the Darwin Mobile Force. These instructors were really good, and in the course of a few short weeks had the recruits marching like veterans. Several of the W.O.’s8 and N.C.O.’s among the instructors came to the regiment as battery and troop sergeant-majors and quarter-master sergeants9, and again proved their worth. To carry out administrative duties at the Showgrounds and to act as draft conducting officers, five militia officers, Lieutenants Mair10, Barnden11, Parkinson12, Tatchell13, and Wood14, were attested and posted there as regimental representatives. Those days at the Showgrounds are still remembered with very mixed feelings by those who endured them. Most of the “rookies” arrived during the week 24th/31st October. From their arrival until 10th November, life consisted of foot and rifle drill interspersed by route marches. Getting away to a good start of being “mucked about” by the army, they painfully learned the old “form fours” drill and then found that the new “three ranks” drill was to be introduced -- and equally painfully acquired. They had their first contacts with the proverbial “sergeant-majors” and thought them awful b------s; as so many recruits have, only to find later that they were really pretty good blokes and a most essential part of any good army. One of the “rookies,” Gunner C. Dollman15, put his feelings in these words: “Sleeping on straw -- either too much or too little -- in palliasses was a new art speedily acquired and gradually the cameraderie of barrack life grew up. Uniforms came gradually, first unlovely yellow boots, which took their toll in blistered feet, then hats also unlovely with no hat bands and no badges. These same hats were later to take pride of place amongst their owners’ most cherished possessions and were to be worn with particular aplomb by the gunners of the 2/2nd. Cup Day 1939 was made memorable by the appearance at that classic of hordes of partly uniformed “rookies” the first view many of the racecourse patrons had had of the new Army.” While blisters and battalions were being raised at the Showgrounds, a start had been made at preparing a camp and training area for the regiment. The 17th Brigade was to concentrate on the hastily erected camp at the then unknown Puckapunyal, several miles west of Seymour. This camp was not yet large enough to house all the troops being raised in Victoria and the 2/2nd Regiment and part of 6th Divisional Cavalry Regiment were to be temporarily accommodated at old Seymour Camp -- a veteran of 1914/18 and many ‘tween wars militia camps. On Friday, 3rd November, Lieut.-Colonel Cremor, Lieutenant Guy, and twenty one ex- militia N.C.O.’s16 arrived at Seymour to prepare for the whole regiment. In keeping with the then leisurely pace of our war, they found the area deserted and had to scrounge their first meal from a neighbouring militia camp. Ordnance at Seymour siding, when approached, was not interested and the most unremitting persistence was needed to procure an initial issue of the necessary blankets and cooking gear. The issuing clerk had never heard of a field artillery “regiment” let alone a scale of issue for such a unit.

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

CHAPTER 2 THE NEW REGIMENT 3

Forceful telephoning to Melbourne H.Q. by the 2 i/c together with Lieutenant Guy's knowledge of the P.M.F. compelled Ordnance to start a real issue next day, and all hands of the advance party were soon very busy preparing for the main body. On 4th November, more arrived and on the 6th the majority of the officers and volunteers from the militia marched in. They were followed by the first of the many batches from the Showgrounds. These lads were living illustrations of our lack of preparedness for war. Though it was now more than two months since the outbreak of war, most of them were still largely in their civilian clothes. Some were lucky they had felt hats and those bright yellow boots, but the “in-between” was still very much civilian. The troops themselves were merely civilians who had had a little army training instilled into them at the Showgrounds. They had learnt something of army organisation but they had lost little of their civilian outlook. This was illustrated in the first issue of “Action Front” in which the following conversation was recorded: New recruit (to officer): “Excuse me, sir, but would it be in order for me to bring my motor-bike into camp?” Officer: “That would be quite all right.” New recruit: “You're absolutely certain, sir? What I mean is, can I take your word for it as sufficient authority?” Officer (smiling): “You can please yourself about that, son; I'm only the second in command of this regiment.” As each batch arrived -- it took many days to complete the manning of the regiment -- the lads were issued with such small items of camping gear as were available and were allotted to the various sub-unit H.Q.’s and troops. Every such unit has an establishment, a list setting out the numbers of officers, N.C.O.’s, clerks, gunners, drivers, cooks, etc., necessary to make the unit function, and this had to be filled. Sorting the unknown new arrivals in an attempt to fill the categories naturally resulted in many square pegs in round holes, none more obviously than in the all important cook house, where burnt offerings were produced for a few days. Of technical equipment there was virtually none: no guns, no battery staff equipment, few rifles, no Bren guns. Here the term “Wouldn't it?” reached tremendous proportions as the troops suffered for the paucity of equipment and the lack of foresight among our politicians of all parties. The term illustrated both disgust and contempt, “Wouldn't it rotate you?” being a polite variant to the more earthy original. The militia training of the officers and N.C.O.’s proved its worth and, despite the lack of gear, training went on. Blackboard instruction was largely used and made up for the lack of text books. Branches of trees laid on the ground represented guns and the troops responded to the “gun” drill with enthusiasm, though to the many who had never even seen a gun it must have been very bewildering. Route marches and field-craft received much attention and this early training stood in good stead in later months when the emphasis was on making up lost time in technical training. Gradually equipment began to drift in. First motor transport, some Marmon Herrington tractors for towing the still absent guns and some speedy utility trucks. The regiment’s first casualties occurred shortly afterwards -- W.O. E. J. Duncan, Sergeants J. Cleary, Paul Thompson, and George Edgar being killed in a terrific motor smash not far from the camp. On 29th November the Prime Minister announced that the A.I.F. would serve overseas. By early December, sufficient guns and motor transport had arrived to make training more interesting and cross country work away from camp became possible. On the 18th December, after working parties had spent several strenuous days clearing and levelling parade grounds and gun parks, the regiment moved to the newly completed

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

CHAPTER 2 THE NEW REGIMENT 4 artillery block at Puckapunyal and made its first contact with 17th Brigade. Soon after arriving at Puckapunyal, an advance party of the regiment left for the Middle East. The party consisted of Captain W. R. Hiscock, Lieutenant Norm McQuilken and Sergeants Alf Bickell and Ken Stewart. They sailed from Port Melbourne on 20th December, 1939. Most of the regiment was given leave for Christmas and, having by now been issued with uniforms, the troops descended on Melbourne and their home towns with the first definite signs of that swagger which always distinguishes the gunner of a well-found regiment. Apart from their friends and close relatives, they found people as yet unaware of the significance of the new uniform or the new colour patches with the grey background of the new division.

1 Later Lt.-Gen. Sir Edmund Herring, K.C.M.G., K.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., E.D. 2 One sergeant was overheard to remark: “Why should I join the A.I.F. now when I can wait in the militia, get a commission and then join the A.I.F. with a commission?” And he did! 3 Afterwards Major-General L. G. H. Dyke, C.B.E., D.S.O. 4 Afterwards Col. 5 Afterwards Major. 6 Gnr. Lewis, 15; Gnr. Artis, 16. 7 Army term for recruits. 8 Warrant Officers. 9 Amongst them were W.O.'s Clark, Duncan, Cruickshank and Walsh. 10 Later Major. 11 Later Major C. L. Barnden, M.B.E. 12 Later Major L. G. Parkinson, M.B.E., E.D. 13 Later Major J. Tatchell, M.B.E. 14 Later Major F. H. Wood, M.B.E., E.D. 15 Later Captain. 16 They were: Sgt. G. J. Smith, Sgt. Alf. Wright, Sgt. A. Osborne, Sgt. Chas. Coulson, Sgt. Alf. Davis, Bdrs. S. Saber, Eric Turner, Arch. Fletcher, Alf. Bickell, Ted Liddy, Fred Young, Geo. Williams, Ken Stewart, Bob Donovan and Phil Tatchell, and Gnrs. Reg. Kirk, Ian Bolger, Laurie Kaye, Geoff Hobbs, lan Ramsay, and Norm. Bravo.

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

CHAPTER 3 GROWING UP 1

On their return from Christmas leave, the troops found training beginning in real earnest. All types of equipment commenced to roll in, and troop and battery exercises became the order of the day -- and night. After day-long exercises with the newly acquired motor transport the troops were often turned out at night to drive without lights to Euroa, Nagambie, and similar places. Those night marches will never be forgotten by those who took part. As they felt their way along tree•lined country roads and lanes, the only lights were the parking lights of the leading vehicle. Batteries and troops would go out complete and return in bits and pieces. The big army vehicles moving like noisy ghosts through the usually quiet countryside must have caused more than a little consternation to the locals and to the other -- fortunately few -- road users. On one or two occasions, minor collisions occurred in the small hours with fruit-laden trucks heading for the Melbourne markets, but apart from a few scattered pears and tomatoes there were no casualties. The worst night for many was to follow the very late arrival of the weekend leave train one Sunday night. When the troops arrived back at Puckapunyal they found that the second-in-command, who had not been on leave, had used his spare time during the weekend to plan a most torturous march for that night. New Year’s Eve in Puckapunyal was a really festive night. Each unit had its own party, and after midnight there was much visiting between units. Bands, both official and impromptu, paraded the camp and made much of the occasion -- particularly in the 2/5th Battalion area, where the Scots and their pipes kept up their traditional New Year festivities. The new regimental organization had brought with it a new system of controlling the fire of the regiment and until January, when a party of officers led by Major Cremor, went to Holdsworthy for a three weeks course of instruction, very little was known of the new system. In the meantime training at Puckapunyal went on steadily. The weather was very hot and dust bowl conditions soon existed around the camp where the soft grey soil broke up under the wheels of the heavy vehicles. As each troop moved out to its training area the camp became enshrouded with a pall whipped up by the ever willing north wind. The artillery range added its quota to the general discomfort by catching fire, resulting in a great tussle to save the valuable forest at the back of Mount Puckapunyal, a steep conical hill which blazed like a giant torch when the fire swept over it. Soon came the first practice shoot and the first injections. Injections en masse are unpleasant episodes -- the smell of iodine, the shining instruments and the rather inane jokes to the doctors as they quickly pinch up the flesh on the bared arms and sink in their not so sharp needles. At the same time, news was received that the first big body of troops, the 16th Brigade raised in N.S.W., with the 2/2nd's sister regiment, the 2/1st, had sailed from Sydney Harbour in a magnificent convoy of England’s largest ships. The divisional commander, General Sir Thomas Blamey, carried out an inspection in the field -- the first glimpse many had of their G.O.C. This was followed on the 24th January by what proved to be a very grand experience -- the march of the brigade group through Melbourne. On the 23rd the regiment moved by road, not completely equipped with motor transport but with enough to give each man a place, to the Artillery and Engineers Depots in Batman Avenue, where bivouac was made for the night. Tremendous crowds turned out to greet the brigade as it was led by the regiment on a roundabout route through the city. For the first time, many Melbourne citizens saw the new troops on parade and what they saw they liked -- and let the troops know it in no uncertain way. This is a memory that all who took part in the march keep tucked away with other good memories. After the march, the regiment moved, not as many hoped to transports, but back to camp and more training. The next big march was per boot, a surprise sprung by the C.O. in the form of a twenty mile route march, part of a process of toughening up.

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CHAPTER 3 GROWING UP 2

4th Battery was lucky enough to be chosen to move by road to Holdsworthy to act as depot battery for the next course at the School of Artillery. This was a real test and the battery came through well, moving 600 miles in four days. The towns at which they stopped overnight greeted the troops with traditional country hospitality. Lieut.-Colonel Ramsay and another batch of officers left for Sydney to be put through their paces by the indefatigable Colonel H. B. Sewell, and the new, very learned batch returned to pass on their new knowledge. Training was now really “on,” Divisional Artillery H.Q. putting 3rd Battery through its paces out Mitcheltown way with the R.A.A.F. turning on opposition to keep the need for concealment and dispersion in the limelight. Exercises -- days long -- shooting, night marches, vaccinations with mighty sore arms and many down with fever, more injections, vehicles being despatched for move overseas, the return of 4th Battery, rifle shooting, issue of respirators, gas drill, all mixed in an accelerating tempo bringing nearer the inevitable embarkation -- busy days full of colour and anticipation and the gradual moulding of a regiment that was fast becoming a fine unit. On 5th March, “C” Troop again marched to Melbourne, this time to fire a salute as a last tribute to Lieut.-General E. K. Squires, an English officer who died in Melbourne while on loan to Australia as Chief of the General Staff. On the way back, while the convoy was going up a steep hill, a whole gun crew, taking advantage of their Sergeant Alf Davis's dozing on the front scat of the tractor and unable to resist the lure of the bright lights, bailed out and went A.W.L., an episode which the surprised sergeant found hard to explain on his arrival back at his gun park. On 5th March the regiment made history by producing the first printed regimental newspaper of the new A.I.F., “Action Front,” under the editorship of Sgt. E. Liddy. Later editions of the paper were produced in every land in which the regiment served. Few of the troops expected to be in Australia for long after joining up, but as the busy months hastened by it seemed that the war must surely be over before they left their homeland. The unreality of the “Sitzkrieg” in Europe was reflected in Australia, and the news of embarkation leave, so long anticipated and so long deferred, came as an electrifying shock. On the 20th March the Victorian men moved out on leave, leaving a small contingent of interstate soldiers, mainly Western Australians, in camp. By now the raw troops of October had become disciplined soldiers with a real pride in their regiment. They returned to their homes for what they thought would be their last visit before sailing, talking of little else than their “cobbers” and their doings and seeming already a little stranger to their folk carrying on the normal round of life. Packing of equipment, issues of stores and more unwelcome medical attention followed leave. “Tinhats” made everyone look and feel very warlike but they were soon regarded as encumbrances and afterwards, were rarely worn. The 17th Brigade was by now a very smart show, the infantry with their bands putting on fine parades past the artillery camp as they moved out to the range. They had with them a much larger proportion of old soldiers from the 1914/18 war than had the gunners. In both arms, however, these veterans were adept in passing on to the youngsters all the small tips which could make soldiering relatively comfortable. Though many of them dropped out shortly after their arrival overseas they had already rendered invaluable service which was not obvious at the time. There was always a good deal of good-natured back chat between the old soldiers and the new. The older men often said that they did not know how the soft new generation would take the hard knocks of war. The youngsters usually came back as did the bombardier to one of the regiment's senior officers who had voiced the same opinion. “Well, if I might say so, sir, if your generation had done the job properly last time there'd be no occasion for my generation to be taking anything.”

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On 6th March, the Government decided to enlarge the new A.I.F. from a division to a corps of two divisions, the 7th Division to be raised forthwith. A Corps Headquarters was to be formed, together with corps artillery including medium guns. On 4th April it was announced that the regiment's C.O., Colonel Ramsay, was to be appointed Commander Corps Medium Artillery, and promoted Brigadier. He had given devoted service to the unit during its cradle days and his new promotion was a fitting recognition of his services to the artillery. Lieut.-Colonel Cremor was appointed C.O. in his stead, Major Young becoming 2 i/c and Captain A. E. Arthur1 being given command of 4th Battery. The new C.O., on taking over, held on 6th April one of what were to become his famous regimental parades, when the troops knew that they were being assembled to be told that by and large they were a pretty poor lot, but on a few memorable occasions very good indeed. On this first parade, Lieut.-Colonel Cremor told them that war was 95 per cent boredom and 5 per cent fright, that the man who said he was never frightened was a liar, and that in the days to come they would regard the regiment as their home and would break their necks to get back to it (a statement mostly derided then by the troops but remembered in the years to come as a simple truth). On 11th April, an historic parade was held for the newly appointed Corps Commander, General Blamey, who had relinquished command of the division to Major-General Iven Mackay, already in Palestine. The ranks of well turned out troops along the long length of the huge Puckapunyal parade ground were a magnificent sight, as was the march past after the G.O.C.’s inspiring address in which he said: “Civilisation is at the cross-roads, and the development of the past centuries is threatened by a people that is ruthless and cruel. The martyrs of Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, and now Norway and Denmark demand that those who believe as we do in freedom should be helped to the utmost of our capacity. You know it. That is why you are going.” On the night of Friday the 12th, each battery and troop turned on its own farewell party, the festivities being aided by large bonfires and hurriedly garnered supplies of beer. What threatened to be even a rowdier “break-up” night on the Saturday was quietly nipped in the bud by the C.O., who turned on a sixteen mile route march in the afternoon. About 1700 hours back stumbled a weary regiment to camp but the 2/2nd’s lines that night, the last in Australia, were as silent as the tomb -- as the C.O. had intended that they should be -- and every man had a sound night’s sleep so that the regiment was ready next morning to move out not bleary eyed and lethargic but fit, alert, and in good spirits.

1 Later Brig. A. E. Arthur, D.S.O., E.D.

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Great secrecy had been maintained regarding the brigade group’s move to Port Melbourne, so far as any official announcement was concerned. However, it was found out a few days before that most of the station staff at Seymour knew the whole story, including the names of the troopships and the allocation of units to them. On Sunday, 14th April, the move from camp went smoothly, the troops travelling in 30- cwt. lorries to Seymour, the regiment then being split between two troop trains. Most of Melbourne seemed to have known of the impending departure, and from Broadmeadows onwards the stations were lined by people determined to give the troops a tumultuous farewell. There was a huge crowd at Port Melbourne and as the trains ran slowly over the level crossings, through the crowded station and on to the pier, the lads were able to recognize friends and relations eager to say farewell. Unfortunately, very few people were allowed on to the pier and although this probably assisted in the case of the embarkation, it made the actual departure rather colourless, despite the presence of numerous officials and a military band. The regiment, together with the 2/8th Infantry Battalion, was allotted to H.M.T. Dunera, a modern British India line ship of 11,162 tons, which had for some years previously been used as a troopship for taking British regular army units to and from India and Hong Kong. Despite the inexperience of the embarkation staff -- this was the first major troop movement from Port Melbourne since 1918 -- the allotment of troops to their quarters went smoothly enough. The lads hurried to their mess decks, dumped their gear and then crowded back to the rails to see what they could of the distant but enthusiastically farewelling crowd. General Sir Thomas Blamey came aboard to bid farewell and shortly after 6.00 hours, to the strains of the band, Dunera pulled out in a blinding rain squall to join the remainder of the convoy -- the Ettrick and Nevasa -- and in their company moved to an overnight anchorage opposite Dromana where they were joined next day by the Stratbaird, which had Divisional Headquarters and the 2/7th Battalion aboard. Adelaide was the only escort until Fremantle. Through the Heads and out into the Southern Ocean went the ships, taking up convoy formation and ploughing grandly southward and westward into the cold rough seas of the Australian Bight. The troops soon settled down to shipboard routine, although the rough weather made things rather unpleasant on the mess decks. They were not well ventilated, and the rigidly enforced blackout made the air very stuffy. In real troopship style and in marked contrast to the comfort of the 16th Brigade group which had left in January in the big converted passenger ships, the mess decks combined the functions of feeding areas and living and sleeping quarters, the hammocks being slung by night above the solid wooden dining tables. The smell of woollen uniforms, of men en masse, of cooking and for a while, of seasickness, did not add up to comfortable living, but as the seas smoothed out, so did living conditions, and the lads were pretty comfortable. A few of the troops were the envy of their mates through their luck in being allotted to cabins normally used by families of British soldiers trooping to and from India. Because of limited accommodation and deck space, training was confined to lectures and to circular route marches around and around the decks to the music of the 2/8th Battalion regimental band. The afternoons were devoted to sports, again strictly limited by space. Boxing was very popular and the regiment produced some champions in the shape of Gunners “Mick” McKay and Jack Wilson, Bombardier “Bluey” Walsh, Sergeant Alf Davis, and Gunners Charles Jager, Harry Neal and Dave Price. By Sunday, the 21st, the lifeboat drill, the daily ship’s officer’s inspection and general shipboard procedure had become second nature to the troops, and they were expectantly eager to explore Perth as the ships nosed in to the Fremantle berths. Although the hotels were closed -- it was Sunday -- the people of Perth turned out in force to give the new diggers a grand reception. Apart from sightseeing, the most popular occupation seemed to

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CHAPTER 4 PUCKAPUNYAL TO PALESTINE 2 be waiting for telephone calls to be put through to the Eastern States. The public telephone booths were crowded with troops, many of whom spent hours of their precious leave in an endeavour to have a last word with those at home. The Western Australian members of the Victorian units re-joined during the day1, and the rest of the lads were back on board by midnight, some making undignified and perilous approaches up the mooring lines. At dawn next day, the convoy moved into the Roads, joining the Neuralia with the Western Australian infantry battalion, the 2/11th, on board. The seas were very calm, a condition that was to continue until near Suez, and with the convoy assembled in a new formation, the ships turned their sterns on Australia and made for Colombo. Overhead a solitary Avro Anson maintained patrol, a last link with the fast fading shores of Australia. With the suspected presence of German raiders in the Indian Ocean, the convoy’s escort became more active. The battleship Ramillies, old but still formidable, ploughed along quite near the troopships, but the Sydney, new and fast, moved out to the horizon. All the troopships carried stern chaser guns of about 4-inch calibre with gun crews made up from the ship's crew and volunteers from among the troops. Zig•zagging commenced immediately after leaving Fremantle, the Strathaird carrying the convoy commander setting the pace and the direction. In off-duty moments the troops never tired of watching the convoy steaming on through the steel grey waters, the wakes of the ships leaving the zig-zag pattern visible for miles astern. The approach to the tropics soon began to make itself obvious -- hot, still days, canvas awnings over the open decks, dire penalties announced for anyone suffering from sunstroke, and the flying fish making impossibly long leaps from the waters alongside the ships. Two days out, Sydney left the convoy to return to pick up the big ships following close behind, the third convoy. As she turned her battered stern to the north and flashed back through the convoy, she took many a heart with her. After her great success in the Mediterranean, the future was not kind to this short-lived successor to the ship which put the name of the R.A.N. in the forefront of naval history. Anzac Day, 1940, will always be remembered by members of the convoy. Ramillies dressed ship and with her complement lining the decks went past each of the troopships in turn, her marine band playing Australian tunes, “Waltzing Matilda” of course being among them and the more martial “Australia Will Be There.” On the transports, troops “dressed ship,” i.e., the troops were formed up at attention along the side of the decks as Ramillies passed, and the infantry bands responded with “Hearts of Oak” and regimental marches. This simple but very impressive Anzac Day ceremony will always live in the minds of those who took part in it, and was to come to mind most vividly by way of contrast on Anzac Day, 1941. The French light cruiser, Amiral Suffren, had taken Sydney's place in the escort, but was usually seen only as a speck or a smudge of smoke on the horizon. This fine-looking ship was later tied up for years in Alexandria following the surrender of France. A big boxing tournament took place on the 30th April and 1st May, when “Hit the Deck” Sergeant Alf Davis caused a sensation by knocking out “Bluey” Walsh, who had figured successfully in matches at Puckapunyal. Colombo was reached on the 3rd of May, and as the convoy came to rest in the rather dirty anchorage, the troops were eager to be ashore to visit their first overseas city. The first convoy earlier in the year had rather overdone things in Colombo, and the traders, now alive to the Australian habit of generous spending, had put their prices up accordingly. No summer uniforms being available, the lads went ashore in serge battledress to be marched in the stifling heat to Rifle Green, where they were dismissed to their sightseeing. There is no doubt that Colombo will remember the second convoy as

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CHAPTER 4 PUCKAPUNYAL TO PALESTINE 3 vividly as the second convoy will remember Colombo. Leave was granted again next day and once more this near equatorial city gave the uncomfortably clad troops a taste of really tropical weather1. As the convoy moved away from Ceylon towards the narrow waters of the Red Sea, rumours were rife. Italy was poised on the brink of war and with the menace of her airstrips and naval base at Massawa in Italian Somaliland it was not certain that a treacherous attack might not be made on the convoy. However, the risk was taken and with a strengthened convoy, the cruisers Liverpool and Kent with eight destroyers, having been added, the ships moved on to Aden. Aden, its hills silhouetting the narrow strip of flat beach and the crowded town, looked full of interest, but no leave was granted and the troops spent a dull day watching small craft scuffling between ship and ship, and ship and shore, and the activities of the distant town. As the convoy gathered again, trailing their wakes in the dead calm, lead-coloured waters, Liverpool gave a breath-taking display as she dashed, at 30 knots, along the length of the convoy, her bow wave rising higher than her deck. From Aden an aerial escort was almost continuous as Italy’s plunge war became more certain. Passing Massawa the great guns of the Ramillies were trained on that port, warning enough to any timid Italian. One midnight brought the thud of guns, and excited troops reached the decks to see a startled Arab dhow outlined in the light of star shells fired by the high angle guns of Ramillies, Mutual surprise no doubt. On moved the convoy through the narrow water of the Gulf of Suez, to arrive at Suez, or more correctly Port Tewfik, on the 17th May. While the troopships were waiting to enter the canal in turn, two white and green painted Italian ships loaded with M.T. passed close, provoking gestures and rude remarks from both sides. The first leg of the journey up the canal to the Bitter Lakes showed the vast difference between the Egyptian side where vegetation grew wherever it could possibly grow and the stark Arabian side showing little but sand and the rusted barbed wire remains of the defences of the 1914/18 war. A representative of the 16th Brigade had come aboard at Suez and as Dunera swung at anchor in the Lakes waiting for previous ships to discharge at Kantara, he lectured -- to the accompaniment of the regiment’s first experience of the khamsin -- on the geography of Palestine and the habits of its inhabitants from his experience gained during three months in the Middle East. When Dunera's turn came, Kantara was reached at 2200 hours -- El Kantara, the ancient junction between Egypt and Palestine, where caravans and armies had passed for centuries and now the terminus for the Egyptian railway on the west and the Palestine railway on the east, the narrow canal between. After an hour’s delay, disembarkation began, a difficult feat down a steep gangway, balancing kitbags and packs precariously, and on to a bobbing pontoon wharf -- a slow progress. From the training camps of Australia to the sands of the age old Palestine, the regiment's journey was now complete.

1 It is just another mystery of Australian army administration why the troops had not been issued with shirts and shorts when it was well known that they were bound for Palestine.

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CHAPTER 5 SOMEWHERE EAST OF SUEZ 1

At Kantara, the regiment found a meal of stew and saveloys laid on by the ubiquitous N.A.A.F.I. (the Navy, Army and Air Force, Institute), an organization which turned on canteen stores and services for United Kingdom troops throughout the world and which was always admired by the A.I.F. May is one of the hottest months in Palestine and even in the small hours of the morning the air and sand were hot and savoured of camel dung and unwashed Wog1 -- a generic term embracing in the Digger's mind the natives of any Middle East country regardless of their status in life. The troop train was poor by Australian standards and offered the troops bare wooden benches normally used by lower class Arabs. By this time, the lads were too tired to care how they travelled and most slept soundly as the train steamed into the Sinai Desert on a line originally built over the sand by Egyptian labour who followed closely in the rear of Allenby’s victorious advance to Jerusalem in 1917. Through the desert the white sand sifted in through the fine wire gauze guards over the windows, but the countryside gradually became more fertile as Romani, El Arish, Khan Yunis and Gaza, names made familiar to all Australians by the exploits of the Diggers of the Light Horse, passed in a kind of historical review. Detraining took place at Beit Jirja -- a camp named like most Palestinian camps, after its adjacent Arab village. Beit Jirja is literally “the Home of George” and the name “George” was thereafter freely applied to Australians of all ranks by the Arabs, “Saida George” becoming the standard greeting between Arab and Australian. The camp had been prepared by the 2/3rd Battalion of 16th Brigade. They “fostered” the regiment in, supplying all sorts of stores and information and, most important, a good meal. This camp was occupied for only a few days, long enough though to put in some hard work digging weapon pits and drains and making colonial ovens. On the 24th May, the regiment, still without transport of its own, moved like sheep in hired wire-sided Arab trucks to Deir Suneid, a camp nearer Gaza, where the work of making camp started once again. Gleamine white Indian-type tents2 were laid out in neat rows in regular peace-time style. As the war situation in Europe darkened and the Churchillian-styled “jackal,” Mussolini, looked for a safe opening for a thrust at France, it was realised that an obvious first move by Italy should be to bomb military establishments in Egypt and Palestine. Further, it was quite possible that Italian troops might attempt a sea or parachute landing to occupy the Canal zone and thus neutralize both Egypt and Palestine and cut the direct route for reinforcements and stores from India and Australasia. Tents were hurriedly and widely dispersed, higgledy-piggledy, to minimize the effects of bombing and, crime of crimes to the quartermasters, their new whiteness was dimmed by an improvised but effective camouflage of mud. The roofs of all the buildings were similarly treated. Finally, a huge defence system was dug around the camp. On 10th June, Italy did declare war on the Allies, but showed no inclination to take spectacular action against the Middle East, though she had many troops across the border of Egypt and Libya. At this time was commenced the system of dealing with all promotions of officers and N.C.O.'s on a regimental instead of a battery basis, and this was the greatest factor in welding the whole of the unit together as a regiment because it effectively stopped in- breeding in troops and batteries. Apart from a few unimportant items, the regiment had not been permitted to bring technical stores or instruments from Australia -- and over-conscientious interpretation of these orders cost the regiment instruments of a type they were not to see again for years. There were no guns and no motor vehicles. In an adjoining camp, the 2/1st Field Regiment were, by comparison, well equipped, though the paucity of equipment would have surprised gunners of 1915. Using 18-pounders and 4.5 in. howitzers brought from

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CHAPTER 5 SOMEWHERE EAST OF SUEZ 2

Australia, and an odd assortment of English and Australian motor transport, the 2/1st had been training in co-operation with both the 16th British Infantry Brigade and 16th Australian Infantry Brigade. Arrangements were made for the sister regiments to share the one set of equipment available, a most impracticable set-up. 3rd Battery was the first to be given the opportunity of showing its paces and carried out a brief exercise with British infantry regiments. It soon became obvious that little equipment could be expected from Australia, where the infant munitions industry was scarcely out of its swaddling clothes, and where all available guns were being used to train the new A.I.F. divisions and the militia; or from England, who as striving hard to equip her own rapidly expanding forces and to replace the tragic losses of the B.E.F. at Dunkirk -- all of which was a very sad commentary on the unpreparedness of both countries. Without the almost immediate arrival of more guns and motor transport, it was apparent that both the Australian field regiments could not be trained simultaneously. It was decided, therefore, to concentrate all available equipment with one regiment and to train the personnel of the other on 3.7 inch anti-aircraft equipment. This was to be accomplished by splitting up the regiment to man A.A. guns in Haifa, Palestine’s most important port and oil pipeline terminal, and along the Suez Canal. It was a critical moment in the life of the regiment. Fortunately for the 2/2nd, the C.R.A. had seen it in Australia and knew its troops. He had not had the same opportunity to see the 2/1st and, probably naturally, he turned to the unit he knew better. It was a cruel blow to the morale of the 2/1st and set back its training as a field regiment for many months, as it was not until October that it was re-formed. It says much for the enthusiasm of the gunners of the 2/1st that within a few short weeks of being re-equipped they were in action and doing splendidly. While the 2/1st were manning the A.A. guns, the 2/2nd was the only Australian field regiment available to support the three A.I.F. infantry brigades in the Middle East. Training in Palestine, in addition to toughening up, was designed to familiarize the troops with the problems peculiar to warfare in the open and sandy desert. There was little natural cover, and training emphasized the need for careful movement in the open and for wide dispersal. This wide dispersal made control difficult and brought out all the weaknesses in communications. During the whole of its stay in Palestine, the regiment carried out only minor exercises with the infantry, all arms using this period to concentrate on their own particular technical problems. Headquarters, Divisional Artillery, turned on some extensive exercises which took first each battery in turn and then the whole regiment into the desert for days at a time. This was excellent training, not only in technical problems but also in the ever-present problem of control and supply over long distances from railhead. But training, though seemingly endless, did not occupy the whole of the time. Swimming at Gaza beach was popular and the Australians organised some first-class surf parades. Leave parties were arranged on a roster system and visited the various large towns of Palestine. Tel Aviv and Jerusalem were the most popular resorts. Transport was normally by large buses driven by Arabs. The drive to Jerusalem was picturesque and nerve-racking, as the crazy “wog” drivers took the corners of the mountain roads at high speed, particularly when descending the zig-zag turns of the Seven Sisters. The Holy City was popular for its historical interest, particularly with the biblical students, although the over-commercialization of the relics of early Christianity disgusted many of the troops who visited them. The contrast between the two cities was amazing and expressive. Tel Aviv offered a modern Hollywood type of city with excellent cafes, picture theatres, and all the amenities of a large European city, while Jerusalem had all the antiquity of the immemorial East.

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CHAPTER 5 SOMEWHERE EAST OF SUEZ 3

A few lucky parties obtained leave to Cairo and brought back hair-raising stories from that fabulous city. The leave hostels established by the Australian Comforts Fund in most of the leave centres were excellent and most popular with the troops, who were normally fleeced if left to their own resources to find accommodation. On the whole, taking into consideration the number of diseases indigenous to an old and notoriously unhygienic country, the health of the regiment was good, and Captain W. D. Refshauge,1 the regimental medical officer, began to regard himself as a mere dispenser of aspirin and Number 9’s. “Gyppo stomach,” a form of dysentery, was common enough, and sandfly fever, an enervating sickness caused by the bite of the tiny sandfly, sometimes caused many casualties. The nets issued to keep out the minute insect were of very fine mesh and, tucked securely under the bedding, made a very stuffy compartment. Though it was an offence, they were often unused by the troops. After an out•break of the disease, the Orderly Officer was ordered to make several midnight raids, and he might have been seen poking his head into each tent in turn. The result, a big increase in the regimental charge sheet, and a sudden drop in the incidence of sandfly fever! Fortunately, accidents were not frequent, the most serious being one which resulted in Lance-Bombardier Keith MacMillan, of R.H.Q., losing a leg. The country in which the camps were situated was not by any means desert, though it was barren by most standards. Further north, lush crops grew wherever irrigation could be introduced and even south of Gaza some areas yielded very fair crops. However, there were large patches of drift sand and steep banked wadis which gave excellent experience to the drivers. Driving normal wheeled vehicles over soft sand is an art and one which it is difficult to acquire. Colonel Cremor was very keen to teach the drivers how to negotiate sand, and each evening for a week led them across a soft area at the back of the camp with a deep wadi in the middle, leaving those who bogged down to get out under their own power. When his own sedan was bogged to the axles the following week the drivers were not at all sympathetic. An exercise long to be remembered was at this time produced by H.Q., 6th Divisional Arty. -- a thorough testing for the regiment towards the end of its stay in Palestine. It commenced quietly enough with the regiment making a long march from Deir Suneid to Hadera, a pretty little Jewish village some 50 kilometres north of Tel Aviv. At Hadera, Gunners E. L. ("Scout") Capper and P. ("Cinder") Alston, endeavouring to break down the cool, impersonal aloofness of the Jewish families who populated the area, were observed knocking at doors and greeting whoever answered with the statement that “Mr. Cohen of Carlton had asked them to call.” At Hadera also some intrepid gunners returning from a riotous leave in the town and finding W.O. Burgess asleep, clipped off one side of the moustache he had been carefully cultivating for many month, “Dingo’s” rage next morning when he discovered this, woke up half of Hadera township, and his troops received many annoying fatigue duties, although “Dingo” could never discover the actual culprits. There, bivouac was made amid familiar gum trees, known as Rothschilds Forest, quite close to the Mediterranean. From here, while the rest of the regiment did light duties, enjoyed leave in the village, and swam, the senior officers were taken “over the course” by the C.R.T, Brigadier Herring, but when the exercise got going a day or two later, the troops had little rest for three days. The “battle” moved over difficult and historic ground - - the traditional battle ground of Palestine since Old Testament times -- up the rugged defile of the Mus Mus Pass, and past the enormous mound of Megiddo, said to be the site of several ancient cities built through the centuries and a source of perpetual joy to archaeologists, whose tunnels honeycombed the mound. Incidentally, it was a superb observation post and commanded the plain of Esdraelon, now green with maize, and the

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CHAPTER 5 SOMEWHERE EAST OF SUEZ 4 hills surrounding Nazareth. Providing the normal Arab-Jew contrast, the little town of Afula was the turning point, and the tide of “battle” moved south, along the old narrow gauge Turkish railway, once in its southern stages the plaything of Lawrence of Arabia. The route back to camp led through the “Murder Triangle,” Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarm, scene of bloody clashes during the Arab unrest in the thirties. On the last day of its stay on the Plain of Esdraelon, the regiment saw and heard the Italians bombing Haifa. Several groups of officers and N.C.O.’s of the regiment were sent in turn for attachment to British gunner regiments in Egypt, particularly the 31st Regiment, R.A., of the 4th Indian Division, and they in turn sent people to the 2/2nd. These regular, well-trained gunners gave another slant to the training and many of the N.C.O.’s became very “regimental” -- a good trait. An artillery competition, in which battery and troops competed in the skills of gun drill, driving, signalling and all the other arts in the complicated life of the modern gunner, was held on a large flat area of land, opposite the camp, before an audience drawn from all the A.I.F. troops in Palestine, including General Blamey, who reviewed the regiment.

1 Satirically “Worthy Oriental Gentleman.” 2 E.P.I.P. tents, i.e., European Personnel, Indian Pattern. 3 Afterwards Major-General W. D. Refshauge, O.B.E.

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CHAPTER 6 DESERT AND THE DELTA 1

On 26th August, the rumour that the 6th Australian Division was shortly to move to Egypt was confirmed and the preparation of equipment for the long trek began. During the stay in Palestine the flow of new equipment had been steady and the regiment was now reasonably well equipped -- by 1939 standards. The new gear was most noticeable in the communication set-up, and satisfactory communication by both radio and line telephony was now reasonably certain. Everyone was thrilled at the prospect of the move, for after a few weeks in any camp the urge to be on the move invariably became overpowering. After the novelty of Palestine wore off -- its historical agedness after the newness of Australia -- the sameness of its training areas bored the troops and they were eager for the story-book atmosphere of Egypt. An advance party under Major Young went down to Egypt to prepare the new camp site. The rest of the regiment moved in three fairly easy stages, the first being along reasonably good roads through Beersheba to Bir Asluj, a police post not far from the Palestine- Egyptian frontier and on the verge of the Sinai Desert. This was the place where the Light Horse had secretly watered their horses in 1917, the night before the attack on Beersheba. This desert, unlike most encountered in the Middle East, complied with all the specifications of a Hollywood desert, with its fine golden or white sand piled in row on row of low, rounded dunes and a brassy sky overhead. Across this vast movie set ran a remarkable road known as the Shell Road -- a black ribbon across, the gold. Made of a black oil emulsion mixed with sand and baked on the spot by a huge mobile oven, and lined with literally thousands of discarded oil drums, the road, without real foundations, stood up to the heavy punishment of military traffic. Apart from an odd rest camp and a lonely police post, not even a tiny village graced the road until it reached the Canal, ending at a vehicular punt opposite the pretty town of Ismailia with its numerous trees. This antiquated punt1 was a shocking bottleneck which could have had tragic results if the war had reached the Canal Zone. The regiment, tired after the aching desert, sat down and waited -- and waited -- while the vehicles moved across two or three at a time. From the desert side the green gardens and tall trees of Ismailia looked like a fairy land. As the vehicles reached the Egyptian side they were escorted to a large, picturesque permanent barracks at Moascar, where bivouac was made for what was left of the night. The following day, the regiment moved by an excellent road running for the most part alongside the most inaptly named Sweet Water Canal, to Cairo. The only catch was that some staff officer had given the distance to Cairo as 90 miles whereas it was only 90 kilometres! Met on the outside of the city by British MP.’s and in battery groups at very close intervals, the regiment was conducted through the teeming streets of Cairo to a tree- lined road running parallel to the huge Nile, on through the fertile strip of intense cultivation, to the desert again. This time it was a coarse, sanded, stony, cruel-looking desert just outside Helwan, an ancient town with some reputation among Europeans for its sulphur springs and baths. The camp, south of the town, had been prepared for the New Zealanders. It contained buildings for offices and stores, and kitchens and mess huts, but no tents were erected and the troops spent their first night at the new camp in the open. Egypt has often been called the land of the paradox and it deserves such a title. The ruling minority, the wealthy land owners, are rich by any standard, as their luxurious homes and clubs stretching along the Nile, the busy show part of Cairo, and the pomp and ceremony of royalty bear ample witness; but the poor, the fellaheen, are deadly poor. They are usually diseased from birth, their expectation of life is said to be about thirty-five years, and they spend their days cultivating, for a meagre wage, the astoundingly fertile areas of irrigated land along the Nile or man-handling and manoeuvring the ponderous feluccas through the narrow canals or the wide waters of the great river. In the desert areas, the nomad Arab types lead an equally poor but seemingly happier life.

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Helwan camp was situated on a series of ridges a mile or two south of the town and not far from the green cultivated strip along the Nile. The training areas stretched away to the south -- ideal ground for training for desert warfare, consisting of low rock strewn hills, a number with flat tops and precipitous sides. The main plain appropriately marked on the map as Sun Stroke Plain, was criss-crossed with wadis or dry rivers of soft sand, presenting a nice problem to the drivers of wheeled vehicles. The now normal digging of slit trenches near the sleeping tents and gun parks, despite the flint-like ground, went more expeditiously than usual. A couple of air raid warnings might have had some effect in stimulating this activity. At the beginning of September the first batch of new officers arrived, Lieutenants Crawford, Edwards, Flerning, Fetherstonhaugh, Kater and Sutton being commissioned from the O.R.’s of the 2/1st Regiment, and Lieutenants Eason and Young from the regiment’s own ranks. These young men soon became known as “The Tweenies” and underwent a rather gruelling first few months in the regiment at the hands of the senior officers, who were determined that they should realise the high standard demanded of commissioned ranks in the 2/2nd. Nevertheless most of them soon fitted into the 2/2nd pattern and proved very capable and popular officers. The regiment was soon introduced to the joys of real desert manoeuvres -- and that by night. The C.O., sensing a slackening after the tension of the long drive from Palestine, applied his usual remedy, a really tough and unexpected task. He had two red lights placed in the desert about two miles from camp and there stationed the intelligence officer, Lieutenant P. S. Whitelaw.2 That night, the map spot having been given to the battery commanders, the regiment was ordered to march out into the desert, around the lights and back to camp. The regiment moved out by troops into the unreconnoitred desert for its first real desert drive -- no lights, no land marks, no wireless. A few were lucky and fluked the only solid route but most foundered hopelessly in, the sand, spent the night digging and heaving -- and cursing -- and limped back in bits and pieces, the last getting home the next afternoon. One ingenious officer, Captain “Jock” Crawford, attached from the 2/1st Regiment, appeared in camp at midnight mounted astride a camel to demand that the L.A.D. be sent to help his troop. How he came to induce the always suspicious Arabs to part with one of their beloved, camels remains a mystery. By now, the two original brigades of the Division, 16th and 17th, were concentrated in the one training area. The 2/2nd Regiment was still the only artillery regiment available to the division, the 2/1st still being A/A and the 2/1st Anti-Tank Regiment and 2/3rd Field Regiment being in England with the 18th Brigade. With two brigades to support in both field and anti-tank roles, training for the regiment became really intense as the various arms began to work together as one team. New desert tactics, based on experience gained by the few British troops opposing the slow Italian advance from the Libyan frontier to Sidi Barrani, were practised. To avoid detection and to minimize the effect of air bombing, formations moved on a wide front -- about one mile for a brigade -- with vehicles and platoons widely dispersed and at a very slow pace to avoid raising dust. This formation became known as the “Box” formation and, in fact, it did closely resemble a box. Carriers and other A.F.V.’s3 and anti-tank guns formed the front, artillery the rear, and further A.T.2 guns the sides. The “foot sloggers” and the soft vehicles moved within this outer screen or “box” of fire power. Lacking the A.T. regiment, the field guns had to double up their role, the 18-pounders acting as A.T. guns around the perimeter of the box during the day and joining the 4.5 howitzers in the normal field role at night. The A.T. role meant almost continuous movement of individual guns into and out of ction and the man-handling of the heavy field pieces in the soft sand was extremely hard work, especially when followed by concentrations during the night for defensive

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CHAPTER 6 DESERT AND THE DELTA 3 fire tasks. A day or two on a box exercise was enough for the most energetic gunner, but it was good solid training, toughening and teaching how to avoid detection in the bare desert, how to cross apparently impossible ground, how to navigate a sub-unit at night to a map spot, without lights and across atrocious country. This was exactly what was wanted to train the regiment for the battles to come. In the midst of the intensive training, voting for the Federal elections took place, but it aroused no enthusiasm at all. Australia seemed far away and its political set-up a little unreal. Leave in Cairo was much more interesting and the returning leave parties brought back stories as lurid as any told by the old A.I.F. -- and probably just as fanciful. This time there was no Battle of the Wazir, although minor clashes did occur. The market area of the Muski was popular and few homes in Australia did not receive some small example of Egyptian skill in carpet making or in copper and silversmithing. During one of the exercises an English officer in a Bren Carrier who was acting as a dummy tank attempted to take the guns of “D” Troop by surprise. He drove the Bren Carrier into a “wadi” and endeavoured to approach the guns under cover. However, Sgt. Trewarne had seen the carrier enter the “wadi” and ordering his gun crew to load a “blank” he was ready for the tank. As it appeared over the wadi edge only a few yards directly in front of his gun he ordered “fire.” The officer was blown out of the carrier by the blast and other members of the carrier's crew promptly dived for cover. No doubt the same officer approached the gun positions with considerably more caution during the remainder of the exercise. A few days after the first box exercise with 16th Brigade, the regiment moved out through Maadi, the Dead City5, and Heliopolis, arid along the Suez Road to the artillery practice range in stark desert country. For the first time since leaving Australia, the regiment was to carry out firing practice, a really important event, as it proved to be the and only live ammunition practice the regiment had during the whole of its stay in the Middle East before going into action. The guns had first to be calibrated, that is, to be made to shoot together, and after this purely technical shoot there was little ammunition left for observed shooting, particularly for the howitzers. The regiment got into “action” very smoothly and the first day’s shooting went fairly well, During the night a heavy fog came down and the next day’s stunt, a demonstration barrage to impress the infantry commanders, was delayed while the spectators found themselves and the O.P.! The barrage was to be quite extensive but to save ammunition only the opening and final lines were to be fired. After the first line came down in perfect position, instead of the long silence laid down in orders those at the O.P. were amazed to hear the seemingly endless thud of guns firing. The C.R.A. was furious, “Are those your guns firing?”, he roared at Major Arthur and receiving a negative reply he turned to Major Dyke to find him frantically calling down the phone “Stop! Stop! For God’s sake stop!” The C.R.A. raised his hands to heaven and shouted, “Can't anyone stop those bloody guns!” As was usual in all demonstrations, something had come unstuck. In this case the mistake was due to the over-enthusiasm of the junior subaltern, Lieutenant Bob Nethercote, who had been carried away by the magnitude of the occasion! By now, the howitzers had only a few rounds left. Consequently, only a handful of officers did any observed shooting, and so it happened that the majority of officers who went into action as O.P.O.’s at Bardia had not conducted a single observed shoot in the whole of their fourteen months in the A.I.F., a handicap they overcame only by the intensity and ingenuity of their militia training in procedure and by their own good sense and courage. Soon after the shoots, the regimental organization was changed. The two batteries which had each contained two four-gun troops of 18-pounders and one of four 4.5 inch

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CHAPTER 6 DESERT AND THE DELTA 4 howitzers, now changed to two troops each of six guns or howitzers. The B.C.’s6 tossed to decide who would get the guns and who the howitzers, 3rd Battery getting the howitzers and 4th Battery the guns. This meant that four more howitzers had to be obtained to make up the number to completely equip a battery -- the 2/1st Regiment had brought only eight howitzers from Australia. The extra four guns arrived shortly after. They were very old, almost museum pieces, one being dated 1910, and it had been fitted in America with wheels and pneumatic tyres much lighter than the Australian models. At the same time, the system of controlling the line of the various sub-units of the regiment was simplified and the complicated system introduced in the early days of 1939 was abandoned much to the relief of everyone. Most officers had always known that it could never work in action. After a few days’ practice in the new organization, the regiment was again ready to train with the infantry and entered enthusiastically on its first divisional exercise. This was another box affair and lasted three days. It was a comprehensive show, including mock attacks by planes and A.F.V.’s. 4th Battery's “B” echelon, led by B.Q.M.S. Osborne, lost its way on the first night, but by now the desert-wise troops had private tucker boxes built into each truck and were never at a loss for a square meal. Earlier, the regimental fund had been used to buy a primus stove for each truck and hot tea was brewed at every halt. Equipment was still arriving in a steady but slender stream. New engines were fitted to most of the hard-worked Marmon tractors and more staff vehicles arrived. The new style desert camouflage was introduced, and the vehicles were painted with radiating lines in various shades of fawn and grey. General Wavell, Major-General Freyberg, and Mr. Anthony Eden visited the division in turn, the parades for those V.I.P.’s showing the division as a well-trained entity. The C.O. left during October for a month’s course at the Middle East Tactical School at Abassia and during his absence Major C. L. Young acted as C.O. Major Dyke went north to carry out a reconnaissance around Alexandria, and Captain Blamey7 went further north to Mersa Matruh. The war had come a little closer with several air raids on Cairo, the nightly alerts, and the nightly expectation of a raid on the adjacent aerodrome at Helwan. Interest in future moves quickened: the troops had “had” Helwan. The reconnaissance’s seemed to indicate a move to a new camp, and the regiment was quite ready and keen to move on. News from Palestine about this time told of a vicious air raid on Tel Aviv and the tragic death there of Lance-Bombardier Keith McMillan while on a last leave from Gaza Hospital before being invalided home -- the regiment’s first war fatality. On 26th October, hopes were fulfilled and with no regrets, the regiment left and Helwan and moved via Mena, a place made famous by the Light Horse, to an equally and camp, Amiriya, on a long ridge overlooking the naval base at Alexandria. There the guns, motor transport and tents were scattered over acres of ground, trenches were dug in seemingly solid rock and Bren gun posts were dug and sandbagged, for here air raids were real and frequent. Another tragic accident marred the trip from Cairo. Sergeant F. R, Chamberlain, who had been riding a motor cycle at the rear of the column, was struck by a truck driven by an Egyptian soldier and so grievously injured that he died a few days later. Gunner J. Anderson died in Alexandria Hospital at about the same time as the accident to Chamberlain. Alexandria naval base was a favourite target for the Italian Air Force, and the camp lay along the route the bombers took. Most raids were at night, and it became a forbidden but spectacular entertainment for the troops to sit up on the ridge above the camp watching the searchlight beams sweeping the sky and the curving tracers from both ship and land guns streaming upwards, In early November the C.O. returned from his course at Cairo. Realising that men would not leave their tents to go out into slit trenches during an air raid, he ordered the tents to be dug down three feet six inches below ground level with a two feet wide ridge in

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CHAPTER 6 DESERT AND THE DELTA 5 the centre so that if a bomb did strike a tent at the most it would get six men. The Italians had moved towards Alexandria from Sidi Barrani. Between Mersa Matruli and Alexandria the British troops had established two defended “boxes,” Maaten Bagush and Wadi Ngarnish. These “boxes” were wired with dug-in gun pits and mined tracks but there were very few troops to man them. They were the only defences between the Italian and the coveted naval base at Alexandria -- the key to the whole of Egypt and the Canal Zone. It was obvious that one or the other of the opposing forces must move soon, and in either case the 6th Australian Division was determined to be in it. In case the “Itie” did get through, defences were reconnoitred along the ready-made tank traps of the Nile delta irrigation system. Many hours were spent by the, battery and troop commanders along the Umm Umm canal as gun positions and observation posts were selected and surveyed. More box exercises, over cultivated land towards Burgh el Arab, made the gunners expert with this type of movement. The 2/1st Regiment, by now reformed as a field regiment and equipped, to the 2/2nd’s jealous disgust, with brand new 25-pounders, took part in some of the exercises, and the regiment returned to its normal role in support of the 17th Brigade. 20th November saw the commencement of another divisional exercise with three brigades, 16th and 17th Brigades attacking towards Burgh el Arab, where 19th Brigade was installed as the enemy. Plenty of movement and night work for all hands were the order of the hour. Following this exercise came the toughest show of all when the C.O. really let his head go and turned on what will ever remembered as his “Bastardy Exercise.” Always adept at seeking out the regiment’s weaknesses, he ordered the regiment out in teeming rain for its most thorough tryout. He and his directing staff had spent three days before in arranging the production of every possible contingency which the regiment might be expected to meet in action. They released gas (in the form of bombs), cut telephone lines, tapped the lines and gave false orders, removed instruments left unguarded, captured O.P.O.’s8, put vehicles out of action, and all in all had an immensely good time and gave the regiment a most thorough testing. To the accompaniment of constant digging -- now even the vehicles were dug in -- November sped on. Early in December the biggest exercise yet was teed up. A full dress divisional show was staged again towards Burgh el Arab, with the two field regiments in support of the 16th and 17th Brigades against the 19th. The lads, in full battle order, and as nearly fully equipped as they were ever to be, were in great fettle and when the forces clashed there were some hectic moments as tempers ran hot. “Enemy” raiders got well in among 16th and 17th Brigades and some observation posts were lucky to avoid capture. Lieut.-Colonel Cook of the 5th Battalion was not so lucky and spent some uncomfortably silent hours after capture following a gallant attempt to repulse the raiders with a pick helve! After this tryout the regiment felt that it had nothing to fear from action and if rumour was to be believed the next “exercise” would be the real thing. On the 6th December the two battery commanders, Major Arthur and Captain Jaboor9 -- the latter acting in Major Dyke's absence at a course at M.E.T.S.10 as O.C. 3rd Battery -- formed part of a divisional reconnaissance party which went forward to a base at Smugglers’ Cave, just short of Mersa Matruh, The party was to make preparations to take over the defences of the Bagush Box and the Nulla Ngatmish Wadi from 4th Indian Division. When the leader of the party contacted the commander, Western Desert Force, Lieut.-General Richard O'Connor11 he was told that the Indian division had moved out on exercise and that the reconnaissance would have to be done without guides. The whole area was found to be deserted and it did not require a very shrewd guess to know that something bigger than an exercise was on. In a day or two rumour was confirmed and it was known that the audacious British had completely surprised the hopeless Italians by extending the exercise fairly into their area,

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CHAPTER 6 DESERT AND THE DELTA 6 capturing several formidable forts in the process and driving on towards Sidi Barrani. Prisoners flowed in by the thousand. It was obvious that further reconnaissance was out of date and the reconnaissance party in the absence of orders decided to return to camp to see what was afoot. On the way, the advance party of the regiment was encountered in the midst of a furious sand storm, near the rail station of Sidi Haneish, railhead for the Bagush Box. For in the meantime the 6th Division had received orders to move up: the opportunity was too good to miss and the regiment’s advance guard under Captain Bleby had moved forward on 9th December. By the 10th the move of the remainder of the regiment was quite definite and extra equipment was being drawn and training gear returned. It was soon apparent that the motor transport could not cope with all the bits and pieces collected by the regiment during its months in the Middle East and a drastic pruning took place. On each subsequent move, and particularly after its first action, the regiment pruned its belongings still further as it was realizing that the lighter it travelled the easier it was. Final orders for the move came on 11th December. The regiment came under command of 16th Brigade and next day, at 1000 hours, it moved off on the long march of 140 kilometres to Matan Bagush. It arrived at night and moved into the dugouts and gun pits of the preceding British artillery. The road forward had led roughly parallel to the coast, with the Mediterranean gleaming on the right and the seemingly unending escarpment forming the horizon on the left. The march revealed a little of the support that was available, aerodromes with rather ancient planes, some taking off trailing long spumes of dust hanging close to the ground and an occasional Matilda tank moving slowly forward. The few days’ spell at Bagush was well spent in maintenance, checking equipment and a further pruning of surplus stores. The Mediterranean was popular in the off duty hours. In the small hours of the 14th, the 25th Field Regiment, R.A., which had occupied the area on their way forward, arrived back -- the 2/2nd had had no notice but soon the cooks had been roused out to brew tea and turn on bread and cheese. The troops gathered around the “Tommies” listening to the stories of their recent victories, admiring the souvenirs, and scrounging “Berettas,” the much coveted Italian automatic pistols. The Tommy regiment moved off next day with the remainder of the 4th Indian Division, to fresh conquests against vastly superior forces in Eritrea and Somaliland -- campaigns as audacious and courageous as the General, Wavell, who planned them, and as the little advertised though brilliant division which carried them out. On 15th December, the C.O. and the B.C.’s left on a forward reconnaissance. The route lay inland along the edge of the escarpment. After reporting at command H.Q., the party moved on through the recently captured Italian strong posts. Surprise had been complete. There were guns standing undestroyed in their pits, with instruments alongside as on the day their users fled, a few scattered tanks, an unbelievable amount of paper scattered over each enemy bivouac, and the still unburied dead. Descending the escarpment to return to Bagush, the party passed through Sidi Barrani, a white stone town wrecked by the R.N. as by an earthquake. To the north the thud of guns rumbled back from around Buq-Buq. On the 16th, shortly after the return of the C.O., movement orders were received. A wave of excitement swept through the regiment -- It was “on” at last. But it wasn’t, the order being cancelled at 1900 hours. Spirits sank below zero. A very dejected regiment saw the 16th Brigade move on to Sidi Barrani next day, rumour adding to the depression by reporting that the R.A. would support our infantry. So it was a great moment when the news came through that the move was on again and that the regiment was to move next day to Sidi Barrani. At 0700 hours on 18th December the regiment moved off -- along a good tar macadam road through Mersa Matruh, south towards the escarpment then west again parallel to the

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CHAPTER 6 DESERT AND THE DELTA 7 coast. Strung out for miles, widely dispersed as a precaution against air attack, the vehicles were escorted by Hurricanes swooping over at zero height. Bivouac was made a few miles west of wrecked Sidi Barrani, after a trying march of some 160 miles. Orders to move into action in support of the 16th Brigade, which was to relieve some of the British troops investing Bardia in Italian Libya, came shortly after dusk and the regiment knew that its first real test was near and that the long, long training period was over.

