Section Two: Science

“where nature leads culture often follows.” Nicholas Humphrey, Con- sciousness Regained

The purpose of this section is to build from the historical ideas in the Philosophy section. Topics such as , in- stincts, the standard social science model, , genes, culture, neuroscience, emotions, moral dilemma, empathy, tempera- ment, the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, consciousness, free will, , individual and , and theo- ry of mind will be considered in detail. E.O. Wilson asks, “What is the relation between science and the humanities, and how is it important for human welfare?” (C:UK 13). For example, how do we reconcile humanistic values with a mecha- nistic explanation of the brain? Newton explained the universe with- out reference to any ultimate design; do we need to see the human brain only in terms of what it is biologically? Mind is to a great extent material via the physical properties of neurons and electrical impulses. Ethical behavior relies on the brain, but there is no one place (nor even a few places) in the brain responsible for ethics; the parts of the brain involved in ethical behavior also play other, biological roles not sur- prisingly related to memory and higher order thinking. Though a diffi- cult conclusion to accept for some people, ethical behaviors “are the wonderful and most useful side effects of...other [brain] activities” (Damasio LS 165). Moreover, consider how Richard Shweder, an an- thropologist, says that there are three main areas of moral concern: an “ethic of autonomy” that deals with the individual; an “ethic of com- munity” that deals with families and nations; and an “ethic of divini- ty” that deals with one’s spirit (qtd. in Gazzaniga H:SB 130). Granting these different ethics, there is still a desire, a need for each one. So then, what constitutes individual ethos? Joseph Carroll says (drawing from biologist ) that a wholly good human being is not biologically possible, since most good intentions most often are “easily overridden” by completely selfish emotions, desires, and motives (LD 10). How does modern science then build from the moral sense philosophers? 86 Making Mind: Moral Sense and Consciousness

Darwin (The Descent of Man), discussing early human beings and natural selection in terms of social emotions and instincts, argues that certain communal feelings and tendencies gave rise as adaptive behav- iors to moral sense, conscience, and sympathy (ch. XXI). While Joan Silk essentially supports the assumptions of Darwin in Descent, con- firmed by the recent research of de Waal and Preston, there is yet be- lief that “modern human social life” differs from our ancestral ape forebears from whom we split some five to seven million years ago: the human mind, in addition to its linguistic abilities, exhibits traits for the “cultural transmission of ideas,” “values and beliefs,” a sophisti- cated sense of “perspective-taking,” and of course “moral sentiments” (Gangestad 104). Zoltan Torey has tried to characterize the brain structures associated with what we call mind, areas such as: speech, conceptualization, and “speech-thought production,” all of which are important since the mind is “the agency” that fuels and feeds the brain system with input, “outcomes,” and “alternatives” (133, 149).

Mind and the Standard Social Science Model

There has been a turn away from and indeed a critique of the dom- inant standard social science model that lays emphasis on, through Freud and the behaviorists, experience as shaping and developing a person. But people do not change from an unformed lump into mature, thinking adults only through environmental factors (Tooby “Psych. Found.” 25). While there is to some extent “human malleability” (em- pirical character) in terms of moral learning, malleability distorts two issues: first, the “evolved design” of human psychological develop- ment which can “construct” and, second, the stability of what people do “regardless of circumstances,” a difference between what has evolved in the human mind and, in relation to that mind, what happens in the environment (Tooby “Psych. Found.” 35, 39). To an even great- er extent, and more particular to this discussion, who permits his or her mind to be influenced by externals and to what degree? That is a question of individual ethos. Evolutionary processes would not have constructed a “content free” mind: rather, there are “content- specific...adaptations” in the human mind derived from hunter- gatherers (Tooby “Psych. Found.” 49-50). E.O. Wilson is the first (benignly) to admit that evolutionary psychology derives from his so-