LEBANON Shadow Report

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

LEBANON Shadow Report LEBANON Shadow report Report submitted to the Committee against Torture in the context of the initial review of Lebanon Alkarama Foundation 16 March 2017 Alkarama Foundation – 150 route de Ferney, C.P. 2100 CH – 1211 Genève 2 – Switzerland +41 22 734 10 06 – +41 22 734 10 34 – [email protected] – www.alkarama.org Table of contents TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................................ 2 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 3 2. BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................................................... 3 3. THE PRACTICE OF TORTURE ...................................................................................................................... 5 3.1 DEFINITION, ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION AND CRIMINALISATION ................................................................................. 5 3.2 WIDESPREAD AND SYSTEMATIC TORTURE .......................................................................................................... 6 3.2.1 Article 20 inquiry and limited implementation of its recommendations ......................................... 7 3.2.2 Widespread and systematic use of torture ..................................................................................... 7 3.3 VIOLATIONS OF THE LEGAL SAFEGUARDS RELATED TO THE DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY ................................................... 9 3.3.1 Arbitrariness of arrests .................................................................................................................. 10 3.3.2 Violations of the right to legal counsel during investigation and the practice of incommunicado detention ....................................................................................................................................................... 11 3.3.3 Absence of prompt and independent medical assistance ............................................................. 12 3.3.4 Violations of the right to be promptly brought before a judge and the right not to be tried without undue delay ..................................................................................................................................... 13 3.4 EXTRACTION OF CONFESSIONS UNDER TORTURE AND VIOLATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE .................................... 14 3.5 ABUSES COMMITTED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM ........................................................ 15 3.5.1 Arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions and extraction of confessions under torture ........ 15 3.5.2 The exceptional justice system ...................................................................................................... 16 3.5.2.1 The Military Court ......................................................................................................................... 16 3.5.2.1 The Judicial Council........................................................................................................................ 18 3.5.3 Abuses against refugees ................................................................................................................ 19 3.6 EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE AGAINST PROTESTORS ................................................................................................ 21 3.7 ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO PREVENT TORTURE ................................................................................... 23 3.8 A PREVAILING IMPUNITY FOR ACTS OF TORTURE ................................................................................................ 25 4. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................... 26 2 Alkarama Foundation – 150 route de Ferney, C.P. 2100 CH – 1211 Genève 2 – Switzerland +41 22 734 10 06 – +41 22 734 10 34 – [email protected] – www.alkarama.org 1. Introduction Lebanon’s first periodic report (CAT/C/LBN/1)1 was submitted to the Committee against Torture on 9 March 2016, with a delay of over 14 years, and will be reviewed by the Committee at its 60th session. Alkarama regrets that the State party report only contains a compilation of Lebanese laws without providing information on the current practice of torture in Lebanon. Alkarama hereby submits this shadow report in which it evaluates the implementation of the Convention against Torture in Lebanon (hereinafter “the Convention”), highlighting its main concerns and addressing recommendations to the State party. This report is based on Alkarama’s documentation of human rights violations in Lebanon since 2004, as well as, on a review of the State party’s report. Alkarama also wishes to provide the Committee with a detailed follow-up of its recommendations issued in October 2014, following its inquiry under article 20 of the Convention,2 which established the widespread and systematic character of the use of torture in the country. Since then, torture continues to be practiced in Lebanon; suspects are deprived the most fundamental legal safeguards as they are routinely arrested without warrant, detained for extended periods of time without judicial oversight, often incommunicado, and interrogated in order to extract confessions that will be used as a source of evidence in trials. Alkarama notes that such pattern is particularly evident in cases where suspects, even minors, are accused of crimes of terrorism and tried by military courts, before which they are not afforded a fair trial in line with international standards, and often sentenced to heavy penalties. While acknowledging the challenges faced by Lebanon, Alkarama hopes that the Committee’s constructive dialogue with the State party and its recently appointed new government will allow to tackle the issue of torture in the country. 