1 By 1941 it had been replaced by a two road pontoon bridge. 2 Later Major. 3 Armoured Fighting Vehicles. 4 Anti-Tank. 5 The Dead City is a huge Mohammedan cemetery of graves and vaults covering literally several hundred acres. 6 Battery Commanders. 7 Afterwards Lt.-Col. T. A. Blamey, M.B.E. 8 Observation Post Officers. 9 Afterwards Lt.-Col. R. F. Jaboor, O.B.E., E.D. 10 Middle East Tactical School. 11 Afterwards Gen. Sir Richard O'Connor, K.B.E.

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CHAPTER 7 INTO BATTLE 1

The dust was so thick, so fine that it resembled one of those famed greyish-yellow fogs of London, blotting out the sun. Only large objects were briefly visible as they loomed as dark ghostly shapes and quickly faded again. The only difference was that this peculiar fog was dry and choking instead of damp and clammy. It moved in waves heaped up by a high wind -- a wind cold and penetrating. It filled the eyes and cars and nose with a fine powder. It smeared every surface with a fine grit that rasped the skin and within this curtain and helping considerably to keep up its density moved a seemingly endless column of large dark shapes visible only for a fleeting second and then fading so that each link in the chain felt alone and isolated. To keep on the right track and to keep touch was the main difficulty. Quick glances moved from map to speedometer, then up to the brighter part of the fog to where the sun must be -- yes, the direction seemed right -- only one main track, hardly a road, and marked by wrecked and burnt-out equipment -- some of ours but mostly theirs. A burnt-out Fiat fighter, blown ammunition trucks, and strangest and most prominent of all, abandoned steam rollers, landmarks which were to become so well known. It was the 20th of December, and the regiment was moving to its first rendezvous with the enemy, fifteen long months since its inception, fifteen long months of arduous training now to be proved in battle, moving up to join the British troops now gathering to complete the encirclement and investment of Bardia -- one of Mussolini’s “impregnable bastions” -- moving up in the forefront of the 6th Australian Division. Since before dawn everyone had been active. The reconnaissance parties had moved out first from the overnight bivouac at Sidi Barrani, and the main body of the regiment was following to rendezvous with them at the top of the escarpment above Halfaya Pass not far from the gap through the frontier wire -- the wide and high barbed wire belt, running for some hundreds of miles along the frontier between Egypt and Libya, created by the Italians to prevent Libyan Arabs from escaping into Egypt. The C.O. and his reconnaissance parties made a fast trip from Sidi Barrani to Sollum, along a road carefully built by the Italians, deeply metalled but not tar sealed, the first parties missing the fog of dust that was to envelop the regiment. After a brief rest at the base of the pass, they moved up and on to their rendezvous near a ruined building marked on the map as Musdid where the C.O. met the C.C.R.A., Western Desert Force, who took him and his staff off to select the first battery battle positions. To the battery commanders and their parties waiting hour after anxious hour in the cold, biting, dust-laden wind at Musa’id it was obvious that something had gone astray. It had! The C.O. having been taken to the positions selected by the C.C.R.A. was amazed to find that his guns would be out of range of the Italian positions. The C.C.R.A. was not aware that the regiment was equipped with 18-pounders and 4.5 howitzers and had selected positions suitable for the far longer ranged 25-pounders with which the English regiments were armed. When he discovered his mistake, he told the C.O. to select his own battery positions. With the afternoon waning, the C.O. was forced to make a hasty new reconnaissance of the fast darkening desert. New positions were selected by the C.O., dividing the job with the second-in-command, but daylight was rapidly receding and by the time the fretting battery commanders were collected from their chilly rendezvous, the sun was not very far from the horizon. If ever a reconnaissance of battery positions needed to be meticulous, that time was now, with a regiment new to war moving to occupy its first battle positions by night and these positions unprotected by infantry. A night occupation is always a hazardous business and in the desert bereft of obvious landmarks, it is doubly so. But now there was no time to carry out the normal procedure, no time to mark the routes into the gun positions, no time to post guides -- and all because no English officer could have dreamt that Australian artillery would still be armed with the outmoded guns of 1914-18. The repercussions from

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CHAPTER 7 INTO BATTLE 2 this necessarily hasty reconnaissance and from the hastily selected forward positions were to be many and varied. In the meantime, the remainder of the regiment, in company with the rest of the artillery allotted to the task, had felt their way past Buq-Baq towards Sollum. The other gunners were all Royal Artillery: 51st and 104th Field Regiments, and two medium batteries, 234th with new 4.5 in. guns and 27th with 6 in. howitzers. Sollum, important only by virtue of its position as a frontier town, and as one of the few sheltered ports in this rugged coast, had been occupied by the Italians since their advance into Egypt. It nestled at the base of the escarpment where the escarpment met the sea after running roughly parallel with the coast from just west of Alexandria. The regiment found the little town bright with sunshine and almost sheltered from the howling wind. Away to the right stretched the very blue Mediterranean. To the front, above the town itself, a good bitumened road zig-zagged up the cliffs -- Sollum Pass, known to all who knew Libya -- the Egyptian Frontier Force barracks perched on its upper stretches. This pass was still under fire from the Italian guns, and the regiment was to use the even more famous Halfaya Pass -- a natural “Hellfire” Pass to all who used it. Just below “Hellfire” the regiment halted and dispersed while other well-dispersed traffic cleared the pass -- well dispersed because an unpleasant gentleman known as “Bardia Bill” had registered the pass and threw an occasional noisy, but usually inaccurate, shell in that direction. It was peaceful outside little Sollum -- not the imagined advance into action, though war was near in the distant thud of guns and in the devastated buildings of the town wrecked in a recent naval bombardment. War came nearer when “Bardia Bill” boomed in the distance and his shell arrived with a very loud cough some distance off to the right front. The explosion seemed to clang and echo just above the vehicles, but it was soon realized that it was far enough away to leave the regiment undisturbed. Soon the pass was clear and the regiment commenced to climb. At the top the wind pounced on them again -- the same biting wind full of grit and gall. The road, fair through the pass, soon deteriorated to a track as it swung north, again skirting the wadis running precipitously down the steep slope of the escarpment. The regiment moved quickly along this track to its rendezvous near Anza el Qualala (new name for “Damnall”) and again halted -- and waited. It was nearly dusk when orders came for the B.C.’s to go forward with their parties to select positions for their troops and now began a race against time -- a race to make preparations enough to get the guns forward from their rendezvous over unknown roads and across featureless open country to their positions, ready to fire before dawn. The road into Bardia was the division between the batteries, 3rd going to the right, 4th to the left. Both positions were bare and devoid of landmarks, though 3rd was lucky in having a telegraph line to follow into position. Wrecked planes formed a background for 4th. By the time the G.P.O.’s1 were placed on their gun positions by the B.C.’s, it was dark -- dark as only a desert night can be -- a sea of ink -- shapes only being recognizable by getting the face close down to the desert surface to obtain a silhouette. It had been decided to wait for the moon before attempting the occupation, and it was cold, bitingly cold2, waiting impatiently in the inky darkness -- waiting with a peculiar feeling around the heart. The regiment had been moved further along the road with its head near the broad barbed wire frontier fence and in the darkness had become badly bunched -- the darkness

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CHAPTER 7 INTO BATTLE 3 and the knowledge that the enemy was near were strong incentives. On his arrival, the C.O. did not approve and did not hesitate to say so. There can be no doubt that the regiment’s first move into action was fraught with great risks. The too hasty reconnaissance necessitated by the original “out of range” positions for a night occupation meant that the usual guides were not available, and the battery commanders led their batteries into the stygian darkness with no aids other than compass bearings and speedometer readings. 3rd Battery succeeded in reaching its position, but 4th Battery became separated from its battery commander and was halted by the C.P.O., Lieutenant Strong, who at first light put the battery into action just before the battery commander returned to lead them to the correct position, which he had found during the night. Under any circumstances such a night occupation was a risk but now it was greatly accentuated by the fact that neither battery had infantry between the guns and the enemy. The 2/2nd Battalion of 16th Brigade was astride the road leading almost due north from Fort Capuzzo to Bardia, about in line with the two batteries, but in front of the guns there was nothing but darkness and somewhere, the enemy. No doubt the risk was justified -- no doubt the Commander, Western Desert Force, knew that the Italians were cowed after their recent defeats and lacked initiative, but the risk was there -- a risk that even a small enemy patrol might chance on the guns in the darkness before they were organised for defence, or that the guns may have been led past their positions into the then unknown Italian lines. However, only one truck went astray. The quartermaster of 4th Bty., Staff-Sergeant Osborne, and Gunner Gell, being misinformed as to the battery position, travelled up the unblocked road straight into fire from the Italian guns which set the truck alight. The two men were captured and quickly bundled off to Italy. The Italians had made full use of the flat ground on the top of the escarpment between Sollum and Bardia. There were several aerodromes well littered with unserviceable planes, while in the wadis leading to the coast were well protected and well camouflaged stores. Ridotto Capuzzo, a modern looking fort commanding the road gap through the frontier wire, had already been taken and retaken several times and showed evidence of the skill of the artillery of both sides. The enemy gunners knew the ground well and had many points registered, while much of it, including 3rd Battery position, was under observation from intrepid observers perched uncomfortably but tenaciously on the top of tall ladders. It was also under long-range, small-arms fire from an enemy post named by the troops, “The Old Gentleman’s Tomb.” R.H.Q.’s original position was near Fort Capuzzo and it had some uncomfortable minutes when the Italians strafed the area with medium guns. The original intelligence reports purported to show that the enemy had only 38 guns in his perimeter around Bardia, but the fire he brought down on many occasions showed this number to be an underestimation. Although the Italian shellfire was never heavy according to later standards, it was terrifying enough when first encountered. The regimental survey party3 took the first shells which fell close while doing their first survey of 4th Battery position on the evening of the 20th and left hastily. Soon after coming into action on the 21st, 4th Battery was given what seemed to be a heavy pounding but though the fire was accurate the ammunition was poor, and there were no casualties. Subsequently, both batteries, and particularly 3rd Battery in its forward position, suffered heavy fire but no one was hurt throughout the investment though several suffered from blast from very close misses. This escape from casualties was due to the fact that all guns, etc., were well dug in and to the poor ammunition of the Italians. Both batteries had extreme difficulty in obtaining satisfactory observation. 4th Battery was helped by a nonchalant R.H.A.4 officer who appeared in the early morning in a partially burnt truck and took the B.C. to a ridge just north of the guns. There he pointed out the enemy, who promptly responded with several well placed salvos. The honour of

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CHAPTER 7 INTO BATTLE 4 firing the first shot from the guns of the artillery of the Second A.I.F. goes without dispute to 2/2nd Field Regiment, but the claim to that honour between the batteries is still a matter of dispute. It appears fairly certain that “B” Troop of 3rd Battery fired the first rounds -- registration rounds without observation on the enemy -- but to “A” sub•section consisting of Sergeant C. Doyle, Bombardier H. Adeney and Gunners F. Toogood and J. Wood (3rd Battery) went the privilege of firing the first rounds at a seen target -- enemy transport spotted from an O.P. on a ridge just in front of the gun position. The first round fired by 4th Battery was fired by “E” Sub-Section of “D” Troop: Sgt. D. Cunningham, Bdr. F. Nixon, L/Bdr. R. Walker, Gnrs. E. T. Smith, P. L. Duncan, L. Andrews, A. L. Stewart and F. McDonald. From here Major Arthur, Captain Bleby5 and Bombardier Shaw6, N.C.O. Sigs., fired first from “D” Troop and then from “F” Troop and scored a direct hit on what later proved to be a mobile gun. The Italians then spotted the excited and pretty obvious O.P. parties and sent over shells that chased them down the ridge and followed them right to the gun position, much to the disgust of Lieutenant Strong7, the C.P.O.8, in whose necessarily capacious dugout they took refuge. During the next few days, the batteries settled down to the routine of life in action, joining the brotherhood of those who have heard the whistle of enemy shells coming right at them -- a brotherhood of men who become veterans in a few brief hours. The way the troops adapted themselves to the rigorous new life was really marvellous. As time went on, dugouts became more and more ambitious and comfortable. Gun crews slept, ate, and fought together and soon found they could work the guns with two or three men while the remaining members rested or worked at improving the gun pits and slit trenches. The shortage of water was a major problem from the start. The Italians salted the wells at Capuzzo. (Some say that the original salting was performed by British troops when they were pushed back from the fort in August.) Water had to be brought in none too plentiful water carts from Sidi Barrani and even further back. For ten days the official water allowance was about one half a water bottle per man, but later this improved to a full bottle. It was remarkable how it was possible to maintain a reasonable degree of cleanliness on this allowance. First a tooth wash, then the same water used for a shave and again the same water for a sponge which removed most of the dirt9. Now, as they were to do right through the desert campaign, the drivers of the water carts did a marvellous and back-breaking job, running many extra miles and working until all hours to give their mates some little water above the official scale. Both batteries were having great difficulty in obtaining observation. 4th Battery was fortunate in having a ridge not far in front of the guns from which good observation could be obtained. 3rd Battery had flatter country from which to work, and the O.P. ’s had to go very far forward to get results. New O.P. areas were selected by day and the actual O.P.’s selected and dug in by night. Many of these were mere slits as the ground was usually rocky. The O.P.O.’s were placed in position at night and relieved the following night. In these cramped quarters they spent many very uncomfortable hours. As the O.P. ’s were moved progressively forward to obtain the best observation, they became more and more dangerously placed. Although Italian patrols frequently moved close around the O.P. ’s, in one case even locating and examining a signal wire, none was ever discovered, a fact which says much for the skilful use of camouflage and the rigid discipline that eliminated movement around the O.P. ’s. It says a lot, too, for the good observation obtained by the forward O.P. ’s and for the skill of the O.P.O.’s that the counter-battery records at Divisional H.Q. showed that many more recorded and registered enemy batteries were discovered by our O.P.O.’s than by any other regiment engaged in the operation, and this despite the regiment’s antiquated guns. After the battle this was the subject of a congratulatory letter from the counter-battery officer at Divisional H.Q. During the 20th and 21st, 4th Battery came under heavy and concentrated fire from 75- mm. and 105-mm. guns. The 75-mm. shell was feeble, although the sound of its arrival was

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CHAPTER 7 INTO BATTLE 5 terrifying enough. The 105-mm. was more serious although fortunately there were many duds. It was obvious that the enemy had the position well taped so on the 21st the C.O. ordered five guns of each troop to be moved back 500 yards, leaving one gun per troop in the old position to carry out registration and to “draw the crabs” -- and they did draw them. For shooting, all six guns shot together, being linked by telephone. The code names for these guns were “Little Gobi”10, and “Little Jono”10 and they became famous throughout the regiment. Though nerve-racking for the forward crews, the ruse worked well and the main position was never again subjected to heavy fire. The signallers were showing up remarkably well. The batteries were linked together and with R.H.Q. with alternative lines, while the numerous and distant O.P. ’s were in communication with the whole set up and any O.P. could fire any troop of the regiment. Heavy shelling, Bren-carriers, and tanks were constantly breaking the lines. Maintenance had to be carried out at all hours and the task of wandering along a line at the dead of night feeling for a break and wondering just when an Italian patrol would pounce was nerve-destroying work. The many O.P. ’s meant miles of line, and maintenance posts were often required. The amount of wire officially permitted was hopelessly inadequate and had to be heavily supplemented by reclaimed Italian wire and line salvaged. Strong representations about the inadequacy of the official allowance of wire had been made before the regiment left Egypt, but probably the wire was not available11. Wireless was rarely used as the Italians had been reported in intelligence summaries to be in possession of direction finders able to locate active wireless sets, and they soon proved the intelligence summaries to be right. They frequently jammed sets, directed shell fire on to the wireless sets12 and on one occasion tried to interpolate a false conversation. The Italian gunners were highly skilled in their trade and fought their guns well, even when their infantry had folded up. Handicapped by poor ammunition and guns looking like veterans of the 1914 war (some of ours were even older, but the pneumatic tyres made them look modern) they nevertheless used every dodge known to artillery science. In the early morning and just before dusk, an observation plane would appear briefly just above the skyline -- to make sure our guns were still there no doubt -- and then down came their concentrations. They persisted in their use of observation ladders until chased down by air burst shrapnel -- one of the few times it was used by the A.I.F. They knew every inch of the country and had all prominent points registered. The border fence between Libya and Egypt, Fort Capuzzo, the kilo stones, the telegraph line, and wrecked aircraft all made magnificent aiming points which had been well and truly “taped” by enemy gunners for weeks and months before the regiment had arrived. Proof of this was provided when on occasions the “twenty-seventh telegraph pole” or the “89th Kilo Stone” or the “burnt out Savoia” mysteriously changed their location overnight through the hands of the regiment. On one occasion, 4th Battery removed almost the whole of a Fiat fighter suspected of being a ranging mark, by hooking the tail skid over the back of the battery’s captain’s little 15-cwt. truck “K.” Its slow progress in a tailwards direction must have seemed very undignified to this erstwhile falcon of Aeronautica Reggia. The enemy’s counter-battery work was good. On the fall of Bardia an enemy artillery map was found with 3rd Battery position neatly and accurately marked and labelled “contra-batteria.” Quite a number of their guns were mounted on big 10-ton trucks and were used as mobile artillery. On one night a 4th Battery O.P. party was busy digging in a new O.P. when they were amazed to hear the Italian command to fire, followed by the flash of several guns, seemingly very close. A search next day revealed no guns in that area so it was concluded that they had been brought up during the night to take on some special target. To those who knew the battlefields of Europe in 1914-18 and to those whose reading and imagination had caused them to visualize continuous lines of infantry, the set up now

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CHAPTER 7 INTO BATTLE 6 was new and disturbing. For days the guns stood alone and unprotected by infantry. True, infantry patrols were active both day and night, but it is a fact that a sortie in strength from their perimeter would have given the Italians the guns of the regiment with little effort on their part. Later, the infantry was brought much further forward, but even then every O.P. was forward of the infantry front line and depended on camouflage and the guns it controlled for its protection. The regiment’s first casualties came from a small aeroplane bomb which had been found by a member of R.H.Q. and was being examined by W.O. Caris and a crowd of onlookers prior to their taking it to the C.O. It exploded and injured several of the spectators, including W.O. Caris; fortunately, none of them seriously. What the C.O. said when he heard that it had been proposed to take it to him was comprehensive but not intended for publication! For the first few days the batteries enjoyed plenty of shoots and certainly succeeded in harassing the Italian. Most of the officers took their turn in the O.P. ’s and quickly got their eye in. O.P. ’s were dug in at night and camouflaged. Usually they were well forward of the infantry and during the day no movement was possible. The daring of the O.P. officers and signallers was such that eventually orders had to be issued that they were not to go where they did not have infantry protection. By the 24th, the difficulties in getting ammunition from railhead to the guns, and the need for conserving ammunition for the coming battle, necessitated an order restricting fire to five rounds per gun per day. This made things boring for the O.P.O.’s, but the ammunition was well used in registering further targets and for harassing fire at night. About this time, neither side was particularly active in the air. The British bombers were busy on the main port of Benghazi and in preventing the building up of a force to march to the relief of Bardia. On the 22nd, the Italians laid on two fairly heavy raids. They pattern bombed the road near Capuzzo apparently searching for Div. H.Q. One run appeared to be coming straight for R.H.Q. and everyone hugged the ground in his usually inadequate slit trench as the succeeding bursts rushed towards them, but it turned off in time and an English field regiment received what was left in the bomb racks -- several vehicles being left blazing fiercely. Later in the same day they came again. This time a couple of Hurricanes got among them and one of the Savoias came down in a tremendous burst of flame and dust amidst the cheers of the troops. Except for one heavy raid on the 27th, these were their main raids, and most other Italian Air Force activities were confined to hurried artillery reconnaissance and night harassing flights during which they sowed a number of “thermos flask” bombs and other nuisances. The regiment’s aircraft warning system worked well. The O.P. ’s spotted the planes as they came over the lines and telephoned a warning to the guns, whereupon all movement ceased. As far as can be ascertained, the guns were never spotted -- they were certainly never bombed. So the latter days of December passed, Christmas Day differing little from the rest. It was a quiet day, except for fairly heavy shelling of 3rd Battery. The much advertised turkey and plum pudding of later war-time Christmases was certainly missing on this, the first Christmas to find the 2nd A.I.F. at battle stations. Instead, the usual bully beef was served and there was one bottle of beer to every three men. Canteen supplies were beginning very slowly to trickle in to add to the very fair but monotonous rations. W.O. Burgess had made some long trips back to Mersa Matruh before a small canteen was established at Sollum, and had managed to get some small canteen supplies for the regiment. The 2/1st Australian Field Regiment had moved into action on the 24th and had taken up position in the rear of 4th Battery, taking over the zone previously covered by that battery and thus freeing 4th Battery to join 3rd Battery in support of the 17th Brigade. So 4th Battery crossed the Capuzzo-Bardia road and came into action about 1,000 yards in

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CHAPTER 7 INTO BATTLE 7 rear of 3rd Battery, the 18-pounders having an advantage of about 3,000 yards range over the 4.5 howitzers. The evacuation of the old position was carried out at high noon and in that flat open country should have been greeted by shelling from the Italians, but by moving the guns at intervals of about 10 minutes, with the tractors moving dead slow and showing not a puff of dust, the move continued undisturbed. This move meant handing over hard won O.P. ’s to the 2/1st and starting again on the more difficult right flanks. Here O.P. ’s were again pushed forward by the same routine, and the ground ahead of the infantry from the frontier wire to the coast, was covered in a search for commanding observation posts. In the new positions, the now established method of having a decoy gun ahead of the troop gun positions was again used successfully and the main position was never shelled although 3rd Battery continued to receive its full share and more. On the 27th, a strong formation of Italian bombers came over, their unsynchronised motors warning everyone that these were definitely not ours. By now an English Bofors regiment -- 1st Light A.A. Regiment -- had arrived and its guns were distributed among the various regiments and H.Q. These opened up and joined the usual chorus of rifle and Bren gun fire, sending their tracers curving through the air. Hurricanes joined the party, and soon two bombers faltered and fell out of formation, one crash being credited to the Bofors and one to the Hurricanes. One British pilot won the admiration of the whole division by the manner in which he carried out sorties twice daily. This reconnaissance plane, “Lizzie the Lysander,” an old moth-like creature, mooched over the enemy lines taking photos and conducting artillery shoots mainly with the medium artillery. It seemed a miracle that the pilot should survive the storm of fire from the Bredas that greeted him as he crossed the lines, but he continued his unhurried duties throughout the investment of Bardia. The continued restrictions on ammunition13 curbed the activities of the O.P. ’s, but by using all available shells for registration the O.P.O.’s continued to build up information for passing back to the counter battery organization set up by the brigade major at Divisional Artillery H.Q. This information proved invaluable in the preparation of artillery, tasks in support of the attack on Bardia when it came, and greatly contributed to the effectiveness of the fire which helped our infantry to arrive at their objectives with relatively little loss. Although no flash spotting units were available, each O.P. spent the nights on the look-out for enemy gun flashes, and by taking a compass bearing to each flash, and passing this together with the exact time of the observation to R.H.Q., it was possible by comparing reports from all O.P. ’s to get a fairly accurate idea of where the enemy guns were. By the 29th14, the preparation and planning for the big attack were well under way, and it was obvious that the regiment would fight in support of their old friends, the 17th Brigade. To assist the liaison between the two H.Q.’s, R.H.Q. moved from near Capuzzo to a site on the Egyptian side of the wire adjacent to 17th Brigade H.Q. In the meanwhile, all available trucks from all artillery regiments had been mobilized into an ammunition column under the 4th Battery Captain, Captain Hiscock15 and were running a shuttle service bringing ammunition up in preparation for the big programmes to be fired when the push started. On the 29th, too, Major Dyke returned from a course at M.E.T.S., Cairo, and became 2 i/c to the regiment, Major Young being transferred to the 2/Ist Field Regiment as second- in-command. Dusty weather was spoiling observation for the O.P. ’s but they managed to use to good effect all the ammunition that could be spared. On the evening of the 30th, a fighting patrol of Italians ran into “D” Company, 2/6th Battalion, and a short scrap ensued. From this and other observations it became obvious that the enemy were planning a raid on 3rd

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Battery. R.H.Q. accordingly ordered the withdrawal of the battery, and during the night it was pulled back through 4th Battery. The Italians did indeed come out but found the 2/7th Battalion across their axis of advance and retired without much argument; 3rd Battery returned to its gun position early next day and resumed its harassing fire. On 19th December, 1940, Intelligence had estimated the enemy strength in Bardia at “1 Division with about 20 Field and 6 Medium Guns.” Although this estimate was increased from air reconnaissance and infantry patrol reports before the battle opened, the sequel proved how hopelessly wrong the Intelligence forecasts were. Not even the most ardent optimist could have visualised what was to be the number of enemy killed and captured or the booty that would be taken by the end of the impending battle. The defences of Bardia covered an area some eleven miles long and five miles deep and ran in a semi-circle with minefields on the outside, then a deep anti-tank ditch, and finally two lines of strongly fortified concrete posts behind a continuous double apron fence of barbed wire. In all, there were eighty of these concrete small forts or posts, forty in the front line system, the remainder in a secondary line, 200 to 500 yards in the rear. The eastern section of Bardia defended area consisted of deep wadis, running inland from the sea, and it was in this area that most of the enemy artillery was located. This was also the site of the largest and most strongly defended posts. Undoubtedly a determined force should have held this strongly reinforced, natural defensive area, almost indefinitely -- British, Australians or Germans certainly would have. To invest this fortress of Mussolini’s, Western Desert Force had 6th Australian Division (less 2/3rd Field Regiment, 2/1st Anti-Tank Regiment, and one Field Ambulance) plus the following British troops:- 7th Armoured Division, whose role was to make a feint against the western sector and then to prevent any reinforcement of the enemy from the direction of Tobruk. Both of these jobs were of course carried out with the efficiency and zeal for which 7th Armoured Division was noted. 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, a magnificent machine gun battalion, the detachments of which attached to 2/2nd Field Regiment were outstanding examples of the efficient “Tommy.” 7th Medium Regiment, R.A., whose C.O., Lieut-Colonel J. H. Frowen, played a major part in the organisation of the counter•battery work of R.A.A. Headquarters, and whose 2 i/c, Major Snook, had become a legend of the desert for his outstanding work in earlier battles around Fort Capuzzo. 1st and 2nd Batteries of 104th Regiment, R.H.A., who had been in the desert for so long that they did not care to remember when they last saw a city. This, the regiment’s first meeting in action with the British Royal Artillery, will be ever remembered by all ranks, for the readiness and willingness of the “Tommies,” led by the inimitable Major H. C. Withers of handle-bar moustache fame, to pass on all the tips and quips which are so helpful to newcomers at this strange game. It should also be remembered that this British force were out in the flat, wide open desert, every inch of which was known to, and registered by, the enemy. The plan of attack as disclosed to the troops after a number of conferences between the senior officers and Divisional Headquarters was a simple one. The operation was to be controlled by the 6th Australian Division. Under its command was placed the 7th Armoured Division, 7th Medium Regiment, R.A., 104th Regiment, R.H.A., and 1st Northumberland Fusiliers (a machine gun battalion). The plan was that the armoured division was to make a feint against the northern sector, north of the Bardia-Tobruk Road. It also had a secondary role of stopping any relieving force of Italians coming from

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Tobruk. The night before the battle, the Royal Navy was to bombard Bardia and the Royal Air Force was also to heavily bomb several sectors of the Italian defences. Between Posts 47 and 45 the 16th Australian Infantry Brigade supported by “I” Tanks and under cover of a box barrage from all the British and Australian artillery were to break in around the area where the road from Fort Capuzzo enters Bardia. In the south the 17th Australian Infantry Brigade, who by its vigorous patrolling and fire had almost convinced the enemy that this sector would be the point of attack, was to contain the enemy in the south and only attack around Post 11 if the opportunity offered. Between 2/6th Battalion on the extreme south and the 16th Brigade’s attack, 2/5th Battalion and 2/7th Battalion were to capture posts on the south-west of the perimeter. New Year’s Day saw tension gradually increasing as it was realized that the Battle for Bardia was not far off. Ammunition stocks were building up around each gun position and points to be used in the preparation of programmes were being registered. It was now known that the 2/1st Field Regiment would have to move to give full support to the attack on the left of the perimeter. So that the direction of the attack would not be suspected by the enemy, it was essential that the move of the 2/1st should be unknown to them. So a busy programme was laid down for the 4th Battery. The 2/1st were to leave their camouflage nets in position when they moved on the night of 1st/2nd January 1941. The 4th Battery collected abandoned Italian guns from along the road from Buq-Buq and with these and dummy guns made up from large pipes and old truck wheels filled the old gun positions of the 2/1st, except for one gun pit per troop into which an 18•pounder brought from the 4th Battery position was placed. The 18•pounders kept up spasmodic fire throughout the 2nd on previous 2/1st targets while Italian hand grenades were burst in front of the dummy guns to simulate flashes. How far these subterfuges succeeded will never be known, but it is certain that the direction of the attack and the weight of fire accompanying it were complete surprises to the enemy. While part of the 4th Battery was employed in these deceptive activities, the C.P.O.’s and O.P.O.’s of both batteries were hard at work on the very extensive programmes to be fired in support of the attack, now definitely timed to go over at 5 a.m. next day -- 3rd January, 1941. Both batteries were now flat out preparing ammunition and moving it to the gun pits from the dumps made by Hiscock’s ammunition convoy. In addition, the 4th Battery had to prepare new battle positions about 1,000 yards forward of their previous position. Activities went on right through the night, 2nd/3rd January. At dusk on the 2nd the 18-pounders of 4th Battery returned from the 2/1st positions and later that night, after taking part in a harassing fire programme, moved quietly forward to their battle positions. By about 0010 hours ammunition had been sorted by the toiling gunners, task tables had been made out by the weary battery staffs and everything was in readiness for zero hour. But few troops could sleep, the more stolid certainly did gain three or four hours’ sleep, but those who were thinking of what the morrow might be like could get little sleep. Meanwhile, at regimental and battery headquarters, weary officers, N.C.O.’s and men lay down where they were to get some rest before the battle opened. All members of the regiment down to the latest joined gunner knew by now that they were masters of their own trade but they had read stories of the 1914-18 war and wondered how they themselves would react in stern action. Within 24 hours they were to know and most of them would be content. Starting at midnight, the Mediterranean Fleet of the Royal Navy, led by Warspite, Barham, and Valiant, bombarded the fortress of Bardia. The luckless garrison received every type of naval shell, from the 15-inch of the battleships down to the 4-inch of the destroyers. Overhead the air force kept up a continuous bombing, their low-flying craft drowning the noise of the tanks of the 7th Armoured Division moving, towards the west of the perimeter.

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CHAPTER 7 INTO BATTLE 10

Now as dawn came slowly to end the chill night, programmes were checked and double- checked and issued to the waiting No. 1’s. Torches gleamed discreetly. Skilled hands set the sights to the angles fixed for the first concentrations. Keen eyes peered through the eye pieces until they saw the tiny glow worms of night aiming points in the cross wires. The guns swung slowly, steadied and stopped. The lays were checked, the breeches opened, received their burdens and clanged to. The regiment was ready and waited on time alone to shoot and for the guns to flash their bloody warning to the Italians that the hours of the vaunted impregnable bastion of Bardia were numbered.

1 Gun Position Officers. 2 This night the troops realised that the old song, “The sands of the desert grow cold,” had much truth in it. They would probably have worked in an adjective in front of “cold.” 3 The survey party at this time consisted of Lieut. L. G. Parkinson, Sgts. C. R. Kilburn and S. McGregor, Bdrs. K. Johnson and W. Swalwell, and Gnrs. A. Baker, W. Barker, R. Stephens, A. Cameron, G. Stewart, C. Ford, D. Bennett, K. Lewtas, I. Ramsay and D. Price. 4 Royal Horse Artillery. 5 Later Lt.-Col. G. Bleby, O.B.E. 6 Later Lieut. 7 Afterwards Major J. A. R. K. Strong, M.B.E. 8 Command Post Officer. 9 Because of the uplift in morale which was produced when troops were either clean or felt themselves clean, R.H.Q. had ordered that every man, despite the shortage of water and irrespective of what was happening, should shave every morning. For a start, in certain quarters, this order was greeted with derision, so much so that in the March, 1941, issue of “Action Front,” one sergeant’s contribution headed, “Looking Back,” spoke of ““then there was the C.O. who thought he could make the boys shave every day. Clever bloke he was.” 10 “Gobi” and “Jono” were respectively the code names for 3rd and 4th Batteries. 11 3rd Battery N.C.O. sigs. (Sgt. Len Creed) calculated that there was 38 miles of wire on the ground in 3rd Battery lay-out, apart from 4 or 5 miles on reels in reserve. The official allowance was 11 miles! 12 During the battle, shell bursts twice blew the telephone exchange at 3rd Bty. off its stand in the dugout on to the knees of the operator; and after the battle was over, within a radius of 50 yards, more than ninety shell craters were counted. 13 The difficulty of obtaining from batteries the urgently required accurate ammunition returns was emphasized one evening when a C.P.O. (Lieutenant A. M. Henderson) reported by phone his ammunition expenditure for the day and the balance on hand. The adjutant (Lieutenant G. M. Lee) receiving the message was amazed to hear the voice of the assistant command post officer say, sotto voce, “No. 3 gun has just reported an extra four rounds H.E. on hand, Sir.” “Did you hear that, Adjutant?” asked C.P.O. “I did, young man,” replied adjutant, “and if I can’t get accurate returns from you, I’ll have you on the mat.” “Always plumb accurate here, old boy,” replied the C.P.O., “A.C.P.O. turn No. 3 gun through 180 degrees and put those four rounds on the adjutant’s mat.” 14 Two amusing incidents during this period come to mind: -- (a) The C.O. on being told by a B.C. over the phone that the latter had been told “something” by one of his subalterns, and having a prior and correct knowledge of the rumour, replied, “Roy, the best thing you can do with some of your subalterns is to tell them to borrow a Mills grenade from the infantry, pull the pin out, let the lever go, put

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CHAPTER 7 INTO BATTLE 11

it to their ear, and listen to it ‘tick-tock.’” To his horror, the C.O. then heard a cultivated English voice say, “Really you know, that’s the soundest advice I have ever heard on how to deal with subalterns.” It was the C.O. Northumberland Fusiliers in the adjacent dugout with Brigadier Savige! (b) On one occasion, the Intelligence Officer was giving synchronised time to a battery over the phone and went right through the drill down to “3, 2, 1 -- now 1700 hours.” On ordering “check back,” he was staggered to hear “I haven’t a watch, sir.” “What the devil were you doing whilst I was giving the time to you?” came back the I.O. “Sir, I was writing it down in the Sig. Log Book!” The CO.’s fetish was that all signallers should meticulously write down messages in a sig. log book – an innovation which 2/2nd Regiment introduced into the A.I.F. artillery. 15 Later Lt.-Col W. R. G. Hiscock, O.B.E., E.D.

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CHAPTER 8 THE BATTLE OF BARDIA 1

By 0500 hours every officer and man was at his post. Two seconds before 0530 hours a British gun started firing and then every regiment around Bardia joined in. A hail of artillery fire leapt upon the Bardia perimeter, the guns firing methodically at the rate of four rounds per gun per minute. For the troops, all with the exception of half a dozen new to war, it was an awe- inspiring sight to see their shells and the shells of their British comrades bursting on the perimeter. However excited within themselves the gunners might have been, the guns were laid, loaded and fired without any excitement. Soon the Italian artillery began to reply. As our bombardment increased, so did their retaliation. The 3rd Battery was heavily shelled by Italian medium batteries1, whilst 4th Battery was attended to by their field guns. Fortunately for the Australians, however, the majority of their shells proved either dud or ineffective. For three hours the regiment went on with its steady firing but news was soon circulating2 that the 16th Brigade breakthrough had been successful. Then the rum issue arrived. Soon afterwards 2/5th and 2/7th Battalions broke into the perimeter in front of their sectors on the south-west, but lower down the 2/6th was able to make very little progress against the strong opposition from Post 11. In a Bren carrier, Lieutenant A. M. D. Henderson, the F.O.O. with the 2/5th Battalion, lost communication with the regiment but was later reported by the C.O. 2/5th Battalion to have done yeoman service on his own initiative by rounding up prisoners in his carrier. Lieutenant R, Nethercote, the F.O.O. with 2/6th Battalion, had struck hot opposition, which had been expected in the sector fronting the Wadi Muatered. Not only had Bob Nethercote been an inspiration to his men and other junior officers since the day he joined but on this, the regiment's first day in battle, he had already proved by a sterling job in the toughest spot that he would more than fulfil the high opinion his senior officers had of him. Unfortunately, this was not to be. At 1100 hours came through the news that Bob Nethercote had been killed by shellfire when forward with the leading company of the 2/61 Battalion. The battalion commander's report on Lieutenant Nethercote's work on that morning was such that he was later post•humously mentioned in despatches.3 Lieutenant Eric Crute was immediately detailed to take over as F.O.O. in Bob Nethercote's place, and the cool and determined manner in which he received his orders from the C.O. evoked the admiration of everyone at R.H.Q., for it was not an easy nor pleasant task to take over the job of F.O.O. in one's first battle immediately after one's predecessor had been killed. And so during the morning the regiment kept up its regulated fire according to timetable. Then an hour later news of further casualties was received when it was reported that Major A. E. Arthur, O.C., 4th Battery; Lieutenant Jack Crawford and Gnr. Phil. Russell were missing. A reconnaissance towards the O.P. by signallers led by Bombardier L. Shaw4 showed broken telephones and blood spattered around their O.P. For a start it was believed that the three of them had been killed, but later on it was ascertained that whilst directing fire from a roof of a small hut almost in the enemy line, Major Arthur was forced by rifle and machine-gun fire into the court-yard of the hut, where he was joined by Lieutenant Crawford and Gnr. Phil Russell. Whilst Arthur continued the direction of fire from inside the court-yard, enemy infantry crept forward around the flank and threw hand grenades into the court•yard, very seriously wounding Arthur in both legs and peppering Crawford all over the body. Gunner Russell fortunately escaped injury but all three were taken prisoners. Captain W. R. G. Hiscock was thereupon ordered to command 4th Battery. The battle continued to progress successfully as far as the infantry were concerned, but in the regiment there was intense gloom as the result of the loss of some of its most popular officers. Early in the afternoon the whole regiment was switched to support the 2/6th Battalion in its attack upon the south-eastern portion of the perimeter around Post 11. Of this post, the C.O. 2/6th Battalion sub•sequently wrote: "It could have defied capture if manned by Australian troops. It had wire, tank ditches, tunnelled communications between strong

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CHAPTER 8 THE BATTLE OF BARDIA 2 points, and a garrison reinforced to a strength of some 400 men, with numerous machine guns and accurately ranged artillery support." Hundreds of shells were fired at this post but it was found that the instantaneous 106 E fuse just simply bounced off the concrete roof. Unable to obtain any delayed action fuses, R.H.Q. in desperation ordered 3rd Battery to try to penetrate the roof with 4.5 inch shells with the cap on, but naturally the effect was simply to bounce these shells off also and they did not detonate. By the end of the day the attack on the north had gone brilliantly. The 16th Brigade had fanned out and their leading infantry were in sight of Bardia township. The 2/5th and 2/7th Battalions had entered the perimeter after very difficult and confused fighting and the two brigades spent the night in sorting themselves out and consolidating their gains. The 2/2nd Regiment spent the night in maintaining harassing fire on various Italian gun positions, in bringing up more much•needed ammunition and in repairing damage to gun pits caused by enemy shell fire. In the meantime the 19th Brigade was being moved up to support the final phases of the attack. January 4th was spent by the regiment in supporting the 17th Brigade, particularly the 2/6th Battalion, which was maintaining its pressure on Post 11. At intervals during the day counter-battery fire was put down on hostile batteries interfering with the rest of 1 7th Brigade infantry. Post 11 was reported to be impregnable from the front, but during the day some elements of the 2/6th Battalion got well to the rear of this particular post. For the gunners there was little let up during the whole day. Task after task was fired in support of the infantry and the physical effort particularly was almost overwhelming for at that time no system of rest for gunners had been worked out. At the end of the second day, all of Bardia's defences and garrisons were in the hands of the Allies with the exception of the strong defences around Post 11. Fortunately for the regiment there were no casualties during the day, although the shelling of battery positions continued, but on a somewhat lighter scale than on the previous day. Zero hour for the attack of the 19th Brigade was tentatively fixed for 0900 hours on January 25th. The regiment had been ordered to assist this attack with a barrage and with concentration on known enemy positions. Six “I” tanks which had not been available to the 17th Brigade on the previous day were to go into attack with the 2/11th Battalion, whilst the 2/4th Battalion was to pass through and exploit. The fire plan proved successful. The tanks charged straight into enemy batteries when the Australian artillery fire lifted. The infantry supported them and mopped up and enemy resistance soon wilted. With the enemy batteries silent, the 17th Brigade was able to move eastwards, and at long last, at 1300 hours, Post 11, the last remaining bastion of the enemy, surrendered and the battle was over. As soon as Bardia was captured it was discovered that Major Arthur and Lieutenant Crawford were in the Italian hospital. When the C.O. and Adjutant arrived there they found that the A.D.M.S. of the 6th Division (Colonel Clive Disher)5 had an ambulance ready and was about to transfer the two wounded officers to the main dressing station. Gunner Phil Russell came in a few hours later none the worse for his experience as a temporary prisoner of war. He had been well fed, and had found the Italians most curious as to why the Australians were fighting them. Apparently, the meaning of the word "Empire" was not the same in both languages. Bardia was a great triumph for the 6th Division. The victory was not as easy as it appears in retrospect6. Some enemy troops, particularly their gunners and their machine- gunners, fought well and to the last. Most of their infantry in the south-eastern sector did the same. In numerous cases, gunners were found dead around their guns, having fought them to the end. Our casualties were certainly light but this fact could be traced to three most important factors: (a) The Italian tactics of putting their troops in concrete pill-boxes from which there was a natural reluctance to emerge, (b) their extremely bad ammunition, most of which

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CHAPTER 8 THE BATTLE OF BARDIA 3 exploded with little detonating effect and (c) the fact that a large proportion of the Italian troops were not interested in Mussolini's war. But not even the most ardently optimistic Australian could have visualised that by 1300 hours on 5th January, 1941, there would have been 40,000 Italians either killed or captured and in addition over 400 guns, 130 light and medium tanks, 700 motor trucks and hundreds of the enemy's machine guns in our hands. As soon as fighting finished, conducted tours of the battlefield were arranged within the regiment and stress had to be laid on avoiding any booby traps that might have been left by the enemy. Later, swimming parties were sent to the beaches, and what a relief they were to men who had been existing on one water bottle of water a day for weeks! At the same time, a strict and thorough maintenance of all guns and vehicles was carried out, captured vehicles being used in some cases to make good the wastage of our own vehicles. One officer, two sergeants and four men from each battery were detailed to make a list of the guns and artillery ammunition captured from the enemy. At the same time, preparations were going on for the regimental advance to the investment of Tobruk. The weather during the battle for Bardia had been typical of the season of the year. It was bitterly cold with biting winds that drove the everlasting sand of the desert into eyes, ears and mouth, and food with a monotony that was equalled only by the incessant demand for returns from higher authorities "as per pro forma" for everything from “ammunition” right down the scale to "jam," "youths under eighteen years, strap shoulder, left web" and so on -- and after the battle, “captured vehicles.” As related previously, the artillery ammunition position had been really serious. At times during the firing in the approach battle the shortage had necessitated restriction to five rounds per gun per day. Even during the battle itself a constant watch had to be kept on its expenditure, and it was solely due to the efforts of Captain Hiscock's party that sufficient stocks were brought up from railhead at Mersa Matruh to ensure the firing of the time programmes laid down, together with a reasonable reserve. It will be readily realized and is freely admitted that the division and all its component parts had their share of teething trouble and growing pains during their first battle. On 6th January the C.O. visited both batteries in turn. At a parade, he congratulated them upon the excellence of their gunnery and the whole of their performance during battle. He pointed out that other battles in the future would probably be much harder, but they had come through their first test in a way that proved that they were worthy successors of the Anzacs of 1915. After the battle was finished and it was known that 6th Division's next task would be the capture of Tobruk, the C.O. asked the C.R.A. to allow the regiment to remain at Bardia as long as possible in order to allow the troops to recuperate after their last arduous month. And so the regiment's move to Tobruk was not ordered until 9th January. It was at this stage that Gnr. "Jesse" James composed his famous song “The Bardia Do.”

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CHAPTER 8 THE BATTLE OF BARDIA 4

LIEUTENANT G. R. NETHERCOTE Bob Nethercote was one of the most efficient and popular officers that the regiment ever had. The following tribute to him in "Action Front," signed “WE.C.”, initials which every member of the regiment recognised, was a very accurate and true tribute to Bob Nethercote: "Bobby" "He was my friend, but he was also everyone's friend for who could know Bobby and not like him? Years ago, or so it seems, he joined my militia battery as a recruit and as soon as he became a bombardier, we began to appreciate what a sound officer he would make, because any job you gave him you could be sure would be done quietly and efficiently. As a sergeant he was, and so was the detachment he trained, the outstandingly best in the battery. His commission arrived just before war broke out, and he was one of that band of militia officers who did not hesitate once the opportunity came to join the A.I.F. And so his sphere of usefulness widened. Always keen to acquire more knowledge for himself, he believed in passing as much as he could to his troops, and in this regard he was tireless. Gifted with a quiet sense of humour, he was that ideal officer, one who knows how to act as a buffer between his seniors and juniors without irritating the former or losing the respect of the latter. He was intrinsically just: to the shirker he was merciless, but nobody could put a more forcible defence for a junior if he felt that the junior deserved it. So when an officer had to be selected for the most difficult F.O.O. job at Bardia, naturally it was he. How well he did it was told afterwards by the C.O. of the battalion to which he was attached but it was no more than we who knew and loved him knew he would do. And so the end, which mercifully was instantaneous. Bobby will never fade from our memory. His love for simple things, his home at Benjeroop, an al fresco supper after a hard day's training, a day's fishing, his quiet smile and his loyalty, were qualities which endeared him to us all and made him what he was, one of nature's gentlemen and the best type of Australian officer."

1 During this period, the troop sergeant-major of “B” troop, W.O. Edmondson, acting as a section commander, calmly ignored all shells and nonchalantly went on with his job. His attitude -- so typical of the good soldier he was -- was an inspiration to his troops, new to action as he himself was. The same attitude was adopted by the troop G.P.O.'s. 2 A very excellent characteristic of the 6th Division, which commenced in this, the division's first battle, was the prompt dissemination of accurate intelligence about our own position and that of the enemy. 3 See Note at end of Chapter. 4 Later Lieut. L. Shaw. 5 Later Brigadier C. Disher, C.B.E., D.S.O. 6 The editorial in "Action Front” of' March, 1941, rather well represented the views of the troops ... Now that we have done our bit towards the successful conclusion of the Libyan campaign, we cannot afford to let ourselves slack. In our own minds, however, however much patting on the back we may get, we all know just how hard this show actually was and we realize that the real enemy, the Germans, are not going to be the same. Many and varied are the lessons we have learned from our experiences of December, January, and February, and it is up to each and every one of us to see we take advantage of these lessons. In closing, let me cite an example which no doubt everyone will recall. The scene, the Western Desert, the time, November 29th, 1940. The C.O.'s “bastardy" stunt. How many were the criticisms shied at that "do." Trucks damaged, lines cut, O.P.'s captured, W.T. sets jammed, false messages, prisoners unsearched. “Oh, no, that couldn't happen to us.” “Couldn't it?" "Didn't it?" "Yes, sir. We came, we saw, we learnt.”

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CHAPTER 9 TOBRUK 1

Seventy-five miles west of Bardia lay Tobruk, the next Italian fortress which had to be reduced and so the regimental reconnaissance party under command of the 2 i/c, Major Dyke, and consisting of the two B.C.'s, two C.P.O.'s, a section of the survey party and two guides per battery, went forward on 9th January, 1941, with a 17th Brigade reconnaissance party. Permits had to be granted and provisional licences issued by R.A.A. for the use of captured enemy vehicles. By a stroke of good fortune, and the absence of the duty officer from R.A.A. when the Adjutant, Lieutenant G. M. Lee, called to pick up the regiment's permits and licences, it was found that, as they had to be signed by an officer, he would have to sign them himself! A perfect march table was prepared by H.Q. R.A.A. for the move of the regiment, with intervals of 40 yards between vehicles and 800 yards between batteries. And so to the investment of Tobruk, the regiment passed the start point at 0830 hours on 10th January, 1941, but to this day there are some senior officers who swear that the perfect march table would have remained perfect had not 2/2nd Field Regiment been found to have permits and licences duly signed, to use 10-ton captured Italian trucks, loaded to the gunwales, in lieu of motor cycles! The regiment bivouacked that evening just off the Bardia-Tobruk road, about ten miles east of the Italian perimeter. Tobruk had a similar defence system to Bardia. Its perimeter extended for thirty-two miles from the sea in a semi-circle until the sea was again reached on the west. Around the perimeter were 140 strong posts at fairly regular intervals and in two lines, the second line being about a quarter of a mile in the rear of the first. These posts, as at Bardia, were built of reinforced concrete and around the perimeter also were the usual anti•tank ditch, mines, and wire. The enemy, however, had learnt no lesson from his defeat at Bardia. Apart from the artillery and supporting arms, his infantry were all disposed in these posts around the perimeter. On the night of January 13th and 14th the regiment moved into its battle stations. The 3rd Battery with its 4.5 howitzers was forward with gun positions in deep wadis which provided excellent flash cover for the howitzers and good protection for the troops, as the wadi banks were very steep. The drivers did an excellent job in getting the guns into such difficult positions, as they also did on the night of the 22nd January when a move took place for the second phase of Tobruk. The 4th Battery, having 18-pounders with a very flat trajectory, could not take advantage of the wadis and felt rather naked on the large bare desert. However, “D” Troop were nicely perched on a narrow razor-backed ridge between two wadis. On this ridge the troops could watch the “overs” and “unders” from the Italians without too much anxiety as nothing less than a direct hit could do much harm. To ensure that even a direct hit would not do too much damage, the engineers were induced to bring up their air compressors and dig gun pits out of the solid rock. In the same way, they also dug gun pits out of the solid wadi bed for 3rd Battery. “F” Troop, although its gun positions were extremely well camouflaged with camel thorns, was not so happily situated, as it was out in the open desert. It took a poor view of one particular coastal or naval gun which engaged in a vicious “hate” every hour or two daily. One large calibre shell fell just short of an ammunition trailer beside one of the guns and left a large crack in the earth's surface to show its course underground. This one failed to go off and may still be there. January 15th was mainly spent in the process of settling in, the main job being the establishment of O.P.'s and communication. January 15th was also noteworthy for the fact that an air mail arrived, as also did the real hot weather. As at Bardia, the enemy had their observation posts on poles all around the perimeter. On January 16th R.H.Q. gave one 18-pounder gun from 4th Battery to Lieut. R. Eason1, later relieved by Lieut. F. Young2, with orders to move from place to place and shoot up any of the O.P.'s which were occupied. The Crew3 had several interesting days annoying the Italians and shooting up the pole sitters with varying success. Basking in false security

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CHAPTER 9 TOBRUK 2 because of its cover, the regiment considered itself safe from enemy shells. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, however, shells started to fall all about the regimental area. These were from heavy guns and it was suspected came from the beached Italian cruiser San Giorgio. As a khamsin had been raging all day and visibility was almost nil, the shooting of the Italian gunners was regarded as very good, even though the regiment was on the receiving end. The arrival of a large number of reinforcements on January 17th was mainly notable because in addition to the number of men returning from hospital it introduced to the regiment a man who was later to become one of its personalities, “the Man of Steel,” Lieutenant Fred Johnston. The title “Man of Steel” came into being at the staging camp at Amariya. Told to select a draft to go to 2/2nd Field Regiment, Lieutenant Johnston said to the parade, “I want forty men of steel to come with me to the Western Desert,” It was later on in the dark days of Crete that Fred Johnston did prove himself a man of steel, his courage and energy gaining the whole-hearted admiration of the troops who were in direct contact with him. The only new reinforcements amongst this batch were Gunner Elmo. Newman (who being an acting sergeant had wangled himself into the draft) and Gunner W. Yates, who was Lieutenant Johnston's batman. The very comprehensive remarks of Sergeants George Hanstead4 and Gil Smith4 regarding base camps and base wallahs in general were characteristic of these two N.C.O.'s. Prior to the actual infantry attack, the regiment carried out the normal functions of artillery, viz., shooting by observation and shooting on prearranged targets. Shooting by observation was however restricted by the fact that in the afternoon the sun was directly in our eyes and the enemy had the advantage of it too. Then on several days the terrible khamsin5 raged and observation was reduced to one foot. The Italians had expected an attack on Tobruk within two or three days of the fall of Bardia, and when this did not eventuate their patrols became far more aggressive than they were at Bardia. On 18th January the regiment was given its first illustration of fifth column activity, the mere simplicity of the ruse ensuring the success of the operation. Unexpectedly, from the coast on the north-east of the perimeter a herd of camels appeared under the control of some Arabs. After they had stopped to graze and had then moved off, it became noticeable that the Italian artillery opened up. Peculiarly enough, the spots selected for grazing had been in the rear of the respective gun positions of the Australian and the British artillery. Observing this, R.H.Q. telephoned H.Q., R.A.A. and gave a version of what was happening. The I.O.6 replied that the policy was to treat all Arabs in a friendly fashion and that no action was to be taken. However, after the third bombardment of gun positions, the C.O. took matters into his own hands, the camel drivers were arrested, and the camels were driven well cast of the British and Australian positions. The preparations for the Battle of Tobruk were by now beginning to get under way and on the morning of the 18th and 19th January the regiment put over a heavy concentration on the Italian positions. Unfortunately, however, on the 18th there was a fair-sized dust storm, and on the 19th the khamsin raged all day, so that shooting by observation was impossible. However, the Italian artillery engaged in counter•battery work and their bombardment was the most spirited shelling that the regiment had struck since arriving at Tobruk. As against the hopeless Italian dispositions for defence it was known that the weather might well affect the success of the operation. During January in the western desert khamsins are frequent and when the khamsin is not raging, dust storms are frequent. The other factor which had to be watched was the rain. Tobruk usually receives about 11 inches of rain per year, but unfortunately for our plans it was known that this is all concentrated

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CHAPTER 9 TOBRUK 3 in a few very heavy downfalls during the month of January. Consequently, the services of a meteorologist had to be used by the 6th Division to help in determining the date of the attack. Eventually, this was decided on for 21st January. The regiment spent the whole of 20th January in preparation for the ensuing battle, carting7, sorting and stacking ammunition, preparing barrage tables, and doing the hundred and one things that are necessary in an artillery regiment to ensure the success of a set piece battle. As we have not discussed this aspect before, it may be well here to describe what a battle means to the N.C.O.'s and gunners in the way of preparation. Shells have to be carted, stacked around the gun positions, sorted according to lots, so that from similar groups of shells the same performance will be obtained, sorted into smoke and high explosive and the H.E. divided between direct action and delayed action; spare fuses and implements placed handy, sights tested, and the whole of the gun equipment checked over. At the troop and battery command post, officers, N.C.O.'s and men are busily engaged working out abstruse tables, picking out from the regimental trace their own particular job, showing the line, range, and angle of sight of every part of the barrage and then, finally, dividing this up into programmes for each individual gun. The gunners exude sweat from the physical exertion of lumbering shells and fuses around, but the unfortunate battery staff exude much mental effort in producing results so that the guns will fire on their appointed target. That night 4th Battery sent several guns to fire the usual nightly tasks from the gun pits of a British battery on the left flank of the regiment, whilst the British battery moved out to take up its battle position. This was much the same plan of deception as had been used at Bardia. The plan for the attack was that the 7th British Armoured Division -- that magnificent formation which took part in all the desert campaigns, in the invasion of Italy, and ultimately in the invasion of Germany and finally finished up in Berlin -- was to make a distraction along the south-west and western sides of the perimeter whilst the 6th Australian Division broke through the south-eastern sector. The 16th Brigade was to break through on a front of approximately half a mile between Posts R 55 and R 57. At twenty minutes before the zero hour for the opening of the attack, viz., 0440 hours on 21st January, the regiment started the ball by putting down a dummy barrage along the Bardia road near the main entrance to Tobruk. At 0500 hours the regiment switched its fire to take part with the rest of the British and Australian artillery in the real barrage, but the 2/2nd's dummy barrage had achieved its purpose, because the Italian artillery concentrated on the Bardia road. All the Allied artillery was now concentrated around Posts 55 and 57, where the 16th Brigade was ready to make the break through. In went the 2/3rd Battalion and wheeled to deal with the enemy posts on its left. Then came the 2/1st Battalion, which wheeled right to deal with the Italians in posts on the east of the break-through. Following them came troops of British tanks. The 2/6th Battalion, under command of 16th Brigade, followed across the break and then went on to cross the Bardia road. At the same time as the 16th Brigade were breaking through between Posts 55 and 57, the 2/7th Battalion cut its way into the perimeter around Post 75. To the gunners of the 2/2nd, after finishing their barrage and now detailed to support 17th Brigade, the success of their dummy barrage was not only astounding but also most satisfactory. For at least two hours, the enemy continuously shelled the main Bardia road and the track parallel to it but before 0700 hours very little shell fire was directed at the two gaps made in his perimeter. During the morning the regiment continued to support the 17th Brigade. Lieutenants John Tatchell and Des. Cox went as F.O.O.'s with 2/7th Battalion to the Wadi Delia area and Lieutenants “Sandy” Mair and Eric Crute were allotted to the 2/6th Battalion, who were exploiting the Wadi Cheteitra area. The first phase was being carried out right on schedule, the infantry capturing objective after objective, and at 0526 hours F.O.O. for 3rd

