The Exorbitant Burden
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“The Effects of Local Currency Absence to the Banking Market: the Case for Zimbabwe from 2008”
“The effects of local currency absence to the banking market: the case for Zimbabwe from 2008” AUTHORS Charles Nyoka Charles Nyoka (2015). The effects of local currency absence to the banking ARTICLE INFO market: the case for Zimbabwe from 2008. Banks and Bank Systems, 10(2), 15- 22 RELEASED ON Friday, 31 July 2015 JOURNAL "Banks and Bank Systems" FOUNDER LLC “Consulting Publishing Company “Business Perspectives” NUMBER OF REFERENCES NUMBER OF FIGURES NUMBER OF TABLES 0 0 0 © The author(s) 2021. This publication is an open access article. businessperspectives.org Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2015 Charles Nyoka (South Africa) The effects of local currency absence to the banking market: the case for Zimbabwe from 2008 Abstract Local currency based fee charges have always been one of the major contributors to bank profitability. A profitable banking market has more chances of stability compared to less profitable banking markets. The developments within the Zimbabwean on economy over the last six years merit more attention by researchers than has been given to it over the same period. Zimbabwe adopted a multicurrency approach to banking since the establishment of a government of national unity in 2008. To date the country has remained without a domestic currency a factor that seems to have con- tributed to the demise of some banks in Zimbabwe. Numerous press reports have indicated that Zimbabwean Banks are facing liquidity problems a factor that has culminated in the closer of and the surrendering of bank licences to authori- ties by at least nine banks to date. -
Currency Considerations in the Zimbabwean Context 2018
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS AND AUDITORS BOARD Currency considerations in the Zimbabwean context 26 February 2018 1 1. BACKGROUND 1.1. Zimbabwe witnessed significant monetary and exchange control policy changes in 2016 through to 2017. The changes were a result of continued economic challenges faced by the country that resulted in the liquidity crisis. In response, the RBZ promulgated a series of exchange control operational guidelines and compliance frameworks to alleviate the cash shortage and boost the economy. 1.2. The accountancy profession accepted the positive impact of these measures on entities but also noted some concerns that arose from this policy implementation on the financial reporting of entities in Zimbabwe, hence, this document. 1.3. The aim of this paper is to: I. lay out the functional currency considerations that preparers and auditors are having to make before year end reporting commences; II. outline the relevant International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) implications; and III. offer recommended guidance to preparers of financial statements with the intention of achieving fair and consistent presentation to the benefit of the users. 2. FUNCTIONAL CURRENCY CONSIDERATIONS 2.1. In 2009, Zimbabwe adopted the multi-currency system upon the abandonment of the Zimbabwean dollar (ZW$). For financial reporting purposes (presentation of the national budget and levying of taxes etc.) the government of Zimbabwe adopted the United States Dollars (“USD”) as the functional and reporting currency. Consequently, business also adopted the USD as the functional and reporting currency. 2.2. From the fourth quarter of 2015, there have been notable changes in the availability of foreign currency. This has resulted in a need to assess whether there has been a change in the functional currency. -
Dollarization of the Zimbabwean Economy: Cure Or Curse? the Case of the Teaching and Banking Sectors
CONFERENCE THE RENAISSANCE OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES Dar Es Salam, Tanzania, 20 – 21 / 12 / 2010 LA RENAISSANCE ET LA RELANCE DES ECONOMIES AFRICAINES Dollarization of the Zimbabwean Economy: Cure or Curse? The Case of the Teaching and Banking Sectors Tapiwa Chagonda Post-Doctoral Fellow, Department of Sociology University of Johannesburg 1 Dollarization of the Zimbabwean Economy: Cure or Curse? The Case of the Teaching and Banking Sectors. Tapiwa Chagonda Post-Doctoral Fellow, Department of Sociology University of Johannesburg ABSTRACT This paper analyses the effects of the dollarization of the Zimbabwean economy in 2009, in the wake of devastating hyper-inflation and a political crisis that reached its zenith with the electoral crisis of 2008. Efforts to revive the battered Zimbabwean economy, largely through the dollarization of the Zimbabwean economy are assessed through the lens of the teaching and banking sectors. During the peak of the Zimbabwean crisis in 2008, the teaching sector almost collapsed as partial disintegration at the physical level took its toll on the sector. Most of the primary and secondary school teachers responded to the hyper-inflation that had eroded their incomes by going into the diaspora or joining Zimbabwe’s burgeoning speculative informal economy. The establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU) saw the dollarization of the Zimbabwean economy and the shelving of the Zimbabwean dollar in March 2009. The above developments saw the teaching sector beginning to show signs of re-integration, as some of the teachers who had left the profession re-joined the sector. This was largely because the dollarization of the Zimbabwean economy ‘killed off’ the speculative activities which were sustaining some of the teachers in the informal economy, during the period of crisis (2000- 2008). -