2. Background Part of the Ottoman Empire from the early 16th century, Lebanon came under French mandate after World War I and achieved independence in 1943, when Shia, Sunni, and Maronite leaderships agreed on the National Pact establishing a “confessional democracy”, a system of government whereby political and institutional power is distributed proportionally among religious communities. Since the independence and until the mid-1970s, the country prospered, but the conflicts between the Christian and Muslim communities, the regional instability and the influx of Palestinian refugees, brought Lebanon on the brink of civil war. Beginning in 1975 and lasting for 15 years, the civil war had a heavy toll on the civilian population, with mass politically motivated arrests and detentions, torture and ill- treatments, violations of the rights to fair trials, and executions carried out by the various State and non-State actors. Broadly opposing Palestinian and pro-Palestinian Muslim militias against Lebanon’s Christian militias, the Lebanese civil war was also characterised by the intervention of neighbouring States, Israel and Syria, which both aimed at limiting Palestinian armed factions. As Israel launched a full-scale invasion of southern Lebanon to counter the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1982, Shia militia group Hezbollah was formed against it. While most of Israeli troops withdrew from Beirut by 1985, confrontations between Lebanese military factions and the Israeli army continued in southern Lebanon until 2000, when they withdrew. Syrian armed forces, that had entered Lebanon in 1976, left the country in 2005, following a series of public peaceful demonstrations calling for the Syrian army withdrawal and conveying widespread anger at the assassination of Rafiq Hariri – former Prime Minister of Lebanon – the same year. 1 Committee against Torture, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 19 of the Convention, Initial reports of State parties due in 2001, Lebanon, 14 April 2016, (CAT/C/LBN/1*); hereinafter “State party report”. 2 UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), Report of the UN Committee against Torture: Fifty-first session (28 October–22 November 2013) Fifty-second session (28 April–23 May 2014), A/69/44. 3 Alkarama Foundation – 150 route de Ferney, C.P. 2100 CH – 1211 Genève 2 – Switzerland +41 22 734 10 06 – +41 22 734 10 34 – [email protected] – www.alkarama.org Hopes of stabilisation brought about by the Syrian retreat were short-lived, as Lebanon was hit by another conflict against Israel in the summer of 2006, following Hezbollah’s kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers. After 33 days of fights that left at least 1,287 people, nearly all civilians, dead and 4,054 wounded,3 mostly Lebanese, and damage to civilian infrastructures, the conflict ended with the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces along the southern border. While reconstruction of the country unfolded, waves of arrests and interrogations outside the established legal procedures continued, targeting political activists as well as reporters, human rights activists, peaceful demonstrators and trade unionists. Bad conditions of detention and torture continued, eventually leading to a riot in April 2008 in the Roumieh prison, following an incident of police brutality on an inmate during questioning. In May 2007, clashes erupted at the Palestinian refugee camp Nahr el-Bared between Islamist militants and the military. About 40,000 residents fled before the army gained control
Recommended publications
  • Playing the Long Game U.S
    AP PHOTO/HASSAN AMMAR PHOTO/HASSAN AP Playing the Long Game U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance for Lebanon By Hardin Lang and Alia Awadallah August 2017 WWW.AMERICANPROGRESS.ORG Playing the Long Game U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance for Lebanon By Hardin Lang and Alia Awadallah August 2017 Contents 1 Introduction and summary 4 U.S. security assistance to Lebanon 8 Threat landscape 11 Lebanese counterterrorism actors 15 Lebanon’s counterterrorism capabilities 21 Recommendations 24 Conclusion 25 About the authors and acknowledgments 26 Endnotes Introduction and summary During the last week of August 2017, the Lebanese government completed its largest counterterrorism operation in years, pushing Islamic State (IS) militants from the group’s stronghold along the Lebanese border with Syria. As many as 7,000 soldiers from the Lebanese army and special operations forces took part.1 The offensive underscored Lebanon’s contribution to the global counter-IS coali- tion and the key role that its military and security services have played in blocking the expansion of Sunni militant groups in the region. None of this would be possible without the long-term support of the United States, which has quietly bolstered Lebanon’s counterterrorism capabilities over the course of a decade. The cornerstone of the American effort has been a pro- gram to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) that was launched after Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon in 2005.2 In particular, Lebanon’s special operations community has made impressive strides in confronting the threat posed by Salafi-jihadi terror groups. However, as the August operation also made clear, U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Lebanon's Oligarchy Consolidates Control Over the Security Establishment
