INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY
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Critical Thinking: What, Why, and How 1 Richard Paul
Excerpts from The Republic 13 Plato
Apology & Crito 27 Plato
Crito 43 Plato
Statement by Alabama Clergymen 51
Letter From the Birmingham City Jail 53 Martin Luther King, Jr.
The Call of Service: A Witness to Idealism 67 Robert Coles
Men for Others: Education for Social Justice and Social Action Today 75 Pedro Arrupe, S.J.
Our Mission and Justice: Decree Three, Documents of the Thirty-Fourth General Congregation of the Society of Jesus 85
A Meditation on Our Response to the Call of Christ: From the Provincials of the United States Assistancy 87
Critical Thinking and Obedience to Authority 89 John Sabini and Maury Silver Thinking and Moral Considerations: A Lecture 97 Hannah Arendt for W.H. Auden
Introduction to Meditations on First Philosophy 115 René Descartes
Meditations on The First Philosophy: In Which the Existence of God and the Distinction Between Mind and Body are Demonstrated 123 René Descartes
Principles of Philosophy 133 René Descartes
The Will to Believe 137 William James
Fear and Trembling: Repetition 149 Soren Kierkegaard
Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals 175 Immanuel Kant
Nicomachean Ethics 219 Aristotle
The Common Good in a Divided Society 241 David Hollenbach, S.J.
The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House 251 Audre Lorde Excerpts from The Republic
Plato
Book VI which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is of any es, I said, there is. And of the virtues too value if we do not possess the good? or the we must behold not the outline merely, knowledge of all other things if we have no �as at present—nothing short of the most knowledge of beauty and goodness? finished picture should satisfy us. When little Assuredly not. things are elaborated with an infinity of pains, You are further aware that most people in order that they may appear in their full affirm pleasure to be the good, but the finer beauty and utmost clearness, how ridiculous sort of wits say it is knowledge. that we should not think the highest truths Yes. worthy of attaining the highest accuracy! And you are aware too that the latter can- A right noble thought; but do you suppose not explain what they mean by knowledge, that we shall refrain from asking you what is but are obliged after all to say knowledge of this highest knowledge? the good? Nay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain How ridiculous! that you have heard the answer many times, Yes, I said, that they should begin by re- and now you either do not understand me proaching us with our ignorance of the good, or, as I rather think, you are disposed to be and then presume our knowledge of it—for troublesome; for you have of been told that the good they define to be knowledge of the the idea of good is the highest knowledge, good, just as if we understood them when and that all other things become useful and they use the term ‘good’—this is of course advantageous only by their use of this. You ridiculous. can hardly be ignorant that of this I was about Most true, he said. to speak, concerning which, as you have often And those who make pleasure their good heard me say, we know so little; and, without are in equal perplexity; for they are compelled
Plato, from The Republic, trans. Benjamin Jowett. Copyright in the Public Domain.
13 14 | Introduction to Philosophy to admit that there are bad pleasures as well True, Socrates; but I must say that one who as good. like you has passed a lifetime in the study of Certainly. philosophy should not be always repeating the And therefore to acknowledge that bad opinions of others, and never telling his own. and good are the same? Well, but has any one a right to say posi- True. tively what he does not know? There can be no doubt about the numerous Not, he said, with the assurance of positive difficulties in which this question is involved. certainty; he has no right to do that: but he There can be none. may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion. Further, do we not see that many are will- And do you not know, I said, that all mere ing to do or to have or to seem to be what opinions are bad, and the best of them blind? is just and honourable without the reality; You would not deny that those who have any but no one is satisfied with the appearance true notion without intelligence are only like of good—the reality is what they seek; in the blind men who feel their way along the road? case of the good, appearance is despised by Very true. every one. And do you wish to behold what is blind Very true, he said. and crooked and base, when others will tell Of this then, which every soul of man you of brightness and beauty? pursues and makes the end of all his actions, Glaucon–SOCRATES having a presentiment that there is such an Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said end, and yet hesitating because neither know- Glaucon, not to turn away just as you are ing the nature nor having the same assurance reaching the goal; if you will only give such an of this as of other things, and therefore losing explanation of the good as you have already whatever good there is in other things,—of a given of justice and temperance and the other principle such and so great as this ought the virtues, we shall be satisfied. best men in our State, to whom everything is Yes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally entrusted, to be in the darkness of ignorance? satisfied, but I cannot help fearing that I shall Certainly not, he said. fall, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring I am sure, I said, that he who does not know ridicule upon me. No, sweet sirs, let us not at now the beautiful and the just are likewise present ask what is the actual nature of the good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and good, for to reach what is now in my thoughts I suspect that no one who is ignorant of the would be an effort too great for me. But of good will have a true knowledge of them. the child of the good who is likest him, I would That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished yours. to hear—otherwise, not. And if we only have a guardian who has By all means, he said, tell us about the this knowledge our State will be perfectly child, and you shall remain in our debt for the ordered? account of the parent. Of course, he replied; but I wish that you I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, would tell me whether you conceive this su- and you receive, the account of the parent, preme principle of the good to be knowledge and not, as now, of the offspring only; take, or pleasure, or different from either. however, this latter by way of interest, and at Aye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious the same time have a care that I do not render gentleman like you would not be contented a false account, although I have no intention with the thoughts of other people about these of deceiving you. matters. Yes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed. Excerpts from The Republic | 15
Yes, I said, but I must first come to an also present in them, still unless there be a understanding with you, and remind you of third nature specially adapted to the purpose, what I have mentioned in the course of this the owner of the eyes will see nothing and the discussion, and at many other times. colours will be invisible. What? Of what nature are you speaking? The old story, that there is a many beautiful Of that which you term light, I replied. and a many good, and so of other things which True, he said. we describe and define; to all of them ‘many’ Noble, then, is the bond which links to- is applied. gether sight and visibility, and great beyond True, he said. other bonds by no small difference of nature; And there is an absolute beauty and an ab- for light is their bond, and light is no ignoble solute good, and of other things to which the thing? term ‘many’ is applied there is an absolute; Nay, he said, the reverse of ignoble. for they may be brought under a single idea, And which, I said, of the gods in heaven which is called the essence of each. would you say was the lord of this element? Very true. Whose is that light which makes the eye to The many, as we say, are seen but not see perfectly and the visible to appear? known, and the ideas are known but not seen. You mean the sun, as you and all mankind Exactly. say. And what is the organ with which we see May not the relation of sight to this deity the visible things? be described as follows? The sight, he said. How? And with the hearing, I said, we hear, and Neither sight nor the eye in which sight with the other senses perceive the other ob- resides is the sun? jects of sense? No. True. Yet of all the organs of sense the eye is the But have you remarked that sight is by far most like the sun? the most costly and complex piece of work- By far the most like. manship which the artificer of the senses ever And the power which the eye possesses is a contrived? sort of effluence which is dispensed from the No, I never have, he said. sun? Then reflect; has the ear or voice need of Exactly. any third or additional nature in order that the Then the sun is not sight, but the author of one may be able to hear and the other to be sight who is recognised by sight. heard? True, he said. Nothing of the sort. And this is he whom I call the child of the No, indeed, I replied; and the same is true good, whom the good begat in his own like- of most, if not all, the other senses—you ness, to be in the visible world, in relation to would not say that any of them requires such sight and the things of sight, what the good an addition? is in the intellectual world in relation to mind Certainly not. and the things of mind. But you see that without the addition of Will you be a little more explicit? he said. some other nature there is no seeing or being Why, you know, I said, that the eyes, when seen? a person directs them towards objects on How do you mean? which the light of day is no longer shining, but Sight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and the moon and stars only, see dimly, and are he who has eyes wanting to see; colour being 16 | Introduction to Philosophy nearly blind; they seem to have no clearness yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds of vision in them? essence in dignity and power. Very true. Glaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness: But when they are directed towards objects By the light of heaven, how amazing! on which the sun shines, they see clearly and Yes, I said, and the exaggeration may be there is sight in them? set down to you; for you made me utter my Certainly. fancies. And the soul is like the eye: when resting And pray continue to utter them; at any upon that on which truth and being shine, the rate let us hear if there is anything more to be soul perceives and understands and is radiant said about the similitude of the sun. with intelligence; but when turned towards Yes, I said, there is a great deal more. the twilight of becoming and perishing, then Then omit nothing, however slight. she has opinion only, and goes blinking about, I will do my best, I said; but I should think and is first of one opinion and then of another, that a great deal will have to be omitted. and seems to have no intelligence? You have to imagine, then, that there are Just so. two ruling powers, and that one of them is Now, that which imparts truth to the known set over the intellectual world, the other and the power of knowing to the knower is over the visible. I do not say heaven, lest you what I would have you term the idea of good, should fancy that I am playing upon the name and this you will deem to be the cause of (‘ourhanoz, orhatoz’). May I suppose that you science, and of truth in so far as the latter have this distinction of the visible and intel- becomes the subject of knowledge; beautiful ligible fixed in your mind? too, as are both truth and knowledge, you I have. will be right in esteeming this other nature Now take a line which has been cut into as more beautiful than either; and, as in the two unequal parts, and divide each of them previous instance, light and sight may be truly again in the same proportion, and suppose said to be like the sun, and yet not to be the the two main divisions to answer, one to the sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth visible and the other to the intelligible, and may be deemed to be like the good, but not then compare the subdivisions in respect of the good; the good has a place of honour yet their clearness and want of clearness, and you higher. will find that the first section in the sphere of What a wonder of beauty that must be, he the visible consists of images. And by images said, which is the author of science and truth, I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you second place, reflections in water and in solid, surely cannot mean to say that pleasure is the smooth and polished bodies and the like: Do good? you understand? God forbid, I replied; but may I ask you to Yes, I understand. consider the image in another point of view? Imagine, now, the other section, of which In what point of view? this is only the resemblance, to include the You would say, would you not, that the animals which we see, and everything that sun is only the author of visibility in all visible grows or is made. things, but of generation and nourishment and Very good. growth, though he himself is not generation? Would you not admit that both the sec- Certainly. tions of this division have different degrees In like manner the good may be said to be of truth, and that the copy is to the original not only the author of knowledge to all things as the sphere of opinion is to the sphere of known, but of their being and essence, and knowledge? Excerpts from The Republic | 17
