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Foundations, City at Brink of Plan to Shrink Detroit
20100125-NEWS--0001-NAT-CCI-CD_-- 1/22/2010 6:21 PM Page 1 ® www.crainsdetroit.com Vol. 26, No. 4 JANUARY 25 – 31, 2010 $2 a copy; $59 a year ©Entire contents copyright 2010 by Crain Communications Inc. All rights reserved Page 3 Saudis seek Sales of small businesses down – are only the strong Davidson for sale? contract with Study calls on biz to help prevent diseases, cut costs Brighton Supreme Court ruling clears has her way for corporate, nonprofit Hospital stands on candidates BY JAY GREENE CRAIN’S DETROIT BUSINESS Inside St. John Health System’s Brighton Hospital has signed a letter of in- Firm’s pitch to governments: tent to begin discussions on a long- reasons term management contract with a Privatize building Saudi Arabian company that is building a 250-bed addiction treat- departments, Page 6 ment hospital in Riyadh. But estate tax isn’t After a nine-month internation- al search, Brighton Hospital was Finance Extra DUANE BURLESON/THE ASSOCIATED PRESS Owner Karen Davidson watches the Detroit Pistons chosen over other more famous one of them, rep says on Wednesday at the Palace of Auburn Hills. and larger addiction treatment ‘Our focus was on survival’: providers in Europe and the U.S. Bailouts, credit crunch because of its expertise, high suc- BY BILL SHEA Michael Layne of Farmington to shield her and the two adult cess rate, clinical care model and torpedo 2009 M&A, Page 11. CRAIN’S DETROIT BUSINESS Hills PR and marketing agency children named in the estate, 12-step treatment approach, said Marx Layne & Co., said on Friday there’s eventually a tax bill to Mohammed Al-Turaiki, CEO of Karen Davidson’s decision to that she doesn’t pay — potentially to the tune of Saudi Care for Rehabilitation and Crain’s List possibly sell the Detroit Pistons, owe any. -
Private Equity Buyouts in Healthcare: Who Wins, Who Loses? Eileen Appelbaum and Rosemary Batt Working Paper No
Private Equity Buyouts in Healthcare: Who Wins, Who Loses? Eileen Appelbaum* and Rosemary Batt† Working Paper No. 118 March 15, 2020 ABSTRACT Private equity firms have become major players in the healthcare industry. How has this happened and what are the results? What is private equity’s ‘value proposition’ to the industry and to the American people -- at a time when healthcare is under constant pressure to cut costs and prices? How can PE firms use their classic leveraged buyout model to ‘save healthcare’ while delivering ‘outsized returns’ to investors? In this paper, we bring together a wide range of sources and empirical evidence to answer these questions. Given the complexity of the sector, we focus on four segments where private equity firms have been particularly active: hospitals, outpatient care (urgent care and ambulatory surgery centers), physician staffing and emergency * Co-Director and Senior Economist, Center for Economic and Policy Research. [email protected] † Alice H. Cook Professor of Women and Work, HR Studies and Intl. & Comparative Labor ILR School, Cornell University. [email protected]. We thank Andrea Beaty, Aimee La France, and Kellie Franzblau for able research assistance. room services (surprise medical billing), and revenue cycle management (medical debt collecting). In each of these segments, private equity has taken the lead in consolidating small providers, loading them with debt, and rolling them up into large powerhouses with substantial market power before exiting with handsome returns. https://doi.org/10.36687/inetwp118 JEL Codes: I11 G23 G34 Keywords: Private Equity, Leveraged Buyouts, health care industry, financial engineering, surprise medical billing revenue cycle management, urgent care, ambulatory care. -
GP Spotlight 2020
