Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters August 2014, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 242–274.
Developing a Local Recovery Management Framework: Report on the Post-Disaster Strategies and Approaches Taken by Three Local Governments in the U.S. Following Major Disasters
Laurie A. Johnson
Laurie Johnson Consulting | Research
Email: [email protected]
Comparative case studies of post-disaster recovery are limited, and even fewer have explored organizational approaches to disaster recovery, especially local governments. This paper describes research on the post-disaster strategies and approaches taken by three local governments in the U.S. following major disasters: Los Angeles, California (following the 1994 Northridge earthquake); Grand Forks, North Dakota (following the 1997 Red River flood); and New Orleans, Louisiana (following 2005 Hurricane Katrina). The management practices, recovery timelines, and resulting outcomes were examined for each city. This research proposes a local recovery management framework that can extend the Incident Command System (ICS)-based emergency management structure into recovery, helping to standardize recovery management practices and improve local government effectiveness in recovery. Such a model has diagnostic application to determine gaps in local government capabilities to manage post-disaster recovery and identify needed support and resources—both financial and technical; it can also serve as a framework for recovery exercises and training.
Keywords: Local government, Public management, Disaster recovery, Recovery management, Recovery planning.
Introduction
When Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in 2005, there were a limited number of professionals in the U.S. who had faced the difficult task of managing local government recovery following a major, urban disaster. Professional societies, academic institutions, and federal and state agencies organized conferences and flew in teams of civic leaders, academics and practitioners to share previous experiences with their
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Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework counterparts in New Orleans and other devastated localities. The few academic papers, guidebooks and other potential training materials on local-level post-disaster recovery— like the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)/American Planning Association (APA) guide, Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction (Schwab 1998), were distributed broadly to local managers, academics and consultants. Some professionals and non-profit organizations offered their services pro bono, other professionals signed up with FEMA and its large-scale implementation of Emergency Support Function #14—Long-term Community Recovery Planning, and an army of consultants were hired by state and local agencies to assist (Olshansky et al. 2008). Previous disaster programs, organizational structures, and other “best practices” were quickly studied and applied anew. Again and again, local recovery management approaches were invented; many others unknowingly reinvented. In the U.S., organizational responses to disasters have been the subject of disaster research since the 1950s, but their focus has been mainly on the emergency period and less so on recovery; few studies have looked at recovery from the point of view of local government management (Drabek 2007; Tierney 1995). Also, given the infrequency of disaster events, there has been an inherent lack of systematic study to develop quantitative data as well as qualitative indicators of recovery (Miles and Chang 2006). Instead, researchers tend to “build up knowledge one disaster at a time” and studies often lack a common understanding with respect to disaster “origins, dynamics, and outcomes” (Tierney 2007:520). Furthermore, there is not yet a profession of local disaster recovery management in the U.S. Rather, the management of recovery tasks typically comes from several different parts of local government; and, for many involved; it is an extension of the chaos of disaster response. There are approximately 88,000 local-level entities—cities, counties, special districts, and tribal organizations—in the U.S. Local government is the level of government that most citizens interact with on a daily basis. “It employs more people, provides more direct services and is the most likely point of contact between government and citizens” (R. Cox in Newell 2004:1). The regulation of land use, building construction, and redevelopment, and the provisions of basic urban services (e.g. utilities, education, medical care, community centers) are all primarily the responsibility of local governments and other local-level entities (e.g. utility districts, schools boards, hospital districts).
Research Methods and Approach
This paper reports on research undertaken to help improve the ability of local governments to manage recovery following major disasters. In particular, the study questioned whether: 1) the Incident Command System (ICS)/National Incident Management System (NIMS) management framework used in the U.S. for emergency
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Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework response could be extended to help local governments transition into recovery and structure local recovery management; and 2) whether there were some strategic management practices that, if employed by local governments post-disaster, could enhance local recovery efficiency and effectiveness. The study approach was to first understand the state of knowledge and practice on disaster recovery management, and then to systematically examine the post-disaster strategies and approaches taken by three local governments in the U.S. that have faced significant disasters. The study aspires to: 1) advance the theoretical understanding of the urban disaster recovery process; 2) define recovery management strategies and principles to inform recovery policymaking; and, 3) enhance the capabilities and effectiveness of local governments to manage recovery following major disasters. The research was conducted over a two-year period between 2007 and 2009; however, it draws upon the author’s observation and participation in the post-disaster recovery planning and management of cities both within the U.S. and internationally over more than two decades. Literature related to urban disaster recovery from mainly the U.S. and Japan was first examined; it included research on disaster recovery management principles, strategies, and models; post-disaster recovery tasks and best practices; and models and methods for measuring recovery outcomes. A qualitative description of the historical evolution the U.S. disaster management system over the last century, and the regulatory framework of major national, state and local laws, policies and programs relevant to urban disaster recovery, was also prepared. These reviews drew upon three officially-recognized forms of disaster literature cited in the Handbook of Disaster Research (Rodriguez et al. 2007:xiv–xv): popular literature that includes newspaper and other forms of media reporting, as well as popular books on disaster events and lessons; official literature, such as official documents of governmental, quasi-governmental, and non-profit agencies; and, professional and scientific literature, primarily from the social, physical, and engineering academic and professional publications and meeting proceedings. The research also systematically examined the post-disaster strategies and approaches taken by three local governments in the U.S. that have faced major disasters. The case studies are the cities of Los Angeles, California (following the 1994 Northridge earthquake); Grand Forks, North Dakota (following the 1997 Red River flood); and New Orleans, Louisiana (following 2005 Hurricane Katrina). During the initial years following each selected case study disaster, the author was either directly involved in the recovery efforts, or conducting research in each locality. In Los Angeles, the author participated in several research studies following the January 1994 earthquake. In Grand Forks, the author worked for the first six months of the city’s recovery from the April 1997 flood as a consultant funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to assist the city in its recovery management and was a lead author of the city’s recovery plan. In New Orleans, the author performed research during the first year of the city’s
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Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework recovery following Hurricane Katrina, and then worked in New Orleans for six months helping to prepare the city’s recovery plan. The case study method employed in this research has limitations, particularly in limiting the reproducibility or universal application of any policy conclusions drawn from the cases. The cases selected for this study were all major disasters that affected significant physical, social, economic, and institutional elements of the cities studied, and thus, there will certainly be issues of scalability of the policy conclusions for more moderate events and in different political and policy settings. Nonetheless, case study research remains one of the best methods for understanding complex social phenomena such as public policy and administration in a real-life, post-disaster situations (Yin 2009). The detailed reviews of the literature related to urban disaster recovery and the U.S. disaster management system were included in the study to help provide policy and theoretical context for each case, and to help extend the applicability of insights gathered from each case. Also, each case study was prepared using a common structure that was developed as part of this research. It included an explanation of the author’s research and practice relevant to the case; a description of the structure of city governance at the time of the disaster, facts about the disaster, and a summary of damage and losses; a description of the recovery management structure of the city, federal and state recovery assistance, private and non-profit recovery assistance (including insurance), and the recovery strategies and programs for transportation, infrastructure and public facilities, housing, business, and hazard mitigation; examination of the use of seven strategic management practices; construction of a timeline for key recovery operations and programs, as well as milestones for key decisions and funding commitments; and, analysis of the physical, socioeconomic, and institutional recovery restoration and resilience outcomes. Each case study was also prepared using accepted forms of disaster literature, previous work products from the author’s recovery research and practice, personal experience, and interview and field notes. Then, all three case studies and the recovery outcome rankings were peer reviewed by local officials or researchers with firsthand knowledge of the recovery process and outcomes.