Most undoubtedly. first principle, because she is unable to rise Next proceed to consider the manner in above the region of hypothesis, but employ- which the sphere of the intellectual is to be ing the objects of which the shadows below divided. are resemblances in their turn as images, In what manner? they having in relation to the shadows and Thus:—There are two subdivisions, in the reflections of them a greater distinctness, and lower or which the soul uses the figures given therefore a higher value. by the former division as images; the enquiry I understand, he said, that you are speak- can only be hypothetical, and instead of going ing of the province of geometry and the sister upwards to a principle descends to the other arts. end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes And when I speak of the other division out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle of the intelligible, you will understand me which is above hypotheses, making no use of to speak of that other sort of knowledge images as in the former case, but proceeding which reason herself attains by the power only in and through the ideas themselves. of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first I do not quite understand your meaning, he principles, but only as hypotheses—that is said. to say, as steps and points of departure into Then I will try again; you will understand a world which is above hypotheses, in order me better when I have made some prelimi- that she may soar beyond them to the first nary remarks. You are aware that students of principle of the whole; and clinging to this and geometry, arithmetic, and the kindred sci- then to that which depends on this, by suc- ences assume the odd and the even and the cessive steps she descends again without the figures and three kinds of angles and the like aid of any sensible object, from ideas, through in their several branches of science; these are ideas, and in ideas she ends. their hypotheses, which they and everybody I understand you, he replied; not perfectly, are supposed to know, and therefore they do for you seem to me to be describing a task not deign to give any account of them either which is really tremendous; but, at any rate, to themselves or others; but they begin with I understand you to say that knowledge and them, and go on until they arrive at last, and being, which the science of dialectic contem- in a consistent manner, at their conclusion? plates, are clearer than the notions of the Yes, he said, I know. arts, as they are termed, which proceed from And do you not know also that although hypotheses only: these are also contemplated they make use of the visible forms and reason by the understanding, and not by the senses: about them, they are thinking not of these, yet, because they start from hypotheses but of the ideals which they resemble; not of and do not ascend to a principle, those who the figures which they draw, but of the abso- contemplate them appear to you not to exer- lute square and the absolute diameter, and so cise the higher reason upon them, although on—the forms which they draw or make, and when a first principle is added to them they which have shadows and reflections in water are cognizable by the higher reason. And the of their own, are converted by them into im- habit which is concerned with geometry and ages, but they are really seeking to behold the the cognate sciences I suppose that you would things themselves, which can only be seen term understanding and not reason, as being with the eye of the mind? intermediate between opinion and reason. That is true. And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, You have quite conceived my meaning, I although in the search after it the soul is com- said; and now, corresponding to these four pelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a divisions, let there be four faculties in the 18 | Introduction to Philosophy soul-reason answering to the highest, under- True, he said; how could they see anything standing to the second, faith (or conviction) but the shadows if they were never allowed to to the third, and perception of shadows to move their heads? the last-and let there be a scale of them, And of the objects which are being car- and let us suppose that the several faculties ried in like manner they would only see the have clearness in the same degree that their shadows? objects have truth. Yes, he said. I understand, he replied, and give my as- And if they were able to converse with one sent, and accept your arrangement. another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them? Very true. And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side, would Book VII they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow? Socrates–GLAUCON No question, he replied. And now, I said, let me show in a figure how far To them, I said, the truth would be literally our nature is enlightened or unenlightened:— nothing but the shadows of the images. Behold! human beings living in a underground That is certain. den, which has a mouth open towards the light And now look again, and see what will and reaching all along the den; here they have naturally follow it’ the prisoners are released been from their childhood, and have their and disabused of their error. At first, when any legs and necks chained so that they cannot of them is liberated and compelled suddenly move, and can only see before them, being to stand up and turn his neck round and walk prevented by the chains from turning round and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp their heads. Above and behind them a fire is pains; the glare will distress him, and he will blazing at a distance, and between the fire and be unable to see the realities of which in his the prisoners there is a raised way; and you former state he had seen the shadows; and will see, if you look, a low wall built along the then conceive some one saying to him, that way, like the screen which marionette players what he saw before was an illusion, but that have in front of them, over which they show now, when he is approaching nearer to being the puppets. and his eye is turned towards more real exis- I see. tence, he has a clearer vision, -what will be And do you see, I said, men passing along his reply? And you may further imagine that the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and stat- his instructor is pointing to the objects as they ues and figures of animals made of wood and pass and requiring him to name them, -will he stone and various materials, which appear not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the over the wall? Some of them are talking, oth- shadows which he formerly saw are truer than ers silent. the objects which are now shown to him? You have shown me a strange image, and Far truer. they are strange prisoners. And if he is compelled to look straight at Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes their own shadows, or the shadows of one an- which will make him turn away to take and other, which the fire throws on the opposite take in the objects of vision which he can see, wall of the cave? and which he will conceive to be in reality Excerpts from The Republic | 19 clearer than the things which are now being together; and who were therefore best able shown to him? to draw conclusions as to the future, do you True, he now think that he would care for such honours And suppose once more, that he is reluc- and glories, or envy the possessors of them? tantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, Would he not say with Homer, and held fast until he’s forced into the pres- ence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be Better to be the poor servant of a pained and irritated? When he approaches poor master, and to endure anything, the light his eyes will be dazzled, and he will rather than think as they do and live not be able to see anything at all of what are after their manner? now called realities. Not all in a moment, he said. Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer He will require to grow accustomed to the anything than entertain these false notions sight of the upper world. And first he will see and live in this miserable manner. the shadows best, next the reflections of men Imagine once more, I said, such an one and other objects in the water, and then the coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced objects themselves; then he will gaze upon in his old situation; would he not be certain to the light of the moon and the stars and the have his eyes full of darkness spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and To be sure, he said. the stars by night better than the sun or the And if there were a contest, and he had light of the sun by day? to compete in measuring the shadows with Certainly. the prisoners who had never moved out of Last of he will be able to see the sun, and the den, while his sight was still weak, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but before his eyes had become steady (and the he will see him in his own proper place, and time which would be needed to acquire this not in another; and he will contemplate him new habit of sight might be very considerable) as he is. would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of Certainly. him that up he went and down he came with- He will then proceed to argue that this is he out his eyes; and that it was better not even who gives the season and the years, and is the to think of ascending; and if any one tried to guardian of all that is in the visible world, and loose another and lead him up to the light, let in a certain way the cause of all things which them only catch the offender, and they would he and his fellows have been accustomed to put him to death. behold? No question, he said. Clearly, he said, he would first see the sun This entire allegory, I said, you may now and then reason about him. append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argu- And when he remembered his old habita- ment; the prison-house is the world of sight, tion, and the wisdom of the den and his the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he misapprehend me if you interpret the journey would felicitate himself on the change, and upwards to be the ascent of the soul into pity them? the intellectual world according to my poor Certainly, he would. belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed And if they were in the habit of conferring whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, honours among themselves on those who whether true or false, my opinion is that in the were quickest to observe the passing shadows world of knowledge the idea of good appears and to remark which of them went before, last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, and which followed after, and which were when seen, is also inferred to be the universal 20 | Introduction to Philosophy author of all things beautiful and right, parent the laugh which greets him who returns from of light and of the lord of light in this visible above out of the light into the den. world, and the immediate source of reason That, he said, is a very just distinction. and truth in the intellectual; and that this But then, if I am right, certain professors of is the power upon which he who would act education must be wrong when they say that rationally, either in public or private life must they can put a knowledge into the soul which have his eye fixed. was not there before, like sight into blind eyes. I agree, he said, as far as I am able to un- They undoubtedly say this, he replied. derstand you. Whereas, our argument shows that the Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that power and capacity of learning exists in the those who attain to this beatific vision are un- soul