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CHAPTER 9 TOBRUK 4

Battery reported the capture of Post 101 and that our forces were through to the sea. Prisoners were already beginning to stream back and amongst them were several sailors from the ill-fated cruiser, San Giorgio. By 1000 hours a wide swathe had been made in the southern part of the Italian defences, whilst his eastern sector was split by the attack of the 17th Brigade supported by the 2/2nd Field Regiment. The 19th Brigade were then brought in and advanced towards Tobruk township. At 1030 hours R.H.Q. accompanied 17th Brigade to a new position just inside the perimeter near Post 75. Finding the battle rolling on towards Tobruk, the C.O. moved across to contact Lieutenant Cox. Cox was somewhere in front of his O.P. looking for a further forward O.P. However, a signaller, plenty of telephone wire and an assistant were still at the O.P. The C.O. thereupon decided to engage in some shooting himself to clear out all the Italians sheltering in the wadis running into the sea just inside the north-east side of the perimeter. Being anxious to get in some shooting -- C.O.'s had little opportunity of doing any shooting -- before Cox returned from his reconnaissance, he told 4th Battery Command Post that he was going to shoot the whole regiment by giving them corrections both for line and elevation in yards8. Knowing that both batteries were firing almost parallel, the C.O. did not bother to put down any rounds on their zero lines (i.e., the line on which the guns normally fire and from which switches are made) but he ordered one round gun fire from the regiment. Two big corrections both for line and for elevation followed and the third order was destined to put the fire somewhat to the right and rear of the O.P. which he was then occupying. The C.O. told the assistant, Bombardier Phil Russell, and the signaller, Gunner Alec Russell, that they had better shelter in the sangar until the first round came down because he was not quite certain whether the corrections were right. Phil Russell9, with his six feet of height, insisted on standing up for the honour of 4th Battery. Back at 4th Battery, Lieutenant Joe Strong, ably assisted by Bombardier John Hannington10 was hopping up and down the steps of the command post getting the corrections from a signaller, converting the line correction into degrees and giving them to both batteries. The shoot was quite successful and a lot of Italians were driven out of the wadis, but 3rd Battery decided to pull out when the C.O. had reached a range 1,000 yards above the capability of the 4.5 howitzers. However, everyone was happy, and particularly, presumably, the Commanding Officer. The 4th Battery later indulged in a wadi clearing campaign of its own, using long range air burst shrapnel with quite profitable results. By late afternoon on 21st January all of the enemy's south-eastern defences had been breached and the 19th Brigade were outside Fort Solaro ready next day to make a direct attack on the township of Tobruk. During the late part of that afternoon 16th and 17th Brigades regrouped themselves. As Active Service says, although “the fighting had been slight, the discipline and verve of our men were none the less strenuously tested. The whole plan of battle hinged on movement to an exacting and elaborate timetable in an immense area of stony waste and amid the hazard of shell fire and mine fields and booby traps. For some infantry units 21st January was the day of a marathon walk. The sheer energy of their movements confused the ineptly led Italians and prevented the rally which might have set a costly price in casualties on our capture of Tobruk.” By nightfall the 17th Brigade were containing the enemy in the very wide and deep wadi area just inside his eastern defence line, the wadis which the C.O. and 4th Battery had slightly cleaned out earlier in the afternoon. Next day it was intended that the 17th Brigade should clean up the wadis and consequently in the late evening movement orders came through for the regiment to support the 2/6th Battalion in this task next morning. To do this, the regiment had to move inside the perimeter to a position a little way inside the wire and just south of the Bardia-Tobruk road. This movement on the night of January 21st/22nd was carried out

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CHAPTER 9 TOBRUK 5 in stygian darkness and the reconnaissance parties had had no time to mark the general position before dark, but at 2300 hours the move commenced. It was a tribute to the drivers and to all the battery and troop sergeant-majors that the move was completely successful. Actually the comparative case with which the operation was carried out reflected the lessons learnt in all the night training exercises that had been carried out in Palestine and Egypt. During the reconnaissance of 3rd Battery gun area, a rather amusing incident occurred. With Major Jaboor leading the party, everyone was getting along in complete silence when the word came back to stop. The major had come across a freshly dug trench. Nerves were a bit on edge when it was passed back that Major Jaboor had discovered a minefield. He called for Lieutenant Fetherstonhaugh to come forward and said, “Dicky, you know a bit about mines and all that sort of thing, have a look at this ... .. Fethers,” with his heart in his mouth, knelt down and gently scratched the dirt away. After what seemed like hours he announced that it was a freshly laid telephone cable! The reconnaissance then proceeded. Just prior to this the O.C. 4th Battery, Major W. R. G. Hiscock, nearly took a header into the large anti-tank ditch on the perimeter when his driver, Gunner Gordon Major, pulled up dead with the bonnet seeming to reach out into mid-air. There was much silent cursing as a ramp was dug on either side and it was only when safely over that there came to all the party the sudden realization that there might have been mines in that part of the ditch. Such are the hazards of night reconnaissance on wheels. In 3rd Battery, Lieutenant Harry Sutton as G.P.O. of “A” Troop moved to the cast of a track inside the perimeter and with his assistant, Bombardier Jack Tynan11, commenced marking out the gun position for his troop. When it came to putting out gun indicators, he discovered that they had been mislaid in the darkness. Lieutenant Sutton then contacted Sergeant L. Creed11 at the signal truck and secured the loan of six flags. Locating signal flags in the darkness proved to be somewhat of a task and Lieutenant Sutton had to return for some more flags. This act was repeated on two other occasions throughout the night and when visibility improved in the morning light there were twenty four flags sticking out of the ground and not any of them was anywhere near where a gun position should be! The incident provided Lieutenant Sutton with about his one hundred and twenty third story and on the countless times he told it the number of flags could not be altered. At dawn next morning, 22nd January, the 6th Division was disposed as follows: On the left 16th Brigade were ready to deal with the untouched western posts. On their right was 19th Brigade waiting to take Tobruk, whilst further to the right was the 17th Brigade ready to clean up the wadi area. However, at dawn the 7th Armoured Division broke through the perimeter on the west where the Derna road meets it. The 16th Brigade thereupon started an advance, whilst 2/4th Battalion entered Tobruk at 1020 hours. The battalions of 17th Brigade were to clear up the wadis running into the sea. The 3rd Battery was to support 2/6th Battalion and 4th Battery 2/5th Battalion. At 0600 hours, 3rd Battery opened, after a few ranging rounds, with ten rounds gun fire. After the first few rounds were fired, Italians bobbed up from everywhere. Later it was found that 3rd Battery was deployed on an Italian gun position and that the Italians had been in hiding from the previous day when they had been passed over by the infantry who had swept forward without mopping up. Consequently, in a very short time nearly 100 prisoners had been collected on the battery area. The 4th Battery found that their services were not required except for some spasmodic cleaning up of the Italians in the wadi. The morning was a very easy one for the whole of the regiment and by noon all organized resistance at Tobruk had ceased. Once again the 6th Australian Division had won through. The battle had not been spectacular, the fighting was not very severe, but the strain upon the troops had been considerable. It is doubtful if in any later battle the infantry had marched as far as had the battalions of 16th and 17th Brigade, and a mere recital of firing and movement cannot

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CHAPTER 9 TOBRUK 6 convey the strain imposed upon officers, N.C.O.'s and gunners of the 2/2nd Field Regiment. Conditions were, if anything, worse than they had been outside Bardia and water was just as scarce. However, methodical planning, complete execution of those plans to the smallest detail, and, above all, the perfect dove-tailing of the different arms of the services and the work performed by the troops themselves produced a perfect success. Tobruk, for the material it gave to the Allies at such a small cost in men and equipment, represented one of the greatest gains in the war up to that time. It had a splendid harbour, which helped greatly to solve the army supply difficulties. Tobruk is, of course, a name that will always be associated with the A.I.F. on account of the glorious part taken by the 9th Division in its defence during the siege and it was most fitting that in the initial capture of the town the original division of the A.I.F., the 6th, had played a major role. It was now six weeks after the British break through at Sidi Barrani and the Italian war machine in North Africa had been smashed. The prisoners-of-war cages were filled with the best of Mussolini's troops, a large number of his generals were in our hands, and the remainder of the Italians had completely lost their morale. Gunner Jack Pridinore was dressed in an amazing variety of Italian clothes by this time and some of his “mates” handed him over to the Tommy Provosts at the prisoner of war camp. Jack spent the night behind barbed wire for quite some time before his protestations had any effect. The sergeant of the guard reckoned Jack must be an Iti because he (Pridniore) could “not speak English correctly” -- the sergeant himself had a Lancashire accent one could cut with a knife. In the rest of the Libyan campaign, there was to be nothing comparable to the decisive battles of Bardia and Tobruk. On the 23rd January, the regiment moved to a bivouac area near the coast, and in the move the damage that had been caused to the Italian defences was all too visible. The cruiser San Giorgio was still burning, there were three large ships beached on the southern shores of the harbour, and on the far side all dumps and ammunition points were blazing furiously. Next day the C.R.A., Brigadier E. E Herring, called to congratulate the regiment on its excellent shooting on the 21st. The 24th and 25th were spent on maintenancing the guns and vehicles, getting them ready for the next move westward. But many of the troops managed to find time to do a bit of private looting in Tobruk and its environs. Everyone in the regiment was hoping that the next drive would take it to Benghazi. Rumours had already begun to circulate -- and for once rumour was correct -- that once the 6th Division reached Benghazi it would be relieved by another Australian division. January 26th was notable for the arrival of the first official report of the German Air Force in Libya. The enemy had sent dive bombers to bolster up his inept ally. In its training and in action, the regiment had always taken precautions against aircraft and now more than ever anti-aircraft precautions were observed. As soon as Tobruk fell, the 7th Armoured Division hurtled west•ward and by the 22nd January was in touch with the enemy some ten miles south-east of Derna. The 16th Infantry Brigade were to be left at Tobruk as a garrison and also to sort out the large amount of valuable material that had been captured. This was only fitting; the 16th Brigade had led the break through both at Bardia and at Tobruk. The 19th and 17th Brigade Groups were, however, to push on towards Benghazi. And on January 26th orders came through for the regiment to move with the 17th Brigade towards Derna. The spirit of the troops seemed to rise immediately as the prospects of further action appeared imminent. At R.H.Q., however, worries about the condition of the regiment's vehicles were bearing heavily on all the officers. Few of the regiment's vehicles were new when issued and now, after the severe trek across the desert, most had at least two broken leaves in their springs -- and this was the least of the worries about mechanical transport •- but no replacements were available. Similarly, with practically every motor transport spare required, now, seven months after the arrival of the division in Palestine, these replacements were not to

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CHAPTER 9 TOBRUK 7 hand. Obviously there had been a lack of foresight somewhere in not seeing that these spares, most of which could be manufactured in Australia, were readily available to 6th Division. Next day saw the regiment on the move again. With a whole division trying to use the one narrow, winding coast road, no road control had been arranged by Divisional H.Q. and the traffic congestion was at its highest. All efforts to keep distances or anything approaching road discipline were impossible. Trucks from other units kept barging in and the officers and N.C.O.'s in charge of vehicles were more than pleased when the regiment was called off the road at Ain El Gazala. The strict attention to road discipline which had been observed by 2/2nd Field Regiment in all its training since its early days at Puckapunyal was in this case brought to naught by circumstances which turned order into disorder. The regiment had always been trained to be air-minded and had assimilated the training, but had the enemy air force appeared that morning between Tobruk and Gazala it would have been presented with the airman's dream target. Around Gazala, which had been an enemy airfield, the regiment was bivouacked. By now the troops, a great proportion of whom had come from the city and had never been used to roughing it, were seasoned soldiers and were able to make themselves comfortable in the most unpropitious surroundings. Little information as to what was happening westward was produced from higher authority, but the signallers never failed to tune in to the B.B.C. news and it was learnt that night that the British forces had already by-passed Dema.

1 Later Capt. R. Eason, M.C. 2 Later Capt. 3 The crew consisted of Sgt. D. Cunningham, Bdr. F. Nixon, L/Bdr. C. R. Walker, and Gnrs. P. L. Duncan, I. Andrews, A. Stewart, F. McDonald and L Smithett. 4 Afterwards Lieut. 5 Khamsin -- the blinding, cutting sandstorm which rages from early morning until dusk and which, apart from its discomfort, reduces visibility to between one yard and one foot. 6 Intelligence Officer. 7 One ammunition bombardier in the regiment, “Bunny” Batten, had his own patent method of delivering ammunition. “Bunny” would drive close up to the gun, drop the tailboard of his three tonner; race back in reverse; slam on all brakes and most of the boxes of ammunition would sail out over the tail•board. At Tobruk, with the batteries in deep wadis, this unorthodox method of delivery saved the gunners lumping the boxes down the sides of the wadi. But they all got clear of the gun before Batten's delivery started! 8 The normal correction for guns is given as far as line is concerned in degrees and as far as elevation in yards. If line corrections are given in yards, it is necessary for the command post officer to convert the yards into degrees. 9 Afterwards Lieut. 10 Afterwards Lieut. 11 Afterwards Lieut.

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CHAPTER 10 ON TO BENGHAZI 1

Information as to exactly how long the regiment would be bivouacked at Ain E1 Gazala was rather sketchy. Heavy rain fell overnight, and in the absence of movement, the day was spent in maintenance. The wind had dropped and weather conditions were improving when orders came through for a movement party to be ready to move at 1330 hours on 28th January, complete with rations for two days. Information as to the disposition of our forces disclosed that the 19th Brigade was astride the Derna Road to the north of Martuba and that once again the 7th Armoured Division had cut the road leading from Derna to the west. The regiment was warned to move at 0700 hours on 29th January. At that time a reconnaissance party moved out, and at 0845 hours the guns and heavy vehicles were on the move. Chaotic traffic conditions once again prevailed and the road presented a mass of slowly-moving vehicles. The lack of control of traffic in the move westwards from Tobruk was a reflection on those responsible. They did not seem to have assimilated any lessons from the happenings in France and Belgium in 1940. Late that afternoon, the guns came into position south of Derna. Preparations were completed for the attack on Derna, but with the exception of several ranging rounds from our guns, the 2/2nd had nothing to do. January 30th was a very dull day. There was little activity from the enemy and little information coming back as to the exact strength of the Italians in Derna. The infantry were mainly concerned in patrolling, though 2/6th Battalion had been given the job of securing a crossing over the Wadi Derna, some 15 miles to the south of the town, and there was an unconfirmed report that one of the battalions of the 19th Brigade was in Derna. Later that afternoon the regiment was informed that mustard gas stocks had been discovered. As the story grew, so the amount of gas discovered grew likewise, and all ranks were instructed to carry respirators. The gas equipment had received little or no attention since leaving Bardia and hasty maintenance was the order of the day. After Tobruk, because of the necessity to carry more than the usual echelon of ammunition and because of the deficiencies in transport, 4th Battery had dumped all its gas equipment. Captured documents showed that the enemy had made provision for chemical warfare at Bardia and Tobruk, and consequently a fresh issue was obtained for 4th Battery. However, 4th Battery having by then lost more vehicles, it had again dumped its gas equipment shortly after leaving Derna because it could not carry this equipment and the extra ammunition. This was not discovered until the arrival of the regiment at Barce and then several officers nearly lost the number of their mess over it. Friday, the 31st, was mainly spent in reconnaissance and occupying several positions. During the night there was considerable activity from the area of Derna itself, and it appeared as if preparations for an attack on the town were being made. That night, however, the B.B.C. news conveyed the information that the British forces had occupied Derna. It was certainly news to the regiment! The regiment was deployed in a further position on 1st February and 4th Battery fired a concentration into a wadi north of its position. About 400 prisoners came filing through in a body and it appeared as if the end was in sight for all of the Italians around Derna. The regiment was then in support of the 2/5th and 2/6th Battalions and R.H.Q. had joined headquarters of 17th Brigade. The Italians had not stayed long in Derna, which was by far the hardest town in Libya to defend. The town itself was on a flat plain stretching back from the sea for a distance of a couple of miles and was ringed by a very steep escarpment. Through the escarpment ran several deep wadis, the biggest being Wadi Derna. The road down to the town and back up the escarpment on the further side stood as a tribute to the engineering efficiency of the Italians. At one corner of the escarpment, on the Benghazi side of Derna, the road had been blown in such a manner that it was totally impassable except for foot traffic.

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CHAPTER 10 ON TO BENGHAZI 2

The withdrawal of the Italians from Derna was covered by a diversionary movement against the west flank of our forces. Troops from some 200 vehicles launched an attack against the 2/4th Battalion, but as later reports showed, it was only a “blind” whilst the main body of the Italian forces got clear. On 2nd February, the chase continued and it was expected that the next formed Italian opposition would be found at the walled fort of Giovanni Berta. The regiment, still in support of the 17th Brigade, was to move across country, whilst the remainder of the British forces were to go around the coast. This march westwards from Derna must surely rank as one of the greatest driving feats of the war, comparable later with the nightmare drive that marked the second stage of the withdrawal in Greece. The crossing of the Wadi Derna, in itself, was very nearly a superhuman task. The guns and every other vehicle of the regiment went diagonally down the almost perpendicular sides of the 300 foot deep wadi, along the rocky bottom and up the other side. The crossing of the wadi occupied practically the whole of the morning but it reflected the greatest possible tribute that could be offered to the drivers of the vehicles. The Italians were moving westwards very swiftly, and often our leading elements were out of touch with their rearguards. The regiment finally came into position on the ridges from which it could command the village of Elouet el Asel. During the march that day the C.O. met an English subaltern from the 7th Medium Regiment R.A., who blithely informed him that at 1200 hours, he had been ordered by 6th Division H.Q. to put a concentration into the fort. As this was the time when our infantry would arrive there, the C.O. told him to cancel his instructions. The 3rd and 4th Batteries moving along in open formation with the whole column came into action in the first typical drill book manner of the campaign. Trails were hardly on the ground when each battery almost simultaneously opened fire and fired about 20 rounds into the fort and along chosen points along the ridge. There was no response and then the 2/7th Battalion moved in, and found the fort deserted. just then, however, the R.A.F. decided to add some difficulties to this peaceful progress, and a squadron proceeded to bomb the leading elements of our own troops, including 17th Brigade H.Q. and 2/2nd Regiment's R.H.Q. Fortunately, no casualties were caused but no one appeared to be very enthusiastic over this diversion. The Italians even in retreat proved a very cunning adversary. The road, which at times ran through deep mountain passes, had been very cleverly mined and our engineers performed a grand job in getting the road open with all possible speed. The mines, discarded on the edges of the road after being deloused, were of rather a crude nature and presented little difficulty except to slow up our advance. Late that afternoon the 2/7th Battalion occupied Giovanni Berta with very little opposition and the regiment deployed on the high ground outside the town. Giovanni Berta provided the first substantial “souveniring” of the war, and most of the regiment managed to stock up with fresh food, Chianti and Vermouth. In the early morning of 3rd February, the regiment moved through Giovanni Berta and the chase westwards went on. The country was rapidly changing and we were now in the area which Mussolini had colonised. The settlers had not moved out and were still in possession of their homes. Judging by their expressions, and the amount of white linen hastily erected at every possible point, they appeared to welcome our entry, but their Fascist salute, with the right hand raised above their heads, rapidly changed into a semblance of a correct military salute. Every house had its white flag fluttering and the settlements with their white plaster abodes were very neat and trim, but still suggestive of the domineering, aggressive Fascist regime. The populace, however, was quick to accept the Australians as liberators, with, it seemed to their captors, an air of thankfulness.

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CHAPTER 10 ON TO BENGHAZI 3

A temporary halt was called the next day, when the regiment was in position outside the fort of El Gheibab. The transport of the regiment was mobilised and sent back to bring the 2/7th Battalion forward, together with other units of 17th Brigade. The 17th Brigade in a sensational burst had marched across the desert for 77 miles in full battle order, a feat which will always be regarded in military circles as a magnificent effort. The march was quickly resumed and more delaying evidence of the Italians was seen. The movement along the road was rather spasmodic, and that evening the regiment left the road and bivouacked in an area in the vicinity of El Gehab. All petrol stocks were being brought forward in flimsy four-gallon tins and at least 75 percent of the tins arrived only half full. The regiment found itself obliged to rely on captured Italian petrol which was stored in huge dumps every few miles along the road. The petrol was in 44-gallon drums and a drum became part of the stores carried on all section ammunition vehicles and trailers. The following day there was a split in the batteries and 4th Battery was ordered to join “Slonta force” and moved out early. The 3rd Battery remained allotted to “EI Garda force” and moved further towards Barce. There was evidently some trouble brewing between the Arabs and Italians, because Arabs reported that Italian civilians had shot up several of their tribe and requested that we disarm the Italians in the village forward of EI Gehab. The position was very obscure and rumours reached the regiment that the Italians were preparing to evacuate Benghazi. February 5th saw the regiment once again on the move. The 3rd Battery moved forward at 0900 hours and R.H.Q. at 0930 with H.Q. 17th Brigade. The next objective was El Jardia. This area was much more fertile than any previously seen and there was abundant water about, chiefly from mineral springs. The march was temporarily suspended owing to the state of the roads, and the regiment once again bivouacked, this time just outside Slonta. The afternoon was spent in much needed maintenance, both of equipment and personnel. Chaplain Tyler, that afternoon, buried three R.A.F. personnel near 4th Battery position. Their Blenheim had burst into flames and the entire crew had been incinerated. It was rumoured at this stage that the Italians were in full flight and it was evident that the Libyan campaign was nearly over. The countryside had now completely changed and the 6th Division was in the fertile area of Cyrenaica. Green was the dominant colour and the countryside was dotted with villages and little farms occupied by Italians who had been compulsorily uprooted from their homeland by Mussolini and given blocks in this alien land. All had been provided with small stone whitewashed cottages and a small area of land. The change from the desert was very pleasant but it was marred by rain and mud for by now winter had thoroughly set in. On the night of 8th February, the regiment had its first rum issue for many weeks and the troops certainly needed and appreciated it. On the 7th an attempt had been made to move the regiment to Barce, but the Italians had so effectively blown the pass leading in to the town that it was found impossible to get down from the highlands. The regiment, therefore, stopped eight miles short of Barce, and settled into bivouac until the pass was opened. This day, the lack of road discipline and control again drew many unfavourable comments from the men of the regiment. For the next two days rain came down in torrents. The troops were sleeping under hastily constructed rude shelters and in the morning found their ground sheets covered in ice, whilst clothes, blankets and boots were always soggy. The road proved impassable, and all efforts to find a side track down to Barce proved unavailing as the Italians had blown every possible crossing. It was not until 1115 hours on 10th February that the regiment was again able to get on the move. As it came down the Barce Pass a picture of more green land came to it. The plain on which the town of Barce is situated had been thoroughly cultivated by the Italians and now was a mass of green waving grass and corn, a sight to gladden the eyes of the Australians after

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CHAPTER 10 ON TO BENGHAZI 4 their long trek across the sandy wastes of the desert. One incident of this day is, perhaps, worthy of mention. Determined to stop what had happened all along the road from Bardia, i.e., vehicles from other units paying no attention to road discipline and hurtling through the regimental convoy, the C.O. had given the Adjutant, that very determined, courageous and short-tempered little soldier, Captain A. M. D. Henderson, instructions that he was to stay at the rear of the regiment and not allow any other vehicle to pass through it until it reached Barce. To Henderson, orders were orders and when a red-tabbed British colonel, flying a pennant with all the authority of Middle East Headquarters, arrived in a staff car followed by a utility truck containing his batman and gear and also an office truck and attempted to go through, Henderson ordered him to stop by putting his own truck across the road. On being asked what was the trouble, Henderson explained his own orders. The colonel, being a true soldier, realized that Henderson was merely obeying his own C.O.'s instructions. He, therefore, said, “Well, old boy, I appreciate your C.O.'s idea, but it is really essential that I get through to Benghazi. How would it be if you let me go through and these other two trucks of mine can follow your regiment and join me at Benghazi eventually??” “Sandy” agreed and honour was satisfied. Brigadier S. G. Savige had reserved portion of the Italian barracks at Barce for the regiment and the remainder of the afternoon was spent in settling in. The troops could not help but comment scornfully upon Italian ideas of decency and of honour. Apparently, such a thing as respect for a convention was totally unknown to them and although their buildings covered several acres and most of them consisted of ordnance stores, that had not stopped them from blazoning almost every roof with huge red crosses. However, this was only typical of the enemy’s lack of morals. That there were absolutely no sanitary facilities and that all the surroundings of the barracks were deep in ordure was equally typical of his ideas of sanitation. The thought that the 6th Division might continue on to Tripoli and drive the Italians finally out of Africa did not come to fruition. By the time the 2/2nd Regiment had reached the top of the Barce Pass the magnificent 7th Armoured Division had completely rounded up the last remnant of Mussolini’s army in Cyrenaica at Mersa Brega and the desert campaign was over. In the regiment, vehicles were in a very bad way, and there was scarcely one which had four whole springs. The guns also required considerable overhaul, but the morale of the troops was high and they had very little doubt that had the necessary replacement in equipment and vehicles been available they could have carried on to Tripoli. However, the 6th Division had by now proved itself, and its victory and that of its British comrades was the first real Allied victory of the Second World War. On 12th February, the 17th Brigade Group was addressed by the Prime Minister of Australia, the Rt. Hon. R. G. Menzies, who had called in to congratulate the troops. Although an effort had been made to obtain some uniformity in the troops’ dress, it is doubtful whether any V.I.P. ever inspected and addressed such a weirdly dressed brigade group. Headgear consisted of tin hats, felt hats, forage caps, some Italian caps; some men were dressed in shorts, others in long trousers; some hid on drill, others khaki and a small percentage were wearing captured enemy clothing. Despite this, the superb “Present Arms” of the infantry greatly impressed the gunners. The Prime Minister made a very simple and sincere speech, but to most of the troops it seemed to lack fire. The next few days were spent in maintenance of guns and vehicles and in general cleaning up, and at night impromptu concerts were organized by the 17th Brigade Transport Officer, Captain J. McGeoch. Now it became known that German fighter and bomber aircraft were operating over the area. The possibility of attack by day was stressed and anti-aircraft defences were

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CHAPTER 10 ON TO BENGHAZI 5 arranged. It was also noticed that at this time with the arrival of the Headquarters of the Australian Corps in the area, for the first time in the Libyan campaign, canteen supplies which could have been arranged for before, were also arriving. On 15th February the regiment was ordered to move to the village of D’Anunzio where it would come under direct command again of 6th Divisional Artillery Headquarters. Before the regiment left Barce Brigadier Savige addressed a regimental parade. He complimented the whole regiment on the job it had done throughout the entire campaign from the opening days of Bardia. He said that the infantry battalions of his brigade had the utmost confidence in the regiment and that the regiment had created that confidence in the space of four weeks. “In World War l,” he said, “such confidence had taken nearly four years to create.” These sentiments were but symptomatic of the relations between the 17th Brigade and 2/2nd Field Regiment throughout the whole of the war. D’Anunzio was a typical Italian settlement. The communal centre consisted of a number of brick buildings in the form of a U. On one side was the school, in the centre was the church and on the other side were the municipal offices. Around this centre stretched the green foot•hills and valleys, and winter was now passing into spring. Never since leaving Australia had the troops seemed so happy and contented. Confident in themselves, because they had now proved themselves in battle, re-clothed and clean after the griminess of the desert and the long trek across Libya, with good food instead of the eternal bully beef and biscuits, and plenty of water instead of the restricted allowances of the desert, and with canteen supplies available and home mail arriving, it was no wonder that morale reached its highest peak. Ten percent of the regiment were granted leave to Benghazi each day and although there was nothing much to see or do in Benghazi, it was at any rate a break. There had been several German raids on Benghazi during the time that men were in on leave, but on the night of 21st February, the leave convoy coming back was attacked by German aircraft. Four bombs exploded nearby but fortunately no one was hurt. During the regiment’s stay here the Arabs were trying to get some of their own back on the Italian settlers. Consequently every night the regiment had to supply two armed patrols which patrolled the roads in three-tonners to keep off the Arabs. Because of the intense cold this was a duty unaccompanied by any pleasure.

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CHAPTER 11 RETURN TO EGYPT 1

On 23rd February, orders were received placing the regiment under command of the 19th Infantry Brigade for the move back to Egypt and the regiment was ordered to proceed in rear of the brigade, the first stop to be at Derna. However, during the day the C.O. decided that 30 to 35 miles per hour was a bit too fast for guns, and determined to go along at a slower but more reasonable pace. That night the regiment bivouacked outside Derna. Next morning the regiment required 400 gallons of petrol at Derna to enable it to continue its move. However, when the quartermaster approached the British officer in charge of the fuel depot in Derna township, he was told that he could not be issued with any petrol unless he had an order from the A.Q.M.G. of the Australian Corps. The C.O. then took a hand and after a combination of threats and blandishment succeeded in getting the necessary petrol. This omission to provide for refuelling the regiment was, unfortunately, too typical of the staff arrangements prevalent at the time. As the regiment arrived at Derna, the C.O. went ahead to inspect the road leading up the pass out of the township. It took him two hours to get up the pass, which was crowded with slow-moving transport. No one controlled it and on the top there were another hundred-odd vehicles waiting to fight their way down. Thereupon, deciding that the total lack of road discipline and control would possibly mean stalling some of the worn-out tractors on the road up the pass, he wirelessed Major Jaboor from the top that he was to return and go back by way of Elouet el Asel. The result was that the regiment retraced its steps and returned to Gazala by the same route as it had originally taken when making its westward advance. During the wait in Derna, Lieut. F. J. Young was very badly injured whilst directing traffic. He was knocked down by a truck driven by an Arab who did not stop until apprehended by some of the troops. Fred Young was a very popular young officer, and, as it was obvious that he was very badly injured, some of the troops were all for shooting the “wog” until restrained by the R.M.O., Capt. W. D. Refshauge.1 Young spent many months in hospital and did not rejoin the regiment again until it was back in Australia. Late that afternoon R.H.Q. pulled into Gazala and the two batteries reached the area next day. Gazala aerodrome, which was later to become the scene of many famous battles, was a large aerodrome some fifteen miles west of Tobruk. Outside the area on which the regiment was bivouacked, the Italians had dropped a large number of thermos bombs. The regiment had been warned to be very careful to watch out for these on the desert sands and fortunately no one in the unit was ever injured by them, but some other units camped nearby had several men killed. The first few days at Gazala were mainly spent in clearing up administration matters, but the highlight of the period was a pay parade on 28th February. 2 That evening flashes were observed from the Tobruk area and next day information reached the unit that enemy aircraft had been over Tobruk. On 1st March the regiment was ordered to change its guns with those of the 51st Field Regiment R.A. At long last the regiment was to get 25-pounders instead of the outmoded 18-pounders and 4.5 howitzers. However, it found that the guns it was to take over were not new 25-pounders but 18- pounders converted into 25-pounders. Anything was better than nothing, and the only people perturbed by the change were the unfortunate 51st Field Regiment. On the morning of 4th March arrangements were made for the R.A.F. to give a display of machine-gunning and bombing in the bay outside Gazala so that troops would realize what the air force could do if it were in earnest and not imitating the Italians, who invariably bombed from never lower than ten thousand feet. Two days later the Hun gave a display of dive-bombing and machine gunning at the water point along the Derna road. Gunner Sid Charman, the driver of 3rd Battery water cart, was hit with machine-gun bullets and very badly wounded. At Gazala the days were spent in the training of

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CHAPTER 11 RETURN TO EGYPT 2 specialists and in improvising amusement for the troops. The best show of the lot was a competition between the batteries in various aspects of artillery work, which was won by “B” Troop. A better show from the troops’ point of view was that four bottles of beer per man and many other amenities were obtained from the canteen at Tobruk. Rumours were many and varied, but the most persistent one was that the 6th Division was bound for Greece. Next day orders were received for the regiment to continue its movement towards Mersa Matruli. Consequently, on the 14th, still under the command of 19th Brigade, the regiment commenced to move once more. Unfortunately, a terrific khamsin blew all that day and consequently the pace was slowed down to that of walking. Having got about half the distance it had anticipated, the regiment bivouacked outside Bardia on the battlefield where it had undergone its first action some weeks before. Next morning the khamsin had blown itself out but on the descent down the Sollum. Pass movement once again slowed up when several guns and trailers sheared off wheels. The reason advanced by the O.C. of the L.A.D.3 was that severe crystallisation was to blame, but that morning the C.O. was not in one of his best humours and several unfortunate officers and N.C.O.’s must have felt that they themselves were responsible for shearing off the wheels. By the night of 15th March the regiment had reached a position 15 miles east of Sidi Barrani and the next day it pulled into Mersa Matrub. As the batteries moved to their allotted areas, 3rd Battery had three trucks blown up on minefields and 4th Battery lost one. Fortunately, the regiment had been ordered to sand-bag the floor-boards of all vehicles and no one was hurt. The sequel of this was that a very irate C.O. went to find the officer in charge of Mersa Matruh. He found him in a dug-out lined with concrete, about 30 feet below ground. The C.O. asked had the officer a chart of the minefield. The reply was “Sorry, old boy, but we haven’t one. It has been lost and I don’t know where they are.” The C.O.’s blistering reply was “Well come with me and I’ll show you where they are.” Mersa Matruh was simply a few days of rest interspersed with taking over new vehicles. Most of the regiment’s M.T. was almost unserviceable by now and it was given new vehicles in place of them. But it did not have to exchange quite as many vehicles as some other units which apparently had not had its sense of maintenance. By now, rumours that the regiment was going to Greece had obliterated all others and there was no doubt at all in the minds of everyone that it was for Greece that they were bound.

1 It was only the strong representations of the same Capt. Refshauge several days later that prevented a British medical officer from amputating Young's leg. 2 Another highlight was a raid on a British food dump led by Captain A. Mair. Caught by a sentry, “Sandy,” with his customary aplomb, talked his way out of it to the great admiration of his henchmen, Lieutenant H. Sutton, Sergeants Gil Smith and Len Ingram. 3 The Light Aid Detachment -- a detachment of the Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineer Corps which acted as a kind of mobile service station and repair section to a regiment.

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CHAPTER 12 PRELUDE TO DISASTER 1

When Benghazi was taken and the last of the Italian forces left in Cyrenaica destroyed by the 7th Armoured Division, all ranks of the 6th Division confidently expected that the campaign would be consummated by a final advance to Tripoli, and they could not understand why Western Desert Force stopped at Benghazi. Various reasons were given out by Divisional Headquarters for this decision but it is now obvious that either Divisional Headquarters was not told of the reason or told of it in confidence. The case for the advance has well been put by Lieut.-General de Guingand in "Operation Victory”: -- “In the joint Planning room at G.H.Q., we had convinced ourselves that once Tobruk and Benghazi were captured we could, after a pause of a week or two, advance with adequate forces to capture Tripoli. The prize was great. It would mean that we should be in a position to avoid further major campaigns in North Africa. We would be able to link up with the French in Tunis, which might well lead to active collaboration. The shipping route through the Mediterranean might be kept open without great difficulty. There were uncertainties inherent in all bold military ventures. For instance, subsequent maintenance of the forces in Tripolitania might well have proved very difficult. On the other hand, I seem to remember that General O’Connor’s own staff were studying the same problem and were very hopeful. There was very little, if any, useful Italian opposition left, and at the time the decision had to be made, the Germans had not decided upon major intervention across the Mediterranean. In order to maintain the comparatively small force that would have been necessary to capture Tripoli, all but this striking force would have had to be grounded and its transport formed into supply echelons. All this, however, had been worked out and was by no means impossible.” Certainly had all preparations been made for the advance and had it been carried on immediately after the destruction of the last of the Italians in Cyrenaica by the 7th Armoured Division at Agedabia the Allies might just have beaten the Germans into Tripoli. But the first German units landed at Tripoli late in February and had the Army of the Nile had to invest Tripoli with German troops in it, it would, in ordinary parlance, have been “sticking its neck out” -- and it was a long neck stretching from Benghazi to Tripoli and dependent on road supply. But when the move back eastwards commenced, it was not known to anyone what it implied, and most of the regiment anticipated a campaign either in Abyssinia or Eritrea. Soon, however, rumours began to seep up from Egypt that the 6th Division was bound for Greece. Before describing the tragic but heroic expedition to Greece, it is advisable to explain its genesis. For sometime the Germans had been threatening, both Greece and Turkey and they certainly had unofficially occupied Bulgaria, where roads were being built by the famous Todt organization and bridges constructed across the Danube. The halt at Benghazi had been ordered by the British Cabinet, which had decided that aid must be sent from the very weak and partly untrained garrison of the Middle East to Greece. Shortly after this, Anthony Eden, then Foreign Secretary, and Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Stag, arrived in Egypt, and after conferences with the Greek Government, arranged that an expedition should be dispatched to Greece. This plan seemed at the time -- and when put into operation very soon proved to be -- totally opposed to every possible military consideration, and is m outstanding example of what happens too often in British history: the politicians over-riding their military advisers and insisting upon a militarily indefensible plan which naturally ends in disaster. The Germans had told the world that they would throw us out whenever we attempted to land in Europe and now we were giving them another opportunity to carry out the threat and to further damage our prestige. The first effect was that the unfortunate, and at that time, untrained and ill-equipped 9th Australian Division was left to garrison the Benghazi bulge. A glance at the map will soon show that, as happened in 1941 and again in 1942, Benghazi could easily be outflanked by

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CHAPTER 12 PRELUDE TO DISASTER 2 a force taking the southern track across the desert from Agheila to Tobruk. This, of course, is what Rommel did, and soon we had lost all the gains made by the Army of the Nile in 1941. But to return to the Grecian side. We had never had any hope of concentrating in Greece a force which would have the slightest chance of stopping a German invasion. Both strategically and tactically the Hun held every card, while our hand was practically barren. We were sending two1 lone divisions to Greece to support the ill-equipped Greek army, which itself had already suffered severe casualties in fighting the Italians. Against any force which we could land in Greece, the enemy could easily bring a greater force from his European pool. Intelligence, Middle East H.Q., at this time, estimated that in Greece he could bring against us from eight to fifteen divisions2. His air force could likewise out- number and so ultimately destroy any air squadrons we could send from the few then in the Middle East. Our line of communication was across the Mediterranean and was for a great part of its length under attack from the German Air Force. Naval vessels required for escort and similar duties were likewise exposed to air attack. We lacked much vital equipment necessary to support the army; for example, only one tank brigade could be spared for this hair•brained adventure. But worst of all, we buoyed up the heroic Greek people with illusory hopes and advertised to Turkey our inability to give adequate help to our friends. Another aspect which the Australian people would do well to remember is that General Sir Thomas Blamey as commander of the Australian forces in the Middle East, in writing had stated that this proposal was extremely hazardous and unlikely to succeed. Suppose, however, that General Blamey’s plan already discussed in detail by H.Q., Middle East, had been put into effect. One division with all its equipment should be used to garrison Crete and another should be used for an attack upon the Italian island of Rhodes -- and at that time the Royal Navy dominated the Eastern Mediterranean. How sound this plan was can be realized in a few moments’ thought. With the aid of the British fleet, there is no doubt that either the 6th or 7th Division would have taken Rhodes, even though the initial landing might have been somewhat costly. With Rhodes in our possession, all enemy air attacks on the Suez Canal would have ceased and we would have dominated the vital eastern Mediterranean for the rest of the war. With a fully equipped division on Crete, it is extremely doubtful if the enemy would have succeeded in his air- borne attack. However, military considerations were cast to the winds politically and the stage was prepared for another certain British disaster3.

1 It was to have been three, but fortunately 7th Div. was stopped from embarking when the German attack started. 2 In the sequel, he used only ten divisions. 3 It is only fair, in this regard, to say that the Australian Government found itself committed by the British Government and by the unjustifiably optimistic forecasts of high British military authorities, an optimism not shared by the G.O.C., A.I.F. (Middle East).

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CHAPTER 13 GREECE - A TRAGEDY OF HEROISM 1

(1) NORTHWARDS TO THE JUGO-SLAV FRONTIER On the 20th March, the guns were entrained at Mersa Matruh station for Alexandria where they were given a thorough overhaul in the ordnance workshops. On 22nd March at 1845 hours, the regiment in its motor transport set out for Alexandria, the camp at Ikingi Maryut being reached at dusk. As typical of what was to happen during the whole of this ill-fated campaign, the regiment had been ordered to pack all cooking gear and stores, and Alexandria base area headquarters had made no arrangements for, nor would it supply, any cooking utensils whilst the regiment was awaiting embarkation. The result was that for several days meals had to be cooked in kerosene tins and similar makeshifts. Most members of the regiment were given leave to Alexandria but, at the same time, vehicles were packed with stores, all equipment was given a complete overhaul, and vehicle canopies were lowered to lessen the space necessary for stowage aboard ship. On the morning of 24th March, the regiment’s M.T. was grouped according to types and sent down to the marshalling yard. Each driver was to remain with his vehicle throughout the voyage and so -- fortunately, as it was to prove -- most men had been able to bring along extras for their own comfort during the voyage. Had they known the manner in which they were to travel, most would certainly have brought more, especially food. By the end of the day about half the regiment’s vehicles were loaded on the M.S. Delane, a British cargo carrier of about 6,000 tons which had no facilities aboard for the transport of personnel. Captain L. G. Parkinson1 was appointed O.C. troops and was accompanied by Lieutenants Cox1, McCaw2 Crute2, and Whitelaw2. Next day, the remainder of the vehicles, together with the guns and trailers, were put aboard and by 1800 hours on the 26th, the Delane did not have space for another gun or truck either in her hold or on deck. The personnel on board comprised details of thirty units, of which about one-third of the 9 officers and 400 other ranks were from the 2/2nd Field Regiment. On the morning of 27th March, news of the final disintegration of the Italians in Eritrea was announced; the bag this time being sixty to seventy thousand prisoners. This news at the beginning of another campaign boosted the morale of the troops even if it did not tend to dissipate the forebodings of the senior officers. Most of this day was spent organising the personnel on board into “troops” for administration purposes. There were five of these, each about eighty strong, placed in the charge of an officer. As there were no cooking facilities on board other than for the crew, the troops were divided into “eating groups” who received their rations and did their own cooking to the best of their ability and where they could, on primus stoves. This was a most unsatisfactory arrangement but it was the only one possible in the circumstances. At 1900 hours Delane moved out into a harbour anchorage next to the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Eagle. Just astern of Delane was the Free French battleship Lorraine and four Vichy French cruisers, all disarmed. In the dry dock was H.M.S. Liverpool, which had escorted the regiment from Colombo and was now being repaired after an aerial torpedo attack. (For the sake of convenience, the voyage of the M.T. convoy will be described before we deal with the rest of the regiment.) At 0800 hours on 28th March Delane and three other ships left Alexandria with a cruiser and destroyer escort, and next day this convoy was joined by twenty-three other ships from Port Said. The convoy was in five columns, its speed being eight knots. On this day we received the news of the battle of Matapan, and next afternoon the convoy was circled by two cruisers and attendant destroyers, including H.M.A.S. Perth, all returning from their victory at Matapan. On the 31st March the entire day was spent passing the rugged island of Crete. The mountains which seemed to rise straight from the shore-line were capped with snow, dazzling white in the Mediterranean sunlight and interspersed with the greyish brown of barren sides down which numerous snow streams poured and cascaded. In the evening the convoy rounded the western end of Crete. The fine sunny day

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CHAPTER 13 GREECE - A TRAGEDY OF HEROISM 2 had made the war seem far away, but an air raid at 1930 hours upset this idea, when a single plane splashed a few bombs around the far line of ships in the convoy. Next morning the convoy entered the Bay of Athens. Delane berthed just before noon at the coaling wharf in Piracus and unloading commenced immediately. Captain F. H. Wood, who had proceeded to Greece with the advance party, met the 2/2nd detachment. Next day all vehicles had been got off the ship and they proceeded to Hassani, which had been selected as the bivouac area. After the M.T. and guns had departed, the remaining troops spent most of their time on leave in Alexandria. On 30th March, they were warned that they would embark on the 31st, and that day, after being taken by train into Alexandria, the regiment embarked on the Dutch S.S. PennIand. The Pennland was a typical squat Dutch passenger ship but, as in addition to the 2/2nd she had on board the 2/3rd Field Regiment and 2/4th Battalion, 2/8th. Battalion, Divisional Headquarters and various odd small units, she was a very crowded transport. Next day at 1600 hours, the convoy, now containing most of the 6th Division and escorted by two destroyers, left for Greece. During the voyage all ranks had to carry a life-belt, water-bottle, and emergency rations at all times. Everyone had to sleep in his clothes and it was forbidden to have any doors closed at any time. These stringent precautions, however, did not seem to worry anyone as after the arrival of the news of the Royal Navy’s victory at Cape Matapan no-one imagined that the Italians could attack the convoy. Early in the morning of 3rd April, the convoy came to the first of the Greek islands and after so many months in the drab desert, the spirits of all aboard were uplifted. Shrouded in a blue-grey mist, flecked with the vivid green of fields and with a background of a soft blue sky, these islands were set like jewels in the translucent Mediterranean. To many, the names of the Aegean islands, such as Lemnos and Imbros, recalled the original 1st Australian Division and the Gallipoli campaign of 1915. Many also remembered from their childhood that they were now approaching the birthplace of the fabled heroes. This area was the home of Ulysses and the Argonauts. Shortly they were to meet the magic names of Athens, Pinios, Olympus and Thermopylae -- but little did any one of them realize then that within a very few weeks they themselves were to relive another Thermopylae on the historic pass. In the afternoon of 3rd April the convoy pulled into the harbour of Piraeus, the port of Athens. The advance party was waiting for the regiment and transported it through cheering, waving crowds to Hassani near the airfield on the outskirts of Athens. At Piraeus it was noted with amazement that German agents were blatantly, and without hindrance, making notes of the number of troops and vehicles which were being disembarked3. Next day a large number of the regiment were granted leave to Athens and here they began to realize what a magnificent people the Greeks were. The majority visited the dignified and stately Acropolis and Parthenon, and few left with other than a sense of awe at the wonders of ancient Greek civilization. Many had difficulty with the Greek money as it was in notes right down to the smallest coin, the drachma (worth twopence-halfpenny in Australian currency), but the courtesy and innate decency of the people soon smoothed out these worries and made the troops realize that there were foreign countries which were populated by other than “Wogs”. Back at the camp there was hurried sorting of equipment and maintenancing of guns and vehicles which the Greek air force had re-camouflaged in record time so that they were now green and brown instead of the slate, white and grey of the desert. Attempts to obtain very vital equipment, such as skid chains, torches and watches, were unavailing, but the regiment was given the tents in which it was then camped. Within twenty four hours of arrival in Greece, orders were received for the regiment to proceed to Kozani, where further orders would be issued by the C.R.A. The orders instructed that 3,000 extra rounds of ammunition would be taken. This was another

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CHAPTER 13 GREECE - A TRAGEDY OF HEROISM 3 illustration of an order which it would have been impossible to fulfil being blithely issued by an inexperienced staff. With the existing regimental transport it was simply impossible to take another 100 rounds let alone 3,000. However, with the aid of Major G. O’Brien4, who was acting as liaison officer at British Headquarters, and who had done a marvellous job of organisation, four truck-loads of stores, including the new tents and two Bren gun carriers were sent forward by train under Lieutenant P. S. Whitelaw and the extra ammunition was duly carried in the trucks thus emptied of these stores. At 0700 hours on 5th April, the regiment started on its long trek northwards but, unfortunately, going through the dense morning traffic in the city of Athens, the “Tommy” M.P. guides managed to lose various sections and the regiment did not get together for several hours afterwards5. After leaving Athens, the troops began to appreciate still more the wonderful Greek country. The road through the foot hills wound through green forests and fields with the pine-clad, snow-topped mountains in the near distance, and clean little white villages nestling in all the hills. In the fields were picturesque shepherds with their flocks, each sheep or goat with its own little tinkling bell, Women were constantly re-making the road, while most of their men folk were in the mountains to the north thrashing the Italian invader. As the convoy passed through each village the women and children showered flowers into the tractors and vehicles, and there were few men who were not affected by the beauty of the Greek countryside and the wonderful welcome by the people. As many said openly, “No wonder these Greeks fight.” Late that night the regiment halted and bivouacked at Atlantis. As the troops were having breakfast next morning, it was learnt that the Hun had played his usual trick and had invaded the northern frontiers of Greece that morning -- after the declaration of war had been served on the Greek Government at 3 a.m. The troops found that the remaining Greeks had been ordered to mobilize, and many Greek soldiers were given a lift into nearby cities. These Greeks had known war all their lives and now up against the ruthless Prussian, they were quietly courageous and determined to fight. As the regiment set out once again on its trek northwards, the previous day’s reception was repeated at every village through which it passed. Again flowers -- the only token of appreciation which this proud but poverty-stricken people had -- were thrown into the vehicles and many men kept these flowers pressed in their wallets for many months6. As the regiment arrived at the town of Lamia there was an air raid warning on the town’s siren but the all clear signal was soon given and presently the school children of the town were out on the road giving the usual enthusiastic welcome. Over the Lamia Pass, and then on and over the Domokos Pass, the convoy reached the town of Larissa which, shortly after it had been struck by an earthquake, had been savagely bombed by Mussolini’s air force -- presumably from their usual safe height of 15,000 feet. The halt for the night was made off the road just north of Larissa, and this night no lights or fires were allowed, sentries were warned to shoot if a command was not obeyed, and all troops realized that they were closely approaching action again. Next morning, 7th April, the move was continued along ever ascending mountain roads. The country was, if anything more picturesque, with storks nesting on the chimney tops of many houses7. It was more noticeable this day that on many places along the road gangs were carrying out repairs to the roads. These gangs consisted of women -- even grandmothers -- children and old men. The route was through the town of Servia to Kozani. On the way a number of vehicles, including three gun-tractors, broke down through mechanical defects, but all rejoined later in the night. Over-heating of the 15-cwt. utilities, which were not at all suitable for army purposes, was first noticed on this occasion and was the cause of subsequent loss of most of these vehicles. Whilst the regiment spent the day on maintenance of vehicles, etc., at Kozani, the C.O., battery and troop commanders went forward to the Verria Pass to reconnoitre gun

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CHAPTER 13 GREECE - A TRAGEDY OF HEROISM 4 positions. Just after this party returned at dusk, the 19th Brigade, supported by the 2/3rd Field Regiment and 2/1st Anti-tank Regiment, all under the command of 6th Divisional Headquarters, was sent to meet the Germans coming through the Monastir Gap. The 2/2nd Regiment was ordered to proceed to Verria next morning to support the 16th Brigade, which was to hold the Verria Pass. That night was a very disturbed one and few men were able to obtain much sleep as refugees from Yugoslavia were pouring down the road which flanked the regimental bivouac. Next morning reveille was at 0430 hours and an hour later the regiment started literally to fight its way up to Verria. A narrow road, barely wide enough for two vehicles, skirted the marshes at the foot of the hills to a village, after which it became a mountain road with steep gradients and in places only wide enough for one vehicle. Coming westward along this road, the regiment soon found the 2/8th Battalion with its first and second line transport. Hundreds of vehicles of all descriptions, ranging from buses with up to forty passengers, down to mule carts, all containing refugees, were likewise making their way southward. This was the only time during the whole of the Greek campaign that refugees were found on the roads and it was suspected that most of these were not Greeks. Afterwards, even during the most desperate days of the retreat, the Greek people kept off the roads and left them free to the motorized traffic of the Anzac Corps. Traffic became so congested that at last, in desperation, the C.O. was compelled to order that any refugee vehicle which had broken down or which was blocking the passage of the guns was to be manhandled off the road. This order meant that some refugees were abandoned on the road, but, unfortunately, war is war, and it was more important that the regimental guns should be got into action than that the road should be made passable for civilian refugees. Anticipating that he would have more trouble in getting up the narrow mountain road, the C.O. sent Lieutenant C. Dollman, the I.O., ahead with strict injunctions not to allow any vehicles down the pass until the regiment had got up to the top of it. Dollman found no difficulty in stopping the stream of refugees but near the top of the pass he found himself confronted with a British tank battalion which was proceeding south. Dollman respectfully, but most firmly, refused to allow the C.O. of the battalion to go down and an impasse had been reached when the C.O. of the 2/2nd arrived. A compromise was soon effected and as the British sent six of their vehicles down, the regiment sent six up until both parties were clear. Once on top of the pass, the regiment was deployed to support the front of the 16th Brigade. The battery and troop commanders then moved off to select observation posts. The only suitable areas for these were near the top of some extremely high mountains nearly six miles from the gun position. At Polimilon, Major Jaboor contacted a Greek unit who lent a guide and three ponies on which 3rd Battery reconnaissance party set off up the mountain, much to the envy of the infantry struggling up on foot and carrying their gear, with mules only to carry their stores and ammunition. Near the top of the mountain Major Jaboor found a dug-in observation post occupied by a Royal Artillery captain and his bombardier8. The only complaint from these Englishmen was that their 4.5-inch guns had been taken from them just before they left Libya and given to a regular regiment whilst their regiment (Territorial) now had the 6-inch howitzers formerly on issue to the regulars. They, of course, were convinced that it was part of a deliberate policy to give the regulars all the modern equipment. This Royal Artillery regiment was about to leave the area so Major Jaboor arranged to take over their observation post next day, giving them six miles of telephone wire on reels to replace the lines which they had laid to the guns and which had taken them three days to lay. At the same time, Gnrs. Bert Boxshall and Elmo Newman had gone down to the village and arrived back at 3rd Battery position with some 50 mules for use of the regiment. These handy animals, for all their faults, proved a blessing in disguise to the signallers, who had to carry miles of heavy wire and supplies to the O.P. ’s.

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Back at the gun position the gunners set about digging the guns in. Thus was the regiment deployed to meet the Hun if he came through by way of Verria. As soon as the deployment was completed, the C.O. reconnoitred as far forward as Verria township prior to the road being blown, which was to be done that afternoon. In Verria he was amazed to find that Lieutenant Whitelaw, together with the Bren carriers and stores, had arrived the previous afternoon but had been given no instructions by the staff at Athens as to where the party would rejoin its regiment. This fortuitous meeting undoubtedly saved Whitelaw and his men from spending the rest of the war in a German prison camp. During that night the regimental telephone lines were frequently cut by fifth columnists. This was the unit’s first experience of a form of interference most difficult to prevent, easy to carry out where wires ran close to villages, and which was to be used by widely planted German agents at every subsequent position in Greece. The position in Greece now was that the 6th Australian Division and 2nd New Zealand Division had deployed to assist the Greek army to repel the Hun invasion -- truly the old thin red line of British history had again come into being. The Greek eastern army was defending Salonika. Next came the New Zealand Division around Mount Olympus, then 16th Brigade and between 16th Brigade and 19th Brigade at Florina were two Greek divisions. Further left, the front was extended by the Greeks, who were opposing the Italians on the Albanian front. Against the might of the German panzers, assisted by their air force, the Allied situation did not look promising to anyone who knew it and thought about it. R.H.Q., therefore, gave considerable thought to the situation and made a number of plans to cope with all eventualities. That the allied line could not possibly hold was all too obvious, even if every sector fought to the death. Three separate plans were therefore made, depending upon whether it was possible to get both guns and tractors out, whether only the vehicles could be got out, and finally if only the troops themselves could be got out. These plans were communicated only to the battery commanders and certain members of R.H.Q. staff. The first step in this plan was to send every surplus vehicle back from the gun position to the foot of the pass to shelter in a village there. Later on that morning when it became known that the Greek divisions between 16th and 19th Brigades had to withdraw, the necessity became all too evident. April l0th was a miserable day for everyone. Snow had started to fall and, whilst this was a novelty for a few minutes, its effect was only to add to the cold and general misery of the troops. Fortunately, during the day a rum issue was made. Unfortunately for “B” Troop, whilst on his way back to the troop position on his motorcycle, W.O. “Snowy” Edmondson managed to break the jar of rum. “Snowy’s” popularity sank temporarily to minus. The 16th Brigade now had two battalions in the line and one in reserve. On the right, 2/2nd Battalion was supported by 4th Battery, whilst 2/1st Battalion on the left had the support of 3rd Battery. The batteries tried to register targets in front of the infantry positions but observation was extremely difficult. For example, at 3rd Battery O.P. there were Captains McPherson and Mair, Lieutenant Fetherstonhaugh and Gunner Budd together with a Royal Artillery officer and his bombardier. Although these six observers were watching for the fall of shells, 12 rounds had to be fired before the burst of one was seen. The O.P. parties and the signallers were having a terrible time. Soaked through and cold, the signallers had to pull the telephone line up from the frozen ground with their bare hands, gloves for signallers being unheard of at that time in the Australian Army. Men found that the water in their water bottles had frozen as had also their M and V 9 ration. The engines of the motor vehicles were run for about ten minutes every hour so that it would be unnecessary to drain the radiators to prevent the cylinders cracking and thus delay any sudden move by the necessity for refilling them. Although, as has been pointed out before, only a few selected senior officers had been told of possible plans for a

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CHAPTER 13 GREECE - A TRAGEDY OF HEROISM 6 withdrawal it is now10 clear that most members of the regiment knew that a withdrawal would take place. With some 3,000 extra rounds of ammunition dumped about the gun position, it was quite apparent that the regiment could not take all the ammunition away with it. Consequently, the C.O. gave orders to the battery commanders that upon receipt of a certain code word from him they would dump the surplus ammunition over the cliff so that it would not fall into German hands. The one bright spot during the whole of 10th April was the news that General Blamey had been appointed to command the operations in Greece. Now the 6th Division knew at least that sound military principles would govern the fight about to begin. Good Friday, 11th April, was merely a repetition of the discomfort experienced on the previous day. However, at 1700 hours the C.O. returned from a conference at 16th Brigade H.Q. with orders for the move which had been anticipated by everyone for the last two days. Leaving 4th Battery to protect the initial retirement of the 16th Brigade, the rest of the regiment was to move that night to Mikrovalton some ten miles south of Servia and there to support the 19th Brigade. The 16th Brigade itself was to move south, mostly by foot, across country to Pinios11. Thus was commenced the almost chess-board like moves by which General Blamey extricated the Australian and New Zealand divisions in turn and at the same time mauled the advancing German so much that he was never able really to interfere with the retirement. (2) THE RETIREMENT COMMENCES Shortly after 1800 hours, R.H.Q. issued orders that the retirement would commence at 2000 hours and the code word was sent to the battery commanders to destroy the surplus ammunition. At 1930 hours a “Q” officer from Corps Headquarters rang up to ask what was being done with the surplus ammunition. Upon being told, he became very wrathful and said that destruction was to stop and vehicles would be sent up to collect the ammunition next day. Fortunately, only about 500 surplus rounds were left and these presumably were a present to the enemy as no vehicles were ever sent up for them. This was merely another illustration of poor staff work. The O.P. parties collected as many spare rifles as they could from the infantry, who were unable on their pedestrian journey southward to carry spare rifles. Moving down from their O.P. to the battery position, 3rd Battery O.P. party, because it would have taken a very long time to reel it in, cut the telephone line into short lengths, which were thrown over the cliff. Unfortunately, 4th Battery, in its role of rearguard, was to occupy the old 3rd Battery O.P. and consequently had to use wireless, there being no line available. For the rest of the campaign, 3rd Battery was very short of telephone wire because it was found impossible to obtain replacement12. Before the regiment set out there was some apprehension in the minds of some of the senior officers about the move down the steep gradient of the snow-covered pass, all to be made without lights13. However, all the night practice in driving without lights which had earned the unanimous and whole-hearted curses of the regiment now began to prove itself. Along the narrow mountain road, with a sheer drop on the outside of literally thousands of feet, the regiment moved slowly down to the plains without losing a single vehicle, and after travelling all night began to arrive at Mikrovalton about 0600 hours on 12th April. Once the main Servia-Elasson road had been left, the road to Mikrovalton was found to be not only semi-metalled but covered in fair-sized boulders. However, as dawn approached it became easier to negotiate the many obstacles. The regiment bivouacked and had breakfast, whilst the C.O., battery and troop commanders set out on a reconnaissance for gun positions.