Disaster Recovery as a Complex, Multi-dimensional Process
While recovery scholars are starting to concur on a definition of recovery as “a complex and urgent process to achieve functionality of socio-ecological systems and adapt to new conditions” following perturbation by an extreme event (PERI 2011), there are still gaps in recovery theory, how it should be modeled and measured, and what constitutes successful or effective recovery (Comerio 2005; Olshansky and Chang 2009). Disaster recovery encompasses the restoration and rebuilding of the physical, social, economic and institutional elements that comprise our modern urban settings (Hayashi
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2007; Mileti 1999; Olshansky and Chang 2009); but in a greatly contracted timeframe (Olshansky and Johnson 2010). The compression comes from the pressure by individuals, businesses and institutions—both directly and indirectly impacted—to restore normalcy as quickly and practicably as possible (Haas et al. 1977; Olshansky et al. 2006). This compression also means that decision-making must go faster than information and planning generally flows (Haas et al. 1977; Olshansky and Chang 2009); that issues frequently emerge simultaneously or in illogical sequences (Rubin 1985); and time to deliberate and satisfactorily involve stakeholders in the recovery decision-making is always challenged (Birch and Wachter 2006; Inam 1999; Olshansky et al. 2006; Schwab 1998). Haas et al. (1977), Spangle Associates (1991) and others have agreed that recovery and reconstruction can take 10 or more years to complete; however, the process does not have a clear end point (Rubin 1985). Instead, at some point, the majority of urban activity is less likely associated with the disaster and more likely to be part of the more routine urban activities. Recovery is increasingly viewed as a bottom-up process comprised of the many decisions and actions taken by individuals, businesses, and institutions with no unitary decision maker (Alesch 2005). “There are hundreds or thousands of decision makers, only some of whom are public policy makers. What happens in (recovery) is, to a considerable extent, the outcome of hundreds and thousands of individual choices” (Alesch 2005). Managing the recovery process then becomes a process of influencing the many, simultaneous decisions that are being made by individuals, businesses, and institutions to achieve this vision. Also, in recovery, there is a significant opportunity to rebuild stronger, change land use patterns, reduce development in hazardous areas, and also reshape social, political and economic pre-existing conditions; but consideration of these opportunities competes with the community pressures to restore normalcy and the substantial uncertainty inherent in the process (Alesch, Arendt and Holly 2009; Arnold 1993; Berke et al. 1993; Haas et al. 1977; Schwab 1998; Spangle Associates 1991). Researchers have proposed that a more holistic recovery process has “sustainability,” “resiliency,” “robustness,” and “vision” as guiding principles (Bruneau et al. 2003; Natural Hazards Center 2005; Smith and Wenger 2007; Sternberg and Tierney 1998; Vale and Campanella 2005). Over 100 titles of the disaster recovery literature of the past 30 years were collected and examined as part of this research; yet, this review found that no comprehensive set of recovery measures. Thus, as indicated in Table 1, 36 qualitative measures were used in analyzing recovery outcomes in the three case study cities. These measures were grouped into physical (9), social (8), economic (6), and institutional (13) indicators so that the outcomes of recovery might be assessed from multiple perspectives. All items suggested by the literature were included and there was remarkable consistency across the literature. Some of the measures are defined as restoration indicators since they are more related to direct products or outcomes of the process of recovery (i.e. numbers of houses repaired or
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Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework rebuilt). Also, indicators of resilience are also defined to describe how future disruption has been minimized, flexibility and adaptability have been added, and other improvements have been made as part of the recovery process.
Table 1. Compilation of Recovery Restoration and Resilience Indicators Derived from Disaster Recovery Research Literature and Studies
Elements Recovery Restoration Indicators Recovery Resilience Indicators • Rebuilt residential units • Implemented mitigation improvements • Rebuilt commercial/industrial to residential units properties • Implemented mitigation improvements Restored utilities and rebuilt to commercial/ industrial units Physical • infrastructure • Implemented mitigation improvements • Rebuilt public facilities to public facilities and infrastructure • Removed visual evidence of • Implemented environmental disaster recovery/improvements • Retained population/residents • Provided affordable and ample • Resumed schools and residential housing supply educational opportunities • Improved neighborhood conditions Social • Satisfied basic human needs and • Increased social and geographic daily life equity • Maintained/restored mental and • Increased social networks resilience physical health and self-reliance • Resumed/retained jobs • Increased supply of affordable • Resumed/retained business commercial/industrial space Increased economic diversity and Economic • Restored cultural/historical/ • recreation/tourist amenities business/market/job growth • Improved wealth recovery/sustainability • Completed timely recovery action • Established institutionalized routines, and reconstruction redundancy, sustainable capacity • Provided leadership, innovation, • Established institutionalized, creativity and vision strengthened and sustainable planning • Used high-quality information with • Improved fiscal recovery/sustainability agreed meanings in decision- • Improved political recovery/ making sustainability Institution Achieved robust stakeholder al • • Achieved resident and business representation and decision satisfaction with institutions/outcomes agreement • Achieved positive external • Provided ample resources that reputation/perception can be leveraged to meet needs • Established post-disaster risk • Achieved intergovernmental management/ preparedness collaboration and institutional commitment equity
Understanding Recovery Management Policy and Practices
Recovery policymaking in the U.S. has also evolved over time, mostly in reaction to disasters; only a few of these have been major urban disasters (Birkland 1997; Rubin 2007). Most of this policymaking emphasis has been on post-disaster financing and
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Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework federal programs, and generally lacked clear and explicit objectives about the role of government—at all levels—in disaster recovery (Smith and Wenger 2007). Historically lacking a comprehensive strategy, it has been difficult for government to motivate individuals, businesses, and all the many private and public institutions that need to invest resources in recovery (Topping and Flores 1997). The major pieces of federal legislation that have been passed, most notably the Disaster Relief Act of 1950 (and as amended in 1974), Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 5121-5207), Homeland Security Act of 2002, and Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) of 2006, all attempted to clarify the role of the federal government, in particular, in disaster response and recovery (Rubin 2007). In particular, the PKEMRA of 2006 directed DHS-FEMA to prepare a National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) (Rubin 2007). The majority of this research was performed before work on the NDRF was undertaken. The final version of the NDRF, published in September 2011, specifies for the first time: core recovery principles; roles and responsibilities of federal agencies, recovery coordinators and other stakeholders; a coordinating structure that facilitates communication and collaboration among all stakeholders; guidance for pre- and post- disaster recovery planning; and, community-level guidance for implementing and managing recovery (FEMA 2011). While it is still too soon to analyze the effectiveness of the framework in managing and coordinating recovery, the NDRF is a key source of administrative guidance and its core principles, and recommendations on structure and leadership for recovery, are considered in the findings of this article. With respect to federal programs for recovery, the Stafford Act specifies three programs that are required (statutorily) to be applied after a Presidentially-declared disaster (FEMA 2005). They are: Individual and Household Assistance (IA), Public Assistance (PA) to repair damaged public facilities and infrastructure, and Hazard Mitigation Grants (HMGP) to reduce future losses. Also, the Small Business Act specifies the role of the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) in disaster response; SBA automatically activates when a Presidential disaster declaration is made (FEMA 2005). However, an array of other federal programs that were enacted for different (non- disaster specific) purposes are used in major urban disasters, most notably the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Community Development Block Grant Program. Federal agencies and programs, along with private insurance, philanthropic funding, and other state, local and private resources, combine to serve a mix of clients—state and local public agencies, non-profit agencies, individuals, businesses—and intended outcomes in disaster recovery. While arguably the programmatic approach may work well for most (moderate) disasters, in major disasters, recovery policy and practices tend to be overly fixated on the management of federal and state assistance programs. This can undermine the abilities of