GP Spotlight 2020 Featuring Dyal Capital Partners | Pantheon | Riverside Partners | Starwood Capital Group | Vista Equity Partners DYAL CAPITAL PARTNERS Building long-lasting institutions to partner GPs Dyal Capital Partners: Best Growth Manager (Fund Size >$1bn) yal Capital, a division of Neuberger Berman, was established in 2011, over which time it has forged D a reputation for being one of the private equity industry’s pre-eminent investors. To date, Dyal has raised four permanent capital vehicles, providing minority equity capital to more than 40 well-established private equity and hedge fund firms. Dyal’s latest vehicle – Dyal Capital Partners IV – attracted over USD9 billion of committed capital interests from its global network of investors, which include some of the biggest pen- sion funds, sovereign wealth funds and insurance companies. Aggregate commitments across all Dyal funds and co-invest- ment vehicles now total more than USD21.6 billion. Initially, we didn’t have a talent management group in “The investments we make are typically in the USD500 place, so some of elements of how we built the platform million to USD1 billion range,” remarks Michael Rees, were also reactive, based on questions PE sponsors were Managing Director and Head of Dyal Capital Partners. “It is coming to us with.” a narrow playing field and given we are so differentiated, Ultimately, Dyal’s modus operandi is about building we feel like we are in a pretty good spot.” long-lasting institutions based on a close alignment of inter- Rees puts Dyal’s success down to being a good partner. ests. “We look to partner with PE groups who are looking “We wanted to build a business that could become a to build an organisation that lasts longer than any one indi- leading partner to some of the best GPs in the world. -
Private Equity
OHIO PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM 277 EAST TOWN STREET, COLUMBUS, OH 43215-4642 1-800-222-PERS (7377) www.opers.org MEMORANDUM DATE: July 3, 2007 TO: OPERS Retirement Board Members Chris DeRose - Executive Director CC: Jennifer Hom, Director – Investments Greg Uebele, Senior Investment Officer – External Management FROM: Paul Rodgers, Portfolio Manager – Private Equity RE: Private Equity Update Purpose This memo provides a general update for the private equity activities. General Ohio-Midwest Discretionary Mandate On June 14, Credit Suisse held another “Breakfast Lecture Series” event in Dayton. The event attracted an audience of fifty people with the interaction between panelists and audience members once again vibrant. Those in attendance learned about the Ohio-Midwest initiative and its early results, the decision by OPERS to further support the program with another $50 million of capital, as well as the opportunities and attractiveness of investing in Ohio. One of the benefits of these meetings, beyond education and networking, is to stimulate deal flow opportunities. Credit Suisse’s Mel Carter reported shortly after the event that an entrepreneur in attendance approached one of the Ohio-Midwest Fund’s general partners and initiated a dialogue about the potential sale or recapitalization of his business. Such a meeting most likely would not have occurred had the Dayton event not taken place. Private Equity Procedures Staff is in the process of revising its General Partner Selection and Administration procedures to reflect the changes resulting from the shift in the advisory services model as well as improvements made with regard to workflow. Staff is coordinating this activity with Hamilton Lane, Investment Accounting, Audit, Legal, and Fund Management. -
Liste Des Sociétés De Gestion Agréées Et En Activité Au 29 Février 2020 1
Liste des sociétés de gestion agréées et en activité au 29 février 2020 1 Nombre de société agréées : 663 SGP: Société de gestion de portefeuille Date N Nom Activités de gestion N° d'agrément Adresse d'agrément Gestion de FIA (AIFM) 1 1 2 3 INVESTMENT MANAGERS 28/06/2001 GP01021 94 rue de la Victoire 75009 PARIS Gestion de mandats Gestion de FIA (AIFM) 2 111 CAPITAL 23/08/2017 GP-17000024 10 RUE HENRI ROCHEFORT 75017 PARIS Gestion de mandats 3 21 CENTRALE PARTNERS 12/02/1999 Gestion de FIA (AIFM) GP99006 9, avenue Hoche 75008 PARIS 4 360 CAPITAL PARTNERS 08/12/2011 Gestion de FIA (AIFM) GP-11000040 13 Avenue de l’Opera 75001 PARIS 5 4D GLOBAL ENERGY ADVISORS