ZIMBABWE's UNORTHODOX DOLLARIZATION Erik Bostrom
SAE./No.85/September 2017 Studies in Applied Economics ZIMBABWE'S UNORTHODOX DOLLARIZATION Erik Bostrom Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise Zimbabwe’s Unorthodox Dollarization By Erik Bostrom Copyright 2017 by Erik Bostrom. This work may be reproduced provided that no fee is charged and the original source is properly cited. About the Series The Studies in Applied Economics series is under the general direction of Professor Steve H. Hanke, Co-Director of The Johns Hopkins Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health and the Study of Business Enterprise ([email protected]). The author is mainly a student at The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. Some of his work was performed as research assistant at the Institute. About the Author Erik Bostrom ([email protected]) is a student at The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland and is also a student in the BA/MA program at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C. Erik is a junior pursuing a Bachelor’s in International Studies and Economics and a Master’s in International Economics and Strategic Studies. He wrote this paper as an undergraduate researcher at the Institute for Applied Economics, Global Health, and the Study of Business Enterprise during Summer 2017. Erik will graduate in May 2019 from Johns Hopkins University and in May 2020 from SAIS. Abstract From 2007-2009 Zimbabwe underwent a hyperinflation that culminated in an annual inflation rate of 89.7 sextillion (10^21) percent. Consequently, the government abandoned the local Zimbabwean dollar and adopted a multi-currency system in which several foreign currencies were accepted as legal tender. -
Weak Dollar Policy by Jan Dehn
THE EMERGING VIEW February 2017 Weak Dollar policy By Jan Dehn The US economy is becoming seriously unproductive and the Trump Administration faces an important choice: support American business with heterodox policies such as import tariffs or abandon the strong Dollar policy? We think the strong Dollar policy has outlived its purpose. A lower Dollar could provide the same support for US business at a much lower cost than border adjustment. We think border adjustment is a trap set by Congress Republicans to finance a large corporate tax cut, but Trump would be left holding the macroeconomic baby. Is the new US president smart enough to see that he is being played? Introduction The strong Dollar was useful in the Don’t say that you were not warned. In the past few weeks and aftermath of the Subprime Crisis, months, influential US policy makers and institutions have increasingly been complaining about the strength of the Dollar, but is now crippling the including Donald Trump, US Treasury Secretary designate US economy Steven Mnuchin, US trade advisor Peter Navarro, the US Fed and the IMF. Their statements are sometimes dressed up as attacks on other countries for weakening their currencies versus Since then the US economy has recovered and stock markets in the Dollar, but this is ultimately the same thing as saying that particular have staged a strong rally. Each Dollar that went into the Dollar is too strong. the US economy initially had hugely positive effects by providing It is quite possible that a weak Dollar policy is now in the making. -
Money Demand and Seignorage Maximization Before the End of the Zimbabwean Dollar
Money Demand and Seignorage Maximization before the End of the Zimbabwean Dollar Stephen Matteo Miller and Thandinkosi Ndhlela MERCATUS WORKING PAPER All studies in the Mercatus Working Paper series have followed a rigorous process of academic evaluation, including (except where otherwise noted) at least one double-blind peer review. Working Papers present an author’s provisional findings, which, upon further consideration and revision, are likely to be republished in an academic journal. The opinions expressed in Mercatus Working Papers are the authors’ and do not represent official positions of the Mercatus Center or George Mason University. Stephen Matteo Miller and Thandinkosi Ndhlela. “Money Demand and Seignorage Maximization before the End of the Zimbabwean Dollar.” Mercatus Working Paper, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, February 2019. Abstract Unlike most hyperinflations, during Zimbabwe’s recent hyperinflation, as in Revolutionary France, the currency ended before the regime. The empirical results here suggest that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe operated on the correct side of the inflation tax Laffer curve before abandoning the currency. Estimates of the seignorage- maximizing rate derive from a short-run structural vector autoregression framework using monthly parallel market exchange rate data computed from the ratio of prices from 1999 to 2008 for Old Mutual insurance company’s shares, which trade in London and Harare. Dynamic semi-elasticities generated from orthogonalized impulse response functions -