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Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework all levels of government to positively influence recovery decisions—in both the public and private sectors—and also to achieve betterment in the recovery process (Alesch et al. 2009; Olshansky et al. 2006). The legislative branches of federal and state government, in particular, also can’t afford to ignore the devastation caused by large-scale disasters in their constituencies (Inam 2005). Thus, the disaster recovery process can be highly vulnerable to, or conversely dependent upon, disaster politics, competency of leadership, and public choice. Also, with each disaster, the landscape of disaster recovery management inevitably changes (Birkland 2006). The rules and guidelines for both public funding and private insurance change, new governmental organizations emerge, and the roles and functions of government vary (Rubin 2007; Smith and Wenger 2007; Olshansky and Johnson 2010). The NDRF specifies a core principle of “Leadership and Local Primacy” in recovery (FEMA 2011:9). The NDRF (FEMA 2011:9-10) acknowledges that local, state and tribal governments have “primary responsibility for the recovery of their communities and play the lead role in planning for and managing all aspects of community recovery… States act in support of their communities, evaluate their capabilities and provide a means of support for overwhelmed local governments. The Federal Government is a partner and facilitator in recovery, prepared to enlarge its role when the disaster impacts relate to areas where Federal jurisdiction is primary or affects national security.” While local governments have the greatest stake in recovery and bear the ultimate responsibility of physical, social and economic outcomes of the recovery process, by definition, the demands of major disasters exceed the capacities of individuals, local, regional, state, and sometimes even national resources to respond and recover (Smith and Wenger 2007). Thus, recovery inevitably necessitates a collaborative pooling of governmental resources, as well as those of individuals and private and non-governmental organizations (Alesch et al. 2009; Inam 2005). Of all levels of governments, local governments have the greatest knowledge of the multitude of recovery decision makers, experience in integrating citizen and business input into local planning and visioning processes, and providing information for citizen and business decision-making. But individual local governments experience disasters with less frequency, are typically the least knowledgeable about disaster recovery programs, and can become overwhelmed with the responsibilities of managing post- disaster recovery in conjunction with non-disaster operations (Smith and Wenger 2007:240). Conversely, state and federal agencies may have more disaster recovery experience and expertise in post-disaster assistance programs, but not as much in local politics, policies, and tools. Community Recovery was the first U.S. study that carefully examined governmental organization and recovery processes at a community-level (Rubin 1985). However, there remains limited research guidance regarding appropriate organizational management approaches to disaster recovery, particularly local government management (Olshansky
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Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework and Chang 2009). Organizational management is a process of planning, organizing, leading and controlling an organization’s human, financial, physical and information resources to achieve organization goals; in recovery, there are multiple organizations involved in management. To deal with the multitude of actors, complexities, and the unexpected nature of response and recovery, scholars have proposed a host of organizational management approaches and strategies that include leadership (Rubin 1985; Spangle Associates 2002); coordination, collaboration, and deliberation (Birch and Wachter 2006; Drabek 2007; Mileti 1999; Schwab 1998); organizational adaptation, innovation, and capacity building (Chaladna et al. 2006; Innes and Booher 2002; Kendra and Wachtendorf 2007; Rubin 1985); sequential and time-based management (Haas et al. 1977; Spangle Associates 1991); spatial and systems management (Alesch et al. 2009; Helbing et al. 2006; Murosaki 2007; Steele and Verma 2006). Among these, leadership is highly valued in local recovery management; aggressive leadership approaches in the first few years of recovery help build positive momentum for local recovery (Rubin 1985). Successful communities must quickly identify their recovery needs, and decide upon their priority objectives and organizational and decision framework (Rubin 1985). Many scholars have emphasized that facilitation; flexible, creative styles of problem solving; a multi-governmental shared vision of the community’s recovery; and strong links to other public and private decision makers are essential leadership skills throughout recovery (Olshansky et al. 2006; Rubin 1985; Schwab 1998; Sternberg and Tierney 1998). Others have emphasized that successful management recognized the time-dependency of management tasks and decision-making (Haas et al. 1977; Murosaki 2007; Spangle Associates 1991; 1994). In major disasters, it may be time consuming and difficult to deliberate, innovate new programs, and implement creative new schemes; and the outcomes are likely to be more uncertain (Bolin and Stanford 1998). Many other scholars have found relying on familiar routines and programs, and the use of pre-disaster plans and effective administrative and development management mechanisms (e.g., land use controls, redevelopment, building permits, information systems, mutual aid agreements) are all important to facilitating recovery (Inam 2005; Olshansky et al. 2006; Spangle Associates 1997; Sternberg and Tierney 1998). It is hard to coordinate people and organizations that have not collaborated before and do not know each other’s management structures (Helbing et al. 2006). This in part, explains the nationwide push for universal adoption of a U.S. National Incident Management System (NIMS) which is based upon the Incident Command System (ICS) (Tierney 2007). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 defines NIMS as a system to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management (DHS 2008:93). ICS was developed in the 1970s to coordinate wildfire resource mobilization in the U.S. and it is designed to help create a common operational picture across multiple organizations,
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Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework standardizing organizational template and creating a “unified command” in crisis (Harrald 2007). It has been credited with helping to maximize organizational capacity and mutual aid with standardized functions, processes and protocols (Harrald 2007). But, it has been criticized for not generalizing well to all types of organizations responding to all types of hazards (Lutz and Lindell 2008). There are five main functional areas in ICS/NIMS that are remarkably consistent with the basic definition of organizational management. They are: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance and Administration (DHS 2008). Command develops a “common operational picture,” sets goals, objectives and priorities, and manages internal and external communications. The other four functions work in support of Command. Operations implement the priority actions. Planning facilitates creation of “common operational picture” and action planning to set priorities, objectives, strategies, and tactics. Logistics provides resources (e.g. personnel, facilities, supplies), including mutual aid, to fulfill operations. Finance and Administration tracks costs and manages reimbursements for operations. While it is intended for all phases of incident management, NIMS is mostly used in emergency response. The State of California first adopted ICS as a statewide management model in the 1990s—known as the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS). SEMS was used by local and state agencies following the Northridge earthquake and is credited with helping facilitate a well-coordinated intergovernmental response (Nigg and Eisner 1997; Sternberg and Tierney 1998). As the transition to recovery occurs, the organizations operating within the ICS/NIMS structure can be modified and staffing can transition away from emergency responders to those agencies and departments with key recovery responsibilities, such as city planning and redevelopment agencies, and provide inter-governmental organizational guidance for recovery management, with state and federal agencies involved in recovery. Following its 1997 flood, the City of Grand Forks adapted the ICS structure for its recovery management organization and facilitated weekly recovery planning sessions with multiple city agencies as well as state and federal agencies for successful implementation of the city’s six month recovery plan (City of Grand Forks 1997b; 2006); this may be the first-ever application of ICS in recovery. But, critics warn that management models like SEMS/ICS are particularly ill-suited to the distinctive challenges disasters present, which call for flexibility, improvisation, collaborative decision-making, and organizational adaptability (Tierney 2007:409). Drabek calls for more research on the implementation of ICS/NIMS both within and among local, state, and national agencies (Drabek 2007). Tierney also cites the need for more research on organizational response in disaster situations, in part because of the new post-disaster management strategies and technologies that are being employed, such as NIMS and the National Response Framework (Tierney 2007).