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Apparently recognizing that it would be very difficult to find gun positions in the area allotted to the regiment, Corps Headquarters had sent Lieut.-Colonel H. F. H. Durant14 the senior staff officer, R.A., Corps Headquarters, down to assist the C.O. in the reconnaissance. Durant, the C.O. and the battery and troop commanders tramped the whole area during the morning but found that there was no position big enough to accommodate a troop of six guns. Consequently, troops were split, with some guns in one position and the remainder in another as near as possible; for example, one troop had four guns in one place and two in another, another had five and one, another had three and three. However, by night all the guns were in position covered by trees from air observation and just covered from ground observation of their flashes by a slight rise in front. Portion of the road, however, was open to enemy observation from the ground. During the night the O.P. telephone lines were cut and suspicion fell upon some shepherds who were watching small flocks of sheep. Each sheep had a tiny bell around its neck and when the flock was anywhere nearby there was the charming tinkling of bells. The shepherds wore a black cloak with a curious pointed hood and seemed rather curious without being very friendly. R.H.Q. therefore, ordered that the telephone lines would be patrolled by armed guards and the shepherds were quietly watched in case they should decide to signal or mark the gun position for enemy aircraft. A rifle shot was fired close to the shepherds if they approached a gun position because of the possibility of a line of sheep indicating the direction of the guns to aircraft. By this time the regiment was very security minded. The shepherds might have been innocent but they were given no chance to be otherwise. The cutting of telephone lines, however, was difficult to detect and could have been carried out by any agent with little risk of detection. The C.O. himself had demonstrated in many training exercises how easy it was to do this and yet although the whole regiment knew that he would, if given the opportunity, be cutting lines in order to add reality to the training, he was very rarely detected. Patrols, however, did help to deter the enemy agents armed with pliers. Always around the gun positions were some stray Greek soldiers, men whose units had been scattered in the fighting to the north; when they strayed into the regimental area they came under suspicion, particularly as none, either officers or other ranks, carried any identity card or other means of identification15. They were usually handed over to any recognized Greek unit which could be found. On 13th April Captains Tatchell and Mair were sent across the Aliakmon River to act as forward observation officers with the 19th Brigade. They laid a telephone line about five miles long, including a portion across the swift-flowing but wide and shallow Aliakmon. Unbelievable as it may seem, this telephone line was to prove the only method of communication which the 19th Brigade Headquarters had with the 6th Division Headquarters, the sigs. of 6th Division having been able to bring forward the divisional line only to 4th Battery exchange. This friendly service of providing communication for a neighbouring unit almost proved the undoing of the regiment several days later when R.H.Q. was trying desperately to get into touch with Divisional Artillery Headquarters but found that it could not get on to the line, which was continuously being used by 19th Brigade Headquarters. The regiment was now beginning to see some evidence of the might of Germany. Flights of planes, some reaching as many as 27, seemed to be passing over all day, but, fortunately, they did not interfere much with the regiment. Almost continuous bombing was heard during the day, and late in the afternoon the waggon lines were machine-gunned by aircraft but no damage was caused. At 11.25 that morning Lance-Bombardier H. Smith with his Bren gun was credited with bringing down a Stuka which flew low over the forward position, although the actual crash was not seen. However, the Stuka emitted

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CHAPTER 13 GREECE - A TRAGEDY OF HEROISM 8 smoke, sank steeply and disappeared behind the ridges in front of the observation post, and shortly afterwards a very loud explosion was heard. All that day the O.P. parties saw long streams of enemy vehicles entering Kozani, fifteen to twenty miles away, from the north. It was estimated that over 700 vehicles entered the village during the afternoon, but they were soon lost to sight in the cover of the trees. Later on a large dust-cloud was visible leading into Bejogo just across the river, and towards the evening there was direct evidence of the presence of the enemy when their guns opened up. The shelling was concentrated where the road to Mikrovalton left the Servia-Ellason road. Despite bearings taken from the gun flashes from widely dispersed O.P. ’s which should have given a location of the enemy guns, there was no counter•battery fire from the Royal Artillery 4.5 guns just south of the junction. This was later reported to be due to the fact that they lacked ammunition but at the time it was felt that enemy shelling and heavy bombing earlier in the day might have destroyed the guns which had done such effective counter- battery work in Libya. At 1715 hours a message was received from 6th Divisional Headquarters stating that the enemy were now being supported by armoured close support 105-mm. self-propelled guns. These were said to “closely resemble tanks” and the message stated “should be good targets.” Although the regiment’s O.P. ’s did not identify any of these self-propelled guns, either in this or in any later position, it is difficult to know what was meant by the term “good targets”; probably the message meant that if seen they were to be treated as priority targets. So passed the anniversary of the day on which the regiment had embarked in Melbourne. During the night of 14th-15th April snow had fallen, but the day of the 15th was marred by only a few short drizzling showers. All day enemy aircraft and artillery were active along the main Servia road. It appeared also that the enemy’s emergency landing grounds just to the north of the Anzac position had not been affected by rain, as all day his aircraft were flying backwards and forwards. Cessation of movement in the regimental position probably saved them from observation, but two gunners of 4th Battery, Gunners E. Moor and W. (“Pudder”) Everett, who were having a bath in the Aliakmon River were chased from it by a Messerschmitt. “Pudder” was so enraged at the enemy plane that he tried to shoot it down with his revolver. During the afternoon a large force of enemy infantry attempted to cross the river at the right of the regiment’s position but after being heavily engaged by 2/3rd Field Regiment most were driven back. The few who crossed the river were soon dealt with by Brigadier Puttick’s New Zealand brigade. In the early afternoon, orders were brought to the regiment by the liaison officer from divisional headquarters (Lieutenant G. M. Lee16) that the regiment was to move that night to a position north of Elasson to be ready to support 16th Brigade by 0600 hours next morning. Lee told the C.O. that several huge bomb craters on the Mikrovalton portion of the road would not allow gun tractors to pass. The battery captain of 3rd Battery (Captain F. Wood) also brought information that it would be impossible at night to take tractors and guns along the road north-east of 3rd battery position because of a similar large bomb crater which had destroyed most of the road and made it impossible to get other than small vehicles past even in daylight. Later in the afternoon both of these pieces of information were confirmed by the regimental quartermaster (Lieutenant K. Houghton) who had been down to Servia to get ammunition. The C.O., therefore, told the Brigade Major (L) 6th Aust. Div., R.A.A., who visited him during the afternoon, that he would have to move down the back road to Elasson instead of the main Servia-Elasson road. Then for five hours, from 1500 hours until the regiment pulled out, regimental headquarters was desperately trying to get into touch with H.Q. R.A.A. 6th Aust. Div. so that it could explain to the C.R.A. what it was doing, but as the 19th Brigade and 6th Division were using the lines all the time for urgent messages it was quite impossible to break in.

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Thus at 2000 hours the regiment commenced a night march, which was possibly one of the most difficult ever done by a field artillery regiment during the war and one which those who took part in it will certainly never forget. The route was to be through Mikrovalton and Deskati to Elasson. The route was poorly mapped and most of the officers had only a quickly made trace from the map showing very few details. The road proved to be deep in mud most of the way and in places it was entirely unformed. The whole of the move was to be made without lights and with complete wireless silence. For mile on mile, officers and N.C.O.’s in charge of vehicles walked ahead of them chain-smoking cigarettes so that the driver could keep on the road. Despite these precautions, however, a number of vehicles did go over the side and others became inextricably bogged. As one gunner of 4th Battery17 wrote in his diary, “During the night, I woke up and peered over the side of the truck. There was nothing there for a couple of thousand feet. Then I wished I had not looked.” If ever the much•cursed night drives without lights proved their value, it was on this particular night. Pitch black, with not a sign of the moon, over an entirely unknown route (and, because of the lack of maps, much uncertainty as to the exact route) the night was one long nightmare to all officers, N.C.O.’s and drivers. However, despite all these difficulties, the only casualty which occurred all night was when 4th Battery water- cart overturned and Gunner R. F. Sobee was killed. Near the rear of the regiment on Sergeant Gil Smith’s tractor was the C.O. himself, who had had to abandon his own car and belongings. This tractor also picked up the C.O. of 2/Ist Anti-Tank Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel F. St. John, and finally had a couple of Greek soldiers riding on the gun platform which was secured on top of the trail. All the vehicles at the rear of the column were rather crowded as in addition to personnel from some of the abandoned vehicles, they had picked up the O.P. parties of Captains Mair and Tatchell, who had walked across to the road just in time to catch the rear of the regiment after destroying their own vehicles because the road out from their position had been cut off by the Germans. Dawn disclosed the regiment strung out over miles of country. Twelve vehicles had been abandoned, two guns were over the side of the road, and seventeen ammunition trailers had been pushed over the side in order to get the guns out of bad spots or to enable the tractor to pull other vehicles along. Early in the morning, the regiment experienced another illustration of fifth-column activity. A huge boulder had been levered down the mountain side and completely blocked the road, splitting the regiment in half. It took the united effort of about twenty men and nearly an hour in time to lever this again over the side. At this time a very worried C.O. had visions of an unfortunate 16th Infantry Brigade unsupported by artillery being attacked by the Germans. However, 16th Brigade had, during the night, been ordered again to withdraw and during the day the regiment received orders that it was to move back through Elasson and Tirnavos to Zarkos, where it was to occupy a position to protect part of the left flank of the withdrawal. Grimly pushing on it straggled by bits and pieces on to the main highway a few miles north of Elasson. At this town the canteen was getting rid of its stocks by distributing them to the troops as they passed by. In this way most vehicles got a stock of very acceptable items, such as beer, tinned fruit, chocolates, etc., which the troops had not seen since they had arrived in Greece. Down the main road to Tirnavos where the C.R.A., Brigadier Herring, was waiting to see the regiment come through and to offer his congratulations upon the magnificent effort it had achieved during the night, it passed through the New Zealand gunners digging in to do their part in protecting the area north of Larissa. In another slithering drive across about eleven miles of plain, Zarkos was eventually reached, and as the guns came in they went into action in order to protect the left flank, it being then learned that miles away out on the left, the 17th Brigade had taken up a position at Kalabaka.

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During the afternoon the Messerschmitts started strafing the gun position and waggon lines in earnest, but because of the dispersion and excellent digging in, no casualties were caused. Next day, 17th April, the two missing guns turned up, having been man-handled up to the road by their own crews and so, despite the loss of vehicles, the regiment had all its guns in action. Rain fell for most of the morning, and consequently the Luftwaffe was missing. The afternoon, however, proved to be warm and sunny, and this enabled the German planes once more to get into the air. Shortly after noon the regiment was again machine-gunned and dive-bombed, but again without casualties. Early in the afternoon, orders were received that the regiment was to withdraw to a position south of Larissa, where it was to dig in to protect the approaches to the township of Larissa and it was also then to form part of the 6th Division reserve. The reconnaissance party, led by Major Dyke, moved off at 1430 hours and was at Larissa when the enemy bombing and ground strafing commenced. Fortunately, its dispersion enabled it to avoid casualties. The bombing of Larissa continued for the remainder of the afternoon. At 1900 hours the remainder of the regiment proceeded to move, R.H.Q. leading and being followed by 4th and 3rd Battery in that order. To minimize casualties from air attack, the regiment moved in small groups of four vehicles with 30 yards between vehicles and 400 yards between each group. Thus although it was bombed and machine-gunned from the air shortly after starting, there were several narrow escapes but not any casualties. The fine township of Larissa had been practically levelled to the ground by the enemy bombing. Passing through it the troops could not help admiring a number of 7th Division Australian Provosts who were on traffic duty in the town. Two were directing traffic near two very large unexploded bombs on the side of the road, whilst another two moved-on vehicles which tended to halt near them with the remark, “I would advise you not to stop here as this corner is about due for its next bombing18.” The corporals, however, remained there despite the bombing. Outside the township, two large deserted camps with the tents still standing caused the enemy airmen to waste many bombs and machine-gun bullets and distracted their attention from other more important targets. By 2100 hours the guns were being dug in and the vehicles of the regiment widely dispersed. That day, a divisional order was issued to the troops in which it was stated that “in face of superior numbers we are compelled to withdraw to a shorter line further back where we will definitely stand. All personnel are permitted to obtain stores, petrol, etc., from dumps along the road. Men are not to feel that this war is developing into a similar state of affairs as at Dunkirk. Hitherto, our positions were being held on too large a front.” Strangely enough, very few of the troops did think that we were “Dunkirking” but it is safe to say that no officer of the rank of battery commander or above had the slightest doubt as to what was happening19. During the night, 17th-18th April, an earthquake shook poor, mangled Larissa and its outskirts. At first, many of the troops thought this was the enemy bombing by night time, but the absence of the sound of explosions soon made everyone realize the true reason for the rocking of the ground. The regiment spent the morning improving its gun positions. Above them the sky was thick with German aircraft but, fortunately for the regiment they still devoted their attention to the standing and deserted camps, and also, probably because of the fact that the regiment was well dug in and there was little movement, its position was not observed. At any rate it suffered no attacks from the air during this day. Captain Mair had his O.P. at the top of the water tower of the Larissa aerodrome. He noticed that although enemy planes heavily bombed the town alongside, they did not attempt to bomb the aerodrome, because, apparently, they expected to be using it soon. Unfortunately, the storehouses at the aerodrome contained quite a number of Hurricane planes in crates which, of course, eventually passed into the hands of the Hun. During this morning a Hun reconnaissance aeroplane was over a large ammunition dump just as the engineers blew it up. There was a terrific explosion and the plane was tossed over and over like a piece of

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CHAPTER 13 GREECE - A TRAGEDY OF HEROISM 11 paper, but to the intense disappointment of all the troops the pilot regained control just as the plane appeared about to crash. At 1300 hours the C.O. received personal instructions from H.Q., 6th Div., that he was to take a convoy consisting of the 2/2nd Field Regiment, 2/1st Infantry Battalion, 2/7th Field Ambulance, an anti•tank battery and a New Zealand machine-gun platoon to Brallos, start time to be 1700 hours. However, during the afternoon, news reached Divisional Headquarters of the enemy armoured break-through of 16th Infantry Brigade and the New Zealanders at Pinios. The projected move was, therefore, cancelled and the C.O. was ordered to take charge of the force just mentioned and to deploy it for the protection of the road leading south from Larissa so that the remainder of the division could retire. Not very thrilled at the prospect of trying to hold a plain at least twenty miles wide with one battalion and one field regiment, he however, hurried off to make the deployment. The 2/1st Battalion was stopped just as it had embussed and the deployment arranged. Most of the armour piercing shell in the regiment was rushed to “A” troop, which was in the best position to deal with tanks. But just as the deployment was complete, further orders came from 6th Div. Headquarters that the break-through was not so serious as had been first supposed and that the original orders would stand except that the start time would now be 1900 hours. The order stated that for two hours at least after 1900 hours the road ahead of the convoy would be clear of traffic. At 1900 hours the convoy set out on what was to be for all officers, N.C.O.’s and drivers, at least, another nightmare drive. (For the troops in the vehicles it was not quite so bad because it was a main road and they could sleep.) The statement that the road ahead was clear for at least two hours must have been a bit of wishful thinking because the column had not proceeded three miles when it found itself at the rear of a long column of vehicles stretching ahead as far as could be seen. Then out came the Messerschmitts for their last attack before darkness. The column ahead was badly machine-gunned and all vehicles stopped. Unfortunately, they stopped too long because drivers did not get back to their vehicles as soon as the attack was obviously over. At the rear of 3rd Battery some vehicles were caught by the Hun aircraft and as a result Gunner Jack James was killed and Gunners Hopkins and D. McKay were wounded. Then, with darkness approaching, the convoy started to move. Ahead of the regimental group there were something like five or six hundred vehicles of all shapes and conditions, and from all kinds of units. All night, vehicles stopped because the driver, worn out with fatigue, went to sleep at the wheel the moment he halted or because he had stopped behind a deserted and burnt-out truck which in the darkness he though was part of the convoy. Officers and N.C.O.’s had continually to go ahead on foot to ensure that vehicles in front which had stopped got moving again; if they could not move they were pushed off the road20. As the convoy approached the town of Domokos Colonel Cremor met Colonel Elliott21 of Corps H.Q. These two officers decided that the danger from bombing of the mountain roads at night time was practically negligible and that it was not necessary for the vehicles to be travelling without lights. They, therefore, on their own volition, decided to order that lights should be put on all vehicles. This necessitated the two of them doing a tremendous amount of walking and talking to almost every individual driver, each of whom had to be convinced that they were not Fifth Columnists and that there was very little danger as lights could be put out if any bombing started. Now the convoy began to move more rapidly. Up and over the Domokos Pass, along the muddy plain with its numerous burnt-out and burning vehicles, over the Lamia Pass and then down to Lamia township itself. Here the New Zealanders were directed along the coastal road to the left and the Australians up to the Brallos Pass. As day broke on the 19th April the vast convoy was still making its way through the village of Lamia22 and up the Brallos Pass. Just after dawn some Hurricane planes with

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Greek markings on them flew over the convoy; these were the first -- and last -- friendly planes seen by the regiment in Greece. Most of those who saw them were suspicious that the pilots may have been Germans but as there was no hostile action, they were probably Greeks. By now the C.O. had gone ahead to report to Brigadier G. A. Vasey, commanding 19th Brigade. Brigadier Vasey told him that he wanted at least two guns so placed that the Hun would be prevented from repairing the bridge over the Sperichios River which it was intended to destroy. The C.O., after walking almost down to the bottom of the pass, selected the only gun position which would enable the shells to reach the bridge. This was about two-thirds of the way up the pass. Meanwhile, the regiment had dispersed near the village of Skainnos so that vehicles could proceed up the pass at a reasonable interval and avoid presenting a worthwhile target to the enemy aircraft, and also to avoid the risk of blocking the narrow road. Regimental Headquarters and 4th Battery got safely up the pass, but vehicles coming from the rear banked up on to 3rd Battery, thus destroying their interval and presenting just the target the Messerschmitts were hoping to find. Consequently, several vehicles were set on fire or overturned. “A” Troop lost a gun tractor and Lieutenant Sutton, the gun position officer, just managed to save some essential instruments from his vehicle before it was destroyed by fire; the gun from the burnt tractor was towed up the pass by an infantry 15-cwt. truck which had a towing hook fitted to it23. So the regiment wound its way up the road which literally was cut in the face of the cliffs. On the way up “A” Troop of 3rd Battery left two guns under the command of Lieutenant A. J. Anderson at the position which had previously been selected by the C.O. (This was about 60 yards in front of the spot subsequently selected by 3rd Battery for its Observation Post and right in the 2/4th Battalion area.) The 2/4th Battalion troops were wisely moved well away from the guns because they, as well as the gunners, realized what would happen in the form of retaliation when the guns fired and were spotted by the enemy. Eventually, the regiment reached a bivouac area behind the village of Brallos. The rest of the day was spent by the C.O., battery commanders and troop commanders reconnoitring gun positions and observation posts. One of the two Bren gun carriers, provided for the use of forward observation officers when they had to move about under fire, just failed to reach the foot of the pass. After being taken to Verria by rail, it had travelled all the way back to Brallos on hard roads which were too much for its track, and the driver, Gunner Syd. Clarkson, had to destroy it and then abandon it at Skainos. (3) THERMOPYLAE By the morning of 21st April, the Anzac Corps had established itself upon the Thermopylae line. Most of the troops remembered from their infancy the story of Leonidas and his four hundred Spartans holding this pass and now twenty-four hundred years later, the Anzac Corps was placed in almost the same position. Out on the right between the mountains and the sea lay 2nd New Zealand Division. Extending from it across the mountains was deployed what was left of 6th Australian Division: in the line were 19th and 17th Brigades. In support were the 2/2nd Field Regiment and a battery of the 2/1st Field Regiment under command. On the 6th Division’s front the enemy had to attack either up the cliff faces or to go around and try to out-flank the position on the left. To prevent him attacking from the front and to render his attack on the left flank more circuitous, the 2/2nd Field Regiment’s job was primarily to ensure that the bridge over the Sperkhios River would not be available to him. Otherwise, the regiment’s job was to watch the left flank and to prevent the enemy infiltrating towards the infantry. At 0700 hours that morning over came Messerschmitt after Messerschmitt machine- gunning the road and bivouac areas. All the regiment’s vehicles had as usual been very

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CHAPTER 13 GREECE - A TRAGEDY OF HEROISM 13 well dispersed and put under cover as far as was possible. Nevertheless, four trucks of the regiment were set alight, and destroyed. During the continuous attacks in the morning Bombardier L. Kay and Gunners R. Matthews, G. K. Stewart and W. P. Matters were killed and a number of other troops were wounded, Bombardier Barwick very seriously. During the day, dribbling up the pass came the 17th Brigade from their flank job out at Kalabaka and the composite force known as the “Miles Force.” As soon as the last of these troops had passed, the bridge over the Sperkhios River was blown up by the engineers. But the regiment had little time to notice what was going on beside it. Its job was to get its guns into action. Throughout the day, gun by gun at long intervals was sent up to the new positions selected by the officers on the previous afternoon. This meant taking a gun out of its hiding place, travelling it slowly, stopping, as soon as the Messerschmitts came over (and hoping it would not be seen) and eventually putting it into its gun position. As soon as it was dusk, deep gun-pits were dug and the camouflage nets duly erected over them. As dusk fell, the Germans set about trying to repair the bridge over the Sperkhios River. Accurate fire from the two forward guns prevented them, however, doing much. This fire was maintained all night and so at daybreak on 22nd April the bridge was still unrepaired and the enemy could not get across. All that day, the enemy tried very hard to locate the forward guns by every means in his power. He used air reconnaissance and tried air ranging but did not succeed. About midday, the guns opened fire on a German aeroplane which had been brought down on to the plain by a Royal Artillery detachment with a Breda light anti-aircraft gun stationed alongside the regiment’s two forward guns. Four airmen from the plane were seen to escape to the river. The guns immediately started to fire on the plane and damaged it very badly24. About 1700 hours, the enemy commenced to move down the road from Lamia, and at a range of 10,900 yards Anderson put the first enemy vehicle out of action. Dusk fell shortly afterwards and for the rest of the night twelve rounds per gun per hour were fired at irregular intervals. It was obvious that the enemy was making strenuous efforts to repair the bridge but that the regiment’s fire prevented his doing so. Soon after sunrise next morning another convoy moved down from Lamia at about 30 yard intervals and was immediately engaged. They appeared several times again through the trees, each time with a longer interval, but they were prevented by our fire from moving forward. The enemy now brought a medium battery to a wood south-east of Lamia. Anderson tried to engage this battery but although he used, against all artillery tradition and practice, two third charges and one first charge, thereby getting an additional five hundred yards range, his rounds still fell short25. During the day, Anderson continued firing but every time his guns opened up he received retaliation from the 5.9’s. About 1300 hours he was surprised to see an enemy convoy at the foot of the pass about half a mile to his left flank. It was obvious that they had got around by making a detour. As a company of German infantry were dismounting, Anderson fired about 60 rounds over open sights as fast as the guns could be loaded and so inflicted a large number of casualties upon the enemy. The enemy then used his 5.9’s to fire air burst high explosive against our guns in addition to the usual ground bursting shells. Eventually, both guns were put out of action. As the crews were moved off, several rounds inflicted grave casualties on the gun detachment. Seven of the gunners were killed and three were very seriously wounded26. The destruction of these two guns was a great tragedy that afflicted the regiment. The guns and those gunners who had so faithfully served them had done their job. Their action had undoubtedly saved a more precipitate retirement of the Anzac Corps, because had the enemy been able to get up the pass, before 19th and 17th Brigade were completely in position, it is quite possible that he would have been able to convert the hitherto orderly retreat into a rout from which few would have escaped. The tragedy was emphasized by the

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CHAPTER 13 GREECE - A TRAGEDY OF HEROISM 14 characters of the lads who were killed. Bombardier Orm. Tulloch, a talented musician, quiet and reserved, was a brilliant assistant in an Observation Post and had been sent down with a message to the forward gun when the bombardment started. Lionel Caldwell was another militiaman who enlisted in October, 1939. For quiet determined courage there were few men in the regiment who could equal Lionel Caldwell. Several years before the war he had distinguished himself as the one driver left on a bolting six-horse team, who eventually brought it to a stop despite the danger to himself. He was the troop artificer, and it was his job to ensure that the guns remained in action. Therefore, he went to the guns and shared their fate. Len Ingram, an original of the regiment, had his brother back at 3rd Battery gun position. John Drake, the youngest son of a family, and himself in his thirties, who had had his eldest brother killed in the First War; Frank O’Brien, the son of a soldier who had died of his injuries in the First War, was a militiaman before the war who enlisted as soon as he was nineteen. Fred Kerr, the only son of a very brave set of parents and a brilliant athlete, had determined, despite all objections, to join the original 6th Division. The disaster naturally cast a gloom over the troops who had known their dead fellows, but its main effect was to make them more determined than ever that the Hun would pay. Lieutenant John Anderson carried some of the wounded along a goat track up the side of the pass to the nearest R.A.P27. For these dead gunners there could well be repeated and paraphrased, the message of Leonidas: “Go! stranger, tell at Melbourne that we who lie here died content.” During the day the observation post of 3rd Battery saw other vehicles moving to the east of the main road from Lamia and disappearing. Next day, a number of these proved to be guns. Throughout the night a large number of vehicle lights were observed approaching Lamia from the north but there were no lights after the vehicles reached the town -- a sign of respect for the guns of the regiment. The batteries had completed registration by shooting into the areas they were to cover by their fire, Gun-pits were improved and all preparations were made for the imminent battle. The precise deduction of the location of targets was made difficult by the very great difference in height between guns on the mountains and their targets on the plains below. This difference in height could not be made up by the sight clinometers of the gun, which naturally were never devised for firing from heights some two to three thousand feet above their targets. Another difficulty was that due to crest clearance, i.e., the problem of getting shells to their targets on the plains close in front of high peaks occupied by the observation parties and infantry. But all these difficulties were overcome by the ingenuity of the observation post officers. The enemy was very active in the air looking for the location of the Anzac Corps; a reconnaissance plane was brought down in the regiment’s waggon line area and both occupants killed as it was flying very low over the regimental waggon line. Telephone-wire was very scarce as no replacement had been obtained for that lost in Verria Pass and at Mikrovalton. The 3rd Battery had insufficient wire to run a line from their observation post to the battery area and were frequently forced to rely on wireless or upon the occasional use of 4th Battery’s line, which they managed by putting a short line between their observation post and that of 4th Battery. (This kind of co-operation, which was done between the two officers concerned, Captains McPherson28, and Parkinson, was symptomatic of the high standard of co-operation which the regiment had then reached.) Wireless communication was poor owing to the blanketing effect of high mountains between the sets; this channel of communication was successful only during the time that Lieutenant Fetherstonhaugh, the F.O.O., had his set in a position suitable for relaying the messages. The 3rd Battery signallers overcame the problem by joining together in parallel all the civil telephone lines which ran along the road, cutting them at the point nearest the gun position and the observation post and running short lines to the telephones. This line kept the signal linesmen extremely busy climbing the poles to make repairs because

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CHAPTER 13 GREECE - A TRAGEDY OF HEROISM 15 practically every aircraft bomb which fell near it cut the wires; next day, shelling increased the number of breaks. It was now 23rd April, and it was clear to every member of the Anzac Corps that the enemy would do his utmost to make the 1941 anniversary of Anzac Day the greatest tragedy in Australian history. Early that morning at 0400 hours “F” Troop of 4th Battery were shelled by medium guns, but it was obvious that the German was engaging in an area shoot without observation, and no damage was done. At 0715 hours 3rd Battery got the same treatment with the same result. This morning at R.H.Q. orders had been received that 17th Brigade were to withdraw and that 19th Brigade would hold a very much more restricted front. The 2/2nd Field Regiment guns would, therefore, be withdrawn during the night to support this new position of 19th Brigade. During the day, the C.O. and the battery captains reconnoitred the new gun positions. About 1100 hours that morning the regimental quartermaster, Lieutenant K. Houghton, reported to the C.O. that he had found a number of camouflage nets at the Brallos railway station. The C.O. ordered him to commandeer them and bring them up. Having observed a German reconnaissance plane flying over the battery position most of the afternoon, the C.O. decided that luck must be on the side of the regiment. When orders were issued for the withdrawal of the guns, emphasis was placed on the fact that the camouflage nets in the old position were to be left there and all traces of withdrawal removed. The sequel to this was seen next morning. Shortly after noon, Captain Mair observed enemy troops debussing from vehicles well south of the river, just in front of the mountain and about a mile to the west of his observation post. He fired on them and drove the vehicles back before they could debus any further troops29. A few minutes later, he detected mortars firing from a large house in the village of Skamnos. Very quickly he silenced them with the fire of the whole of his battery. Next he detected movement in an enemy observation post on a hill half a mile to his left30. (4) ANZAC REPEATED April 23rd probably produced the most doleful news of the whole of the Grecian campaign. During the day, news came through that the Greek army holding the left flank had been compelled to surrender. Later came through the news that the Germans had broken through and were moving down the Missolonghi Road. If the enemy came down the Missolonghi Road, Anzac Corps was cut off from its beaches. This explains the withdrawal of the 17th Brigade, one of whose battalions was ordered forward to hold that particular flank. During the afternoon, half of the gun detachments and the drivers were sent back to the new position to dig the gun pits. The result was that they had the gun pits ready for the guns when they proceeded to withdraw shortly after dark. On Anzac Eve, 24th April, it became light at about 0615 hours. Almost to the minute at 0700 hours there arrived 42 Stuka dive-bombers escorted overhead by 30 fighters -- the German alone knew why he needed a fighter escort as there had been no British planes in the sky for the last three days. One after another, the Stukas peeled off and dive-bombed the old gun positions which contained only the camouflage nets. For 50 minutes this proceeding went on unhampered. A fair amount of damage was done around the old gun positions and two gun pits received direct hits. For all that, it was an example of typical German stupidity and lack of imagination. The previous day the reconnaissance plane had photographed the battery positions. Some enemy commander had ordered that they would be dive-bombed -- and dive-bombed they were. Had a reconnaissance plane been sent over that morning to reconnoitre the area first, they could not help but have observed that the regiment had shifted back a mile and a half. From the rear, most of the regiment observed this performance and chuckled long and loudly. Those who did not do any chuckling were

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CHAPTER 13 GREECE - A TRAGEDY OF HEROISM 16 the O.P. officers and their party. The O.P. ’s were established on the ridge just forward of the gun position, whilst the remainder of their parties were dispersed just behind it. Captain Ron McPherson had with him Gunners Cliff Jude, Norman Caldow, Owen Donogahy and Jack Lewis, who was this day “celebrating” his seventeenth birthday. None of these troops were at all amused. Having finished its dive-bombing and being perfectly satisfied apparently with the result, the German air force proceeded to go home, but to relieve them there arrived a reconnaissance plane which directed medium guns from down on the plain on to the old gun position. These guns were probably the same ones which had brought down predicted fire31 the day before. For the rest of the day the air was never without relays of Stulcas and Messerschmitts. Shells from the medium guns down on the plain fell in all areas during the day, but it was mostly unobserved fire on points selected from the map as likely targets. In consequence, road and track junctions came in for a large share of the fire, and telephone lines following the roads, because of the rough nature of the country, sustained a very large number of breaks. During the day the C.O. was called down to a conference at Divisional Headquarters where he was told that it had been definitely decided to evacuate Greece. It had been obvious to everyone for the previous ten days that there were only two alternatives for the Anzac Corps -- evacuation or annihilation -- despite a rumour on 22nd April, probably emanating from the enemy, that 20,000 Canadians had landed at Piracus. The C.O. was told that the guns were to be destroyed in their existing positions. On his return he issued the necessary orders regarding evacuation, it being originally intended that the regiment should leave from Argos. This was later changed to Megara. Included in the orders was the statement that if the enemy managed to break through, the troops should make for the coast and that they should tell the Greeks that any caique32 which took troops to Crete or to a British ship would be adequately rewarded. Whether the troops should have been told at this stage that evacuation had been decided upon or not will ever remain a moot point. As far as the troops of the 2/2nd Field Regiment were concerned, it did not make one scrap of difference, but, when all is said and done, the artillery was not holding the front line. The effect of this information upon troops holding the front line cannot be gauged now -- and it would ill become a gunner to discuss that aspect. In the case of the 2/2nd the orders were brief and very much to the point. The evacuation point was to be Megara, sketch maps would be issued to every vehicle to show the route (R.H.Q. Survey Section prepared a sketch map for every vehicle, showing the route and the main towns which would be passed), and an officer or N.C.O. was to travel with the driver in the front of every vehicle. By 1200 hours it was obvious that the enemy was concentrating some 2,000 yards in front of the forward defended line held by the 2/l1th Battalion. This Anzac Eve produced many alarms and excursions, particularly for R.H.Q. The batteries saw or heard only what was happening in front of them, but the picture down at R.H.Q. was not a happy one at any time during the day. Very early in the morning the Germans started determinedly to try to force the Brallos Pass. They got lorry-borne infantry well out on the left. The observation post officers could not see into this area so far to their left rear and consequently Captain Parkinson and Lieutenant Barnden established an O.P. very dose to the guns and directed heavy fire on to the Germans. These observation posts were kept busy all day firing on German troops advancing down to a number of small villages to the west of the Brallos Pass. Once again it appeared that the Germans were attempting to get round the flanks of the Australians and New Zealanders in an attempt to cut them off from the rear, and once again there were no troops on the flank to stop them. Other German troops were moving up along the railway on the left, having been able finally to get up the pass upon 19th Brigade’s withdrawal the previous day. They crossed a gorge and were concentrating

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CHAPTER 13 GREECE - A TRAGEDY OF HEROISM 17 in a tree-covered area about 2,000 yards in front of the forward troops of the 2/11th Battalion. The 3rd Battery guns were kept busy traversing through a large arc to the left to fire on the targets seen by Lieutenant Barnden, then swinging to the front again for Captain McPherson’s targets. The 4th Battery were kept on the targets on the left flank, which in the morning appeared to be the greater threat. On the extreme right, Captain John Tatchell, who was well forward, did not get any shooting at all. Then word came from B. echelon of the 2/1st Battalion that enemy troops were coming down from the hills east of the road in the rear. Captain Bleby was sent to investigate and it proved that the “enemy” were remnants of the Greek army. The 2/11th Battalion, which was holding the foremost line, had lost all its tools because the mules carrying them had been killed by fire from the air on the previous night, so they could do little digging. The area in which advanced troops of the 6th. Division were now fighting was very mountainous, with few level spaces. Most of it was covered with scrub about four feet high. During the morning the regiment was firing at every possible target towards its front and towards its left flank. Nevertheless, the Germans were advancing determinedly but gradually, both on the left flank and through the railway tunnel in front of the 2/11th Battalion. By 1600 hours the enemy were moving south from Gardikaki, obviously engaged upon a wide, outflanking movement. The 2/11th Battalion were, therefore, ordered to hold a line west of Ano Brallos. Consequently, their companies proceeded to withdraw. Unfortunately, the artillery supporting them were not informed of this withdrawal. The result was that about 1740 hours, their forward companies having been heavily attacked, they withdrew to the lines to which they had been previously ordered, i.e., a line running south-west through Kato Brallos. Thus, soon there was no infantry between the advancing Germans and the guns some 2,000 odd yards away. All the O.P. ’s were forced to withdraw. Captain Tatchell had to walk back from his observation post through rough country when the Germans crossed the road in rear of him. Captain McPherson and his party got out to the road in their vehicle when the enemy troops were about 100 yards to the opposite flank and in rear of them. On their way they picked up the last few infantry troops, most of whom were wounded. Within a few minutes, this situation had been reported to the C.O. All the O.P.O.’s had been forced to withdraw, both those of his own batteries and that of the 2/1st troop attached. Things looked pretty grim. He, thereupon, took a decision which might have had grave consequences. He got on to the phone to the C.P.O.33 of each of the three batteries and ordered them to bring down gunfire on the previous infantry F.D.L.’s34 until he himself told them to stop. The 4th Battery merely asked that the order be repeated so that they could be sure about it. The 3rd Battery’s C.P.O. accepted the order but a minute later the battery commander, Major Jaboor, got on the phone and suggested that there might be some infantry left in the F.D.L.’s. He was bluntly told to do as he was ordered and to bring down fire. It appeared that the troop of the 2/1st Field Regiment was not carrying out the order. Upon which the I.O. of the regiment, Lieutenant C. Dollman, was sent on a motorcycle to tell them to do as they had been ordered. The result was that the regiment plus the troop of 2/1st Regiment attached proceeded to bring down gun fire35 on the previous infantry F.D.L.’s and so the enemy was unable to move through this terrific barrage. The C.O. then reported to Brigadier G. A. Vasey who, having confirmed the fact that 2/11th Battalion had withdrawn, sent a company of the 2/1st Battalion up to restore the situation. Fortunately, however, before this the carrier platoon of the 2/1st Battalion had itself on its own initiative moved up and were holding the enemy from a ridge 200 yards behind the previous position. A platoon of this battalion also arrived to give a hand to restore the situation. The regiment’s O.P.O.’s had to withdraw, but they had received orders that they were to re-establish O.P. ’s as soon as possible. This, Major Hiscock, Major Peters of the 2/1st Field Regiment and Captain McPherson did some few hundred yards behind the ridge which they had been forced to evacuate. It says a lot for the morale

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CHAPTER 13 GREECE - A TRAGEDY OF HEROISM 18 of the regiment that during all this excitement, whilst the guns were still vigorously firing as quickly as they could be loaded, evening meal was being prepared in all the gun positions, in the command posts and in the O.P. ’s. There was certainly no consternation in the ranks of 2/2nd Field Regiment. At 19th Brigade Headquarters, Colonel Cremor expressed his anxiety about the position of his guns. Brigadier Vasey, one of the coolest and most competent commanders that the A.I.F. had produced, at first was inclined to pooh-pooh Cremor’s anxiety, but, when Cremor insisted, Vasey agreed that from the point of view of distance, viz., approximately 2,300 yards, the enemy might arrive at the guns before the laid down time of departure. He, therefore, asked Cremor if he would be satisfied if the time of evacuation was put forward from 2000 hours to 1900 hours. Cremor agreed and so it was ordered, Consequently, the time of evacuation of the rearguard infantry was also altered from 2130 to 2030 hours. This was probably the brightest day in the whole history of the regiment as never before or afterwards had it such excellent opportunities of doing its job. The guns continued firing, ultimately over open sights36, until they were finally hooked on to their tractors. Because of the original order that the guns were to be destroyed where they were, most of them had been put into dry creek beds from which it was not thought that they would have to be shifted. Despite this, every gun with the exception of one which simply could not be drawn out (“F” Troop gun, Sgt. Eric Capper’s) was eventually withdrawn and Sgt. C. Morley’s gun of “D” Troop, 4th Battery, continued firing from the road until the remainder of 4th Battery was through. From this exposed position, it fired directly on enemy troops who could be seen quite plainly by the gun crew. The orders for withdrawal gave the order of march as 2/4th Battalion, 2/1st Battalion, 2/2nd Field Regiment, 2/8th Battalion, 2/11th Battalion. They also laid down that units would move for the first five miles from their position without lights. Then lights were to be turned on and the convoy was to move at the best possible speed without stopping until it reached the dispersal area at Megara. As it moved, road demolitions were made by our engineers to hinder the enemy. Having seen the regiment started on the road and being very doubtful, because of his previous experience, of whether the movement would go as smoothly as planned, the C.O. then went to the head of the regiment. It proved rather fortunate that he did so. The first block was caused after about eight miles had been traversed by the leisurely movement of the “B” echelon transport of an infantry battalion mov•ing out from the fields on the right of the road just in front of the regiment. A few well-chosen words to the C.O. of this unit hastened their exit. The next incident occurred north of Elcusis, where some fifth columnists ran a farm tractor diagonally across the road. Stopping his part of the column, the C.O. got about thirty troops to man-handle it into the ditch and cursed the fact that he was too slow to get his pistol out to shoot the fifth columnists. Shortly after midnight another stoppage occurred and as far as could be seen, the convoy ahead had completely stopped. Finally it was discovered that the halt had been caused by an infantry battalion commander who, despite the strict orders to the contrary, had decided to have a ten minutes’ halt at midnight in order that his personnel might have a cup of tea! During the night some of the convoy were diverted up into a dead end at Eleusis by an M.P. who it is now obvious was a German in disguise. It took over an hour to sort out this particular mess but the convoy got moving again. Eventually, around about 0300 hours, the convoy arrived at Megara. Here an English staff officer tried to insist that the artillery was to go on to Argos. He was finally convinced by the C.O. that the artillery supporting 19th Brigade was to go with the brigade and not to Argos. However, the adjutant had to be stationed on the road to ensure that all vehicles of the regiment were diverted off37.

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Just inside the dispersal area the regiment found to its horror that all the transport belonging to one unit was parked wheel to wheel and radiator to tail-board in the open, with the troops streaming away from them. The C.O. of this unit refused to disperse them and it looked as if they might be left there as a beacon for the Hun next morning38. The regiment was, therefore, ordered to move at least three miles away from the road and to thoroughly disperse all vehicles. Within an hour this had been accomplished and there were only a few odd vehicles still to report in. In the morning, the German Stukas duly arrived together with Dorniers. They dropped a few bombs on the village of Megara, but the dispersal of the regiment under cover of the olive trees saved it from being seen and it was not attacked during the day. During the morning Brigadier Vasey issued orders regarding evacuation that night. The sequence of embarkation was to be 2/1st Battalion, 2/11th Battalion, 2/1st Anti-Tank Regiment (or what was left of it) and finally 2/2nd Field Regiment. Consequently, at 1400 hours the C.O. called a conference of battery commanders and gave the necessary orders for the destruction of the guns, vehicles and other equipment. This, probably the most heart-breaking conference that was ever called in the regiment, had its sadness accentuated by the fact that it was 1400 hours on the 25th April, the time that the Anzac march would be starting in Melbourne. The normal method of destroying guns is to place a shell base outward in the muzzle end of the gun and fire another shell from the breech by means of a long lanyard. This ensures that the barrel of the gun is burst. On this occasion, however, no firing was permitted, and other means had to be found. Members of the regiment were determined that there would be nothing left worthwhile for the Hun. They set to work, albeit sadly, but with enthusiasm, to wreck their precious guns and vehicles. Picks, sledge hammers and every conceivable method of destruction were used. Certain of the troops went a little further than even orders had demanded and left a few neatly planted booby traps in wireless sets, etc., for the inquisitive enemy. At 2000 hours the men of the regiment assembled in their troops and batteries and moved to the beach. No packs were allowed, only haversacks; consequently, most men had only what they stood up in although all sights, directors39, clinometers40, and telephones were taken. It had been ordered that a number of vehicles should be emptied but not destroyed and as soon as it was dark the drivers took these vehicles to Daphrie camp a few miles away and picked up troops of many units who were to be taken to Kalamata. However, the orders were changed and the troops were delivered close to the beach to join those already waiting for the ships. The drivers then destroyed their vehicles and were just in time to move off with the regiment. Quietly, quickly, the regiment moved down to a small stone jetty from which landing craft took them to the destroyers. Some of the regiment were accommodated on H.M.A.S. Waterken and H.M.S. Hastings, but most of them went on H.M.S. Decoy. One tank landing craft ran aground with a large number of troops on board but Decoy took the risk of coming alongside and the troops were got safely on board. Then the three destroyers set off full speed for Crete. The Navy gave everyone a thick mug of cocoa and a meal. The officers of Decoy gave up their cabins to the senior officers of the regiment and their ward room to the junior officers. Although the destroyers had about 800 soldiers on board, one would not have imagined from the magnificent attitude of the sailors that it was anything out of the usual for one of H.M. destroyers to be engaged on a troop-ferrying service. During the day, German planes passed over the convoy several times and were heavily engaged by the anti-aircraft guns of the ships and driven off. While it lasted it was a wonderful sight to see the three destroyers travelling at 33 knots through a calm sea and firing instantly at any plane which appeared. And so the ill-starred adventure was over; 60,000 British, Australian and New Zealand troops, as fully equipped as the Middle East could in those days equip them, went to

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Greece; 44,000 came out, carrying only their rifles and whatever they stood up in. But what came out of Greece was not a disorganized and defeated rabble but a number of formed and disciplined units with their morale undeterred and undiminished. The Anzac Corps had met and had withstood four and a half times its own number in ground troops. Except for the break•through at Pinios the German armour had never been able to get near the Anzac infantry, and the Anzac Corps knew that as individual soldiers they were better than anything the enemy could produce. As one member of the regiment recorded in his diary: “In Greece we never had a chance. On the ground we had about four to one against us and he had the air entirely to himself. Give us equality in the air -- not superiority -- and he can have odds of two to one on the ground, and without boasting, we are quite satisfied that we can defeat him.” The Germans took approximately 3,600 prisoners from the Anzac Corps. The casualties, i.e., dead and wounded, would be approximately 2,150. The German himself, through the voice of Hitler after the campaign, admitted that his casualties were 1,160 killed and 3,755 wounded. From the experience of 2/2nd Field Regiment it is pretty safe to say that it is no exaggeration that the correct numbers were at least treble these figures. The Lion’s sons had been mauled but their attackers had paid very, very dearly for their mauling. It had been another Anzac. Just as ill-prepared, just as equally wrong strategically, just as badly unsupported when it needed support, and differing only from Anzac in that the evacuation was made, and successfully made, despite the opposition of and with the full knowledge of the enemy. Artillery does not have regimental colours for the simple reason that never has there been a battle fought in the history of the British Empire but that there have been some gunners there. If the 2/2nd Field Regiment had had colours it would have been able to emblazon on those colours the magic, centuries-old names of Thermopylae, Verria, Larissa and Megara, words symbolic of freedom from the first days of recorded history. But for the troops huddled on the destroyers there was little to stimulate their deadened sense of defeat and futility. The only redeeming feature of the whole of the ill-fated three weeks’ campaign had been the brilliant strategy of the commander of the Anzac Corps, General Blamey. Rarely does the man in the ranks appreciate the strategy of the higher commander during a battle, but instinctively he knows whether the strategy or tactics are well thought out or not, and every man in the 6th Division knew that Blamey’s handling of the Grecian campaign had been masterly. Thus, it is not unnatural that General Blamey has always been the hero of 6th Div. Generals may come and commanders may go but much sand will drift across the desert before any original member of 6th Div. forgets Thomas Albert Blamey. There was sorrow for the dead left behind, and the wounded in hospital soon to become prisoners of the arrogant German. There was anguish and shame at leaving the heroic Greeks, the Greeks whose women kissed the departing troops even though they knew full well that next day they would be under the heel of the merciless German. But there was no resentment expressed by any Greek man or woman and they farewelled the troops with “thumbs up” and shouts of “Nike! Nike!” 41. Courage is a very petty word to describe what animated these heroic and marvellous Greeks. One effect of such a parting was to instil into the heart of every troop who saw it the cold determination that ultimately these people must be freed however hard the road might be to freedom.

1 Later Major. 2 Later Captain. 3 Germany had not then declared war on Greece. 4 Later Brig. G. H. O’Brien, C.B.E.

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5 Whilst passing through Athens one driver, Jack Egan, overcome by the artistic beauty, both ornamental and female, knocked over a butcher boy on a bike. The Marmon was suitably adorned around the bonnet with strings of sausages and two large livers splashed neatly on the windscreen, much to the amusement of the Greeks (less butcher boy). 6 It did not seem significant at the time but the usual greeting from the children with their very limited knowledge of English was “Good-bye, boy.” 7 The Greeks considered it a good omen for a stork to nest on the cottage chimney so they made no attempt to disturb the huge birds. Naturally the fireplace could not be used during the time the birds were nesting. 8 Peculiarly enough, this bombardier, Bdr. H. Pugh, had been the first person at Tobruk to demonstrate to 3rd Battery O.P. parties the method of making the monotonous ration of herrings more palatable by crunching issue biscuits, mixing in the herrings, and then rolling the mixture into rissoles and frying them. 9 Meat and Vegetable -- a tinned concoction which was reasonably palatable or the first meal but nauseating after half a dozen meals of it on end. 10 In 1948. 11 The 16th Brigade seemed to be destined throughout its career to get many of the nasty jobs. It had been the initial break-through brigade, both at Bardia and Tobruk; now it was destined to trudge across mountains and flooded creeks to Pinios, where it would meet the full attack of a German panzer division. Later it was one of the brigades which took part in the Kokoda operation in New Guinea. 12 It is impossible with the information available, at this date, to determine whose fault this mistake was. Obviously either the C.O.’s order to withdraw had not covered this point or the orders being verbal, complete orders had not been transmitted from 3rd Battery to its O.P. officers. 13 Probably the only comparable road in Australia to that which the regiment traversed that night down the pass is the Alpine Road from Bright to Omeo in Victoria. 14 Later Brigadier. 15 Australian officers carried an identity card, endorsed in Greek; other ranks always had their paybooks and thus could identify themselves as in every Greek village was some soldier who had learnt English while living in America. 16 Later Major. 17 Gnr. (later Sgt.) Ern. Moor, of Cheltenham, Victoria. 18 Personnel of 6th Division, generally speaking, had a lot of time for their Divisional Provost Corps and its attitude to them. They had very little time, however, for the home-service variety which they met on their return to Australia in 1942. 19 On the other hand, one battery captain records that probably because of his own pre- occupation with his own job, he never realized until he received the actual orders for evacuation that the Anzac Corps would have to evacuate Greece. 20 The C.O. estimated that he and his adjutant, Capt. A. M, D. Henderson, walked about sixteen miles that night, straightening out tangles and getting vehicles on the move. 21 Later Brig. C. M. L. Elliott, Aust. Staff Corps. 22 Vehicles were prohibited from stopping in or near Lamia, where a few bombs could have seriously interfered with the movement of both the Australian and the New Zealand Division. 23 On many occasions those experienced in artillery had expressed their amazement that Australian vehicles, unlike the British, were not fitted with towing hooks so that any vehicle could tow another. It must be admitted that later on in the war, vehicles produced in Australia were so fitted. 24 One thing that had been practised in 2/2nd Regiment in training, and in action was always adopted, was the idea that the gunners should always be told the result of their shooting. On this particular occasion, the message was sent down to 3rd Battery that their forward guns had destroyed a German aeroplane on the plain below the Pass.

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Brigadier S. G. Savige happened to come upon the gun position at the moment the message had been received. He found the G.P.O., Lieutenant P. S. Whitelaw, and some of his staff dancing a jig. The brigadier was thoroughly astonished and asked what was the matter. He was joyfully told that the guns had destroyed a German aeroplane. 25 Charges one, two and three for 25-pounders are graduated for propelling power. Normally, charges one, two or three are used according to the range. For short ranges, charges two and three are taken out, but for long ranges the whole three are left in. It is entirely unorthodox to take out the second charge and to substitute for it another third charge because the extra propelling charge thereby generated might well burst the gun. 26 Killed were: Sgt. L. Ingram, Bdr. L. Caldwell, Bdr. F. Kerr, Gnr. J. Drake, Gnr. F. O’Brien and Bdr. O. Tulloch. Wounded were: Sgt. J. Lees, Bdr. W. Grogan, Gnr. Lennie and Gnr. E. Condon. Sgt. Lees, Bdr. Grogan and Gnr. Lennie were subsequently taken prisoners from the hospital to which they had been evacuated. Gnr. Eddie Condon, although wounded, insisted on carrying out gun laying when he got back to the main troop position. 27 For his remarkably efficient work and courage in this position, Lieutenant Anderson was awarded the M.C. 28 Later Major R. E. McPherson, M.C. 29 Fire was not very accurate as the target was at extreme range for the second charge and the crest could not be cleared with the third, i.e., the highest charge. However, the vehicles were driven back. Some shells slithered down the northern slopes of the mountain before exploding! 30 The previous evening Captain McPherson had detected what was obviously an enemy reconnaissance party on this particular hill. He fired on them, driving them back over the hill and duly recorded the target. Both Mair and McPherson kept the area under very close observation this day as they suspected that an enemy observation post was being established in a position where it would have excellent observation from a rear flank on the regiment’s forward guns and on 2/4th Infantry Battalion. Mair’s fire on the 23rd enabled McPherson to return unharmed from a local reconnaissance, much to the amazement of an infantry officer who reported that the route had been unusable since early morning. These incidents showed that the Germans were across the river in force but undoubtedly owing to the activity of the regiment’s forward guns had been unable to get their heavy equipment across. 31 The term applied when guns fire on to a known location, making all possible correction for the effect of weather, etc., so as to ensure accuracy but lacking the benefits of an observer to make corrections for factors which cannot be accurately measured in the field, or, to ensure that the target is still in the location being fired upon. Naturally, this method must be used to fire on a target during darkness. Nevertheless, the fire was ineffective on “D” Troop in the hours of the early morning. 32 Greek fishing boat. 33 Command Post Officer. 34 Forward Defended Localities. 35 During this gun fire, Sgt. Fred. McDonald’s gun on which Gnr Bill Smethurst was layer, had a premature, fortunately without any casualties to the crew. 36 i.e., direct at the enemy. Normally gunners do not see their targets. Over open sights, the guns are laid direct at enemy troops. 37 Despite this precaution, Sgt. Riseborough’s detachment was not noticed and went on to Argos. 38 After first light next morning these vehicles were slowly dispersed. 39 Director -- an instrument not as accurate as a theodolite but more robust, used for passing the correct line or direction to the gun. 40 Clinometer -- an accurate instrument of the spirit level type used for laying the gun. 41 “Victory! Victory!”