already; and that just as the eye was un- willing to descend to human affairs; for their able to turn from darkness to light without the souls are ever hastening into the upper world whole body, so too the instrument of knowl- where they desire to dwell; which desire of edge can only by the movement of the whole theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be soul be turned from the world of becoming trusted. into that of being, and learn by degrees to Yes, very natural. endure the sight of being, and of the brightest And is there anything surprising in one and best of being, or in other words, of the who passes from divine contemplations to the good. evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ri- Very true. diculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking And must there not be some art which will and before he has become accustomed to the effect conversion in the easiest and quickest surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, in courts of law, or in other places, about the for that exists already, but has been turned in images or the shadows of images of justice, the wrong direction, and is looking away from and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions the truth? of those who have never yet seen absolute Yes, he said, such an art may be presumed. justice? And whereas the other so-called virtues of Anything but surprising, he replied. the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities, Any one who has common sense will re- for even when they are not originally innate member that the bewilderments of the eyes they can be implanted later by habit and are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, exercise, the of wisdom more than anything either from coming out of the light or from else contains a divine element which always going into the light, which is true of the mind’s remains, and by this conversion is rendered eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and useful and profitable; or, on the other hand, he who remembers this when he sees any hurtful and useless. Did you never observe one whose vision is perplexed and weak, will the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask eye of a clever rogue—how eager he is, how whether that soul of man has come out of the clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; brighter light, and is unable to see because he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eye- unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned sight is forced into the service of evil, and he from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness. of light. And he will count the one happy in Very true, he said. his condition and state of being, and he will But what if there had been a circumcision pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh of such natures in the days of their youth; and at the soul which comes from below into the they had been severed from those sensual light, there will be more reason in this than in pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which, Excerpts from The Republic | 21 like leaden weights, were attached to them at benefactors of one another; to this end he their birth, and which drag them down and created them, not to please themselves, but turn the vision of their souls upon the things to be his instruments in binding up the State. that are below—if, I say, they had been re- True, he said, I had forgotten. leased from these impediments and turned in Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no the opposite direction, the very same faculty injustice in compelling our philosophers to in them would have seen the truth as keenly have a care and providence of others; we as they see what their eyes are turned to now. shall explain to them that in other States, Very likely. men of their class are not obliged to share Yes, I said; and there is another thing which in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, is likely. or rather a necessary inference from for they grow up at their own sweet will, and what has preceded, that neither the uneducat- the government would rather not have them. ed and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those Being self-taught, they cannot be expected to who never make an end of their education, show any gratitude for a culture which they will be able ministers of State; not the former, have never received. But we have brought you because they have no single aim of duty which into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings is the rule of all their actions, private as well of yourselves and of the other citizens, and as public; nor the latter, because they will not have educated you far better and more per- act at all except upon compulsion, fancying fectly than they have been educated, and you that they are already dwelling apart in the are better able to share in the double duty. islands of the blest. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, Very true, he replied. must go down to the general underground Then, I said, the business of us who are the abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. founders of the State will be to compel the When you have acquired the habit, you will best minds to attain that knowledge which we see ten thousand times better than the inhab- have already shown to be the greatest of all- itants of the den, and you will know what the they must continue to ascend until they arrive several images are, and what they represent, at the good; but when they have ascended because you have seen the beautiful and just and seen enough we must not allow them to and good in their truth. And thus our State do as they do now. which is also yours will be a reality, and not What do you mean? a dream only, and will be administered in a I mean that they remain in the upper world: spirit unlike that of other States, in which men but this must not be allowed; they must be fight with one another about shadows only made to descend again among the prisoners and are distracted in the struggle for power, in the den, and partake of their labours and which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas honours, whether they are worth having or the truth is that the State in which the rulers not. are most reluctant to govern is always the But is not this unjust? he said; ought we to best and most quietly governed, and the State give them a worse life, when they might have in which they are most eager, the worst. a better? Quite true, he replied. You have again forgotten, my friend, I And will our pupils, when they hear this, said, the intention of the legislator, who did refuse to take their turn at the toils of State, not aim at making any one class in the State when they are allowed to spend the greater happy above the rest; the happiness was to part of their time with one another in the be in the whole State, and he held the citizens heavenly light? together by persuasion and necessity, making Impossible, he answered; for they are just them benefactors of the State, and therefore men, and the commands which we impose 22 | Introduction to Philosophy upon them are just; there can be no doubt ascent from below, which we affirm to be true that every one of them will take office as a philosophy? stern necessity, and not after the fashion of Quite so. our present rulers of State. And should we not enquire what sort of Yes, my friend, I said; and there lies the knowledge has the power of effecting such a point. You must contrive for your future rul- change? ers another and a better life than that of a Certainly. ruler, and then you may have a well-ordered What sort of knowledge is there which State; for only in the State which offers this, would draw the soul from becoming to being? will they rule who are truly rich, not in silver And another consideration has just occurred and gold, but in virtue and wisdom, which are to me: You will remember that our young men the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to are to be warrior athletes the administration of public affairs, poor and Yes, that was said. hungering after the’ own private advantage, Then this new kind of knowledge must thinking that hence they are to snatch the have an additional quality? chief good, order there can never be; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils which thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole State. Most true, he replied. And the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that of true philosophy. Do you know of any other? Indeed, I do not, he said. And those who govern ought not to be lov- ers of the task? For, if they are, there will be rival lovers, and they will fight. No question. Who then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will be the men who are wisest about affairs of State, and by whom the State is best administered, and who at the same time have other honours and another and a better life than that of politics? They are the men, and I will choose them, he replied. And now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced, and how they are to be brought from darkness to light,—as some are said to have ascended from the world below to the gods? By all means, he replied. The process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell, but the turning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than night to the true day of being, that is, the Excerpts from The Republic | 23
Key terms trapped in previous or outdated modes of thought. Analogy of the Divided Line—As with Allegory of the Cave—Socrates presents the Allegory of the Cave and the Analogy of Glaucon with a scenario where prisoners are the Sun, Socrates presents Plato’s brother trapped in a cave since birth, surrounded by Glaucon with another metaphorical device. flames, with chains restricting the movement In this case, Socrates speaks of a line bisected of their heads and legs. Free (or “other”) into two major parts. One half of the line rep- people who routinely enter and leave the cave resents the intelligible realm while the other at their own volition seem to be engaged in half represents the visible realm. Both realms a daily ritual of carrying items into the fire. are also bisected into two smaller parts, Since the bodies of the prisoners are fixed respectively. In total, the intelligible and the against the wall, they can only physically visible contain four parts. These four parts are perceive the shadows of the items and those known as epistemic states. The four epistemic who are carrying them. Thus, for the prison- states are ranked from intelligence being the ers, the shadows represent a semblance of highest form of cognitive ability and imagina- reality. They are completely unaware of those tion being the lowest. Belief and imagination who carry the items, the physical properties form the totality of the visible realm. Belief is of items, from where the items are derived, conceived from someone’s ability to perceive and the existence of the fire that causes the the existence of something, namely, physi- shadows to appear. Eventually, a prisoner cal objects. However, these perceptions rely escapes from the cave and is immediately ex- heavily on the limitations of one’s cognitive posed to a new reality (the sunlight and all it ability and physical senses. Additionally, in illuminates). Initially, this may prove daunting the state of imagination, an individual informs for the prisoner who leaves the cave, yet he himself about the world and himself by look- realizes the nature of the sun and begins to ing to unreliable sources such as shadows. conceptualize its existence in his own terms Such perceptions are highly circumstantial of understanding. By doing this, he has gained and dependent upon other variables, so a higher sense of knowledge and, ultimately, they are most likely to be dubious, at best. a higher sense of self. The one who rises out For example, if one sees the shadow of an of the cave will argue that it is he who con- elephant from one angle, he could possibly ceived all things first even though the exterior see the elephant’s ears, feet, trunk, etc. world around him significantly predates his Yet, if one stands in another position, with existence. The prisoner who has now been considerably less sunlight, the shadow could “illuminated” will return to the cave to impart offer a very distorted image of the elephant. knowledge of his new discovery unto his fellow Belief and Imagination fall under category prisoners. Yet, upon returning into the cave, of “opinion” since knowledge derived from the released prisoner will be blinded by the these categories could be deceptive. On the darkness, causing him great visible malaise other end of the spectrum, the intelligible which will, in turn, scare the prisoners from realm consists of mathematical reasoning and venturing outside of the cave themselves. For intelligence. Together, both intelligence and Socrates, this story serves as a pedagogical mathematical reasoning constitute “knowl- tool for those who have reached a higher form edge.” For Socrates, mathematics is one of of knowledge and strive for “the good.” Once the closest forms to true knowledge. Through they have attained this knowledge, these mathematics, we can perceive near perfect people need to “descend back into the cave” images in our mind and make them physical to deliver their findings to those who are still in our reality (e.g., drawings, technology, etc.) 24 | Introduction to Philosophy