S.A.S 03/12/2008 Gestion de FIA (AIFM) GP-08000048 15 rue de la Baume 75008 PARIS 6 52 CAPITAL 20/07/2016 Gestion de FIA (AIFM) GP-16000019 4,place de la Concorde-1rue Royale 75008 Paris Gestion de FIA (AIFM) 7 A PLUS FINANCE SAS 20/11/1998 GP98051 8, rue Bellini 75116 PARIS Gestion de mandats 8 AALPS CAPITAL FRANCE 24/05/2017 Gestion de FIA (AIFM) GP-17000012 21,boulevard Haussmann 75009 Paris Gestion de FIA (AIFM) 9 ABC ARBITRAGE ASSET MANAGEMENT 28/12/2004 GP-04000067 18 rue du quatre Septembre 75002 PARIS Gestion de mandats 10 ABC GESTION 22/07/2014 Gestion de FIA (non AIFM) GP-14000032 12, place des Etats-Unis CS 70052 92547 Montrouge Cedex Gestion de FIA (AIFM) 11 ABENEX CAPITAL 19/05/1998 GP98014 9, avenue Matignon 75008 PARIS Gestion de mandats Gestion d'OPCVM 12 ABN AMRO INVESTMENT SOLUTIONS 20/09/1999 Gestion de FIA (AIFM) GP99027 3, avenue Hoche 75008 PARIS Gestion de mandats -
Cv-18-608313-00Cl Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Court File No.: CV-18-608313-00CL ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE COMMERCIAL LIST IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF FORME DEVELOPMENT GROUP INC. AND THE OTHER COMPANIES LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A" HERETO (the "Applicants") APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES’ CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE MONITOR (Returnable July 2, 2019) June 26, 2019 BENNETT JONES LLP 3400 One First Canadian Place P.O. Box 130 Toronto, Ontario M5X 1A4 Fax: (416) 863-1716 Sean Zweig (LSO #57307I) Tel: (416) 777-6254 Aiden Nelms (LSO#74170S) Tel: (416) 777-4642 Counsel to KSV Kofman Inc., solely in its capacity as Court-appointed monitor and not in its personal capacity INDEX TAB DESCRIPTION 1 Nortel Networks Corp., Re, [2009] O.J. No. 3169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Comm. List]). 2 Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp., (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.). 3 Bloom Lake, g.p.l., 2015 QCCS 1920. 4 Terrace Bay Pulp Inc., Re , 2012 ONSC 4247 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]. 5 Re AbitibiBowater Inc., 2010 QCCS 1742 (C.S. Que.). TAB 1 Nortel Networks Corp., Re, 2009 CarswellOnt 4467 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, [2009] O.J. No. 3169, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 265... 2009 CarswellOnt 4467 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List] Nortel Networks Corp., Re 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, [2009] O.J. No. 3169, 179 A.C.W.S. -
The German Internet Industry 2016-2019 the German Industry 2016-2019 Internet
The German Internet Industry 2016-2019 The German Industry 2016-2019 Internet WE ARE SHAPING THE INTERNET. Table of Contents 1. Introduction .5 1.1 Reality check of the claims in the previous studies .6 1.2 Infographic explaining the underlying concepts of the market model .7 2. The German Internet Industry in Facts and Figures .10 2.1 Projections 2012–2019 .10 2.2 The Impact of the Commercial Internet on Germany as an Industry Location .13 3. A detailed look at the individual layers and segments .16 of the Internet industry 3.1 NETWORK, INFRASTRUCTURE & OPERATIONS .16 3.1.1 Colocation & Housing .18 3.1.2 Internet Exchanges .20 3.1.3 Internet Backbone, Transit & CDN .22 3.1.4 Fixed Internet Access Network .24 3.1.5 Mobile Internet Access Network .26 3.2 SERVICES & APPLICATIONS .28 3.2.1 Cloud Computing – Public IaaS .30 3.2.2 Cloud Computing – Public PaaS .32 3.2.3 Cloud Computing – Public SaaS .34 3.2.4 Web Hosting & Domains .36 3.3 AGGREGATION & TRANSACTIONS .38 3.3.1 Online Advertising & Internet Presence .40 3.3.2 Portals & Classified Marketplaces .42 3.3.3 Billing & Payment .44 3.3.4 E-Commerce B2B .46 3.3.5 E-Commerce B2C .48 3.4 PAID CONTENT .50 3.4.1 Gaming .52 3.4.2 Gambling .54 3.4.3 TV & Video .56 3.4.4 Music & Radio .58 3.4.5 E-Publishing .60 4. 20 Years of eco in Germany .62 4.1 eco is shaping the Internet .62 4.2 The Development of eco in figures .63 4.3 Worldwide Distribution of Member Companies .64 4.4 eco Services .65 5. -