The Federal Reserve Engages the World (1970–2000): an Insider’S Narrative of the Transition to Managed Floating and Financial Turbulence
Working Paper Series WP 14-5 AUGUST 2014 The Federal Reserve Engages the World (1970–2000): An Insider’s Narrative of the Transition to Managed Floating and Financial Turbulence Edwin M. Truman Abstract This paper traces the evolution of the Federal Reserve and its engagement with the global economy over the last three decades of the 20th century: 1970 to 2000. The paper examines the Federal Reserve’s role in international economic and financial policy and analysis covering four areas: the emergence and taming of the great inflation, developments in US external accounts, foreign exchange analysis and activities, and external financial crises. It concludes that during this period the US central bank emerged to become the closest the world has to a global central bank. JEL Codes: F3, F31, F32, F33, F34, E4, E42, F5, F52, F53 Keywords: Federal Reserve, Federal Open Market Committee, inflation, macroeconomic policies, monetary policy, external balance, exchange rates, exchange market intervention, financial crises, third world debt crises, Mexican crisis, Asian financial crises Edwin M. Truman, senior fellow since 2001, served as assistant secretary of the US Treasury for International Affairs from December 1998 to January 2001, and returned as counselor to the secretary from March–May 2009. He directed the Division of International Finance of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from 1977 to 1998. He is the author, coauthor, or editor of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Threat or Salvation? (2010), Reforming the IMF for the 21st Century (2006), A Strategy for IMF Reform (2006), Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight Against Money Laundering (2004), and Inflation Targeting in the World Economy (2003). -
The Syndrome of the Ever-Higher Yen, 1971-1995: American Mercantile Pressure on Japanese Monetary Policy
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Changes in Exchange Rates in Rapidly Development Countries: Theory, Practice, and Policy Issues (NBER-EASE volume 7) Volume Author/Editor: Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger, editors Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-38673-2 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ito_99-1 Publication Date: January 1999 Chapter Title: The Syndrome of the Ever-Higher Yen, 1971-1995: American Mercantile Pressure on Japanese Monetary Policy Chapter Author: Ronald McKinnon, Kenichi Ohno, Kazuko Shirono Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8625 Chapter pages in book: (p. 341 - 376) 13 The Syndrome of the Ever- Higher Yen, 1971-1995: American Mercantile Pressure on Japanese Monetary Policy Ronald I. McKinnon, Kenichi Ohno, and Kazuko Shirono As defined by WebsterS Tenth New Collegiate Dictionary, a syndrome is 1: a group of signs and symptoms that occur together and characterize a particular abnormality; and, 2: a set of concurrent things (as emotions or actions) that usually form an identifiable pattern. From 1971, when the yen-dollar rate was 360, through Apiill995, when the rate briefly touched 80 (fig. 13.1), the interactions of the American and Japa- nese governments in their conduct of commercial, exchange rate, and monetary policies resulted in what we call “the syndrome of the ever-higher yen.” Our model of this syndrome is unusual because it links “real” considerations-that is, commercial policies, including threats of a trade war-with the monetary determination of the yen-dollar exchange rate and price levels in the two coun- tries. -
Pdfthe U. S. Payments Deficit and the Strong Dollar
6 The U.S. Payments Deficit and the Strong Dollar: Policy Options Richard N. Cooper In 1984 the uilited States ran a current account deficit of $102 billion, seven times larger than the "alarming" deficit of 1978. The United States had to borrow from foreigners an equivalent amount, net of any American investment abroad. This large deficit can be attributed in part to the fact that the U.S. econ- omy was recovering eMer and more vigorously from the 1982 recession than were other countries, especially those in Europe, and in part to the fact that one of its most important regional markets, Latin America, was still in a period of slump and retrenchment from the debt crisis that started in 1982 and continues. But there is fairly general agreement with Federal Reserve Governor Henry Wallich's recent statement that these and other miscellane- ous factors can only account for about one-third of the deficit, and that the exceptionally strong dollar is responsible for about two-thirds. The U. S. dollar, on a U.S. -trade weighted basis and after correcting for inflation differentials, has appreciated about 40 percent since 1980, a year which already saw substantial appreciation from the low year of 1978. The dollar in mid-1985-is considerably stronger (on a trade-weighted basis) than it was in 1970, before the Smithsonian agreement that devalued the dollar in December 1971. Is this a problem? U.S. employment has risen, U.S. inflation rates have dropped, and economic recovery continues, albeit at a moderate pace. If the course of economic events is going well, why should the government alter the course of economic policy? If there are no problems, there is no need for solutions. -