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This study also reviewed research for its consideration of seven strategic management practices that were identified and developed, in large part, from a combination of professional experience and research into local recovery after several major disasters. Their validity was evaluated in a series of interviews with the managers of the cities of Watsonville and Oakland on the lessons of local recovery management 10 years after the Loma Prieta Earthquake (Johnson 1999) and again in considering New Orleans recovery planning processes (Johnson 2007). The seven management practices are: Preparation of post-disaster damage and economic assessments; Multi-tier governmental coordination; Planning for post-disaster recovery management; Use of flexible and creative financing; Use of outside technical assistance; Use of disaster management information systems; and Recovery communications and public participation. These practices are generally consistent with the factors that Haas et al (1977) recommended to increase the speed of reconstruction; the 12 tasks defined by Spangle Associates (1994) to help local governments prepare for long-term recovery and rebuilding after earthquakes; the five categories of tasks in the State of California’s earthquake recovery manual (OES 1993); the five groups of recovery management activities undertaken by the City of Los Angeles following the Northridge earthquake (Spangle Associates 1997); the 10-step process for holistic disaster recovery proposed by the Natural Hazards Center (2005); the factors that facilitated post-earthquake recovery in Los Angeles and Kobe (Olshansky et al. 2006); and, the mix of institutional strategies that Smith and Wenger (2007) suggest to promote sustainable community recovery. Post-disaster damage and economic assessments, initiated soon after a disaster, should work to quantify the losses (i.e., physical property damage well as the indirect consequences and ripple effects), the resources available for recovery and the potential unmet needs (Alesch et al. 2009). Following this initial assessment, local governments should also continue to identify, catalog, analyze and address the additional social, economic and political consequences that unfold over time, in response to the initial impacts and consequences; these consequences can dramatically complicate, and be the biggest obstacles to, community recovery (Alesch et al. 2009). Multi-tier governmental coordination can help reduce common recovery obstacles associated with reimbursements, application review and regulatory compliance (Alesch et al. 2009; FEMA 2011). Both inter-governmental and intra-goverrnmental collaborations are credited with improving interactions among various government entities while also improving links to outside groups, information sharing, constructive dialogue, and decisions informed by the knowledge of differing stakeholders (Innes and Booher 2002:16). Planning for post-disaster recovery management helps establish critical priorities and objectives, traceable milestones, essential leadership, and community commitment for recovery (Schwab 1998; Olshansky et al. 2006). Observing the complexities of recovery in New Orleans, Olshansky and Johnson (2010) and others have emphasized that
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Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework recovery after large disasters involves multiple plans by multiple actors. Alesch et al. (2009) describe effective post-disaster plans as balancing different directions at various junctures, depending on how things are going. Flexible and creative financing helps address the idiosyncrasies of the local sociopolitical environment and recovery needs (Olshansky et al. 2006). Alesch et al. (2009) recommend that local governments develop financing strategies that address both the short- and long-term revenue gaps that come from post-disaster declines in tax base due to business closures, and can serve as a guide (and potentially the justification) for using federal and state recovery funding sources. Local governments should aim to leverage federal and other outside resources with local resources for long-term investment in the city’s operations and economic sustainability (City of Grand Forks 2006). Outside technical assistance (with disaster experience) should be used to augment local staff, especially when staff is unfamiliar with disasters and disaster regulatory compliance (Alesch et al. 2009). Local governments typically augment their post-disaster staffing capacity to help with evaluating and assessing the disaster consequences, in devising and evaluating recovery strategies and programs, managing programs that involve several agencies, and coordinating with granting agencies (Johnson 1999; Schwab 1998; Sternberg and Tierney 1998). Some communities have hired consultants to provide recovery expertise; others have turned to academics and volunteers, especially in post-disaster recovery planning and community design. Disaster management information systems, particularly databases, interdepartmental networking, and geographic information systems (GIS), should be integral to local recovery planning and decision-making. Newell (2004) proposes that the greatest increases in local government management output in recent years have generally resulted from investments in, and the adoption and use of, information systems and technology and other state-of-the-art technologies; he credits information systems with significantly advancing management decision-making and the effective delivery of services (Newell 2004:164). He specifically identifies the contributions of GIS, integrated computer software, data warehousing, automated budgeting systems, and citizen relationship management programs—that aggregate and disseminate information to residents on behalf of the city (Newell 2004:164). All of these are critical resources for local recovery planning, management, and decision-making. Recovery communications and public participation with residents, community interest groups, and governmental and non-governmental organizations should also be part of the local recovery management efforts. Many recovery researchers speak of the importance of community participation, even though it necessarily complicates decision- making processes and the number of actors involved increases the possibility of unexpected outcomes (Johnson 1999; Olshansky 2005; Rubin 1985).
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Comparative Analysis of Three Case Study Cities
The three communities all faced major disasters, involving all aspects of the urban setting, and resulting in recovery processes that were complex and required significant local government management involvement. Table 2 provides some of the key statistics for the disasters as well as the city population, governance structure, and economy at the time of the respective disaster. Of the three, Los Angeles was a substantially larger jurisdiction and the impacts were proportionally lower than both Grand Forks and New Orleans. These differences in disaster magnitude and organizational capacity are critical to understanding the organizational challenges and recovery rates and progress over time in each city.
Table 2. Case Study Cities and Disaster Impacts
Los Angeles, CA Grand Forks, ND New Orleans, LA
Mw6.7 Northridge Red River Flood, levee Hurricane Katrina Disaster Earthquake, overtopping on April 19, (Category 3) landfall on January 17, 1994 1997 August 29, 2005 • 57 deaths; 11,800 • No deaths or major • >1,800 deaths injuries injuries • 90% of New Orleans’ • 22,000 people • Nearly 75% of city’s residents initially homeless land area submerged displaced >200,000 • $40 billion in total and 90% of residents residents displaced damage and displaced for several long-term Disaster economic losses weeks • >100,000 households Impacts (1995) • $1 to 2 billion in total (50% of city total) with damage and >1.3 meters of economic losses floodwater (1997) • >$175 billion in total damage and economic losses (2005) • 3.5 million residents • 52,500 residents • 455,000 residents • 1,256 sq. km area • 52 sq. km area • 173 sq. km area rd City • Dominant city in • 3 largest city in • Largest city in Statistics Southern California North Dakota, with Louisiana, with (at the time (18 million people) University of North tourism, major port, of the • 35,000 city Dakota and major Air universities, and disaster) employees Force Base hospitals • 500 city employees • ~6,000 city employees
The three cities structured their recovery management differently but each case provides examples of how leadership, vision, plans and funding influenced the recovery process. Table 3 summarizes the major policymaking bodies; management structures; key departments and programs; and recovery vision, planning and policies of each city.