Zalando Q1/2021 Earnings Call
Zalando Q2/2021 Earnings Call August 5th, 2021 David Schröder, CFO 1 Exceptional H1 performance underlines our opportunity to play an even bigger role for customers and partners through our platform strategy Growing customer and partner engagement: Active Customers grew by >30% to 44.5m and Partner Program GMV by >100% in H1 while pandemic induced restrictions have been gradually lifted. Elevating our Beauty proposition: Building a distinct Beauty proposition is a key priority for us and the Sephora partnership presents an attractive opportunity to accelerate our growth trajectory. Expanding our footprint in Europe: Customers in six additional markets can now enjoy Zalando’s endless choice, seamless convenience and tailored digital experience. Delivering strong financial results in Q2: Delivered GMV growth of +40% YoY and strong profitability with an adj. EBIT margin of 6.7% against exceptional Q2/2020 comparables. Reiterating FY/2021 guidance: GMV and revenue growth unchanged at +31-36% and +26-31% YoY, respectively, adj. EBIT now expected to reach the upper half of the guided 400-475m EUR range. 2 Business Update Q2 2021 3 Strongest absolute growth in active customers on record and increasing order frequency demonstrate strong consumer demand Active customers (in #m) Average orders per active customer 4.7 5.0 (LTM in #) Q2/20 Q2/21 Average basket size after returns1 57.0 57.7 44.5 (LTM in €) 34.1 Q2/20 Q2/21 GMV per active Q2/20 Q2/21 customer2 268.7 289.8 (LTM in €) Q2/20 Q2/21 1) Defined as GMV divided by the number of orders 2) Defined as GMV divided by the number of active customers 4 Customers acquired during the first lockdown in 2020 continued to remain very active as stores reopened and restrictions eased throughout Q2 Repurchase rate March & April 2020 vs. -
PM 2012 Sample Pages.Indd
Executive Summary - Sample Pages The 2012 Preqin Private Equity Performance Monitor Fig. 1.1: PrEQIn Index: All Strategies 1. Executive Summary 300 250 PrEQIn All Private Equity 200 Despite challenging conditions in wider In the latter part of 2011, however, the ability PrEQIn Buyout fi nancial markets, private equity has of private equity funds to deliver attractive 150 weathered the crisis well. The onset of the returns was tested yet again, with wider Index Returns 100 PrEQIn fi nancial downturn and the introduction of fi nancial markets experiencing volatility Venture Capital mark-to-market valuations in 2008 saw brought on in part by an escalation of the 50 steep losses in the short term; however, sovereign debt crisis in Europe. This has (rebased to 100 as of 31-Dec-2000) since that time the asset class as a whole led to two important questions – how have 0 has been in a state of recovery. private equity funds fared, and can such investments provide returns to investors in The PrEQIn Index, shown in Fig. 1.1, times of economic uncertainty? 31-Dec-00 31-Dec-01 31-Dec-02 31-Dec-03 31-Dec-04 31-Dec-05 31-Dec-06 31-Dec-07 31-Dec-08 31-Dec-09 31-Dec-10 31-Dec-11 tracks the quarterly movements in the performance of the private equity industry Private Equity Performance: The Emerging since December 2000, illustrating the Picture Fig. 1.2: All Private Equity - J-Curve: Annual Median Net IRRs by Vintage Year downturn as well as the subsequent rebound of private equity fund returns. -
2011 Le 28 Mars 2012
ACTIVITÉ DES ACTEURS FRANÇAIS DU CAPITAL INVESTISSEMENT Année 2011 Le 28 mars 2012 Concerne les acteurs français membres de l’AFIC, investissant en France et à l’étranger page 1 www.afic-data.com L’ORGANISATION DU PARTENARIAT AFIC – GRANT THORNTON Revue de la méthodologie par le Comité Scientifique de l’AFIC Elaboration de la méthodologie, collecte et traitement de l'information par l'AFIC Audit des données et du traitement de l'information par Grant Thornton page 2 page 2 AUDIT RÉALISÉ PAR GRANT THORNTON : LES CONCLUSIONS • OBJECTIFS DES CONTRÔLES – Exhaustivité des opérations (levées de fonds, investissements, désinvestissements). – Vraisemblance des montants déclarés. – Cohérence du