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The resources of the Navy had been strained to the uttermost to evacuate the army through the island-studded narrow passages off the Grecian coast. The navy’s first task was to get the troops off the Greek beaches. Those who were taken off in the larger ships were taken straight to Egypt, but the smaller ships, such as the destroyers, had to make several trips and, therefore, it was decided that they should land their evacuees on the island of Crete, from whence they could be taken away later. Thus it was that at 1030 hours on 26th April, Decoy with her two consorts steamed into Suda Bay. Huddled all night on the wind-swept open decks, the troops had had little sleep and were completely worn out after the previous strenuous four days. Nevertheless, all of their own volition had washed and shaved as soon as it was light, a fact commented upon by Brigadier Herring, the C.R.A., when he saw them move off the ships. With only a haversack to carry their own personal possessions, they had nevertheless brought away from Greece the sights and clinometers of every gun, the directors and telephones, and every man had retrieved some personal weapon, while several signallers had managed to bring away the essential parts of a wireless set. The staff arrangements on Crete for the reception of the disembarking troops were typical of the whole of the staff work during the Cretan tragedy. Troops were given a cup of tea about a mile past Suda jetty and then ordered to proceed to “Camp C” which was situated in the hills above Perivolia, a little to the south of Canea, the capital of the island. Worn out and without water, they had to march over six miles in the blistering sun with every guide saying, apparently on instructions, that it was only one mile more to the camp. On arrival at “Camp C” every man was completely exhausted, “Camp C” was, however, a camp in name only; there were no tents, there were no blankets, and there was no food. The one saving grace about the “camp” was the abundance of cool mountain streams in which the men proceeded to bathe and so overcome some of their exhaustion. Why the bivouac area could not have been within a couple of miles of Suda Bay was a mystery known only to the staff who arranged it. That night, the men of the regiment, having fed on the little of the emergency rations they still carried with them, huddled together around brush-wood fires trying in vain to keep warm and to sleep in the cold Cretan mountain air. Some of the more resourceful, or possibly more sensible, wandered off to the little adjacent Cretan villages and filled themselves up with the potent Cretan wine, “mavrodafni.” Early next morning a succession of staff officers arrived with instructions, but there was no food forthcoming. The regiment was ordered to move back to Suda Bay, starting at 0700 hours, to be embarked for Egypt. Unable to obtain any consideration from any of these officers to his request that arrangements be made to relieve the troops of the various instruments they were carrying, the C.O. decided that he was not going to allow his troops to be unnecessarily exhausted any more. Consequently, he made a dump of all these instruments, i.e., gun sights, directors, etc1. On the regiment’s arrival at Suda Port, it was found that the utmost confusion prevailed. Placing the regiment in an open place off the road, the C.O., with the adjutant, spent the next two hours vainly trying to interview staff officers or to get instructions from them. Finally he was informed that it had been decided that the artillery would not be embarked for Egypt and that he was to move the regiment 14 miles south-east from Suda along the coast road; no satisfaction could be obtained, however, as to when blankets, tents or food were likely to be provided. The C.O. then told the senior Australian staff officer that because of the exhausted condition of his men he refused to move them more than two miles cast of Suda jetty. At this point the remainder of the day was spent bathing in the warm waters of Suda Bay. Fortunately, ample fresh water was available from a small mountain stream which started from a spring a short way up the hillside. A march of another fourteen miles on that summer day with the troops in the condition they were, with no operational urgency and without the prospect of even a blanket or food at the end of the march, was one of the most unreasonable orders ever received by the regiment in its

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 2 history. During the day the R.H.Q. made further contact with the staff at Suda jetty and it was eventually agreed to move a further four miles along the road to just past Suda Point, where there was a faint hope of getting a few tents for the troops. Consequently, about 1800 hours the regiment commenced a further four miles move to a bivouac area between Suda Point (Kalami) and Kalibes. During this move the regiment experienced the first attack by German aircraft on the island, and it was necessary on several occasions to take shelter by the side of the road cut along the cliffs whilst the enemy aeroplanes were above. Arriving in moonlight, batteries were dispersed in pleasant surroundings amongst the olive trees on a small green plain watered by cool mountain streams. A small departing British unit was persuaded to leave behind its tents and consequently that night some of the troops were fortunate enough to be able to sleep twenty under a tent or fly which was used as a giant blanket. Before proceeding further with the story of the Cretan calamity, we shall examine the position existing on the island on this day, the 27th April. As early as the 29th October, 1940, the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, had cabled to Mr. Eden in Egypt: “It seems of prime importance to hold a naval fuelling base at Suda Bay and the best airfield possible. Successful defence of Crete is ingenious and invaluable aid to the defence of Egypt. Loss of Crete would be a grievous aggravation of all Mediterranean difficulties. So great a prize is worth the risk and almost equal to a successful offensive in Libya. Pray examine whole problem with Wavell and Smuts, and do not hesitate to make proposals for action on large scale at expense of other sectors, at the same time seeking for any further aid you require from here, including aircraft and anti-aircraft batteries.” Then at the invitation of the Greek Government, Suda Bay, the best harbour in Crete, was occupied by our forces two days later. In his book The Second World War Mr. Churchill then proceeds to lay the whole blame for the lack of defence of Crete on Middle East Headquarters. He says “it remains astonishing to me that we should have failed to make Suda Bay the amphibious citadel of which all Crete was the fortress. Everything was understood and agreed and much was done; but all was half scale effort.” Middle East Headquarters did not have the forces at its disposal to garrison Crete if it was to carry out the conquest of Libya and Abyssinia. With Libya conquered and two Australian divisions available for further operations if the Grecian expedition was to take place there were certainly no troops available for garrisoning Crete2. Where, however, Middle East Headquarters fell down on its job was in its lack of appreciation of what could be done on Crete even though it had to carry out its other commitments. In the seven months between our occupation and the German invasion, the commander of the Crete Force had been changed on several occasions. No real directive had ever been issued by Headquarters Middle East to the commander as to what he was expected to do. Consequently, no effort was made to produce underground hangars or underground shelters for aircraft -• a very easy proceeding in the Cretan undulating country -- nor had alternative airstrips been provided. Worst of all was the siting of the few anti-aircraft guns around the shore, none of them ever mutually supporting. Then, lastly, it was quite obvious that the staff sent to Crete was by no means the pick of Middle East staff officers. These were the serious shortcomings in the defence of Crete prior to the evacuation of Greece. But it was now the end of April, 1941, Greece had been lost. A large number of unarmed troops had been dumped on Crete and the original intention was to evacuate them to Egypt. By 29th April, all of 6th Aust. Div. Headquarters had left the island and the command of all Australian troops was placed upon Brigadier Vasey. In his report to his Corps Commander after the evacuation of Crete, Brigadier Vasey said: “A.I.F. personnel represented detachments from almost every unit, as well as a majority of Corps troops who had been in Greece3. Constant representations to Headquarters, Crete Force, to evacuate from the island all personnel not required for the defence were made. Despite these

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 3 representations the evacuation was very slow and less than 2,500 A.I.F. personnel had been sent away before operations commenced on 20th May.” Had there been any sound appreciation by Headquarters, Crete Force, as to the position on the island it was obvious that all the unarmed personnel -- artillery, ordnance, A.M.C., A.S.C., etc.-- would have been evacuated even had the evacuation been made by the easy method then of moving these troops across the island to Sphakia, as had eventually to be done. But apparently, despite their training, none of the staff had ever read that military classic, The Green Curve by General Swinton, which had for years proved to many students of war what should be done with the “useless mouths” or in other words, the personnel who could not fight. To return to the regimental picture. On 28th April, the regiment was disposed in a defensive position around the beach to the cast of Suda Point. Food was still very short. Then the regiment was formed together with the 2/3rd Field Regiment into infantry companies to defend the area cast of Suda Point. During the next few days a few blankets arrived and a few tents. On 29th April took place one of the most interesting days in the experience of the regiment. In the afternoon the anti-aircraft guns shot down three planes. Then in the late afternoon several thousands of troops, artillery, infantry, A.M.C., etc., all scattered around the little bay to the cast of Suda Point, saw one Hurricane and two Gladiators chase three Stukas flying just above the water out of Suda Harbour. One Stuka went down to the Hurricane and another to the Gladiator. The third Stuka out distanced the second Gladiator, who turned back and shook his wings as in disgust. The hundreds of cheering troops who applauded each victory of the R.A.F. was reminiscent of Melbourne or Sydney Cricket Ground during a test match, Then on the 29th April, 2/7th Battalion landed after rescue from the sinking Costa Rica. There were a few regimental personnel aboard the Costa Rica. Included among these were Gnr. Len “Poop Deck” Crawford. Worn out but with morale undiminished and without a single weapon, they were prepared to fight. Consequently, orders were issued that all rifles, machine-guns and sub-machine guns held by 2/2nd and 2/3rd Field Regiments would be handed over to the 2/7th Battalion. This the regiment carried out without complaint4, because it realized that the infantry were much more adept at handling these weapons than it was but it meant that the regiment was now entirely without any defensive arms. During this time the enemy was making frequent attacks with Messerschmitts, Stukas and Dorniers on the shipping and the installations on the island. On 2nd May, Major-General Freyberg, G.O.C. 2nd New Zealand Division, who had been placed in command of the defence of Crete, addressed a massed parade of all Australians. His address dispelled any idea the regiment had that it would be moved off the island. He explained that the Germans would invade the island by air within, it was expected, the next 48 hours. On the afternoon of this day the C.O. reminded the regiment that the dive-bombing attacks of the Germans in Greece had done very little material damage, and he also reminded it of the necessity for strict discipline during periods of boredom such as was being experienced at the time. It was on this day that the enemy started his high level and dive-bombing in earnest. Most of the day Heinkels and Stukas were over the harbour and the villages. Very soon movement not only of vehicles but of personnel became very hazardous during the daytime. It was at this time that the attitude of the staff on Crete became completely incomprehensible to those officers who were dealing with them. Although the G.O.C. had warned the troops that an air invasion was imminent, this staff carried on as it had been accustomed to do in the halcyon days of peace in Egypt. From 1300 hours to 1730 hours a

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 4 siesta or rest period was indulged in by all officers and neither administration nor the issue of stores was done during this period. Next day the Cypriot Labour Corps, who had been unloading the ships in the harbour, refused to work any longer because of the bombing. Major. G. Torr5 was put in charge of unloading. He assembled all his engineers and asked for 150 men from 2/2nd Field Regiment. This number of volunteers was more than forthcoming: in fact, a selection had to be made. These soldier stevedores carried on for the remainder of the time the unit was in Crete, unloading ships and never stopping despite the wholesale bombing unless planes were directly over the ship they were unloading. Their best effort was to retrieve Bren carriers from a sunken ship which had some three feet of water over its top deck. The quiet bravery and devoted heroism of these troops obtained no official reward, but all British and Australian troops on the island admired the grand work they had done. During this time within the regiment physical training in the form of route marching continued. The C.O. had a bright idea and ordered that these marches should be carried out at the rate of 140 paces to the minute. Most of the regiment took this to mean that in the C.O.’s opinion, the marching was too slow and a number of officers pointed out he had made a mistake and obviously meant 114 or even perhaps 110 paces to the minute. They were very quickly informed that he had said 140 and meant 140. Each troop set out to march this pace, particularly when they thought that the C.O. could see them. Eventually, one troop achieved the distinction of marching half a mile at this peculiar pace and the others set out to emulate them. On 3rd May, Brigadier Vasey moved with his brigade down to Georgiopolis, the sector the defence of which his brigade had been allotted. As the senior Australian officer on Crete, he then issued orders that Colonel Cremor would command the remainder of the Australian forces around Suda Bay area under Major-General E. C. Weston, R,M., the commander of that sector. On that day the 2/3rd and 2/2nd Field Regiments were issued with sufficient 1918-pattern Remington American .300 calibre rifles to enable them to form one infantry company from each regiment. The rifles were covered in mineral jelly, in which they had reposed for 22 years, ammunition was short and a number of the rifles soon split at the butt. The only bright spot on that particular day was that the few remaining Hurricanes on the island shot down five enemy aircraft. Next day Cremor took over command of his force, which he satirically dubbed “His Majesty’s Unarmed Forces in Crete.” His instructions were that he was to prevent a beach landing by the enemy between Kalibes and Suda Point and to protect the coast and A.A. batteries at Suda Point, and the coast guns at Kalibes. For this task he had some men of the 16th Brigade who were landed in Crete from Greece, known as “16 Bn.,” organized in three companies of 125 men each armed with .300 Remington rifles but no Bren or machine guns, and, under Major P. A. Cohen, one company of 125 men from 2/5th and 2/6th Battalions, evacuees armed with .300 Remington rifles, and two companies of those battalions each of 130 men armed with .303 rifles. These were under Major J. G. Rowan and known as “17 Bn.” He also had the 2/3rd Field Regiment, numbering 346 officers and men, and armed only with Remington .300 rifles, under the command of Lieut-Colonel H. W. Strutt, and his own 2/2nd Field Regiment, numbering 410 officers and men also armed with the .300 Remingtons. In addition to these men, who were at any rate armed with something, he also had under his command some seventeen other units, including 2/1st Field Company (190), 2/2 Field Park Company (120), two whole field ambulances, plus a large number of ordnance and A.S.C. personnel. A parade state on 4th May disclosed that there were 2,283 men around Suda Bay area under his command, over one-third of whom were without any weapon at all. What the unarmed personnel could do except run or throw stones was unknown to Cremor and presumably to Cretan Headquarters. Apart from the rifles, this force had a few Bren and Lewis guns which the troops had brought from

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Greece. But they had no mortars, they had very few hand grenades, and there were no anti- personnel or anti-tank mines available. There was a small supply of barbed wire on hand but the small-arms ammunition would not last out any long engagement. There were no cooking utensils apart from a few buckets -- the rest the troops had to improvise with kerosene tins, etc. On 5th May bayonets were issued for the .300 American Reming•ton rifles and the gunner companies immediately set to work to learn bayonet fighting, an art in which they had never previously been instructed. And so the days passed6. The enemy amused himself with his bombing and machine- gunning from the air, those troops who had a weapon assiduously practised its use, whilst those who were completely unarmed endeavoured not to become too bored. As the Australian Army Service Corps established themselves, rations became more normal, the main item being tinned meat and biscuits. To overcome the monotony of these rations most of the troops bought chicken, eggs or honey from the Cretans who, unlike the inhabitants of most other countries, never attempted to charge even a fraction more than the normal market price. The Cretans themselves were short of vital food but readily sold what they could to the troops. At Kalibes, only a mile and a half away, many had meals of chicken or eggs at a cafe, but very few soldiers were ever seen in the queue for bread as the realised that the Cretans needed it more than they. It was at this stage that the troops began to take a liking -- a liking which has persisted throughout the years -- to the Cretan people. They were still cautious because of their experience of the fifth column in Greece, but they were certainly surprised by the low prices for food and the few odd articles they bought in the shops in Canea. In Greece there had been no opportunity to do any shopping, but in all probability the people there would have not charged prices in excess of normal any more than the Cretans did. Subsequent events, however, showed the Cretans as a whole to be as likeable as the Greeks. The regiment never at any time had any evidence of a fifth column in Crete. On 7th May Major Dyke, the 2 i/c, was taken from the regiment to act as liaison officer at General Freyberg’s headquarters7. The job Major Dyke did in that position was one of the finest done on the island. Later, in the midst of the bitter blitz by the Hun, Dyke never hesitated during the daytime to go from one place to another to carry out his duties despite the most intensive dive-bombing and machine-gunning. His place was taken by Major R. F. Jaboor, who assumed the position of 2 i/c and acting C.O.; and Captain F. H. Wood assumed command of 3rd Battery. On that day instructions were received that all artillery personnel on the island were to remain8. Colonel Cremor received instructions that he was to detail sufficient gunners to man the Italian guns captured at Tobruk in February, 1941. These had been sent over from Egypt, had a little ammunition with them, but were entirely devoid of sights and the only way to lay them originally was to look through the barrel. The ingenuity of the gunners soon devised rough sights for them, but neither regiment was at all keen to be allotted to the task. Cremor found himself in a dilemma. As the senior officer commanding the Australian troops in the Suda Bay area, it was his right to detail the regiment to man them. He knew, however, that the gunners of neither regiment were at all keen for the job. He did not think it fair to detail his own regiment for the job, neither did he think it right to detail the gunners of the 2/3rd Field Regiment. He, therefore, sent for the C.O. of the 2/3rd Field Regiment and suggested that the acting C.O. of the 2/2nd Regiment, Major Jaboor, should toss with him, the loser to man the guns. So it was done. Major Jaboor won the toss and so the 2/3rd Field Regiment manned the guns. One of their batteries was sent to Heraklion and a troop of another went to Maleme aerodrome. Unfortunately, however, the battery which went to Heraklion became prisoners of war.

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Groups of men from the regiment were given leave to Canea each day and they cheerfully set out to walk the seven miles, although they hitch-hiked if they could on the few vehicles that were about, but it was most unusual to obtain a ride. In the course of their hikes they always had to take cover on at least two or three occasions whilst the enemy was over the road. In Canea, a pretty little town of white houses, the “Kiwis”, a New Zealand Entertainment Unit, put on a good concert every afternoon. When the air-raid warning sounded the compere would ask the audience whether they wanted the show stopped until the all clear but all would yell, “No, keep it going.” At the end of the performance the audience would be asked to leave in twos and threes and disperse quickly when they got outside. Cigarettes and tobacco supplies on the island soon ran out. The population were the first to be affected, but issues to the troops with their rations became rarer. Eventually, the only tobacco available amounted to one or two half-pound tins of pipe tobacco per troop of sixty-odd men. From these cigarettes were rolled, using air mail paper or even newspaper9. Now the enemy stepped up his Stuka dive-bombing attacks of the port of Suda. In the late afternoon, when advantage could be taken of the low angle of the sun to aid the attackers, the bombing became very intense. On 8th May the rest of the infantry who had not been armed were given the .300 American Remington rifles which had been issued to the regiment. But a miracle then occurred and every man in the regiment was issued with a British service rifle, although no bayonets were available, and the whole regiment proceeded to train as infantry although organised in the more familiar (to them) regimental headquarters, batteries and troops. It was now a full moon and enemy aircraft were active all night over Suda Bay and Canea. On 8th May the C.O. was ordered by Crete H.Q. to take his regiment back to Camp “C” near Perivolia, the reason given being that there were too many troops around Suda Bay area. As this would have meant a march of eleven miles and there seemed to be no sense in the order particularly as the unarmed troops would be left around Suda Bay with the newly set-up headquarters taken away from them, the C.O. went to Force Headquarters. Upon investigation, it was discovered that the order had been issued by a junior staff officer without consultation with anyone else. It was thereupon cancelled, but it was suggested to the C.O. that he should move his regiment to the vicinity of the creek about one and a half miles cast of Suda jetty, the creek around which the regiment had been disposed on 27th April. This would still enable him to command the Suda Point-Kalibes area but also to have his regiment nearer Canea. During all this time, it must be realised by the reader, practically from daylight to dusk, the ships in Suda Bay, the neighbouring villages and any likely concentration of troops, were subjected to dive- bombing and high-level bombing by the Germans. For most of these days the weather was pleasantly mild, and the troops spent their days swimming and sunbathing, with a couple of route marches each day to restore physical condition, but on 8th May it rained steadily for three hours. Soon every officer and man was wet through. It was impossible to light fires because of the German aircraft attacks. The C.O. thereupon wrote a memo to Suda Bay Headquarters pointing out that his troops (i.e., the two-thousand-odd men under his command) had no protection against the weather. There were no tents and 40 percent of them were without greatcoats or waterproof capes. Only 12 percent had one blanket and there were no medical supplies. He therefore said that he would be compelled to decline to take responsibility for the fighting efficiency of the troops under his command unless immediate steps were taken to provide cover, blankets and medical supplies. This protest was simply ignored, although when the retirement from Crete started it was found that the ordnance depots contained all of the things which the C.O. had demanded, except tents. The regiment, with the exception of most of 4th Battery left behind under the command of Major Hiscock to defend the anti-aircraft guns at the top of the hill behind Suda Point,

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 7 were now dispersed around the little creek previously referred to. Air raids, of course, continued but fortunately these were directed at other targets than the regiment. Then the Royal Marine Brigade landed. They had come straight by sea from England. The brigade consisted of Docks Operating Companies, Harbour Maintenance Companies, Coast Defence Companies, etc., but there were no fighting soldiers amongst them. They were completely inexperienced and to the hard-bitten 6th Division troops, these fresh- faced English boys with their officers equipped with trunks, hat-boxes, mess equipment, etc., looked pathetically out of place. They were, however, envied for their equipment, particularly the motor transport they brought with them. The 6th Division engineers, plus the 150 men from the regiment, were still unloading ships at the completely inadequately equipped Suda Port jetty. This sleepy little port was now called upon to handle more cargo in a week than it had previously handled in a year in peace•time. To supply the troops in Crete effectively the port would have been required to handle about eight times as much as the maximum then achieved. The Germans were increasing their air attack and it became almost impossible to unload ships during the day. But still the troops kept at it day and night with bombs falling all around them. More and more ships were sunk in the harbour and the area around Suda port was flooded with partly submerged and burning vessels. On the morning of 12th May at 0430 hours enemy Messerschmitts tried to machine-gun the searchlights around Suda Bay. And on this day also Brigadier Vasey issued an emphatic order that Colonel Cremor as to remain in command, whatever happened, of all Australian troops around Suda Bay. Very soon the losses from enemy daylight bombing attacks became severe that ships were brought in for unloading only at night. The bombing still kept on in the moonlight but the unloading also kept on at a fast rate at night to allow the ships to get clear of Suda Bay by daylight. On 13th May all the aerodromes on Crete were heavily bombed several times in daylight attacks. That night there were several air raids on the Suda Bay area, during one of which a large number of bombs fell in the regimental area. There were several narrow escapes but the only men injured were hit by falling rocks. The air attacks grew heavier as every day passed and the R.A.F. grew weaker as planes were shot down or destroyed on the ground so that by the 16th there were no British operational planes available on Crete. Various people at different times suggested to Crete Headquarters that when the R.A.F. ceased to use Maleme aerodrome it should be rendered unserviceable. It was pointed out that parts of it could be ploughed up and the rest of it filled with broken down Greek carts, etc. The reply was that Maleme was to be preserved as the R.A.F. might need it. When and how the R.A.F. could ever use it had apparently not been considered. The result was that nothing was done to destroy Maleme and the capture of this huge airfield resulted in the eventual downfall of Crete. Neither were Retimo or Heraklion landing strips destroyed even though they had not been in use for some time. On the morning of 14th May about 0300 hours the enemy did some severe bombing in the 4th Battery area and minor casualties were caused owing to falling rocks10. Awaiting the invasion and realising how little chance the forces then on Crete had of repelling it, the regiment had to listen night after night to “Lord Haw-Haw” (the traitor Joyce) telling them of what the German was going to do to them11. He rather accurately described Crete as “the island of doomed men.” But unfortunately for “Haw•Haw” and his German masters, they never did realize the psychology of the British or the Australians. The effect of “Haw-Haw’s” broadcast was merely to strengthen the determination of the troops that at any rate if they were doomed, they would not be doomed without first of all putting up a good account of themselves.

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 8

And so the days and nights wore on. With the coming of the full moon, the Germans increased their night attacks and now there was rarely an hour during the whole 24 in which enemy planes were not overhead bombing. Then the enemy again set about deliberately seeking out the searchlights and in this he had considerable success as by concentrating on each light in turn, he gradually managed to disable most of them. The light anti-aircraft guns had for some inexplicable reason been placed in sand-bagged gun pits around the shore of Suda Bay, and their positions were easily detected by the Germans. In consequence, the German air force concentrated on blowing these guns out one after another and those which had not been obliterated by the day of the invasion were very soon knocked out that morning. Air attacks on shipping in the harbour continued. The cruiser York had been sunk in shallow water before the regiment arrived in Crete and lay listing with her upper decks above water. Attempts to refloat her had been unsuccessful because the divers had been killed12 when bombs fell near by whilst they were under water. Her anti-aircraft armament had been taken ashore and did valiant work against the enemy aircraft. However, despite York’s ineffectiveness, she was the target for many German air attacks, but after one attack on 17th May the watchers on shore were amazed to see that a near miss had straightened her up and she now appeared undamaged. Every day the Germans had sunk at least one ship and on 17th May an oil tanker was hit and added further to the black smoke over Suda Bay. A partly unloaded ammunition ship about one and a half miles off shore was set on fire on 18th May and after burning for about two hours she disintegrated in a terrific explosion which was seen by nearly every man in the regiment13. On that evening whilst some of the troops were assembled at regimental headquarters ready to take down the B.B.C. News -- the only real news ever obtained by the troops on Crete -- from a small radio set carried in his pack by the O.C. Light Aid Detachment, Lieutenant F. Gannon, an enemy fighter passed very low over head. It had obviously been damaged and had one wing lower than the other but when it turned out over Suda Bay just as it appeared certain to crash into a hill in its course a loud sigh went up from the regiment. A moment later the sigh turned to a cheer as the plane dived into the sea. By this time air raids were continuous all day, and Suda Bay was full of burning or sunken ships. The enemy was concentrating on the shipping around Suda port and on all roads leading to Canea. Then on 17th May Headquarters Crete Force evolved another brilliant idea. The regiment received orders that it was to produce a troop to man 2-pounder 37 mm. anti-tank guns on a rocky little island some acre and a half in extent at the south of Suda Bay. The object of manning these guns was to prevent an enemy seaborne invasion. What use 37 min. anti-tank shells would be against anything at sea was something that the regiment could not understand. However, Brig. Vasey called in at R.H.Q. that day on his way to Force Headquarters. Upon being told of this stupid idea, he, on his arrival at Crete Headquarters, had the order immediately cancelled. On 18th May all the aerodromes in Crete were heavily bombed several times in daylight attacks. This attack on the airfields combined with the attacks on the anti-aircraft guns and the searchlights and the obvious stepping up of the tempo of the air attacks, made it apparent to everyone that invasion was becoming more imminent. On the 19th the same procedure continued, particularly on targets around Suda Port and the aerodrome; in fact, on that day, it was very difficult for even one man, let alone a motor vehicle, to move. By now the dispositions of the Australian troops on the island were: The 2/4th Battalion was under command of the British 14th Brigade at Heraklion; 2/1st and 2/11th Battalions were at Retimo; at Georgiopolis were the 2/7th and part of the 2/8th Battalion under Brigadier Vasey. The force at Suda Bay consisting, as has been previously detailed, of some 2,000 troops was under the command of Colonel Cremor. These latter units were

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 9 scattered in defensive positions between Kalibes, Suda Point and Suda Bay, whilst the unarmed personnel were dispersed in as safe a position as possible south of the coast. The dawn of 20th May, 1941, was no different from any other dawn on a beautiful day in Crete. But that day was to be for ever remembered afterwards in history. It was the day on which the Germans started a full-scale landing from the air, without the support of naval or ground troops. At almost the stroke of 0700 hours a terrific outburst of anti- aircraft fire from the guns that had not been knocked out announced the start of the German invasion14. The sky was full of German planes, Dorniers, Messerschmitts and Stukas, machine-gunning, bombing, dive-bombing, zooming, and criss-crossing all over the area between Suda port and Canca and Maleme. They concentrated on the few remaining anti-aircraft gun positions and on Maleme aerodrome. Very soon every anti- aircraft position and every suspected troop position in the Suda Bay-Canea-Maleme area had been scientifically and thoroughly bombed. The Messerschmitts completed the destruction by machine gunning the same area. There was a lull then, a lull which enabled the bomb-blasted troops to take a look up from their all too shallow slit trenches. But the lull was only temporary. Within a matter of a few minutes over came the slow Junkers transport planes carrying parachutists. Thousands of these descended and although many of them were killed in the air or immediately after landing, there were sufficient landed safely, particularly those out of range of the defending troops, to enable them to form themselves into organised groups and make strong points. It was an amazing sight to see these parachutists dropping all over the area. They hurtled out of the plane, then the parachute billowed out and they slowly descended to the ground. It was noticed that there were varying types of parachutes: some obviously contained a man but others, larger ones, also quite obviously contained mortars or small field guns. All the troops in the attacked area used Bren machine gun and rifle fire on the descending parachutists but as the enemy had methodically dropped sufficient men around each anti-aircraft position, soon there was not one anti-aircraft gunner left alive to service his gun. Around about 1000 hours the enemy captured the hospital outside Canea. The Germans ruthlessly forced the walking wounded to go in front of them as a screen. However, very little success was achieved by this ruse, although a number of walking wounded were killed. In the next phase of the attack came gliders, three gliders being towed by a transport plane. Callously disregarding the loss of life, the Germans proceeded to crash-land their gliders on the beaches near Maleme. Many gliders were shot up in the air or broke up on landing, but a large number landed safely. The German attack was now concentrated on Maleme aerodrome, possession of which would enable the enemy to bring down his transport planes. During the afternoon, nearly all the paratroops dropped in the Canea-Suda Bay area had been cleared up, and the Germans were losing thousands of men. Maleme aerodrome was being defended by the heroic New Zealanders and a few old Italian guns manned by the gunners of 2/3rd Regiment. Later that afternoon the New Zealanders were forced to withdraw from the aerodrome itself and it now became a no man’s land. During this day, the regiment had not taken part in the actual fighting but it had received its fair attention from the air. Fortunately, its wide dispersion enabled it to get through the day without any casualties. That night there was no news from Crete Headquarters, except a brief message that the situation was well in hand. The battery and troop commanders, gathered at R.H.Q. to listen to the news from the one wireless set available, heard from the B.B.C. that the German attack had been held. They later heard the gloating tones of “Haw•Haw” telling them again what was in store for them. This news when distributed to the troops did not seem to have any marked effect one way or the other. Although 2/2nd Field Regiment had not been in the battle, it was perfectly obvious by nightfall to everyone that the enemy had succeeded in, establishing himself on Crete. Later that night, it was also made clear that the position was much more serious than had

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 10 been allowed to leak out. Brigadier Vesey’s troops were brought back from Georgiopolis to strengthen the New Zealand position. Early on the morning of 21st May, the C.O. was ordered by Brigadier Vasey to hand over command of the regiment to Major Jaboor and to return to Suda Point where he was to take over active command of the two so-called infantry battalions and all other armed Australian troops around Suda Bay area. He was told to send 200 men under a Field Officer to the southern outskirts of Canea, where they would act as a Force reserve. At the same time, he was told to man with at least a battery, a defensive position and observation post on the hill behind Suda Port. Consequently, Major Hiscock with 4th Battery H.Q. was ordered to the latter position, whilst Capt. F. H. Wood, having under his command 3rd Battery H.Q. “A” and “F” troops and a sub-section of “D” troop, was ordered to report to Major-General Weston. This instruction said that Captain Wood’s company would relieve a company of the Royal Marines. They were to take over at the south end of Tobruk Avenue. They were also to extend the King’s Royal Rifle Regiment’s line from the monastery west to the wireless station, a distance of 2,500 yards. This was merely another example of the inadequacy of the arrangements being made for defence of the island. A company of two hundred men to occupy a line of 2,500 yards in length! Just as this party reached Greenery Avenue, they came under heavy strafing from Messerschmitts. They took cover in roadside ditches and watched almost spellbound a parachute landing well out of their range near Perivolia. Despite the fact that everyone realized this meant more of their inveterate enemies dropping into action, most were impressed by the beauty of the scene. Floating gently down in the bright sunlight were large groups of dazzling white parachutes with here and there a red or blue one. The scene was made all the more beautiful because of the brilliant blue sky and the grey-green foreground of the olive trees. Wood’s party then relieved “F” Battery of the Royal Marines, who were holding an east-west line running through the monastery, an ordnance dump, and an ammunition dump. Fields of fire were extremely poor and averaged only about 20 yards. Lieut-Colonel A. F. Hely, of the 106th R.H.A., was told by General Weston to take over 600 yards of this line, but the line still ran through the ordnance dump clearly marked by a narrow gauge railway line and also through the ammunition dump. In this line Captain Wood placed “F” troop on the left, then “A” troop, then 3rd Bty. H.Q. which joined up with 106th R.H.A. The one virtue of this position was that the abandoned DID15 -- an A.S.C. food depot -- assured food for the troops. During the afternoon, General Weston came up to the position and promptly named the party “Wood’s Own Rifles.” Weston was the type of British officer who appealed completely to Australians. Already -- as he afterwards did for the remainder of his stay on the island -- he drove his own car rather than expose his driver to the strafing and bombing which he so often experienced himself. Weston found himself, in his fifties, having served almost a lifetime in the Royal Marines, commanding troops on the ground. At no time, however, was he seen to be anything but cool and imperturbable. He always showed great interest in this group of the regiment and called on Captain Wood every time he passed. During the day very few of the ordnance troops were to be seen about the dump, but when darkness fell “A” troop were amazed to see the large number who appeared from dugouts for their evening meal. On taking over the position, Captain Wood had been given the keys of a number of huts containing large stocks of food. These huts were open at the time but none of the keys given him would fit the locks to enable him to lock the doors. The party, however, fed well from the dump and Captain Wood sent word to R.H.Q. that rations were not required by his party. He thought this ‘would be welcome news to the

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 11 remainder of the regiment, who he understood to be still on short rations. In the same area as the food dumps, two English soldiers had been left guarding the clothing dumps but they were no longer being supplied with rations by their own unit. They were fed by “Wood’s Own Rifles” who in return obtained any clothing they required. Ammunition was very hard to obtain as the officer at the dump would not release it. He was persuaded to “lend” some hand grenades “to guard his dump” and some other ammunition was “obtained16.” Eventually this dump must have been very acceptable to the Germans. Outside the dump was a ditched undamaged heavy truck. Captain Wood’s party wished to salvage it but the ammunition officer claimed it as one of his vehicles which would eventually be pulled out. Five days later when the troops were evacuating the area it was still in the same position. “Wood’s Own Rifles” sent a number of patrols out to the foot•hills to the south but made no contact with the Germans, although Bdr. Harry Merlo with Gnrs. Blackburn and Boxshall trailed and captured a German paratrooper who was obviously ill and was trying to hide. He was promptly relieved of a brand new unfired Luger pistol and marched to H.Q. There was some sporadic sniping activity near the junction of Greenery Avenue and the main Canea-Suda Bay road. The snipers were obviously a few lone survivors of a parachute descent but they did not fire on large parties and only on single vehicles or not more than two men. In this way they escaped retribution for a few days. Meanwhile at Maleme the enemy were relentlessly driving forward their attack. Early on 23rd May General Weston rang Captain Wood, who told him that he was not at all happy about the positions of the troops under his command. He asked permission to change his lines to a north-south line in the same area to cover the direct route to Suda Bay from Perivolia where paratroops had been seen to drop. General Weston said he would come himself to the position on the following day to discuss this. However, he was unable to come during the day, and Captain Wood moved his lines through 90 degrees on his own volition and they now ran north and south. General Weston rang later and approved the move. Asked whether he wanted anything, Captain Wood replied “Automatic weapons and barbed wire.” General Weston replied “So would we all,” but later in the day he sent six Fiat heavy machine-guns which apparently had been captured in Libya. He certainly did not know that all of these guns had at least one part missing and would not fire. The remarks of the troops regarding the persons responsible for inspecting and despatching to Crete these useless pieces were illuminating. The ship which brought them from Egypt could have carried picks and shovels, rifles and bayonets or numerous other vitally needed items instead of these useless bits of metal. Sergeant Rose went to work with his accustomed enthusiasm and eventually got one firing correctly and another firing single shots. The remainder were thrown into a creek. General Weston also sent some barbed wire which was put out in front of the defensive position. Each troop still patrolled out to the foothills, but Lieutenant Fred Johnston was very much “the man of steel.” He so organised the patrolling and sentries of 3rd B.H.Q. on the left flank of the line that an approach by enemy forces from any direction would have been immediately detected and dealt with. His troops responded to his enthusiasm and knew exactly what to do in any set of circumstances. A Cypriot labour unit in the area was almost completely undisciplined and panicked badly every time there was an air raid. At Captain Wood’s request, General Weston withdrew them. Another unit which was troublesome was now just behind “F” troop on the right of the line, but had been in front of the old line. Captain Wood had been partly influenced in his desire for a new line by the desire to have this unit behind rather than in front of him. They had their own rules of identification which no one else knew; one day they would fire on anyone wearing a jacket, the next on anyone not wearing a jacket, and so on. However, they had some cigarettes and a wireless set, which made their area

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 12 reasonably popular with Captain Wood’s party. They had a great tendency to get into a slit trench and stay there when there was no danger. One night after sunset, a number of “A” troop were listening to the B.B.C. news when a lone bomber, probably German, flew north towards Greece, directly over the position. The wireless set was immediately turned off because “the bomber might detect it.” The Australians returned to their positions sarcastically remarking about the amazing German who could detect a wireless receiving set on the ground from a plane moving at 150 miles per hour at a height of 3,000 feet. The bomber was probably returning empty to Greece. These units were almost invariably inefficient because they had poor officers. Despite these officers the troops were excellent when they were given a chance. That night the troops could hear sustained gunfire at sea and 4th Bty. H.Q. on their hilltop observation post at Suda Point and “B” troop O.P. on Mount Zouvra could see flares, searchlights and gun flashes. This was the Navy sending to the bottom or blowing to pieces three fleets of caiques loaded with German troops. Next morning came the news that seaborne German forces had been completely destroyed by the Royal Navy, and the morale of the troops rose considerably. Early on the morning of the 22nd Colonel Cremor was ordered to send Major Jaboor with the remainder of the regiment to report to General Weston, Lieutenant Featherstonehaugh’s O.P. party remaining to man Mount Zouvra. Major Jaboor was to come under command of Brigadier Hely17. The move was the usual difficult movement along the road with Messerschmitts dominating the sky. Fortunately, however, the regiment sustained no casualties. On their way they had seen at Suda Port a large building burning brightly and they walked through wine running down the street -- a part of the damage from the day’s bombing. After arriving in the area at about 2300 hours they were disturbed for the remainder of the night by the apparent closeness of flares sent up by the Germans. Captain Wood’s party now came under command of Major Jaboor, who had the main body of the regiment in the area around the wireless station about half a mile from the village of Mournies. Brigadier Hely gave orders to Major Jaboor that the regiment was to form a line on the left of 19th Brigade in an effort to join up with Greeks in the hills south of Mournies. Major Jaboor made a reconnaissance and pointed out to troop commanders the areas they were to hold. As always, during the whole of this day, the enemy Messerschmitts attacked any moving vehicle or man on the road or in the field. The regiment had reconnaissance patrols out during the whole of the day and by 2100 hours had occupied its new position. Prior to this, however, as the regiment was preparing to move, the area was heavily bombed and machine-gunned from the air. Gunners F. H. Pickles and G. A. Davis of “D” troop were killed, Gunner Hancock so badly wounded that he afterwards died of wounds, and several others wounded. At the same time the “F” Troop sub-section which had previously been with “F” Troop re-joined its own troop. The regiment now took up a position along the creek just to the west of Mournies village and dug some shallow slit trenches in the rocky ground. The one pick and one shovel per troop now at the position was assisted where possible by scratching with empty bully•beef tins but these methods did not permit good slit trenches to be made. Some sleep was obtained by all whilst waiting for use of picks but everyone had his turn on guard as a large number of sentries had to be posted. The only means of communication available was by runner, whilst to keep touch with neighbouring formations Captain Henderson acted as liaison officer at 19th Brigade Headquarters and Captain Gannon, the O.C. L.A.D., at Brigadier Hely’s headquarters. As daylight dawned on 26th May18 the last civilians in Mournies village hurried away to the south with the few belongings they could carry. Troops going to the village for water found it a very little place of white buildings and stone walls. But no property of the villagers was touched by the troops although the doors of the deserted houses were wide

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 13 open. This was the simple tribute of the men towards their brave Cretan friends. Even gold coins were left untouched. On 26th May patrols established contact with the Greeks and on several occasions parties of Greeks moved across in front of the regimental position. During the morning a heavy German mortar on the east edge of Perivolia began bombardment of the regiment’s position with 150 mm. bombs. “F” Troop received a number of mortar bombs in their area but they fortunately caused no casualties. The Greeks to the south were also heavily bombed by the same mortar, which kept up its attack throughout the day. Although it could be plainly seen through binoculars from “A” troop position, the regiment had nothing with which to strike back at it. The Germans obviously knew that there were no reliable field guns against them and had placed this mortar in the open with no attempt at digging in or concealment. O.P. officers of the regiment who saw it longed for a chance to use even one good gun on such a target. During the afternoon some of the positions came under machine-gun fire, but the bullets were thought be merely spent ones, which had not been aimed at troops of the regiment. There were many air attacks on the area during the day and the bomb-blasted town of Canea was again savagely bombed by a large number of planes. In one heavy bombing attack during the afternoon, R.H.Q. suffered a number of casualties, Corporal I. McA. Vincent, Gunners A. Kennedy, R. W. Mitchell, F. J. Mitchell, and J. Zampelis were killed, whilst Gunner L. Wade was wounded. The ever-popular R.M.O., Captain Refshauge, was for the second time badly injured by rocks from a bomb explosion and his body from shoulder to ankle was a mass of bruises. Bill Refshauge in the true ideal of his profession attempted to carry on but Major Jaboor telephoned Colonel Cremor, who immediately arranged for him to be relieved. That afternoon also the enemy started a new effort which members of the regiment could not recognize. His bombers began throwing into Suda Bay a bomb which came with a peculiar wail. This bomb fell into the sea without exploding. The German usually did not badly aim his bombs and consequently it was decided that these were acoustic or some other kind of mine being dropped into Suda Bay. By dusk, German troops could be seen in the open on the steep hills to the south-east of Perivolia engaged in capturing civilians who had been sheltering in the caves there. At 1800 hours this day Colonel Cremor was told to report to General Freyberg’s headquarters. He was informed that evacuation had been decided on and that from his infantry command he was to provide a flank guard out towards Neon Khorion of at least 250 men, an advance guard at Sphakia to ensure that the Germans would not be able to land paratroops there, and a personal guard of a platoon strength for General Freyberg. Cremor asked what transport could be made available to him, but after talking to the D.D.S.T.19 realised that there was none apart from what he could “scrounge” himself. By grabbing everything from his command, he was able to provide for the men destined for Sphakia, but the flank guards who were to go to Neon Khorion had to march on their flat feet. At 2000 hours that night General Freyberg issued orders that existing positions were to be held to the last man. Later on, apparently, the orders for movement to the south were sent out. The effect of the order, counter-order, and usual disorder was nearly disastrous for the regiment. It was fortunate that the regiment or even a lone troop was not left to fight all the German forces in the area. Early in the evening the officers had been informed that evacu•ation had been decided on and that it would probably be worse than Dunkirk. The troops, they were told, were not to be informed until dawn next day. At 2300 hours troop commanders were called to R.H.Q. for orders to withdraw, these orders having been given by Brigadier Hely, But they were soon given orders that the positions were to be held another 24 hours, because Captain Gannon had just arrived with these new orders from Brigadier Hely. The troop commanders returned to their position with foreboding, gave their new orders and, in most cases, settled down to sleep. They left

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 14 their most junior officers on duty so as to be themselves on duty from well before dawn next morning when they expected to meet an enemy attack. At 2300 hours igth Brigade commenced to move20 out and Captain Henderson walked over to give this information to Major Jaboor. Major Jaboor could see troops moving down the road and soon found that there were no troops on his right flank. As there had been no troops on his left flank all day, Major Jaboor decided to withdraw the regiment. Therefore, the regiment started evacuating its position at 0200 hours, although it was 0300 hours before the last of them (3rd Battery H.Q.) left. Before moving off from the position, everyone was told that his destination was SPHAKIA on the south coast, but as it was just off the map now in the possession of most officers, there was only a general idea as to where it was. As the regiment moved towards Suda Point, at each road junction it met streams of troops moving in the same direction, but just before reaching Suda Point all New Zealand troops were directed along a road running to the south, where the New Zealanders were to form a line. Once clear of this junction the road was no longer congested. Shortly after dawn, at the turn-off from the coast road to Neon Khorion, General Weston was personally directing traffic and instructing troops to move off the road, in groups of two or three, to SPHAKIA. At this point the C.O. rejoined the regiment and dispersed it until dusk, when it was to reassemble and continue the march. In the dispersal area the regiment first saw members of two commando units which had been landed at SUDA at midnight. These commandos were wandering about the area singly and told the Australian troops that they were there to take over. They did not impress the Australians as being effective as they aimlessly wandered about, but their commander, Lieut.-Colonel Laycock21 was seen to be a sound, quiet, determined fighter and the majority of them did a good job in the rearguard operations. Had these two units arrived a few days earlier they might have made a very effective contribution to the saving of Crete. After reconnoitring forward on foot the C.O. ordered that the regiment should travel in very small groups, off the road, to a village just south of Neon Khorion, where it was to assemble at 2000 hours that evening. The rendezvous was visible from the dispersal area as it was clearly marked by a cliff and was only four miles away. Most groups moved off early, hoping to get to the rendezvous in a couple of hours at the most. However, all day German planes meticulously bombed and machine-gunned at any movement of troops and all areas where they could possibly be hiding. It thus took about ten hours for most of the men to cover the four miles. Before the retirement commenced the staff had stated that dumps of food and water would be placed along the road. This was merely another thing that did not happen, although a few cases of bully beef were placed in a large grove of olive trees near Neon Khorion. Unfortunately, this area selected for the only food dump that was actually made on the whole road to Sphakia was the most obvious hiding place for troops in the whole area and in consequence was heavily bombed all day22. That night the regiment -- or most of it -- assembled as ordered and continued the march. At a vital road junction no guide had been placed and the whole column had stopped. It was only when the C.O. arrived and got a Cretan to point out the correct route that it got moving again. That night march was a horror to all who took part in it. It was very hot when marching and apart from a few muddy wells there was nothing to assuage the terrible thirst from which all the men were suffering. The Germans had fired several villages on the road with incendiary bombs and at times dropped flares to illuminate the road, although peculiarly

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 15 enough they did little bombing. Many of the troops -- not Australians -- were panic- stricken and the horror of the march was added to by the stream of uncontrolled trucks laden with troops which pushed through the thousands marching on foot. (It will be remembered that Colonel Cremor was unable to obtain trucks to transport the flank-guard which he had to detail. That non-combatant units retained these trucks and then used them to transport themselves to the evacuation area was but another illustration of the maladministration which existed throughout the campaign.) The regiment became badly split up into small parties but fortunately an officer was able to remain with most of them. Most laid up for some hours during the night for a rest and tried to find a well to assuage their awful thirst. Back at Suda Bay and then forward along the road 19th Australian Bde., 5th New Zealand Bde. and Laycock’s commandos were in turn acting as rearguards and so preventing the enemy from establishing contact with the retiring troops. Early next morning the troops set out again along the road. Throughout the day they were frequently obliged to take cover at the side of the road from Messerschmitts and Stukas. Colonel Cremor had only a small party numbering about twenty with him by now, but Major Jaboor had managed to get some four or five miles further along the road and by nightfall started to collect the regiment in a position some half mile off the side of the road. Next morning Colonel Cremor was ordered to take charge of a road control post some eleven miles from the village of Sphakia. With Lieutenant Dollman, his I.O., his job was to stop “scrimshankers” from moving down towards the beach. During the day he was to organize the troops in the surrounding woods into parties of 200 so that they could move down to the beach under an officer as soon as it got dark. As usual during the day, he received orders and counter-orders. The parties were to be reduced to 50. Then they were to be increased to 100. Then they were to be increased to 200. The regiment, on the other hand, had a fairly quiet day and managed to “scrounge” some water, although most of them were woefully short of food. As dusk began to fall, Cremor started the movement. A mile or so lower down the road, Captain Wood was directing another control point and near the village of Sphakia Major V. Burston commanded another control point23. By 2020 hours Cremor and Dollman saw the tail of the regiment passing. They themselves had orders to remain until the next night. The regiment made its way down to the start of the macadamised road, then staff officers who had apparently reconnoitred the route during the daytime sent the troops down goat paths and up another goat path on the other side to cross at least three valleys. The troops had to move along these in single file. The road was certainly longer but during the night had the troops kept to the road they would have progressed much faster. The road ended some five miles north of the village of Sphakia. Then it was a case of scrambling down the hillsides by a rough goat-path. Stony and boulder-ridden as these parts were, they injured the already tender feet of the troops and many had, to be helped along by their comrades. The way led through a deep gorge, the Sphakiano Pharangi. This was a ravine some hundred feet deep through sheer rock on either side. Then they passed through a rough stone wall just outside the German blasted village of Sphakia. Through the village and down a low hill, then over a plain some two miles long strewn with boulders and very little indication of the track, they eventually came down to a little cove with an extremely rocky beach a few hundred yards in length. Out in the bay could be seen the dim shapes of warships. Occasionally a discreet light winked from the boats to the shore and was replied to. Landing craft were busy shuttling to and from the ship. And once again every member of the regiment said quietly as he had said a month before, “Thank God for the Navy.” At 2230 hours, to their astonishment, Colonel Cremor and Lieutenant Dollman were relieved by an infantry officer and told that they were to rejoin their regiment. With Lieut.-Colonel H. W. Strutt and Major G. H. O’Brien they set out with faint hope but

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 16 determinedly kept along the road and refused to go down any by-path to the valley. They pushed along at a pace of about four miles per hour. On one occasion the two Australian officers found the whole column stopped whilst some officers were calling, “Sendback for the guides.” Strutt, who knew the path, pointed out to them that they had only to follow their nose and got the column moving again. Some time later Dollman lagged behind deliberately to help O’Brien, who was suffering very badly from injuries to his feet. Cremor and Strutt found themselves alone. Strutt stopped at the head of the 2/3rd Field Regiment and Cremor joined the rear of the 2/2nd. At the beach, as landing craft came in the requisite number of men were rushed across a small beach of some 50 yards, embarked, and the craft scurried away to the ships. The convoy consisted of the troop•carrier Glengyle, the cruisers Calcutta, Coventry, Perth and Phoebe, and the destroyers Jervis, James and Hasty. (At dawn the destroyers Stuart, Jaguar and Defender joined it.) Most of the regiment found themselves aboard H.M.T. Glengyle, a ship which had been taken over by the British army and specially adapted for the transport of troops for landing operations. A few others were put on Perth. As they climbed up the rope ladder, they were met at the gangway by a boatswain who directed them to the mess decks where the navy had hot cocoa and bread and bully-beef awaiting them. Sharp at 0320 hours, the convoy lifted its anchors and set out for Egypt. It was fortunate that Glengyle had filled her water tanks for the troops drank and drank. Probably every man on board consumed that night at least three quarts of water. Then, of their own free will, 2/2nd Regiment’s troops, as they had on Decoy, set about shaving and cleaning themselves up as far as possible. Shortly after dawn came the Stukas. During the morning three vicious attacks were made by squadrons of ten Stukas. Fortunately the avoiding action taken by the ships was successful, but Perth suffered twelve casualties, four of them being sailors, when a bomb landed on her deck. In the afternoon, the convoy was out of range of Stukas and there•after had an uneventful passage to Alexandria, which it reached some time in the early morning of the following day. Few of the exhausted troops saw the entry into Alexandria Harbour and next morning most were amazed to find the ship tied up at the wharf. As one officer feelingly remarked to his friends whilst he looked over the ship’s rail at the typically Egyptian scene of dirty, lazy Egyptians and the squalor surrounding the dockyard, “Well, when we left for Greece, I never thought that I should be glad to see ‘Wogland’ again.”24 By 0800 hours, the troops had disembarked and were being given a cup of tea and cake by the New Zealand Red Cross. One senior officer who saw them that morning wrote: “Looking at them one could see what they had been through. This regiment always had its own high ideals. Every man was shaved, and looked clean, although ragged. Their C.O. had the back out of his pants; a major had a great rent under his armpit; the clothing of quite a number of the men was torn, and the men looked very serious, but one could see that they were very glad to be back. When they formed up to move off to the train, I noticed the same look in the eyes of every man. It was as if they had come back from another world. But even if they were exhausted, there was nothing wrong with the manner in which they moved off as a trained unit to the train.” Arriving at Amariya station, the troops found that Brigadier “Pat” Gorman had arranged a fine breakfast for them, together with a bottle of beer for each man.” Pat” Gorman’s remark was typical, “I wish the wowsers in Australia could see me now.” After breakfast, he issued each man with a chit entitling him to obtain, if so desired, two bottles of beer at the canteen. The troops then moved down to the reception camp where Major Ronald had absolutely everything arranged to receive them. First they had a bath and then were issued with a complete set of new clothing. They were paid and any of them who had Greek

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 17 money had it changed into Egyptian. Late that afternoon, thoroughly re-clothed, they looked a different body of men. They then found to their astonishment that the Australian Base Commandant of the Alexandria area had closed Alexandria to men on leave. Apparently this action had been taken because of the misbehaviour of some troops who were proceeding to the Western desert some weeks before. This, by now seasoned, unit utterly failed to understand why it should be penalised for the misbehaviour of troops as yet untried in action. Consequently, a number surreptitiously betook themselves to Alexandria. Next morning, R.H.Q. made representations to the Base Area Commander but leave was still refused. This officer made a remark which deserves a high place in the list of stupid remarks made by base officers. During the course of the discussion about leave, he said: “I saw your troops come in yesterday. They were all clean. But I saw the men who came in from ------the day before and they were unwashed-unshaven and utterly worn out.” The men who came in from ------had marched a few miles down to the jetty to be taken off by waiting destroyers. They had not marched across the island of Crete under constant dive-bombing and machine-gunning. However, they had not learnt that troops should shave and wash when possible and, consequently, came ashore dirty, grimy and unshaved. The retort of a certain R.H.Q. officer to the Base Commandant, in normal circumstances, should have earned him a court martial. Personnel minus pay books were here paid a sum of £1 Egyptian -- it was remarkable the number of Smiths, Joneses and Browns who lined up and collected. The result of this was that about 1100 hours, as at that time it was not intended that the regiment should leave until 2nd June, battery commanders were told that their troops could go AWL. The 4th Battery very quick, on this occasion, to obey an order immediately sent its troops off, but then ten minutes later came an order from the Base Commander that the regiment would leave Amariya at 1300 hours for Palestine. Hurried efforts were made to stop the rest of the regiment from going AWL., but the result was that about two-thirds of 4th Battery had got away and did not leave until the next day. At Amariya siding the Australian Canteen Service had established a canteen. When the regiment arrived, the train was in the station but there was no engine. Captain Frank Wood had been appointed entraining officer. Some five minutes after the regiment had assembled on the platform along came a young lieutenant, obviously without any active service experience, who asked why the troops were not entrained. Wood, with his usual quickness replied, “When you put an engine on the train, I’ll entrain the troops.” Ten minutes later, still with no engine in sight between Amariya and Alexandria, the agitated R.T.O. came again to Wood and said: “Sir, do you see that your troops are putting cases of beer on the train.” They certainly were. They were also putting on a lot of chocolate and tinned fruit. Said Wood this time: “Yes, I do. The C.O. has told me that they can.” “But, Sir, won’t that cause a lot of trouble?” No, I shouldn’t imagine so, this regiment is disciplined,” and so it was. During the whole of the monotonous trip to Palestine there was not the slightest trouble. Arriving at Kantara shortly after midnight the regiment once again experienced the tiresome journey across the canal in the little punt which would take at a time not more than 20 men and their equipment. On the Palestinian side of the canal, Major Marr Miller had a fine meal ready for the troops and after they had eaten this, they entrained and by about 8 o’clock next morning found themselves halted on the railway line outside the village of Deir Suneid, the village with which they had first made acquaintance in Palestine. The worst snag about this journey was that the trucks in which the troops travelled had previously carried crude oil, the residue of which on the truck floors completely ruined their new clothing. Detraining, they were issued with breakfast, a sketchy advance party being sent to the new camp at Khassa to arrange for the arrival of the troops. During breakfast occurred an

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 18 incident which typified the unrealistic attitude of certain senior Australian commanders. Lieutenant Ned Kater remarked to some of his friends, “Well, thank God there are no Stukas here.” He was immediately jumped on by a very senior officer who had not been in either Greece or Crete. “Why did you say that?” he was asked. Kater replied, “Well I’m a bit tired of dive-bombing, sir.” “Dive-bombing? You don’t know what dive-bombing is. I’ve been dive-bombed25. There is nothing in dive-bombing. You are a defeatist and ought to be court martialled.” Kater, who possessed moral and physical courage of a very high order, quietly said, “Well, sir, I think there is a lot in dive-bombing.” And who should know better than Ned Kater. Shortly afterwards trucks arrived and transported the regiment to Khassa. There they found a party under Lieutenant Don Eddy, who had missed their latest campaigns because of a stay in hospital, with everything ready to usher them in. This “fostering” party were all men of the regiment who had been left behind in April because of wounds or sickness but who had been discharged since from hospital. Amongst them was “Smoky” Dawson. Dawson had been one of the trials of the regiment but now he commenced to give proof of a changed life. He could not work hard enough nor do enough for those who had returned from Crete. Rarely afterwards did he get into trouble and when the regiment returned to Australia he joined 2/2nd Battalion as a private and was killed in New Guinea. RETROSPECT What was left of the 6th Australian Division was back in Palestine. Three whole battalions had been lost in Greece and Crete. Every other unit had suffered severe casualties in killed, wounded and captured. What had been achieved? Less than nothing. The division had killed a number of Germans but the unfortunate Greeks were now under their merciless heel. The Italians still occupied Rhodes. Crete was now a jumping-off place for the enemy in his attacks on the Suez Canal. The 6th Division was entirely without equipment, and it took some weeks even to clothe the troops. As for the troops themselves, it appeared that their senses were deadened because of their experiences. Unquestionably there was no diminution of their morale and they were quite willing to meet the German at any time. Nevertheless, they could not help but feel that never had they had a chance in Greece, and certainly not in Crete. Winston Churchill has certainly been the saviour of the British Empire, but it is very unfortunate for the southern Dominions that on two occasions during his tenure of ministerial office he has organized an attack on the southern part of Europe. Anzac in 1915 was a tragedy, and Greece and Crete were even greater tragedies because the Allies should never have gone there. Because of this adventure, the grand Greek people were subjected for years to every devilment of torture and starvation of which the barbarous German could think. Had the Anzac Corps gone to Rhodes and Crete, possibly the Greeks might have been saved this Gethsemane. These were the thoughts that animated the troops in those dark and bitter days of June and July 1941. Being Australians, however, they soon regained their normal spirits and determined to pay the enemy and his allies ten-fold for what they and their comrades had suffered. The one saving grace of the two disasters of Greece and Crete was the troops’ abiding faith in and admiration for the navy. In his remarkably accurate appreciation of what would happen if the British and Australians were sent to Greece, General Blarney had given the picture almost literally as it had eventually happened. Knowing the case with which the German Air Force could command the skies and realizing the difficulties of evacuation across the island-studded Aegean Sea, he had said, “There will be no possibility of enacting another Dunkirk.” This was the only sentence which proved wrong in that remarkably prescient forecast. Because the navy, inspired by its traditions, proved the Australian commander-in-chief wrong. Despite the Luftwaffe they had brought the Anzac Corps out of Greece. They had prevented the enemy from landing one single troop by sea on Crete. Then faced with the task of evacuating the army from Crete they had

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CHAPTER 14 CRETE - A DEBACLE 19 nobly faced up to it. At the time the evacuation of Crete was decided upon they had for weeks been scouring the seas around Crete to ensure that no German vessels reached the island. As that grand fighter, Admiral Viscount Cunningham says26, “The evacuation had to be undertaken with ships whose officers and men were on the verge of complete exhaustion, physically and mentally. As for the ships themselves, they had been driven hard for more than two months without the occasional two or three days’ respite in harbour for boiler cleaning and running repairs. Their machinery had become unreliable, while many were struggling on as best they could after damage by enemy bombs. Moreover, their numbers were depleting. We had already lost two cruisers and four destroyers, while two battleships, our one aircraft carrier, another cruiser and a destroyer were out of action for weeks or months. Another five destroyers and four cruisers had been damaged but were still able to steam and to fight. We were not really in favourable condition to evacuate some twenty-two thousand soldiers, most of them from an open beach in the face of the Luftwaffe. But there was no alternative.” Actually that is a very modest account of what really happened. It had been suggested at a senior officers’ conference that in trying to evacuate the army from Crete the navy would lose very many ships. To this Admiral Cunningham replied: “It takes hundreds of years to build up a tradition, but it takes only a few years to build a ship. The navy could not show its face again if it left the army in Crete. The army will be evacuated.” But at what a cost was that evacuation carried out! For the battle in Crete the Mediterranean Fleet had paid a price it would not have paid in a major action. The cruisers Gloucester, Fiji and Calcutta were sunk. So were the destroyers Juno, Greyhound, Kashmir, Kelly, Hereward and Imperial. The battleships Warspite, Barham and Formidable, the cruisers Orion and Dido, and the destroyers Kelvin and Nubian were damaged beyond repair on the spot and would be out of action for some months, whilst the cruiser Perth, the destroyers Naiad, Carlisle, Napier, Kipling and Decoy would be under repair for some weeks and the destroyers Havoc, Kingston and Nizam for at least a fortnight. Over 2,000 men of the fleet were dead. We again quote from Admiral Cunningham’s despatches: “It is not easy to convey how heavy was the strain that men and ships sustained. Apart from the cumulative effect of prolonged seagoing over extended periods, it has to be remembered that in this last instance ships’ companies had none of the inspirations of battle with the enemy to bear them up. Instead they had the unceasing anxiety of the task of trying to bring away in safety the thousands of their own countrymen, many of whom were in an exhausted and disspirited27 condition... in ships necessarily so over-crowded that even when there was opportunity to relax, conditions made this impossible. They had started the evacuation already over-tired and they had to carry it through under conditions of savage air attacks such as had only recently caused grievous losses to the fleet. I thought more than once myself that the stage had been reached when no more could be asked of officers and men physically and mentally exhausted by their efforts and by the events of these fateful days. It is perhaps even now not realized how nearly the breaking point was reached but that these men struggled through is the measure of their achievement and I trust that it will not lightly be forgotten.” It will not lightly be forgotten and, in fact, it will never be forgotten by those whom the Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy brought out of Crete. When one exhausted subaltern remarked on the quay at Alexandria: “Thank God, we are back in Alex.,” his immediate superior, a captain, interjected: “Please insert after ‘God,’ ‘Thomas Albert Blamey and the Navy.’”