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Table 3. Comparison of Recovery Vision, Management Structure, Policies and Plans in Case Study Cities (in the First Three Years of Recovery)
Management Los Angeles, CA Grand Forks, ND New Orleans, LA Practices • Mayor • Mayor and Business • Mayor and • City Council Ad-hoc Recovery Task Force Commission of committee (Jan (May 1997) citizens/experts (Bring Major 1994). • City Council Ad-hoc New Orleans Back— Policymaking committee (May 1997) BNOB) (Oct 2005; Bodies (start ended Jan 2006) date) • City Council Ad-hoc committee (Sept 2005) • Louisiana Recovery Authority (Oct 2005) • Limited oversight by • Mayor appointed three • CAO leads Public CAO and Mayor’s department directors Assistance claims office as “Tri-chairs” for • Office of Recovery Management • Departments recovery (May 1997) and Development Structure managed key • ICS management Administration (start date) programs working structure with weekly (formed Dec 2006) independently action planning leads CDBG claims • 2 efforts not well- linked initially • Public Works (Jan • Public Works (April • CAO (Sept 2005) 1997) 1997) • General Services Key • Building and Safety • Urban Development (Sept 2005) Departments (Jan 1997) (April 1997) • Public Works (Sept and • Housing (June • Finance (April 1997) 2005) Programs 1997) • Office of Recovery (start date) • Redevelopment and Development Agency (Nov 1997) Administration— ORDA (January 2006) • Draft plan before • Had initiated flood • Recovery vision earthquake. protections studies and constructed over time Specified recovery downtown revitalization by city and state division of planning before flood • BNOB plan (draft Jan Emergency • Multi-level government, 2006) Operations recovery vision of flood • Lambert plan ( (draft Organization was protection developed Oct 2007) Recovery not activated soon after flood Unified New Orleans Vision, • • Limited vision of Short-term disaster Plan and ORDA Planning, • recovery recovery plan adopted Target Area Policies constructed in 1st (July 1997) Development Plan (adoption/ year; Housing repair Levee protection (adopted June 2007) establishment • program (June options (July 1997); date) 1994); City adopted (Feb Redevelopment 1998) projects (Nov 1997) • Downtown plan (Oct • Revised citywide 1997) recovery plan • Long-term recovery (adopted Jan 1995 plan visioning session conducted (May 1998) 255
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Los Angeles had a draft recovery and reconstruction plan prepared just prior to the 1994 Northridge earthquake (City of Los Angeles 1994); it was the only case study city with a pre-disaster recovery plan. This plan provided specific directions for several key city departments, which were followed after the earthquake (Spangle Associates 1997). The Mayor’s office, an ad hoc committee of the City Council, and the Chief Administrator’s Office (CAO), had significant management roles in the recovery (City of Los Angeles 1995). Grand Forks also established an ad hoc committee of the City Council and the Mayor appointed three department heads as the Tri-chairs for Recovery to co-manage the recovery; and also formally incorporated community and business leaders into the process (City of Grand Forks 1997a). The City developed a recovery action plan and also facilitated weekly action planning meetings with the Tri-chairs, the Mayor, other City staff, and federal and State agency representatives (City of Grand Forks 1997a; 1997b). New Orleans’ CAO was a key recovery manager early on (City of New Orleans 2006). The Mayor initially appointed a commission comprised of citizens and experts— the Bring New Orleans Back (BNOB) Commission—that produced a comprehensive rebuilding plan within months (Nagin and BNOB 2006). But, it was heavily criticized by the media and the public; both the Commission and the plan failed (Olshansky and Johnson 2010). The City Council appointed an ad hoc committee to review recovery- related matters on behalf of the full City Council, which continued for years into recovery (UNOP 2007). The City Council also funded a neighborhood planning process and the City’s third planning effort—the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP) process (which started 1 year after the hurricane)—incorporated information from the previous two planning efforts (UNOP 2007). In December 2006, the Mayor formed the Office of Recovery Management Office, later named the Office of Recovery and Development Administration (ORDA), to lead the City’s recovery efforts (Olshansky and Johnson 2010). ORDA developed the New Orleans Strategic Recovery and Redevelopment Plan in March 2007 that was based upon UNOP and prioritized recovery projects in seventeen target areas around the City, and was also adopted simultaneously with UNOP in June 2007 (City of New Orleans 2007; LRA 2007). For the next two years, ORDA worked with the State to secure CDBG funding for the plan and the CAO’s office led the City’s Public Assistance funding efforts with additional help from the departments of General Services and Public Works; this office closed and staff was absorbed into other departments in the summer of 2009 (Olshansky and Johnson 2010). Table 4 summarizes the recovery funds managed by each city. Both Los Angeles and Grand Forks received substantial commitments of federal recovery dollars directed to the local government entity to manage, within the first two months after the disaster. Both also received sizeable advances on those funds as well as waivers and other exceptions or modifications to the regulations.
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Table 4. Comparison of Recovery Funds Managed by Case Study Cities in the First Three Years of Recovery
Los Angeles, CA Grand Forks, ND New Orleans, LA • Region-wide estimate • Region-wide • Total estimate of $150 of $15 to $30 billion estimate of $1 to $2 billion. Federal funding Recovery (Jan 1994); Likely total billion (June 1997) of >$116 billion. State Financing >$40 billion (1995) City estimated need estimate of $100 billion Needs and • City gap estimate $500 of $500 million (June (June 2007) Gaps • million-$1.2 billion (Dec 1997) • City estimated gap of 1994) $14 billion (Jan 2007) • City directly-managed ~ • City directly- • City expects to manage $1.5 billion of recovery managed ~ $320 ~ $2 billion • FEMA PA - $760million million • FEMA PA—$1.1 billion ($75million advance, • FEMA PA and obligated (Nov 2008) Jan 28, 1994) HMGP - $59.5million • HUD CDBG/LRA - • HUD CDBG - (HMGP approved $411million ($117million $361million ($99million June 24, 1997) obligated June 2007; (Feb 1994); $22million HUD CDBG - $294million obligated Recovery • (May 1994); $171.6million Dec 2007; <$10 million Financing $200million (Aug 1994); ($50million on June received as of Nov Sources $40million (April 1996)) 12, 1997; total 2008) (Amounts EDA - $56million funding on Aug 7, FEMA community and Timing) • • • Other state, insurance, 1997) disaster loans bonds, misc. • EDA - $10.2million $240million ($120 • Other state, million Nov 2005) insurance, bonds, • Federal Gulf Opportunity reserves Zone Act* tax-free loans - $52.3million • Other state, insurance, loans, misc. • First Congressional • First Congressional • Five Congressional appropriation (Feb 12, appropriation (June appropriations (Sept 2 1994) 12, 1997) and 8, 2005; Dec 30, • FEMA PA advance and • Both FEMA (HMGP) 2005; June 15, 2006; only $30 million unpaid; and HUD gave City Dec 2007) finished all PA advances (June • Substantial delays in Comments reimbursements in two 1997) FEMA PA and HUD years • Congressional CDBG obligations to the • HUD authorized authorization for state, and then to the important waivers and $203 million levee City expedited funds protection system • Most of the funds are • City used CDBG funds (Dec 1998) reimbursement-based for mitigation; no and City needs funds to HMGP funds start work PA: FEMA Public Assistance, CDBG: HUD Community Development Block Grants, EDA: Economic Development Administration, HMGP: FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant Program *Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-135) (Internal Revenue Service 2014)
All three cities used Public Assistance (PA) and private insurance to repair or reconstruct city-owned public facilities and infrastructure. Los Angeles received a $75 million advance of PA funds two weeks after the earthquake, and received a total of $760 million in PA funding, completing most of its PA repairs within two years after the 257
Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework earthquake (City of Los Angeles 1995; Petak and Elahi 2001). Grand Forks expedited emergency repairs to get all systems and services operational but then took longer to replace and upgrade systems; managing about $60 million in PA and Hazard Mitigation Grant Funds (North Dakota Department of Emergency Services 2007; President’s Long- term Recovery Task Force 1997a). Both Grand Forks and Los Angeles were direct recipients (from the federal government) of post-disaster CDBG and Economic Development Administration (EDA) funds and used those funds for housing and business recovery (City of Los Angeles 1995; City of Grand Forks 1997b). Both cities structured the use of those funds in ways that influenced recovery decisions to meet their recovery vision. For example, Los Angeles created a loan program for multi-family housing repairs that provided bonuses for early completion and inclusion of units for lower income households (Comerio 1998). Grand Forks used some of its CDBG funds to start repairs of public facilities, buyouts of flood- prone damaged housing, and construction of new housing (City of Grand Forks 1997b; Natural Hazards Center 1999). Grand Forks also provided grants and loans to small businesses that rewarded them for maintaining their locations downtown, even during construction (City of Grand Forks 1997b). As of October 2008 (over three years after the disaster), New Orleans had $1.1 billion in obligated funds designated for recovery, but had only spent $78 million (City of New Orleans 2008). The City was fiscally challenged to manage its operating expenses while also raising the necessary capital to initiate repairs and reconstruction so that it could draw down these reimbursement-based funds (City of New Orleans 2008). New Orleans had been obligated $411 million in CDBG post-disaster funds from the State of Louisiana (LRA 2008), but it was not a direct recipient from the federal government like Grand Forks and Los Angeles. The State of Louisiana has many examples of funds being used to influence recovery decisions in the private sector, particularly with the state’s “Road Home” housing repair program (GAO 2007; LRA 2008). In all three cases, there were major differences and inconsistencies in how relatively similar federal recovery policies and regulations were applied. These differences were further complicated by varying state and local systems. This is most evident in New Orleans, where federal and state funding commitments were much slower and allowed the city much less flexibility. Significant waivers were provided to both the cities of Los Angeles and Grand Forks in accelerating and easing the use of their FEMA PA and HMGP, and HUD CDBG funds (City of Los Angeles 1995; Natural Hazards Center 1999; Olshansky et al. 2006). Table 5 provides a summary comparison of each city’s use of seven management practices qualitatively describing whether the application of each practice was “strong”, “moderate” or “minimal”. In all three cities, some forms of early post-disaster damage assessments were conducted. There are strong correlations between the cities’ damage and economic assessment, planning for post-disaster recovery management, and the use