passage des données désagrégées aux agrégats. • TRAVAUX RÉALISÉS – Comparaison de la base de données Grant Thornton (source presse) avec www.afic-data.com. – Vérification des règles de cut off d'ouverture (absence de doublons entre les périodes 2010 et 2011) – Mise en place de différents tests permettant de contrôler la cohérence des informations recueillies sur l'exhaustivité de la base. – Proposition d'analyses complémentaires. – Vérification des traitements réalisés et du calcul des agrégats. – Identification des écarts, analyses et commentaires de l'AFIC puis mise à jour de la base de données si nécessaire. • CONCLUSIONS – Engagement de 300 heures par Grant Thornton de contrôle de la base www.afic-data.com. – La base de données www.afic-data.com n'a pas révélé d'anomalies significatives. page 3 page 3 MÉTHODOLOGIE • PRINCIPES DE COLLECTE – Des statistiques établies sur la base des réponses collectées via le site Internet sécurisé www.afic-data.com dédié aux membres de l'AFIC. -
Abstimmungsergebnisse Deka Investment Gmbh
Abstimmungsergebnisse Deka Investment GmbH Zeitraum: 1. Januar 2018 – 31. Dezember 2018 Abstimmungsergebnisse Deka Investment GmbH 1&1 Drillisch AG Meeting Date: 17/05/2018 Country: Germany Meeting Type: Annual Ticker: DRI Primary ISIN: DE0005545503 Primary SEDOL: 5734672 Proposal Vote Number Proposal Text Proponent Mgmt Rec Instruction 1 Receive Financial Statements and Statutory Mgmt Reports for Fiscal 2017 (Non-Voting) 2 Approve Allocation of Income and Dividends Mgmt For For of EUR 1.60 per Share 3.1 Approve Discharge of Management Board Mgmt For For Member Vlasios Choulidis for Fiscal 2017 3.2 Approve Discharge of Management Board Mgmt For For Member Andre Driesen for Fiscal 2017 3.3 Approve Discharge of Management Board Mgmt For For Member Martin Witt for Fiscal 2017 4.1 Approve Discharge of Supervisory Board Mgmt For Against Member Michael Scheeren for Fiscal 2017 4.2 Approve Discharge of Supervisory Board Mgmt For For Member Kai-Uwe Ricke for Fiscal 2017 4.3 Approve Discharge of Supervisory Board Mgmt For For Member Kurt Dobitsch for Fiscal 2017 4.4 Approve Discharge of Supervisory Board Mgmt For For Member Norbert Lang for Fiscal 2017 4.5 Approve Discharge of Supervisory Board Mgmt For For Member Marc Brucherseifer for Fiscal 2017 4.6 Approve Discharge of Supervisory Board Mgmt For For Member Horst Lennertz for Fiscal 2017 4.7 Approve Discharge of Supervisory Board Mgmt For For Member Frank Rothauge for Fiscal 2017 4.8 Approve Discharge of Supervisory Board Mgmt For For Member Susanne Rueckert for Fiscal 2017 4.9 Approve Discharge -
Pay Now Or Pay Later? the Economics Within the Private Equity Partnership
Pay Now or Pay Later? The Economics within the Private Equity Partnership The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Ivashina, Victoria, and Josh Lerner. "Pay Now or Pay Later? The Economics within the Private Equity Partnership." Journal of Financial Economics 131, no. 1 (January 2019): 61–87. Published Version https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.07.017 Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:41845080 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#OAP Pay Now or Pay Later?: The Economics within the Private Equity Partnership Victoria Ivashina Harvard University and NBER Josh Lerner Harvard University and NBER First draft: March 9, 2016 This draft: March 1, 2017 Abstract The economics of partnerships have been of enduring interest to economists, yet it is not clear what profit sharing within a private partnership should look like. We examine over seven hundred private equity partnerships, and show that the allocation of fund economics to individual partners varies drastically even among the most senior partners and appears divorced from past success as an investor, being instead related to status as a founder. A smaller share of carried interest and ownership—and inequality in fund economics more generally—is associated with departures of senior partners, which, in turn, is negatively related to the funds’ ability to raise additional capital.