1 Next day he met Major G. H. O’Brien, who had then been transferred to Force Headquarters as a staff officer, and made arrangements with O’Brien to collect the instruments, which were then forwarded to Egypt. 2 Regarding this subject, see Chapter 12.

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3 There were troops from 45 different units. 4 One exception was W.O. Geo. Hanstead. George had cherished his rifle since it had first been issued to him and had a collection of ammunition, tracer, explosive, etc., that would have done credit to an ordnance store. 5 Later Brig. A. G. Torr, C.B.E., D.S.O. 6 Fortunately for nearly all the troops in Crete, who had no cover in the event of rain and very few blankets, the weather normally was fine and mild throughout the campaign. 7 Major Dyke took L/Sgt. Arthur Bale with him as a motor-cycle orderly. Arthur Bale was asked to remain at H.Q. after Major Dyke was relieved, just prior to the evacuation. He did a sterling job but unfortunately became a P.O.W. 8 This order emanated apparently from Middle East Headquarters. It had been decided that Italian guns captured in the desert campaign would be sent to Crete and that it would be necessary for gunners to man them. Headquarters Middle East probably did not know how many gunners were available on Crete or perhaps it expected to forward more weapons. In any case, the result was that two complete regiments were retained on the island although, when it came down to manning guns, it was found that this could be done by the personnel of a little more than one battery. 9 After the invasion commenced, the regiment, as it retired, passed through an ordnance dump where there were literally hundreds of pounds of tobacco, apart from many other delectable items. 10 One night an anti-aircraft gunner had apparently had too many attacks to feel happy in his fixed position on the beach. No aircraft were about and a number of the regiment were smoking cigarettes up on the hill above him. He called out “If you don’t put those cigarettes out, I will shoot.” Immediately a voice replied out of the darkness: “We have three hundred rifles up here, try it and see what happens.” The anti-aircraft gunner said no more. This incident unfortunately shows the state of panic to which many troops, both English and Australian, had been reduced under the ceaseless and merciless bombing by the enemy. In Greece, some men had smashed the headlights of cars which were proceeding with lights when there was no enemy aircraft at all in the sky. So with this incident, when there was no occasion for not smoking, this gunner with his nerves gone did not have sense enough to, appreciate the fact. 11 “Haw•Haw” started and finished his broadcasts with “Run rabbit, run,” as the theme song. 12 One of these was C.P.O. Haddow, who had been a gunner in 15th Bde., A.F.A., before the war. 13 The height finder at an anti-aircraft gun position recorded 1,800 feet as the height to which debris was thrown by this explosion. 14 General Student, the German parachute commander, had convinced Hitler that a parachute invasion was certain to be successful. However, the sequel proved that the casualties suffered by the Germans were so severe that never again for the remainder of the war did the Germans stage any major parachute landing. It has since been ascertained that the Germans used one parachute division (14,000 men), one glider regiment and the 5th Mountain Division. The Germans lost 4,000 killed and missing out of the 23,000 men they landed. Their heavy losses convinced Hitler that the day of the paratrooper was over. The British proved later to him that it was not. 15 Details Issue Depot. 16 Two days later when “A” troop moved three or four hundred yards nearer Perivolia the ammunition officer sent a runner with a message demanding the immediate return of the grenades. “A” troop commander told the runner “no reply.” 17 As was the sensible British procedure, promoted to temporary brigadier on the spot as he was then commanding the equivalent of a brigade. 18 At 0930 hours on 26th May, General Freyberg had cabled Middle East H.Q. that the limit of endurance had been reached by his troops under his command at Suda Bay. He

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said: “No matter what decision is taken by the C. in C. from a military point of view, our position here is hopeless. Provided a decision is reached at once a certain portion of the force might be embarked. Once this sector has been reduced, the reduction of Retimo and Heraklion by the same methods will only be a matter of time.” 19 Deputy Director, Supply and Transport. 20 An extract from Brigadier G. A Vasey’s report after he had returned to Egypt: “After discussion with the NX Division, I issued a warning order at 2100 hours on the night of the 26th May that the Brigade would withdraw to the Suda Bay area. At 2300 hours I had received no orders of any kind and after a final conversation with the Commander, New Zealand Division, I issued instructions for 2/7th and 2/8th Battalions to withdraw to the Suda Bay area. I informed 2 Greek Battalion and the Commanders of British troops in the vicinity of my intention. Shortly after these orders were issued, an order signed by Major-General Freyberg was received stating that 19th Bde. would hold until dark on 27th May a line 1,000 yards cast of the position it had held that day. Discussion with the N.Z. Division showed that the Division had received no similar order and that they were withdrawing to Suda Bay. Consequently, I decided to withdraw to Suda Bay.” (Unfortunately these orders did not reach 2/2nd Regiment.) 21 Afterwards Lieut.-General Sir Robert Laycock. 22 Wounded here and elsewhere during the day, but fortunately none too seri•ously were Bdr. R. W. Batten, Gnrs. I. H. Forbes, F. T. Chettle, G. A. Cutler, E. T. Paice and J. G. Carmichael. Most of these were put on passing trucks or helped along by their friends. 23 “Tiny” Burston, one of the most popular original officers of the regiment, but then with 2/3rd Regt., faithfully did his job to the last and himself became a P.O.W. 24 The following notes regarding the evacuation are illuminating: Navy estimate of Number actually Date number which could be evacuated evacuated each night 28th/29th May 1,000 700 29th/30th May 6,000 6,000 30th/31st May 3,000 1,400 31st May/1st June 3,000 4,000 It will thus be seen that on the first night of the evacuation the Navy took off 300 less than it had estimated and on the third night, 1,600 less, but it tried to make up for the inefficiency of the army by taking off on the last night 1000 more than it had provided for. 25 He had been “dive-bombed” -- by Capronis outside Derna from a height of 15,000 feet. One of the writers of this history happened to be present when the Capronis dropped their bombs, about a mile away from his H.Q. 26 A Sailor’s Odyssey, Page 380. 27 “Dis-spirited” is scarcely accurate.

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Khassa was a comparatively new camp situated about ten miles north of Gaza and half a mile off the Beersheba-Tel Aviv road. There were permanent buildings for offices, stores and canteen, whilst the troops were quartered in the now familiar large E.P.I.P. tents. The fostering-in party had done a wonderful job and the tired and weary troops found a perfectly set up camp ready for them. Beer, food, and two month’s mail were waiting for the troops, and the rest of the first day was spent just lazing around and assimilating the news from home. From the moment of the regiment’s arrival it was visited by troops from other formations in adjacent camps who were seeking news of relatives or friends. In many cases, unfortunately, their enquiries were in vain. “Perhaps he is still in Alex., mate; a number of our chaps were told to go through before we left,” was the most optimistic reply that could be given. On the day after arrival the C.O. held a regimental parade. He told the regiment that it had proved itself by the outstanding job it had done both in Greece and Crete and he pointed out that two things only had brought the regiment out of Crete: The devotion to duty and the initiative shown by junior officers, and the men’s own wonderful sense of discipline1. Whilst the regiment was still lazing about and reclothing itself, R.H.Q. personnel were very busy compiling a list of the missing and endeavouring to trace what had happened to them. By this means a fairly accurate picture was obtained of men who had been last seen by their comrades. Unfortunately, in some cases troops had lost touch in the dark, and little, if any, information could be obtained regarding them. On 6th June2 at a regimental parade the C.R.A., Brigadier Herring, complimented the regiment on its work in Greece and Crete. He also spoke of the efforts and sacrifices of the R.A.F. in the same theatres. Time has shown just how tragically gallant the exploits of that force were. On 3rd June, the day after the arrival of the regiment in Palestine, strong representations were made to Divisional Headquarters that the troops needed a period of leave. In the meantime, day leave to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem was given to a certain small percentage each day. Divisional Headquarters were very dilatory about this leave question, possibly because they did not realize what Crete had meant for those who took part in it. Finally, no approval having been obtained, two bus tours of Northern Palestine, each of which would last for four days, were organised by the regiment. The men were sent off on these tours 50 percent at a time. The tour embraced Tel Aviv, Haifa, Tiberias, Nathania and Jerusalem, and was partly financed by the regimental welfare association. Some men, who, during the previous year, had made friends in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv or some other township, and others who preferred to go off by themselves, were given the same four days’ leave to do so. The regiment had, in truth come through the Valley of Tribulation in Greece and Crete and this leave did wonders in the way of restoring the vitality and physical health of the troops3. On the 18th June, Major Dyke4 left to become C.O. of the Artillery Training Depot. Major Jaboor became second-in-command and Major V. Gibbins5 from 2/1st Field Regiment became B.C. 3rd Battery. Up to this time, with the exception of essential camp duties, all ranks not on leave had spent their days resting, writing, and visiting friends in nearby camps, but on the 19th June training was resumed. It was resumed in somewhat the same way as it had started in the early days of Puckapunyal. There were no guns, there were no vehicles, there was very, very little equipment. However, drill was introduced to get the troops back to a state of physical perfection, and classes were conducted for officers, signallers, N.C.O.’s and specialists. On 19th July the second series of four-day leave trips were arranged, and a week later the regiment had its long delayed Christmas dinner which it had been unable to have seven months before because it was then investing Bardia. With the help of a donation of £60 from the Regiment’s Comfort Fund in Australia, supplemented by its own canteen fund, a great spread was laid before the troops. The C.O.

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CHAPTER 15 RECUPERATING AND REFITTING 2 and the R.S.M. acted as dual chairmen and the officers and sergeants served the troops and then cleaned up. Thanks to Lieut.-Colonel T. Farrell, of the Canteens Service -- an old gunner officer himself -- turkey, ham, all the fruits of Palestine and lashings of beer, were made available. Held out in the evening sun, with the troops in shirts and shorts, this dinner will always be remembered by those who participated in it. During August6 the regiment continued to receive technical instruments and guns. The motor vehicles it received were those which had been used by 9th Division regiments who had not been in Tobruk but in the area around Mersa Matruh. The tops of all of them had been literally hacked off -- not sawn off -- as British orders insisted that vehicles must conform to the small British pattern so that they would not be so conspicuous in the desert7. Reinforcement officers and men began to flow in to make up for losses in Greece and Crete, and to replace the experienced officers and N.C.O.’s temporarily detached to recruit depots and schools8. This may be the appropriate place to comment upon the regiment’s reception of reinforcements. Some units maintained during the whole of the war a most peculiar attitude that they did not want reinforcements and consequently never made them welcome. The men of the 2/2nd by now had seen enough of war not to be so silly. Other ranks could always anticipate -- and got -- a pleasant welcome from everyone. Reinforcement officers were in a different category. Every man in the regiment knew that many of the proved N.C.O.’s deserved commissions before these people who had been commissioned in Australia and sent over to Palestine as reinforcement officers. Nevertheless when the reinforcing officer used tact and commonsense in dealing with the troops he soon became an accepted part of the regiment. Fortunately, of all the reinforcement officers the unit received, only three proved incompetent. The rest soon fitted in and gained the respect of the troops. And so training went on with troop and battery exercises and an occasional regimental exercise, with enough leave particularly for those who wanted the weekend. Every Saturday afternoon there was a football match against one of the neighbouring battalions and rarely did the regimental team lose. Reinforcements, both officers and men, flowed in, whilst a number of the N.C.O.’s were either commissioned in the regiment or obtained their commissions after attending the Officers’ Training School in Egypt. For shooting practice, the regiment several times moved down to the desert to Asluj, south of Beersheba. After several months of this kind of existence, the men were rapidly getting back to the high standard they had reached before the first Libyan campaign. Every vehicle was equipped with its tucker box and its cooking utensils9, the reinforcements were becoming an integral part of the unit, and the regiment was once more fit for action. A long training period tends to become boring but with a lot of promotion and about 25 percent of inexperienced reinforcement officers and men now assimilated into the regiment, all of this training was vitally necessary. The troops normally trained for 44 hours a week but at any time they were liable to be ordered out on a 40 mile night march without lights. The originals of the regiment naturally reserved to themselves the right to curse these night marches whole-heartedly, but those who had been through Greece realized that there was a lack of real enthusiasm behind the cursing. Two incidents during this period are worth recording. As soon as the regiment obtained new vehicles, R.H.Q. realizing that men wanted during the weekends to visit their friends in adjacent camps and hospitals, arranged a roster of vehicles to leave for the various places to which troops would want to go. However, on 13th September, 6th Div. H.Q. peremptorily ordered that this use of the regiment’s vehicles would cease forthwith. Had there been any shortage of petrol or motor vehicles, this order would have been cheerfully accepted. As it was, there was no shortage of any kind and the only result of the order was that troops had either to “hitch hike” or to travel with the unwashed Arabs in Arab buses. Less than two months

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CHAPTER 15 RECUPERATING AND REFITTING 3 later when the regiment, left behind in Palestine whilst the rest of the 6th Division went to Syria, came under the command of the 6th Division, it found that, the day after 6th Division arrived, a divisional order was issued ordering all units in the area to provide the same system of unit transport to other camps and hospitals as the regiment had been using up to September. Towards the end of September, an order was received that field artillery regiments were to be reorganized along the British pattern. It had been long obvious to anyone who had been in action that a regiment consisting of four troops of six guns was an unwieldy organization; in modern war it is almost an impossibility for one person to command six guns in action. Australian regiments were, therefore, to be divided into three batteries, each consisting of two troops of four guns. This meant the formation of a new battery, the 52nd. No information was divulged by the C.O. as to who were to be the officers of the new battery, but at a regimental parade he explained the reason for the formation and asked for volunteers to join it. As a result, about 90 men decided to volunteer. That night the commanding officer himself went through the regimental list and detailed approximately another hundred to form the new battery. Next morning a regimental order was published giving the names of the officers and men transferred to 52nd battery, under the command of Major W. H. Hawkins. As was their right and custom, those compulsorily transferred -- and peculiarly enough most of those compulsorily transferred were some of the best N.C.O.’s, gunners and signallers in the regiment -- gave loud voice to their disgust, but also peculiarly enough it was not many weeks before they were very proud of being in the new 52nd battery. This period will remain notable in the history of the regiment for the size of the guard it produced for several months. This guard, commanded by a captain, attended by three subalterns and with about half-a-dozen sergeants became the marvel of the area, so much so that every night at its mounting it was viewed by a number of wondering infantry privates. The regimental policy had always been to keep guards at a minimum and until this time guards and sentries were provided only for such places as stores, offices, canteens, etc. However, after the second time a battery cook house had been broken into during the night, the C.O. at a regimental parade, in his usual ironic way, pointed out that it was obvious that these places and a lot of others needed guarding. If the troops indulged in the stealing of rations, it would obviously be their bad luck, because as from that night the guard would consist of 111 other ranks. Guards at Khassa also became famous because of the existence of a wadi known as “Hair-trigger Valley.” This was a fairly deep wadi which ran into the camp from the main Tel Aviv-Gaza road, and then swerved off into the desert. The local wogs, being far- sighted gentlemen and natural thieves, were anxious to build up a good armoury for themselves against the day when the war would be over and they would be able to revert to their time-honoured custom of liquidating their enemies who on this occasion were obviously going to be the Jews. They therefore lost no opportunity of visiting camps surreptitiously and purloining arms and ammunition or anything else that was readily movable. After a gunner in the 2/1st Field Regiment had been shot dead by a marauding Arab one night, 2/2nd Field Regiment guards declared an unofficial open season on all visitors after dark. Anybody moving around the camp area after dark did so at grave peril, and whereas the normal duty of an orderly officer doing his rounds at night was to approach a sentry quietly, now his main concern was to let the sentry know he was coming and who he was. This was done by whistling, flashing torches or any other means which would indicate to everyone that he was somebody going about his lawful occasions. Over a period of two or three months, shots rang out nightly and at all hours of the night. Members of the guard had decided early in the piece that their efforts were not to he hampered by such

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CHAPTER 15 RECUPERATING AND REFITTING 4 trouble•some things as orderly rooms or stupid questions. So, no matter how soon the orderly officer was on the spot, no sentry was ever found who did not have a clean oily rifle, the correct number of rounds and a firm denial that he had fired the shot. It was not until after the war that it was learned that the troops had spare rifles secreted in the areas they patrolled and plenty of surplus ammunition. No dead wogs were ever found, but on one occasion a shot went through the window of the officers’ mess of the 2/1st Regiment, and on one classic night a couple of 2/2nd officers left the mess after a play night and, probably owing to a slight thickening of speech, failed to give the correct responses to a challenge. Next instant they were lying flat in a shallow wadi with shots flying over their heads until the sentry decided that the language he was hearing could not possibly emanate from the lips of a “worthy oriental gentleman.” On September 27th Captain W. D. Refshauge, who had been the regimental medical officer since the inception of the regiment in 1939, was promoted major and left to become a company commander in the 2/2nd Field Ambulance. The “Doc,” as he was known to everyone, was one of the most popular and also one of the most efficient R.M.O.’s ever to have served in a regiment. He could quietly deal with the few malingerers who consulted him, but for the man who was genuinely ill no attention at any time of the day or night was too much trouble for Bill Refshauge. In action he insisted on visiting the batteries to ensure that his medical orderlies had everything necessary, and on Crete his heroism and his perseverance after he was twice injured himself evoked the whole-hearted admiration of every man in the regiment. During the remaining part of the autumn, training continued with troops, battery and regimental exercises, and field firing at Asluj. During November, the infantry brigades of the 6th Division moved up to Syria to join the 7th Division in garrisoning that country. Consequently, the three artillery regiments, 2/1st, 2/2nd and 2/3rd, were placed under the command of Colonel Cremor and for administrative purposes came under the command of the 9th Division, which had come to Palestine after its sojourn in Tobruk. Even the gunners could not help but admire how this Division looked after them. Leave trucks were provided10, rum was available on cold nights or after night marches, and a commonsense attitude ruled regarding the issue of clothing and other essentials. These improvements were probably due to the fact that the A.Q.M.G. of 9th Div. was Lieut.-Colonel B. W. Pulver11 the original brigade major of the 17th Brigade. The days were now becoming colder and soon winter set in earnest in Palestine. Shortly after the regiment’s arrival at Khassa all tents had been dug in. There was little possibility of air raids on central Palestine, but the C.O., apart from the fact that he was not taking any risks, was determined that everything should be done in a proper manner. However, the effect of this order was that one night when a storm burst over the camp, practically every tent was flooded out. Next morning many troops were searching the sand for their belongings but the most annoyed was one gunner who was sifting the sand where the tent had previously stood in a vain search for his set of teeth which he had left in a mug by the side of his bed the night before. As December wore on it became colder and wetter. In the middle of the month the vehicles were camouflaged with green and yellow paint, and rumours of an impending move to Syria became firmer. With the approach of Christmas the weather became intensely cold, snow covered the Hebron Hills, and sight-seeing parties were organized. For many of the reinforcements, this was their first sight of snow, but for those who had served in Greece, there was little enthusiasm to join the parties. For Christmas dinner the canteen had been ransacked to produce turkey, ham, plum pudding, nuts and fruit, together with an unlimited quantity of beer. As the weather was

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CHAPTER 15 RECUPERATING AND REFITTING 5 extremely bad, arrangements were made for the meal to be sent around to the troops in their tents, a much better idea than having them sitting in the cold, wet mess tent,. Starting at 1130 hours, the C.O., accompanied by the second-in-command, Major R. F. Jaboor, visited every tent in turn to have a drink with the occupants. The C.O., being wily as usual, had armed himself with a whisky glass; the second-in-command had not. There were 79 tents in the regimental area. New Year’s Eve was made hideous by the shooting of rifles and the detonation of grenades in the camps around Khassa. In the regiment, however, although there were many parties in the troops’ tents, not a single shot was fired. Those who had been through Greece and Crete did not feel like behaving as school boys, and their attitude, of course, was adopted by the newer reinforcements. January 6th, 7th and 8th, 1942, will probably never be forgotten by the men who were in Khassa camp at that time. On each of these nights, without warning, the regiment was sent out on a route march, without lights, of about 45 miles. There was, however, some compensation for this night driving practice because when the troops came home, there was a rum issue waiting for them, together with a meal of grilled or fried meat and toast12. On 10th January, the regiment suffered the loss of another original when Major Hiscock was transferred as Brigade Major, 7th Div. Artillery. Dick Hiscock had been one of the original officers of the regiment, who joined in 1939. He was the officer selected to go with the advance party of the Australian forces in December, 1939, to prepare the camps for the incoming units. He was a most popular battery commander and a gentleman by instinct. His courage in action, his knowledge of his job, and the way in which he always looked after and stood up for his troops, endeared him to the regiment, and his loss was a sad blow to everyone. His place was taken by Major R. E. Dewar, a Western Australian and an original officer of the 2/3rd Field Regiment. At this stage there came new perils which quickened the tempo of the war, for on 7th December, Japan treacherously attacked Britain and the U.S.A. As news from the East grew graver and graver, many of the men naturally became concerned about the position of their relatives in Australia, but this did not affect their morale as was to be shown months later. When they were ordered home to Australia, many came to the C.O. to protest against the decision and to ask could they not go back to the Western Desert where things were in such a sorry fix. Soon, however, rumours began to spread that the A.I.F. was going back to Australia. At a regimental parade on 22nd January, the C.O. pointed out to the regiment the danger of such talk and asked the troops to squash it. On 24th January the regiment moved down to Jericho. For once not a breath of rumour had preceded the movement and it was a complete surprise to all the troops. Unfortunately for the regiment, however, the convoy on the mountain roads down to Jericho did not please their commanding officer at all. That evening some of the officers and N.C.O.’s were thoroughly “ticked off,” and he ordered that next day the troops could have a holiday but that some officers, N.C.O.’s and drivers must take the vehicles back to Khassa and return so that they could demonstrate that they were able to drive along that road in convoy correctly. When the British movement control authorities in Jerusalem were asked by the Adjutant to keep the roads clear for this exercise and were told the reason for it, the senior Movement Control Officer exclaimed, “Good God! This is the first real commander we have met in Palestine. He can have the roads cleared for two days if he wants them.” However, the C.O. relented at Ramallah and turned the regiment about there. The Jericho depression on the shores of the Dead Sea, some 2,000 feet below sea level, had been a death trap for the Anzac Mounted Division in the 1914-18 war. Devoid of the least breath of wind and with a sweltering heat, in those days it had also been a malarial plague spot. The discomfort still existed but malaria, fortunately, was absent. For two days the regiment did field-firing practice in the desert north•west of Jericho. The 17th Brigade

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CHAPTER 15 RECUPERATING AND REFITTING 6 were also in the area and a brigade parade was to be held to receive the Emir of Transjordania, H.R.H. the Emir Abdullah. At a regimental parade on the day preceding the review, the C.O. told the regiment who Abdullah was -- a very eminent Arabian gentleman who had fought with Lawrence in the 1914-18 war. Then he made a remark which became famous in Palestine: “In view of what I have told you and who Abdullah happens to be, I just want it to be known that if I hear the expression ‘Saida George’ during the next twenty four hours, it will be worth a fiver and twenty eight days.” During the night preceding the review, as no blank ammunition was available, the troops were set the job of making some. One of the charges was taken out of the cartridges and the cartridge then had several cardboard discs placed in it. Unfortunately, next day when the regiment set out to fire its twenty one gun salute, some cartridges made a decent bang but others just made a wheezy “whoof.” However, the parade passed off very well, the Emir inspecting the brigade group in a carrier. On return to camp, orders were issued for a return to Khassa. This came as a surprise to most of the troops, who thought that they were to be in the Jericho depression for a period of about six weeks. The enterprising Arabs had set up a laundry close to the regimental lines and consequently next day they were besieged by troops demanding a rapid return of their clothing clean or dirty and threatening the proprietors with a variety of deaths all very painful, for non-compliance with these requests. Arabs have never been known to work harder or to talk faster than on Friday, 6th February, as the troops’ demands became more urgent and their threats more vehement. However, most of the troops got back their clothing safely. This return to Khassa started the rumours off afresh. By now Singapore had fallen, and most troops thought that they were returning to Australia. Most of them, because of their experience of the fifth column in Greece, had become very security minded and, consequently, they were not very pleased to see, outside Gaza Headquarters, boxes plainly labelled with the destination “Australia” on them, nor did the talk that came from pay, postal and A.S.C. personnel from Gaza Headquarters give them any satisfaction either. All of them realized that the war position was as serious as ever it was. However, signs of a move were daily becoming more evident. Capt. D. G. Cox, accompanied by Gnr. (afterwards W.O.) Frank Hazel, left for Australia as a regimental advance party. Clothing and equipment continued to roll in and new kit bags were issued, which had to be immediately painted with the usual mystic sign. Hessian covers for helmets were issued, and camouflaged with green and yellow paint, Projectiles and charges were cleaned and oiled and limber-stores doubly secured. Finally, vehicles were prepared for shipping. On 17th February all vehicles of the regiment left by road under Captain Henderson for an unknown destination.

1 The regiment itself added “and Lieut.-Colonel W. Cremor.” 2 On this day also, Lieutenant C. Dollman arrived at Khassa with 39 men whom he managed to bring out of Crete on the last night of the evacuation. These were some of the men who had become detached from the main body of the regi•ment on the march across the island. Dollman, who as previously related, had stayed behind to look after Major G. H. O’Brien, collected these men and by putting them at the rear of 2/3rd Field Regiment was able to have them evacuated. 3 The policy of Colonel Cremor in always granting leave to the men of the regiment whenever it was possible to do so -- a policy afterwards adopted by Colonel Jaboor -- showed its greatest success in the months which were to follow when the regiment had the lowest percentage of persons AWL. in the whole division. (Incidentally, it also had the lowest percentage of admissions to V.D. hospitals.)

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4 Major Dyke had always been a most popular officer with the troops. In action his courage was outstanding and out of action he permitted no one to say a bad word about the troops under his command. “Action Front” of October, 1940, records the following:- “The C.O. and Gunner Dyke make a good pair. Has anyone been on the carpet before the old man and heard Gunner Dyke say a bad word about any of them? It’s invariably: ‘Well, Major, what record has this man?’ Major Dyke, ‘I can honestly say, sir, that Gunner ------is one of my best men and shows exceptional promise, etc., etc.’” 5 Later Lieut.-Colonel. 6 In August was perpetrated one of the practical jokes which could only be put over in an Australian regiment where the C.O. and his troops understood one another. Owing to transfers out from R.H.Q., because of promotions, the standard of the R.H.Q. football team had sunk to a very low level and it had been consistently defeated by the batteries. In the pre-action training periods In Palestine and Egypt, this had never happened and consequently the C.O. had to listen to many indirect comments about the inadequacy of R.H.Q. On the evening of 18th August, the C.O. had the stencil of regimental orders placed before him and noticed that it occupied exactly one page with the adjutant’s signature at the bottom. He, thereupon, arranged for an extra sheet to be attached to the orders without anyone’s signature, transferring ten of the best footballers of the batteries to R.H.Q. This order went out next morning and no one questioned it. Ten very annoyed gunners were paraded to the R.S.M., “Dingo” Burgess, and duly allotted to tents in the R.H.Q. area. Unfortunately for the success of the plot, that day the C.O. received orders that on 20th August he was to proceed up to Syria. He thereupon sent for the R.S.M. and told him that after dark he was to go around to the various battery notice boards and retrieve the second page of the orders. “Dingo” duly did this. Next morning “Dingo” paraded the ten compulsorily transferred footballers and asked them what they meant by it. He told them that they could not get on to R.H.Q. by any funny business and, apparently, they had put one over him. They had told him that there was an order transferring them, but no such order was in existence. One, Lance-Sergeant Jack Dhim (later Lieut.), protested and pointed out that he had seen the order. “Dingo” forthwith said: “You bring me a copy of the order then, Sergeant; but in the meantime you will report to your batteries and I do not want any more of this nonsense.” Jack Dhim came back about an hour later without the order but said with a wealth of feeling, “I wish to God I could produce a copy of that order.” Actually, the whole of the regiment knew that the C.O. had put over one of his jokes but few realized at the time how he had done it. 7 British tractors and motor vehicles were much more suitable for war than the Australian type. It had always seemed a pity that the Defence Dept. in Australia invented its own types of motor transport instead of adopting the proved British types. Apart from the unsuitability for war of the Australian types this policy only added to the difficulties of getting spares and replacements. 8 The officers and N.C.O.’s detached for duty at the Training Regiment were Capt. G. M. Lee, Lieut. R. T. Eason, Sgt.-Major E. Meates, Sgts. G. Hanstead, A. Davis, L. A. Stevens and S. Werrett. Major J. A. Strong was detached to the School of Artillery. 9 Although £150 worth of Primus stoves, paid for by the unit itself, was lost Greece, 6th Div. H.Q. refused to consider a claim for this amount. In Australia, in 1944, a primus stove was issued for each vehicle. 10 On the night of 21st December Gnr. Phil (“Straight”) Edge was, killed and seven others injured when a leave truck capsized on returning from Tel Aviv. 11 Later Brigadier B. W. Pulver, C.B.E., D.S.O. 12 It was on one of these night marches that Bdr. Bill (W. W.) McKay obtained a little notoriety. It was a peculiar fact about Bill McKay that whenever he came into contact with the C.O. there was always some plain talking indulged in. A previous occasion on

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which he had met the C.O. was many months before, at Helwan when McKay, then a gunner, had told a bombardier exactly what he thought of him. Given the opportunity by the C.O. to apologize, Bill respectfully but firmly declined. He thought he was justified and even though it cost him £1 he still stuck to his guns. On this night as the troops had settled into, the vehicles, Bdr. McKay in no better frame of mind than the rest of them, exclaimed very loudly, “I’ll bet that the old ------is warm in bed, with a book and a bottle of whisky by his side.” Into the truck was poked a head and a, torch lit up the face so that the occupants could see who it was. “The old ------is not in bed, Bombardier, but if he had some competent N.C.O.’s who could do their job, possibly both he and his gunners could stay in bed instead of’ having to practise these night marches at this stage of the war.” Collapse of Bill McKay.

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CHAPTER 16 WHITHER BOUND? 1

With the departure of the vehicles, the troops thought that their nocturnal peregrinations had come to an end. Unfortunately, for the rest of the regiment, some of them were bold enough to say this indirectly in the presence of the gentleman responsible for the night wanderings. Thus it happened that at 0315 hours on the 22nd February the familiar cry again rang through the lines “Turn out. Full Marching Order. Parade on the road in fifteen minutes.” Blankets were rapidly folded and tents cleaned and tidied (as they had to be left in inspection order) and the regiment paraded in batteries facing the regimental headquarters office block. Followed an hour’s march around Khassa in the drizzling rain, and it was a very bad tempered regiment that returned to bed at about 0530 hours. Some compensation was afforded them as Reveille was not until 0830 hours next morning. Gunners without guns are not the happiest of people and the life at Khassa at this time became very monotonous. However, arrangements were made for officers and N.C.O.’s from other arms to come across and lecture and demonstrate on the tactics of their own branch. Machine-gunners demonstrated the working of the Vickers machine gun, and infantry not only showed their own methods of advance, assault and consolidation but on one occasion gave a whole morning’s demonstration on the use of various types of bombs. On the day following this last demonstration, several boxes of Mills grenades were obtained from the infantry and every man in the regiment practised in the throwing of a bomb. The site selected was a small wadi from which the grenade had to be thrown over the lip of the wadi into a deeper wadi about ten yards away. Most of the troops got through the performance all right but, unfortunately, one subaltern, Lieutenant W. Farrell, after pulling out the pin, dropped the bomb at his feet. The ensuing scatter saved the instructors and the subaltern. Several gunners also managed to lob the bomb just on top of the wadi. Again there was a scatter. However, this instruction proved very useful to the gunners when they afterwards got to New Guinea and always had to be ready to defend themselves. The rest of the time was filled in with boring route marches (in full marching order), anti-gas training, small-arms training and so on. It was at this stage that a new expression was coined, “harassing tactics.” Fortunately for the morale of everyone, leave was generous, and anyone who wanted leave to Tel Aviv or Jerusalem for a day could get it for the asking. Rumours of movement and of destination became frequent and fantastic, and although any story was eagerly listened to practically all discounted until such time as official orders were received; by now, the regiment was a seasoned one. On the morning of 4th March, the regiment was turned out for yet another night march. It was then under 18 hours notice to move. (In other words, nothing could be undertaken which would prevent any officer or man of the regiment not being available within 18 hours after an order had been received.) Sure enough at noon on 4th March, orders for the movement arrived. Then ensued the normal process of a well trained regiment getting very busy to dismantle the camp in which it had lived. Home made beds had to be broken up and the material stacked and the usual conglomeration of bedside furniture, such as cupboards, rifle racks, etc., had to be moved out. Surplus personal gear acquired during a long period had to be either packed or carried on the back, or given to the “wogs” who, sensing a move, flocked in for the pickings. Next morning spare blankets had to be handed in, tents dropped and packed and the general hurly-burly of moving, commenced in earnest. By midday all tents had been dismantled and packed and the old Khassa camp was practically bare. A few showers during the morning had been very welcome as they laid the thick dust. At 1300 hours they had developed into a steady downpour. R.H.Q. quickly arranged for a free picture show to be screened at the Garrison Cinema and as there was no shelter left in the lines, every man of the regiment was glad of the chance to get under cover and also to see the show. A.S.C. vehicles began arriving shortly after 1800 hours to move the regiment to the entraining point at El Majdal Station. The train was made up of the familiar steel box cars, but,

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CHAPTER 16 WHITHER BOUND? 2 unfortunately, most of them had previously been used for the cartage of cement and had not been swept out. Yet in a very short time the troops were entrained, settled down and endeavoured to go to sleep to pass the journey to Kantara. Kantara was reached in the early morning and after a hot meal at the transit camp, the regiment crossed the canal on the antiquated punt to entrain at Kantara West. A slow journey along the canal to the transit camp near Suez gave the regiment a chance to see the enormous changes which had taken place in the Canal Zone since Dunera had passed up in June, 1940. Huge dumps of stores, airfields packed with fighters, hundreds of vehicles, hundreds of tanks and best of all, prisoner of war camps filled with German and Italian prisoners, who, with typical Nazi and Fascist arrogance, shouted insults about Japan invading Australia. This arrogance was very soon stopped when a few pistol shots were fired over their heads. The staging camp, a sandy, listless place without the slightest amenity, was eyed with disfavour, which grew during the days the regiment was quartered there. Of all the places the unit had ever stayed at, this staging camp was the worst. Apparently the base gentleman in charge of it thought that everything should be made as uncomfortable as possible for the troops so that they would be glad to get out of it. The first evening meal, served by Italian prisoners of war, consisted of watery soup and a lump, not a slice, of dry bread. Breakfast next day consisted of two eggs boiled solid and a lump of rock•like bread, whilst lunch saw the watery soup on again. This menu never varied during the time when the regiment was there except, on one occasion, the dry bread was moistened with a little tinned margarine and marmalade. The final insult happened on Sunday, 8th March, when the Italian prisoners of war who had been pretending to help in preparing and serving the meals were given a holiday and the troops had to look after themselves1. On the Sunday night, at 0315 hours, apparently in order to take the troops’ minds off their horrible conditions and give them something else to growl about, the C.O. turned the regiment out for a night march on foot. Embarkation was set down for the 10th and on that day the regiment paraded at 0630 hours. It then set out on the march to Port Tewfik. Despite the early hour, the sun’s heat was fierce and then the troops had to spend the next two hours packed in a landing barge to go to the transport Otranto. Prior to the troops arriving, an advance party had been sent down to ensure that kit-bags, etc., were placed on board. It is difficult now to conceive that in the middle of the war such shocking lack of arrangements had been in existence. The ship’s officers of Otranto took not the slightest notice of the loading of the ship with the troops’ gear and but for the regimental officers all the personal gear of the troops of 4th Battery would have been left behind on the wharf. When the gear arrived on the ship, officers’ trunks, troops’ kit-bags and regimental stores were simply cascaded by the “wogs” down into the hold. It mattered nothing at all, apparently, to the officers of this ship that troops’ kit-bags were split open, officers’ trunks badly bulged and cases containing records smashed. Eventually, the regiment got aboard and, at 1800 hours, Otranto sailed. It soon became known to everyone that the 16th and 17th Brigade groups were destined for Ceylon. The attitude of the troops was based upon their experience. Despite the fact that they now felt that their relatives in Australia were threatened, the majority would have been quite willing to remain and fight in the Middle East. As garrison of Ceylon it seemed to them that they were being placed in much the same position as they had once before been placed in Crete and they could show no enthusiasm for the idea. They would have liked to go back to Australia so that they could fight for Australia, but they did not desire an opportunity to repeat their experiences of Crete. Otranto was the most unpleasant troopship on which the regiment ever sailed2. Neither the captain nor the crew had any time for Australians; they did everything they could to make the voyage unpleasant. On the

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CHAPTER 16 WHITHER BOUND? 3 first night out the canteen was burgled and although it was obvious that it had been burgled by the ship’s crew, assisted by some stray troops, the captain refused point-blank to have his crew’s quarters searched despite the fact that he made a demand for £135 for the alleged loss. During the whole voyage the ship’s officers complained continually about the troops, mostly about small pettifogging matters. On 12th March at 1300 hours the transport pulled into Port Sudan and the troops saw under the hard sun their first sight of Sudanese. No one was allowed ashore, but it was a relief to have port holes open and all the lights on after dark. Next morning Otranto left at 0800 hours for Aden, where it refuelled and then proceeded full steam for Colombo.

1 On the previous Saturday afternoon occurred the only touch of humour that lightened the dreary five days that the regiment spent in this camp. The officers of 2/6th Battalion challenged the officers of 2/2nd Field Regiment to a football match. Unfortunately, about one-third of the regimental officers’ team came from New South Wales, where they had played only Rugby. The comical effort of officers like Major Dewar, Lieutenants Pring, Sutton, Fetherstonhaugh and Kater attempting Australian rules proved to be the one very humorous item for the troops who were watching. 2 However, not all the troops suffered on Otranto. Whoever allotted the accommodation must have done so from a plan of the ship instead of looking through the boat. A and B Decks were first-class cabins and were, naturally, allotted to officers. C Deck, however, was made up of suites each consisting of a two-berth cabin with bathroom, etc., attached. These were allotted to warrant-officers and sergeants. Having got into them they naturally kept secret the luxury of their living quarters. Down the passage from them lived a party of staff officers, each in three berth cabins without any other amenities. The sergeants, therefore, whenever passing this particular locality always had their shirts off, but the highlight of their day was when a GIII would knock on their door and humbly ask “I say, old chap, could my friends and I use your bathroom.”

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On the morning of 23rd March Otranto anchored in the outer harbour of Colombo. At a regimental parade held between the hot troop decks, the C.O. told the regiment that it was to garrison Ceylon in conjunction with 16th and 17th Brigade troops. The statement evoked no enthusiasm. By now the troops, who had gone through one victorious campaign and had experienced the fighting retirement in Greece and the tragic debacle of Crete, instinctively knew whether the job they were being given was reasonable or not. If the voyage on Otranto was indicative of the future, then they felt that Ceylon could prove another Crete. In the afternoon, Otranto moved into the inner harbour and their forebodings were only increased. In the harbour were 144 ships of all sizes and conditions, but most of them reasonably sized transports and freighters. Some of the men, remembering Suda Bay, thought to themselves what might happen if only a few Jap. aeroplanes managed to get above the harbour. Next day disembarkation commenced. Before discussing the deployment of the regiment it seems appropriate to explain the position existing on Ceylon at this time. The Ceylon army defence now consisted of the 31st Indian Division, 21st East African Brigade (native troops) and 16th and 17th Australian Infantry Brigade Groups, now to be put together as a division. British land forces were under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Henry Pownall. Pownall was the type of British regular officer who disliked Australians. Unfortunately, this dislike was not compensated for by any surplus sense of generalship, The Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, was another Englishman of the same type. On the arrival of the Australians in Ceylon he had warned the G.O.C. that Australians were not popular in Ceylon. “If the Australians set out to make their name stink in Ceylon, by God, they have succeeded” was his comment. Major-General Boase pointed out to him that a force should not be judged by a small minority and that Australian troops, if they received reasonable treatment, behaved reasonably. This, of course, was the same kind of thing that General Blamey had had to say on several occasions in the Middle East. The impression that the troops received when Otranto entered Colombo Harbour was not removed when on 29th March the G.O.C. Ceylon issued a message to all ranks in which he tried to give the picture of how Ceylon would be defended. In this message occurred the unfortunate sentence, “I have not the slightest doubt that there will be no repetition of the Singapore debacle.” These troops, who had seen the debacle of Crete under the same kind of mismanagement as was apparent in Ceylon, were not at all reassured by the tone of the message or the methods in vogue. This feeling of lack of confidence in the higher command was accentuated by the attitude of a few British officers and many English civilians who be known that they did not like Australians1. Another statement in this remarkable survey of the position was, “Owing to landings being possible at almost any point along the coast, our strategy, therefore, is to garrison only vital points with the minimum number of troops.” Later, the troops contrasted this statement with the actuality when they were ordered to place all the guns of the regiment on the beaches at high water mark and were refused permission to move them to a central spot. Then A.I.F. Headquarters added to the rising tide of lack of confidence by a statement in a divisional order that “The campaigns in Greece and Libya proved that dive- bombing is less effective than sustained artillery fire.” Ever since Crete, this had been a favourite statement of staff officers who had not experienced dive-bombing themselves. That there had been no dive-bombing in Libya was apparently unknown to them; in any case the effectiveness of dive-bombing in Greece and Crete could only be judged by those who had experienced it. It all depended on what one’s definition of “effective” was. The enemy’s achievement in this regard has, however, been dealt with in Chapter 13. Then there was the statement, “We must ensure that the enemy is prevented from using existing roads and tracks. This implies the removal or destruction of any local means of transport, e.g., carts, bicycles, etc.” But on 5th April, the G.O.C. Ceylon refused to allow these bicycles to be commandeered in the event of invasion so that the enemy would be

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CHAPTER 17 CEYLON -- AND SENSELESSNESS 2 prevented from using them and gave specific orders that such action was not to be taken in any circumstances! Furthermore, in the event of an enemy landing, civilian vehicles, despite the Army’s shortage of transport were “not to be commandeered.” Then, finally, there was the “armoured train.” This was a relic, presumably, of the pre-1914 era. It consisted of an engine and four carriages all armoured with boiler plates. It was manned by veterans of the first war and 50 managers of tea plantations (provided the 50 managers could be assembled in time). Its offensive weapons consisted of one 12-pounder gun and five medium machine guns. It could steam up or down the line between Colombo and Galle, and it was “to oppose any enemy landing within range of the railway line!” But what use it could ever be in any possible situation, particularly as the line mostly ran between the jungle, was something beyond the imagination of even the latest joined recruit of the regiment. However, if there could be little confidence placed in the British command in Ceylon it was soon borne in upon the troops that there were likewise some considerable deficiencies in their own Headquarters, A.I.F. Ceylon. However strenuously officers may try to conceal the shortcomings of their own seniors from their men, experienced troops soon wake up to the situation. And in Ceylon men of 2/2nd Regiment were soon putting two and two together and seeing that it could not make anything but four. On the morning of the 24th the regiment disembarked and moved by train a distance of approximately 60 miles to Manning racecourse at Boussa, about five miles north of the town of Galle. Some days later the batteries were ordered into positions on the beach a few feet above high water mark, and dug-in. Presumably, the object was to enable them to cover a certain sector of the beach against Japanese landings. There was not a single gunner in the regiment who did not realize the absolute futility of these dispositions, particularly the dispositions of 3rd Battery, which was placed on a beach which had a reef about three-quarters of a mile from the shore, a reef which would prevent any, even the most shallow draught, landing craft from crossing it2, and 4th Battery, which could only fire out to sea. The guns would have been much better disposed had they been deployed some distance from the shore, where they could cover by indirect fire a much greater arc of the beach than they could in their existing ludicrous positions. Furthermore, if they were to be required in some other part of the island to repel an invasion, it would have taken at least half an hour to dig them out of the gun positions on the high-water line before they could be assembled and moved. Later, on being asked how, in any case, guns on the beach could fire at night time, one senior staff officer explained that he had made several journeys down to the beach at night time and standing at high water mark, it was quite possible to see some considerable distance out to sea! (This did not of course explain how guns could be laid without torches even if the gunners could see out to sea.) But his best effort was to say that in any case, H.Q. had decided to issue flares which would be fired from 2-inch mortars and would illuminate the target for twenty seconds! Had the been participating in a comic opera, statements such as these might have been appropriate but it was supposed to be helping to defend an island in imminent danger of invasion. Not even the most inexperienced gunner needed to be told that at night time it is essential that he has a light with which to see his gun sights. It was of course not then known to the troops that the C.O. had written an emphatic protest to A.I.F. H.Q. Ceylon about this positioning of a field regiment. This protest was merely filed away. Strangely enough, the C.O. of the 2/1st Field Regiment, without knowledge of Colonel Cremor’s letter, had written a similar protest. But there was no C.R.A. at A.I.F. Headquarters and it had been decided that it was not necessary to appoint such an officer3. On 4th April an order, issued from H.Q. A.I.F. (Ceylon), was promulgated to all the troops. It stated that a Japanese fleet had been sighted within 18 hours’ sailing distance of Ceylon, bearing 115 degrees. The composition of the fleet was not given nor was it stated

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CHAPTER 17 CEYLON -- AND SENSELESSNESS 3 at what time it had been 18 hours from Ceylon. However, all troops were ordered to “stand to” although the gunners armed with rifles for only about 30 percent of them could not quite see any fun in this particular “stand to.” Actually this fleet consisted of one battleship, WO cruisers and four other vessels, several of which must have been aircraft carriers. About 8 a.m. on the morning of the next day, 5th April, about 75 Japanese aircraft from this force raided Colombo but unfortunately for the Japanese this was not another Singapore. They found squadrons of Hurricanes waiting for them and in the ensuing battle, at least 27 enemy planes were brought down with five additional possibles. We lost twelve aircraft. The raid, which lasted one hour and three-quarters did, comparatively speaking, very little damage. Fortunately, by then the harbour was almost empty of shipping4 but H.M.S. Tenedos, a small destroyer, was sunk and an armed merchant ship, H.M.S. Hector, set on fire. The bombs dropped in Colombo did what was accurately described as “minor damage” and certainly no military damage. The regiment stretched out along the beach at Galle some 60 miles from Colombo did not of course know of the result of the raid at the time and many who had been in Crete were rather disturbed to see the remnants of the Japanese air fleet flying sedately in proper formation out of the island. During the raid, the ships conveying the regiment’s vehicles were in Colombo Harbour. One of them, Cornish City, had unloaded all but seven vehicles by that morning. About breakfast time, the troops on board noticed that there was an unusually large number of planes in the sky. Someone was heard to remark, “The last time we saw as many., as that, they were not ours.” At that moment the Japanese dive-bombed. All Bren guns on the ship were manned, some by experienced but others by inexperienced personnel. Cornish City was credited with one possible Zero and the funnel of the adjoining ship. When the raid was over it was found that the coolies unloading the vessel had disappeared like magic. Lieutenants Freeman5 and Powel16 went ashore, however, and in true 2/2nd style commandeered two lighters and a tug and had succeeded in loading four of the remaining vehicles from the Cornish City when this ship complied with orders it had received to sail immediately. This meant that three of the regiment’s vehicles full of stores were left aboard. At the time the loss seemed a tragedy, but later on it proved a boon to the quartermaster when he had to account for missing equipment. Now commenced for the regiment what were probably the three most unhappy months of its existence, even counting the months under the command of Second Army in Australia. The 3rd Battery was under command of 2/5th Battalion near Galle. Further south, 4th Battery was under command of 2/6th Battalion, whilst 52nd Battery was under command of 2/7th Battalion at Weligama. Regimental Headquarters at Akuressa, close to 17th Brigade Headquarters, could exert little influence upon the training or administration of the batteries. Occasionally, batteries moved from their fantastic positions on the beach for a day or part of a day to train with the infantry battalion, but there was no opportunity to train the regiment as a regiment, nor to maintain the high standard of gunnery, signalling and the other adjuncts of artillery work for which it had always been noted. No senior artillery officer would have tolerated this absurd system of placing small portions of artillery under command of small infantry units. The result of it all was seen when some months later the regiment proceeded to do some practice shooting under the stern eye of the M.G.R.A. India (Major-General Mirrlees)7. April was marred by two fatalities which cast a gloom over the regiment. Lance- Bombardier Jack Beasley, an original member of 4th Battery, was accidentally shot dead, and Gunner Dave Jolly of 4th Battery was drowned whilst surfing. In their static gun positions on the beach, with little to do and no opportunity of real training, in the enervating tropical conditions, later to be accentuated by the monsoon, which brought heavy rain but no diminution of the heat, and very little relieved by the gentle sea breeze which blew at night time, there was every factor to reduce the morale of

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CHAPTER 17 CEYLON -- AND SENSELESSNESS 4 the troops. “B” Troop in particular was split into two sections. One was on the beach in from “A” Troop. The path was little more than a bridle track and the first thing W.O. (II) Len. Creed did was to raid the Ceylon Railways Dept. and send off plenty of sleepers, construct a few bridges and, as he claimed a tree at the back of “A” Troop was his responsibility, that was given the axe, in case a speedy withdrawal was necessary. Realizing that no adequate attempt was being made to produce canteen supplies for the men, the regiment as usual got busy on its own and soon had trucks doing a brisk business with the British canteen at Trincomalee on the north-east coast, with a canteen at Colombo and a brewery at Neuryaliya. This went on happily for a period of two months until it was forbidden by H.Q. A.I.F. (Ceylon), and after that much smaller supplies were available. Eventually, a hostel for troops on leave was established for troops in Colombo but prior to this, as no leave had been officially arranged, the regiment itself sent small parties to spend a week in the invigorating mountain air of Neuryaliya, which was the holiday resort of Ceylon and was situated some 6,200 feet above sea level. The contrast between the climate there and the coastal swamp was both enjoyable and beneficial. The flooded paddy fields and surrounding swampy country on the south coast, resulted in quite a few malaria cases. On 22nd April a torrential downpour heralded the start of the south-west monsoon season8. When the monsoon started, it simply teemed rain for several days on end. During one of these occasions whilst the C.O. was away conducting a “jungle school,” Captain G. M. Lee was left in charge of R.H.Q. At this time R.H.Q. was situated on a small tableland near the village of Aqueressa. Soon the tableland was surrounded by floods anything up to 12 feet deep. Rafts had to be constructed to bring in food to R.H.Q. and it was a sight for the gods to see the R.S.M., “Dingo” Burgess, swimming and propelling a raft of much needed rations. One night, about 2300 hours, Lee was rung personally on the telephone by a senior staff officer at A.I.F. H.Q. and told to send five 3-tonners from ‘ R.H.Q. to Colombo next morning. Lee respectfully pointed out that it was an impossibility to get even a motor- cycle away from R.H.Q. area. He was peremptorily told, “Lee, you will have five 3- tonners at this Headquarters by 11 a.m. tomorrow, or ------.” In spite of the fact that the B.M., 17th Brigade, had confirmed to a senior staff officer at A.I.F. H.Q. (Ceylon) the fact that movement of the vehicles from 2/2nd R.H.Q. area was impossible, Lee was later paraded to H.Q. and soundly berated for “refusing to obey an order!” This was merely indicative of the completely unrealistic attitude of H.Q.9 At the beginning of May, Headquarters A.I.F., Ceylon, issued an instruction that each regiment would nominate one major. From the nominations, A.I.F. Headquarters would select an officer who would act as combined brigade major and staff captain and orders regarding artillery would be issued by the G.S.O.I.10 As a result, Major F. H. Wood was selected for this difficult position. At the beginning of June, at the instigation of Major-General Mirrlees, all the batteries in turn proceeded some 130 miles inland to Divatalawa to do a practice shoot. Divatalawa was reached by winding roads up the mountain side and partly through the jungle, where several plantations of gum trees which were passed on the way brought back nostalgic memories. This trip took approximately five days and was very much enjoyed as apart from enabling the troops to see much of the country, the change of air was most beneficial. It was not, however, all pleasure, because the shooting was organized and controlled by the Artillery Command, India11. The M.G.R.A. (India) was most caustic about the performance of many officers and of the batteries as a whole. The fact that the batteries had been stuck on the beach and had had no opportunity to do any real training for three months was, of course, unknown to General Mirrlees and, in the circumstances, it is a wonder that the shooting was as good as it actually was12.

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And so the months passed with the senior officers as nervous as kittens lest they made a mistake which would bring the wrath of Headquarters down upon them, for the slightest mistake or the smallest dereliction of duty produced an obnoxious memo to the regiment demanding a “report and a full explanation.” The troops generally were bored stiff and realized that there was something wrong with the feeling in their own good regiment, but were unable to see the cause of it although the tone of A.I.F. H.Q. (Ceylon) orders could not help but make them contrast these orders with those issued in the Middle East. Another result of the attitude of H.Q. A.I.F., was that the battery commanders and the C.O. deliberately reduced charges which were made against men to a lesser offence so that they would not be charged at a court martial where they would almost certainly be found guilty and sentenced beyond what those officers thought was a fair thing13. So matters progressed until towards the end of June when rumours began to emanate from personnel at H.Q. A.I.F. (Ceylon), and postal and pay units, that the A.I.F. were going back to Australia, many weeks prior to any official announcement being made to the C.O.’s of units. It was known to all the troops, even if it was not realised by their H.Q., that Ceylon was riddled with Japanese agents. Consequently, as these rumours became more prominent, a suggestion was made to H.Q. A.I.F. (Ceylon) that it would be a good idea if the A.I.F. was really bound for Australia, if a cover plan were put out14. However, no such action was taken. On 20th June, secret orders were received by R.H.Q. giving details of the return of the A.I.F. to Australia. Then ensued what must have been one of the most remarkable series of movement orders ever issued to any formation within the A.I.F. At the time this was not known in the regiment except to the officers and men on R.H.Q. Orders were issued, cancelled, countermanded and altered in quick succession, but on 26th June movement of the regiment’s vehicles to Colombo for embarkation commenced. For an experienced regiment, such as 2/2nd now was, change of location and embarkation of vehicles was an everyday matter. Unfortunately, certain junior staff officers on H.Q. A.I.F. (Ceylon) did not realize this and considered that they knew more about embarking vehicles than any experienced senior field officers could possibly know15. The highlight of their proceedings was when they set out to check over wireless trucks being loaded on to the ship. In a regiment, wireless sets were liable to be transferred from one truck to another, depending upon which was in going condition. Some months before, a return had been demanded from the regiment show•ing all its vehicles, including “wireless trucks.” This was supplied with a note appended that the term “wireless trucks” did not apply to artillery. However, this old list was now revived and on two occasions trucks which had already been loaded on the ship with wireless aboard were peremptorily ordered off and a demand sent to the unit that it would send forward the trucks which it had named on its original statement. The result was that two perfectly good motor vehicles were left behind in Ceylon whilst two others which had at one time contained wireless sets had to be towed up because the motors would not work and were placed aboard the ship for return to Australia. Naturally, of course, for this particular mess up the regiment was soundly berated. On 30th June the incoming C.R.A. of the relieving British division, arrived with his C.O.’s and asked to be shown around the battery positions of which he had obviously been satirically told by the M.G.R.A. (India). The C.O. diplomatically suggested that he might like to choose his own gun positions, but he insisted on being shown at least some of the gun positions at high water mark on the beach. The C.O. and the battery commanders shamefacedly showed him several of these positions, but after one look at each he was quite satisfied that he had seen enough. Then on 1st July the regiment again concentrated at Boussa. At this stage all of our previous gains in the Western Desert had been lost, and to the regiment it looked as if there was little between Rommel and Egypt. The 9th Australian Division was still there, but, whilst the troops of the 2/2nd were keen to defend their homeland, many of them felt that they had to think of the outcome of the war as a

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CHAPTER 17 CEYLON -- AND SENSELESSNESS 6 whole, and they were not at all happy to be going back to Australia with the prospect of the Hun getting into Egypt. On 7th July after Reveille at 0300 hours, the regiment moved by train to Colombo and, embarked on H.M.T. Aronda. Aronda proved to be a small passenger ship of 8,328 tons and had been built just before the war for the Calcutta-Rangoon run and later converted into a troop transport. Having been designed for the tropics it was by far best “trooper” the regiment had ever travelled on and it accommodated not only the 2/2nd Field Regiment but about 200 assorted officers and other ranks from other units very comfortably. After the troops came aboard the C.O. had to listen to half a dozen N.C.O.’s and gunners who asked whether it was really necessary that they should go home to Australia. “Why could not troops be allowed to volunteer to return to the Western Desert?” They received little sympathy from the C.O. (whose views were probably their own) and were told that the best thing a soldier could do was to carry out orders. The troops were aboard Aronda for several days before she sailed. Fortunately, to overcome their misgivings, on the day before the regiment left, Sunday, 12th July, news arrived that 9th Division was in action in the Desert. They felt that at least Australia’s self-respect was saved. In the days whilst awaiting departure, most of the men had bought a large number of cigarettes (50 for 1/9), tea (which they heard was scarce in Australia) and souvenirs of the most varied kind. The result was that the majority had at least one extra kit bag in addition to the usual impedimenta. The amount of junk ranging from wooden elephants to alleged precious stones that was displayed in a later kit inspection made the deck where the inspection was held look like an eastern bazaar!