Every single stage presented on the Divided of intelligence. Once understood, the good Line is experienced by the released prisoner should act as the philosophical driving factor in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. for one’s life. Those who understand are to Analogy of the Sun—According to Socrates, rule and impart their knowledge unto others the sun is not the source of our sight, yet it who have not attained this prestigious level is what illuminates everything around us. By of intelligence. The people tasked with the illuminating all that encompasses us, the sun aforementioned were deemed “guardians” allows us to become knowledgeable of our or “philosopher kings.” In Socrates’s ideal natural reality. Goodness, or the good, func- Republic, philosopher kings, those who have tions similarly to the sun since through good- grasped the good, should be the sole rulers of ness alone we are able to obtain veritable society. knowledge. Importantly, Socrates stresses the Guardian (philosopher-king)—In Plato’s fact that goodness, like the sun, is the source desired society, the guardians are those who of all indisputable knowledge. If we did not have reached the highest form of intelligence have sunlight, our sight would be engulfed by by grasping the good. Thus, they are tasked darkness. Also, if the good were absent, we with ruling over the city. Only those who have wouldn’t be able to grasp knowledge beyond reached this level can justly rule over others. our basic physical senses. The good should Knowledge—Classified as the ever expand- elevate our understanding to the level of in- ing category of irrefutable objective truths; telligence by allowing us to understand with part of the intelligible realm of the divided the mind primarily, rejecting dependency on line. physical perception. Opinion—Subjective assertions that fall Epistemology—The study of knowledge; outside of the realm of irrefutable truths. philosophical study dealing with belief, knowl- Relegated to the visible realm. edge, and theory of thought. Epistemology Metaphysics—The study of reality as we forces us to question our basic understandings understand it. Generally understood to be of knowledge and everything we know to be the field of philosophical inquiry that forces true. Is it possible to really “know”? Socrates’s us to ponder upon existence, the existence of entire philosophy for understanding knowl- things, causes of this existence, the ability of edge is based off of his epistemic approach. things to remain the same over time, etc. The This is evidenced when he boldly claims in chief objective of those who undertake such front of the jury, “I know nothing.” study is to attempt to explicate the veritable The Good—While discussing the Analogy existence of being, life, and the natural world. of the Sun, Socrates describes the good as “that which impacts truth to the known, and the power of knowing to the knower is what I would have you term the idea of good.” Initially, during his conversation with Glaucon, Reading Questions Socrates adamantly refuses to provide Glaucon with a definition of the good. Yet, as Glaucon continues to press Socrates for an 1. Plato wants to create a “just society”; answer, he eventually obliges, to some de- yet is it really just if rule is relegated to a gree, and reveals that the good is the highest minority of elite thinkers? form of knowledge. If an individual compre- 2. Do “guardians” exist in our contemporary hends the good, he has reached the summit world, or is this an archaic concept that Excerpts from The Republic | 25
never took root? Could you name catego- ries of individuals who could be consid- ered modern “guardians”? 3. Explain in detail the key differences between epistemology and metaphysics. In what ways are these two branches of philosophy similar? 4. Why does Plato despise the poets more than the artisans and the politicians? What does this imply about the poets and their poetry? 5. Outline the concept of the “divided line.” What does each level represent and why? Apology & Crito
Plato
ow you, O Athenians, have been af- appearing before you, O men of Athens, in the fected by my accusers, I cannot tell; but character of a juvenile orator—let no one expect I know that they almost made me forget it of me. And I must beg of you to grant me a Hwho I was—so persuasively did they speak; and favour:—If I defend myself in my accustomed yet they have hardly uttered a word of truth. manner, and you hear me using the words which But of the many falsehoods told by them, there I have been in the habit of using in the agora, at was one which quite amazed me;—I mean when the tables of the money-changers, or anywhere they said that you should be upon your guard else, I would ask you not to be surprised, and and not allow yourselves to be deceived by the not to interrupt me on this account. For I am force of my eloquence. To say this, when they more than seventy years of age, and appearing were certain to be detected as soon as I opened now for the first time in a court of law, Iam my lips and proved myself to be anything but a quite a stranger to the language of the place; great speaker, did indeed appear to me most and therefore I would have you regard me as if I shameless—unless by the force of eloquence were really a stranger, whom you would excuse they mean the force of truth; for is such is their if he spoke in his native tongue, and after the meaning, I admit that I am eloquent. But in fashion of his country:—Am I making an unfair how different a way from theirs! Well, as I was request of you? Never mind the manner, which saying, they have scarcely spoken the truth at may or may not be good; but think only of the all; but from me you shall hear the whole truth: truth of my words, and give heed to that: let the not, however, delivered after their manner speaker speak truly and the judge decide justly. in a set oration duly ornamented with words And first, I have to reply to the older charges and phrases. No, by heaven! but I shall use the and to my first accusers, and then I will go on to words and arguments which occur to me at the the later ones. For of old I have had many accus- moment; for I am confident in the justice of my ers, who have accused me falsely to you during cause (Or, I am certain that I am right in taking many years; and I am more afraid of them than this course.): at my time of life I ought not to be of Anytus and his associates, who are dangerous,
Plato, “Apology,” trans. Benjamin Jowett. Copyright in the Public Domain.
27 28 | Introduction to Philosophy too, in their own way. But far more dangerous heaven, and he makes the worse appear the bet- are the others, who began when you were ter cause; and he teaches the aforesaid doctrines children, and took possession of your minds to others.’ Such is the nature of the accusation: with their falsehoods, telling of one Socrates, it is just what you have yourselves seen in the a wise man, who speculated about the heaven comedy of Aristophanes (Aristoph., Clouds.), who above, and searched into the earth beneath, and has introduced a man whom he calls Socrates, made the worse appear the better cause. The going about and saying that he walks in air, and disseminators of this tale are the accusers whom talking a deal of nonsense concerning matters of I dread; for their hearers are apt to fancy that which I do not pretend to know either much or such enquirers do not believe in the existence of little—not that I mean to speak disparagingly of the gods. And they are many, and their charges anyone who is a student of natural philosophy. against me are of ancient date, and they were I should be very sorry if Meletus could bring so made by them in the days when you were more grave a charge against me. But the simple truth impressible than you are now—in childhood, or is, O Athenians, that I have nothing to do with it may have been in youth—and the cause when physical speculations. Very many of those here heard went by default, for there was none to an- present are witnesses to the truth of this, and to swer. And hardest of all, I do not know and can- them I appeal. Speak then, you who have heard not tell the names of my accusers; unless in the me, and tell your neighbours whether any of you chance case of a Comic poet. All who from envy have ever known me hold forth in few words or in and malice have persuaded you—some of them many upon such matters … You hear their answer. having first convinced themselves—all this class And from what they say of this part of the charge of men are most difficult to deal with; for I can- you will be able to judge of the truth of the rest. not have them up here, and cross-examine them, As little foundation is there for the report that and therefore I must simply fight with shadows I am a teacher, and take money; this accusation in my own defence, and argue when there is no has no more truth in it than the other. Although, one who answers. I will ask you then to assume if a man were really able to instruct mankind, to with me, as I was saying, that my opponents are receive money for giving instruction would, in my of two kinds; one recent, the other ancient: and opinion, be an honour to him. There is Gorgias I hope that you will see the propriety of my an- of Leontium, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias swering the latter first, for these accusations you of Elis, who go the round of the cities, and are heard long before the others, and much oftener. able to persuade the young men to leave their Well, then, I must make my defence, and en- own citizens by whom they might be taught for deavour to clear away in a short time, a slander nothing, and come to them whom they not only which has lasted a long time. May I succeed, if pay, but are thankful if they may be allowed to to succeed be for my good and yours, or likely pay them. There is at this time a Parian philoso- to avail me in my cause! The task is not an easy pher residing in Athens, of whom I have heard; one; I quite understand the nature of it. And so and I came to hear of him in this way:—I came leaving the event with God, in obedience to the across a man who has spent a world of money on law I will now make my defence. the Sophists, Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and I will begin at the beginning, and ask what is knowing that he had sons, I asked him: ‘Callias,’ I the accusation which has given rise to the slander said, ‘if your two sons were foals or calves, there of me, and in fact has encouraged Meletus to would be no difficulty in finding someone to put proof this charge against me. Well, what do the over them; we should hire a trainer of horses, slanderers say? They shall be my prosecutors, or a farmer probably, who would improve and and I will sum up their words in an affidavit: perfect them in their own proper virtue and ‘Socrates is an evil-doer, and a curious person, excellence; but as they are human beings, whom who searches into things under the earth and in are you thinking of placing over them? Is there Apology & Crito | 29 anyone who understands human and political tell him whether—as I was saying, I must beg you virtue? You must have thought about the mat- not to interrupt—he asked the oracle to tell him ter, for you have sons; is there any one?’ ‘There whether anyone was wiser than I was, and the is,’ he said. ‘Who is he?’ said I; ‘and of what Pythian prophetess answered, that there was no country? And what does he charge?’ ‘Evenus the man wiser. Chaerephon is dead himself; but his Parian,’ he replied; ‘he is the man, and his charge brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of is five minae.’ Happy is Evenus, I said to myself, if what I am saying. he really has this wisdom, and teaches at such a Why do I mention this? Because I am going moderate charge. Had I the same, I should have to explain to you why I have such an evil name. been very proud and conceited; but the truth is When I heard the answer, I said to myself, What that I have no knowledge of the kind. can the god mean? and what is the interpretation I dare say, Athenians, that someone among of his riddle? for I know that I have no wisdom, you will reply, ‘Yes, Socrates, but what is the small or great. What then can he mean when he origin of these accusations which are brought says that I am the wisest of men? And yet he is against you; there must have been something a god, and cannot lie; that would be against his strange which you have been doing? All these ru- nature. After long consideration, I thought of a mours and this talk about you would never have method of trying the question. I reflected that if arisen if you had been like other men: tell us, I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I then, what is the cause of them, for we should be might go to the god with a refutation in my hand. sorry to judge hastily of you.’ Now I regard this as I should say to him, ‘Here is a man who is wiser a fair challenge, and I will endeavour to explain than I am; but you said that I was the wisest.’ to you the reason why I am called wise and have Accordingly I went to one who had the reputa- such an evil fame. Please to attend then. And tion of wisdom, and observed him—his name I although some of you may think that I am joking, need not mention; he was a politician whom I I declare that I will tell you the entire truth. Men selected for examination—and the result was as of Athens, this reputation of mine has come of a follows: When I began to talk with him, I could certain sort of wisdom which I possess. If you ask not help thinking that he was not really wise, me what kind of wisdom, I reply, wisdom such although he was thought wise by many, and still as may perhaps be attained by man, for to that wiser by himself; and thereupon I tried to explain extent I am inclined to believe that I am wise; to him that he thought himself wise, but was not whereas the persons of whom I was speaking really wise; and the consequence was that he have a superhuman wisdom which I may fail to hated me, and his enmity was shared by several describe, because I have it not myself; and he who were present and heard me. So I left him, who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is taking saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I away my character. And here, O men of Athens, I do not suppose that either of us knows anything must beg you not to interrupt me, even if I seem really beautiful and good, I am better off than to say something extravagant. For the word he is,—for he knows nothing, and thinks that he which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to knows; I neither know nor think that I know. In a witness who is worthy of credit; that witness this latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly shall be the God of Delphi—he will tell you about the advantage of him. Then I went to another my wisdom, if I have any, and of what sort it is. who had still higher pretensions to wisdom, and You must have known Chaerephon; he was early my conclusion was exactly the same. Whereupon a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for I made another enemy of him, and of many oth- he shared in the recent exile of the people, and ers besides him. returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you Then I went to one man after another, being know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked, he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle to and I lamented and feared this: but necessity 30 | Introduction to Philosophy was laid upon me,—the word of God, I thought, neither having their knowledge nor their igno- ought to be considered first. And I said to myself, rance, or like them in both; and I made answer Go I must to all who appear to know, and find out to myself and to the oracle that I was better off the meaning of the oracle. And I swear to you, as I was. Athenians, by the dog I swear!—for I must tell you This inquisition has led to my having many the truth—the result of my mission was just this: enemies of the worst and most dangerous kind, I found that the men most in repute were all but and has given occasion also to many calumnies. the most foolish; and that others less esteemed And I am called wise, for my hearers always were really wiser and better. I will tell you the tale imagine that I myself possess the wisdom which of my wanderings and of the ‘Herculean’ labours, I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men as I may call them, which I endured only to find of Athens, that God only is wise; and by his at last the oracle irrefutable. After the politicians, answer he intends to show that the wisdom of I went to the poets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all men is worth little or nothing; he is not speaking sorts. And there, I said to myself, you will be in- of Socrates, he is only using my name by way of stantly detected; now you will find out that you illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is the wis- are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I est, who, like Socrates, knows that his wisdom took them some of the most elaborate passages is in truth worth nothing. And so I go about the in their own writings, and asked what was the world, obedient to the god, and search and make meaning of them—thinking that they would enquiry into the wisdom of any one, whether teach me something. Will you believe me? I am citizen or stranger, who appears to be wise; and almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I must if he is not wise, then in vindication of the oracle say that there is hardly a person present who I show him that he is not wise; and my occupa- would not have talked better about their poetry tion quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give than they did themselves. Then I knew that not either to any public matter of interest or to any by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort concern of my own, but I am in utter poverty by of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or reason of my devotion to the god. soothsayers who also say many fine things, but There is another thing:—young men of the do not understand the meaning of them. The po- richer classes, who have not much to do, come ets appeared to me to be much in the same case; about me of their own accord; they like to hear and I further observed that upon the strength of the pretenders examined, and they often imi- their poetry they believed themselves to be the tate me, and proceed to examine others; there wisest of men in other things in which they were are plenty of persons, as they quickly discover, not wise. So I departed, conceiving myself to be who think that they know something, but really superior to them for the same reason that I was know little or nothing; and then those who are superior to the politicians. examined by them instead of being angry with At last I went to the artisans. I was conscious themselves are angry with me: that I knew nothing at all, as I may say, and I was This confounded Socrates, they say; this sure that they knew many fine things; and here I villainous misleader of youth!—and then if was not mistaken, for they did know many things somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he of which I was ignorant, and in this they certainly practise or teach? they do not know, and cannot were wiser than I was. But I observed that even tell; but in order that they may not appear to be the good artisans fell into the same error as the at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges poets;—because they were good workmen they which are used against all philosophers about thought that they also knew all sorts of high mat- teaching things up in the clouds and under the ters, and this defect in them overshadowed their earth, and having no gods, and making the worse wisdom; and therefore I asked myself on behalf appear the better cause; for they do not like to of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was, confess that their pretence of knowledge has Apology & Crito | 31 been detected—which is the truth; and as they the judges who their improver is.—Observe, are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to are drawn up in battle array and have persuasive say. But is not this rather disgraceful, and a very tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud considerable proof of what I was saying, that you and inveterate calumnies. And this is the reason have no interest in the matter? Speak up, friend, why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and and tell us who their improver is. Lycon, have set upon me; Meletus, who has a The laws. quarrel with me on behalf of the poets; Anytus, But that, my good sir, is not my meaning. I on behalf of the craftsmen and politicians; Lycon, want to know who the person is, who, in the first on behalf of the rhetoricians: and as I said at the place, knows the laws. beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of such a The judges, Socrates, who are present in mass of calumny all in a moment. And this, O court. men of Athens, is the truth and the whole truth; I What, do you mean to say, Meletus, that they have concealed nothing, I have dissembled noth- are able to instruct and improve youth? ing. And yet, I know that my plainness of speech Certainly they are. makes them hate me, and what is their hatred What, all of them, or some only and not but a proof that I am speaking the truth?—Hence others? has arisen the prejudice against me; and this is All of them. the reason of it, as you will find out either in this By the goddess Here, that is good news! There or in any future enquiry. are plenty of improvers, then. And what do you I have said enough in my defence against the say of the audience,—do they improve them? first class of my accusers; I turn to the second Yes, they do. class. They are headed by Meletus, that good And the senators? man and true lover of his country, as he calls Yes, the senators improve them. himself. Against these, too, I must try to make a But perhaps the members of the assembly defence:—Let their affidavit be read: it contains corrupt them?—or do they too improve them? something of this kind: It says that Socrates is a They improve them. doer of evil, who corrupts the youth; and who Then every Athenian improves and elevates does not believe in the gods of the state, but them; all with the exception of myself; and I alone has other new divinities of his own. Such is the am their corrupter? Is that what you affirm? charge; and now let us examine the particular That is what I stoutly affirm. counts. He says that I am a doer of evil, and I am very unfortunate if you are right. But corrupt the youth; but I say, O men of Athens, suppose I ask you a question: How about horses? that Meletus is a doer of evil, in that he pretends Does one man do them harm and all the world to be in earnest when he is only in jest, and is good? Is not the exact opposite the truth? One so eager to bring men to trial from a pretended man is able to do them good, or at least not zeal and interest about matters in which he really many;—the trainer of horses, that is to say, never had the smallest interest. And the truth of does them good, and others who have to do this I will endeavour to prove to you. with them rather injure them? Is not that true, Come hither, Meletus, and let me ask a ques- Meletus, of horses, or of any other animals? tion of you. You think a great deal about the Most assuredly it is; whether you and Anytus say improvement of youth? yes or no. Happy indeed would be the condition Yes, I do. of youth if they had one corrupter only, and all Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; the rest of the world were their improvers. But for you must know, as you have taken the pains you, Meletus, have sufficiently shown that you to discover their corrupter, and are citing and never had a thought about the young: your accusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell 32 | Introduction to Philosophy carelessness is seen in your not caring about the acknowledge the gods which the state acknowl- very things which you bring against me. edges, but some other new divinities or spiritual And now, Meletus, I will ask you another agencies in their stead. These are the lessons by question—by Zeus I will: Which is better, to which I corrupt the youth, as you say. live among bad citizens, or among good ones? Yes, that I say emphatically. Answer, friend, I say; the question is one which Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are may be easily answered. Do not the good do speaking, tell me and the court, in somewhat their neighbours good, and the bad do them plainer terms, what you mean! for I do not as yet evil? understand whether you affirm that I teach other Certainly. men to acknowledge some gods, and therefore And is there anyone who would rather be in- that I do believe in gods, and am not an entire jured than benefited by those who live with him? atheist—this you do not lay to my charge,—but Answer, my good friend, the law requires you to only you say that they