The Group of Seven
The Group of Seven We are now in the era of the G8, although the G7 still exists as a grouping for finance ministers and central bank governors. Why do G7 finance ministries and central banks co-operate? What are the implications of this for the power of the United States and the abilities of the other six states to exercise leadership? What influence do the G7 have on global financial governance? How much authority do they possess and how is that authority exercised? This is the first major work to address these fundamental questions. It argues that to understand the G7’s contribution to global financial governance it is necessary to locate the group’s activities in a context of ‘decentralized globalization’. It also provides original case study material on the G7’s contribution to macro- economic governance and to debates on the global financial architecture over the last decade. The book assesses the G7’s role in producing a system of global financial governance based on market supremacy and technocratic trans-governmental consensus and articulates normative criticisms of the G7’s exclusivity. For researchers in the fields of IR/IPE, postgraduate students in the field of international organization and global governance, policy-makers and financial journalists, this is the most comprehensive analysis of the G7 and financial governance to date. Andrew Baker is Lecturer at the School of Politics and International Studies at the Queen’s University of Belfast. He is the co-editor of Governing Financial Globalisation (Routledge, 2005) and has published in journals such as Review of International Political Economy and Global Governance. -
Currency Code Currency Name Units Per EUR USD US Dollar 1,114282
Currency code Currency name Units per EUR USD US Dollar 1,114282 EUR Euro 1,000000 GBP British Pound 0,891731 INR Indian Rupee 76,833664 AUD Australian Dollar 1,596830 CAD Canadian Dollar 1,463998 SGD Singapore Dollar 1,519556 CHF Swiss Franc 1,097908 MYR Malaysian Ringgit 4,585569 JPY Japanese Yen 120,445338 CNY Chinese Yuan Renminbi 7,657364 NZD New Zealand Dollar 1,660507 THB Thai Baht 34,435083 HUF Hungarian Forint 325,394724 AED Emirati Dirham 4,092202 HKD Hong Kong Dollar 8,705685 MXN Mexican Peso 21,275509 ZAR South African Rand 15,449937 PHP Philippine Peso 56,970569 SEK Swedish Krona 10,508745 IDR Indonesian Rupiah 15576,638324 SAR Saudi Arabian Riyal 4,178559 BRL Brazilian Real 4,190947 TRY Turkish Lira 6,353929 KES Kenyan Shilling 115,893733 KRW South Korean Won 1311,898493 EGP Egyptian Pound 18,508337 IQD Iraqi Dinar 1326,662413 NOK Norwegian Krone 9,632916 KWD Kuwaiti Dinar 0,339171 RUB Russian Ruble 70,335592 DKK Danish Krone 7,465851 PKR Pakistani Rupee 179,387706 ILS Israeli Shekel 3,926669 PLN Polish Zloty 4,255048 QAR Qatari Riyal 4,055988 XAU Gold Ounce 0,000784 OMR Omani Rial 0,428442 COP Colombian Peso 3560,158642 CLP Chilean Peso 770,643233 TWD Taiwan New Dollar 34,639236 ARS Argentine Peso 47,788112 CZK Czech Koruna 25,516024 VND Vietnamese Dong 25847,134851 MAD Moroccan Dirham 10,697013 JOD Jordanian Dinar 0,790026 BHD Bahraini Dinar 0,418970 XOF CFA Franc 655,957000 LKR Sri Lankan Rupee 196,347604 UAH Ukrainian Hryvnia 28,564201 NGN Nigerian Naira 403,643263 TND Tunisian Dinar 3,212774 UGX Ugandan Shilling 4118,051290 -
The Renminbi Exchange Rate Revaluation: Theory, Practice and Lessons from Japan
The Renminbi Exchange Rate Revaluation: Theory, Practice and Lessons from Japan Toshiki Kanamori (金森俊树) Zhijun Zhao (赵志君) March, 2006 Asian Development Bank Institute Kasumigaseki Building, 8th Floor 3-2-5 Kasumigaseki Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-6008 Japan www.adbi.org ADBI Policy Paper No. 9 [email protected] © 2006 Asian Development Bank Institute. Knowledge Management Unit 3/06 ISBN: 4-89974-010-7 The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views or position of the ADB Institute, its Advisory Council, Board of Directors, or the governments they represent. The ADB Institute does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included and accepts no responsibility for any consequences arising from its use. The word “country” or other geographical names do not imply any judgment by the ADB Institute as to the legal or other status of any entity, including its borders. About the authors Toshiki Kanamori is Director, Administration, Management and Coordination of the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI). He graduated from Hitotsubashi University as well as from New Asia and Yale Center of Chinese University of Hong Kong. During his government career he served with Japan’s Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of International Trade and Industry. He was an Alternate Director at ADB HQ from 1990 to 1993. Before joining the ADBI, he was a Visiting Fellow at the China Business Centre (CBC), Hong Kong Polytechnic University. He has published many articles on the PRC economy as well as on global socio-economic issues. Zhijun Zhao is professor and senior researcher of the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).