1 On the other hand, 2/5th Battalion reported that white people in Ceylon generally welcomed Australians and considered them to be exemplary. ‘The Burgers (i.e., descendants of the original Dutch settlers) and Moslems have gone out of their way to show hospitality to Australians,” said this battalion’s report. Soon the regiment began itself to receive the wonderful hospitality of these people. 2 “A” Troop of 3rd Battery could not fire on to any part of the beach at all, but only out to sea over this reef. 3 In this connection, mention must be made of the unstinted help and advice to the Australian gunners so pleasantly given whenever he could by the B.R.A. at Ceylon Force H.Q., Brigadier W. Swinton, M.C. 4 Two days before the raid, there were 121 ships concentrated in the about one square mile of the inner harbour. 5 Later Capt. 6 Later Capt. R. L. Powell, M.C. 7 Major-General W. H. Mirrlees, C.B., D.S.O., M.C., M.G.R.A. (India). 8 On 28th April, vide 17th Brigade War Diary, the G.O.C., A.I.F. (Ceylon), told the Commander, 17th Brigade, that during the period of the south-west Monsoon season the whole of the south-west coast of Ceylon was considered to be entirely out of bounds of possible landing areas for the Japs. But the guns of the regiment were still left at high water mark on the beaches! (One day, a wave actually came into “A” Troop gun-pits, on its narrow beach, but it was not permitted to cut down a palm tree so that the guns could be shifted back a little.) 9 Another illustration of this attitude is extracted from 17th Brigade War Diary. “From A.I.F. H.Q. to 17th Brigade, ‘AA. guard, 2/7th Battalion, arrived Colombo without oil G.S. for guns. stop. No enquiries for oil made to this H.Q.’ To which Lt.-Col. H. G. Guinn curtly replied, ‘Indents for oil were placed with A.D.O.S. as follows: 1 June -- 10 gals. -- received 5. 20 June -- 10 gals. -- received nil. If ordnance cannot supply these requirements it is impossible to issue them.’”

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CHAPTER 17 CEYLON -- AND SENSELESSNESS 7

10 That this officer had no experience as an artilleryman seemed to be immaterial. 11 Present at this shooting also was Brigadier M. C. Swinton, the B.R.A., Ceylon H.Q., who had always been most helpful to the regiment. 12 The C.O. had not been at these practice shoots as he had been ordered to administer command of 17th Brigade in the absence of Brigadier M. J. Moten. A week later, when he met General Mirrlees and explained to him what had been happening to the batteries since they had arrived in Ceylon, General Mirrlees was most apologetic about his previous comments, and said that had he known of how the batteries had been disposed he would not have dreamt of making such comments. He asked the C.O. to convey his apologies to the officers. 13 This headquarters notion of maintaining discipline with Australian troops was to publish the findings and sentences of court martial and demand that these savage sentences should be read to the troops on parade. For example, this kind of thing: “Private ------convicted of being improperly in possession of liquor and of giving an incorrect name to the provost was sentenced to ninety days’ detention.” [One of these sentences was inflicted upon one of the best N.C.O.’s in 2/2nd Regiment, who was sentenced to be deprived of pay for twenty six days and severely reprimanded. Upon the C.O., who had obtained legal advice, pointing out that this conviction was not valid in law, he was curtly told: “H.Q., A.I.F. (Ceylon), is not interested in the views of the C.O., 2/2nd Field Regiment.” Peculiarly enough, even though H.Q. was not interested in the C.O.’s views, within a week of the regiment’s arrival in Australia, the Judge•Advocate-General quashed the conviction and sentence on the grounds that it was invalid.] 14 A cover plan is one designed to deliberately mislead the enemy. All pretence is made that the operation about to take place will be in a different place from that which is intended. 15 As a general rule, junior staff officers are not permitted to imagine that their staff appointment permits them to be rude or domineering to regimental commanders.

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CHAPTER 18 A VISIT HOME 1

On 13th July the convoy left Colombo at 1500 hours. There were twelve ships in the convoy, escorted by one cruiser, one auxiliary cruiser, and four destroyers. Next day the troops were officially told that their destination was Australia and the news was received with very mixed feelings. Whilst everybody was anxious to see his relatives again, many felt that they were being used as political pawns in being brought back to Australia, and they considered with some justification, that they were skilled in desert warfare and they certainly regarded the desert as their particular hunting ground. All felt that Rommel’s advance into Egypt was the most serious threat which that theatre had had up to date, and there was a feeling of disappointment when they realized that they were not to be used to stop him. On 15th July the destroyers left the convoy and the cruiser became the only escort. The convoy made first towards Madagascar and then towards Australia so as to keep well away from Jap submarines and raiders which were operating from the East Indies and had been reported off the north•west of Australia. On the 19th the escort cruiser H.M.S. Gambia left and the U.S.S. Phoenix took over the escort. On 21st a message was received that a British ship had been shelled by a Jap. raider 200 miles due south of the direction in which the convoy was heading. This naturally was not communicated to the troops, but the senior officers who heard it wondered how much information had leaked out to the Japs. because of the blatant manner in which the A.I.F.’s departure had been talked about. On 26th July a Catalina flew over the convoy and made the regiment realize that it was now approaching Australia. Two days later Aronda arrived at Fremantle and tied up at 1500 hours. The first person to appear on the wharf as the ship berthed was Brigadier L. G. H. Dyke, resplendent with red cap-band and red tabs. Colonel Cremor was the first to step ashore as soon as the gang•way was lowered and the regiment cheered to see him salute his former second-in- command. Brigadier Dyke came aboard and was almost mobbed whilst he gave the troops all the latest information about conditions in Australia. The troops had been told that as soon as they were paid they could go on leave. Unfortunately, the representative of the District Finance Officer arrived at the wharf with £250 to pay some 1000-odd troops. This would have meant that every man would have been able to obtain 5/-. Consequently, he was forthwith sent about his business by the O.C. Troops and told to return with enough money to pay the troops adequately. The result was that it took over two hours before the troops could get away on leave1. Then to their astonishment, after over two and a half years’ absence from Australia, they found that they were unable to buy bottled beer -- a privilege freely accorded civilians. They also found that if they went into a hotel for, a meal they were unable to get wine with it! These were the first jars they got upon their return to Australia. Within the next 18 months they were to receive many more. Leave was granted liberally for the next two days and Perth lived up to its reputation for hospitality. This city had suffered from riotous behaviour of some of the troops in the early part of the war, although, peculiarly enough, when the second contingent of 6th Div. went away in April, 1940 (the 2/2nd being a part of this contingent), the troops were remarkable for their good behaviour. However, other troops had either had a last fling in Perth before they left Australia or they celebrated their return to Australia there. Nevertheless, individually and collectively, the resident never relaxed their effort to entertain troops. West Australian personnel left the ship for a staging camp and for disembarkation leave whilst the remainder spent their time enjoying their first taste of Australia, and reacting to some of the new wartime restrictions. The troops were most impressed by the clean, well-mannered children, charming happy girls and real Australian draught beer. What a change it was from the dirty, cheeky Arab urchins, dirty, sulky-looking women and all manner of liquids masquerading under the name of beer. One veteran of all the regiment’s campaigns got the bright idea of buying his wife some underwear, presumably with the idea of telling her it was the best that the East could produce, and on being asked to fork out the coupons, he said “What coupons?” A snooty little shop assistant retorted, “Don’t you know there

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CHAPTER 18 A VISIT HOME 2 is a war on?” This was a question that unfortunately many of the 1939 men were to bear in the next two years from a lot of people in Australia who had never realised that there really was a war on. On Friday, 31st July, the convoy left Fremantle at 1600 hours. The then Prime Minister, the late John Curtin, had, on the advice of his military authorities, imposed a rigid censorship on all telephonic and telegraphic messages from Western Australia when 16th and 17th Brigades arrived there. Despite stupid political pressure, instigated unfortunately by unthinking womenfolk, he emphatically refused to allow any messages regarding the arrival of the troops in Western Australia to be transmitted to the eastern States until it was certain that the troops had arrived safely in Port Phillip Bay. For this he deserved the thanks of every member of 16th and 17th Brigade groups because at that time Japanese submarines were operating with vigour in Bass Strait and the slightest hint that this convoy was approaching might well have meant disaster. A cold trip across the Bight followed, and on the morning of 8th August, 1942, Aronda sailed through the Heads of Port Phillip Bay and berthed at Port Melbourne. The home coming of the regiment was not heralded by bands or by a cheering populace, for it had not been advertised and only a favoured few, such as Major-General Whitelaw2 and Lieut.- Colonel A. E. Arthur were allowed on the wharf. However, some troops had been able to get the news of their arrival to their relatives and during the night a number of these managed to greet their soldiers from outside the wharf gates. The evening the regiment arrived was notable for a strike by wharf labourers because a man who was drunk had been dismissed. The result was that the whole of the gang went on strike3. A lot of the troops thought of similar happenings in the regiment’s history before. When Cornish City was being loaded at Suez there had been a strike of Arab wharf labourers which the troops themselves quelled by the judicious use of some bamboo poles that happened to be handy. At Colombo there was another strike by the coolies following an air raid on the harbour, and the troops were not very proud when they found that a section of Australian wharf labourers were also striking during war•time for no good reason at all. Next day the regiment disembarked and moved by train to Seymour camp. The civilians in the camp post office voluntarily worked overtime that night, and telegraph and telephone wires ran hot. The fostering units had done a good job and everything was ready for the troops -• food, beer and all the necessary canteen supplies. In the next two days many relatives journeyed up to Seymour and then most of the regiment set out on 14 days’ disembarkation leave4. As many of them have expressed in their diaries, they appeared strangers to their families. They were not now the laughing youngsters who had gone away in April, 1940; they seemed to be serious men. They could not appreciate the lack of real interest in the war that the citizens generally seemed to express; for them it had been too real. They were glad to be home but between them and their relatives there seemed to be some bar which neither side could break down. They appeared to prefer to be out with their cobbers instead of enjoying the comforts of home. They had no common bond of talk with those of their pre-war friends who had not joined the services. In themselves they were tremendously glad to have again renewed their home contacts, yet there seemed to be something strange about them which neither their womenfolk nor their fathers could understand. They knew that the war was by no means finished and that they again would soon have to take part in it. But unfortunately they felt themselves strangers in their own country. Relatives and friends did their best to overcome this feeling but with little success. And so they went through their disembarkation leave, some getting married, some finding that the girl to whom they were to be married had other ideas, and others finding that they could not settle into their own home and were only awaiting the day when they could get back to their

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CHAPTER 18 A VISIT HOME 3 regiment. There were a fortunate few to whom these conditions did not apply but they were very, very few. On leave, to the astonishment of the populace, and the home•serving provost corps, they behaved themselves. They drank with their cobbers but they did not make themselves obnoxious and it was the Provost Marshal of Melbourne himself who expressed admiration at the remarkably good behaviour of 17th Brigade Group during their disembarkation leave. Then they began to trickle back from leave. A number were to be commissioned and transferred to other units; some were to be transferred to other units in the jobs which they were then fulfilling5, but the core of the regiment remained. It was this core which was to carry on the tradition which had animated 2/2nd Field Regiment since its inception. For the regiment this was the end of an era.

1 That evening, Capt. Keith Houghton, the regimental Q.M., became involved in an argument with one of the unsuitable type of Provost Officers, with whom Australia seemed to be inflicted in its base units, and flattened him. Next day it took all his C.O.’s adroitness to have the matter covered up. 2 Major-General J. Whitelaw, CR, C.B.E., M.G.R.A., (Aust.). 3 Gnr. J. Woods, incensed at this stupid strike, bought an argument with one stevedore and came off very much the better in the fight which followed. 4 Leave parties left very early in the morning. To wake them, Sgt. F. Stapley used the siren for the gas alarm. The permanent dwellers in Seymour Camp were not amused. 5 A number also decided that they should sample other types of fighting. Among these were Sgts. L. Peck and A. Davis, Bdr. L. Beardsell and Gnr. A. T. Hamill, who transferred to the R.A.A.F., and Gnrs. C. Jager and J. Donovan, who transferred to the R.A.N.

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CHAPTER 19 IN THE DOLDRUMS 1

The return of the regiment to Australia ushered in a new era. Everyone realized that changes were inevitable and that it would have to disgorge some of its talent. Lieut.- Colonel Cremor was promoted Brigadier and left to become C.R.A. 3rd Div. He took with him Bombardier Phil Russell1, and Gunners Keith Hilder2 and George Taylor, and those three were the advance guard of many other regimental personnel. On 27th August, the day following the expiration of leave, the regiment, led by the acting C.O., Major R. F. Jaboor, marched with the other troops of 6th Division through Melbourne. The march finished at Spencer Street and the regiment immediately entrained for Seymour. Judging by the countless funkholes, doubtless dug in frenzy, some Australian base wallahs must have thought Seymour camp a supreme military objective. These slit trenches and holes were a menace to man and vehicle and the regiment with a sense of proportion gave priority of work to filling in and levelling them. It spent three weeks at Seymour and quite a number of the troops took “french” leave. It was too close to their homes and the temptation to have another night was too great. That ended, however, when movement orders were received to entrain for Greta camp on the 18th September. There they found that their guns and vehicles had arrived during their leave. However, all stores and souvenirs which the trusting troops had stored in the vehicles had been looted on the wharf; the loss of their hard won souvenirs and parcels was a hard blow to individuals, and it took a long time to replace the vehicle tools, etc. At Greta the unit linked up again with 17th Infantry Brigade and prepared to move with them to New Guinea. Alas for its hopes! On 1st October, when 17th Brigade received their orders, the artillery was not included. (Unfortunately, the appreciation of the use of artillery was then based on the Kokoda operation. The Americans at Aitape, Hollandia and Bougainville, later showed how artillery could be used in the jungle as well as anywhere else in saying the lives of the infantry.) Consequently, the 2/2nd were left to fight the battle of New South Wales. On 1st October 17th Brigade moved out and Major Jaboor became Commander 6th Aust. Div. (Australia) with eleven sub-units under his command. All papers for promotion went forward to New Guinea with 6th Div. Headquarters and after many signals part of them were received many months later3. The 2/2nd felt it had joined the lost legion. The days were spent in normal training and sport, many new friendships were made, and some of the troops found their life mates there. Major F. H. Wood was transferred as brigade-major, and Lieutenant Cliff Kilburn as staff captain, to swell the ranks of ex-2/2nd Field Regiment personnel with 3rd Division; Major R. E. Dewar took over the appointment of senior instructor at Beenleigh Tactical School. Early in November 4th Battery, under Captain McNaughton, was detailed to co-operate with the Americans at Nelson Bay and remained there practising joint operations until late in March. The 4th Battery soon found out what fine troops the Yanks really were once they got to know them and enjoyed their three months' training there immensely. It was in November also that the regiment received its first batch of reinforcements since its return to Australia. These came from the disbanded 1st Field Regiment. During November and December seventeen N.C.O.'s were commissioned without examination. They were all battle-experienced men who had been specially schooled by regimental instructors ever since the unit had left the Middle East. The regiment retained four of these officers (Lieutenants A. J. Bickell, Gil Smith, Len Creed, Alan Riseborough), but the majority went to units scattered all over Australia. The next loss was that of Major W. H. Hawkins who was seconded to 3rd Aust. Corps. Greta camp was a worry from the time the regiment first set foot into it because of the type of persons controlling it. The troops behaved in an excellent manner as long as they were treated like men, but naturally they reacted to treatment that is normally meted out to unruly children. To cut themselves off from as much L. of C.4 interference as possible the regiment moved from this fixed camp, of which it was heartily sick, to a bare area in

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Singleton with no amenities at all. With a bit of “scrounging,” the camp was made as cosy as conditions would permit. The 52nd Battery, under Major A. M. Henderson, made history by moving a house from under the nose of its occupant. They had been informed that any old buildings on the adjacent Singleton range could be used, but Henderson's crowd went one better. They transported a house which was actually being used. After much haggling, the regiment transferred another house from the range and though it was considered the owner was furnished with a much better house, the regiment was forced to throw in £10 to settle with the irate owner. However, when it is considered that he had originally demanded £300 compensation, the 2/2nd certainly finished on the right side of the ledger. Life at Singleton5 was good, mainly because the unit was unmolested by the L. of C. type of commander. Firing practice with quick moves on the Singleton Range6 put new life into the unit, and took it back to the good old days in the Middle East where a job was done without reference to anything but the practical situation. Christmas Day was celebrated in the usual style with plenty to eat but not much to drink, and with the officers and sergeants waiting on the seated troops. On 28th December, the regiment, in accordance with orders received from 2nd Army, commenced what was called “infantry” training. This programme was to cover a lengthy period and all time was to be devoted to it. Guns were greased and to be forgotten except for maintenance. On being informed of this typical stupidity, the M.G.R.A., Major-General Whitelaw, took a hand and the regiment was soon back on its guns. During February Brigadier Cremor visited the camp and chatted, with the old stagers. He was still “the old man” to them, as he is now. An old identity in the person of W.O. Snowy Edmondson was transferred, owing to medical classification B2, back to the garrison at Fort Nepean. He was T.S.M. of “B” Troop through all Middle East campaigns and previously had served 12 years in R.G.A. Later in the month the regimental sergeant- major, Warrant Officer Burgess, left to take up his civil employment. “Dingo” Burgess as he was known to everyone was an old “thirty-niner” and was a real father to the youngsters. The vacancy was filled by the promotion of Warrant Officer Cyril Murray. Then on the 8th, the first officer reinforcements to arrive since the, regiment's return to Australia marched in. Lieutenants Yates and Witney remained until the cessation of hostilities, but Lieutenant Noble was involved in an accident shortly after his arrival and was out of action for the duration. On the 19th February the regiment moved to Cemetery Point, on the shores of Nelson Bay. It was an ideal camp area and many happy weeks were spent enjoying the surroundings. The camp was placed on rolling lawns with a fringe of jungle and with the sea at its doorstep, whilst handy to the camp was an R.A.A.F. bombing range which was used for firing practice. The surroundings were not unlike the desert although the sands were much cleaner. At Port Stephens, the whole unit established a firm friendship with Mr. Lillie and his family. “Alf” had an oyster lease and entertained royally anyone who flew the banner of the 2/2nd Field Regiment. He could not do enough for the troops and when visited he ceased operations for the day in order to entertain them. On one occasion his hospitality included a bushel bag of oysters which had to be consumed on the spot by the seven visitors. In consequence, when Alf visited the regiment he was met by an escort of motor-cyclists and ushered in like a field marshal. Many men still correspond with Alf and he loves to hear any odd bit of news. March was ushered in with a tragedy, Gunner W. E. Hayston being killed when his motor-cycle left the road. All the senior regimental officers had been sent at the beginning of March to the joint Operational Training School at Port Stephens for instruction in amphibious warfare. They were then taken by the assault ships Manoora and Henry T. Allen to witness amphibious operations at Mount Martha, Victoria. The Americans who provided these were original Guadalcanal marines who were resting after a strenuous campaign. (It was while at the joint Operational Training School that a small party from

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4th Battery decided that a Higgins boat would be a fine means of transport across the bay to a dance being held there. All these Higgins boats -- small landing craft -- belonged to the United States Army and were guarded by armed guards. However, without incident the, amateur pirates crept aboard, started up and withdrew from the beach before an outcry was raised. Replying with derisive jeers and rude comments to all commands from the beach to return they proceeded to set a course. Consternation reigned a few moments later when the sharp chatter of a light machine-gun rang out and a burst whistled over the bows of the boat. The Americans were playing the hard way. No order to abandon ship was given but it was understood. With one accord the pirate crew dived overboard fully clothed and swam for the beach, home and safety. Needless to say, the dance hall did not see any of them that night.) In the first week of June the regiment moved to Narellan camp, approximately 30 miles west of Sydney. It had everything to make life comfortable except warmth. The camp had its virtues, however, as it was close to Sydney and half of the men were able to partake of the delights of the capital city each week. Whilst here the little town of Camden held a gymkhana to aid charity and the C.O. despatched a 25-pounder to help the worthy cause. A small admission fee was charged with little business forthcoming from the locals until a member of the gun crew got to work. To an admiring and ever-growing crowd he gave the history of the famous gun that had taken part in the campaigns of Libya, Greece and Crete. Money poured in as people came to see the historic gun. Small boys clambered over it looking for battle scars. Needless to say, they did not find any as all our guns had been destroyed in Greece, but the regiment's contribution to charity was most handsome. Then Second Aust. Army had a blitz on vehicles. All vehicles had been grounded and 4th Battery's waggon line officer lodged the keys with R.H.Q., and to make doubly sure that the vehicles would not be removed, the M.T. sergeant disconnected all battery earth-leads and placed them in a safe place. A few days later he proceeded on leave. A warning order was received that the G.O.C.'s inspection would take place shortly. Keys were hurriedly sent out so that maintenance and engines could be checked. To the horror of all in 4th Battery none would start. It was discovered that the leads were missing -- as was the M.T. sergeant. A hasty telegram requesting the whereabouts of the leads was sent and the reply arrived minutes before the inspection -- but Second Army never found out. On the 17th June the unit moved to the Tianjara Range for a week's exercise and shooting. This exercise was umpired by officers and N.C.O.'s of a militia regiment as yet untried in battle. The value of the comments can be imagined and those of the regiment who were not furious were highly amused. But it was all typical of what had been experienced since the unit's return to Australia. These bright young gentlemen who had not seen any service themselves, with the full backing of many of their ilk in senior ranks and of some old gentlemen who had rendered very good service in the 1914-18 war but had not served since, were quite convinced that their text-book knowledge was very much superior to that of troops who had been in action. However, it was fun while it lasted, and the move back through the famous Bulli Pass was an eye-opener even to those who had been through before. Then dawned the day which the regiment had been looking forward to for nearly a year. On 26th June a warning order was received that it was to rejoin its brothers at arms of the 6th Division on the Atherton Tableland7. And it is safe to say that no warning order in the previous history of the regiment had ever been received with greater joy. Who will ever forget going through the D.P.1 stage? Every man of the regiment was inspected by Second Army personnel down to the last button and buckle, and every vehicle down to the last split pin8. But with such a prospect ahead, everyone was happy, to go through, without a murmur, anything which would please Second Army. All vehicles not of the four-wheel drive type were reconditioned and sent to Blacktown. Colonel Jaboor was most

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CHAPTER 19 IN THE DOLDRUMS 4 apprehensive over the loss of his vehicles, but was informed that new vehicles would be issued in lieu of these once the unit was concentrated in its new area. The information was of course wrong and it was months before replacement vehicles were issued. On 25th July, the main body departed and on arrival at Kairi on 31st July were met by the original C.O. of the regiment, Brigadier A. H. Ramsay, who was then C.C.R.A. 1st Aust. Corps. Around the area were scattered other regiments of 6th and 9th Divisions, and El Alamein, Greece and Crete received much attention before mention of these campaigns was dropped by mutual agreement. Not many miles away at Wondecla was 6th Aust. Div. who at that time had only the 2/3rd Field Regiment attached to it as divisional artillery. Many a yearning glance was cast in that direction, and it was not long before the troops discovered sufficient reason to slip off for a day to the 6th Division area to renew old acquaintances and to make new ones.

1 Later Lieut. 2 Later Sgt. 3 Because of this, Major Jaboor's promotion to be Lt.-Col. and C.O. was delayed from early August to 14th December. 4 Line of Communication. 5 Whilst here the unit artificers were lent to an adjacent armoured brigade who had fired their tank guns without filling their buffers with oil. Sgt. Arthur Rose did a great job in instructing their artificers. 6 One of the shoots was done with gas shells for experimental purposes. Volunteers from the regiment went through the gas in gas clothing. Unfortunately some were still burnt by the gas, the worst sufferers being Lieut. Phil Tatchell and Sgt. Alec Armstrong. 7 It was not, however, going back to 6th Div. It was to be a regiment of the Corps Artillery. The Kokoda Trail mentality about the use of artillery was still in existence. 8 The object of this D.P.1 inspection was, according to its inventors, to ensure that every man, every vehicle, and every part of equipment was in perfect condition before departing for active service. By means of this inspection, however, many “scrimshankers” in certain units managed always to have something wrong with them and so avoided leaving Australia. Otherwise, this inspection was nothing but an insult to battle-trained and experienced commanding officers, regimental officers, N.C.O.'s and men. And it was suspected that one of the objects of the inspection was to give jobs to people who did not propose to go on active service themselves. However, the whole thing was typical of the base and L. of C. mentality which was then found to be permeating the army in Australia.

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CHAPTER 20 BACK TO 6th DIVISION 1

In the experience of the regiment, camp sites were one of two types; they either had everything laid on or they had nothing at all. Kairi was of the latter variety and as far as the regiment, was concerned was preferable to the first type. Naturally, the settling in process took quite a time and just as naturally, when the regiment had settled in, it was moved to the other side of the road. This kind of messing about had happened so often in Australia that it was almost expected. Administrative huts were constructed by the army and around these some pig pens and a small vegetable garden were built. The troops lived in tents. Plants and flowers grow quickly on the Atherton Tablelands, and even though the soil in the area appeared second rate, the troops soon had a reasonable display. Quite a large amount of the timber used in camp construction burst forth into bloom and it was not uncommon to see table legs sprouting small branches. The Atherton Tableland had been selected for training the A.I.F. divisions because of its excellent climate and because it had, within reasonable distances of the camps, rivers and jungles similar to those which would be met in New Guinea. The training of the unit now went on apace. In addition to the normal artillery training, unarmed combat and small-arms training were added. River crossings, using more equipment and manpower, were carried out, and on one occasion, the aid of donkeys was invoked. It was soon discovered that man labour and time could be reduced at least 50 percent by dispensing with the donkeys, who seemed to object to too much exertion. In August started the trek back to the regiment of old identities who had been commissioned soon after its arrival in Australia and who had been sent to other units. These regiments had been disbanded and, naturally, every effort was made by these officers to get back to the 2/2nd. Those who led the trek were Lieutenants “Baron” Griffeth, Charlie McLeod, Eric Capper and “Sandy” McDonald. The C.C.R.A., Brigadier A. H. Ramsay, tested the unit with an exercise at Herberton. It was like old times, strenuous and enjoyable. Later, with the assistance of Lieut.-Colonel Len Wade, he conducted close shooting1 from a blindage2. During one of these shoots, a blindage was occupied by about 20 personnel, shoulder to shoulder, when an unwelcome visitor in the shape of a black snake passed through one of the observation slits and slithered down between Brigadier Ramsay and Colonel Jaboor. A snake in the open is a pretty poor companion but in a black crowded hole in the ground it defies description. The 20 occupants left the blindage in less time than it takes to tell. At the end of August, Brigadier Cremor was transferred from 3rd Div. to 6th Div. as C.R.A. He brought with him all his H.Q. from 3rd Div., including Major Frank Wood, Captain Cliff Kilburn and Lieutenant Sid. Raggett3, all ex-2/2nd officers. The arrival of these officers at 6th Div. Headquarters was taken as a favourable augury for the re-transfer of the 2/2nd back to 6th Div. The first result of this transfer was that on 11th October, the regiment made its first real contact with 6th Div. since October, 1942, as it was borrowed from Corps Headquarters to take part in an exercise in support of the 19th Brigade. The exercise was to take four days and embrace the area of Mount Garnet, Ravenshoe and Chilverton. At this period there was some talk going on that another regiment should go back to each of the divisions4. Brigadier Cremor knowing his old unit’s views, and knowing also that 6th Div. itself would benefit by the acquisition of 2/2nd, had given Colonel Jaboor the tip that the regiment should endeavour to make a good impression upon the commander of 6th Div., Major-General J. E. Stevens, and the other senior officers. Consequently, every man from the C.O. down to the latest-joined gunner was on his toes during the exercise. Just as in the 1939-42 days, the regiment found the C.R.A. nicely hidden behind a fold in the ground, leaning on his stick, watching the convoy pass as it went to join Brigadier Martin’s brigade. Although he did not tell them at the time, shortly afterwards he remarked that never in all his experience had he seen such a perfectly spaced convoy. This standard was maintained during the whole of the four day

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CHAPTER 20 BACK TO 6th DIVISION 2 exercise. The opposing 16th Brigade was supported by the 2/3rd Field Regiment, and fortunately for the 2/2nd -- and equally unfortunately for the 2/3rd -- this regiment during the course of the exercise made several mistakes which served only to increase the prestige gained by the 2/2nd amongst the division. The exercise was a realistic one. This area was the army’s own and consequently red tape, which always hindered exercises in the more civilized parts of Australia by not allowing any realistic warfare to creep in, was entirely absent. Bridges were really blown up, roads were really rendered impassable and obstacles, therefore, had to be overcome in actual fact and not on paper. At the conclusion of the exercise, Brigadier Martin conveyed to the C.O. his appreciation of the outstanding work the regiment had done for him and his brigade. Some 80 miles to the south-east of the Tablelands was the town of Innisfail, which possessed most of the requirements for a good, healthy time away from the routine of camp life. A small rest area was, therefore, established by the regiment at Ettie Bay, seven miles from Innisfail and the men were sent down in batches of 100 to partake of the amenities there. These parties remained for four days. Ettie Bay had a delightful spacious beach and many were content to remain there bathing, and sun baking. The more restless spirits were transported to Innisfail daily. There was always someone to look after the unfortunate who had imbibed too freely and the companionship and interest in a cobber’s welfare for which the regiment had been renowned in the past was still alive. Training then continued in the Malanda-Mareeba district. The men made many contacts in these areas and the “locals” frequently arranged dances for the troops. Homes were thrown open by these people, possibly the most hospitable in Australia. The troops always appreciated this homely touch, which helped to make up for the complete lack of it in camp. Lake Eacham Hotel, Yungaburra, became a meeting place for the troops in leave hours, and they were seldom denied a thirst quencher. As a commentary on this, “worst regiment,” to quote Colonel ------, and the way in which its members always got on with the local inhabitants, it can be now mentioned that whilst local residents were frequently turned away from Lake Eacham Hotel, the back door was always open to the lads of 2/2nd. Brigadier Cremor was promoted from C.R.A., 6th Division, to C.C.R.A., 1st Aust. Corps, and, consequently, the regiment again came under his command. Whilst the troops were pleased at his continued promotion, they had no illusions as to what was going to happen to them. They knew from hard past experience what were Cremor’s ideas about training officers and troops. They, therefore, entered into the contest with him philosophically but knowing full well that the scales were heavily weighted against them. As always, they heartily cursed him and all his ideas and expressed their views amongst themselves in vivid, descriptive language even though the old stagers in the regiment knew that few of these comments were altogether genuine. The first contest between its old C.O. and the regiment was an inspection which he made of the whole unit. The regiment had been given four days’ notice of this inspection, and the combined knowledge of the old hands was pooled so as to ensure that the C.C.R.A. could not pick a single fault in the regiment. Rarely had it turned out so spick and span, and as the C.C.R.A. could find not a single fault in the turn out of the troops themselves, it looked for a start as if the regiment was going to have a victory. As each battery was inspected in turn, hasty telephone messages were sent to the batteries still to be inspected telling them what the “old ------” was looking for. The inspection was a most meticulous one but as the troops had expected, although they had tried hard to avoid it, victory lay with the C.C.R.A. In one troop, omissions were discovered in the driver’s log book, in another a reel of signal wire did not have the beginning of the wire free, and so it went on with each troop damned in turn. It was left, however, to Captain H. L. Sutton to complete the rout of the regiment. Harry never could let well alone and at the finish of the inspection, which had then lasted for about three

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CHAPTER 20 BACK TO 6th DIVISION 3 hours, he asked the C.C.R.A. whether he would like to see the best tent in the whole Tablelands area. “Yes, Sutton, tents are my hobby,” was the reply he received, but most officers would cheerfully once more have cut Harry’s throat. The party proceeded to this “best tent,” but unfortunately for Harry, whilst he and his men had been away at the inspection a thick column of black ants had made its way up to a little bit of sugar left on a mess tin rack outside the tent. This produced a satiric comment, but inside the tent everything looked perfect and the C.C.R.A. was almost baffled until finally he inspected a few gas-mask satchels and in the last one discovered a packet of the gunner’s love letters. A snort of disgust about having his time wasted ended the inspection of Sutton’s “best tent.” Then Corps Artillery Headquarters arranged a four day exercise for the regiment under its own command, but Major Sandy Henderson had been borrowed to act as chief umpire for the C.C.R.A. The regiment itself thought that it had put up a very good show and was smugly satisfied. This satisfaction was very rudely blasted when the C.C.R.A. spent just over one hour at the finish of the exercise pointing out a host of errors and shortcomings. The exercise ended conveniently at Ettie Bay and the regiment then spent two happy days lazing on the sand. On 27th November Corps Artillery Headquarters organized an artillery competition on the sports ground at Kairi. These competitions embraced the work of signallers, drivers, gunners and command post assistants. Rivalry was very keen between the three regiments attached to the Corps, 2/2nd, 2/7th and 2/8th, and the troops were on their toes all the time. The 2/2nd carried off the honours in the competition by a fairly substantial margin, the brightest effort being that of one gun crew who partially dressed themselves, assembled a 25-pounder gun, and laid it in four minutes. The regiment’s ego, however, received a severe setback shortly afterwards at swimming and athletic sports arranged by Corps, when it went down to 2/8th and 2/7th Regiments. The sergeants and the gunners had all built their own messes out of local timber and, in December, from plans supplied by Major MacNaughton, Lance-Bombardier Kelly and a small party of volunteer gunners completed the officers’ mess. This was a really fine structure made out of local timber and was the envy of every other unit on the Tablelands. During November and December, several blindages were constructed at the Walsh River artillery range. Placed right amongst the tall timber, there was very little observation. Most of the shooting meant bringing rounds very close to the blindage, but as the rounds were without smoke boxes, observers had to rely mostly on sound assisted by splinter effect. The lessons learnt in this dose shooting afterwards proved most valuable in the New Guinea campaign. From Kairi, trips to the Tully Falls and Green Island were organized. They were very popular for a time, but this popularity waned because of the long road journey in uncomfortable three-ton trucks. Fish traps were laid down by the regiment in the Daintree River and parties of amateur anglers spent happy, lazy days providing the regiment with fish. As a side line, they shot wild pigs, and one would be hard put to discover the difference between the flesh of the wild pig and its more domestic relations. Ice boxes were used to convey the precious foodstuffs back to the camp to ensure that they arrived in edible condition. Consequently, on at least one day per week, the regiment was regaled with fish and wild pig. Owing to the fact that the traps were some eighty miles from the camp, the project caused some consternation at divisional headquarters when it became known, but it remained in service for many months. At the beginning of March, Major A. M. D. Henderson was transferred to the 2/3rd Regiment, where he remained in command of its 5th Battery until illness forced his retirement from New Guinea to the mainland5. His place was taken by Major Tulloch

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Roberts, M.C., from 2/8th Field Regiment. Roberts soon carved out a niche for himself in the regiment and proved his worth on many subsequent occasions. On 3rd March, the ribbons of the Africa Star were distributed to those entitled to them and all felt that the wearing of this ribbon, was a far better indication of service than the greatly misused chevrons. On 4th March arrived the orders for which the regiment had been yearning for over 18 months. The 2/2nd was to re-join the 6th Division as part of the divisional artillery. Having been shifted from pillar to post during this period, it was decided to move as many of the mess buildings as possible to the new area. This was only fair and logical as these messes had been built by the voluntary labour of the troops themselves and nothing had been contributed towards them by the army. Consequently, the regiment had the pleasure of the coverage and hospitality of these buildings for another eight months. A tank carrying trailer was borrowed to move the semi-circular bar and dining table, etc., of the officers’ mess, orders being issued to it that movement was to be by a roundabout route so that it would not go past 6th Div. Headquarters looking like part of a Labour Day procession. However, despite the order, the party drove blithely past 6th Div. Headquarters and repercussions were awaited. Fortunately, there were none. At Wondecla the experiments which had been commenced at Kairi in home brew were continued and improved. From near and far came soldier friends of the regiment and civilian friends who sampled the result of the amateur brewers and many units adopted the same idea. By the time 6th Div. departed for its final campaign, the amount brewed per week rivalled the output of some of the smaller breweries. Settling in took much longer this time than was anticipated, mainly because of leave and training exercises. The regiment was quite happy to plod on and construct when the opportunity permitted; before long, in each of the troops’ mess huts there was a bar and a large fire-place, both necessary for good fellowship. Many happy nights were spent in the messes at housey-housey and other minor forms of relaxation. To supplement battery funds, 52nd Battery later followed by 3rd, ran a little Tatts sweep once a fortnight and the first prize of £25 was a great attraction. Numbers were drawn out of a revolving drum to the tune of clinking glasses. The 4th Battery raised its funds by other unorthodox means but the troops consequently fed well on the money raised. The origin of “little Tatts” came from the inspiration of Gnr. Jack Egan. Wally Walpole and Gil Smith managed to convince Major Cheong of “Table Tops” of the necessity of the enterprise. He kindly printed our tickets. Then difficulty was experienced about the numbers to be drawn from the barrel. One enterprising gunner managed to obtain a set of mosquito net poles, which were cut to the required thickness, and L-Bdr. Happy Holloway painted on the numbers. The mosquito poles were donated by the R.Q.M., Capt. “Nigger” Houghton -- they were his own and he did not know he donated them. This “Little Tatts” of 52nd Batt. netted between £30 and £40 per pay. This resulted in a highly improved menu for the gunners. Trips to Innisfail ceased for a while because of a short-sighted policy disallowing the use of vehicles over long distances. Permission, however, was, eventually granted to send seventy of all ranks to Innisfail on Good Friday. Innisfail with its many hostelries felt the full force of the troops and it is a tribute to their discipline that during the entire period of their visits only two incidents arose where disciplinary measures were necessary. This was a somewhat better record of this “worst regiment” than others had. In April a further batch of reinforcements arrived to offset wastage. What the non- service person never seems to realize is that wastage occurs in a unit out of action because of illness, etc., just the same as it does because of casualties in action. On 8th May, Major G. M. Lee went to hospital, was eventually marked B class, and transferred to Major- General Whitelaw’s staff in Melbourne. “Dickie” Lee had joined the regiment in February, 1940, and after a period in most jobs, including that of Adjutant, had risen to be a battery

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CHAPTER 20 BACK TO 6th DIVISION 5 commander. His enthusiasm and his sense of humour had endeared him to all ranks. His place was taken by, Major T. Roberts, M.C., who was transferred from 2/8th Field Regiment. Roberts soon carved out a niche for himself and proved his worth on many subsequent occasions; the troops reckoned that he was a worthy successor to “Dickie”, Lee. In May the short 25-pounders arrived and became the property of 4th Battery6. No-one was aware of the capabilities of this gun except from hearsay, and judgment of the weapon was therefore deferred. On l0th June the first parade of the whole of the division since the parade at Jericho for the Emir Abdullah was held and was reviewed by the G.O.C., Major- General J. E. S. Stevens7. Major W. J. Hawkins, who had just arrived on his re-transfer back to the regiment after an absence of 18 months, was one of the spectators. A month later, on 17th July, the 6th Division held a ceremonial parade and was reviewed by the Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Thomas Blamey. After re•marking most favourably on the turn out and telling the troops what the future held in store, he delighted the 16th Brigade with the announcement that they were going on leave. This produced loud cheers from the lucky brigade and utter silence from those less fortunate. Exercises were continued to discover the easiest method of moving a regiment with limited tractors and jeeps. Then followed trial packing of equipment. Varying methods of getting guns over rivers and loading jeeps, lorries and guns into landing craft and planes were also practised. Shooting practices were also held to keep everyone’s eye in. At last, on 23rd August, the first warning order for embarkation was received and a new system of training was introduced. The regiment listened to numerous lectures on hygiene, malaria and scrub typhus, marched in tropical studded boots to get used to them, took atebrin under supervision and adhered to full malarial precautions. Until scrub typhus lotion could be applied to clothing, gaiters were worn until retiring. Then came more inoculation against cholera, tetanus and typhoid. Although some months were to elapse before embarkation, the regimental vehicles were tactically packed ready for instant war8. During these months a fair amount of amusement was provided for the troops. As always with the 2/2nd Regiment, football was the most popular. Many inter-regimental matches were played but the climax came when a combined R.A.A. team, including eight members of 2/2nd Regiment, played 19th Brigade, represented by their crack team from the 2/11th Battalion. After a great match, the R.A.A. team won. The 2/2nd Regiment had been represented by Les. Coffen, Andy Bucholer, “Shorty” Armstrong, “Scottie” McDonald, “Kanga” Hale, Evan Hopkins, “Slapsy” Hibberd and Fred Flett. On 2nd November, Major Hawkins with the advance party left for Aitape in New Guinea and the regiment carried on with its practice in river crossing and in swimming. In swimming there was keen rivalry with the sister regiment, 2/1st. In a competition with this regiment on 9th November, the regimental team consisted of Harry Sutton, John Pring, Don von Bertough, Bruce Needham, Col. Morley, Eric Candy, Norm Taylor, Pat Murphy, Noel Parker, Brian Hogan, Fred Smith, Jack Barclay, Norm Touzel, Alan Hughes and Ern Marsh. Von Bertough won every event in which he started, including the diving and back- stroke, but the final outcome as the scores were level, rested with the winner of the 100 yards, Norm. Taylor was the regiment’s hope and although he put up a magnificent performance he was beaten by inches. All the regiment’s equipment and stores had been moved to the embarkation port, Cairns, and now the rest of everything in the way of guns, etc., went and the regiment spent its days in route marches and sport, but miniature sport accompanied by much heckling and barracking occupied a fair proportion of the time. In this, Sergeant Les Gillam always produced the best disciplined team.

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And so on 2nd and 3rd December the regiment moved down to Cairns and embarked upon U.S.A.T. Evangeline. Colonel Jaboor was O.C. troops and Captain C. Adam, Adjutant. As the convoy pulled out and the mainland receded, the minds of the troops flew back quickly through the events of the past 12 months on the Tablelands. They had visions of the long fight to get back to 6th Division, Innisfail, Mossman and the nearer townships, the regular two bottles of beer a week and an occasional visit to the local, but above all the hospitable folk on the Tablelands. All these pleasant things were being left behind and the future in the jungle battle loomed closer. The half of the regiment which had been in action had no illusions left, but they had a job to do -- a job which they had enlisted to do -- and they were quietly determined to do it. The reinforcements who had not yet been in action felt as all men who have not been in action feel before the impending battle. But they were fortunate. They were going into action with a very seasoned, a very well-trained, and a finely disciplined unit All of them, old timers and reinforcements, knew that the Jap. had to be met and defeated. They had the capability to do this and they knew that their intensive training had fitted them for whatever lay in store. Consequently, their morale was of the highest as the shores of Australia faded in the distance.

1 Close shooting means that the shells are brought down close to our own troops. 2 A blindage is an observation post artificially constructed so that it is safe from shell fire and has only a small slit in the front from which the observing officer can see. 3 Later Capt. 4 In connection with this discussion, a senior 6th Div. staff officer who had made himself most unpopular with the regiment in Ceylon made a faux pas. Not knowing Brigadier Ramsay’s previous connection with the regiment, and disliking the regiment and its officers for their independence and their scarcely disguised contempt for inefficiency, he expressed to the brigadier his view that if a second regiment was to come back to the division, it should not be 2/2nd, which he regarded as “one of the worst units in the A.I.F.” Upon the brigadier asking him whether he had had any experience in artillery, he had to reply that he had not. Brigadier Ramsay then very coldly said: “Well ------I was the original commanding officer of that regiment and I regard it as one of the soundest units in the A.I.F.” 5 Henderson was the last of the senior officers to be rifled from the regiment at the direction of the M.G.R.A., Major-General Whitelaw, but actually at the instigation of the C.C.R.A. (Brigadier Cremor), Captains Mair and Tatchell were now battery commanders in 3rd Div.; Major McPherson was counter battery officer on Corps Headquarters; Major Parkinson was BM., 5th Div., R.A.; Major Wood was BM., 6th Div., R.A.; and Major Des. Cox was a battery commander in 2/8th Field Regiment. Apart from these there had been literally dozens of lieutenants and captains transferred so that at one stage when the number of Australian artillery units was at its peak, there was only one regiment in the whole of the Australian Military Forces which did not have an ex-officer of 2/2nd Field Regiment in it. 6 This gun was an Australian adaptation of the British 25-pounder designed for jungle warfare. About half of the barrel had been cut off and smaller wheels fitted. Otherwise, it had all the characteristics of the ordinary 25-pounder. When used properly it proved a good weapon for the jungle but unfortunately many units with true conservatism never learnt its proper use because they always treated it as an ordinary 25-pounder gun. 7 Major-General Sir Jack S. Stevens, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., E.D. 8 Tactically packed means that vehicles are so packed as to have everything in its place ready for immediate battle.

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The first introduction of the regiment to the Americans was not at all an auspicious one as the first information they received about meals was that there would be only two a day, one at some ungodly hour in the early morning and the other at 4 p.m. in the afternoon. Due however to the efforts of the C.O., Colonel Jaboor, there was added an additional meal about mid-day. The trip to Aitape was very much the same as a trip on any other troopship, except that as the vessel was so crowded little could be attempted in the way of training or recreation, and most men spent their time in small groups gathered at every available nook and corner, playing cards or reading. A strict blackout at night time limited even these activities. Past historic Milne Bay and through the China Straits the Evangeline made her placid way to Aitape, arriving there on the morning of 7th December. The disembarkation was a masterpiece of mismanagement. But the experienced soldiers from the Middle East who since their return to Australia had been messed about by experts were a great help to the more recent reinforcements, when it came to disembarkation. From early morning the troops had been standing with all their kit in the gangways waiting to move on, but although landing craft, launches, Fairmiles, Dukws and amphibious craft of all descriptions were darting about the harbour, it was not until the sea started to run about 4 o’clock in the afternoon that one landing craft arrived to take off the troops. One landing net was thrown over the side and the biggest men of the regiment went first so that they could endeavour to hold the net close to the L.C.T. whilst the remainder of the troops, burdened with all their gear, including rifles, attempted to scramble down the net. At times the L.C.T. rose as high as the sides of the Evangeline itself, and it was only by a miracle that a number of men were not killed whilst this disembarkation process went on. By the time the men had scrambled over the sides one by one it was nearly 10 o’clock at night before the landing craft made for the shore. The men had eaten before mid-day and it was only the generosity of the crew of the Evangeline who kept handing out through the portholes bread and dixies of tea that the troops in the landing craft were able to get any food at all. The men waded from the L.C.T. to the shore in water waist high. As usual the ubiquitous Salvation Army was on the beach to greet the men with the usual orange drink, tea and biscuits. Then the troops were transported in trucks to a staging camp. There in the complete darkness they were given a meal and, likewise in the darkness, and the foot-deep mud, they had to search for stores and other equipment belonging to the unit. Then the trucks left for the regimental area where the regimental cooks had another meal prepared. Tents had been erected by the advance party and it was a very tired and weary regiment that went to sleep that night at Aitape, their first and belated introduction to the jungle of New Guinea. The advance party had been in Aitape for nearly a month but had been nobody’s baby. No area was available for the regiment, and for a start the troops had to depend upon the goodwill of the 2/3rd Field Regiment. Being wise in the ways of the army, the members of the advance party had set about scrounging everything they could lay their hands on. Whisky was largely their means of tender for almost anything, and consequently hutments and kitchens came their way from the Americans. To say that the two tractors of the advance party were over-worked would be an understatement and it was often necessary to call on the friendly 2/3rd Field Regiment for assistance with heavy vehicles. The regiment will never forget its debt of gratitude to the 2/3rd’s quartermaster, Captain U. Ferrier, who did everything in his power to aid the advance party in settling in the regiment. An area was eventually allotted to the regiment and naturally everyone got busy clearing it and building shelters. Two days later it was handed over to the 2/5th Infantry Battalion, and amid moans and groans from all and sundry the regiment moved into another area. In view of previous experiences the troops were rather dubious about settling in and decided to rest on their arms reversed. Sure enough after some days it was allotted to H.Q. 17th Brigade. The usual had occurred again, but now the regiment’s salvage dumps had grown to enormous proportions. The regiment was eventually settled in southeast of

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Aitape. R.H.Q. was neat the shore in soft ground, which made movement slow and tedious. Not one tree or shrub graced this site. No one in his normal senses would want to oust the regiment from this area so part of the salvage dump was quickly utilized and various hutments sprang up. At this time 2/2nd troops were probably the worst but most willing artisans on the island. Before discussing the further employment of the regiment, it may be advisable to explain the set-up at Aitape. The Americans had landed here in force in 1944 in one of their by-passing operations along the northern New Guinea coast. As was their usual well-conceived custom these Americans had landed in great force and, having driven the Japanese well back, they established a perimeter in the form of a semi-circle which had the sea as its diameter. The diameter was about nine miles long and the radius of the semi-circle was about six miles. Repelling counter-attacks and ready at any time to repel further ones, the Americans were content to remain within their secure perimeter and to allow the Japanese to live as best they could in the jungle, cut off from their normal supplies. The policy adopted by the Australian Government of taking over these island perimeters from the Americans and proceeding and kill the Japanese in the jungle was the subject of much bitter comment amongst officers and other ranks in other formations. Upon that policy this history desires to offer no comment, but it is safe to say that within the ranks of the 2/2nd Regiment there was little questioning of the policy. For over two long years the regiment, after its campaigns in the Middle East, had been back in Australia, and for most of that time had been at the mercy of the greatest experts in messing troops about that it was ever likely to experience. Once back to the 6th Division, all it asked for was to get into action and now its desires were to be gratified. Many of the officers and gunners who saw the results of American artillery fire on the east banks of the Danmap River could not help but think that the Americans at least knew how to use artillery. Instead of the niggardly use which had been made of the Australian artillery, except at Finschafen, the Americans did not hesitate to concentrate the guns of a whole corps to blast away the jungle. For a length several miles, and extending from the east bank inwards to a depth of some 600 yards the jungle had been literally blasted away by artillery fire. The result was that when the Japanese fanatically counter-attacked, their ranks were mown down by machinegun fire and none of their troops ever reached the main line of resistance. The regiment was now well settled in, but even by 21st December there were still a large number of gun stores on the U.S.S. Isaacson at Aitape, and none of the guns had been able to get their dial sights. Then the regiment had to hand over some of its tracked vehicles to the engineers. These vehicles had been in constant demand and were now almost worn out for tasks other than artillery. Spares were unprocurable, and, although the C.R.A. protested to divisional headquarters a ruling was given that it was necessary for two of these to be lent the engineers for log-hauling. This practice was unfortunately a characteristic of the Australian army in the later stages of the war. Through bitter experience the British army had found out that it was necessary for each artillery regiment to have tractors, tracked vehicles and bulldozers if it was to do its job properly. In the Australian army, however, divisional and other commanders could never appreciate that if these vehicles were used for other than artillery purposes they would not be available for the artillery when it vitally required them. The same thing happened about the “Piper Cub” aeroplanes which the British had devised for “spotting” for artillery. In Britain these were piloted by artillery officers and reserved solely for artillery purposes. When eventually some were brought to Australia, and it was suggested that they were essentially an artillery equipment, one very senior officer remarked to the M.G.R.A. “We are not going to allow you to run your private air force” and consequently “Piper Cubs,” instead of being placed

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CHAPTER 21 AITAPE TO WEWAK 3 under the direct command of the C.R.A., were allotted to the divisions. Apart from this, they were manned by R.A.A.F. personnel and consequently on very few occasions did they serve the purpose for which they had been devised. The regiment spent Christmas Day, 1944, within the old American perimeter. A parcel for each man had been issued by the Australian Comforts Fund and as usual the cooks did their best, but it was a different Christmas from any of, those which had precede, it. 1940 outside Bardia with very limited supplies, 1941 after Greece and Crete with all the good food and wine of Palestine, 1942 at Greta in the shadow of the worst type of “base wallah,” and 1943 on the Tablelands, still a corps regiment but firmly convinced that they were going back to the 6th Division. Now at long last, in the New Guinea jungle, and about to set out on absolutely new experiences. The task allotted to the 6th Division was to move from Aitape along the coast and a limited distance inland to Wewak and to clear the Japanese from these areas. The 19th Brigade, with 2/3rd Field Regiment in support, had already moved from Aitape and had reached Matapau at Rocky Point. But the further the advance was made and the enemy driven into the Porricellis, the more difficult became the ground and the longer the line of supply. On 2nd January the C.O., accompanied by Captains Powell and Sutton, left for a three-day recon naissance in the Danmap area as a preparation for the 2/2nd Field Regiment taking over from 2/3rd Field Regiment. The roads were very boggy and a stretch of three miles took three hours to negotiate. On 8th January, Captain C. Dollman and Lieutenant J. Pring directed fire from H.M.A.S. Vendetta on concentrations of Jap. troops on Matapau and Abau. Captain Dollman acted as spotter in a plane and Lieut. Pring had a comfortable berth on board H.M.A.S. Vendetta. On 11th January orders were received that 3rd Battery was to move to Marlin to assist the 2/8th Battalion in clearing that area of the enemy. Next day a reshuffle of the officers of the regiment was carried out and, although it might appear to the layman akin to changing drivers when the coach is crossing a flooded creek, it was quite in order as such a reshuffle had frequently taken place on previous occasions. By now the regiment was a seasoned unit, animated throughout by the same ideals and sentiments, and officers found no difficulty in transferring from troop to troop or from battery to battery. On 15th and 16th January 3rd Battery moved to its new area on the fork of the Danmap River. During their first few rounds in support of 2/8th Battalion one gun had a premature 12 inches from the muzzle. Although pieces of steel flew in all directions, no casualties were sustained. On 19th January R.H.Q. and 52nd Battery followed 3rd Battery, but 52nd had to bivouac on the west side of the Danmap River owing to its high water level. Until 52nd Battery was able get into position, 5th Battery of 2/3rd Field Regiment remained on 21st January these two batteries came under command of Colonel Jaboor, who had then arrived at the 2/8th Battalion’s Headquarters. In this Marlan area great difficulty was encountered in finding observation posts. Owing to the thick forest, visibility was nil and the use of the highest trees allowed the observer to see only more treetops. Consequently, many old trees had to be destroyed ready for an emergency. To register D.F. tasks, O.P.O.’s moved out with infantry patrols. By the morning of 22nd January, 52nd Battery had all managed to cross the Danmap and had relieved 5th Battery. The regiment found that the 2/8th Battalion had a policy of very active patrolling. This required little artillery support, but on 24th January some members of the regiment were introduced to jungle fighting in earnest. A patrol from the 2/1st Battalion had been ambushed. The relief party, including “E” Troop O.P. party under Captain Dollman, was also ambushed and unfortunately, as the exact whereabouts of the first patrol was not known, Dollman was unable to bring down artillery fire for the assistance of the relief party. After the fight was over, it was found

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CHAPTER 21 AITAPE TO WEWAK 4 that our first patrol had suffered losses of one killed and three wounded, whilst the relief party had three killed and six wounded. The enemy, however, lost 16 killed. On 27th January, the 2/3rd Battalion of 16th Brigade were just completing their relief of the 2/8th Battalion when, about 1930 hours, the Danmap River suddenly rose in height approximately 20 feet at 2/3rd Battalion Headquarters and 15 feet near its mouth. The river was running at about 22 miles an hour and a wall of water about two feet high swept through part of the 2/3rd Battalion area. Soon men were struggling for their lives in the water. At Marlan, for example, 18 members of the Headquarters Company of 2/3rd Battalion were in position on a small island in the Danmap River. In normal times, it was easy to move to and from this island by means of a log spanning the river between the headquarters position on the bank and the island. But this night the river rose so suddenly that the troops on the island were cut off before they could be withdrawn. At that time, it did not appear very serious. Unfortunately, the water soon rose as described above and gathered such momentum that it completely washed away the island. The men clung to substantial trees until these crashed and joined the mad rush of the torrent. One by one the trees disappeared, carrying troops with them. To those standing on the bank, absolutely helpless, the morale of these infantrymen was awe inspiring. As each tree crashed, one heard a cry of “Here I go” or “My turn now” and so they passed down the river, some to be drowned. In the regimental area, matters were not quite so bad as this although they were bad enough. Ammunition and equipment soon went under water and jeeps were bogged up to their windscreens. All land communications to Marlan were washed away and the only means of communication which the whole area had with the outer world was a 2/2nd regimental line over a back route. R.H.Q. had to pass all messages to and from 16th Brigade. The 4th Battery advance party coming up to join the regiment found itself flooded out and one of the best and most efficient of the originals, Sergeant Alan Fleet, was swept away and presumably drowned. Personnel of 3rd Battery did magnificent work in rescuing marooned troops. In this work Lance-Bombardier McAllister played a most prominent part and was credited with rescuing thirteen men from drowning. For his brave deeds that night he was awarded the George Medal. Amidst, the chaos and confusion, loss of lives, wreckage of bridges and destruction of equipment, almost out of touch with their fellow men, the morale of the troops remained remarkably high and had not the flood proved so costly in human life and material, it would have been like the acting of a comedy. At the Fork, 3rd Battery became a collecting place for stragglers from the Marlan area and the defended areas to the south-west. Their aid post was kept busy treating 107 flood casualties and their canteen ran out of hot refreshments. By 0600 hours on the morning of the 28th wireless communication with divisional headquarters had been re-established. On 29th the 2/3rd Battalion resumed active patrolling and several contacts were made with the enemy. The Japs. were still playing their old game of infiltration and harassing the lines of communication. Lines were tampered with or not completely cut but rendered almost useless by the severing of about five wires. The consequent loss of power made reception impossible. Maintenance was very difficult over a line many miles long, and a long and arduous procedure was necessary to circumvent this enemy action. Extra armed personnel had to be provided for the maintenance groups from a pool of men already taxed to capacity. On several occasions, the enemy tapped into the line, gave the code word, and called for messages. But his method of requesting information always gave him away, to the alert signallers. On 30th January “F” Troop engaged targets in support of a company of the 2/3rd Battalion. On 31st January Lieutenant Needham left with a two-day fighting patrol of two platoons of the 2/3rd Battalion. Next day this patrol clashed with the enemy and suffered casualties of one killed and five wounded for ten killed of the enemy. All of the 2/2nd party returned safe, but thoroughly exhausted. As the Australian advance moved down the coast, enemy resistance stiffened and they became much more active and

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CHAPTER 21 AITAPE TO WEWAK 5 aggressive. Frequent attacks at night were made on the forward troops and telephone lines were frequently cut. On 4th February Gunner E. V. Kelly, a member of Lieutenant Robbins’s O.P. party, recorded the first personal “kill” for the regiment in this campaign by shooting a Jap. during the change over of O.P. personnel in the hills east of the Danmap River. On 7th February another bit of regimental history was made when Captain Powell in an Auster plane became the first regimental air O.P.O. Not desiring to weary the reader with a mass of detail, we shall not attempt to outline the activities of all the O.P. parties or of what went on back at the gun position. Outstanding instances only will be recorded but it must be realized that during the whole of this campaign, the regiment had O.P. parties consisting of an officer, his assistant and signallers always out in front with the infantry patrol. For communication, they relied sometimes upon lines, but more often upon wireless. They were in the same position as the infantry and had to be able to defend themselves when necessary. Back at the guns the troops were liable to be attacked at any time by infiltrated parties of Japanese and consequently had to keep a very strict watch at night time and at all times to have the guns in an easily defended position. For the officers, assistants, signallers and gunners back at the gun position, this war was the same as any other war except for the additional necessity of protecting, as described above, their gun positions both during the day and night. For the O.P. parties it was far otherwise. On 8th February a patrol which included Lieutenant John Pring and his party found a new Jap. 2-inch mortar and sent it back to 3rd Battery. Next day 52nd Battery O.P. line was tampered with in the early hours of the morning, four strands of the line being cut. An hour later the line was completely cut 800 yards from the gun position. On the 10th a patrol from “D” Company of the 2/3rd Battalion was ambushed at 0700 hours. A patrol from “A” Company accompanied by Lieutenant Pring and his party went out to investigate. They themselves were ambushed but dispersed the enemy after a short sharp fight. A few hours later, 52nd Battery fired ten rounds gunfire on the ambush areas searching and sweeping. The result was unknown, but they certainly made it uncomfortable for the Jap. ambush party. By 15th February the regiment had completely taken over from the 2/3rd Field Regiment in the Danmap area and was placed under command of 16th Brigade, in which situation it remained until the Hawain River was reached early in May. And so the slow infantry advance along the coast continued with support from the regiment. Apart from direct support of the infantry patrols moving forward, harassing fire tasks were the order of the day. On 19th February 52nd Battery fired 160 rounds according to a fire plan preparatory to the infantry attack on the Pimple. The 3rd Battery joined in and fired 240 rounds. The infantry reported that the shooting was very effective and was responsible for clearing the Japanese from the Pimple area. By 20th February the regiment had moved forward to Abau. Next day was notable in the history of the regiment for the departure of Major Tulloch Roberts. Major Roberts had gained an M.C. with the 9th Divisional Artillery at El Alamein and had come across to command 52nd Battery just before the regiment left the Tablelands. Roberts was one of the most popular battery commanders the regiment had ever had. After five years’ service he was now being discharged on the death of his father as he was the sole remaining member of the family to carry on the business. The position at Abau looked quite dry and firm, but it very soon turned into a quagmire when the rains came. The laymen may suggest that this was due to poor reconnaissance but in the jungle, gun positions were very difficult to obtain and in ordinary weather these positions looked quite suitable. When the unexpected rain arrived, all exits and entrances were rendered impassable and life was dismal and difficult.