are not the same gods answer—does any one like to be injured? which the city recognizes—the charge is that Certainly not. they are different gods. Or, do you mean that I And when you accuse me of corrupting and am an atheist simply, and a teacher of atheism? deteriorating the youth, do you allege that I cor- I mean the latter—that you are a complete rupt them intentionally or unintentionally? atheist. Intentionally, I say. What an extraordinary statement! Why do But you have just admitted that the good do you think so, Meletus? Do you mean that I do their neighbours good, and the evil do them evil. not believe in the godhead of the sun or moon, Now, is that a truth which your superior wisdom like other men? has recognized thus early in life, and am I, at my I assure you, judges, that he does not: for he age, in such darkness and ignorance as not to says that the sun is stone, and the moon earth. know that if a man with whom I have to live is Friend Meletus, you think that you are ac- corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed cusing Anaxagoras: and you have but a bad by him; and yet I corrupt him, and intentionally, opinion of the judges, if you fancy them illiter- too—so you say, although neither I nor any other ate to such a degree as not to know that these human being is ever likely to be convinced by doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras you. But either I do not corrupt them, or I cor- the Clazomenian, which are full of them. And so, rupt them unintentionally; and on either view of forsooth, the youth are said to be taught them the case you lie. If my offence is unintentional, by Socrates, when there are not unfrequently the law has no cognizance of unintentional -of exhibitions of them at the theatre (Probably fences: you ought to have taken me privately, and in allusion to Aristophanes who caricatured, warned and admonished me; for if I had been and to Euripides who borrowed the notions of better advised, I should have left off doing what I Anaxagoras, as well as to other dramatic poets.) only did unintentionally—no doubt I should; but (price of admission one drachma at the most); you would have nothing to say to me and refused and they might pay their money, and laugh at to teach me. And now you bring me up in this Socrates if he pretends to father these extraordi- court, which is a place not of instruction, but of nary views. And so, Meletus, you really think that punishment. I do not believe in any god? It will be very clear to you, Athenians, as I I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in was saying, that Meletus has no care at all, great none at all. or small, about the matter. But still I should like Nobody will believe you, Meletus, and I am to know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to cor- pretty sure that you do not believe yourself. I can- rupt the young. I suppose you mean, as I infer not help thinking, men of Athens, that Meletus is from your indictment, that I teach them not to reckless and impudent, and that he has written Apology & Crito | 33 this indictment in a spirit of mere wantonness believe in demigods. For if the demigods are the and youthful bravado. Has he not compounded a illegitimate sons of gods, whether by the nymphs riddle, thinking to try me? He said to himself:—I or by any other mothers, of whom they are said shall see whether the wise Socrates will discover to be the sons—what human being will ever my facetious contradiction, or whether I shall be believe that there are no gods if they are the sons able to deceive him and the rest of them. For he of gods? You might as well affirm the existence certainly does appear to me to contradict him- of mules, and deny that of horses and asses. self in the indictment as much as if he said that Such nonsense, Meletus, could only have been Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, intended by you to make trial of me. You have put and yet of believing in them—but this is not like this into the indictment because you had nothing a person who is in earnest. real of which to accuse me. But no one who has a I should like you, O men of Athens, to join me particle of understanding will ever be convinced in examining what I conceive to be his inconsis- by you that the same men can believe in divine tency; and do you, Meletus, answer. And I must and superhuman things, and yet not believe that remind the audience of my request that they there are gods and demigods and heroes. would not make a disturbance if I speak in my I have said enough in answer to the charge of accustomed manner: Meletus: any elaborate defence is unnecessary, Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the exis- but I know only too well how many are the enmi- tence of human things, and not of human beings? ties which I have incurred, and this is what will be … I wish, men of Athens, that he would answer, my destruction if I am destroyed;—not Meletus, and not be always trying to get up an interrup- nor yet Anytus, but the envy and detraction of tion. Did ever any man believe in horsemanship, the world, which has been the death of many and not in horses? or in flute-playing, and not good men, and will probably be the death of in flute-players? No, my friend; I will answer to many more; there is no danger of my being the you and to the court, as you refuse to answer for last of them. yourself. There is no man who ever did. But now Someone will say: And are you not ashamed, please to answer the next question: Can a man Socrates, of a course of life which is likely to believe in spiritual and divine agencies, and not bring you to an untimely end? To him I may in spirits or demigods? fairly answer: There you are mistaken: a man He cannot. who is good for anything ought not to calculate How lucky I am to have extracted that answer, the chance of living or dying; he ought only to by the assistance of the court! But then you consider whether in doing anything he is doing swear in the indictment that I teach and believe right or wrong—acting the part of a good man or in divine or spiritual agencies (new or old, no of a bad. Whereas, upon your view, the heroes matter for that); at any rate, I believe in spiritual who fell at Troy were not good for much, and agencies,—so you say and swear in the affidavit; the son of Thetis above all, who altogether de- and yet if I believe in divine beings, how can I spised danger in comparison with disgrace; and help believing in spirits or demigods;—must I when he was so eager to slay Hector, his god- not? To be sure I must; and therefore I may as- dess mother said to him, that if he avenged his sume that your silence gives consent. Now what companion Patroclus, and slew Hector, he would are spirits or demigods? Are they not either gods die himself—‘Fate,’ she said, in these or the like or the sons of gods? words, ‘waits for you next after Hector;’ he, Certainly they are. receiving this warning, utterly despised danger But this is what I call the facetious riddle in- and death, and instead of fearing them, feared vented by you: the demigods or spirits are gods, rather to live in dishonour, and not to avenge his and you say first that I do not believe in gods, and friend. ‘Let me die forthwith,’ he replies, ‘and be then again that I do believe in gods; that is, if I avenged of my enemy, rather than abide here by 34 | Introduction to Philosophy the beaked ships, a laughing-stock and a burden enquire and speculate in this way any more, and of the earth.’ Had Achilles any thought of death that if you are caught doing so again you shall and danger? For wherever a man’s place is, die;—if this was the condition on which you let whether the place which he has chosen or that me go, I should reply: Men of Athens, I honour in which he has been placed by a commander, and love you; but I shall obey God rather than there he ought to remain in the hour of danger; you, and while I have life and strength I shall he should not think of death or of anything but never cease from the practice and teaching of of disgrace. And this, O men of Athens, is a true philosophy, exhorting any one whom I meet and saying. saying to him after my manner: You, my friend,— Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, O a citizen of the great and mighty and wise city men of Athens, if I who, when I was ordered by of Athens,—are you not ashamed of heaping up the generals whom you chose to command me at the greatest amount of money and honour and Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, remained reputation, and caring so little about wisdom and where they placed me, like any other man, facing truth and the greatest improvement of the soul, death—if now, when, as I conceive and imagine, which you never regard or heed at all? And if the God orders me to fulfil the philosopher’s mission person with whom I am arguing, says: Yes, but I of searching into myself and other men, I were do care; then I do not leave him or let him go at to desert my post through fear of death, or any once; but I proceed to interrogate and examine other fear; that would indeed be strange, and I and cross-examine him, and if I think that he might justly be arraigned in court for denying the has no virtue in him, but only says that he has, I existence of the gods, if I disobeyed the oracle reproach him with undervaluing the greater, and because I was afraid of death, fancying that I was overvaluing the less. And I shall repeat the same wise when I was not wise. For the fear of death words to every one whom I meet, young and old, is indeed the pretence of wisdom, and not real citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens, wisdom, being a pretence of knowing the un- inasmuch as they are my brethren. For know that known; and no one knows whether death, which this is the command of God; and I believe that men in their fear apprehend to be the greatest no greater good has ever happened in the state evil, may not be the greatest good. Is not this than my service to the God. For I do nothing but ignorance of a disgraceful sort, the ignorance go about persuading you all, old and young alike, which is the conceit that a man knows what he not to take thought for your persons or your does not know? And in this respect only I believe properties, but first and chiefly to care about the myself to differ from men in general, and may greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that perhaps claim to be wiser than they are:—that virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue whereas I know but little of the world below, I comes money and every other good of man, do not suppose that I know: but I do know that public as well as private. This is my teaching, and injustice and disobedience to a better, whether if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, God or man, is evil and dishonourable, and I I am a mischievous person. But if any one says will never fear or avoid a possible good rather that this is not my teaching, he is speaking an than a certain evil. And therefore if you let me untruth. Wherefore, O men of Athens, I say to go now, and are not convinced by Anytus, who you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and said that since I had been prosecuted I must be either acquit me or not; but whichever you do, put to death; (or if not that I ought never to have understand that I shall never alter my ways, not been prosecuted at all); and that if I escape now, even if I have to die many times. your sons will all be utterly ruined by listening to Men of Athens, do not interrupt, but hear my words—if you say to me, Socrates, this time me; there was an understanding between us that we will not mind Anytus, and you shall be let you should hear me to the end: I have something off, but upon one condition, that you are not to more to say, at which you may be inclined to cry Apology & Crito | 35 out; but I believe that to hear me will be good I have ever exacted or sought pay of any one; of for you, and therefore I beg that you will not cry that they have no witness. And I have a sufficient out. I would have you know, that if you kill such witness to the truth of what I say—my poverty. an one as I am, you will injure yourselves more Some one may wonder why I go about in than you will injure me. Nothing will injure me, private giving advice and busying myself with not Meletus nor yet Anytus—they cannot, for a the concerns of others, but do not venture to bad man is not permitted to injure a better than come forward in public and advise the state. himself. I do not deny that Anytus may, perhaps, I will tell you why. You have heard me speak at kill him, or drive him into exile, or deprive him sundry times and in divers places of an oracle of civil rights; and he may imagine, and others or sign which comes to me, and is the divinity may imagine, that he is inflicting a great injury which Meletus ridicules