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Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework of disaster management information systems. In other words, the cities that had good damage and economic assessments also showed good information management and planning practices. The information management systems were initially used to collect and analyze damage and loss data and were modified, with time, to develop plans and programs, track recovery funds and progress, and store information on buildings and infrastructure for future planning. Each of the three cities came to understand its post-disaster economic resources and gaps at varying times in recovery. Over the summer of 1997 (four months after the flood), Grand Forks developed a comprehensive financing matrix identifying all the sources of funding and how they would be applied to different programs (City of Grand Forks 1997a). Starting at about six months after the earthquake, Los Angeles worked with consultants to conduct a comprehensive assessment of both the public and private sectors’ recovery resources and needs; it was published in December 1994, almost one year after the earthquake (City of Los Angeles 1995). It provided an integrated view of the status of City-led recovery, identified needs, available resources, and funding shortfalls. In New Orleans, a comprehensive assessment was performed in January 2007 as part of the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP) preparation process, estimating the public and private resources that had already been paid or obligated for response and recovery in Orleans Parish (contiguous with City of New Orleans) as well as the gap (UNOP 2007). In addition to financing and economics, the UNOP assessment looked at recovery progress across a range of sectors and developed a citywide GIS database and atlas of maps displaying the assessment results, which were shared with the public on the UNOP website. The assessment covered population, flood protection, funding, housing, infrastructure, transportation, public facilities, education, economic development, public safety, healthcare, historic preservation, and culture.
Table 5. Summary Comparison of the Use of Strategic Management Practices in Case Study Cities (in the First Three Years of Recovery)
Los Grand New Orleans Angeles Forks Post-disaster damage and economic Moderate Moderate Moderate assessments Multi-level governmental coordination Strong Strong Minimal Planning for post-disaster recovery Moderate Moderate Moderate management Access to and use of flexible and creative Strong Strong Minimal financing Use of outside technical assistance (with Minimal Strong Moderate disaster experience) Use of disaster management information Strong Moderate Moderate systems Recovery communications and public Minimal Moderate Moderate participation
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All three cities undertook recovery planning. Los Angeles benefited from having a citywide pre-event recovery plan; it developed other plans in the first year after the earthquake (City of Los Angeles 1994; City of Los Angeles 1995). Los Angeles’ pre- disaster response and recovery planning has been credited as a major factor in the City’s positive inter-organizational and multi-governmental relationships, as well as its overall ability to manage the post-Northridge recovery, familiarizing key city departments with their likely roles and responsibilities, information needs, and funding sources and procedures for obtaining them (Olshansky et al. 2006; Spangle Associates 1997; Tierney 1995). Grand Forks undertook a short-term recovery planning process in the first months after the flood. It also conducted weekly action planning sessions modeled after daily situation planning sessions generally performed by emergency responders using the ICS management approach (City of Grand Forks 1997a). Federal and state representatives attended the weekly planning sessions and many program restrictions/issues were often resolved there. New Orleans had a protracted planning process that lasted nearly two years (Olshansky and Johnson 2010). There are also strong correlations between multi-level governmental coordination and each city’s access to and use of creative and flexible financing. This was most evident in Grand Forks. On the third day of the flood, then-President Clinton created a cabinet-level, Federal Long-term Recovery Task Force, whose framework for action was released on May 19 (one month after flood) and had three recovery priorities: 1) Mitigation of flood hazards, 2) Housing, and 3) Reestablishing community sustainability (President’s Long- term Recovery Task Force 1997b). The framework also outlined principal federal programs and resources available for recovery and state-by-state contacts for every federal agency, provided a series of specific directives to several federal agencies, and asked all affected communities to focus on mitigation in rebuilding. Grand Forks also had strong pre-existing relationships with its U.S. Congressional delegation; they worked quickly after the flood to get a supplemental budget appropriation approved within two months (Glassheim 2002) that included a HUD CDBG block grant of $171.6 million provided directly to the City of Grand Forks (Natural Hazards Center 1999). Also, HUD, SBA, and EDA opened a joint “federal recovery office” in May 1997 in the City office, and North Dakota’s Governor also appointed a State flood recovery coordinator to work directly between the City and State in recovery decision-making and program implementation (City of Grand Forks 2006). In Los Angeles, multi-level governmental coordination was strong amongst like agencies, such as HUD and the City’s Housing Department, and the State Office of Emergency Services, FEMA, and the City’s Public Works division responsible for FEMA Public Assistance claims; some also benefited from good, pre-existing relationships (Comerio 1998; Tierney 1995). The City may have benefited from swift federal and state funding and multi-level coordination with key departments to develop
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Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework and execute key recovery programs, such as the multi-family housing repair program (Comerio 1998; Inam 2005; Olshansky et al. 2006). In New Orleans, the State of Louisiana, particularly the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA), had in a major coordination role as well as funding policy role with the federal government (Olshansky and Johnson 2010). The City of New Orleans interfaced with FEMA and the Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOHSEP) on Public Assistance claims, initially but then worked with the LRA and state Office of Community Development (OCD) access to HUD CDBG funds; LRA also began advising on the use of PA funds in 2008 (LRA 2008) . Furthermore, the state-federal relationship did not appear to be as collaborative as compared with Los Angeles and Grand Forks. State officials repeatedly testified before Congress to seek additional funding and Congressional action, as well as to direct federal agencies to provide waivers and other flexibilities offered to other states and cities in previous disasters (Fraiche 2007; Kopplin 2007; Rainwater 2009). All three cities employed, to varying degrees, the remaining strategic practices: use of outside technical assistance, use of disaster information management systems, and recovery communications and citizen participation. In Grand Forks, a HUD-funded, multi-disciplinary team of consultants worked with the City for the first six months of its recovery, helping to plan and manage a multi-pronged recovery strategy with programs to buyout flood-damaged properties, construct new housing, promote downtown redevelopment and business recovery, repair damaged infrastructure, and develop an enhanced flood protection system (FEMA 2007; HUD Technical Assistance Team 1997). The damage assessment and planning efforts in the cities also relied on disaster information management systems, recovery communications, and citizen participation. The UNOP planning effort in New Orleans involved three “community congresses” and four rounds of 14 district-level meetings, as well as countless neighborhood and grassroots meetings, a website, phone information center, and many other communications approaches (UNOP 2007; Olshansky and Johnson 2010). Table 6 compares the recovery outcomes of the three case study cities utilizing the 36 restoration and resilience indicators developed as part of this research. For purposes of ranking, a simple system was used to qualitatively describe whether evidence of the indicator was “strong”, “moderate” or “minimal”. The ratings were determined based upon published literature on recovery progress in each city. At the time this research was completed in early 2009, three and one-half years had elapsed since Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans and the Gulf Coast. Thus, for comparative purposes, the ratings are provided at roughly the three-year point in each city’s recovery timeline. All three case studies and the recovery outcome rankings were peer reviewed by local officials or researchers with firsthand knowledge of the recovery process and outcomes.