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The main worry confronting the officers was how to get the guns out. The position was only a few yards from the shore and consequently landing craft proved a quick and easy method. Unfortunately, that equipment was in very short supply, having been reserved for ammunition and rations, and the regiment had to be patient and use what mobile land means it had in its possession. On 24th February Lieutenant Meredith registered a defensive fire task for “B” Company of the 2/1st Battalion. As the shells would have to fall very close to the forward infantry, each gun of the battery was ranged separately. A few miles forward of Abau in the Wank creek area, enemy equipment began to show up to the forward infantry and our own O.P. party. Numerous American vehicles were in evidence and shortly afterwards trucks bearing 8th Aust. Div. markings were discovered. Many of these vehicles had been trans-shipped from Malaya and the Philippines, but most of them were unserviceable. Some Japanese artillery equipment which was captured by troops of the 16th Brigade showed signs of complete lack of maintenance; apparently the Japanese artillery personnel were by now almost non-existent or they had been absorbed into other jobs. On 25th February Major-General J. S. Whitelaw and the C.R.A., Brigadier J. Reddish, visited the regiment and stayed for three days. They saw ammunition being supplied to the Abau positions by L.C.T. and being used by the batteries almost as soon as it hit the shore. They also saw H.M.A.S. Swan bombard Sowon village. Aboard Swan was Lieutenant Pring and Lance-Sergeant Reg. A. Ford. Captain C. Dollman spotted for the ship from aircraft. This was the second naval bombardment which the regiment had been able to execute. During this visit Major•General Whitelaw and the C.R.A. visited 3rd and 4th Battery gun positions at Abau.1 At this time ammunition was being supplied to the Abau position by L.C.T. and used almost as soon as the L.C.T. hit the beach. As the L.C.T. came in, the enemy fired air burst H.E. at the landing craft but did no damage. A Japanese 75-mm. opened up on the infantry from Sowon village and was engaged by 3rd Battery. Mortars also opened up but 3rd Battery silenced them. Then at 1540 hours, “B” Troop engaged an L.M.G. which had pinned down our forward patrol. One of these groups, headed by Lieutenant L. Creed, had an unfortunate experience on these patrols. On the afternoon of 27th February he moved out with his O.P. group on a “Tiger” (or fighting patrol). The infantry was at company strength from the 2/3rd Battalion. The patrol leader was Lieutenant B. H. MacDougal. Late in the afternoon, Creed contacted Lieutenant G. Martin and Sergeant McLeod and took over a No. 22 set from them. His party from the regiment consisted Sergeant “Tex” Rickard, Gunners F. T. Clancy, E. B. Kelly, A Wilson and T. Hennessy. The patrol had instructions to reach the Anumb River was not to be avoided and data had to be brought back. On 28th February the patrol moved on towards the Anumb enemy groups were contacted on three occasions. On the last fray, they counter-attacked in the rear and three casualties were sustained by the patrol. Several Japanese were killed in these actions. The furthest village overlooking the Anumb, River was reached, and the patrol leader decided that, in view of the casualties that he had suffered, plus the fact that the Japanese were very hostile in the area, he was justified in returning, to base. How right Lieutenant MacDougal was well borne out by later events. On the feature overlooking this village were several thousand Japs. and the action later on to take this point was one of the heaviest of the regiment’s entire campaign in New Guinea. Before it finally came into Allied possession, it was the subject of several air strikes plus one of the biggest combined infantry attacks of the New Guinea war. Members of the regiment may well remember this particular feature on the approaches of the Anumb as it was here that the R.A.A.F. bombed behind their bomb line, through no fault of their own. One of the regiment, Phil (“Slit”) Trencher, was wounded in the bombing and later lost the lower portion of his left leg.

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Coming back to the patrol: Lieutenant MacDougal decided to make back for Scully’s Hill, where the patrol had camped the previous night. It was on this hill that Lieutenant George Martin directed the fire of the regiment at such total disregard for his own safety that he was awarded a very well-earned Military Cross. Arriving back on Scully’s Hill, contact with battalion headquarters was made with the No. 22 Set. Lieut. MacDougal reported to his C.O. the activities of the day and his opinion of the position plus the fact that with the patrol were two walking wounded and one stretcher case. Lieut.-Colonel Ian Hutchison, commanding officer of the 2/3rd Battalion, ordered that on the next day MacDougal was to retrace his tracks until he reached the banks of the Anumb River. After a consultation with Lieutenant Creed and Captain Ross Easdown, who was the artillery officer with Colonel Hutchison, it was decided that the guns of 3rd Battery would put down a fire plan on the three points where the patrol had struck trouble on that day. Accordingly, Lieutenant MacDougal arranged for a reconnaissance patrol for the next day, which was led by his junior officer. At daybreak, the walking wounded and the stretcher party with guards returned to battalion headquarters. The infantry officer with 12 men and Lieutenant Creed, Sergeant Rickard and Gunner Wilson then set out for the Anumb River. They were to wait at a safety distance of 400 yards from the first target before proceeding on their way. Right on time, the shells from 3rd Battery came over. But it was an unfortunate day in the regiment’s history. The targets had been plotted from an ordinary survey map and it was 400 yards out. The first round of gunfire fell right among the patrol. Realising that there was a space of 20 seconds before the next rounds fell as the time-table was for three rounds per gun per minute, Lieutenant Creed with all haste led the infantry back along the line of fire. Finally, by a roundabout way, the patrol then came back on to the track as the guns lifted for the barrage on the next target. This patrol, which was purely a reconnaissance one, had no communication with the guns or battalion headquarters and the fire from 3rd Battery couldn’t be stopped. Unfortunately one of the infantry soldiers, NX125640 Private N. Jobson, was killed. He was buried in the spot where the first rounds fell. Two other infanteers were wounded, one of whom was a stretcher case. A runner was sent back immediately to Lieutenant MacDougal at Scully’s Hill, where battalion headquarters was contacted and informed of the tragedy. The reconnaissance patrol then returned to Scully’s Hill and the entire patrol moved back to battalion headquarters. Lieutenants MacDougal, Creed and two infantry soldiers moved well ahead of the main party who brought back the wounded. The guns of 3rd Battery were checked and re-checked, and after an exhaustive inquiry, it was found that the survey maps of that portion of New Guinea were at least 400 yards out. The fact that the shells fell short was no fault of the regiment or its personnel. One hundred and fifty rounds were fired and proved very effective. For his support in this action, Lieut. G. A. Martin was awarded an M.C. At 1640 hours this day an infantry patrol with Captain Olsen, 2/1st Field Battery as F.O.O. was fired on from point-blank range by a Japanese field gun and L.M.G. ’s; 3rd. Battery immediately engaged the area with 400 rounds. Captain Olsen tried to obtain better observation, but was fired at several times by a Jap. sniper. He switched one gun on to the sniper, who was later found dead as the result of this fire. Captain Olsen then put down 80 rounds of smoke, under cover of which the patrol was able to withdraw with only minor casualties. On 16th February our infantry captured the feature known as Hill 800. This was a very important position in the drive to the Anumb River.

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As the war progressed towards Wewak, the guns of 52nd Battery became out of range. As their gun position was in more or less an impossible position, the guns were ordered out of action. The gun position was on a small plateau with the sea at the side. Later, at the back of the clearing a C.C.S. was established and a squadron of the Armoured Division moved in. Personnel of 52nd Battery were used mainly as carrying parties, while their officers and staff personnel acted as F.O.O. groups. It was now decided to withdraw the short 25-pounders from 4th Battery and to send the guns back to Aitape. Naturally, 4th Battery were disappointed at the thought of being out of the fight, but their feelings were somewhat alleviated by their being temporarily incorporated in the other two batteries. They were later issued with the ordinary Mark II 25-pounders and regained their former status as a battery. Supported by the regiment’s fire, the main body of the 2/2nd Battalion moved forward and occupied the Sowon villages. Their patrols pushed across the Minahau River and got as far cast as the Gilagmar creek. But before this happened on the 5th March, owing to a combination of misunderstanding and the similarity of localities, our own planes bombed a little closer to our troops than was expected. The result was that Gunner Phil. Trencher received a serious leg wound which necessitated his leg being amputated below the knee.2 The guns were moving forward to support the infantry, and by 5th March five guns from 1st Battery, still under command of the 2/2nd Field Regiment, had moved by barge to Wank creek. For this move, members of 4th and 3rd Battery formed carrying parties and moved ammunition and stores to the 2/1st Battery. Road movement was limited because of the terrible conditions and guns in the rear were still bogged down. The 16th Brigade were slowly but determinedly pushing forward, their objective being the airstrip and mission at But. On 7th March a phosphorus smoke grenade exploded in the regiment’s B Echelon lines, injuring six men, two of whom were admitted to the M.D.S. with serious burns. Still supporting the 16th Brigade battalions with an average of 300 rounds per day, the regiment remained in its position until 11th March, when 52nd Battery received a warning order to move. On the next day Lieutenant Apted, who had been acting as F.O.O. with a patrol moving to Minahau, was slightly wounded in an encounter with a Jap. On 13th March the F.O.O. found a 75-mm. mountain gun with U.S. markings and a 20 mm. high angle dual-purpose gun. Both were unserviceable owing to rust. By now, the continuous wet weather had made the hastily constructed roads impassable in many places and rations for R.H.Q., 3rd and 4th Batteries had to be carried by manpower over the worst stretches of mud. By 1200 hours on 16thMarch 52nd Battery had managed to get two guns across the Anumb River in a punt. These were intended for close support of the infantry moving forward towards But and were in action next day. To help them and their tractors get forward, it was necessary to use 120 men from both 3rd and 4th Batteries as a working party. In the meanwhile skeleton crews from 3rd Battery were firing on enemy held high ground at a range 1B, 400 yards. At 1700 hours that evening, two enemy guns shelled our troops moving forward along the road. On 17th March the 2/2nd Battalion captured the airstrip, the mission and the jetty at But. This capture produced a large amount of equipment, abandoned guns and a large dump of petrol and oil. On 23rd March 52nd Battery moved forward into the But-Dagua area on the coast, “F” Troop occupying a position almost in the infantry F.D.L., and by 25th March 3rd Battery and R.H.Q. were established on But airstrip. It was at this stage that the employment of artillery became easier. The land opened up a little and positions similar to those in normal warfare became more common. Much larger quantities of ammunition were available than had ever been available to the regiment before. Consequently, artillery was

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CHAPTER 21 AITAPE TO WEWAK 9 back, for a while at least, in employment a la, text book. Colonel Jaboor, with the Adjutant and intelligence officer, was established with 16th Brigade Headquarters. It was at Dagua that 52nd Battery fired their famous “alienating” fire. It had been reported that Major General Nakai and some of his staff were being carted around the country by scores of native bearers. Eleven targets were selected as areas known to be where Nakai was moving and they received adequate treatment. It. proved profitable some of the natives changed their allegiance overnight. The rapid advance of the 2/2nd Battalion on the coastal sector had meant the by-passing of a number of Japanese positions in the ranges between But and Dagua. This area was essential for the enemy’s defence plan and reports were coming in from natives that large numbers of enemy troops were in the Wonginara Mission. The 2/3rd Battalion were moved in to the hills to deal with the enemy, who held very strong positions in this area. On five knolls commanding the Dagua Wonginara Mission tracks, he was well dug in and seemed to have a fair amount of artillery support. The tracks leading through the Tokoku Pass and all other tracks leading into it were defended by six positions and ambushes. On 30th March “F” Troop fired 1,520 rounds on Tokoku Pass to soften the enemy. On the night of 1st-2nd April 52nd Battery fired 1,000 rounds of harassing fire. Then “B” Company, 2/2nd Battalion, went in to the attack and captured four out of the five knolls around the path. Next night “E” Troop fired 960 rounds on an enemy strong point, which was later attacked and captured by “A” Company, 2/2nd Battalion, who reported that the artillery fire had been most effective. On 5th April, “A” Troop fired 550 rounds on the remaining enemy who were dug in along the Tokoku Pass and the pass was finally cleared of all enemy the next day. It was here at Dagua that the regiment saw its first rescued Indian, captured in Malaya; 3,000 were brought to the north coast of New Guinea as beasts burden. The regiment rescued less than 300. The poor devils were all in, starved, beaten, but not without hope. Thighs no thicker than man’s wrist. The 2/1st Battalion now relieved the 2/2nd Battalion and on 12th April the regiment, less 52nd Battery, was concentrated in the Smain area for a short rest and check up. It was a lovely spot, and the troops spent most of their time in the sea. Whilst 3rd and 4th Battery were enjoying themselves on the beach, 52nd Battery remained in action supporting the advance of the 2/2nd Battalion. This battalion occupied Karawop on 13th April. Next day that part of the regiment which had been out at rest again moved into action at Banak to support the advance of the 2/1st Battalion. During the day, Lieutenant John Pring, who was acting as F.O.O. to “B” Company of the battalion, engaged with his gun and subdued mortars which were holding up the advance. And so the days went on. A varying number of F.O.O.’s accompanied by their signallers and assistants were out with the forward infantry, there was plenty of firing for the gunners back at the guns, and still the necessity remained for protecting the gun positions at night. Between 20th and 22nd April the regiment moved forward to a position at Karawop. It was 52nd Battery’s turn to get the easy job; they were deputed to act as coast defence guns in case the Japs. tried a barge landing. Each section of this battery was sited in an ideal position near the shore, and it now had a glorious laze to compensate it for remaining in action whilst the rest of the regiment had been pulled out a week before. On 25th April, informal Anzac services were held on each battery position by Padre Marshall. The 2/3rd Battalion had now joined the 2/1st Battalion in the coastal advance and the regiment was supporting both battalions, two F.O.O. parties being attached to each battalion. This day, the 2/3rd Battalion pushed through Boiken, whilst the 2/1st had reached a position just south west of the village. As will be observed from the narrative, it was a dreary war but it sometimes had its compensations. Early on 26th April, for instance, about 20 Japs. were observed swimming near the mouth of the Hawain River. Only two ranging rounds were necessary before gunfire was used and the first rounds were observed to land in the area in

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CHAPTER 21 AITAPE TO WEWAK 10 which the Japs. were swimming. On the same day, the infantry reported a party of Japs. and a suspected tank in Welubi village. The 4th Battery immediately pumped down 400 rounds on the village. Shortly afterwards, it was discovered that a motor truck had been completely destroyed -- this was the suspected tank. Then a Jap. 37-mm. anti-tank gun fired one round at some of our tanks supporting the 2/3rd Battalion. As he was about to fire his second round our gunfire blew the gun to pieces. By 27th April, forward elements of the 16th Brigade had reached the Hawain River near the coast. The 2/2nd Battalion had little difficulty in moving rapidly from Hawain River and in a quick drive, supported by tanks, reached and captured Worn on 4th May. The last four miles made by this battalion were covered without artillery support. The regiment, however, was kept in the Karawop area to support the 2/1st Battalion in operations south of Karawop plantation. The 19th Brigade, with whom the regiment had last been associated in Crete, now relieved the 16th. Although we have dealt only with the advance along the coast, which was the only advance with which the 2/2nd Field Regiment was concerned, it must be realized that further inland the 17th Brigade and the commandos had pushed the Japs. back in the same way as the 16th had along the coast. The objective of the division was Wewak. By now, the enemy had lost more than 3,000 killed, and 59 prisoners had been taken. At this stage it was estimated that his strength was 9,650 combat troops and 6,000 base troops, of which total about 11,000 were “effectives.” The enemy also occupied a number of islands off the coast near Wewak. On some of these islands was heavy artillery, including a battery of naval guns on Kairiru Island. The shells from these guns could reach the mainland and it was essential that as many as possible should be neutralized before the main advance on Wewak, Consequently, R.A.N. sloops and corvettes, together with the R.A.A.F., were used to concentrate their fire on these guns. Around Wewak itself, the enemy had made a very strong line of resistance. The coast line here is extremely irregular, with large and small capes poking out from the shore. On these the enemy had prepared extensive defensive positions. He had constructed bunkers with strong overhead cover and was using the caves reinforced with cement to provide him with strong fire positions. He had a fair amount of artillery, and both the artillery and his small arms covered the natural line of approach. But on our side the picture was also good. Dumps had been established at But and Karawop, and for the first time in the war the regiment saw the 6th Division equipped with everything that modern war required. Two 155¬mm. guns appeared, there was a plentiful supply of tanks and the infantry could get as many flame throwers as they required. If the enemy was going to defend Wewak to the last, he would find that the 6th Division had sufficient equipment to enable it to wipe him out without any very grave cost to itself. On 6th May the regiment started concentrating in the Worn area for the assault on Wewak by the 19th Brigade. And by 7th May the whole regiment was in position. The 2nd Battery of the 2/1st Field Regiment were placed under command of the 2/2nd Field Regiment, and the entire regiment was to be able to support the attack on Wewak. Muschu Island, opposite Wewak, was known to have heavy artillery on it and one of the roles of 4th Battery was to be able to bring fire on this island if the situation warranted it. At 2030 hours on 8th May the regiment fired a 48-gun victory salvo on Wirui Mission south of Wewak. It was a salute to the cessation of hostilities in the European zone, but it also killed a few Japs. The troops of the regiment, particularly the originals, received the news of this cessation of hostilities over the Broadcasting Commission’s network calmly and without any visible signs of emotion, but undoubtedly most of them saw very shortly an end to Pacific hostilities also.

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CHAPTER 21 AITAPE TO WEWAK 11

WEWAK On the night of 8th-9th May a patrol of the 2/4th Battalion moved out to reconnoitre approaches to Wewak Point. Minga Creek had to be crossed. The bridge over this creek had been destroyed by the Japanese. To assist the engineers in bridging this creek the regiment fired star shells to illuminate the area so that the engineers could see at night. From one point of view this was not very successful because it enabled those on reconnaissance to be seen by the enemy, but, at the same time, it enabled the engineers to bridge the creek. As has been previously pointed out, Wewak was strongly held by the Japanese. Concrete pillboxes, caves and rock formation were used to the utmost advantage. Furthermore, it was a round perimeter with the land end almost entirely swamped. The approach to Wewak was by a strip of sand which separated the sea from the swamp. This bridging of the creek enabled the tanks to move over ready for the attack, which was to happen next morning. At 0610 hours the 2/4th Battalion, which was the spearhead, supported by a barrage from the 2/1st and 2/2nd Field Regiments and by the tanks, moved in to the attack. This concentration of artillery was the largest in this campaign, over 4,000 rounds being expended in assisting the infantry assault. By 0700 hours, 2/4th Battalion gained their first objective and then rapidly exploited. From his caves, pillboxes and fox holes, the enemy was resisting fiercely, but the infantry, closely supported by tanks and using flame throwers, gradually wiped out these pockets of resistance. Many snipers abounded in this area and our F.O.O. parties suffered from their attention, but no casualties were caused. Next morning at first light 19th Brigade renewed the attack and very soon they had completely cleared the area. The Japanese had resisted with their usual fierce fanaticism, but of the whole garrison only three escaped from either death or captivity. On 12th May 3rd Battery moved forward into action on Wewak itself. Here the nauseous Japanese dead were still largely in evidence. Late that night the battery moved a gun to the infantry F.D.L. on Wewak aerodrome with the object of using it for sniping purposes early next day. Unfortunately, the infantry guide took the party a little too far and ran into their own booby trap system. Casualties were suffered, the artillery personnel having four slightly wounded, but the infantry had several men killed. After Wirui, a sortie inland was made by the 2/7th Commando Squadron; Captain Easdown and Lieutenant von Bertoud supplied the operating parties from 52nd Battery. The attack south was directed at Sauri I, first of a group of three 700 ft. high features astride the track3, inland over the Prince Alexander Ranges towards the 17th Brigade. Surprise was obtained by attacking Sauri I from the rear, through a swamp. The fortitude of the troops was amazing; they took nearly three hours to progress 3,000 yards and then a climb of 700 feet to attack. After the capture of Sauri I an attack on Sauri II was made next day. L.-Sgt. Len Touzel, helping out with a Bren, was wounded in the head. Two days later Sauri III was captured by the commandos without artillery help. But a request was made for possible S.O.S. tasks. The F.O.O., Lieutenant von Bertoud, did the job, but owing to the shape of the area to be protected it was necessary to send the commandos back 100 yards. Von Bertoud registered with rounds only 15 yards from his O.P. Next night the Nips attacked and wounded three of the commandos, but one party was unscathed. Von Bertoud’s fire plan prevented the attack from developing. His efforts so pleased the 2/7th that he was given the pick of the souvenirs -- a most elaborate officer’s sword. With the capture of Wewak and its airstrip, the next objective for the division along the coast was Wirui Mission, which was the next Japanese strong point, and the place from which their artillery had shelled the attacking troops during the battle for Wewak. The regiment sniping gun from a range of 1,200 yards had a field day prior to the attack on

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CHAPTER 21 AITAPE TO WEWAK 12

Wirui, several Japanese weapons, including a 75-mm. gun being knocked out by this gun. The whole regiment was now moved up to Wewak to support the attack on Wirui. On 14th May, zero hour for the attack on Wirui was 1400 hours and the 2/2nd put down the supporting barrage. Despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, the infantry and tanks, with the constant support of the regiment, captured Mission Hill. On this day the regiment had to perform a large variety of tasks. Apart from the barrage, batteries through their F.O.O.’s were supporting various phases of the infantry attack. As an illustration of this, we find that at 1640 hours 4th Battery were engaging a small cave with perpendicular sides which contained a number of Japs. with L.M.G. ’s and rifles; 67 rounds soon put an end to these Japs. At 1800 hours “A” Troop of 3rd Battery with 38 rounds forced some snipers to withdraw from an area where they were holding up the forward infantry. Working a hill over, several guns knocked out eight pillboxes, two of which were known to contain Japanese machine guns, one 37-mm. gun and a 75-mm. gun. A sniping gun, under Lieutenant Eric Capper, was now sent forward to the Boram area to continue the good work carried out prior to the assault on Wirui. The gun was despatched to the forward infantry element on the coastal strip. The infantry decided that there were no targets offering, but suggested that the Boram airstrip offered quite a lot. To the south of the strip were hillocks full of Japanese and the infantry formed a figure L on their approach to the Jap. position. The strip itself was at this time in no man’s land. A touch of humour was introduced into the situation by the action of the gun and its crew in careering down the strip and back well in front of the infantry and apparently attempting to win the battle on its own. What amazed everyone was that although the gun and crew passed within easy small arms range of the Japanese, not one single shot was fired. Now no one will ever know why but if a guess might be hazarded, it was that the Japanese were mystified arid obviously thought that it was some ruse to discover their strength and position. Consequently, they decided not to fire. The luck of the regiment still held good. The 2/8th Battalion had now taken over from the 2/4th Battalion. Supported by the regiment, despite very strong opposition, they captured Cape Boram, the aerodrome, and the mission. During this attack, the regiment with delayed action fuses reduced a small hill south of the Boram airstrip. Possibly, “reduced” is an under statement. When the battalion walked in the hill was a shambles littered with Japanese dead, and with smashed rifles and machine guns. The 2/8th Battalion were loud in their praise for the work of their gunners. Japanese artillery was still active and the airstrip at Wewak and barges unloading on the shore were severely shelled. The 16th Brigade now came in to relieve the 19th.4 The regiment now proceeded to occupy new positions on the south edge of Boram airstrip. On 28th May it was ready to support 2/3rd Battalion. Next night Lieutenant Gil Smith5 was wounded by a grenade thrown from a short distance by a Japanese. During the move to Boram “E” Troop had left and “F” Troop prepared to move. A regimental target was ordered. During fire for effect, Bdr. “Tojo” Johnson at 52nd Battery sig. maintenance point reported our shells landing in our infantry. Quick and thorough check showed that all guns were O.K. The wily Jap. was doing the job. As our shells were landing, he was firing, thus giving the impression of one of our shells bursting and so avoiding detection. On the night lst-2nd June, the regiment again got into full swing by plastering a Japanese defensive position on Hill 910 south of the Boram airstrip as a means of supporting the 2/3rd Battalion’s attack on that feature; 2,760 rounds were fired and the area was devastated. Every bunker was hit and when the 2/3rd Battalion occupied the position the enemy opposition came from a knoll 300 yards to the southwest. This knoll was engaged by 3rd Battery on two occasions on 2nd June and all opposition ceased. The total number of rounds fired in support of this action was in the vicinity of 3,500 and of course queries were received from superior H.Q. regarding the excessive use of ammunition. When H.Q. was told of the damage done, the casualties sustained by the

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

CHAPTER 21 AITAPE TO WEWAK 13 enemy, it changed its rebukes to compliments. When the 2/3rd Battalion moved up this sector, they discovered 23 bunkers well dug in and many dead Japanese in them. In addition, three machine guns, four mortars and many rifles rendered useless by the 2/2nd’s fire were found during the cleaning up. On 4th June 52nd Battery moved from Boram back across the Hawain River to Dagua Lagoon. There was still some cleaning up to be done by the infantry in that area and artillery support was required. A company of 2/3rd M.G. Battalion was allotted the role of cleaning up. On 6th June 4th Battery moved out of action but its “C” Troop took over the 155-mm. guns at Worn. “D” Troop and Battery H.Q. moved to a regimental rest area on the coast at Dallman Harbour. The following day R.H.Q. and 3rd Battery were moved into the rest area. For nearly five months the regiment had been in action and had travelled many long and gruelling miles. After the necessary settling in and maintenance the troops made the most of the beach and the pleasant weather; 52nd Battery still remained in action. On 11th, 12th and 13th June, 52nd Battery engaged targets in the Kuenumbo area before an attack by “B” Company of 2/3rd M.G. Battalion. This occasion was notable because of the fact that two Japanese were captured by police boys 600 yards east of 52nd Battery position. The night 15th-16th June was hectic. The Japanese infiltrated into most of 2/3rd M.G. Battalion’s position. They attacked with rifles and hand grenades. At “E” Troop O.P., Gunner F. R. Hope was killed, Gunner Infield seriously wounded, and Lieutenant K. R. Stewart wounded. Later during the night a Jap. was discovered 15 yards from No. 4 gun of this troop. He escaped after being wounded. The 19th Brigade, assisted by heavy artillery fire and accurate air bombardment, were pushing on despite heavy enemy opposition. By 19th June they had reached a position 1,200 yards south east of Koigin. By 22nd June the 2/4th Battalion, after bitter fighting, had taken Tazaki. But for the regiment this was a fairly quiet period. The 52nd Battery was the only battery in action, the other two being out at the rest area; but for the men of 52nd Battery being in action in New Guinea was the same strenuous job as it always was. On the morning of 19th June, because movement outside the perimeter had been heard at night, an examination of the outside was made and the tracks of two Japs. were found. Again late at night on 22nd June two Japanese were seen about 600 yards west of “F” Troop position, but they disappeared before they could be shot. On 23rd June 3rd Battery relieved 52nd Battery, who then moved to a well deserved rest. On 27th June there arrived for the regiment the first reinforcements it had received since landing in New Guinea. They consisted of 16 O.R.’s and they were very welcome. The regiment had lost many men since the campaign started through normal wastage, mainly malaria, and reinforcements, though small in number, were always acceptable. This rest period for the batteries proved most beneficial. Apart from the few odd jobs that had, of necessity, to be done, the troops lazed, bathed and caught up with their back mail. Back in action, 3rd Battery was having a fairly good time in their new area, a bit of registration, harassing fire, and a few targets engaged in support of the 2/3rd M.G. Battalion, made up their day. July 6th marked an epoch for on that day seven men of the regiment started out on home leave, the first leave given since arriving in New Guinea.6 Next day was even more remarkable, because on that day the troops received their long delayed back issue of beer, viz., eight bottles per man. Needless to say, this was not distributed all at once. On 13th July a composite troop of 52nd Battery went into action on the east edge of the regimental area, Cholial-Dagua. Its job was to support a patrol of the 2/1st Battalion in the Yarabos area. The patrol had a skirmish with about 15 Japs., of whom three were killed, but Gunner Backholer of 52nd Battery was wounded during the encounter.

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CHAPTER 21 AITAPE TO WEWAK 14

On 13th July Lieutenant Hough went up in an “Auster” plane to indicate artillery targets to the pilot. This reconnaissance failed owing to a breakdown in communications. At 0350 hours on the morning of 15th July some movement was seen outside “B” Troop perimeter. Rifle fire was directed at it and one Japanese was wounded, whereupon he killed himself. In the morning, some mines and demolitions which he had carried were found near by. Later in the day a warning order was received that one troop of short 25-pounders from the regiment would move to the 17th Brigade area in the northern sector at Kairivu. “C” Troop was selected for the job. Forthwith a trial parachute dropping of short 25-pounders was carried out on the Wewak aerodrome and proved entirely successful. On 19th July the movement orders for “C” Troop were changed. Instead of the shorts, “Mark II” guns were now to be used. This caused no trouble to the regiment as loading tables for all types of vehicles and guns into planes had already been worked out. On the next day seven aeroplane loads, including two guns of “C” Troop, left Wewak aerodrome for Hayfield. On 21st July another plane load, including the new 4th Battery commander, left for Hayfield. Thereafter and until 27th July, “C” Troop was moved in small plane loads and subsequently deployed in the Matrik area by 0600 hours on 28th July. Whilst all this was going on 16th Brigade had relieved 19th Brigade and the regiment found itself again in support of 16th Brigade. “D” Troop moved forward to Kofi and the war continued as it always did in New Guinea: F.O.O.’s moving forward with their infantry patrols, several O.P. ’s per troop, and back at the guns the necessity for defending themselves by day and by night. On 24th July news was received that Captains Eason and Powell and Lieutenant Martin had been awarded the M.C. Then on 26th July was received the news that all personnel with five years’ service were to be discharged. These men, the originals of the regiment who had seen the easy victories of Libya, endured the crushing defeats of Greece and in Crete, the boredom of Ceylon and the altogether different warfare of the New Guinea jungle, left on H.M.T. Taroona and on arrival in Australia after 24 days’ leave were given their discharge. Around Maprik, “C” Troop quickly got into action and on 28th July supported a patrol action by the 2/6th Battalion. Subjected to vigorous artillery fire, the Japs. withdrew and the patrol quickly occupied the position. Now the regiment was on the move again. On 31st July 4th Battery left “B” Troop (in the Maprik area) and took over from 2nd Battery of the 2/1st Field, Regiment. On 3rd August 52nd Battery relieved 1st Battery of the 2/2nd Regiment south cast of Sauri. On the same day, following a concentration from “C” Troop, “B” Company 2/5th Battalion successfully attacked and captured Ahegulum. The 4th Battery was moved to Makaw and by 5th August the regiment, less “C” Troop, was well entrenched in the hills around Sauri. The road from the coast was a major engineering project, and whilst the weather was fine the road was excellent. Unfortunately, it consisted of clay only, and it became absolutely impassable during the rain. Fortunately, the regiment had pushed forward sufficient ammunition and everybody was happy. The 52nd Battery supported elements of the 2/2nd Battalion in an attack on Rindogin and, after the capture of the north end of this village, 52nd Battery engaged the south end, with the result that the 2/2nd Battalion occupied the whole area. At 1445 hours that day (5th August) Lieutenant J. Tynan, acting as F.O.O. with the 2/1st Battalion, reported that the enemy was in very great strength in Numoiken. He was granted permission to use 1500 rounds in a fire plan. By 1800 hours 4th Battery had completed the fire plan of its first phase with 500 rounds and by 1845 hours phase two of the task with 700 rounds was fired. The result was that although this area was covered with bunkers and foxholes, it was completely devastated. The C.O. of the 2/1st Battalion, Lieut. Colonel Cullen, was immensely pleased with the shoot. On 6th August the 2/1st Battalion advanced towards Numoiken villages, which they captured, most of their support being

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

CHAPTER 21 AITAPE TO WEWAK 15 given by 4th Battery. During the next three days the regiment supported 16th Brigade in the Rindogin Shiburangu area. At 1030 hours on the 10th August news of the Japanese peace offer was received and a victory salvo was fired on Tassam at the request of the infantry commander. The order of the day from General Sir Thomas Blamey was promulgated stating that the war had ended. There is no denying the fact that every man was pleased, but in the 2/2nd Field Regiment there was no large scale display of rejoicing.

1 It was always characteristic of Major-Gen. Whitelaw that as Australia’s chief gunner he always felt it his job to get as far forward as he could to see how the gunners were doing. 2 How he has overcome this disadvantage since the war has just been typical of the ever smiling “Slit Trencher.” 3 Track known as Big Road. 4 In the 1914 18 war, the artillery had frequently been left in action for many months whilst the infantry had been relieved and sent out to rest positions. Unfortunately, too often during the 1939-45 war, some commanders had pursued the same idea. Whilst no gunner would suggest that the strain on gunners is the same as that on men of the infantry, the fact still remains that artillery need relief the same as other troops do. 5 Gil Smith was probably one of the most unfortunate members of the regiment. Taken seriously ill before the first engagement in Libya, he re-joined the regiment in Tobruk, only to be blown up by a dud Italian shell. In Greece, the same thing happened to him, and now in his fourth campaign, whilst acting as F.O.O. he was splattered by a Jap. grenade. 6 A characteristic of the superior British organization which always amazed Australian troops was that the British, even in the most fierce action, always continued to send their troops on leave, according to a roster. Australian administration, however, seemed totally unable to arrange this.

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

CHAPTER 22 THE END OF A REGIMENT 1

Now commenced the long, tedious process of demobilization. Only one troop of 52nd Battery was to remain in the forward position. The remainder of the regiment were to move back to a rest area, but unfortunately New Guinea remained true to itself. Very heavy rain fell and the road to the rear was closed. Small drafts of the long service personnel were dribbled back to be embarked to Australia, but it was not until 27th August that 3rd Battery were able to move back to the new rest area at Cape Pus. On 1st September there occurred the first release of officers who had been with the regiment since its formation. Although long service troops had been released during the last few months, the officers had stayed on, but on this day 13 officers and 111 other tanks marched out to embark on H.M.A.S. Katoomba. Included amongst them was the C.O., Lieut.-Colonel Jaboor. Major Easdown now administered command of the regiment. By 3rd September the whole of the regiment had been concentrated in the rest area at Cape Pus. On 13th September 8 officers and 70 other ranks attended the surrender parade on Wom Strip. And so the days passed with those who had longer service being dribbled back, whilst the remainder of the regiment spent its time bathing, swimming and fishing. By 9th October, personnel who had short service were transferred to the 2/1st Field Regiment. Gradually over the days and weeks following, troops were moved out to Australia according to the length of their service, until finally on 13th December the last few members of the regiment embarked on H.M.S. Implacable, and arrived in Sydney on 18th December. They returned all stores, stationery, etc., and finally on 11th January received a clearance from N.S.W. Echelon and Records. From that day, authority was given for the disbandment of the unit and the remaining personnel, now reduced to one officer and two O.R.'s were discharged. So came to an end 2/2nd Field Regiment.

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

THE ROLL OF HONOUR

"Much was demanded, Lo! our store was small -- That which we had we gave -- it was our lives."

Bdr. J. K. Anderson L./Bdr. K. McMillan

L./Bdr. J. Beasley Gnr A. H. McIntyre

Bdr. L. A. Caldwell Gnr. W. P. Matters

Sgt. F. R. Chamberlain Gnr. H. C. Matthews

Sgt. J. Cleary Gnr. L. J. Mitchell

Gnr. G. A. Davis Gnr. R. W. Mitchell

L./Bdr. J. M. Drake Gnr. P. Nelson

W.O.II E. J. Duncan Lieut. C. R. Nethercote

Sgt. G. Edgar Gnr. F. J. O'Brien

Gnr. P. S. Edge Gnr. F. H. J. Pickles

Sgt. A. L. Fleet Gnr. L. Piffero

Gnr. W. E. Hayston Gnr. W. Sinclair

Gnr. F. R. Hope Gnr. R. S. Sobee

Sgt. L. S. Ingram Gnr. G. K. Stewart

Gnr J. W. James Sgt. P.T.E. Thompson

Gnr. D. Jolly Bdr. 0. P. Tulloch

Bdr. L. V. Kay Gnr. J. McA. Vincent

Gnr. A. Kennedy Gnr. J. Zampelis

L./Bdr. F. R. Kerr

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

DECORATIONS AWARDED TO MEMBERS OF THE REGIMENT

C.B. Major-General A. H. Ramsay

C.B.E. Major-General A. H. Ramsay Brigadier L. G. H. Dyke Brigadier W. E. Cremor

D.S.O. Major-General A. H. Ramsay Brigadier L. G. H. Dyke Brigadier A. E. Arthur

O.B.E. Brigadier W. E. Cremor Lieut.-Col. R. F. Jaboor Lieut.-Col. W. R. G. Hiscock

M.C. Lieut. J. R. Anderson Major R. E. McPherson Lieut. G. A. Martin Capt. R. T. Eason Lieut. C. H. Morley Capt. R. L. Powell

M.B.E. Lieut.-Col. T. R. Blamey Major F. H. Wood Lieut.-Col. J. A. North Major J. C. Tatchell Major L. G. Parkinson Major C. V. I. R. Barnden

G.M. Gnr. G. J. McAllister

D.C.M. Gnr. W. Hull

M.M. Gnr. D. M. C. Findlay Cpl. J. Donovan L./Sgt. C. Gilbert Gnr E. S. Brown

B.E.M. Gnr. C. Auton

C.I.C. CERTIFICATE L./Sgt. C. Gilbert

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

APPENDIX 1

(This appendix contains entries from the diary of Bdr. D. F. Spark) “Pete” Spark became a prisoner of war at the evacuation of Crete, but he afterwards with Gunners Jager, Murphy and together with a number of other British, Australian and New Zealand prisoners of war were taken off the island. “Pete” Spark afterwards obtained his commission, and with the 4th Field Regiment in Bougainville won the Military Cross. This appendix is published to show the remarkable courage displayed by the Cretans in assisting their Allies, and also to illustrate the courage and determination shown by some of our own gunners. Spark, like many others, had become separated from the regiment in the march across the island. Consequently, on 1st June he found himself a prisoner of war. 1/6/41 We were told that we had to walk all the way back to Canea. This almost broke my heart as I was already weak from want of food. We staggered up the steep hill from the sea. Providence was with us for in the centre of the road I found a package containing delicious short•bread, which we devoured like lions. This just about saved our lives and we were able to walk a little better. Darkness fell and we were forced along by guards, every step proving a greater strain than the last, until almost midnight, when we managed to lose our guard and turned in for a spell. 2/6/41 Turned out at 0600, went to a farm house and begged food. They were very kind and gave me a glass of milk and half a loaf of bread, which was shared around. Pushed on and picked up the crowd at the next village. Moved along with them until about 1200, when the fellows acquired a fowl, some potatoes and onions. About an hour later we came to a village where the Hun gave us one tin of bully beef and two packets of biscuits between five. 3/6/41 Today we were told that we would have to make the camp, a distance of about 16 miles. The intense heat of the day made this doubly tough. On arrival we all just flopped down, scarcely to move a limb. We were given some blue-mouldy bread and another tin of bully beef. 4/6/41 I should estimate the number of prisoners at ten to twelve thousand - a most disgraceful blunder on someone’s part. 7/6/41 I was very much impressed with the style and appearance of our Hun guards, all youngsters between 18 and 21, who had been in the army only a matter of six months. They appear to like playing at the game of war. 5/6/41 The rumours going around the camp are absolutely astounding; the latest, Russia is in the war against Germany. 26/6/41 Plans for escape constantly in my mind - the longer I can dally on this island, the better are our chances. 27/6/41 Lauri and I decide on a plan of escape. We made a reconnaissance of the barbed wire and came to the conclusion that a decent gap exists in a small valley, and that tonight is the night. Around about 2000 hours and it is dusk, and there is a lot of noise in the camp. So our 28 days in prison came to an end at 2035 hours tonight when we went under the barbed wire. The nervous tension during those few minutes was very great, knowing that

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

APPENDIX 2 within 50 yards of us there were four Huns on guard with three machine-guns and automatics. One slip on our part would have meant death. However, when we had crept along for about 400 yards with bare feet we rested. It was a steep climb and very rough on our bare feet. Kept going until 2230, rested, climbed half way up steep hill. 28/6/41 Moved at 0500 along a track, met Greek who gave us directions along the valley. A little boy then told us to cross mountains and make for Souya. We have had a guide all the way. Met four other prisoners, had breakfast, potatoes, bread and cheese, moved on over hills, down into river bed, pulled some onions from garden. Slept all afternoon in a little hut. Met some children who showed us a path, here two women gave us further directions, also some fruit. Climbed path up hillside and were met by five more women. Then one of them led us to a small village almost on top of the hill. The reception here almost killed us, and it might have been thought that we were royalty. We were conducted to a beautifully clean little house, given soap and towels to have a wash, a cigarette each and a chair in the open while the daughter of the house prepared a meal of potato chips and eggs, which was also contributed to by other members of the township. Practically the whole township gathered round. About 1915 tea had been finished off with cavissi and one of the men mended my boots. Whilst this was going on “Mike” turned up. “Mike” spoke very good English. He told us that the Germans had shot between seven and eight thousand civilians after having made them dig their own graves for the offence of having taken up arms against the Hun. 29/6/41 Mike put us on to a path to the next village, and gave us a note in Greek asking for directions to Marlow. The kindness of these Cretans almost makes us cry. A debonair Greek came along and led us to the next village. 30/6/41 Feel very sick. Have over-taxed stomach. People very worried about me. Bring milk puddings, arrowroot and tea with alcohol. Some special dry bread and soup. We want to stay here but don’t know if it is right. The Huns come here sometimes and in consequence it is a risk to these people and not fair to them. At the same time, they don’t seem to be afraid. 7/7/41 George brought us a pair of boots which may just fit Lauri. Three dinners arrived for us today. We managed to do all of them justice . . . We were surprised when Demitros appeared with four packets of cigarettes, which we were not allowed to offer around. On arriving at our “home” at about 2100 hours we discovered three meals waiting for us hanging amongst the branches of our big tree like Christmas presents. Then all of a sudden Lauri uttered an exclamation. He had discovered a bottle of Crassi. 18/7/41 Three weeks today since we escaped. Young Milkah came round to escort us back to his place for dinner. We had our bath, dressed and accompanied him. We dined well and drank much Crassi as usual. During the afternoon another fellow came along. He told us some very disheartening news of the Germans shooting Cretans and of Fifth Column activity. 25/7/41 0830 the panic is on. Pane has just left us. His sister brought the news from Cannea. The Hun is preparing four thousand Alpine troops for a purge of the island; all Englishmen are being rounded up and shot, and the Cretans are to be taken by plane to Germany to work in the fields. In consequence of this, we push on at mid-day to Marlos. So commenced our second month of freedom. There is talk of an English agent at Souya but I think that it is all a lot of hooey. The story about the Hun may be just a rumour, but

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

APPENDIX 3 we can’t afford to take the risk. We will see George and Pane at Marlos, the old priest is giving us a boat for them. I feel certain that we will be looked after on this venture, just as we have been in the last month. We sat waiting and wondering all the morning and at 1245 Pane’s mother arrived with dinner. Soon after Mavie and Blaz and two other women arrived with bags of food. The water melon and honey were very much appreciated. Olga gave me two notes, one from her father to his son George and the other addressed to anyone we might meet asking for directions to George and Harry, both of whom are at Marlos. After tea, Mavie and Olga came and told us that their father said that we must not go. These “instructions” finally decided us that we should not go. 28/8/41 The only bright spot in the last three days was the bombing and machine-gunning of Maleme on Friday night, of which we had an excellent view. 30/8/41 We were taken out to another house where we had Crassi and pork. These people were very nice to us and told us that the Greeks were our friends and would look after us. So far, at any rate, actions had spoken very loudly. Efti said we must leave now as ???? were on their way. We made a hurried departure and climbed and climbed to a position about three miles from the town, and slept amongst the rocks until about midnight, when we got drenched by a downpour of rain. 1/9/41 Can hear guns in the village at the foot of our mountain. The guns must be looked at. Two Stukas flew over dropping pamphlets, the text of which was a warning to the Cretans not to assist English troops in any way. They also said that rewards would be paid for information as to the whereabouts of any English troops. Very much down in the dumps. 3/9/41 One shirt badly worn, one pair of lightweight trousers, one pair of shoes worn out, one pullover, one singlet and one pair of socks. And winter is coming on. 17/9/41 Make our way up terrific mountain in amongst the clouds. No water and very little food. Find stones up at top. Build a big fire and have a warm sleep. 18/9/41 Tried to make our way down the mountain after being drenched with rain. What a hopeless plight. When we are not groping about in the rain, we are vainly peering through a cloud of mist and cloud. Eventually reach a cave, where we were given a meal of beans and later were introduced to a dish of snails. Not impressed. 24/9/41 Raining, no food. An English sergeant had a letter from an English-speaking lass advising him that she had news which would assist him and his friends to escape. Tom is chasing this fellow up now. 1/10/41 Call at old Bill’s. He at least had something to tell us; there is one man at a place called Armari who knows about the submarine. 4/10/41 Our guide arrived early. He takes us a good two and a half miles before he bids us bon voyage. Make our way tenderly down pass where our boots are about finished. We seem to go up and down hills for ages before we reach the outskirts of the village, where we meet a cheerful old lady who takes us home for a meal.

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

APPENDIX 4

5/10/41 Move on in moonlight and at 0430 hours get across the main road. Travel to within a short distance of the village. Some fellows call us over and show us to a very clean little cafe where they shower us with cigarettes and Crassi. We are then taken round to a cave. Later on a delicious meal is brought round for us, and one of the group lances my poisoned finger, another cuts our hair and still another shaves the five-weeks’ growth off our faces. 7/10/41 Reach outskirts of Apostolis at mid-day, where a Greek told us to wait until evening. We became impatient and Lauri and I decide to go in - the greatest mistake we ever made. Two Greeks who were working on a wheel refused to talk and claimed ignorance of any knowledge of a submarine; in fact, we are strongly suspected of being Huns and are told to sit down. They ask why we are apparently not frightened of the main road which passes through the village. Then one fellow speaks to us in German and I think we convinced him we are English. Soon after this, there is a wild scatter when a Hun truck passes along the road, within about 20 yards of us, and we actually saw the Huns looking at us. Demitrius returned before dark and took us into the village, where each of us was put into a house. My house was a very prosperous looking one. I got good food and a bed with sheets. Needless to say, 1 could not sleep in such comfort. 16/10/41 Had diarrhoea. Had no breakfast. Taken to the Mayor’s house by George. Laurie went down to the shack. I was put straight to bed and nursed by the whole family, the old lady was like a mother to me. The father is the Mayor of the village, a retired police captain. As the days went by, I was more and more accepted as one of the family. 26/10/41 A Greek arrived from Egypt. He had a letter to the effect that an attempt was being made to get us all off the island, and we were led to believe by the people of the village that the fellow was honest to goodness. A later story was that we would be taken off in three to eight days. Then we got orders to move. A hasty meal and a very tearful farewell. A crowd of 32 of us, including one officer, moved along the main road. Laurie’s boots were right through, mine were not much better, walking along the road became a painful process. 27/10/41 Marched all day until daybreak and then climbed to the top of a high mountain for the day. I was just about exhausted. 1/11/41 Five months today since this island capitulated - not a very bright day especially as we heard that a few days ago 17 English were recaptured in this very spot. Food is practically nil today although they brought us a small piece of pork and a drink. 3/11/41 Old Mamolie turned up this morning and took Jim Carstairs back to another village to see some high Greek officer, so this looks a little more promising. At dinner time, another Greek came up and said he was to collect us at midnight and take us down to another band of English near the coast of the island. 4/11/41 Our guide told us that all day yesterday an officer was working on a wireless. They are quite convinced that our evacuation is being organized.

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

APPENDIX 5

5/11/41 Breakfast - one camp cake. Fairly hungry. Two of the lads came back from the village this morning and were told by those in charge there that the submarine was definitely coming for us. 6/11/41 We had no breakfast today and at 1330 hours we had one large potato and a small piece of bread. 10/11/41 I have five more of these wretched sores coming out on my legs and a very marked one on the bottom lip. My left boot is right through now. 15/11/41 This morning George, the guide, came to see us and told us we would be here for another four days and would then board a ship. 21/11/41 This morning a fellow came back from Jim, who told him that the unofficial news was good and that we must hold on at all costs for a few days. Last night was freezingly cold and early this morning there was quite a heavy dew, which did not make things any more pleasant. Since yesterday, I have been wondering whether it is my duty to give myself up just in order to be able to write home. This is the only thing that worries me. There are about 80 fellows in this little valley now and the feeding problem is becoming an anxiety to the villagers, besides which, in my opinion, the position here is dangerous on account of the proximity to the village of Kliento, where there are several pro-German Greeks. It would not surprise me if we were all rounded up by them any day now. 22/11/41 J.C. came up to see us about 1400 hours and addressed us about keeping the move a secret. He said we would be getting off. Moved on over mountains and hills and down valleys - pretty tough march. We marched all night. 23/11/41 Reached a point on the mountain in the early hours of the morning. Bitterly cold and very hungry. Bread and olives brought up to us at mid-day with some Crassi. Moved on again over the mountain towards the south coast. Reached a tiny village where we were met by the priest in scarlet raiments. Still extremely cold. They gave us ratki and sultanas and later a piece of meat and bread. Now climbing, the higher we go the colder it becomes. Arrived at the cave at about 2030 hours pretty well exhausted. No room for all in the cave so some of us tried to sleep outside. The temperature made this impossible. 24/11/41 Another night out in the cold will just about kill us all. Moved down towards the sea along winding and rough track. Arrived at the beach about 1930 hours. 25/11/41 Very surprised when Mikko called us at 0100 hours and said there was a reply flashed back from the sea, which put the whole place agog with excitement. We all saw the light and could not believe our eyes. So we are actually getting off this island. We all crowd around the skipper, who landed in a motor boat. Another boat puts in an appearance a few minutes after. Great disappointment when the skipper tells us it is too late to take us off. We all wander back to our little fishing huts and sleep or rather try to. We are not yet off. Many Greeks arrive in the course of the morning with food, all part of this great organization. We are mighty hungry. We are told that we are to go off tonight. We are given “Players” cigarettes. The elusive Captain Hughes about whom we have heard during the last few months arrives on the scene and things begin to move. All the heads are called

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

APPENDIX 6 and there is quite a lot of chatter. Just about lunch time we see a small vessel approaching along the coast from the east. What dare-devils these fellows are. They care nothing for the Hun, and pull in casually to the beach in full view of anyone who may be watching. This was one of the boats which came in last night. We had a good lunch, after which I wrote to mother. How thrilled we all are. At 1700 hours the “Hedge Hog” arrived equally casual. You would have thought it was British territory. The 28 Aussies were taken on board the larger vessel, followed by Kiwis and English and Cypriots. It was not long before we had bidden the crew of the launch good-bye and were on our way. Ninety lucky men jammed on a 45-tonner which looked like nothing but a tramp steamer. She trailed no flag and was skippered by an R.N.R. Lieutenant with a mixed crew - one sailor, one cavalryman, one commando, another naval officer and a Greek lad. The “Hedge Hog” was a sturdy little craft bristling with ack ack and reinforced with concrete. And so we were embarked off Crete, “the island of doomed men,” We spent an uncomfortable but happy night on deck.

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.

EPILOGUE

The regiment had had an existence of just over six years. In October and November, 1939, it had been formed from youngsters eager for the adventure of war, because of the traditions of the First A.I.F., of which they had heard from their fathers and uncles, and the comradeship which during their childhood they had seen existing between these ex- soldiers, and a number of middle-aged men who had no illusions but who realized the need for stopping Hitlerite aggression if democracy was to prevail. Sprinkled with officers, N.C.O.'s and men from the militia forces who had tried to learn their trade in the monotonous days of peace, it had grown from a conglomeration of untrained, ill-assorted men into a regiment which almost everyone who had come into contact with it unreservedly acknowledged to be one of the finest in the A.I.F., and its reputation was known through•out the Australian Artillery. Most remarkable of its achievements was that apart from some reinforcement officers, it had mostly produced its officers from its own ranks. In the number of officers it gave to the A.I.F., its only rival in the number of senior officers (one Major•General, three Brigadiers and many field officers) was the 2/2nd Battalion, but the 2/2nd Regiment commissioned from its ranks more officers than any other unit, infantry or artillery. Starting off with untrained personnel and absolutely no equipment, it had had the advantage of being officered by men who knew their own technical job and who were animated with the highest ideals of the officer's duty. Its discipline was probably stricter than most other units of the A.I.F. but it had always been a very happy regiment and rarely lacked the amenities which make a soldier's life bearable. It had gone through the easy actions of Libya, easy as far as casualties were concerned, but not easy as far as inconveniences were concerned. It had brought itself out of the tragic fighting retirement of Greece and the awful debacle of Crete, the monotony and incompetency of Ceylon, and finally, what every unit experienced in New Guinea, the deadly jungle fighting. It had not had as many casualties as many other units, but this was due largely to its excellent training. Now at the point of discharge, it remembered those who had been killed. Men such as the wonderful Bob Nethercote, Alan Fleet, so delighted to be made a lance-sergeant and such an excellent N.C.O., Dick Mitchell, game, solid and persevering. And so one could go through the whole list of the dead. It is impossible for anyone to guess what the men's thoughts were, but it is safe to say that most of them, particularly those who had served in the Middle East, had some long thoughts. They realized how long it had taken to train a regiment, to train the various individuals in their jobs and to combine the whole of them into a regiment. They looked back over the long training days and remembered how whole•heartedly they had cursed the night marches at Puckapunyal and in Palestine and Egypt. But they knew that but for those night marches, few of them would have got out of Greece. The reinforcements soon realized that they had joined a seasoned regiment, a regiment confident in itself, confident in its ability to do its job and satisfied with its commanders. All of them had been cut off from civilian life for many years. Now they were going to become civilians again. They wondered quietly how their wives and their fiancées would receive them. But they knew that they themselves had preserved their self-respect and faced the new civilian world with the same courage that they had displayed in action, even if they found themselves somewhat wanting in confidence. Those who thought to the future wondered whether Australia was going to repeat the same tragedy of unpreparedness as they themselves had to face in 1939. But whatever their thoughts, there was not an officer, N.C.O. or man who would not for the rest of his life be proud to have belonged to the 2/2nd Field Regiment, R.A.A.

2/2nd FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, R.A.A.