in the indictment. This upon him: but there I do not agree. For the evil of sign, which is a kind of voice, first began to come doing as he is doing—the evil of unjustly taking to me when I was a child; it always forbids but away the life of another—is greater far. never commands me to do anything which I am And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue going to do. This is what deters me from being a for my own sake, as you may think, but for politician. And rightly, as I think. For I am certain, yours, that you may not sin against the God by O men of Athens, that if I had engaged in poli- condemning me, who am his gift to you. For if tics, I should have perished long ago, and done you kill me you will not easily find a successor to no good either to you or to myself. And do not me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of be offended at my telling you the truth: for the speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by truth is, that no man who goes to war with you God; and the state is a great and noble steed who or any other multitude, honestly striving against is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and the many lawless and unrighteous deeds which requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly are done in a state, will save his life; he who will which God has attached to the state, and all day fight for the right, if he would live even for a long and in all places am always fastening upon brief space, must have a private station and not you, arousing and persuading and reproaching a public one. you. You will not easily find another like me, and I can give you convincing evidence of what therefore I would advise you to spare me. I dare I say, not words only, but what you value far say that you may feel out of temper (like a per- more—actions. Let me relate to you a passage of son who is suddenly awakened from sleep), and my own life which will prove to you that I should you think that you might easily strike me dead never have yielded to injustice from any fear as Anytus advises, and then you would sleep on of death, and that ‘as I should have refused to for the remainder of your lives, unless God in his yield’ I must have died at once. I will tell you a care of you sent you another gadfly. When I say tale of the courts, not very interesting perhaps, that I am given to you by God, the proof of my but nevertheless true. The only office of state mission is this:—if I had been like other men, I which I ever held, O men of Athens, was that of should not have neglected all my own concerns senator: the tribe Antiochis, which is my tribe, or patiently seen the neglect of them during all had the presidency at the trial of the generals these years, and have been doing yours, coming who had not taken up the bodies of the slain to you individually like a father or elder brother, after the battle of Arginusae; and you proposed exhorting you to regard virtue; such conduct, to try them in a body, contrary to law, as you all I say, would be unlike human nature. If I had thought afterwards; but at the time I was the gained anything, or if my exhortations had been only one of the Prytanes who was opposed to paid, there would have been some sense in my the illegality, and I gave my vote against you; and doing so; but now, as you will perceive, not even when the orators threatened to impeach and the impudence of my accusers dares to say that arrest me, and you called and shouted, I made 36 | Introduction to Philosophy up my mind that I would run the risk, having But I shall be asked, why do people delight in law and justice with me, rather than take part continually conversing with you? I have told you in your injustice because I feared imprisonment already, Athenians, the whole truth about this and death. This happened in the days of the matter: they like to hear the cross-examination democracy. But when the oligarchy of the Thirty of the pretenders to wisdom; there is amuse- was in power, they sent for me and four others ment in it. Now this duty of cross-examining into the rotunda, and bade us bring Leon the other men has been imposed upon me by Salaminian from Salamis, as they wanted to put God; and has been signified to me by oracles, him to death. This was a specimen of the sort of visions, and in every way in which the will of commands which they were always giving with divine power was ever intimated to any one. the view of implicating as many as possible in This is true, O Athenians, or, if not true, would their crimes; and then I showed, not in word only be soon refuted. If I am or have been corrupting but indeed, that, if I may be allowed to use such the youth, those of them who are now grown up an expression, I cared not a straw for death, and and have become sensible that I gave them bad that my great and only care was lest I should do advice in the days of their youth should come an unrighteous or unholy thing. For the strong forward as accusers, and take their revenge; or arm of that oppressive power did not frighten if they do not like to come themselves, some of me into doing wrong; and when we came out of their relatives, fathers, brothers, or other kins- the rotunda the other four went to Salamis and men, should say what evil their families have fetched Leon, but I went quietly home. For which suffered at my hands. Now is their time. Many of I might have lost my life, had not the power of them I see in the court. There is Crito, who is of the Thirty shortly afterwards come to an end. the same age and of the same deme with myself, And many will witness to my words. and there is Critobulus his son, whom I also see. Now do you really imagine that I could have Then again there is Lysanias of Sphettus, who survived all these years, if I had led a public life, is the father of Aeschines—he is present; and supposing that like a good man I had always also there is Antiphon of Cephisus, who is the maintained the right and had made justice, father of Epigenes; and there are the brothers as I ought, the first thing? No indeed, men of of several who have associated with me. There Athens, neither I nor any other man. But I have is Nicostratus the son of Theosdotides, and the been always the same in all my actions, public brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus himself as well as private, and never have I yielded any is dead, and therefore he, at any rate, will not base compliance to those who are slanderously seek to stop him); and there is Paralus the son termed my disciples, or to any other. Not that I of Demodocus, who had a brother Theages; and have any regular disciples. But if any one likes Adeimantus the son of Ariston, whose brother to come and hear me while I am pursuing my Plato is present; and Aeantodorus, who is the mission, whether he be young or old, he is not brother of Apollodorus, whom I also see. I might excluded. Nor do I converse only with those who mention a great many others, some of whom pay; but any one, whether he be rich or poor, Meletus should have produced as witnesses in may ask and answer me and listen to my words; the course of his speech; and let him still produce and whether he turns out to be a bad man or a them, if he has forgotten—I will make way for good one, neither result can be justly imputed him. And let him say, if he has any testimony of to me; for I never taught or professed to teach the sort which he can produce. Nay, Athenians, him anything. And if any one says that he has the very opposite is the truth. For all these are ever learned or heard anything from me in pri- ready to witness on behalf of the corrupter, of vate which all the world has not heard, let me the injurer of their kindred, as Meletus and tell you that he is lying. Anytus call me; not the corrupted youth only— there might have been a motive for that—but Apology & Crito | 37 their uncorrupted elder relatives. Why should such are a dishonour to the state, and that any they too support me with their testimony? Why, stranger coming in would have said of them that indeed, except for the sake of truth and justice, the most eminent men of Athens, to whom the and because they know that I am speaking the Athenians themselves give honour and com- truth, and that Meletus is a liar. mand, are no better than women. And I say that Well, Athenians, this and the like of this is these things ought not to be done by those of us all the defence which I have to offer. Yet a word who have a reputation; and if they are done, you more. Perhaps there may be some one who is ought not to permit them; you ought rather to offended at me, when he calls to mind how he show that you are far more disposed to condemn himself on a similar, or even a less serious occa- the man who gets up a doleful scene and makes sion, prayed and entreated the judges with many the city ridiculous, than him who holds his peace. tears, and how he produced his children in court, But, setting aside the question of public opin- which was a moving spectacle, together with ion, there seems to be something wrong in asking a host of relations and friends; whereas I, who a favour of a judge, and thus procuring an acquit- am probably in danger of my life, will do none of tal, instead of informing and convincing him. For these things. The contrast may occur to his mind, his duty is, not to make a present of justice, but and he may be set against me, and vote in anger to give judgment; and he has sworn that he will because he is displeased at me on this account. judge according to the laws, and not according Now if there be such a person among you,— to his own good pleasure; and we ought not to mind, I do not say that there is,—to him I may encourage you, nor should you allow yourselves fairly reply: My friend, I am a man, and like other to be encouraged, in this habit of perjury—there men, a creature of flesh and blood, and not ‘of can be no piety in that. Do not then require me wood or stone,’ as Homer says; and I have a fam- to do what I consider dishonourable and impi- ily, yes, and sons, O Athenians, three in number, ous and wrong, especially now, when I am being one almost a man, and two others who are still tried for impiety on the indictment of Meletus. young; and yet I will not bring any of them hither For if, O men of Athens, by force of persuasion in order to petition you for an acquittal. And and entreaty I could overpower your oaths, then why not? Not from any self-assertion or want of I should be teaching you to believe that there are respect for you. Whether I am or am not afraid no gods, and in defending should simply convict of death is another question, of which I will not myself of the charge of not believing in them. now speak. But, having regard to public opinion, But that is not so—far otherwise. For I do believe I feel that such conduct would be discreditable that there are gods, and in a sense higher than to myself, and to you, and to the whole state. that in which any of my accusers believe in them. One who has reached my years, and who has a And to you and to God I commit my cause, to be name for wisdom, ought not to demean himself. determined by you as is best for you and me. Whether this opinion of me be deserved or not, … at any rate the world has decided that Socrates There are many reasons why I am not grieved, is in some way superior to other men. And if O men of Athens, at the vote of condemnation. I those among you who are said to be superior expected it, and am only surprised that the votes in wisdom and courage, and any other virtue, are so nearly equal; for I had thought that the demean themselves in this way, how shameful majority against me would have been far larger; is their conduct! I have seen men of reputation, but now, had thirty votes gone over to the other when they have been condemned, behaving in side, I should have been acquitted. And I may say, the strangest manner: they seemed to fancy that I think, that I have escaped Meletus. I may say they were going to suffer something dreadful more; for without the assistance of Anytus and if they died, and that they could be immortal if Lycon, any one may see that he would not have you only allowed them to live; and I think that had a fifth part of the votes, as the law requires, 38 | Introduction to Philosophy in which case he would have incurred a fine of a have convinced you. But I cannot in a moment thousand drachmae. refute great slanders; and, as I am convinced And so he proposes death as the penalty. that I never wronged another, I will assuredly And what shall I propose on my part, O men not wrong myself. I will not say of myself that I of Athens? Clearly that which is my due. And deserve any evil, or propose any penalty. Why what is my due? What return shall be made to should I? Because I am afraid of the penalty of the man who has never had the wit to be idle death which Meletus proposes? When I do not during his