    Lebanon’s Oligarchy Consolidates Control over the Security Establishment Joe Macaron March 22, 2017 After an impasse of nearly four years, on March move forward and succeed in thwarting suicide 8 the Lebanese government announced a attacks, forcing radical groups to retreat while sectarian quota deal to fill the security cutting their funding and logistical support. establishment's leadership positions. Amid Hariri had a choice to make—between coping tensions surrounding Hezbollah’s regional with Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria while activities, these appointments come at a critical returning to power, or defying it politically moment for the country’s stability and for the from the sidelines. Ultimately, he decided to future of US military aid to Lebanon. cope, but not without drawbacks. He had to What kept Lebanon immune from the spillover quell resistance from his own camp, most of the Syrian war is not necessarily the notably former Minister Ashraf Rifi, who dissociation policy of its consecutive accused him of being complacent with governments but, most importantly, the crucial Hezbollah. decision three years ago to resume coordination The latest appointments reaffirmed the three- among the country’s rival security and year-long security coordination as well as the intelligence agencies. parameters of last year's deal that selected That turning point came in 2014 when the General Michel Aoun as president and Saad Saudi-backed Lebanese intelligence agencies Hariri as prime minister. Sectarian politics were shifted from lack of cooperation with in full display with a distribution of power Hezbollah, and not disrupting aid to groups among the representatives of the three major fighting the Syrian regime, to the resumption of confessional communities: President Aoun counter-terrorism efforts.
    [Show full text]
  • Lebanon: Freedom on the Net 2017
    FREEDOM ON THE NET 2017 Lebanon 2016 2017 Population: 6 million Partly Partly Internet Freedom Status Internet Penetration 2016 (ITU): 76.1 percent Free Free Social Media/ICT Apps Blocked: No Obstacles to Access (0-25) 13 14 Political/Social Content Blocked: Yes Limits on Content (0-35) 12 12 Bloggers/ICT Users Arrested: Yes Violations of User Rights (0-40) 20 20 TOTAL* (0-100) 45 46 Press Freedom 2017 Status: Partly Free * 0=most free, 100=least free Key Developments: June 2016 – May 2017 ● Residents of Arsal, a northeastern town bordering Syria, have been unable to access mobile internet networks for two years (see Restrictions on Connectivity). ● Lebanese civil society organizations used digital tools to organize boycotts and call for the release of individuals wrongly detained for their social media posts (see Digital Activism). ● Activist Ahmad Amhaz was detained for seven nights in March for ridiculing the president, prime minister, and speaker of parliament in a Facebook post. At least two other Facebook users were detained under harsh defamation laws (see Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities). ● Hackers defaced the website of the Lebanese Medical Association for Sexual Health shortly after the organization launched a pro-LGBTI campaign (see Technical Attacks). 1 www.freedomonthenet.org Introduction FREEDOM LEBANON ON THE NET Obstacles to Access 2017 Introduction Availability and Ease of Access Internet freedom declined in Lebanon due to a permanent shutdown on mobile networks in the Restrictions on Connectivity northeastern border town of Arsal that has deprived its 160,000 residents of affordabl internet access for two years.
    [Show full text]
  • LEBANON EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Lebanon Is a Parliamentary
    LEBANON EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Lebanon is a parliamentary republic, with a constitutionally mandated Maronite Christian president, Sunni Muslim prime minister, and Shia Muslim speaker of the chamber of deputies. Parliamentary elections in 2009 were considered free and fair. Government security forces reported to civilian authorities, although the terrorist group Hizballah and Palestinian security and militia forces were outside the direction of government officials. The main human rights abuses reported during this year included limitations on freedom of movement for some refugees, and poor prison and detention conditions sometimes involving torture. Detainees faced substandard prison conditions, lengthy pretrial detention, and long delays in the court system. Other human rights abuses included killings related to societal violence; reports of disappearances and harassment of Syrian political activists; arbitrary arrest and detention of individuals; violation of citizens’ privacy rights; restrictions on freedoms of speech and press, including intimidation of journalists; official corruption and lack of transparency; societal, legal, and economic discrimination against women; widespread domestic violence; trafficking in persons; systematic discrimination against Palestinian refugees and minority groups; restricted labor rights for and abuse of migrant domestic workers; and child labor. Although the legal structure provided for prosecution and punishment, government officials enjoyed a measure of de facto impunity for human rights violations. Despite the presence of Lebanese and UN security forces, Hizballah retained significant influence over parts of the country, and the government made no tangible progress toward disbanding and disarming armed militia groups, including Hizballah. Palestinian refugee camps continued to act as self-governed entities and maintained security and militia forces not under the direction of government officials.