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Table 6. Comparison of Restoration and Resilience Indicators for Case Study Cities During the First Three Years of Recovery
Los Grand New Angeles, Forks, ND Orleans, LA CA Physical Restoration Indicators (Overall Strong Moderate Minimal ranking) • Rebuilt damaged residential units Strong Moderate Minimal • Rebuilt damaged commercial/industrial Moderate Strong Minimal properties • Restored utilities and rebuilt infrastructure Strong Strong Moderate • Rebuilt public facilities Moderate Moderate Minimal • Removed visual evidence of disaster Strong Moderate Minimal Physical Resilience Indicators (Overall Strong Strong Moderate ranking) • Implemented mitigation for residential units Strong Strong Moderate Implemented mitigation for • Strong Strong Minimal commercial/industrial units Implemented mitigation for public facilities and • Strong Strong Strong infrastructure • Implemented environmental Moderate Moderate Minimal recovery/improvements Social Restoration Indicators (Overall Strong Moderate Minimal ranking) • Retained population/residents Strong Strong Minimal Resumed schools and educational • Strong Strong Minimal opportunities • Satisfied basic human needs and daily life Moderate Moderate Moderate Maintained/restored mental and physical • Strong Minimal Minimal health Social Resilience Indicators (Overall Strong Moderate Moderate ranking) • Provided affordable and ample residential housing supply Strong Minimal Minimal • Improved neighborhood conditions Strong Minimal Minimal • Increased social and geographic equity Moderate Moderate Moderate Increased social networks resilience and self- • Moderate Strong Moderate reliance Economic Restoration Indicators (Overall Strong Strong Moderate ranking) • Resumed/retained jobs Moderate Moderate Minimal • Resumed/retained business Moderate Strong Moderate • Restored cultural/historical/recreation/tourist Moderate Strong Moderate amenities Economic Resilience Indicators (Overall Moderate Moderate Minimal ranking) Increased supply of affordable • Moderate Moderate Moderate commercial/industrial space • Increased economic diversity and Moderate Moderate Minimal business/market/job growth • Improved wealth recovery/sustainability Moderate Moderate Minimal
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Table 6. Comparison of Restoration and Resilience Indicators for Case Study Cities During the First Three Years of Recovery (Continued)
Institutional Restoration Indicators (30 max) Strong Strong Minimal Completed timely recovery action and • Moderate Strong Minimal reconstruction Provided leadership, innovation, creativity and • Moderate Strong Minimal vision • Used high-quality information with agreed meanings in decision-making Strong Strong Moderate Achieved robust stakeholder representation • Moderate Minimal Strong and decision agreement Provided ample resources that can be • Strong Strong Minimal leveraged to meet needs • Achieved intergovernmental collaboration and institutional equity Strong Strong Minimal Institutional Resilience Indicators (Overall Strong Strong Minimal ranking) • Established institutionalized routines, Moderate Moderate Minimal redundancy, sustainable capacity Established institutionalized, strengthened • Moderate Minimal Moderate and sustainable planning • Improved fiscal recovery/sustainability Strong Strong Minimal • Improved political recovery/ sustainability Strong Moderate Moderate • Achieved resident and business satisfaction Moderate Moderate Minimal with institutions/outcomes Achieved positive external • Strong Strong Minimal reputation/perception Established post-disaster risk management/ • Strong Strong Moderate preparedness commitment
The ratings show relatively strong progress across all restoration indicators in both Los Angeles and Grand Forks at the three-year point in their recovery. Both cities also achieved a number of mitigation improvements as shown by their strong physical resilience indicator rankings (Natural Hazards Center 1999; Olshansky et al. 2006; Wu and Lindell 2004). These betterments included hazard mitigation, better housing stock, and neighborhood and commercial revitalization. Both Los Angeles and Grand Forks also had strong institutional ratings. In their first six months of recovery, Los Angeles and Grand Forks developed and articulated a collective vision of their desired outcomes and shared these with state and federal agencies who aligned funding resources to help achieve the cities’ goals. Of the three cities, Los Angeles was the fastest to complete recovery, with the majority of housing rebuilt within two years, and major redevelopment projects completed within eight years (Olshansky et al. 2006). Basic utilities and city services were restored quickly—most within the first weeks of the disaster; in particular, the early speedy progress with utility and service restoration is likely attributed to the relatively moderate damage pattern citywide compared with the other two cities. Los Angeles was also the only city that had begun to develop a recovery management structure, plans, policies before the disaster, and may have benefited from swift federal and state funding and a shared multi-level vision and coordination of key recovery programs.
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Grand Forks also moved quickly with housing construction, constructing new subdivisions for “buyout program” participants to relocate to within two years after the flood; downtown redevelopment took over four years; and, completion of the levee flood protection project and accompanying public greenway took over 10 years (City of Grand Forks 2006). Restoration of its basic utilities and city services took slightly longer than Los Angeles, but was still accomplished within the first months of the disaster (City of Grand Forks 1997b). Grand Forks had been working on a major levee construction plan prior to the flood and so, it like Los Angeles, had at least some principles to guide its recovery management once the disaster occurred. Similar to Los Angeles, Grand Forks also obtained a major commitment of outside resources—particularly federal funding within the first two months following the disaster. It also benefited from significant multi-level coordination and technical assistance, from FEMA and HUD. But, the swift recovery leadership and action by the City had negative repercussions as many residents did not feel that they had appropriate input into the process (Kweit and Kweit 2007). In the first three years following Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans significantly lagged in its recovery compared with the other two cities. Restoration of basic utilities and city services took several months to accomplish; some neighborhoods did not have electricity restored for more than one year after the disaster (UNOP 2007). New Orleans’ rankings in all categories are also considerably lower than the other two cities. A simple explanation might be that the level of damage and losses were much greater in New Orleans; however, Grand Forks’ flooding inundated nearly all the city and a protracted evacuation delayed their recovery initiation as well. Arguably, the lower rankings may have resulted from the pre-existing lack of trust in the competence of local and state institutions, considerable delays in appropriating, allocating, and dispensing federal recovery resources; and a lengthy planning process that took nearly two years for the city to develop a recovery vision and management structure (Kates et al. 2006; Olshansky et al. 2008). Since Katrina, the state of Louisiana, in particular, has created visible and credible institutions, plans, and management processes (Fraiche 2007; Kopplin 2007). However, the desired recovery outcomes for New Orleans and the region have not been as clear or as commonly shared across all levels of government involved in the recovery, as Los Angeles and Grand Forks (Olshansky and Johnson 2010).