whole life; but has been careless of know whether death is a good or an evil, why what the many care for—wealth, and family should I propose a penalty which would certainly interests, and military offices, and speaking in be an evil? Shall I say imprisonment? And why the assembly, and magistracies, and plots, and should I live in prison, and be the slave of the parties. Reflecting that I was really too honest magistrates of the year—of the Eleven? Or shall a man to be a politician and live, I did not go the penalty be a fine, and imprisonment until the where I could do no good to you or to myself; fine is paid? There is the same objection. I should but where I could do the greatest good privately have to lie in prison, for money I have none, and to every one of you, thither I went, and sought cannot pay. And if I say exile (and this may pos- to persuade every man among you that he must sibly be the penalty which you will affix), I must look to himself, and seek virtue and wisdom be- indeed be blinded by the love of life, if I am so fore he looks to his private interests, and look to irrational as to expect that when you, who are the state before he looks to the interests of the my own citizens, cannot endure my discourses state; and that this should be the order which he and words, and have found them so grievous observes in all his actions. What shall be done and odious that you will have no more of them, to such an one? Doubtless some good thing, others are likely to endure me. No indeed, men O men of Athens, if he has his reward; and the of Athens, that is not very likely. And what a life good should be of a kind suitable to him. What should I lead, at my age, wandering from city to would be a reward suitable to a poor man who city, ever changing my place of exile, and always is your benefactor, and who desires leisure that being driven out! For I am quite sure that wher- he may instruct you? There can be no reward ever I go, there, as here, the young men will flock so fitting as maintenance in the Prytaneum, O to me; and if I drive them away, their elders will men of Athens, a reward which he deserves far drive me out at their request; and if I let them more than the citizen who has won the prize at come, their fathers and friends will drive me out Olympia in the horse or chariot race, whether for their sakes. the chariots were drawn by two horses or by Some one will say: Yes, Socrates, but cannot many. For I am in want, and he has enough; and you hold your tongue, and then you may go into he only gives you the appearance of happiness, a foreign city, and no one will interfere with you? and I give you the reality. And if I am to estimate Now I have great difficulty in making you under- the penalty fairly, I should say that maintenance stand my answer to this. For if I tell you that to in the Prytaneum is the just return. do as you say would be a disobedience to the Perhaps you think that I am braving you in God, and therefore that I cannot hold my tongue, what I am saying now, as in what I said before you will not believe that I am serious; and if I say about the tears and prayers. But this is not so. again that daily to discourse about virtue, and I speak rather because I am convinced that I of those other things about which you hear me never intentionally wronged any one, although examining myself and others, is the greatest I cannot convince you—the time has been too good of man, and that the unexamined life is not short; if there were a law at Athens, as there is worth living, you are still less likely to believe me. in other cities, that a capital cause should not be Yet I say what is true, although a thing of which it decided in one day, then I believe that I should is hard for me to persuade you. Also, I have never Apology & Crito | 39 been accustomed to think that I deserve to suffer avoid death, but to avoid unrighteousness; for any harm. Had I money I might have estimated that runs faster than death. I am old and move the offence at what I was able to pay, and not slowly, and the slower runner has overtaken me, have been much the worse. But I have none, and and my accusers are keen and quick, and the therefore I must ask you to proportion the fine to faster runner, who is unrighteousness, has over- my means. Well, perhaps I could afford a mina, taken them. And now I depart hence condemned and therefore I propose that penalty: Plato, by you to suffer the penalty of death,—they too Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, my friends go their ways condemned by the truth to suffer here, bid me say thirty minae, and they will be the penalty of villainy and wrong; and I must the sureties. Let thirty minae be the penalty; for abide by my award—let them abide by theirs. I which sum they will be ample security to you. suppose that these things may be regarded as … fated,—and I think that they are well. Not much time will be gained, O Athenians, in And now, O men who have condemned me, return for the evil name which you will get from I would fain prophesy to you; for I am about to the detractors of the city, who will say that you die, and in the hour of death men are gifted killed Socrates, a wise man; for they will call me with prophetic power. And I prophesy to you wise, even although I am not wise, when they who are my murderers, that immediately after want to reproach you. If you had waited a little my departure punishment far heavier than you while, your desire would have been fulfilled in the have inflicted on me will surely await you. Me course of nature. For I am far advanced in years, you have killed because you wanted to escape as you may perceive, and not far from death. I the accuser, and not to give an account of your am speaking now not to all of you, but only to lives. But that will not be as you suppose: far those who have condemned me to death. And I otherwise. For I say that there will be more have another thing to say to them: you think that accusers of you than there are now; accusers I was convicted because I had no words of the whom hitherto I have restrained: and as they are sort which would have procured my acquittal—I younger they will be more inconsiderate with mean, if I had thought fit to leave nothing undone you, and you will be more offended at them. If or unsaid. Not so; the deficiency which led to my you think that by killing men you can prevent conviction was not of words—certainly not. But I some one from censuring your evil lives, you are had not the boldness or impudence or inclination mistaken; that is not a way of escape which is to address you as you would have liked me to do, either possible or honourable; the easiest and weeping and wailing and lamenting, and saying the noblest way is not to be disabling others, but and doing many things which you have been to be improving yourselves. This is the prophecy accustomed to hear from others, and which, as which I utter before my departure to the judges I maintain, are unworthy of me. I thought at the who have condemned me. time that I ought not to do anything common or Friends, who would have acquitted me, I mean when in danger: nor do I now repent of would like also to talk with you about the thing the style of my defence; I would rather die hav- which has come to pass, while the magistrates ing spoken after my manner, than speak in your are busy, and before I go to the place at which manner and live. For neither in war nor yet at law I must die. Stay then a little, for we may as ought I or any man to use every way of escap- well talk with one another while there is ing death. Often in battle there can be no doubt time. You are my friends, and I should like to that if a man will throw away his arms, and fall show you the meaning of this event which has on his knees before his pursuers, he may escape happened to me. O my judges—for you I may death; and in other dangers there are other ways truly call judges—I should like to tell you of a of escaping death, if a man is willing to say and wonderful circumstance. Hitherto the divine do anything. The difficulty, my friends, is not to faculty of which the internal oracle is the source 40 | Introduction to Philosophy has constantly been in the habit of opposing me and Triptolemus, and other sons of God who even about trifles, if I was going to make a slip were righteous in their own life, that pilgrimage or error in any matter; and now as you see there will be worth making. What would not a man has come upon me that which may be thought, give if he might converse with Orpheus and and is generally believed to be, the last and worst Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? Nay, if this be evil. But the oracle made no sign of opposition, true, let me die again and again. I myself, too, either when I was leaving my house in the morn- shall have a wonderful interest in their meeting ing, or when I was on my way to the court, or and conversing with Palamedes, and Ajax the while I was speaking, at anything which I was son of Telamon, and any other ancient hero who going to say; and yet I have often been stopped has suffered death through an unjust judgment; in the middle of a speech, but now in nothing and there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in I either said or did touching the matter in hand comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above has the oracle opposed me. What do I take to be all, I shall then be able to continue my search the explanation of this silence? I will tell you. It into true and false knowledge; as in this world, is an intimation that what has happened to me so also in the next; and I shall find out who is is a good, and that those of us who think that wise, and who pretends to be wise, and is not. death is an evil are in error. For the customary What would not a man give, O judges, to be able sign would surely have opposed me had I been to examine the leader of the great Trojan expe- going to evil and not to good. dition; or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see others, men and women too! What infinite de- that there is great reason to hope that death is light would there be in conversing with them and a good; for one of two things—either death is a asking them questions! In another world they state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, do not put a man to death for asking questions: or, as men say, there is a change and migration assuredly not. For besides being happier than we of the soul from this world to another. Now if are, they will be immortal, if what is said is true. you suppose that there is no consciousness, but Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about a sleep like the sleep of him who is undisturbed death, and know of a certainty, that no evil can even by dreams, death will be an unspeakable happen to a good man, either in life or after gain. For if a person were to select the night death. He and his are not neglected by the gods; in which his sleep was undisturbed even by nor has my own approaching end happened by dreams, and were to compare with this the other mere chance. But I see clearly that the time had days and nights of his life, and then were to tell arrived when it was better for me to die and us how many days and nights he had passed in be released from trouble; wherefore the oracle the course of his life better and more pleasantly gave no sign. For which reason, also, I am not than this one, I think that any man, I will not say a angry with my condemners, or with my accusers; private man, but even the great king will not find they have done me no harm, although they did many such days or nights, when compared with not mean to do me any good; and for this I may the others. Now if death be of such a nature, I gently blame them. say that to die is gain; for eternity is then only Still I have a favour to ask of them. When my a single night. But if death is the journey to an- sons are grown up, I would ask you, O my friends, other place, and there, as men say, all the dead to punish them; and I would have you trouble abide, what good, O my friends and judges, can them, as I have troubled you, if they seem to be greater than this? If indeed when the pilgrim care about riches, or anything, more than about arrives in the world below, he is delivered from virtue; or if they pretend to be something when the professors of justice in this world, and finds they are really nothing,—then reprove them, as I the true judges who are said to give judgment have reproved you, for not caring about that for there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus which they ought to care, and thinking that they Apology & Crito | 41 are something when they are really nothing. And if you do this, both I and my sons will have received justice at your hands. The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways—I to die, and you to live. Which is better God only knows.