    [Show full text]
  • Lebanon and the Syrian Conflict
    A PRECARIOUS BALANCING ACT: LEBANON AND THE SYRIAN CONFLICT Middle East Report N°132 – 22 November 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. SYRIA’S SPILLOVER EFFECTS .................................................................................. 1 A. CROSS-BORDER DYNAMICS.......................................................................................................... 1 1. Increased support for the Syrian uprising .................................................................................... 1 2. A rising sectarian dimension and Sunni Islamist awakening ....................................................... 3 3. Contained violence ....................................................................................................................... 5 B. INTER-LEBANESE DYNAMICS ....................................................................................................... 6 III. LEBANON’S ACTORS AND THE SYRIAN CONFLICT .......................................... 8 A. HIZBOLLAH’S PERSPECTIVE ......................................................................................................... 8 1. A strategic partnership with Syria ................................................................................................ 8 2. A position of strength within Lebanon .....................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Countering Violent Extremism  Civilian Counterterrorism Capacity Building Programs  Regional Strategic Initiative Programs to Counter Foreign Terrorist Fighters
    Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 July 2017 ________________________________ United States Department of State Publication Bureau of Counterterrorism Released July 2017 Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act. COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2016 Table of Contents Chapter 1. Strategic Assessment Chapter 2. Country Reports Africa Overview Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Chad Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Senegal Somalia South Africa Tanzania Uganda East Asia and the Pacific Overview Australia China (Hong Kong and Macau) Indonesia Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Europe Overview Albania Austria Azerbaijan Belgium Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Cyprus Denmark France Georgia Germany Greece Ireland Italy Kosovo Macedonia The Netherlands Norway Russia Serbia Spain Sweden Turkey United Kingdom Middle East and North Africa Overview Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iraq Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen South and Central Asia Overview Afghanistan Bangladesh India Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Tajikistan
    [Show full text]
  • Lebanon's Oligarchy Consolidates Control Over the Security
    Lebanon’s Oligarchy Consolidates Control over the Security Establishment Joe Macaron March 22, 2017 Lebanon’s Oligarchy Consolidates Control over the Security Establishment Joe Macaron After an impasse of nearly four years, on March establishment since 2015 helped the country 8 the Lebanese government announced a move forward and succeed in thwarting suicide sectarian quota deal to fill the security attacks, forcing radical groups to retreat while establishment's leadership positions. Amid cutting their funding and logistical support. tensions surrounding Hezbollah’s regional Hariri had a choice to make—between coping activities, these appointments come at a critical with Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria while moment for the country’s stability and for the returning to power, or defying it politically future of US military aid to Lebanon. from the sidelines. Ultimately, he decided to What kept Lebanon immune from the spillover cope, but not without drawbacks. He had to of the Syrian war is not necessarily the quell resistance from his own camp, most dissociation policy of its consecutive notably former Minister Ashraf Rifi, who governments but, most importantly, the crucial accused him of being complacent with decision three years ago to resume coordination Hezbollah. among the country’s rival security and The latest appointments reaffirmed the three- intelligence agencies. year-long security coordination as well as the That turning point came in 2014 when the parameters of last year's deal that selected Saudi-backed Lebanese intelligence agencies General Michel Aoun as president and Saad shifted from lack of cooperation with Hariri as prime minister. Sectarian politics were Hezbollah, and not disrupting aid to groups in full display with a distribution of power fighting the Syrian regime, to the resumption of among the representatives of the three major counter-terrorism efforts.
    [Show full text]
  • “It's Not the Right Place For
    H U M A N R I G H T S “It’s Not the Right Place for Us” The Trial of Civilians by Military Courts in Lebanon WATCH “It’s Not the Right Place for Us” The Trial of Civilians by Military Courts in Lebanon Copyright © 2017 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-6231-34396 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: https://www.hrw.org JANUARY 2017 ISBN: 978-1-6231-34396 “It’s Not the Right Place for Us” The Trial of Civilians by Military Courts in Lebanon Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1 Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 5 Methodology .....................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]