Findings and Recommendations
This research aspired to advance the understanding of disaster recovery and how recovery can be more effectively managed and measured, viewing local governments as both the client and catalyst for recovery. The study hypothesized at the start that a management framework for local disaster recovery could be developed, helping to standardize and improve the effectiveness of local governments in disaster recovery
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Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework management. The detailed literature review and case study analyses supported both the proposed management framework and strategic management practices. This study finds that the ICS/NIMS management structure can be extended into recovery to create a multi-level unified recovery organization, while also allowing for decentralized operations under a “unified vision”, and helping to ensure organizational accountability and effectiveness. Such a structure could be beneficial in operationalizing many of the concepts, including the recovery coordinator positions and recovery support functions, identified in the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF—FEMA 2011). It would also have an important external value in recovery—providing a single organization for recovery decision-makers and action-takers to look to for vision, plans, leadership, and money—all important recovery influencers. It is important to note that this proposed structure is primarily focused on improving local government organizational management and administration. There are many recovery decisions that will require legislative policy deliberations and actions by locally- elected governing body members directly accountable to voters. Legislative policy decisions involve formal public hearings and community level input. The challenge for this and any other local recovery management structure is to maintain momentum on the large bulk of recovery actions that are not policy-driven, while simultaneously allowing time for inevitable delays and complexities involved with legislative processes such as policy hearings. Figure 1 suggests how the proposed seven strategic management practices could fit into an ICS-based recovery management structure, and the following sections provide additional details on the potential implementation. This management model and strategic management practices could serve as an organizing structure for local recovery management as well as a recovery exercise framework; there are few examples of recovery exercises that are local government focused. In this model, the ICS Command element is modified to Management and includes three proposed management practices: • Creating a recovery management organization based upon the ICS model and consistent with the NDRF recommendations for designated recovery coordinators and implementation of key recovery support functions. • Multi-tier governmental coordination to help reduce common recovery obstacles associated with funding, reimbursements, application review and regulatory compliance, and also to bring additional expertise from state and federal agencies to enhance local capacity and effectiveness in recovery. • Recovery communications and public participation to reach residents, community interest groups, and governmental and non-governmental organizations throughout recovery. The Management section would be supported by the Planning section to include Planning for post-disaster recovery management to establish critical priorities and
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Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework objectives, traceable milestones, essential leadership, and community commitment for recovery. It is recommended that recovery plans address both the desired physical outcomes of a city’s recovery as well as the management structure, policies and procedures that a city wants to put in place.
Figure 1. Proposed Local Recovery Management Framework (based upon ICS) with Strategic Management Practices
tor) tor)
ManagementManagement RecoveryRecovery organization organization
CommunicationsCommunications and and MultiMulti--governmentalgovernmental CitizenCitizen Participation Participation coordinationcoordination
Planning Finance/Finance/ OperationsOperations Planning LogisticsLogistics AdministrationAdministration
Public Facilities and Recovery Vision Information Post-disaster loss Infrastructure and Overall Plan Management and needs assessment
Housing and Recovery action Comprehensive Technical Assistance Social Recovery planning financing plan
Business and Economic Recovery
Other Physical and Institutional Recovery Implementation Resources (Federal, State, Local, and Private Sec Implementation Resources (Federal, State, Local, and Private Sec
The Finance and Administration section is proposed to contain two practices: • Post-disaster damage and economic assessments initiated soon after a disaster to quantify the damage, as well as the resources available for recovery and potential unmet needs. Placing the important work of post-disaster damage and economic assessments within the Finance and Administration section could help integrate this work into a more comprehensive understanding of the losses and the needs posed by the disaster. • Development of a citywide recovery financing plan, considering sources of recovery funds and gaps in funding for the city, and working to obtain access to and use of a
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full range of financing opportunities to help address the physical, socioeconomic, and institutional recovery needs. The Operations section will be structured once the local government is clear about the programs it will be undertaking and directly managing in recovery. They are likely to include repair of damaged city-owned property, recovery of other infrastructure, hazard mitigation, housing recovery, social recovery, and business and economic recovery. In the ICS model, the Operations section is supported by the Logistics section, which would include two proposed practices: • Use of outside technical assistance as needed (with disaster experience) to augment local staff, especially when staff are unfamiliar with disasters and disaster regulatory compliance. • Use of disaster management information systems, particularly databases, interdepartmental networking, and geographic information systems (GIS) for local recovery planning and decision-making. Although additional study is recommended, the three case studies and 36 recovery indicators derived as part of this research illustrate major differences and inconsistencies in the application of the U.S. recovery policy framework as well as the recovery progress and restoration and resilience outcomes in each city. Availability of resources— particularly funding and institutional capacity—together with damage severity and scale, and pre-existing trends, as well as variations in state and local laws, policies and programs are all also likely to be important influences. The NDRF has made significant strides in emphasizing the primacy of local governments in disaster recovery, as well as acknowledging the various federal agencies and programs and how they should be coordinated, and integrated, to provide a more unified and holistic federal policy on disaster recovery. The 36 recovery indicators developed as part of this research could serve as a diagnostic tool to assess the impacts across all urban elements, identify recovery financing and local government recovery management capabilities, and provide the necessary resources—both financial and labor—to support local efforts. It can also be used by local governments to craft a comprehensive vision of the desired end-state of post-disaster recovery policies, plans, and programs; and then also be used to assess recovery management effectiveness as recovery progresses. Finally, several topics emerged from this research and are recommended for additional study to better understand recovery management and strengthen disaster recovery at the local level. First, as with all disaster research, more systematic and long- term observational study of local recovery management efforts is needed. It should include evaluation, screening, and prioritization of the qualitative recovery indicators developed as part of this study, and collection of more quantitative data to make comparative and measurable indicators of recovery progress and outcomes. Also, more
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Johnson: Local Recovery Management Framework study of organizational recovery management efforts is needed to understand the organizational management structures created for response and recovery and post-disaster implementation of ICS/NIMS both within and among local, state, and national agencies; the scope and tasks associated with each of the management practices proposed as part of this study, as well as the sequencing of each practice and the identification of other key management practices and technologies; and the role of leadership, at all levels of government and in the private sector, in both facilitating and impeding local recovery management and progress. The influences of externalities, such as time compression, the flow of funding into a city’s urban setting, and pre-existing trends also merit systematic study. As well, more educational and training emphasis is needed on local disaster recovery management. Disaster recovery management issues should be emphasized in graduate coursework for public administration, urban planning, municipal finance, municipal engineering, building inspection, and emergency management. Similarly, more professional training and exercises are needed for local governments on disaster recovery management and planning.
Acknowledgements
This research would not have been possible without the financial and intellectual support of many individuals and institutions. They include the faculty and staff of the Research Center for Disaster Reduction Systems at Kyoto University; the National Science Foundation (Grant CMMI-0758310); U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; City of Grand Forks, North Dakota; and the Greater New Orleans Community Support Foundation. There are also many collaborators, mentors, colleagues from Los Angeles, Grand Forks, and New Orleans who must be acknowledged, particularly Ken Vein, Jeff Thomas, Robert Olshansky, and Ken Topping, who provided peer review of the case study analyses of this research.
References
Alesch, Daniel J. 2005. “Complex Urban Systems and Extreme Events: Toward a Theory of Disaster Recovery.” in 1st International Conference on Urban Disaster Reduction. Kobe, Japan. Alesch, Daniel J., Lucy A. Arendt, and James N. Holly. 2009. Managing for Long-Term Community Recovery in the Aftermath of Disaster. Fairfax, VA: Public Entity Risk Institute. Arnold, Christopher. 1993. Reconstruction After Earthquakes: Issues, Urban Design, and Case Studies. San Mateo, CA: Building Systems Development, Inc.
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